PORTRAIT OF PERIKLES.

BRITISH MUSEUM.
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INTRODUCTION

Three ancient biographies of Thucydides have come down to us, but they are of little value. They are derived from ancient commentaries, and the biographical details which they contain, wherever they do not rest upon inference from the text of the history itself, are often confused and contradictory. These are supplemented by scattered statements of several ancient writers—Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who wrote two treatises on Thucydides (De Thucydidis historia iudicium and the Second Letter to Ammaeus), Plutarch (Cimon iv), and Pausanias (i. xxxii.).

The only authentic facts about the life of Thucydides are gathered from casual mention in the History. He was the son of Olorus (iv. civ. 4); commenced the compilation of materials for writing the History at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (i. i. 1); and lived through the whole war, ripe in years and

1 One of these, compiled in three distinct portions "from the commentaries," passed under the name of Marcellinus, who is probably to be identified with the author of Scholia on Hermogenes περὶ στάσεως, who seems to have lived in the fifth century A.D.; another was by an anonymous grammarian; and the third is a short notice in Suidas, s.v. Θαυκώδης.
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judgment, following it with close attention, that he might acquire accurate information (v. xxvi. 5). He suffered from the plague of 429 B.C. (π. xlviii. 3), of which he wrote his famous account (π. xlvii–liv). Elected one of the ten generals in 424 B.C., he was sent to the coast of Thrace (where he enjoyed the right of working certain gold mines) to operate against Brasidas. Failing to relieve Amphipolis, he was exiled in 424 B.C., and remained in banishment for twenty years, and thus was able to become acquainted with affairs on both sides (v. xxvi. 5).

For other facts we are dependent largely upon inference; some are reasonably certain, others less so. The name of his father was identical with that of the Thracian prince Olorus, whose daughter Hegesipyle was married to Miltiades, and his tomb, having the inscription Θουκυδίδης Ὄλορος Ἀλυμούσιος, was in the suburb of Athens known as Κοῖλη Μελητίδες, adjoining those of Cimon and Miltiades (Plut. Cim. iv). We may therefore assume that Olorus, the father of Thucydides, was a near kinsman of the Thracian prince Olorus. If, as Marcellinus says (§ 2), Thucydides' mother was named Hegesipyle, like Cimon's mother, that would be confirmation of the relationship; but Plutarch makes no mention of this. It seems likely, then, that Thucydides was of near kin to Cimon, younger perhaps by one generation. His father Olorus was probably a full citizen of Athens, as is indicated by the fact that, mentioning
himself as στρατηγός (iv. civ. 4), he writes Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρον; for only as an Athenian citizen could his father be mentioned in this official style.

As to the date of Thucydides' birth, the only ancient statement that seems worthy of credence was made by Pamphila, a woman writer who in the time of Nero made a great compilation of the results of learning. Aulus Gellius (N.A. xv. 23) quotes from Pamphila that, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Hellanicus was sixty-five years of age, Herodotus fifty-three, Thucydides forty. Pamphila's dates were probably taken from the chronological handbook of Apollodorus (second century B.C.), which was generally accepted among the Greeks and Romans. The term forty years used by Pamphila doubtless meant the ἀκμή or prime of Thucydides, and may have been fixed on the basis of his own assertion that he began to collect material at the opening of the war (i. i. 1) and was then in full maturity of mind (v. xxvi. 5). At any rate his own statement, taken with Pamphila's date, has led to the general assumption that the historian was born somewhere about 472 B.C.

It is indicated by Marcellinus (§ 46), and is probable in itself, that the decree for Thucydides' banishment was adopted on the motion of Cleon, who was then at the height of his power; and it is probable that the charge brought against him was treachery (προδοσία), as stated by Marcellinus (§ 55)
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and the anonymous biographer (§ 2), and apparently implied by Aristophanes (Vesp. 288). His own words, εὐνέβη μοι φεύγειν, admit of this interpretation; and the statement of Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9) that he was later recalled from exile on the motion of Oenobius¹ is best understood on this basis. If he had been banished by a simple decree of the people, the general amnesty that followed the capture of Athens by Lysander would have been sufficient for him as for other exiles; if the sentence was more severe, a special decree would be necessary. But it is possible, of course, that the motion of Oenobius antedated the amnesty of Lysander’s peace by a few months.

As to Thucydides’ death, there was a persistent tradition that he was assassinated, and the fact that the History breaks off suddenly in the midst of exciting events of the Decelean War seems to support the tradition. Plutarch (Cim. iv. 3) says that it was commonly reported that he died a violent death at Scapte Hyle; Pausanias (i. xxiii. 9), that he was murdered on his journey home from exile; Marcellinus (§ 10), that after his return from exile he died and was buried in Athens. But whether he died in

¹ The name, which is a rare one in the fifth century, is found as that of a general commanding in the neighbourhood of Thasos in 410-9 B.C. and we hear somewhat later of one Eucles, son of Oenobius; hence it has been conjectured that the father of Oenobius was Eucles, who was Thucydides’ colleague in Thrace in 424 B.C. (Lv. civ).
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Thrace or in Athens, it seems clear from his own words that he outlived the term of his banishment (v. xxvi. 5, ἕνεβεν μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔκοσι) and that he returned to Athens, since his description of the wall of Themistocles, whose remains "may still be seen at the Peiraeus" (i. xciii. 5), shows that he was there after the destruction of the walls by Lysander. If he had lived to see the restoration of the walls by Conon in 395 B.C., it seems he would certainly have mentioned it. There is another reason, too, for supposing that he did not live to this year: in iii. cxvi. 2 he says that the eruption of Aetna, which occurred in the spring of 425 B.C., was the third on record; hence the one mentioned by Diodorus (xiv. lix. 3) for 396 B.C. could not have been known to him. It seems reasonable, then, to assume that he was not alive in 396 B.C.

There is a pretty and oft-repeated story¹ that Thucydides, as a boy, heard Herodotus recite a portion of his History at Olympia and was moved thereby to tears, whereupon Herodotus said, "Olorus, your son's spirit is aflame with a passion for learning." But Lucian, when telling of the powerful effect of Herodotus' recitation at Olympia,² would surely have mentioned this circumstance had he known of it; besides, chronology is in the way, it

¹ Suidas s.v. ὄργαν and Θουκυδίδης; Photius, Bibli. 60; Marcellinus, § 54.
² Herod. i.
we hold to Pamphila's testimony. But if he did not as a boy hear Herodotus recite at Olympia, he must have known him later as a man at Athens. The period of his youth and early manhood fell in the time when Athens was most prolific in great men. It is clear that he had heard and admired Pericles, and he must have seen Aeschylus and known Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Gorgias, Antiphon, Pheidias, Polygnotus, Mnesicles, Ictinus, Callirrates, and Hippocrates. Association with such men and the atmosphere of Athens at such a time best explain the development of his genius; but the limits of his subject, as he conceived it, precluded any mention of any of these except Pericles, so that for any personal influence of theirs upon him we are left to inference. The first seven years of the war, before his banishment, were doubtless spent in large part at Athens, where he must have heard the speeches of Pericles, the discussions about Mytilene and about Pylos, as well as about other matters of which we have accounts in this History. But the twenty years of his exile he probably passed largely on his properties in Thrace, engaged in the task of compiling materials for his work about the war, as indeed we are told that he

1 It was his family connection with Thrace which led to his acquiring the right of working gold mines in that region (iv. ev. 1), which is all that he himself says, though his biographers state that he was the owner of gold mines at Scapte Hyle.
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did by Plutarch (*De Exil*. xiv.) and Marcellinus (§§ 25 and 47).

From Thucydides' opening statement, that he began the composition of his History at the outbreak of the war, expecting it to be a great one and more noteworthy than any that had gone before, we should naturally infer that he continued the compilation and composition throughout the war, and in fact—as it is clearly unfinished—until his death. Again, as it was never completed, so it was never completely revised, and it is natural that one can find traces of the different dates at which the several portions were composed. Evidence of this kind has been brought forward in support of different hypotheses as to the composition of the work. The most famous of these was that put forth by F. W. Ullrich in his *Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thucydides*, Hamburg, 1845, in which it is maintained that Books I–V. xxvi, which contain the history of the Archidamian War (432–421 B.C.), formed a separate treatise composed between the Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, and that the phrase "this war" in the earlier books refers to the Ten Years' War only.

In v. xxvi Thucydides does make a fresh start with the words, "The same Thucydides recorded the events in order, reckoning by summers and winters,¹

¹ His division of the year corresponds to the actual conditions of the carrying on of war in ancient times: summer
until the fall of Athens." But he adds, "The war lasted for twenty-seven years, and anyone who declines to count the interval of truce as war is mistaken;" which sounds very much like the opening of a second volume of a work that falls into natural divisions. It is quite likely, as Ullrich maintains, that the account of the Archidamian War (I.–v. xxvi.) was composed mainly in the interval between 421 and 416 B.C.; but that it received important additions after the fall of Athens seems certain, e.g. II. lxv. on the career of Pericles. So much may well be admitted for Ullrich's hypothesis, but it is not necessary to admit more. Even the story of the Sicilian expedition, the finest part of the whole work, need not be considered to have been originally a separate treatise, but only to have received especial care. As for the rest, a paragraph from Classen's introduction to Book V outlines a probable order for the growth of the history which seems reasonable: "Though I am convinced that the whole work was written in the shape in which we have it after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, and that Thucydides was called away from life when engaged in the last revision and combination of the portions which he had noted down and sketched in outline from the beginning of the war,
yet I do not believe that all parts of the work received an equally thorough review. I think that the masterly introduction, which makes our First Book, was completed with the full knowledge of the disastrous result of the twenty-seven years' war; that then the history of the ten years' war and the Sicilian Expedition, for which it is likely that the results of laborious inquiry were already at hand more or less perfectly worked out, received their final touches; and that after this, before the thread of the narrative was taken up again with the Ionic-Decelean War, the intervening period of the εἰρήνη ἱππολος was described."

The most interesting testimony as to the recognition of the power of Thucydides in ancient times is Lucian's statement (adv. Indoct. 102) that Demosthenes copied out the history eight times. Dio Cassius constantly imitated and borrowed from him, and among others of the later historians who emulated him were Philistus, Arrian, and Procopius. There is internal evidence that Tacitus was influenced by him, and Sallust often imitated him. Quintilian's oft-quoted characterization, *Densus et brevis et semper instans sibi Thucydides*, shows his appreciation. In modern times his greatest panegyrist is Macaulay: "There is no prose composition, not even the *De Corona*, which I place so high as the Seventh Book of Thucydides. It is the *ne plus ultra* of human art"; again, "The retreat from Syracuse—Is it or
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is it not the finest thing you ever read in your life?”; and still again, “He is the greatest historian that ever lived.” John Stuart Mill said, “The most powerful and affecting piece of narrative perhaps in all literature is the account of the Sicilian catastrophe in his Seventh Book.” The Earl of Chatham, on sending his son William Pitt to Cambridge, “left to professional teachers the legitimate routine in the classic authors, but made it his particular desire that Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen, should be the first Greek which his son read after coming to college.” And the Earl of Chatham’s estimate is well supported by Sir G. Cornwall Lewis: “For close, cogent, and appropriate reasoning on political questions, the speeches of Thucydides have never been surpassed; and indeed they may be considered as having reached the highest excellence of which the human mind is capable in that department.”

In the ordinary narration of events the style of Thucydides is clear, direct, graphic. In strong contrast with this generally simple and lucid form of statement is his style in describing battles and other critical events, in generalizations, and especially in the speeches; here the statement is often so concise and condensed as to become very difficult. Thucydides was not the first to use speeches as a means of vivid presentation of important crises and the actors in them; for that he had the precedent of Homer and the Attic drama. But he used this
means with such impressive effect and success as to induce frequent imitation in later historical writing in ancient times. He does not pretend to give the exact words of the speakers, but says frankly in the Introduction (i. xxii. 1): "As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said." As a natural result the language of the speeches has a uniform character, both in the structure of the sentences and in particular expressions—in other words it is that of Thucydides himself; but at the same time the character and mode of thought of the assumed speaker are clearly manifest in each speech. In the hands of Thucydides such a means of presenting to us a critical situation is extraordinarily effective; here, as in his most striking narrations, his readers become spectators, as Plutarch expressed it. Or as Classen said, "Without our own choice we find ourselves involved in the conflict of
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interests, and are put in the position to form judgment for ourselves from the situation and the feeling of parties. Very seldom does the historian himself add a word of comment."

We are accustomed to admire among Thucydides' great qualities as historian, his impartiality, his trustworthiness, vivid description, sense of contrast, conciseness, epigrammatic sententiousness, reserve, pathos. We come to approve heartily his way of leaving facts clearly stated and skilfully grouped to carry their own judgments. He is never a partisan, and the unsophisticated reader might at times wonder what his nationality was did he not frequently subscribe himself "Thucydides the Athenian." Historians sometimes criticise his attitude, but they all accept his statements of fact. His descriptions of battles read as if he himself had been present. He dramatises history by placing events in such juxtaposition that a world of moral is conveyed without a word of comment; for example, when the funeral oration with its splendid eulogy of Athens is followed by the description of the plague, the disgraceful Melian episode is succeeded by the Sicilian disaster, the holiday-like departure from Athens is set over against the distressful flight from Syracuse. He packs his language so full of meaning that at times a sentence does duty for a paragraph, a word for a sentence. "Of all manifestations of power, restraint impresses men most," and however much we regret xviii
his reserve, since for much that he might have told us we have no other witnesses, we come more and more to regard this as great art. As for pathos, no historian ever excelled such passages as those where the utter defeat of a hitherto invincible navy is portrayed (vii. lxxi), or the misery and dejection of the departing Athenian host is described (vii. lxxv), or where the final catastrophe in the river Assinarus seems to occur before our eyes, preparing us for the final sentence: "Fleet and army perished from the face of the earth, nothing was saved, and of the many who went forth few returned home."
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Of Thucydidean manuscripts the following are, according to Hude, the most important:

A *Cisalpinus sive Italus*, now in Paris (suppl. Gr. 255), parchment, 11th or 12th century.

B *Vaticanus*, Vatican Library at Rome (126), parchment, 11th century.

C *Laurentianus*, Laurentian Library at Florence (69, 2), parchment, 11th century.

E *Palatinus*, Library at Heidelberg (252), parchment, 11th century.

F *Augustanus*, Library at Munich (430), parchment, 11th century.

G *Monacensis*, Library at Munich (228), paper, 13th century.

M *Britannicus*, British Museum (11727), parchment, 11th century.

No one of these manuscripts is of such age or excellence as to deserve preference before all others; but of the two families which may be distinguished, Laurentianus leads the one, namely, C and G, Vaticanus the other, namely, ABEF. Britannicus holds a sort of middle ground between the two. Hude’s preference is for Laurentianus; Classen’s, following Bekker, for Vaticanus. From vi. xciv on Vaticanus has a special value as coming perhaps from a different copy.

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ΘΟΥΚΥΔΙΔΟΥ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑΙ

Α

I. Θουκυδίδης ’Αθηναίος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ ’Αθηναίων ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐπίσκας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογῶτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ᾦσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευὴ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἐλληνικὸν ὄρὸν ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἐκατέρους, τὸ μὲν εὐθὺς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοοῦμενον. κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη δὴ μεγίστη τοῖς Ἐλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὅς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων. τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἄτι παλαιτέρα σαφῶς μὲν εὐρέιν διὰ χρόνον πλήθος ἀδύνατον ἢν, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων δὲ ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντι μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει, όμοι μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὖτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα.

II. Φαίνεται γὰρ ἣ νῦν Ἐλλας καλουμένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαῖως οἰκουμένη, ἄλλα μεταναστάσεις τε οὕσα τὰ πρότερα καὶ ρᾷδίως ἐκαστοι τὴν

1 The Greek text used for this translation of Thucydides is that of Hude. Variations from his text are indicated in footnotes.

2
I. Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war waged by the Peloponnesians and the Athenians against one another. He began the task at the very outset of the war, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. For this was the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, it was impossible to get clear information on account of lapse of time; but from evidence which, on pushing my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can trust, I think that they were not really great either as regards the wars then waged or in other particulars.

II. For it is plain that what is now called Hellas was not of old settled with fixed habitations, but that migrations were frequent in former times, each tribe readily leaving its own land whenever they were
THUCYDIDES

εαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες, βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τινῶν αἰεὶ
2 πλείόνων. τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὕσης οὐδὲ
ἐπιμελεύοντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις οὔτε κατὰ γῆν οὔτε
diὰ θαλάσσης, νεμόμενοι τε τὰ ἐαυτῶν ἐκαστοὶ
οὐσιν ἀποξήν καὶ περιουσίαν χρημάτων οὐκ ἔχοντες
οὔδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον δὲ ὑπὸ τοὺς ἐπελ-
thῶν, καὶ ἀτειχίστων ἀμα οὐτῶν, ἄλλοις ἀφαιρή-
σεται, τῆς τε καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίως τροφῆς
πανταχοῦ ἃν ἡγούμενοι ἐπικρατεῖν οὐ χαλεπῶς
ἀπανίσταντο, καὶ δὴ αὐτὸ οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων
3 ἵσχυον οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ. μάλιστα δὲ
τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη αἰεὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν οἰκη-
tόρων εἰρένη, ἥ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία καλουμένη καὶ
Βοιωτία Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ πλὴν Ἀρ-
kαδίας τῆς τε ἄλλης ὡσα ἡν κράτιστα. διὰ γὰρ
ἀρετὴν γῆς αὐ τε δυνάμεις τισὶ μείζους ἐγγιγνό-
μεναι στάσεις ἐνεποίουν εξ’ ὅν ἐφθείροντο, καὶ
4 ἀμα ὑπὸ ἀλλοφύλων μᾶλλον ἐπεβουλεύοντο. τὴν
γοῦν Ἀττικῆν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλείστοι διὰ τὸ λειτο-
γεων ἀστασίαστον οὗσαν ἀνθρώποι ὁκουν οἱ
5 αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ. καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ
ἐλάχιστον ἔστι διὰ τὰς μετοικήσεις1τὰ ἄλλα μὴ
όμοιοὺς αὐξηθῆναι· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος οἱ
πολέμων ἢ στάσει ἐκπίπτοντες παρ’ Ἀθηναίους
ὁ δυνατώτατοι ὡς βέβαιον ὅν ἀνεχώρουν, καὶ
πολῖται γιγνόμενοι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ μείζω ἔτη

1 So Ullrich: μετοικίας ὡς Mn.
forced to do so by any people that was more numerous. For there was no mercantile traffic and the people did not mingle with one another without fear, either on land or by sea, and they each tilled their own land only enough to obtain a livelihood from it, having no surplus of wealth and not planting orchards, since it was uncertain, especially as they were yet without walls, when some invader might come and despoil them. And so, thinking that they could obtain anywhere the sustenance required for their daily needs, they found it easy to change their abodes, and for this reason were not strong as regards either the size of their cities or their resources in general. And it was always the best of the land that was most subject to these changes of inhabitants—the districts now called Thessaly and Boeotia, most of the Peloponnesus except Arcadia, and the most fertile regions in the rest of Hellas. For the greater power that accrued to some communities on account of the fertility of their land occasioned internal quarrels whereby they were ruined, and at the same time these were more exposed to plots from outside tribes. Attica, at any rate, was free from internal quarrels from the earliest times by reason of the thinness of its soil, and therefore was inhabited by the same people always. And here is an excellent illustration of the truth of my statement that it was owing to these migrations that the other parts of Hellas did not increase in the same way as Attica; for the most influential men of the other parts of Hellas, when they were driven out of their own countries by war or sedition, resorted to Athens as being a firmly settled community, and, becoming citizens, from the very earliest times made the city still greater in the
ἡποίησαν πλήθει ἀνθρώπων τὴν πόλιν, ὡστε καὶ ἐς Ἰωνίαν ὠστερον ὡς ὦχ ἰκανῆς οὕσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀποκιάς ἐξέπεμψαν.

III. Δήλοι δὲ μοι καὶ τὸδε τῶν παλαιῶν ἁσθένειαν ὦχ ἥκιστα: πρὸ γὰρ τῶν Τρωικῶν οὐδὲν φαίνεται πρότερον κοινῇ ἐργασιμένη ἡ Ἔλλας:

2 δοκεῖ δὲ μοι, οὐδὲ τούνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασά πω εἴχεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸ "Ελληνος τοῦ Δευκαλίωνος καὶ πάντων οὐδὲ ἐίναι ἡ ἐπίκλησις αὐτῆ, κατὰ ἔθνη δὲ ἀλλὰ τε καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἐπὶ πλείστον ἢφ’ ἑαυτῶν τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν παρέχεσθαι,"Ελληνος δὲ καὶ τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ Φθιώτιδι ἴσχυσάντων, καὶ ἐπαγομένων αὐτούς ἐπ’ ὥφελία ἐστὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, καθ’ ἐκάστους μὲν ἡδὴ τῇ ὁμιλίᾳ μᾶλλον καλεῖσθαι "Ελληνας, οὐ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε χρόνου ἐδύνατο καὶ ἄπασιν ἐκνικήσαι.

3 τεκμηριωδὲ μάλιστα "Ομηρος. πολλῷ γὰρ ὠστερον ἔτι καὶ τῶν Τρωικῶν γενόμενος οὕδαμον οὕτω τοὺς ξύμπαντας ἀνόμασεν οὐδ’ ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς μετὰ ΄Αχιλλέως ἐκ τῆς Φθιώτιδος, οὐπερ καὶ πρῶτοι "Ελληνες ἰσαν, Δαναοὺς δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐπεσι καὶ ’Αργείους καὶ ’Αχαιοὺς ἀνακαλεῖ. οὐ μὴν οὖδὲ βαρβάρους εἰρήκη διὰ τὸ μηδὲ "Ελληνάς πω, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀντιπαλον ἐς ἐν ὄνομα ἄποκεκρίσθαι, οὐ δ’ οὖν ὡς ἐκαστοῖ "Ελληνες κατὰ πόλεις τε ὀσοὶ ἀλλήλων ξυνίεσαν καὶ ξύμπαντες ὠστερον κληθέντες οὐδὲν πρὸ τῶν Τρωικῶν δὲ ἁσθένειαν καὶ ἀμειξίαν ἀλλήλων ἀθρόοι

1 Added by Reiske.
number of its inhabitants; so that Attica proved too small to hold them, and therefore the Athenians eventually sent out colonies even to Ionia.

III. The weakness of the olden times is further proved to me chiefly by this circumstance, that before the Trojan war, Hellas, as it appears, engaged in no enterprise in common. Indeed, it seems to me that as a whole it did not yet have this name, either, but that before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, this title did not even exist, and that the several tribes, the Pelasgian most extensively, gave their own names to the several districts; but when Hellen and his sons became strong in Phthiotis and were called in to the aid of the other cities, the clans thenceforth came more and more, by reason of this intercourse, to be called Hellenes, though it was a long time before the name could prevail among them all. The best evidence of this is given by Homer; for, though his time was much later even than the Trojan war, he nowhere uses this name of all, or indeed of any of them except the followers of Achilles of Phthiotis, who were in fact the first Hellenes, but designates them in his poems as Danaans and Argives and Achaeans. And he has not used the term Barbarians, either, for the reason, as it seems to me, that the Hellenes on their part had not yet been separated off so as to acquire one common name by way of contrast. However this may be, those who then received the name of Hellenes, whether severally and in succession, city by city, according as they understood one another's speech, or in a body at a later time, engaged together in no enterprise before the Trojan war, on account of weakness and lack of intercourse
ἐπραξαν. ἄλλα καὶ ταύτην τὴν στρατεύαν θαλάσση ἦδη πλείω χρώμενοι ξυνήλθον.

IV. Μίνως γὰρ παλαίτατος δὲν ἀκοῇ ἵσμεν ναυτικὸν ἐκτήσατο καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης ἐπὶ πλείστων ἐκράτησε καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νῆσων ἤρξε τε καὶ οἰκιστὴς πρῶτος τῶν πλείστων ἐγένετο, Κάρας ἐξελάσας καὶ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ παίδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας· τὸ τε ληστικὸν, ὡς εἰκός, καθήμει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ' ὅσον ἐδύνατο, τοῦ τάς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἴναι αὐτῷ.

V. Οἱ γὰρ Ἰ Ἑλληνες τὸ πάλαι καὶ τῶν βαρ-βάρων οἱ τε ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ παραθαλάσσιοι καὶ ὅσοι νῆσους εἶχον, ἐπειδὴ ἤρξαντο μᾶλλον περαιοῦσαι ναυσίν ἐπ' ἄλληλους, ἐτράπουντο πρὸς ληστεῖαν, ἡγομένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἑνέκα καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς, καὶ προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτείχίστοι καὶ κατὰ κώμας ὀικουμέναις ἡρπαξοὶ καὶ τὸν πλείστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιοῦντο, οὐκ ἔχοντὸς πω αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, 2 φέροντο δὲ τι καὶ δόξης μᾶλλον δηλοῦσι δὲ τῶν τε ἡπειρωτῶν τινες ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἷς κόσμος καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν, καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων πανταχοῦ ὁμοίως ἐρωτώντες εἰ λησταὶ εἰσιν, ὡς οὔτε ὃν πυνθάνουν- ταί ἀπαξιοῦντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελέσει εἰς
with one another. And they united even for this
expedition only when they were now making con-
siderable use of the sea.

IV. Minos is the earliest of all those known to us
by tradition who acquired a navy. He made himself
master of a very great part of what is now called
the Hellenic Sea, and became lord of the Cyclades
islands and first colonizer of most of them, driving
out the Carians and establishing his own sons in
them as governors. Piracy, too, he naturally tried
to clear from the sea, as far as he could, desiring
that his revenues should come to him more readily.

V. It should be explained that in early times both
the Hellenes and the Barbarians who dwell on the
mainland near the sea,¹ as well as those on the islands,
when once they began more frequently to cross over
in ships to one another, turned to piracy, under the
lead of their most powerful men, whose motive was
their own private gain and the support of their
weaker followers, and falling upon cities that were
unprovided with walls and consisted of groups of
villages, they pillaged them and got most of their
living from that source. For this occupation did not
as yet involve disgrace, but rather conferred some-
thing even of glory. This is shown by the practice,
even at the present day, of some of the peoples on
the mainland, who still hold it an honour to be suc-
cessful in this business, as well as by the words of
the early poets, who invariably ask the question of
all who put in to shore, whether they are pirates,²
the inference being that neither those whom they
ask ever disavow that occupation, nor those ever

¹ e.g. Phoenicians, Carians, and probably Epirots.
² cf. Homer, γ 73; ι 252.
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3 εἰδέναι οὖν ὑνειδιζόντων. ἐλήξοντο δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἥπειρον ἀλλήλους. καὶ μέχρι τούδε πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ νέμεται περὶ τε Δοκροῦς τοὺς Ὀξόλας καὶ Αἴτωλοὺς καὶ Ἀκαρνάνας καὶ τὴν ταύτη ἥπειρον τὸ τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι τοῦτοι τοῖς ἥπειροταις ἀπὸ τῆς παλαιᾶς ληστείας ἐμμεμένηκεν.

VI. Πᾶσα γὰρ Ἑλλάς ἐσιδηροφόρει διὰ τὰς ἀφάρκτους τε οἰκήσεις καὶ οὖν ἄσφαλεῖς παρ’ ἀλλήλους ἐφόδους, καὶ ξυνήθη τὴν διαίταν μεθ’ ὁ ὁπλων ἐποιήσαντο ὡσπερ οἱ βάρβαροι. σημεῖον δ’ ἐστὶ ταύτα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐτὶ οὕτω νεμόμενα

2 τῶν ποτε καὶ ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως διαιτημάτων. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν τε σίδηρον κατέθεντο καὶ ἀνειμένη τῇ διαίτῃ ἐς τὸ τρυφερώτερον μετέστησαν. καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἀβροδίαιτοι οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτὼνας τε λινοὺς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες καὶ χρυσῶν τεττίγων ἐνέρσει κρωβύλου ἀναδόμμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τριχῶν. ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ Ἰώνων τοὺς πρεσβύτερους κατὰ τὸ ἐξυγγενές ἐπὶ

3 πολὺ αὔτη ἡ σκεύη κατέσχεν. μετρία δ’ αὐ ἐσθήτι καὶ ἐς τὸν νῦν τρόπον πρῶτοι Δακεδαιμόνιοι ἐχρήσαντο καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ τὰ μείζων κεκτημένοι ἱσοδιαίοι μάλιστα

4 κατέστησαν. ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ
censure it who are concerned to have the information. On the mainland also men plundered one another; and even to-day in many parts of Hellas life goes on under the old conditions, as in the region of the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, Acarnanians, and the mainland thereabout. And these mainlanders' habit of carrying arms is a survival of their old freebooting life.

VI. Indeed, all the Hellenes used to carry arms because the places where they dwelt were unprotected, and intercourse with each other was unsafe; and in their everyday life they regularly went armed just as the Barbarians did. And the fact that these districts of Hellas still retain this custom is an evidence that at one time similar modes of life prevailed everywhere. But the Athenians were among the very first to lay aside their arms and, adopting an easier mode of life, to change to more luxurious ways. And indeed, owing to this fastidiousness, it was only recently that their older men of the wealthier class gave up wearing tunics of linen and fastening up their hair in a knot held by a golden grasshopper as a brooch;¹ and this same dress obtained for a long time among the elderly men of the Ionians also, owing to their kinship with the Athenians. An unpretentious costume after the present fashion was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians, and in general their wealthier men took up a style of living that brought them as far as possible into equality with the masses. And they were the first to bare their bodies and, after stripping openly, to anoint

¹ The mode of wearing the hair in a knot on the top of the head with the insertion of a pin in the form of a cicada seems to have persisted long at Athens, a mark of antiquated manners as characteristic as the queue or pig-tail with us.
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φανερῶν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἠλείψαντο. τὸ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγώνι διαξόματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἴδοια οἱ ἄθληται ἠγωνίζοντο, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἐτή ἐπειδὴ πέπαυνται: ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἔστιν οἷς νῦν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀσιανοῖς, πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης 6 ἄθλα τίθεται, καὶ διεξόμενοι τούτῳ δρῶσιν. πολλὰ δὲ ἄν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδεῖξει τὸ παλαίων Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοίότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτῶμεν.

VII. Τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὅσαι μὲν νεώτατα φύκισθησαν καὶ ἤδη πλωιμωτέρων ὄντων περιουσίας μᾶλλον ἔχουσαι χρημάτων, ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγαλοῖς ἐκτίζοντο καὶ τείχεσι τοὺς ἱσθμοὺς ἀπελάμβανον ἐμπορίας τε ἑνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προσοίκους ἐκαστοῖς ἱσχύος; αἳ δὲ παλαιάδα τὴν ληστείαν ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντίσχουσαν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον φύκισθησαν, αἳ τε ἐν ταῖς νῆσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡπείροις (ἐφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὄντες οὐ θαλάσσιοι κάτω φίκουν), καὶ μέχρι τούτῳ ἔτι ἀνφικισμένοι εἰσίν.

VIII. Καὶ οὐχ ἠσοῦν ἠσταλ ἦσαν οἱ νησιώται, Κάρες τε ὄντες καὶ Φοίνικες. οὕτωι γὰρ δὴ τὰς πλείστας τῶν νῆσων ὢκησαν. μαρτύριοι δὲ Δήλου γὰρ καθαρομένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷ δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ καὶ τῶν θηκῶν ἀναφεδεισῶν, ὅσαι ἦσαν τῶν τεθνεώτων ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, ὑπὲρ ἡμισὺ
themselves with oil when they engaged in athletic exercise; for in early times, even in the Olympic games, the athletes wore girdles about their loins in the contests, and it is not many years since the practice has ceased. Indeed, even now among some of the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where prizes for wrestling and boxing are offered, the contestants wear loin-cloths. And one could show that the early Hellenes had many other customs similar to those of the Barbarians of the present day.

VII. However, the cities which were founded in more recent times, when navigation had at length become safer, and were consequently beginning to have surplus resources, were built right on the seashore, and the isthmuses were occupied and walled off with a view to commerce and to the protection of the several peoples against their neighbours. But the older cities, both on the islands and on the mainland, were built more at a distance from the sea on account of the piracy that long prevailed—for the pirates were wont to plunder not only one another, but also any others who dwelt on the coast but were not sea-faring folk—and even to the present day they lie inland.

VIII. Still more addicted to piracy were the islanders. These included Carians as well as Phoenicians, for Carians inhabited most of the islands, as may be inferred from the fact that, when Delos was purified by the Athenians in this war and the graves of all who had ever died on the island were removed, over half were discovered to be Carians.

1 i.e. fortified cities were established on peninsulas, connected with the mainland by an isthmus, which was then walled off as Epidamnus (ch. xxvi. 5) and Potidæa (IV. cxx. 3).

2 In the sixth year of the war, 426 B.C. cf. III. civ.
"Καρες ἐφάνησαν, γυναῖκες τῇ τε σκευῇ τῶν ὀπλῶν ξυντεθαμμένη καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ὁ νῦν ἔτι θάπτουσιν.

2 Καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίλων ναυτικοῦ πλωμοτέρα ἐγένετο παρ' ἄλληλοις (οἱ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῆσων κακοῦργοι ἀνέστησαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ὅτεπερ καὶ τὰς πολλὰς αὐτῶν κατοίκις), καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἀνθρωποὺς μᾶλλον ἢδη τὴν κτήσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ὄκουν, καὶ τινὲς καὶ τείχη περιεβάλλοντο ὡς πλουσιώτεροι ἐαυτῶν γεγυνομενοί ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἱ τῇ ἥσσους ὑπέμενον τῶν κρείσσονων δουλείαν, οἱ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιοῦντο ὑπη-

4 κόσως τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ μᾶλλον ἢδη ὄντες ὑστερον χρόνῳ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν.

IX. Ἀγαμέμνων τε μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοὺς Τυνδάρεως ὀρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἐλένης μνηστήρας ἀγων τῶν στόλων ἀγείραι. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σαφέστατα Πελοποννήσιων μνήμη παρὰ τῶν πρότερον δεδεγμένοι Πέλοπᾶ τε πρῶτον πλήθει χρημάτων, ἀ ἤλθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας ἔχων ἐσ ἀνθρώπους ἄπορους, δύναμιν περιποιησάμενον τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τῆς χῶρας ἐπηλυκὼν ὄντα ὀμως σχείν, καὶ ὑστερον τοῖς

1 Hude reads περιεβάλλοντο with C.
being recognized by the fashion of the armour found buried with them, and by the mode of burial, which is that still in use among them.

But when the navy of Minos had been established, navigation between various peoples became safer—for the evil-doers on the islands were expelled by him, and then he proceeded to colonize most of them—and the dwellers on the sea-coast now began to acquire property more than before and to become more settled in their homes, and some, seeing that they were growing richer than before, began also to put walls around their cities. Their more settled life was due to their desire for gain; actuated by this, the weaker citizens were willing to submit to dependence on the stronger, and the more powerful men, with their enlarged resources, were able to make the lesser cities their subjects. And later on, when they had at length more completely reached this condition of affairs, they made the expedition against Troy.

IX. And it was, as I think, because Agamemnon surpassed in power the princes of his time that he was able to assemble his fleet, and not so much because Helen’s suitors, whom he led, were bound by oath to Tyndareus. It is said, furthermore, by those of the Peloponnesians who have received the clearest traditional accounts from men of former times, that it was by means of the great wealth which he brought with him from Asia into the midst of a poor people that Pelops first acquired power, and, consequently, stranger though he was, gave his name to the country, and that yet greater things choice against all wrong. cf. Isoc. x. 40; Paus. iii. xx. 9; Apollod. iii. x. 9.
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εκγόνοις ἐτὶ μεῖζω ξυνενεχθήναι, Εὔρυσθέως μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὑπὸ Ἡρακλείδῶν ἀποθανόντος, Ἀτρέως δὲ μιθρὸς ἀδελφοῦ ὄντος αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπιτρέψαντος Εὔρυσθέως, ὅτε ἐστράτευε, Μυκήνας τε καὶ τὴν ἄρχην κατὰ τὸ οὐκεῖον Ἀτρέϊ (τυγχάνει δὲ αὐτὸν φεύγοντα τὸν πατέρα διὰ τὸν Χρυσίππου θάνατον), καὶ ὣς οὐκέτι ἀνεχώρησεν Εὔρυσθέως, βουλομένων καὶ τῶν Μυκηναίων φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλείδῶν καὶ ἀμα δυνατον δοκοῦντα εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τεθεραπευκότα τῶν Μυκηναίων τε καὶ ὅσων Εὔρυσθέως ἦρχε τῇ βασιλείᾳ Ἀτρέα χρῆ παραλαβεῖν καὶ τῶν Περσειδῶν τοὺς Πελοπίδας
3 μείζους καταστῆναι. ἂ μοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαμέμνων παραλαβῶν καὶ ναυτικῷ δὲ ἀμα ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν ἀλλῶν ἱσχύσας τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν ποιῆσασθαι. φαίνεται γὰρ ναυσὶ τε πλείσταις αὐτὸς ἀφικόμενος καὶ Ἀρκάσι προσπαρασχῶν, ὡς Ῥομήρος τὸτο δεδήλωκεν, εἰ
4 τῷ Ικανὸς τεκμηρίωσαι. καὶ ἐν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἀμα τῇ παραδόσει εἰρήκεν αὐτῶν "πολλῆς νήσωι καὶ Ἀργεῖ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν". οὐκ ἂν οὖν νῆσων ἔξω τῶν περιοικίδων (αὕται δὲ οὐκ ἂν πολλαὶ εἴεν) ἥπειρότης ἄν ἐκράτει, εἰ μὴ τι καὶ
5 ναυτικῶν εἴχεν. εἰκάζειν δὲ χρή καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ στρατείᾳ οἷα ἦν τὰ πρὸ αὐτῆς.

1 Chrysippus, his half-brother, son of Pelops and Axioche, was killed by Atreus and Thyestes at the instance of their mother Hippodameia.
fell to the lot of his descendants. For when Eurystheus set out on the expedition that resulted in his death in Attica at the hands of the Heracleidae, Atreus, his mother's brother, who chanced to have been banished by his father for the death of Chrysippus, was intrusted by Eurystheus with Mycenae and the sovereignty because he was a kinsman; and when Eurystheus did not return, Atreus, in accordance with the wish of the Mycenaeans, who feared the Heracleidae, and because he seemed to be a man of power and had won the favour of the multitude, received the sovereignty over the Mycenaeans and all who were under the sway of Eurystheus. And so the house of Pelops became greater than the house of Perseus. And it was, I think, because Agamemnon had inherited all this, and at the same time had become strong in naval power beyond the rest, that he was able to collect his armament, not so much by favour as by fear, and so to make the expedition. For it is clear that he himself brought the greatest number of ships, and that he had others with which to supply the Arcadians, as Homer testifies, if he is sufficient witness for anyone. And he says, in the account of the delivery of the sceptre, that Agamemnon "ruled over many islands and all Argos." Now, if he had not had something of a fleet, he could not, as he lived on the mainland, have been lord of any islands except those on the coast, and these would not be "many." And it is from this expedition that we must judge by conjecture what the situation was before that time.

2 cf. Homer, B 576 and 612.
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X. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκήναι μικρὸν ἦν, ἥ εἰ τῷ τῶν τῶν τότε πόλισσα νῦν μὴ ἀξιόχρεων δοκεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀκριβεὶ ἂν τις σημεῖῳ χρώμενος ἀπιστοτικὴ μὴ γενέσθαι τῶν στόλων τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐ τε ποιηταὶ 2 εἰρήκασι καὶ ὁ λόγος κατέχει. Δακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἔγρα ἡ πόλις ἔρημωθείς, λειψθείς δὲ τὰ τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἑδάφη, πολλῆν ἄν οἴμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως προελθὸντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς ἑπείτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι (καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται τῆς τε ἕξυπνάσχη ἤγονται καὶ τῶν ἑξῶν ἔξωμάχων πολλῶν· ὅμως δὲ, οὐτε ἕξυπνικεῖσθείς τῆς 2 πόλεως οὐτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελείσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ' ἄν ὑποδεεστέρα), Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τούτω παθόντων διπλασίαν ἄν τὴν δύναμιν εἰκάζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς 3 φανεράς ὅψεως τῆς πόλεως ἡ ἔστιν. οὐκοιν ἀπιστείν εἰκὸς οὔδε τὰς ὅψεις τῶν πόλεως μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἡ τὰς δυνάμεις, νομίζειν δὲ τὴν στρατείαν ἐκείνην μεγίστην μὲν γενέσθαι τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, λειπομένην δὲ τῶν νῦν, τῇ 'Ομήρου αὐτοῦ ποιήσει εἰ τι χρῆ κανταῦθα πιστεύειν, ἦν εἰκὸς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον μὲν ποιητὴν οὖντα κοσμῆσαι, ὅμως δὲ φαίνεται 4 καὶ οὔτως ἐνδεεστέρα. πεποίηκε γὰρ χιλίων καὶ διακοσίων νεῶν τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν εἰκοσὶ καὶ ἐκατῶν ἀνδρῶν, τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτῆτου πεντήκοντα,

1 Added by Hude.  2 Added by Stephanus.
X. And because Mycenae was only a small place, or if any particular town of that time seems now to be insignificant, it would not be right for me to treat this as an exact piece of evidence and refuse to believe that the expedition against Troy was as great as the poets have asserted and as tradition still maintains. For if the city of the Lacedaemonians should be deserted, and nothing should be left of it but its temples and the foundations of its other buildings, posterity would, I think, after a long lapse of time, be very loath to believe that their power was as great as their renown. (And yet they occupy two-fifths of the Peloponnesus and have the hegemony of the whole, as well as of their many allies outside; but still, as Sparta is not compactly built as a city and has not provided itself with costly temples and other edifices, but is inhabited village-fashion in the old Hellenic style, its power would appear less than it is.) Whereas, if Athens should suffer the same fate, its power would, I think, from what appeared of the city’s ruins, be conjectured double what it is. The reasonable course, therefore, is not to be incredulous or to regard the appearance of cities rather than their power, but to believe that expedition to have been greater than any that preceded it, though falling below those of the present time, if here again one may put any trust in the poetry of Homer; for though it is natural to suppose that he as a poet adorned and magnified the expedition, still even on his showing it was evidently comparatively small. For in the fleet of twelve hundred vessels he has represented the ships of the Boeotians as having one hundred and twenty men each, and those of
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δηλών, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἑλαχί-
στας· ἄλλων γοῦν μεγέθους πέρι ἐν νεῶν κατα-
λογῷ οὐκ ἐμνήσθη. αὐτὲρέται δὲ ὅτι ἦσαν καὶ
μάχιμοι πάντες, ἐν ταῖς Φιλοκτήτου ναυσὶ δεδή-
λωκεν· τοξότας γὰρ πάντας πεποίηκε τοὺς προσ-
κώτους. περίνεως δὲ οὔκ εἴκος πολλοὺς ἐξυμπλεῖν
ἐξώ τῶν βασιλέων καὶ τῶν μάλιστα ἐν τέλει,
ἄλλως τε καὶ μέλλοντας πέλαγος περαιώσεσθαι
μετὰ σκευῶν πολεμικῶν οὐδ' αὐ τὰ πλοῖα κατά-
φαρκτα ἔχοντας, ἄλλα τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ληστι-
κώτεροι παρεσκευασμέναι. πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δ' 
οὖν καὶ ἑλαχίστας ναῖς τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι οὐ
πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης τῆς
'Ελλάδος κοινῆ πεμπόμενοι.

XI. Αἰτιον δ' ἦν οὐχ ἢ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον
ὁσον ἢ ἄχρηματια. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορία τὸν
τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἠγαγον καὶ ὡςον ἥλπιζον
αὐτὸθεν πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφι-
κόμενοι μάχη ἐκράτησαν (δὴλον δὲ· τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα
τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὔκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο), φαίνονται δ' 
οὐδ' ἑνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἄλλα
πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καὶ
ληστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορία. ἦ καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ
Τρώως αὐτῶν διεσπαρμένων τὰ δέκα ἐτη ἄντειχον
βία, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειπομένους ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες.
2 περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες

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Philoctetes as having fifty,\(^1\) indicating, it seems to me, the largest and the smallest ships; at any rate, no mention as to the size of any others is made in the Catalogue of Ships. But that all on board were at once rowers and fighting men he has shown in the case of the ships of Philoctetes; for he represents all the oarsmen as archers. And it is not likely that many supernumeraries sailed with the expedition, apart from the kings and those highest in office, especially as they were to cross the open sea with all the equipment of war, and, furthermore, had boats which were not provided with decks, but were built after the early style, more like pirate-boats. In any event, if one takes the mean between the largest ships and the smallest, it is clear that not a large number of men went on the expedition, considering that they were sent out from all Hellas in common.\(^2\)

XI. The cause was not so much lack of men as lack of money. For it was a want of supplies that caused them to take out a comparatively small force, only so large as could be expected to live on the country while at war. And when they arrived and had prevailed in battle—as evidently they did, for otherwise they could not have built the defence around their camp—even then they seem not to have used their whole force, but to have resorted to farming in the Chersonese and to pillaging, through lack of supplies. Wherefore, since they were scattered, the Trojans found it easier to hold the field against them during those ten years, being a match for those who from time to time were left in camp. But if they had taken with them an abundant

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\(^1\) Hom. B 510, 719.

\(^2\) The number would be 102,000, *i.e.* 1,200 ships at 85 men each.
ΤΟΙΟΤΟΙ ΑΝΕΝ ΛΗΣΤΕΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΓΕΩΡΓΙΑΣ ΞΥΝΕΧΩΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛΕΜΟΥ ΔΙΕΦΕΡΟΥΝ, ΡΑΔΙΩΣ ΑΝ ΜΑΧΗ ΚΡΑΤΟΥΝΤΕΣ ΕΙΛΟΥΝ, ΟΙ ΓΕ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΧ ΑΘΡΟΙ, ΑΛΛΑ ΜΕΡΕΙ ΤΟΙ ΑΙΕΙ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΙ ΑΝΤΕΙΧΟΥΝ, ΠΟΛΙΟΡΚΙΑ Δ' ΑΝ ΠΡΟΣΚΑΘΕΧΟ-ΜΕΝΟΙ ΕΝ ΕΛΑΣΣΟΝΙ ΤΕ ΧΡΟΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΝΩΤΕΡΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΤΡΟΙΑΝ ΕΙΛΟΥΝ. ΑΛΛΑ ΔΙ' ΑΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΑΝ (ΤΑ ΤΕ ΠΡΟ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ) ΑΣΘΕΝΗ ΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΑ ΓΕ ΔΗ ΤΑΥΤΑ, ΌΝΟΜΑ-ΣΤΟΤΑΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΙΝ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΑ, ΔΗΛΟΥΤΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΡΓΟΙΣ ΥΠΟΔΕΕΣΤΕΡΑ ΟΝΤΑ ΤΗΣ ΦΗΜΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΒΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΑΣ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΚΑΤΕΣΧΗΚΟΤΟΣ.

ΧΙΙ. ΕΠΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΑ ΤΡΩΙΚΑ Η 'ΕΛΛΑΣ ΕΤΙ ΜΕΤΑΝΙΣΤΑΤΟ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΤΩΚΙΖΕΤΟ, ΩΣΤΕ ΜΗ ΗΣΥΧΑ-2 ΣΑΣΑ ΑΥΞΗΘΗΝΑΙ. Η ΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΙΣ ΤΩΝ 'ΕΛΛΗΝΩΝ ΕΞ 'ΙΛΙΟΥ ΧΡΟΝΙΑ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΗ ΠΟΛΛΑ ΕΝΕΟΧ-ΜΟΣΕ, ΚΑΙ ΣΤΑΣΕΙΣ ΕΝ ΤΑΪΣ ΠΟΛΕΙΣΙΝ ΩΣ ΕΠΙ ΤΟ ΠΟΛΥ ΕΓΓΥΝΟΝΤΟ, ΑΦ' ΩΝ ΕΚΠΙΠΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΤΑΣ ΠΟΛΕΙΣ 3 ΕΚΤΙΞΟΥΝ. ΒΟΙΩΤΟΙ ΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΟΙ ΒΩΝ ΕΞΗΚΟΣΤΩ ΕΤΕΙ ΜΕΤΑ 'ΙΛΙΟΥ ΆΛΩΣΙΝ ΕΞ 'ΑΡΝΗΣ ΑΝΑΣΤΑΝΤΕΣ ΥΠΟ ΘΕΟΣΑΛΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΒΩΝ ΜΕΝ ΒΟΙΩΤΙΑΝ, ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΘΗΝΔΑ, ΓΗΝ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΗΝ ΩΚΗΣΑΝ (ΗΝ ΔΕ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΟΔΑΣΜΟΣ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΓΗ ΤΑΥΤΗ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ, ΑΦ' ΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΣ 'ΙΛΙΟΥ ΕΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΣΑΝ), ΔΩΡΗΣ ΤΕ ΟΥΔΗΚΟΣΤΩ 4 ΕΤΕΙ ΕΞΙΝ 'ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΔΑΙΣ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΝΝΗΣΟΝ ΕΣΧΟΥΝ. ΜΟΛΙΣ ΤΕ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΛΩ ΧΡΟΝΩ ΗΣΥΧΑΣΑ Η 'ΕΛΛΑΣ ΒΕΒΑΙΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΚΕΤΙ ΑΝΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΗ ΑΠΟΙΚΙΑΣ ΕΞΕ-
supply of food, and, in a body, without resorting to foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war continuously, they would easily have prevailed in battle and taken the city, since even with their forces not united, but with only such part as was from time to time on the spot, they yet held out; whereas, if they could have sat down and laid siege to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and with less trouble. But because of lack of money not only were the undertakings before the Trojan war insignificant, but even this expedition itself, though far more noteworthy than any before, is shown by the facts to have been inferior to its fame and to the tradition about it that now, through the influence of the poets, obtains.

XII. Indeed, even after the Trojan war Hellas was still subject to migrations and in process of settlement, and hence did not get rest and wax stronger. For not only did the return of the Hellenes from Ilium, occurring as it did after a long time, cause many changes; but factions also began to spring up very generally in the cities, and, in consequence of these, men were driven into exile and founded new cities. The present Boeotians, for example, were driven from Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth year after the capture of Ilium and settled in the district now called Boeotia, but formerly Cadmeis; only a portion of these had been in that land before, and it was some of these who took part in the expedition against Ilium. The Dorians, too, in the eightieth year after the war, together with the Heracleidae occupied the Peloponnesus. And so when painfully and after a long course of time Hellas became permanently tranquil and its population was no longer subject to expulsion from their homes, it
πεμπε, καὶ Ἴωνας μὲν Ἀθηναίοι καὶ νησιωτῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς φύκισαν, Ἰταλίας δὲ καὶ Σικελίας τὸ πλέον Πελοποννήσιον τῆς τε ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος έστιν ἄ χωρία. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ύστερον τῶν Τρωικῶν ἐκτίσθη.

XIII. Δυνατώτερας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτήσιν έτι μᾶλλον ἡ πρότερον ποιουμένης τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειξόνων γιγνομένων (πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ρήτορις γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι), ναυτικὰ τε εξηρτύτεο ἡ Ἐλλάς καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ἀντείχοντο.

2 πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχείρισαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τρητειρεις πρῶτον ἐν Κορίνθῳ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐναυπηγήσαντες. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμῖοις Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιοι ναυπηγός ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας· ἐτη δ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου, ὡτε Ἀμεινοκλῆς Σαμῖος ἠλθεν.

3 ναυμαχία τε παλαίτατη ὃν Ἰςμεν γίγνεται Κορίνθιοι πρὸς Κερκυραίους· ἐτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ταύτη εξήκονται καὶ διακόσια ἐστὶ μέχρι τοῦ

4 αὐτοῦ χρόνου. οἰκούντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἱσθμοῦ αἰεὶ δὴ ποτε ἐμπόριον εἶχον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλεῖστα θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐπιμισγόντων, χρήμασι τε δυνατοὶ ἦσαν, ὡς καὶ

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began to send out colonies. The Athenians colonized Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians, the greater part of Italy and Sicily and some portions of the rest of Hellas. And all these colonies were planted after the Trojan war.

XIII. As Hellas grew more powerful and continued to acquire still more wealth than before, along with the increase of their revenue tyrannies began to be established in most of the cities, whereas before that there had been hereditary kingships based on fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes began to fit out navies, too, and to apply themselves more to the sea. And the Corinthians are said to have been the first of all to adopt what was very nearly the modern plan as regards ships and shipping,¹ and Corinth was the first place in all Hellas, we are told, where triremes were built. And it appears that Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, built four ships for the Samians, also; and it was about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian war that Ameinocles came to the Samians.² The earliest sea-fight, too, of which we know, was fought by the Corinthians against the Corecyraeans;³ and this was two hundred and sixty years before the same date. For as the Corinthians had their city on the Isthmus, from the very earliest times they maintained there a market for the exchange of goods, because the Hellenes within and without the Peloponnesus, in olden times communicating with one another more by land than by sea, had to pass through their territory; and so they were powerful and rich, as has

¹ The reference seems to be to the construction of harbours and docks as well as to the structure of the ships, e.g. providing them with decks (ch. x. 4).
² 704 b.c. ³ 664 b.c.
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tois palaiois poihtais dedhlwtaiv afneidon gar epwvomasa v to chxorion. epeidhi te o "Ellines malloin eplojou, tas vaids kthsamevoi to lhsi-
kow kathroun, kai emporion parехontes amfoteran dynatih texhon chrhmatoi prosodph tin polin.

6 kai "Iowisin ustereon polu gignetai vautikow epit Kyrwn Perswv protou basilewntos kai Kamb-
bysoi tov uioi auctou, ths te kath eautous thalasshs Kyrw polemoynites ekratiasin tina
chroun. kai Polukraths, Samou turaanwv epit Kambbysoi, vautikw iskhwn allass te tovnh vissow
uphkous epoishato kai 'Rihewan elwv anethike to 'Apollwv to Dhlwv. Fwkaihn te Maspalian
oikizontes Karhkhdonious evikwn vamvakoynites.

XIV. Dynatwta ga r tahta tov vautikow

2 559-529 B.C. 3 532-522 B.C. 4 cf. iii. civ.
5 Marseilles, founded 600 B.C.
been shown even by the early poets, who called the place "Wealthy Corinth."\(^1\) And when navigation grew more prevalent among the Hellenes, the Corinthians acquired ships and swept the sea of piracy, and offering a market by sea as well as by land, raised their city to great power by means of their revenues. The Ionians, too, acquired a powerful navy later, in the time of Cyrus,\(^2\) the first king of the Persians, and of Cambyses his son; and waging war with Cyrus they maintained control of the sea about their own coasts for some time. Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos in the time of Cambyses,\(^3\) was strong in sea-power and subdued a number of the islands, Rhenea among them, which he captured and consecrated to the Delian Apollo.\(^4\) Finally the Phocaeans, when they were colonizing Massalia,\(^5\) conquered the Carthaginians in a sea-fight.

XIV. These were the most powerful of the fleets; and even these, we learn, though they were formed many generations later than the Trojan war, were provided with only a few triremes, but were still fitted out with fifty-oared galleys and the ordinary long boats,\(^6\) like the navies of that earlier time. Indeed, it was only a little before the Persian war and the death of Darius,\(^7\) who became king of the Persians after Cambyses, that triremes were acquired in large numbers, namely by the tyrants in various parts of Sicily and by the Corcyraeans; and these were the last navies worthy of note that were established in Hellas before the expedition of Xerxes. As for the Athenians and Aeginetans and any other maritime

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\(^1\) πλοῖα, usually contrasted with war-ships (τριήρεις), but here marked as ships of war by the epithet μακρά, though probably differing little except in size from trading-vessels.

\(^2\) 485 B.C.
Referring to Xerxes' invasion. This Aeginetan war is referred to in ch. xli. 2.

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powers, the fleets they had acquired were inconsiderable, consisting mostly of fifty-oared galleys; and it was only quite recently that the Athenians, when they were at war with the Aeginetans and were also expecting the Barbarians, built their fleet, at the instance of Themistocles—the very ships with which they fought at Salamis. And these vessels were still without decks throughout their length.

XV. Such were the navies of the Hellenes, both those of early and those of later times; nevertheless those who gave attention to such matters acquired not a little strength by reason both of revenue of money and of sway over others. For they—and especially the peoples whose own territory was insufficient—made expeditions against the islands and subjugated them. But by land no wars arose from which any considerable accession of power resulted; on the contrary, all that did occur were border wars with their several neighbours, and foreign expeditions far from their own country for the subjugation of others were not undertaken by the Hellenes. For they had not yet been brought into union as subjects of the most powerful states, nor, on the other hand, did they of their own accord make expeditions in common as equal allies; it was rather against one another that the neighbouring peoples severally made war. But it was chiefly in the war that arose a long time ago between the Chalcidians and the Eretrians, that all the rest of Hellas took sides in alliance with the one side or the other.

2 The war for the Lelantine Plain (cf. Hdt. v. xcix.; Strabo, x. i. 11); usually placed in the seventh century, but by Curtius in the eighth (see Hermes, x. pp. 220 ff.).
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XVI. Ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι, καὶ Ἰώσι προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ μέγα τῶν πραγμάτων Κῦρος καὶ ἡ Περσικὴ ἐξουσία Κροίσου καθελοῦσα καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς Ἀλνος ποταμῶν πρὸς θάλασσαν, ἐπεστράτευσε καὶ τὰς ἐν τῇ ἥπειρω πόλεις ἐδούλωσε, Δαρεῖος τε ὑστερον τῷ Φοινίκων ναυτικῷ κρατῶν καὶ τὰς νῆσους.

XVII. Τύραννοι τε ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι, τὸ ἐφ’ ἕαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι ἐστὶν τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐστὶν τὸ τὸν ἵδιον οίκον αὐξεῖν δι’ ἀσφαλείας ὅσον ἐδύναντο μάλιστα τὰς πόλεις ὥκουν, ἐπράξθη τε ὑπὸ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον, εἰ μὴ εἰ τὶ πρὸς περιοίκους τοὺς αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.  

1 οὔτω πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μήτε κοινὴ φανερὸν μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀπολμοτέρα εἶναι.

XVIII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὅτι τε Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρὶν τυραννεύσις οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὑπὸ Δακεδαίμονιών κατελύθησαν, ἢ γὰρ Δακεδαῖμον (μετὰ τὴν κτίσιν [τῶν νῦν ἐνοικοῦντων αὐτὴν]) ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἄν ἵσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασα ὃμως ἐκ παλαιτάτου καὶ ἴσων ἐν μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἐτη γάρ

1 After ἕκαστοις the MSS. have οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, for those in Sicily advanced to a very great degree of power, which Wex deletes, followed by most editors.
2 Hude omits with E.
XVI. But different Hellenic peoples in different localities met with obstacles to their continuous growth; for example, after the Ionians had attained great prosperity, Cyrus and the Persian empire, after subduing Croesus\(^1\) and all the territory between the river Halys and the sea, made war against them and enslaved the cities on the mainland, and later on Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician fleet, enslaved the islands also.\(^2\)

XVII. The tyrants, moreover—whenever there were tyrants in the Hellenic cities—since they had regard for their own interests only, both as to the safety of their own persons and as to the aggrandizement of their own families, in the administration of their cities made security, so far as they possibly could, their chief aim, and so no achievement worthy of mention was accomplished by them, except perchance by individuals in conflict with their own neighbours. So on all sides Hellas was for a long time kept from carrying out in common any notable undertaking, and also its several states from being more enterprising.

XVIII. But finally the tyrants, not only of Athens but also of the rest of Hellas (which, for a long time before Athens, had been dominated by tyrants)—at least most of them and the last that ever ruled, if we except those in Sicily—were put down by the Lacedaemonians. For although Lacedaemon, after the settlement there of the Dorians who now inhabit it, was, for the longest period of all the places of which we know, in a state of sedition, still it obtained good laws at an earlier time than any other land, and has always been free from tyrants; for the

\(^1\) 546 B.C. \(^2\) 493 B.C.
The legislation of Lycurgus, thus placed by Thucydides at four hundred years or more before 404 B.C., would be about 804 B.C. (Eratosthenes gives 884).
period during which the Lacedaemonians have been enjoying the same constitution\textsuperscript{1} covers about four hundred years or a little more down to the end of the Peloponnesian war. And it is for this reason that they became powerful and regulated the affairs of other states as well. Not many years after the overthrow of the tyrants in Hellas by the Lacedaemonians the battle of Marathon\textsuperscript{2} was fought between the Athenians and the Persians; and ten years after that the Barbarian came again with his great host against Hellas to enslave it. In the face of the great danger that threatened, the Lacedaemonians, because they were the most powerful, assumed the leadership of the Hellenes that joined in the war; and the Athenians, when the Persians came on, resolved to abandon their city, and packing up their goods embarked on their ships, and so became sailors. By a common effort the Barbarian was repelled; but not long afterwards the other Hellenes, both those who had revolted from the King and those who had joined the first confederacy against him, parted company and aligned themselves with either the Athenians or the Lacedaemonians; for these states had shown themselves the most powerful, the one strong by land and the other on the sea. The defensive alliance lasted only a little while; then the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians quarrelled and, with their respective allies, made war upon one another, and any of the rest of the Hellenes, if they chanced to be at variance, from now on resorted to one or the other. So that from the Persian invasion continually, to this present war, making peace at one time, at another time

\textsuperscript{2} 490 B.C.
τὰ δὲ πολεμοῦντες ἡ ἀλλήλοις ἡ τοῖς ἑαυτῶιν ἔξυμμάχοις ἀφισταμένοις εὖ παρεσκευάσαντο τὰ πολέμια καὶ ἐμπειρότεροι ἐγένοντο μετὰ κινδύνων τὰς μελέτας ποιοῦμενοι.

XIX. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Δακεδαιμόνιοι οὖν ὑποτελεῖσ ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ἐξυμμάχους ἤγοντο, κατ' ὁλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παράλαβόντες, πλὴν Χίων καὶ Δεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν. καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἱδία παρασκευὴ μεῖζων ἡ ὡς τὰ κράτιστα ποτὲ μετὰ ἀκραίφυος τῆς ἐξυμμαχίας ἦνθησαν.

XX. Τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαύτα ἦνρον, χαλεπά ὄντα παντὶ ἔξης τεκμηρίῳ πιστεύσαι. οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρώποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἡ ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ἡ, ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως παρὰ 2 ἀλλήλων δέχονται. Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος "Ἰππαρχον οἴονται υφ' 'Αρμοδίον καὶ 'Αριστογέ- τονος τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἵσασιν ὅτι Ἰππίας μὲν πρεσβύτατος ἄν ἤρχε τῶν Πεισι- στράτου υἱέων," Ἰππαρχος δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλὸς ἀδελ- φοὶ ἤσαν αὐτοῦ, ὑποτοπήσαντες δὲ τὶ ἐκεῖνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ καὶ παραχρῆμα Ἀρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογεί- των ἐκ τῶν ξυνειδότων σφίσιν Ἰππία μεμηνύσθαι,

1 cf. vi. lxxxv. 2; vii. lvii. 4.
2 Lost its independence after the revolt of 427 B.C. cf. iii. L
3 i.e. as if they took place in some distant land.
fighting with each other or with their own revolted allies, these two states prepared themselves well in matters of war, and became more experienced, taking their training amid actual dangers.

XIX. The Lacedaemonians maintained their hegemony without keeping their allies tributary to them, but took care that these should have an oligarchical form of government conformably to the sole interest of Sparta; the Athenians, on the other hand, maintained theirs by taking over in course of time the ships of the allied cities, with the exception of Chios and Lesbos, and by imposing on them all a tax of money. And so the individual resources of the Athenians available for this war became greater than those of themselves and their allies when that alliance was still unimpaired and strongest.

XX. Now the state of affairs in early times I have found to have been such as I have described, although it is difficult in such matters to credit any and every piece of testimony. For men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them just the same, even though these events belong to the history of their own country. Take the Athenians, for example; most of them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton. They do not know that it was Hippias, as the eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, who was ruler, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were merely his brothers; further, that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, suspecting, on that very day and at the very moment of executing their plan, that information had been conveyed to Hippias by one of their fellow-conspirators,

In the inner Ceramicus near the temple of Apollo Patrous.

2 Herodotus is doubtless one of the Hellenes here criticised. cf. vi. lvii., referring to the two votes; ix. liii., where he seems to have applied a term belonging to a deme (cf. Hdt. iii. lv.) to a division of the army.
held off from him as forewarned, but wishing to do something before they were seized and then take their chances, fell in with Hipparchus, who was marshalling the Panathenaic procession near the sanctuary called Leocorium, and killed him. There are many other matters, too, belonging to the present and not forgotten through lapse of time, regarding which the other Hellenes as well hold mistaken opinions, for example, that at Lacedaemon the kings cast not one but two votes each, and that the Lacedaemonians have the "Pitana company" in their army, which never at any time existed. So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand.

XXI. Still, from the evidence that has been given, any one would not err who should hold the view that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which the poets have put into song, adorning and amplifying their theme, and, on the other, which the chroniclers have composed with a view rather of pleasing the ear than of telling the truth, since their stories cannot be tested and most of them have from lapse of time won their way into the region of the fabulous so as to be incredible. He should regard the facts as having been made out with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest indications, considering that they have to do with early times. And so, even though men are always

3 Public recitation was the ordinary mode of getting the works of the poets and early logographers before the people.
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν φί μὲν ἄν πολεμῶσι τὸν παρόντα
αἰεὶ μέγιστον κρίνοντων, παυσαμένων δὲ τα ἁρ-
χαία μᾶλλον θαυμαζόντων, ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔρ-
γων σκοποῦσι δηλώσει ὁμώς μείζων γεγενημένος
αὐτῶν.

ΧΧΙ. Καὶ ὁσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἐκαστοί ἢ μέλ-
λουτες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἥδη ὄντες, χαλεπῶν
τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεύ-
σαι ἦν ἐμοὶ τε ὅπως αὐτὸς ἦκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοθέν
ποθὲν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὡς δ' ἄν ἐδόκουν μοι
ἐκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τα δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ἔμφυσες γνώ.

2 μης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἰρηται· τὰ
δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ
tοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἡξίωσα γράφειν
οὕδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὁσον δυνατῶν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ

3 ἐκάστου ἐπεξελθῶν. ἐπιτόνως δὲ ηὕρισκετο, διότι
οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἐκάστοις οὐ ταύτα περὶ
tῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκατέρων τις εὐνοίας

4 ἡ μνήμης ἔχοι. καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἵσως τὸ
μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπεστερον φανεῖται ὁσοὶ
inclined, while they are engaged in a war, to judge the present one the greatest, but when it is over to regard ancient events with greater wonder, yet this war will prove, for men who judge from the actual facts, to have been more important than any that went before.

XXII. As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others. And the endeavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection. And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem
THUCYDIDES

dē βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς
σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ
ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι,
ὡφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει. κτῆμα
te ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα
ἀκούειν ξύγκειται.

XXIII. Τῶν δὲ πρῶτον ἔργων μέγιστον ἐπρά-
χθη τὸ Μηδικὸν, καὶ τούτο ὁμοι δυὸι ναιμαχίαις
καὶ πεζομαχίαις ταχεῖαι τὴν κρίσιν ἔσχεν. τού-
tου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου μῆκος τε μέγα προῦβη,
παθήματα τε ἡγνηνίχθη γενέσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ
2 Ἐλλάδι οία οὖν ἔτερα ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ. οὔτε γὰρ
πόλεις τοσαίδε ληφθεὶσαν ἡρμῳδθησαν, αἱ μὲν
ὑπὸ βαρβάρων, αἱ δ᾽ ὑπὸ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀντιπολε-
μούντων (εἰς δὲ αἳ καὶ οἰκήτορας μετέβαλον
ἀλισκόμεναι), οὔτε φυγαὶ τοσαίδε ἀνθρώπων καὶ
φόνος, ὁ μὲν κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν πολέμον, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ
3 στασιάζειν. τά τε πρῶτον ἀκοῆ μὲν λεγόμενα,
ἔργῳ δὲ σπανιώτερον βεβαιούμενα οὐκ ἄπιστα
κατέστη, σεισμῶν τε πέρι, οἳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἄμα
μέρος γῆς καὶ ἵσχυρότατοι οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐπέσχον,
ἡλίου τε ἐκλείψεις, αἳ πυκνότεραι παρὰ τά ἐκ τοῦ
πρὶν χρόνου μυημονευόμενα ξυνέβησαν, αὐχμόι τε
ἔστι παρ᾽ οἷς μεγάλοι καὶ ἄπτ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ λιμοὶ

1 Artemisium and Salamis.
2 Thermopylae and Plataea.
3 As Colophon (iii. xxxiv.), Mycalessus (vii. xxix.).
less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to have a clear view both of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way—for these to adjudge my history profitable will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for the moment, but as a possession for all time.

XXIII. The greatest achievement of former times was the Persian war, and yet this was quickly decided in two sea-fights and two land-battles. But the Peloponnesian war was protracted to a great length, and in the course of it disasters befell Hellas the like of which had never occurred in any equal space of time. Never had so many cities been taken and left desolate, some by the Barbarians, and others by Hellenes themselves warring against one another; while several, after their capture, underwent a change of inhabitants. Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed, whether in the course of the war itself or as the result of civil dissensions. And so the stories of former times, handed down by oral tradition, but very rarely confirmed by fact, ceased to be incredible: about earthquakes, for instance, for they prevailed over a very large part of the earth and were likewise of the greatest violence; eclipses of the sun, which occurred at more frequent intervals than we find recorded of all former times; great droughts also in some quarters with resultant famines; and lastly—

4 e.g. Plataea (III. lxviii. 3), Thyrea (iv. lvii.).
5 e.g. Sollium (II. xxx.), Potidaea (II. lxx.), Anactorium (iv. xlix.), Scione (v. xxxii.), Melos (v. cxvi.).
καὶ ἡ ὥς ἠκιστα ἀκαίρασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μετὰ τούδε ἐπάληκα τοῦ πολέμου ὑμεῖς ἐξουσιάζοντες, ὑπεράντω δέ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντεύτες σπονδάς αἱ αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὖβοι ἀλλοι. διὸ δὲ ἦλθαν, τὰς αἰτίας προὺγραψα πρὸ τοῦ καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς, τὸ μὴ τιμᾶ την ζητῆσαι ποτὲ ἔξ ὅτου τοσοῦτοι πόλεμος τοῖς Ἐλλησι κατέστη. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφαιρεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις ἠγούμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάζασι ἐς τὸ πολέμειν· αἱ δὲ ἔς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἴδησαν ἐκατέρων, ἄφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδάς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.

XXIV. Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις ἐν δεξιᾷ ἐσπλέοντι τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπου προσοικοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν ὡς Ταυλάντων βάρβαροι, Ἰλλυρικόν έθνος. ταυτὴν ἀπόκισαν μὲν Κερκυραιοί, οἰκιστὴς δ' ἐγένετο Φάλλος Ἐρατοκλείδου, Κορίνθιος γένους, τῶν ἂφ᾽ Ἡρακλεός, κατὰ δὴ τὸν παλαιὸν νόμον ἐκ τῆς μητροπόλεως κατακληθείς ἄξιον κισαν δέ καὶ Κορινθιόν τινές καὶ τὸν ἄλλον Δωρικὸν γένους. προελθόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου ἐγένετο ἡ τῶν Ἐπιδαμνών δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάρθρωτος. στασιάσαντες δὲ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐτη πολλά, ὡς λέγεται, ἀπὸ πολέμου τινὸς τῶν προσαίκων βαρβάρων ἐφθάρησαν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς πολλῆς ἐστερηθήσαν, τὰ δὲ τελευταία πρὸ τοῦ τοῦ πολέμου ὁ δήμος αὐτῶν ἐξεδιώξε τοὺς δυνατοὺς, οἱ δὲ ἐπελθόντες μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐλήξοντο.
the disaster which wrought most harm to Hellas and destroyed a considerable part of the people—the noisome pestilence. For all these disasters fell upon them simultaneously with this war. And the war began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the thirty years' truce,\(^1\) concluded between them after the capture of Euboea. The reasons why they broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great a war. The truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war. But the reasons publicly alleged on either side which led them to break the truce and involved them in the war were as follows.

XXIV. There is a city called Epidamnus on the right hand as one sails into the Ionian gulf, and its next-door neighbours are a barbarian tribe, the Taulantians, of Illyrian race. The city was colonized by the Corecyraeans, and its founder was Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of Corinthian stock and a descendant of Heracles, who was invited from the mother-city according to the ancient custom; but some Corinthians and other Dorians joined the Corecyraeans in establishing the colony. As time passed the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous; but civil wars ensued, lasting, it is said, for many years, and in consequence of a war with the neighbouring barbarians they were crippled and stripped of most of their power. Finally, just before the Peloponnesian war, the populace expelled the aristocrats, and they, making common cause with the barbarians and

\(^1\) 445 B.C.; cf. ch. cxv. 1.
The koivai πανηγύρεις are the four great games, here doubtless referring especially to the Isthmian Games held at Corinth. The “privileges” would be places of honour (προεδρίαι), animals for sacrifice presented by the colonies of
attacking Epidamnus, plundered those who were in the city both by land and sea. These, when they were being hard pressed, sent envoys to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, begging them not to look on and see them destroyed, but to reconcile them with the exiles and to put a stop to the war with the barbarians. This petition they made, sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera. But the Corcyraeans denied their supplication, and sent them back unsuccessful.

XXV. The Epidamnians, recognizing that no aid was to be had from Corcyra, were at a loss how to settle their present difficulty; so they sent to Delphi and asked the god whether they should deliver up their city to the Corinthians as founders and try to procure some aid from them. The god answered that they should deliver it up to them and make them leaders. So the Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered up the city as a Corinthian colony, in accordance with the oracle, showing that their founder was from Corinth and stating the response of the oracle; and they begged the Corinthians not to look on and see them utterly destroyed, but to come to their rescue. The Corinthians undertook the task, partly on the ground of right, because they considered that the colony belonged to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans, partly also through hatred of the Corcyraeans, for the reason that these, though Corinthian colonists, neglected the mother-city. For neither at their common festival gatherings would they concede the customary privileges to Corinthians, nor would they begin with a representative of

the mother-city, sending of delegates (dewpol) to Corinthian festivals, etc.
προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν, ὠσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ αὐτούς καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμει ὅντες κατ’ ἐκείνου τὸν χρόνον ὅμοια τοῖς Ἑλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς πόλεμον παρασκευῇ δυνατῶτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ προὔχειν ἐστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόμενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν τῆς Κερκύρας κλέος ἔχοντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξηρτύνουτο τὸ ναυτικόν καὶ ἦσαν οὐκ ἀδύνατον τριήρεις γὰρ εἰκοσὶ καὶ ἐκατὸν ὑπήρχον αὐτοῖς ὅτε ἥρχοντο πολεμεῖν.

XXVI. Πάντων οὖν τούτων ἐγκλήματα ἔχοντες οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον ἐς τὴν Ἕπιδαμνὸν ἄσμενοι τὴν ὁφελίαν, οἰκήτορά τε τὸν Βουλόμενον ἵναι κελεύοντες καὶ Ἀμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Ἑλευκάδων καὶ ἑαυτῶν φρουροὺς. ἐπορεύθησαν δὲ πεζῇ ἐς Ἀπολλωνίαν Κορίνθίων οὐσαν ἀποικίαν, δέει τῶν Κερκυραίων μὴ κωλύσαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν περαιόμενοι. Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἤσθοντο τοὺς τε οἰκήτορας καὶ φρουροὺς ἤκοντας ἐς τὴν Ἕπιδαμνὸν τὴν τε ἀποικίαν Κορίνθιος δεδομένην, ἐχαλέπαινον καὶ πλεύσαντες εὐθὺς πέντε καὶ εἰκοσὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ύστερον ἐτέρῳ στόλῳ τοὺς τε φεύγουσας ἐκέλευον κατ’ ἐπίρειαν δέχεσθαι αὐτοὺς (ἢθ顽强 ἐς τὴν Κερκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἕπιδαμνῶν φυγάδες τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν, ἦν προίσχομενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν) τοὺς τε φρουροὺς οὖς

1 According to the custom obtaining in Hellenic cities, whereby a stranger could offer sacrifice only through a citizen who acted for him. προκαταρχόμενοι, as the Schol. explains, διὸντες πρότερον (sc. ἡ τοῖς ἄλλοις) τὰς καταυχὰς, i.e. giving the hair cut from the victim’s forehead to a repre-
Corinth the initial rites at sacrifices,¹ as the rest of the colonies did, but they treated them with contempt. For at that time they were in point of wealth equal to the richest of the Hellenes, and in preparation for war even stronger, while in sea-power they sometimes boasted that they were greatly superior, just because of the former occupation of the island by the Phaeacians,² whose glory was in their ships. It was for this reason that they kept on developing their navy, and they were in fact powerful; for they had on hand one hundred and twenty triremes when the war began.

XXVI. So the Corinthians, having all these grounds of complaint, gladly sent the desired aid to Epidamnus, inviting whoever wished to go along as settlers and despatching as a garrison some Ambraciots and Leucadians and a detachment of themselves. They proceeded to Apollonia, a colony of the Corinthians, going by land through fear of the Corcyraeans, lest they might be prevented by them if they should attempt to cross the sea. But when the Corcyraeans perceived that the settlers and the garrison had arrived at Epidamnus, and that their colony had been given up to the Corinthians, they were indignant. So they sailed immediately with twenty-five ships, and later with a second fleet, and insolently bade the Epidamnians dismiss the garrison sent by the Corinthians and the settlers, and also receive back their exiles; for the exiled Epidamnians had gone to Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of common ancestors and sentative of Corinth, that he might throw it on the fire (Claessen).

¹ cf. iii. lxx., where a sacred precinct of Alcinous in Corcyra is mentioned. The ancient belief that Corcyra was the Homeric Scheria has no support in the Odyssey.
Κορίνθιοι ἐπεμψαν καὶ τοὺς οἰκήτορας ἀποστέμ-πειν. οἴ δὲ Ἐπιδάμνιοι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ὑπήκουσαν, ἀλλὰ στρατεύουσιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ μετὰ τῶν φυγάδων ὡς κατάξοντες, καὶ τοὺς Ἰλλυρίους προσλαβόντες. προσκαθεξομένοι δὲ τὴν πόλιν προεῖπον Ἐπιδάμνιον τε τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ τοὺς ξένους ἀπαθεῖς ἀπίεναι: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὡς πολεμίως χρῆσθαι. ὥς δ᾽ οὖν ἐπείδθοντο, οἳ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι (ἐστὶ δ᾽ ἱσθμὸς τὸ χωρίον) ἐπολιορκοῦν τὴν πόλιν.

XXVII. Κορίνθιοι δ᾽, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς Ἐπιδάμνιον ἤλθον ἀγγελοὶ ὅτι πολιορκοῦνται, παρεσκευάζοντο στρατεύαν, καὶ ἄμα ἀποικιάν ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδάμνιον ἐκήρυσσον ἐπὶ τῇ ἱση καὶ ὀμοίᾳ τὸν βουλόμενον ἰέναι: εἰ δὲ τις τὸ παραυτικὰ μὲν μὴ ἐθέλει ξυμπλεῖν, μετέχειν δὲ βούλεται τῆς ἀποικίας, πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς καταθέντα Κορίνθιας μένειν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ πλέοντες πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ τάργυριοι καταβάλλοντες. ἐδηθήσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροσπέμψαι, εἰ ἀρα κωλύσωτο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλεῖν: οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο αὐτοῖς όκτὼ ναυσὶ ξυμπλεῖν, καὶ Παλής Κεφαλήνων τέσσαριν. καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίων ἐδηθήσαν, οἱ παρέσχον πέντε, Ἐρμιονῆς δὲ μίαν καὶ Τροιζηνίοι δύο, Δευκάδιοι δὲ δέκα καὶ Ἀμπρακιώται ὀκτώ. Θηβαίους δὲ χρήματα ἤτησαν καὶ Φλειασίους, Ἡλείους δὲ ναῦς τε κενὰς
invoking the tie of kinship had begged the Corcyraeans to restore them. As the Epidamnians paid no heed to them the Corcyraeans proceeded against them with forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they intended to restore, and taking along the Illyrians also. And sitting down before the city they proclaimed that the foreigners and any Epidamnians who wished might go away in safety; otherwise they would treat them as enemies. But when the Epidamnians would not comply, the Corcyraeans laid siege to the city, which is connected with the shore by an isthmus.

XXVII. But the Corinthians, when messengers came from Epidamnus announcing the siege, prepared an expedition and proclaimed at the same time a colony to Epidamnus, saying that any who wished might go there on a basis of equal rights for all, and that if anyone was not inclined to sail at once, but wished to have part in the colony, he might make a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae and remain at home. The number that sailed was large, as also of those who deposited the money. Request was also made of the Megarians to convoy them with ships, in case an attempt should be made by the Corcyraeans to prevent their sailing; and these were preparing to accompany them with eight ships, and the Paleans, from Cephalenia, with four. The Epidaurians, of whom a like request was made, furnished five ships, the Hermionians one, the Troezzenians two, the Leucadians ten, and the Ambraciots eight. Upon the Thebans and the Phliasians a demand was made for money, and upon the Eleans

1 The Corinthian drachma was about equivalent to 6d., but of course had greater purchasing power. The Attic drachma = 9¼d.
καὶ χρήματα. αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων νῆς παρεσκευάζοντο τριάκοντα καὶ τρισχίλιοι ὀπλίται.

XXVIII. Ἕπειδὴ δὲ ἐπύθοντο οἱ Κερκυραίοι τὴν παρασκευὴν, ἐλθόντες ἐς Κορίνθον μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Σικυωνίων πρέσβεων, οὗς παρέλαβον, ἐκέλευσον Κορινθίους τοὺς ἐν Ἑπιδάμμων φρουροὺς τε καὶ οἰκήτορας ἀπάγειν, ὡς οὐ 2 μετὸν αὐτοῖς Ἑπιδάμμων. εἰ δὲ τι ἀντιποιοῦνται, δίκας ἦθελον δοῦναι ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ παρὰ πόλεσιν αἷς ἀν ἀμφότεροι ξυμβώσων ὀποτέρων δὲ ἀν δικασθῇ εἶναι τὴν ἀποκίναι, τούτους κρατεῖν. ἦθελον δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντεῖῳ ἐπιτρέψαι. 3 πόλεμον δὲ οὐκ εἶχον ποιεῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκασθῆσθαι ἐφασαν, ἐκεῖνοιν βιαζομένων, φίλους ποιεῖσθαι οὗς οὐ βούλονται, ἐτέρους τῶν 4 νῦν ὄντων μᾶλλον, ὥφελίας ἑνεκα. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτοῖς, ἵνα τὰς τε ναῦς καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπὸ Ἑπιδάμμων ἀπαγάγωσι, Βοιολεύσεσθαι. πρῶτον δὲ οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν τοὺς μὲν 5 πολιορκεῖσθαι, ἕαυτοις δὲ δικάζεσθαι. Κερκυραίοι δὲ ἀντέλεγον, ἥν καὶ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐν Ἑπιδάμμῳ ἀπαγάγωσι, ποιήσειν ταύτα. ἐτοίμοι δὲ εἶναι καὶ ὡς ἀμφότεροι μένειν κατὰ χῶραν σπουδὰς δὲ 1 ποιήσασθαι ἔως ἂν ἡ δίκη γένηται.

1 Hude deletes δὲ, after Poppo.

1 A threat of an alliance with the Athenians, τῶν νῦν ὄντων referring to the Lacedaemonians and other Peloponnesians, not to the Illyrians (cf. ch. xxvi. 7), as Poppo suggested.
for unmanned ships as well as for money. And the Corinthians themselves, for their part, made ready thirty ships and three thousand hoplites.

XXVIII. When the Corcyraeans learned of these preparations they went to Corinth, with Lacedaemonian and Sicyonian envoys whom they took with them, and bade the Corinthians withdraw the garrison and settlers at Epidamnus, on the ground that they had no part in Epidamnus. But if they made any claim to it they were willing, they said, to submit the matter for arbitration to any states in the Peloponnesus that both should agree upon, and to whichever party the colony should be adjudged to belong, these should have it; and they were willing also to submit the matter to the oracle at Delphi. War, however, they warned them not to bring on; but if it must be, they too would be compelled, if the Corinthians forced the issue, to make friends with those for whom they had no wish, others beyond their present ones, in order to secure assistance. The Corinthians answered that if the Corcyraeans would withdraw their ships and the barbarians from Epidamnus they would consider the matter, but that meanwhile it was not proper for them to be discussing arbitration while the Epidamnians were undergoing siege. Whereupon the Corcyraeans replied that they would do this if the Corinthians on their part would withdraw their forces at Epidamnus; but they were also ready to arbitrate on condition that both parties should remain where they were and that they should make a truce until the decision should be given.²

² i.e. the envoys and the Corinthians.
³ Or, omitting ἄρα, "that they were also ready to make a truce until the decision should be given, on condition that both parties should remain where they were."
THUCYDIDES

XXIX. Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπῆκονον, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις αὐτοῖς ἦσαν αἱ νῆες καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι παρῆσαν, προπέμψαντες κήρυκα πρὸ-τερον πόλεμον προεροῦντα Κερκυραίους, ἀραντες ἐβδομήκοντα ναυσί καὶ πέντε δισχίλιοι τε ὀπλί-ταις ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ’Επίδαμνον, Κερκυραίους

2 ἑναντία πολεμήσουσι τοὺς μὲν νεῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Πελλίχου καὶ Καλλικράτης ὁ Καλλίου καὶ Τιμάνωρ ὁ Τιμάνθους, τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ Ἀρχέτιμος τε ὁ Εὐρυτίμου καὶ Ἰσαρχίδας ὁ Ισάρχου. ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἐγένοντο ἐν Ἀκτίῳ τῆς Ἀνακτορίας γῆς, οὔ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἔστιν, ἐπὶ τῶ ἱέρων τοῦ Ἀμπρακίκου κολπον, οἱ Κερκυραῖοι κήρυκά τε προὔπεμψαν αὐτοῖς ἐν ἀκατίῳ ἀπεριττοῦν μὴ πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἀμα ἐπλήρουν, ξεύχαντες τέ τὰς παλαιὰς ὡστε πλωίμους εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκεψά- σαντες. ὡς δὲ ὁ κῆρυξ τε ἀπήγγειλεν οὐδὲν εἰρηναῖον παρὰ τῶν Κορινθίων καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοῖς ἐπεπλῆρωσεν ὅσαι ὁγδοήκοντα (τεσσαράκοντα γὰρ Ἐπίδαμνον ἐπολιόρκουν), ἀνταναγαγόμενοι καὶ παραταξάμενοι ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἑκνήσαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι παρὰ πολὺ καὶ ναῦς πέντε καὶ δέκα διεφθείραν τῶν Κορινθίων. τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἠμέρᾳ αὐτοῖς ἔννεβθῇ καὶ τοὺς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον πολιόρκουντας παραστήσασθαι ῥμολογία ὡστε τοὺς μὲν ἐπήλυσας ἀποδόθαι, Κορινθίους δὲ ὁσαντας ἔχειν ἐως ἀν ἄλλο τι δόξη.

XXX. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τροπαίον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῇ Δευκίμνῃ τῆς Κερκυραίας ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους οὕς ἔλαβον
XXIX. The Corinthians, however, would not listen to any of these proposals, but, as soon as their ships were manned and their allies were at hand, they sent a herald in advance to declare war against the Corcyraeans; then, setting off with seventy-five ships and two thousand hoplites, they sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corcyraeans. Their ships were under the command of Aristeus son of Pellichus, Callicrates son of Callias, and Timanor son of Timanthes; the infantry under that of Archetimus son of Eurytimus and Isarchidas son of Isarchus. But when they reached Actium in the territory of Anactorium, where is the sanctuary of Apollo at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, the Corcyraeans sent out a herald in a small boat to forbid their advance, and at the same time proceeded to man their ships, having previously strengthened the old vessels with cross-beams so as to make them seaworthy, and having put the rest in repair. When their herald brought back no message of peace from the Corinthians and their ships were now fully manned, being eighty in number (for forty were besieging Epidamnus), they sailed out against the enemy and, drawing up in line, engaged in battle; and they won a complete victory and destroyed fifteen ships of the Corinthians. On the same day it happened that their troops which were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus forced it to a capitulation, on condition that the other immigrants should be sold into slavery but the Corinthians kept in bonds until something else should be agreed upon.

XXX. After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans set up a trophy of their victory at Leucimne, a promontory in the territory of Corecyra, and put to death the

1 i.e. the Ambraciots and Leucadians; cf. ch. xxvi. 1.
αἴχμαλώτοις ἀπέκτειναν, Κορινθίους δὲ δήσαντες
2 εἶχον. ὑστερον δὲ, ἐπειδή οἱ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ
ξύμμαχοι ἱσσημένοι ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ
οἶκου, τῆς θαλάσσης ἀπάσης ἐκράτουν τῆς κατ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ χωρία, οἱ Κερκυραῖοι, καὶ πλεύσαντες
ἐς Λευκάδα τὴν Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν τῆς γῆς έτε-
μον καὶ Κυλλήνην τὸ 'Ηλείων ἐπίνειοι ἐνέπρησαν,
3 ὅτι ναῦς καὶ χρήματα παρέσχουν Κορινθίοις. τοῦ
τε χρόνου τὸν πλείστον μετὰ τὴν ναυμαχίαν
ἐπεκράτουν τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τοὺς τῶν Κοριν-
θίων ξυμμάχους ἐπιπλέοντες ἐφθειροῦν, μέχρι οὐ
Κορίνθιοι περιόντι τῶ θέρει πέμψαντες ναύς καὶ
στρατιάν, ἐπεὶ σφόν οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπόμονων, ἑστρα-
τοπεδεύοντο ἐπὶ 'Ακτίῳ καὶ περὶ τὸ Χειμέριον
tῆς Θεσπρωτίδος, φυλακῆς ἐνεκα τῆς τε Λευκάδος
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ὅσαι σφίσι φίλιαι ἦσαν.
4 ἀντεστρατοπεδεύοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπὶ
tῆ Λευκίμμης ναυσί τε καὶ πεζῷ. ἐπέπλεον τε
οὐδέτεροι ἄλληλοις, ἄλλα τὸ θέρος τούτο ἀντι-
καθεζόμενοι χειμῶνος ἤδη ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οἶκου
ἐκάτεροι.

XXXI. Τὸν δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν πάντα τὸν μετὰ τὴν
ναυμαχίαν καὶ τὸν υστερον οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὅργη
φέροντες τὸν πρὸς Κερκυραίους πόλεμον ἐναυτη-
γούντο καὶ παρεσκεύαζοντο τὰ κράτιστα νεὼν
στόλον, ἐκ τε αὐτῆς Πελοποννήσου ἀγείροντες
καὶ τῆς ἄλλης 'Ελλάδος ἐρέτας μισθῷ πείδοντες.
2 πυρθευόμενοι δὲ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι τὴν παρασκευὴν
αὐτῶν ἐφοβοῦντο, καὶ (ἡσαν γὰρ οὐδενὸς 'Ελλη-
prisoners they had taken, with the exception of the Corinthians, whom they kept in fetters. But afterwards, when the Corinthians and their allies had gone back home with their ships after their defeat, the Corcyraeans were masters of the whole sea in that quarter, and sailing to Leucas, the colony of the Corinthians, they ravaged the country and burned Cyllene, the naval arsenal of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money to the Corinthians. And so for most of the time after the sea-fight they had control over the sea; and sailing against the allies of the Corinthians they kept harrying them, until the Corinthians, as the summer was drawing to an end, seeing that their allies were suffering, sent ships and an army and encamped at Actium and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thesprotis, as a protection for Leucas and the other cities that were friendly to themselves. And the Corcyraeans encamped on the opposite coast at Leucimne with both ships and infantry. Neither side sailed against the other, but they faced each other for the rest of this summer; it was not until winter had come that they each went back home.

XXXI. During the whole year after the sea-fight and the next year the Corinthians, being angrily indignant about their war with the Corcyraeans, kept building ships and preparing a naval armament with all their might, and collected oarsmen from both the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas by the inducement of pay. The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, were alarmed when they learned of their preparations, and since they were without an ally among

\[\pi ε\rho\iota\omicron\nu\tau\iota (as the MSS. read) = \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\omicron\nu\tau\iota. \]

But Ullrich (\textit{Beitr. z. Kr. iii. p. 5}) explains = \(\epsilon\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \pi\epsilon\rho\iota\omicron\nu\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\ \theta\epsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\), "in what remained of the summer." So Boehme.
καταστάσεις δὲ ἐκκλησίας ἐς ἀντιλογίαν ἠλθον. καὶ οἱ μὲν Κερκυραῖοι ἔλεξαν τοιάδει

XXXII. "Δίκαιον, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς μήτε εὐεργεσίας μήτε ξύμμαχοις προφείλο-


3 καταστήσουσι, μὴ ὄργιζεσθαι ἢν ἄτυχώσων. Κερ-


κυραῖοι δὲ μετὰ τῆς ξύμμαχας τῆς αἰτήσεως καὶ
taῦτα πιστεύοντες ἔχουσα ὑμῖν παρέξεσθαι ἀπέ-


3 στείλαν ἡμᾶς. τετύχηκε δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιτήδευμα


πρὸς τε ὑμᾶς ἐς τὴν χρείαν ἡμῶν ἄλογον καὶ ἐς
ta ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἄξυμφορον.


4 ξύμμαχοί τε γὰρ οὔδενος πω ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ


ἐκούσιοι γενόμενοι νῦν ἄλλων τούτῳ δεσομένοι


ἤκομεν, καὶ ἀμα ἐς τὸν παρόντα πόλεμον Κοριν-


θίων ἐρήμου δι' αὐτὸ καθέσταμεν. καὶ περιέ-


στηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη, τὸ
the Hellenes and had not enrolled themselves in the alliance either of the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, they decided to go to the Athenians, become their allies, and try to procure some aid from them. But the Corinthians also, hearing of this, themselves sent envoys to Athens to prevent the accession of the Athenian fleet to that of the Corcyraeans, as this would hamper them in settling the war as they wished. And when an assembly was held opposing speeches were made, and the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:

XXXII. "It is but fair, citizens of Athens, that those who, without any previous claim on the score of important service rendered or of an existing alliance, come to their neighbours to ask aid, as we do now, should show in the first place, if possible, that what they ask is advantageous, or at least that it is not hurtful, and, in the second place, that their gratitude can be depended on; but in case they establish neither of these things clearly, they should not be angry if unsuccessful. Now the Corcyraeans have sent us to ask for an alliance, and in full confidence that they will be able to give you guarantees on just these points. But it so happens that our policy has been at one and the same time inconsistent, as it must seem to you, with our petition, and is also disadvantageous under present circumstances to ourselves; for although heretofore we have freely chosen to be allies of no one, we have now come to ask others for an alliance, and at the same time, in the face of the present war with the Corinthians, we are, because of this very policy, isolated. And so what was formerly fondly imagined to be wise discretion on our part—to enter into no
μὴ ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ξυμμαχίᾳ τῇ τοῦ πέλας γνώμη 
ξυγκινδυνεύειν, νῦν ἄβουλία καὶ ἁσθένεια φαι- 
νομένη. τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ 
κατὰ μόνας ἀπεωσάμεθα Κορινθίους: ἐπειδὴ δὲ 
μείζονι παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς 
Ἄλλης Ἐλλάδος ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὄρμηνται καὶ ἡμεῖς 
ἀδύνατον ὅρωμεν ὄντες τῇ οἰκείᾳ μόνον δυνάμει 
περιγενέσθαι, καὶ ἄμα μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος, εἰ ἐσό- 
μεθα ὑπ' αὐτοῖς, ἀνάγκη καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ ἄλλου 
παντὸς ἐπικουρίας δεῖσθαι, καὶ ξυγγυώμη, εἰ μὴ 
μετὰ κακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἀμαρτία τῇ πρό- 
tερον ἀπραγμοσύνη ἐναντία τολμῶμεν.

ΤΣΧΧΧΙ. "Γενήσεται δὲ ύμῖν πειθομένους 
καλὴ ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας 
χρείας, πρῶτον μὲν ὦτι ἄδικουμένους καὶ οὐχ 
ἐτέρους βλάπτουσι τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ποιήσεσθε, 
ἐπειτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξά- 
μενοι ως ἀν μάλιστα μετ' αἰειμνήστου μαρτυρίου 
tὴν χάριν καταθήσεσθε, ναυτικῶν τε κεκτήμεθα 
πλὴν τοῦ παρ' ύμίν πλείστον. καὶ σκέψασθε 
tὸς εὐπραξία σπανιωτέρα ἡ τῆς τοῖς πολεμίοις 
λυπηροτέρα, εἰ ἴνα ὑμεῖς ἀν πρὸ πολλῶν χρημά- 
tῶν καὶ χάριτος ἐτιμήσασθε δύναμιν ύμῖν προσ-
γενέσθαι, αὕτη πάρεστιν αὐτεπάγγελτος, ἀνευ 
κινδύνων καὶ δαπάνης διδούσα ἑαυτὴν καὶ προσ-
έτι φέρουσα ἐς μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετὴν, οἷς δὲ 
ἐπαμυνεῖτε χάριν, ύμῖν δ' αὐτοῖς ἰσχύν· ἀ ἐν τῷ 
58
foreign alliance, with the possibility of having to take our share of the danger of our neighbour's policy—has now, in the event, proved want of wisdom and a source of weakness. It is true that, in the sea-fight we have had, we repulsed the Corinthians single-handed; but now that they have set out to attack us with a greater force, drawn from the Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, and we see that we are unable to prevail with our own strength alone, and since, further, our peril will be serious if we come into their power, we are constrained to ask help of you and of everyone else; and it is pardonable if we now, actuated by no baseness, but rather acknowledging an error of judgment, venture upon a course that runs counter to our former policy of avoiding foreign entanglements.

XXXIII. "For yourselves, if you concede what we ask, by a happy concurrence of events Athens can get both honour and advantage in many ways: first, you will be giving your aid to those who are wronged and not to those who injure others; next, by taking into alliance men whose most vital interests are at stake, you will lay up for yourselves a claim for gratitude with a record which will abide in our memories for ever; and, lastly, we have a navy greater than any but your own. Think of it now, what good fortune could be rarer, more vexatious to your foes, than this—that the power which you would have accounted it worth much money and gratitude to acquire should become yours unbidden, offering itself to you without danger or expense, and bringing you, besides, a good name before the world, gratitude from those who are to receive your help, and enhanced strength for yourselves? To few in all
Thucydides

παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγοις δὴ ἀμα πάντα ξυνέβη, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐξωμαχίας δεόμενοι οἷς ἐπικαλοῦνται ἀσφαλείαν καὶ κόσμον ὅν ἦσον διδόντες ἡ ληψόμενοι παραγίγονται.

3 "Τὸν δὲ πόλεμον, δι’ ὅπερ χρῆσιμοι ἂν εἴμεν, εἰ τις ὕμων μὴ οἶται ἐσεσθαι, γνώμης ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ὡς αὐθάνεται τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῶν ὑμετέρων πολεμησείντας καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους, δυναμένους παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὕμων ἐχθροὺς ὄντας, τὸ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς πᾶν ἡς τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῶν κοινῶ ἐχθεῖ καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἄλληλων στῶμεν μὴ δοῦν φθάσαι ἁμαρτωσιν, ἡ κακῶσαι ἡμᾶς ἢ σφάς αὐτοὺς βεβαιώσασθαι. ἡμετέροις δὲ γ’ αὐ̣ ἔργον προτερῆσαι, τῶν μὲν διδόντων, ὕμων δὲ δεξιομε-

4 νὸν τὴν ἐξωμαχίαν, καὶ προεπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντεπιβουλεύειν.

XXXIV. "Ἡν δὲ λέγωσιν ὡς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς σφετέρους ἀποίκους ἡμᾶς δέχεσθαι, μαθόντων ὡς πᾶσα ἀποικία εὐ μὲν πάσχουσα τιμᾶ τὴν μητρόπολιν, ἀδικομενή δὲ ἄλλοτριοῦτας οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν δουλῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμοιος τῶν λειτουρ-νοις εἰναι ἐκπέμπονται. ὡς δὲ ἡδίκους σαφές ἐστιν τὸ προκληθέντες ἢ γὰρ περὶ Ἐπιδάμνου ἐς κρίσιν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶ ίσῳ ἐβουλήθησαν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μετελθεῖν. καὶ ὕμων ἐστὼ τι τεκμῆ-

1 καὶ, before προκαταλαμβάνοντας in the MSS., deleted by Stahl.

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1 This allegation is denied in the speech of the Corinthians, ch. xli. 1.
2 Or, retaining καὶ before προκαταλαμβάνοντας, "and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, 6ο
history have such opportunities fallen all at the same time, and few are they who, when they beg for an alliance, come offering to those to whom they make their appeal as large a degree of security and honour as they expect to receive.

"Now as to the war which would give us occasion to be of service, if anyone of you thinks it will not occur he errs in judgment, and fails to perceive that the Lacedaemonians, through fear of you, are eager for war, and that the Corinthians, who have great influence with them and are enemies of yours, are making a beginning with us now with a view to a subsequent attack upon you, in order that we may not be led by our common hatred to take our stand together against them, and that they may not fail, before we unite, to attain their two objects—to harm us and to strengthen themselves. It is our business, on the other hand, to get the start of them—we offering and your accepting the alliance—and to forestall their schemes rather than to counteract them.

XXXIV. "But if they say that it is not right for you to receive their colonists, let them know that while every colony honours the mother-city so long as it is well treated, yet that if wronged it becomes alienated; for colonists are not sent out to be slaves to those who are left behind, but to be their equals. And that they were in the wrong is manifest; for when challenged to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus they preferred to prosecute their charges by war rather than by equity. And let their present treat-
θυκυδίδης

ριον ἂ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς δρῶσιν, ὅστε ἀπάτη τε μὴ παράγεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν δεομένους τε ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέος μὴ ὑπογρεῖν· ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἄν διατελοῖ.

XXXV. "Δύσετε δὲ οὗτε τὰς Δακεδαιμονίων σπουδᾶς δεχόμενοι ἡμᾶς μηδετέρων ὅντας ξυμμάχους. εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς, τῶν Ἐλληνιδῶν πόλεων ἡτὶς μηδαμοῦ ξυμμαχεῖ, ἐξεῖναι παρ’ ὑπ’ ὁποτέρους ἂν ἀρέσκηται ἐλθεῖν. καὶ δεινὸν εἰ τούσδε μὲν ἀπὸ τε τῶν ἐνσπόνδων ἐσται πληροῦν τὰς ναῦς καὶ προσέτη καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης Ἐλλάδος καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπηκόων, ἡμᾶς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς προκειμένης τε ξυμμαχίας εἰρήσουσι καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ὕφελιας, εἶτα ἐν ἀδικήματι θήσονται πεισθέντων ὕμων ἂ δεόμεθα. λο ἂ ἐν πλεῖουν αἰτία ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες ὑμᾶς ἔξωμεν· ἡμᾶς μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ οὐκ ἔχθροις ὅντας ἀπώσεσθε, τώνυτε δὲ οὕς ὁπως κωλυται ἔχθρων ὄντων καὶ ἐπιόντων γενήσεσθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς δύναμιν προσ- λαβεῖν περιώψεσθε· ἢν οὐ δίκαιον, ἀλλ’ ἢ κάκει- νων κωλύειν τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας μισθοφόρους ἢ καὶ ἡμῖν πέμπειν καθ’ ὃ τι ἂν πεισθήτε ὕφελίαν μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς δεξαμένους βοη- 5 θεῖν. πολλὰ δὲ, ὡσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὑπείπομεν, τὰ ξυμφέροντα ἀποδείκνυμεν, καὶ μέγιστον ὄτι οὐ τε

1 With the MSS.; Krüger conjectures et τε, followed by Hude.
ment of us, who are their kinsmen, be a warning to you, that you be not misled by their deceit, or, if they seek aid from you directly, that you may refuse it. For whoever finds fewest occasions to regret doing favours to his opponents will ever remain most secure.

XXXV. "Neither will you be breaking your treaty with the Lacedaemonians by receiving us, who are allies of neither party. For in this treaty it is stipulated that if any of the Hellenic cities is a member of no alliance, it is at liberty to join whichever side it pleases. And it is monstrous if they are to be allowed to recruit their navy, not only from their own allies, but also from the rest of Hellas besides, and particularly from your subjects, but are to debar us from the alliance that should naturally be open to us as well as from aid from any other quarter, and then shall count it a crime if you are persuaded to concede what we ask. Far more shall we hold you at fault if we fail to win your consent; for you will be repulsing us who are in peril and are not your enemies, while as regards these men, who are enemies and aggressors, you will not only not be thwarting them, but will even be allowing them to get fresh forces from your own dominions. To that they have no right; but it is right that you should either prevent them from raising mercenaries in places under your control, or else send aid to us also, on whatever terms you may be induced to make; but it would be best of all for you openly to receive and help us. And many, as we suggested at the outset,\(^1\) are the advantages which we can show you, and the most important of all is this, that the enemies of both of

\(^1\) Ch. xxxiii. 1.
αυτοὶ πολέμιοι ἡμῖν ἦσαν (ὅπερ σαφεστάτη πίστις) καὶ οὗτοι οὐκ ἄσθενεῖς, ἀλλ' ἱκανοὶ τοὺς μεταστάντας βλάψαι. καὶ ναυτικῆς καὶ οὐκ ἥπειρωτίδος τῆς ἑξυμμαχίας διδομένης οὕς ομοία ἡ ἀλλοτρίωσις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλιστα μὲν, εἰ δύνασθε, μηδένα ἄλλον ἐὰν κεκτῆσθαι ναῦς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅστις ἑχυρώτατος, τούτον φίλον ἔχειν.

XXXVI. "Καὶ ὅτω τάδε ἔξυμφέρουντα μὲν δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, φοβεῖται δὲ μὴ δὲ αὐτὰ πειθόμενοι τὰς σπονδάς λύσῃ, γνώτω τὸ μὲν δεδιὸς αὐτοῦ ἴσχὺν ἔχον τοὺς ἐναντίους μᾶλλον φοβήσον, τὸ δὲ θαρ-σοῦν μὴ δεξαμένου ἀσθενεῖς δὴ πρὸς ἴσχύντας τοὺς ἔχθρον ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἁμα οὐ περὶ τῆς Κερκύρας νῦν τὸ πλέον ἢ καὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν βουλευόμενος, καὶ οὐ τὰ κράτιστα αὐταῖς προνοῶν, ὅταν ἐς τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ὅσον οὐ παρόντα πόλεμον τὸ αὐτίκα περισκοπῶν ἐνδοιάζῃ χωρίον προσλαβεῖν ὃ μετὰ μεγίστων 2 καιρῶν οἰκειοῦται τε καὶ πολεμοῦται, τῆς τε γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλοιον κεῖται, ὥστε μήτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικὸν ἐὰσαι Πελοποννησίους ἐπελθεῖν τὸ τε ἐντεῦθεν πρὸς τάκεῖ παραπέμψαι, καὶ ἐς τάλλα ξυμφορώτατον ἔστων.

1 So ἦσαν seems to mean here, where εἰσί was to be expected; cf. ch. xxxiii. 3.
2 δεῖ or ἔξυμφερει seems to be implied.
3 The thirty-years' truce with Sparta; cf. ch. xxiii. 4.
us are, as we see, the same—which is the surest guarantee of fidelity—and these are not weak, but able to injure those who withdraw from them. And furthermore, when the alliance that is offered is with a maritime and not with a continental power, the alienation of such an ally is not a matter of indifference; on the contrary, you should by all means, if possible, permit no one else to possess ships; but if that is impossible, you should have as your friend him who is strongest therein.

XXXVI. "If anyone thinks that this course is indeed expedient, but fears that if he yields to this consideration he will be breaking off the truce, he should understand that his fear, if backed by strength, will make his enemies more afraid; whereas, if he reject our alliance, his confidence will be unsupported by might and will therefore be less formidable against enemies that are strong. He should understand, furthermore, that he is deliberating upon the interests, not so much of Corcyra, as of Athens, and that he is not making the best provision for her when, in the face of the war that is impending and all but present, he hesitates, through cautious consideration of the immediate chances, to attach to himself a country which is not made a friend or a foe except with the most momentous consequences. For Corcyra is favourably situated for a coasting voyage either to Italy or Sicily, so that you could prevent a fleet from coming thence to join the Peloponnesians, or could convoy thither a fleet from here; and in other respects it is a most advantageous

4 i.e. of themselves breaking the truce.
5 i.e. in the security of the truce.
6 Ancient mariners preferred to hug the coast rather than sail through the open sea.
THUCYDIDES

3 ὑποτάτῳ δ' ἀν κεφαλαίω, τοῖς τε ἐξήπτας καὶ καθ' ἐκαστὸν, τόδ' ἀν μὴ προέσθαι ἡμᾶς μᾶθοιτε· τρίᾳ μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἀξία τοῖς "Ελλησι ναυτικά, τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον καὶ τὸ Κορινθίων· τούτων δὲ εἰ περιόψεσθε τὰ δύο ἐς ταῦτα ἔλθεῖν καὶ Κορίνθιοι ἡμᾶς προκαταλήψουται, Κερκυ- ραῖοις τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀμα ναυμαχήσετε· ἐξάμενοι δὲ ἡμᾶς ἔξετε πρὸς αὐτοὺς πλείοσι ναύσι ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀγωνίζεσθαι.

4 Τοιαῦτα μὲν οἱ Κερκυραῖοι εἶπον· οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι μετ' αὐτοὺς τοιάδε.

XXXVII. "Ἀναγκαῖον Κερκυραίων τῶνδε οὐ μόνον περὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι σφᾶς τὸν λόγον ποιήσα- μένων, ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς τε ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ὦν εἰκότως πολεμῶνται, μυσθεῖστας πρῶτον καὶ ἡμᾶς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄλλον λόγον ἴεναι, ἵνα τὴν ἄφ' ἡμῶν τε ἄξιωσιν ἀσφα-, λέστερον προειδήτε καὶ τὴν τῶνδε χρείαν μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπώσησθε.

2 "Φασὶ δὲ ξυμμαχίαν διὰ τὸ σῶφρον οὐδενός πω δέξασθαι· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ κακουργία καὶ οὐκ ἀρετῇ ἐπετήδευσαν, ξυμμαχόν τε οὐδένα βουλόμενοι πρὸς τάδικήματα οὔτε1 μάρτυρα ἔχειν οὐδὲ παρα-, καλοῦντες αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀμά αὐτάρκη θέσιν κειμένη παρέχει αὐτοὺς δικαστάς ὑπ' Βλάπτουσί τινα μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ ξυνθῆκας

1 For οὐδέ of the MSS., Dobree's conjecture. Hude reads οὐδὲ . . . οὐδέ.
place. And by one briefest concluding word, which embraces both the whole issue and all separate facts, you will be convinced that you should not abandon us: The Hellenes have only three fleets that are worthy of mention, yours, ours, and that of the Corinthians; if, now, the Corinthians shall seize us first and you thus let two of these fleets become united, you will have to fight on the sea against both Corecyraeans and Peloponnesians at once; but if you accept us, you will be able to contend against them with your navy augmented by our own."

Thus spoke the Corecyraeans, and after them the Corinthians as follows:

XXXVII. "Since these Corecyraeans have not confined themselves to the question of their admission into your alliance, but have gone further and urged that we are the wrong-doers and they are unfairly attacked, we too must of necessity touch upon both these points before we proceed to our general argument, in order that you may be more definitely forewarned of the nature of the demand we have to make, and may have good grounds for rejecting their petition.

"They say that 'a wise discretion' has hitherto kept them from accepting an alliance with anyone; but the fact is that they adopted this policy with a view to villainy and not from virtuous motives, and because they wished in their misdeeds not to have any ally as witness, or to be put to shame if they invited his presence. Moreover, the insular and independent position of this state causes them to be arbitrary judges of the injuries they do to others instead of being judges appointed by mutual agree-
γίγνεσθαι, διὰ τὸ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας ἐκπλή-ουτας μάλιστα τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνάγκη καταίροντας
4 δέχεσθαι. καὶ τούτο τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἀσπονδοῦν οὐχ
ίνα μὴ ἐξυναδικῶσιν ἐτέροις προβεβληται, ἀλλ’
ἐπὶ κατὰ μόνας ἁδικῶσι καὶ ὅπως ἐν ὑμῖν ἀν
κρατῶσι βιάζωνται, οὐ δ’ ἂν λάθωσι πλέον ἐχω-
σιν, ἦν δὲ ποῦ τι προλάβωσιν ἀναισχυντώσιν.
5 καίτοι εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες, ὀσπερ φασίν, ἀγαθοὶ, ὅσω
ἀληπτότεροι ἦσαν τοῖς πέλας, τόσῳ δὲ φανερω-
τέραν ἔξην αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν διδοὺσι καὶ δεχο-
μένοις τὰ δίκαια δεικνύναι.

XXXVIII. “‘Αλλ’ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους οὕτε
ἐς ἡμᾶς τοιοῦδε εἰσίν, ἀποικοὶ δ’ οὕτε ἀφεστασί
tε διὰ παντὸς καὶ νῦν πολεμοῦσι, λέγοντες ὡς
2 οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθεῖν. ἡμεῖς
dὲ οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ φαμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζε-
σθαι κατοικίσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι
3 καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι. αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι
ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποικῶν
4 στεργόμεθα· καὶ δῆλον ὅτι, εἰ τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀρε-
σκοντες ἐσμεν, τοῖσδ’ ἂν μόνοις οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαρέ-
σκοιμεν, οὐδ’ ἐπιστρατεύομεν ἐκπρεπῶς μὴ καὶ
5 διαφερόντως τι ἁδικοῦμενοι. καλὸν δ’ ἦν, εἰ καὶ
ἡμαρτάνομεν, τοῖσδε μὲν εἰξαι τῇ ἠμετέρᾳ ὅργῃ,
ἡμῖν δὲ αἰσχρῶν βιάσασθαι τὴν τούτων μετρι-
ment; owing to the fact that they resort very little to the ports of their neighbours, but to a very large extent receive into their ports others who are compelled to put in there. And meanwhile they have used as a cloak their specious policy of avoiding alliances, adopted not in order to avoid joining others in wrong-doing, but that they may do wrong all alone; that wherever they have power they may use violence, and wherever they can escape detection they may overreach someone; and if, per-chance, they can steal a march on anyone, that they may brazen it out. And yet, if they were really honest men, as they pretend to be, the less liable they were to attack by their neighbours the more clearly they might have demonstrated their virtuous motives by offering and accepting proposals of arbitration.

XXXVIII. "But neither toward others nor toward us have they shown themselves honest men; on the contrary, although they are colonists of ours, they have constantly stood aloof from us, and now they are at war with us, claiming that they were not sent out to be ill treated. But neither did we colonize them to be insulted by them, but to be their leaders and to receive from them all due reverence. The rest of our colonies, at any rate, honour us, and by our colonists we are beloved more than is any other mother-city. And it is clear that, if we are acceptable to the majority, it cannot be on good grounds that we are unacceptable to these alone; nor are we making war upon them in a way so unusual without being also signally wronged. And even if we were at fault, the honourable course for them would have been to make allowance for our temper, in which case it would have been shameful
"...ύβρει δὲ καὶ ἐξουσία πλούτου πολλὰ ἐς ἡμᾶς ἀλλα τε ἡμαρτήκασι καὶ Ἑπίδαμνον ἡμετέραν οὕσαν κακουμένην μὲν οὐ προσεποιοῦντο, ἐλθόντων δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τιμωρία ἐλόντες βία ἔχουσιν.

XXXIX. "Καὶ φασὶ δὴ δίκη πρότερον ἔθελησαι κρίνεσθαι, ἢν γε οὐ τὸν προύχοντα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀσφαλοὺς προκαλοῦμενον λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἐς ἰσον τά τε ἔργα ῥμοίως καὶ τοὺς λόγους πρίν διαγωνίζεσθαι καθιστάντα. οὐτοὶ δὲ οὐ πρίν πολιορκεῖν τὸ χωρίον, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἡγῆσαντο ἡμᾶς οὐ περιόψεσθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ εὐπρεπῆς τῆς δίκης παρέσχοντο καὶ δεύρο ἡκουσίν, οὐ τάκει μόνον αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς νῦν ἁξιοῦντες οὐ ἄξιμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἐνυαδικεῖν καὶ διαφόρους ὄντας ἡμῖν δέχεσθαι σφᾶς οὐς χρῆν, οτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσιέναι, καὶ μὴ ἐν ϑ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἡδικήμεθα, οὕτω δὲ κινδυνεύουσι, μηδὲ ἐν ϑ ὑμεῖς τῆς τε δυνάμεως αὐτῶν τότε οὐ μεταλαβόντες τῆς ὀφελίας νῦν μεταδόσετε καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀπὸ ἱενόμενοι τῆς ἀφ’ ἡμῶν αἰτίας το ἰσον ἐξετε, πάλαι δὲ κοινώσαιτάς την δύναμιν κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἔχειν."

XL. "Ὄς μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ τε μετὰ προσηκόντων ἐγκλημάτων ἐρχόμεθα καὶ οἴδε βίαιοι καὶ πλεο-

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1 ἐγκλημάτων δὲ μόνων ἀμετόχους οὕτως τῶν μετὰ τὰς πράξεις τούτων μὴ κοινωνεῖν, "As, however, you have had no share in the accusations, you should not share in the consequences." This clause is omitted by all good MSS. except G, and by all recent editors except Bloomfield.
for us to outrage their moderation; but in the injustice and arrogance of wealth they have wronged us in many other ways, and particularly in the case of Epidamnus, our colony, which they made no claim to when it was in distress, but seized by force the moment we came to its relief, and continue to hold.

XXXIX. "They pretend, forsooth, that they were the first to agree to an arbitration of the issue; but surely it is not the proposals of the one who has the advantage, and occupies a safe position when he invites arbitration, that ought to have weight, but rather those of the one who has made his actions tally with his professions before appealing to arms. These men, however, bring forward their specious offer of a court of arbitration, not before laying siege to the place, but only after they had concluded that we would not permit it. And now, not satisfied with the blunders they have committed themselves at Epidamnus, they have come here demanding that you too at this juncture, shall be, not their allies, but their accomplices in crime, and that you shall receive them, now that they are at variance with us. But they ought to have come to you when they were in no peril at all, and not at a time when we are victims of their injustice and they are consequently in danger, nor when you, without having had the benefit of their power before, will now have to give them a share of your aid, and, though you had nothing to do with their blunders, will have to bear an equal part of the blame we shall bestow. For only if you from the first had shared their power ought you to share the consequences also now of their acts.

XL. "Now it has been clearly shown that we have come with proper grounds of complaint against
νέκται εἰςὶ δεδήλωται: ὡς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δικαίως
2 αὐτοὺς δέχοισθε μαθείν χρῆ. εἰ γὰρ εἰρήται ἐν
tαῖς σπουδαῖς, ἐξεῖναι παρ' ὀποτέρους τις βού-
λεται τῶν ἀγράφων πόλεων ἐλθεῖν, οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ
βλάβῃ ἐτέρων ιοῦσιν ἡ ξυνθήκη ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὀστὶς μὴ ἄλλου ἐαυτὸν ἀποστερῶν ἀσφαλείας
dεῖται καὶ ὀστὶς μὴ τοῖς δεξαμένοις, εἰ σωφρο-
νοῦσι, πόλεμον ἀντ' εἰρήνης ποιῆσει· οὐ νῦν ὑμεῖς
3 μὴ πειθόμενοι ἤμιν πάθοιτε ἰν. οὐ γὰρ τοῖσδε
μόνον ἐπίκουροι ἄν γένοισθε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤμιν ἂντὶ
ἐνσπόνδων πολέμιοι. ἀνάγκη γὰρ, εἰ ἵτε μετ'
4 αὐτῶν, καὶ ἀμύνεσθαί μὴ ἄνευ ὑμῶν τούτους. καὶ-
tοι δίκαιοί γ' ἐστε μάλιστα μὲν ἐκποδὼν στήναι
ἀμφοτέροις, εἰ δὲ μῆ, τούναντιόν ἐπὶ τούτους μεθ'
ἡμῶν ἴέναι (Κορινθίοις μὲν γε ἐνσπονδοί ἐστε,
Κερκυραίοις δὲ οὐδὲ δ' ἀνοκωχής πώποτε ἐγέ-
νεσθε), καὶ τὸν νόμον μὴ καθιστάναι ὡστε τοὺς
5 ἐτέρων ἀφισταμένους δέχεσθαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴμεῖς
Σαμῖοι ἀποστάντων ψῆφων προσεθέμεθα ἐναν-
tίαν ἤμιν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων δίχα ἐψη-
φισμένων εἰ χρῆ αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερῶς δὲ
ἀντείπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ἐξυμμάχους αὐτῶν
6 τινα κολάζειν. εἰ γὰρ τοὺς κακὸν τι δρῶντας
δεχόμενοι τιμωρήσετε, φανεῖται καὶ ἂ τῶν ὑμετέ-

1 i.e. “who will permit peace to be maintained by their
new friends if they exercise ordinary discretion.” No new
allies should be received who will render ordinary discretion

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them and that they are violent and overreaching; but you have still to learn that you have no right to receive them into your alliance. For even though it is stipulated in the treaty that any unenrolled city may join whichever party it pleases, the provision is not intended for those who apply to one side for admission with a view to the injury of the other, but for any one who, without defrauding another state of his services, asks for protection, and any one who to those who received him will not—if they are prudent—bring war instead of peace. But this is precisely what will be your fate if you do not listen to us. For you will not merely become allies to them, but also enemies to us instead of being at truce with us. For it will be necessary for us, if you go with them, to include you when we proceed to take vengeance upon them. And yet the right course for you would be, preferably, to stand aloof from us both,—or else to go with us against them, remembering that you are under treaty with the Corinthians, but have never had with the Corcyraeans even an arrangement to refrain from hostilities for a time,—and not to establish the precedent of admitting into your alliance those who revolt from the other side. Why, when the Samians revolted from you, and the other Peloponnesians were divided in their votes on the question of aiding them, we on our part did not vote against you; on the contrary, we openly maintained that each one should discipline his own allies without interference. If you receive and assist evil-doers, you will surely find that unavailing to prevent war, as the Corcyraeans are sure to do.

2 440 B.C. cf. ch. cxv.
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ρων οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἦμιν πρόσεισι, καὶ τὸν νόμον ἐφ' ἦμιν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἐφ' ἦμιν θήσετε.

XLII. "Δικαιώματα μὲν οὖν τάδε πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔχομεν, ίκανὰ κατὰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνων νόμους, παραίνεσιν δὲ καὶ ἄξιωσιν χαρίτος τοιάνδε, ἢν οὐκ ἐχθροὶ ὑντες ὡστε βλάπτειν οὐδ' αὐ φίλοι ὡστ' ἐπιχρήσθαι, ἀντιδοθήμαι ἦμιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι
2 φαμέν χρήναι. νεὼν γὰρ μακρὸν σπανίσαντες ποτὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀἴγινητῶν ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ¹ πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἴκοσι ναός ἐλάβετε· καὶ ἡ ἐνεργεσία αὐτή τε καὶ ἡ ἐς Σαμίους, τὸ δὲ ἦμᾶς Πελοποννησίους αὐτοῖς μὴ βοηθῆσαι, παρέσχεν ὑμῖν Ἀἴγινητῶν μὲν ἐπικράτησιν, Σαμίων δὲ κόλασιν, καὶ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις ἐγένετο, οἷς μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι ἐπ' ἐχθροὺς τοὺς σφετέρους ἴντες τῶν ἀπάντων ἀπερίσποτοι εἰςι παρὰ
3 τὸ νικάν· φίλον τε γὰρ ἤγονται τὸν ὑπουργοῦντα, ἢν καὶ πρότερον ἐχθρὸς ἦ, πολέμοιν τε τὸν ἀντιστάντα, ἢν καὶ τύχη φίλος ὅν, ἔπει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα χεῖρον τίθενται φιλονικίας ἔνεκα τῆς αὐτικα.

XLIII. "*Ων ἐνθυμηθέντες καὶ νεώτερος τις παρὰ πρεσβυτέρου αὐτὰ μαθῶν ἄξιοντω τοῖς ὀμοίοις ἦμᾶς ἀμύνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ νομίσῃ δίκαια μὲν τάδε λέγεσθαι, ἔμφορα δέ, εἰ πολεμήσει,
2 ἀλλὰ εἰναι. τὸ τε γὰρ ἐμφέρον ἐν ὃ ἄν τις

¹ ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικά Krüger deletes, followed by Hude.
full as many of your allies will come over to us, and the precedent you establish will be against yourselves rather than against us.

XLI. "These, then, are the considerations of right which we urge upon you—and they are adequate according to the institutions of the Hellenes; but we have also to remind you of a favour and to urge a claim based upon it; and since we are not your enemies so as to want to injure you, nor yet your friends so that we could make use of you, we think this favour should be repaid us at the present time. It is this: when once, before the Persian war, you were deficient in battle-ships for the war you were waging with the Aeginetans, you borrowed twenty from the Corinthians. And this service and that we rendered in connection with the Samians—our preventing the Peloponnesians from aiding them—enabled you to prevail over the Aeginetans and to chastise the Samians. Both incidents happened, too, at a critical time, when men, engaged in assailing their enemies, are most indifferent to every consideration except victory, regarding any one who assists them as a friend, even if he was an enemy before, and any one who stands in their way as an enemy, even if he happen to be a friend; for they even mismanage their own interests in the eager rivalry of the moment.

XLII. "Bearing these favours in mind—let every young man here be told of them by one who is older—do you consider it your duty to requite us with the like. And do not think that this course is indeed equitable to urge in a speech, but that another course is advantageous if you come to war. For advantage is most likely to result when one
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ἐλάχιστα ἀμαρτάνη μάλιστα ἔπεται, καὶ τὸ 
μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου ὃ φοβοῦντες ύμᾶς Κερκυ- 
ραίου κελεύουσιν ἄδικεῖν ἐν ἄφανε ἔτι κεῖται, καὶ 
οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπαρθέντας αὐτῷ φανερὰν ἐχθραν ἢδη 
καὶ οὐ μέλλουσαν πρὸς Κορινθίους κτήσασθαι, 
τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχόνσει πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑπο-
ψίας σῷφρον ὑφελεῖν μᾶλλον (ἡ γὰρ τελευταῖα 
χάρις καιρῶν ἐχουσα, κἂν ἐλάσσων ἦ, δύναται 
μεῖζον ἐγκλῆμα λύσαι), μηδ' ὅτι ναυτικοῦ ἑῳμ-
μαχίναν μεγάλην διδόσας, τοῦτῳ ἐφέλκεσθαι τὸ 
γὰρ μὴ ἄδικεῖν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ 
τῷ αὐτίκα φανερῷ ἐπαρθέντας διὰ κινδύνων τὸ 
πλέον ἐχειν.

XLIII. “Ἡ μείζον δὲ περιπεπτωκότες οἰς ἐν τῇ 
Νακεδαίμονι αὐτόι προεἴπομεν, τοὺς σφετέρους 
ἑῳμαχίως αὐτῶν τίνα κολάξειν, νῦν παρ’ ύμῶν 
τὸ αὐτὸ ἄξιοῦμεν κομίζεσθαι, καὶ μη τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ 
ψήφῳ ὅφεληθέντας τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ἡμᾶς βλάψαι.

2 τὸ δὲ ἵσον ἀνταπόδοτε, γνόντες τοῦτον ἐκείνον 
εἶναι τὸν καιρόν, ἐν χ' ὅ τε ὑπογρῶν φίλος μά-
λιστα καὶ ὁ ἀντιστὰς ἐχθρός. καὶ Κερκυραῖοι 
γε τοῦσδε μὴτε ἑῳμάχως δέχεσθε βία ὑμῶν 
4 μὴτε ἀμύνετε αὐτοῖς ἄδικονς. καὶ τάδε ποι-
οῦντες τὰ προσήκοντα τε δράσετε καὶ τὰ ἀρίστα 
βουλεύσεσθε ύμῖν αὐτοῖς.”

XLIV. Τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ οἱ Κορινθιοὶ εἶπον. 
‘Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκουόσαντες ἄμφωτερων, γενομένης
errs least, and the contingency of the war, with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into wrong-doing, is still uncertain; and it is not worth while for you to be so carried away by it as to acquire an enmity with the Corinthians that will be from that moment on a manifest fact and no longer a contingency. It would be, rather, the prudent course to remove something of the suspicion which has heretofore existed on account of the Megarians; for the favour which comes last, if conferred at the right moment, even though a small one, can cancel a greater offence. Nor ought you to be tempted by their offer of a great naval alliance; for to refrain from wronging equals is a surer strength than to be carried away by present appearances and seek an advantage by incurring dangers.

XLIII. "But we, since events have brought us under the rule which we ourselves proclaimed at Sparta, that each should discipline his own allies, now claim from you in return the same treatment—that you who were then aided by our vote should not injure us by yours. Pay back like with like, determining that this is the supreme moment when assistance is the truest friendship—opposition the worst hostility. We beg you neither to accept the Corcyraeans as your allies in despite of us, nor to aid them in their wrong-doing. And if you do this, you will not only be taking the fitting course, but will also be consulting your own best interests."

XLIV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Athenians, having heard both sides, held a second

1 Referring apparently to the exclusion of the Megarians from all harbours within the Athenian dominion and from the market at Athens, ch. lxvii. 4.
καὶ δις ἐκκλησίας, τῇ μὲν προτέρα οὖχ ἦσον τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγγυσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὡστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν (εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ Κόρινθου ἐκέλευσεν σφίζων οἱ Κερκυραίοι ξυμπλεῖν, ἐλύσων ἄν αὐτοῖς αἱ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους σπονδαί), ἐπιμαχίαν δὲ ἐποιήσαντο τῇ ἀλλήλων βοήθεια, εὰν τις ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἤ ἦ Ἁθήνας ἢ τοὺς τούτων ξυμμάχους. 2 ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμος καὶ ὃς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὴν Κέρκυραν ἐβούλοντο μὴ προείσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοις ναυτικῶν ἐχοῦσαν τοσοῦτον, ἔγγροιειν δὲ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοὺς ἀλλήλοις, ἵνα ἀσθενεστέροις οὕσιν, ἦν τι δὲ, Κορινθίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς τοῖς ναυτικῶν 3 ἔχουσιν ἐς πόλεμον καθιστῶνται. ἀμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλω κείσθαι.

XLV. Τοιαύτη μὲν γνώμη οἱ Ἁθηναῖοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους προσεδέξαντο, καὶ τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπελθόντων οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον δέκα ναῦς αὐτοῖς ἅπεστειλαν βοηθοῦσι: ἔστρατηγεὶ δὲ αὐτῶν Λακε-δαίμονίος τε ὁ Κίμωνος καὶ Διότιμος ὁ Στρομ. 3 βίχου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους. προείπον δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ ναυμαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἦν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων· οὕτω δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναμιν. προείπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ λυεῖν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδαίς. 1 Added by Bekker.
session of the Ecclesia; and although at the earlier one they were rather inclined to agree with the words of the Corinthians, on the second day they changed their minds in favour of the Corecyraeans, and decided, not, indeed, to make an offensive and defensive alliance with them, for in that case, if the Corecyraeans then asked them to join in an expedition against Corinth, they would have to break, on their own responsibility, the treaty with the Lacedaemonians—but they made a defensive alliance, namely to aid one another in case anyone should attack Corecyra or Athens or the allies of either. For they believed that in any event the war with the Peloponnesians would have to be faced, and they did not wish to give up Corecyra, which had so large a fleet, to the Corinthians, but hoped to wear them out upon one another as much as possible, in order that the Corinthians as well as other naval powers¹ might be found weaker in case they had to go to war with them. Besides, the island seemed to them admirably situated for a coasting voyage to Italy and Sicily.²

XLV. With these motives the Athenians received the Corecyraeans into alliance and sent to their aid, soon after the departure of the Corinthians, ten ships commanded by Lacedaemonius son of Cimon, Diotimus son of Strombichus, and Proteas son of Epicles. Orders were given to these not to engage with the Corinthians, unless they should sail against Corecyra and attempt to land there, or to some place belonging to the Corecyraeans; but in that case they were to thwart them if possible. The object of these orders was to avoid breaking the treaty.

¹ Referring especially to those mentioned ch. xxvii. 2.
² cf. ch. xxxvi. 2.
XLVI. Αἱ μὲν δὴ νῆσες ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ἐκερκυραν. οἱ δὲ Κορινθίου, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοὶς παρε- σκεύαστο, ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἐκερκυραν ναυσὶ πεντή- κοντα καὶ ἑκατόν. ήσαν δὲ Ἡλεῖων μὲν δέκα, Μεγαρέων δὲ δώδεκα καὶ Λευκαδίων δέκα, Ἀμ- πρακιωτῶν δὲ ἑπτά καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ Ἀνακτορίων

2 μία, αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων ἑνενήκοντα. στρατηγοὶ
dὲ τούτων ἦσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἑκάστων,
Κορινθίων δὲ Ξενοκλείδης ὁ Ἐυθυκλέους πέμπτος

3 αὐτὸς. ἐπειδὴ δὲ προσέμειξαν τῇ κατὰ Κερκυραν
ηπείρῳ ἀπὸ Λευκάδας πλέοντες, ὀρμύζονται ἐς

4 Χειμέριον τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος γῆς. ἔστι δὲ λυμήν,
kαὶ πόλεις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κεῖται ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐν
tῇ Ἑλαιατίδι τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἐφύρη. ἐξηγεῖ δὲ
παρ’ αὐτὴν Ἀχερουσία λίμνη ἐς θάλασσαν. διὰ
dὲ τῆς Θεσπρωτίδος Ἀχέρων ποταμὸς ρέων
ἔσβάλλει ἐς αὐτὴν, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ τὴν ἑπωνυμίαν
ἐχει, ἰδί δὲ καὶ Ἐυάμως ποταμὸς ὀρύζων τῆν
Θεσπρωτίδα καὶ Κεστρίνην, ὃν ἐντὸς ἡ ἄκρα

5 ἀνέχει τὸ Χειμέριον. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κορινθίου τῆς
ηπείρου ἐνταῦθα ὀρμύζονται τε καὶ στρατόπεδον
ἐποιήσαντο.

XLVII. Οἱ δὲ Κερκυραῖοι ὡς ἠσθοντο αὐτοὺς
προσπλέοντας, πληρώσαντες δέκα καὶ ἑκατον
ναῦς, ὃν ἤρχε Μικιάδης καὶ Λισιμίδης καὶ Ἐυρύ-
βατος, ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν μιᾶ τῶν νῆσων αἱ
καλοῦνται Σύβωτα, καὶ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ δέκα παρῆσαν.

2 ἔπι δὲ τῇ Λευκίμμην αὐτοῖς τῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ ὁ πεζὸς
ἡν καὶ Ζακυνθίων χίλιοι ὀπλίται βεβοηθηκότες.

3 ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐν τῇ ἴπειρῳ πολλοὶ
tῶν ἑβράρων παραβεβοηθηκότες. οἱ γὰρ ταύτῃ
ἵπειρῳ ταῖς ἐποτε φίλοι αὐτοῖς εἰσιν.
XLVI. These ships arrived at Corecyra, and the Corinthians, when their preparations had been made, sailed against Corecyra with one hundred and fifty ships. Of these ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Megarians, ten to the Leucadians, seventeen to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and ninety to the Corinthians themselves. The several cities had each its own general, but Xenocleides son of Euthycles and four others commanded the Corinthians. They sailed from Leucas, and when they drew near the mainland over against Corecyra, anchored at Cheimerium in the territory of Thesprotia. It is a harbour, and above it lies a city away from the sea in the Eleatic district of Thesprotia, Ephyra by name. Near it is the outlet into the sea of the Acherusian lake; and the river Acheron runs through Thesprotia and empties into the lake, to which it gives its name. There is also the river Thyamis, which separates Thesprotia and Cestrine, and between these rivers rises the promontory of Cheimerium. It was at this point of the mainland then that the Corinthians cast anchor and made a camp.

XLVII. The Corecyraeans, when they became aware of their approach, manned a hundred and ten ships under the command of Miciades, Aesimides, and Eurybatus, and encamped on one of the islands which are called Sybota, the ten Attic ships being also present. Their land-forces were at the promontory of Leucimne, and also a thousand hoplites of the Zacynthians who had come to aid the Corecyraeans. The Corinthians, also, had the aid of many barbarians who had assembled on the mainland adjacent; for the dwellers on the mainland in that region have always been friendly to them.
XLVIII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ παρεσκεύαστο τοῖς Κορινθίοις, λαβόντες τριῶν ἠμερῶν σιτία ἀνήγοντο
2 ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχία ἀπὸ τοῦ. Χειμρεῖον νυκτὸς, καὶ ἀμα ἧπω πλέοντες καθορώσι τὰς τῶν Κερκυραίων
3 ναῦς μετεώρους τε καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλεούσας. ὡς
dὲ κατείδον ἀλλήλους, ἀντιπαρετάσσοντο, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ δεξίων κέρας Κερκυραίων αἱ Ἀττικαὶ
νῆς, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπείχουν τρία τέλη ποιή-
sαντες τῶν νεῶν, δὴ ἠρχε τριῶν στρατηγῶν
ἐκάστον εἰς. οὖτω μὲν Κερκυραίου έτάξαντο.
4 Κορινθίοις δὲ τὸ μὲν δεξίων κέρας αἱ Μεγαρίδες
νῆες εἴχον καὶ αἱ Ἀμπρακιώτιδες, κατὰ δὲ τὸ
μέσον οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ὡς ἐκαστοί, εὐώνυμον
dὲ κέρας αὐτοὶ οἱ Κορινθίοι ταῖς ἄριστα τῶν νεῶν
πλεούσαις κατὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ δεξίων
tῶν Κερκυραίων εἴχον.

XLIX. Ξυμμείξαντες δὲ, ἐπειδὴ τὰ σημεῖα
ἐκατέρως ἦρθη, ἐναυμάχουν, πολλοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας
ἐχοντες ἀμφότεροι ἐπὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων, πολ-
λοὺς δὲ τοξότας τε καὶ ἁκοινιστάς, τῶν παλαίων
2 τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἐτί παρασκευασμένοι. ἦν τε
ἡ ναυμαχία καρτερά, τῇ μὲν τέχνῃ οὐχ ὁμοίως,
3 πεζομαχία δὲ τὸ πλέον προσφερῆς οὔσα. ἐπειδὴ
γὰρ προσβάλοιεν ἀλλήλοις, οὐ ραδίως ἀπελύοντο
ὑπὸ τε τοῦ πλῆθους καὶ ὁχλοῦ τῶν νεῶν καὶ μᾶλ-
λον τι πιστεύοντες τοῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος
ὀπλίταις ἐς τὴν νίκην, οἱ καταστάντες ἐμάχοντο
ἵσυχαζούσον τῶν νεῶν διέκπλοι δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν,
ἀλλὰ θυμὸ καὶ ρώμη τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἦ.
XLVIII. When their preparations had been made, the Corinthians, taking provisions for three days, put off by night from Cheimerium with the intention of giving battle, and at daybreak as they sailed along they descried the ships of the Corcyraeans out at sea and sailing to meet them. And as soon as they saw one another, they drew up in opposing battle lines, the Attic ships on the right wing of the Corcyraeans, who themselves held the rest of the line forming three divisions, each under the command of one of the three generals. So the Corcyraeans arrayed themselves; but the right wing of the Corinthian fleet was held by the Megarian ships and the Ambracian, in the centre were the other allies with their several contingents, while the left was held by the Corinthians themselves with their best sailing ships, opposed to the Athenians and the right wing of the Corcyraeans.

XLIX. When the standards were raised on either side they joined battle and fought, both having many hoplites on the decks as well as many archers and javelin-men, for they were still equipped rather rudely in the ancient fashion. And so the sea-fight was hotly contested, not so much by reason of the skill displayed as because it was more like a battle on land. For when they dashed against one another they could not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number and throng of the ships, still more because they trusted for victory to the hoplites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships remained motionless; and there was no cutting of the line, but they fought with fury and brute strength rather than

1 διέκπλαυσ was a breaking of the line so as to ram the enemy's ship in the flank or astern.
4 ἑπιστήμη, πανταχῇ μὲν οὖν πολὺς θόρυβος καὶ ταραχῶδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία· ἐν ἡ αἰῶνα Ἀττικαί νῆσις παραγιγνόμεναι τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἰ πη πιέζοιτο, φόβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐναυτοῖς, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἥρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν προφητείαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Κορινθίων ἔπονει. οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραίοι εἶκοσι ναυϊν αὐτοὺς τρεψάμενοι καὶ καταδιώκοντες σποράδας ἐς τὴν ἡπείρον καὶ μέχρι τοῦ στρατοπεδοῦ πλεύσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπεκβάντες ἐνέπρησαν τε τὰς σκηνὰς ἐρήμους καὶ τὰ χρήματα διήρπασαν. ταῦτῃ μὲν οὖν οἱ Κορινθίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔσωστον τε καὶ οἱ Κερκυραῖοι ἐπεκράτον· ή δὲ αὐτοὶ ἦσαν οἱ Κορινθίοι, ἐπὶ τῷ εὐσώμῳ, πολὺ ἐνίκων, τοῖς Κερκυραίοις τῶν εἶκοσι νεῶν ἀπὸ ἔλασσονς πλῆθος εκ τῆς διό- 7 ξεως οὐ παροσῶν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ὅρωντες τοὺς Κερκυραίους πιεζομένους μᾶλλον ἦδη ἀπροφα- σίστως ἐπεκουροῦσιν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπεχόμενοι ὡστε μὴ ἐμβάλλειν τινὶ· ἔπειδη δὲ ἡ τροπὴ ἐγένετο λαμπρῶς καὶ ἐνέκειντο οἱ Κορινθίοι, τότε δὴ ἔργου πᾶς εἰχετο ἡδὴ καὶ διεκέρτο οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ ξυνέτεσσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὡστε ἐπιχειρῆσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθη- ναίους.

Σ. Τῆς δὲ τροπῆς γενομένης οἱ Κορινθίοι τὰ σκάφη μὲν οὖν εἶλκον ἀναδοῦμενοι τῶν νεῶν ἃς καταδύσειαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐτράποντο φονεύειν διεκπέλεοντες μᾶλλον ἦ ξονηφεῖν, τοὺς τε αὐτῶν φίλους, οὐκ ἠσθημένοι ὠτι ἡσθήσθητο οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ δεξιῷ κέρα, ἀγνοοῦντες ἐκτεινοῦν. πολλῶν γὰρ
with skill. Accordingly there was everywhere much tumult and confusion in the sea-fight. The Attic ships, if they saw the Corcyraeans pressed at any point, came up and kept the enemy in awe; but their generals would not begin fighting, fearing to disobey the instructions of the Athenians. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered most; for the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them and pursued them in disorder to the mainland, and then, sailing right up to their camp and disembarking, burned the deserted tents and plundered their property. In that quarter, then, the Corinthians and their allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans prevailed; but on the left wing where the Corinthians themselves were, they were decidedly superior, for the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were fewer to begin with, had the twenty ships away in the pursuit. But the moment the Athenians saw that the Corcyraeans were being hard pressed, they began to help them more unreservedly, and though they at first restrained from actually attacking an enemy ship, yet when it was conspicuously clear that they were being put to flight and the Corinthians were close in pursuit, then at length every man put his hand to work, and fine distinctions were no longer made; matters had come to such a pass that Corinthians and Athenians of necessity had to attack one another.

L. After the rout of the Corcyraeans the Corinthians did not take in tow and haul off the hulls of the ships which had been disabled, but turned their attention to the men, cruising up and down and killing them in preference to taking them alive; and they unwittingly slew their own friends, not being aware that their right wing had been worsted. For
Thucydides makes allowance for Salamis, for example, where Greeks had fought against Persians.
since the ships or the two fleets were many and covered a great stretch of sea, it was not easy, when they joined in combat, for the Corinthians to determine just who were conquering and who were being conquered; for this sea-fight was in number of ships engaged greater than any that Hellenes had ever before fought against Hellenes. But as soon as the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the shore, they turned to the wrecks and their own dead, and they were able to recover most of them and to fetch them to Sybota, an unused harbour of Thesprotia, whither the land forces of the barbarians had come to their aid. When they had accomplished this, they got their forces together and sailed once more against the Corcyraeans. And they, with such of their vessels as were seaworthy and all the rest that had not been engaged, together with the Attic ships, on their part also sailed to meet them, fearing that they would attempt to disembark on their territory. It was now late and the paean had been sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after the ten as a reinforcement, fearing just what happened, namely that the Corcyraeans would be defeated and their own ten ships would be too few to help them. LI. So when the Corinthians sighted these ships before the Corcyraeans did, suspecting that they were from Athens and that there were more of them than they saw, they began to withdraw. For the Corcyraeans, however, the Athenian ships were sailing up more out of view and could not be seen by them,

2 The bodies of the dead which were on the disabled ships.
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οὐχ ἐωρῶντο, καὶ ἑθαύμαζον τοὺς Κορινθίους πρῶτον κροουμένους, πρὶν τινες ἰδόντες εἰπον ὅτι νῆς ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέονσιν. τότε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχώρουν (Ἑυνεσκόταζε γὰρ ἡδή), καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἀποτραπόμενοι τὴν διάλυσιν ἐπονήσαντο. οoffsetof μὲν ἡ ἀπαλλαγῇ γεγένετο ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἡ ναυμαχία ἐτελεύτα ἐς νύκτα. τοῖς δὲ Κερκυραίοις στρατο- πεδευομένοις ἐπὶ τῇ Λευκίμνῃ αἱ εἰκοσὶ νῆς αἱ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν αὐτοὶ, ὄν ἡρχε Πλαύκων τε ὁ Λεώγρος καὶ Ἄνδοκίδης ὁ Λεωγόρου, διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατὸπεδον οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἡ ὑφθησαν. 

οἱ δὲ Κερκυραίοι (ἥν γὰρ νύξ) ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ πολέμιαι ὡςιν, ἐπειτὰ δὲ ἐγνωσαν καὶ ὁρμήσαντο. 

LIII. Τῇ δὲ ὕστεραι ἀναγαγόμεναι αἱ τε Ἀττι- καὶ τριάκοντα νῆς καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὅσαι πλώμιοι ἦσαν ἐπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβό- τοις λιμένα, ἐν οἷς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὄριουν, Βουλό- 

μενοι εἰδέναι εἰ ναυμαχήσονσιν. οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν ναῦς ἄραντες ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ παραταξάμενοι μετεώρους ἡσύχαζον, ναυμαχίας οὐ διανοοῦμενοι ἄρχειν ἐκόντες, ὀρῶντες προσγεγενημένας τε ναῦς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀκραίφνεις καὶ σφίσι πολλὰ τὰ ἀπορᾶ πυμβεβηκότα, αἰχμαλώτων τε περὶ φυλα- κῆς, οὔς ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν εἰχον, καὶ ἐπισκευὴν οὐκ 

οὐσαν τῶν νεῶν ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ τοῦ δὲ οἰκαδε πλοῦ μᾶλλον διεσκόπου ὅτη κομισθήσονται, δε- διότες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναιοὶ νομίσαντες λελύσθαι τὰς σπουδάς, διότι ἐς χεῖρας ἤλθουν, οὐκ ἐῶσι σφᾶς ἀποπλείν. 

LIII. Ἐδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς ἄνδρας ἐς κελήτιον
and so they wondered that the Corinthians were backing water, until some of them caught sight of the ships and said, "Yonder are ships sailing up." Then they too retreated—for it was already getting dark; whereupon the Corinthians put their ships about and broke off the action. Thus they separated, the sea-fight ending at nightfall. And while the Corcyraeans were encamping at Leucimne, the twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glaucon son of Leagrus and Andocides son of Leogoras, having made their way through the corpses and the wrecks, sailed down to the camp not long after they were sighted. And the Corcyraeans—for it was night—were afraid they were enemies; but afterwards they recognized them and the ships came to anchor.

LII. On the next day the thirty Attic ships and as many of the Corcyraean as were seaworthy put to sea and advanced against the harbour at Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, wishing to see whether they would fight. But the Corinthians, although they put out from shore and drew up in line in the open sea, kept quiet: for they had no thought of beginning a fight if they could avoid it, as they saw that fresh ships had arrived from Athens and that they themselves were involved in many perplexities, both as regards guarding the captives whom they had in their ships and the impossibility of refitting their ships in a desert place. What they were more concerned about was the voyage home, how they should get back, for they were afraid that the Athenians would consider that the treaty had been broken, since they had come to blows, and would not let them sail away.

LIII. Accordingly they determined to put some
ἐμβιβάσαντας ἀνευ κηρυκείου προσπέμψαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ πείραν ποιήσασθαι. πέμψαντες
τε ἔλεγον τοιῶδε: "Ἄδικείτε, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, πολέμου ἀρχοντες καὶ σπονδᾶς λύνοντες· ἡμῖν γὰρ
πολεμίους τοὺς ἡμετέρους τιμωρούμενοι ἐμποδῶν ἑστάσθη ὅπλα ἀνταίρομενοι. εἰ δ' ἦμῖν γνώμη
ἐστὶ κωλύειν τε ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν ἡ ἀλλοσε εἰ
πη βουλόμεθα πλεῖν καὶ τὰς σπονδὰς λύσετε, ἡμᾶς τούσδε πρῶτος λαβόντες χρήσασθε ὡς
πολεμίοις." οἱ μὲν δὴ τοιαύτα εἴπον τῶν δὲ
Κερκυραίων τὸ μὲν στρατόπεδον ὅσον ἐπήκουσεν
ἀνεβόησεν εὔθυς λαβεῖν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποκτείναι,
oἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι τοιάδε ἀπεκρίναντο: "Οὔτε ἄρ-
χομεν πολέμου, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Πελοποννήσιοι, οὔτε
τὰς σπονδᾶς λύουμεν, Κερκυραίοις δὲ τοῖς ἔξυμ-
μάχοις οὐσὶ βοηθοὶ ἠλθομεν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀλλοσε
ποι βούλεσθε πλεῖν, οὐ κωλύομεν· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ
Κέρκυραν πλευσεῖσθε ἡ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων,
οὗ περιοψόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν."

LIV. Τοιαύτα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀποκριναμένων
οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι τὸν τε πλοῦν τὸν ἐπὶ οἴκου παρε-
σκευάζοντο καὶ τροπαίου ἑστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῷ
ἡπείρῳ Συβότοις· οἱ δὲ Κερκυραίοι τὰ τε ναυάγια
καὶ νεκροὺς ἀνέιλοντο τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς, ἐξενεχθέν-
tον ὑπὸ τοῦ βοῶ καὶ ἀνέμου, ὃς γενόμενος τῆς
νυκτὸς διεσκέδασεν αὐτὰ πανταχῇ, καὶ τροπαίοιν
ἀντέστησαν ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ Συβότοις ὡς
2 νεικηκότες. γνώμη δὲ τοιαύτη ἐκάτεροι τὴν νίκην
προσποιήσαντο. Κορίνθιοι μὲν κρατήσαντες τῇ

1 To bear a herald's wand would have been a recognition of a state of war, whereas the Corinthians were anxious not to be regarded as enemies by the Athenians.
men, without a herald's wand, into a boat and send them to the Athenians, to test their intentions. And these men bore the following message: "You do wrong, men of Athens, to begin war and break a treaty; for by taking up arms against us you interfere with us when we are but punishing our enemies. But if it is your intention to hinder us from sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish, and you thus break the treaty, first take us who are here and treat us as enemies." Thus they spoke; and all the host of the Coreyraeans that was within hearing shouted: "Take them and kill them!" But the Athenians made answer as follows: "We are not beginning war, men of the Peloponnesus, nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to aid the Coreyraeans here, who are our allies. If, then, you wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you; but if you ever sail against Corecyra or any place of theirs, we shall not permit it, if we are able to prevent it."

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, the Corinthians began preparations for the voyage homeward and set up a trophy at Sybota on the mainland; and the Coreyraeans took up the wrecks and dead bodies that had been carried in their direction by the current and by the wind, which had arisen in the night and scattered them in every direction, and set up, as being the victors, a rival trophy at Sybota on the island. Each side claimed the victory on the following grounds: The Corinthians set up a trophy because they had prevailed in

2 Taking up the dead bodies without asking permission of the enemy indicated that the field was maintained, and was therefore a claim of victory.
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ναυμαχία μέχρι νυκτός, ὡστε καὶ ναυάγια πλείστα καὶ νεκροὺς προσκομίσασθαι, καὶ ἄνδρας ἔχοντες αἷμαλωτοὺς οὐκ ἐλάσσοσος χιλίων ναῦς τε κατα-
δύοντες περὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἐστησαν τροπαίον. Κερκυραῖοι δὲ τριάκοντα ναῦς μάλιστα διαφθεί-
ραντες, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοι ἤλθον, ἀνελόμενοι τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ναυάγια καὶ νεκροὺς, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς τῇ τε προτεραια πρύμναι κρονομένοι ὑπεχώρησαν οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἴδιντες τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναῦς, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἤλθον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, οὐκ ἀντεπέ-
πλεον ἐκ τῶν Συβότων, διὰ ταῦτα τροπαίον ἐστη-
σαν. οὔτω μὲν ἐκάτεροι νικῶν ἡξίουν.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι ἀποπλέουσες ἐπ' οἴκου Ἀνακτόριον, ὃ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ Ἀμ-
πρακικοῦ κόλπου, ἐλιὼν ἀπάτη (ἠν δὲ κοινὸν Κερκυραίων καὶ ἐκεῖνων), καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν αὐτῷ Κορινθίους οἰκήτορας ἀνεχώρησαν ἐπ' οίκου καὶ τῶν Κερκυραίων ὀκτακοσίων μὲν οἱ ἢσαν δούλοι ἀπέδουτο, πεντηκόντα δὲ καὶ δια-
κόσιοις δήσαντες ἐφύλασσον καὶ ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἰχον πολλῇ, ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀνα-
χωρήσαντες προσποιήσειαν ἐτύχανον δὲ ἢ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει αὐτῶν οἱ πλείους πρῶτοι οὔτε τῆς ἡ-
πόλεως. ἡ μὲν οὖν Κέρκυρα οὔτω περιγίγνεται τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν Κορινθίων, καὶ αἱ νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀνεχώρησαν ἐξ αὐτῆς. αὕτια δὲ αὐτὴ πρῶτη ἐγένετο τοῦ πολέμου τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὅτι σφίσιν ἐν σπονδαῖς μετὰ Κερκυραίων ἐναυμάχουν.

LVI. Μετὰ ταῦτα δ' εὖθὺς καὶ τάδε ξυνέβη

1 ἐστησαν τοσπαίον bracketed by Hude, following Krüger.
the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy ships; and the Corcyraeans, because they had destroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way and the dead bodies, whereas the Corinthians on the day before had backed water and retreated at sight of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came would not sail out from Sybota and give battle— for these reasons set up a trophy. So each side claimed the victory.

LV. The Corinthians, as they sailed homeward, took by stratagem Anactorium, which is at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a place held by the Corcyraeans and themselves in common, and establishing there some Corinthian colonists returned home. Of their Corcyraean prisoners they sold eight hundred who were slaves, but two hundred and fifty they kept in custody and treated them with much consideration, their motive being that when they returned to Corcyra they might win it over to their side;¹ and it so happened that most of these were among the most influential men of the city. In this way, then, Corcyra had the advantage in the war with the Corinthians, and the ships of the Athenians withdrew from it. And this was the first ground which the Corinthians had for the war against the Athenians, because they had fought with the Corcyraeans against them in time of truce.

LVI. Immediately after this the following events

¹ cf. iii. lxx. 1, where the carrying out of this plan of the Corinthians leads to the bloody feud at Corcyra.
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τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις διάφορα ἐστὶ τὸ πολέμειν. τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων πρασσόντων ὀπως τιμωρήσονται αὐτούς, ὑποτε-πῆσαντες τὴν ἐχθραν αὐτῶν ἦσαν Ἀθηναῖοι Ποτει- δαίτας, οἱ οίκουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἱσθμὸ τῆς Πάλληνης, Κορινθίων ἀποίκους, ἐαυτῶν δὲ ξυμμάχους φόρου ὑποτελείσ, ἐκέλευον τὸ ἐς Πάλληνην τείχος καθε- λείν καὶ ὀμήρους δούναι, τοὺς τε ἐπιδημιουργοὺς ἐκπέμπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ δέχεσθαι οὗς κατὰ ἔτος ἔκαστον Κορινθίων ἔπεμπον, δείσαντες μὴ ἀποστῶσιν ὑπὸ τε Περδίκκου πειθόμενοι καὶ Κορινθίων, τοὺς ἀλλοὺς τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης ξυναποστήσωσι ξυμμάχους.

LVII. Ταύτα δὲ περὶ τοὺς Ποτειδαίτας οἱ Ἀθηναίοι προπαρεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἔν
2 Κερκύρα ναυμαχίαν. οἱ τε γὰρ Κορινθίοι φανερῶς ἤδη διάφοροι ἦσαν, Περδίκκας τε ἐν Ἀλεξάνδρου, Μακεδόνων βασιλείς, ἐπεπολέμωσο τζύμμαχος
3 πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὤν. ἐπολεμώθη δὲ, ὅτι Φιλίππω τῳ ἐαυτῷ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Δέρδα κοινῇ
πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιομένοις οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ξυμμαχίαν
4 ἐποιήσαντο. δεδιώς τε ἐπρασσεν ἐς τῇ ταῖς Δακι-
δαίμονα πέμπων ὀπως πόλεμος γένηται αὐτοῖς
πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προ-
εποιεῖτο τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἐνεκα ἀποστάσεως:
5 προσέφερε δὲ λόγους καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκι-
δέασι καὶ Βοττιάοις ξυναποστήσαται, νομίζον, εἰ
ξύμμαχα ταύτα ἔχοι, ὀμορα ὅντα, τὰ χωρία,

1 Son of Alexander, who had been a friend of the Hellenes in the Persian war. Perdiccas, who originally possessed only Lower Macedonia, had deprived his brother Philip of
also occurred, which caused differences between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and led to the war. While the Corinthians were devising how they should take vengeance on the Athenians, the latter, suspecting their enmity, required of the Potidaeans (who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene and are colonists of the Corinthians but tributary allies of the Athenians), to pull down their wall on the side of Pallene and give hostages, and, furthermore, to send away and not receive in the future the magistrates whom the Corinthians were accustomed to send every year. For they were afraid that the Potidaeans, persuaded by Perdiccas¹ and the Corinthians, would revolt and cause the rest of the allies in Thrace to revolt with them.

LVII. These precautions the Athenians took with regard to the Potidaeans immediately after the sea-fight at Corcyra; for the Corinthians were now openly at variance with them, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had before been an ally and friend, had now become hostile. And he had become hostile because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and with Derdas, who were making common cause against himself. Alarmed at this he kept sending envoys to Lacedaemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens and the Peloponnesians. He sought also to win over the Corinthians, with a view to the revolt of Potidaea; and, furthermore, he made overtures to the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had as allies these countries, which bordered on his own, it would be Upper Macedonia, and now was king of all Macedonia.

See, further, ii. xcix. ff.
6 ῥᾶον ἀν τὸν πόλεμον μετ’ αὐτῶν ποιεῖσθαι. Ὁν ὦ ᾿Αθηναίοι αἰσθόμενοι καὶ βουλόμενοι προκαταλαμβάνειν τῶν πόλεων τὰς ἀποστάσεις (ἐτυχὼν γὰρ τριάκοντα νὰ ἀποστέλλοντες καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῦ ᾿Αρχεστράτου τοῦ Δυκομῆδους μετ’ ἄλλων τεσσάρων στρατηγοῦντος), ἐπιστέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχονσι τῶν νεῶν Ποτείδαισι τε ὁμήρους λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ τεῖχος καθελεῖν, τῶν τε πλησίον πόλεων φυλακὴν ἐχεῖν ὅπως μὴ ἀποστήσονται.

LVIII. Ποτείδαισι τε πέμψαντες μὲν καὶ παρ’ ᾿Αθηναίους πρέσβεις, εἰ πως πείσειαν μὴ σφῶν πέρι νεωτερίζειν μηδέν, ἐλθόντες δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα μετὰ Κορινθίων, ἵνα δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τε ᾿Αθηνῶν ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσοντες οὐδὲν ἡὕροντο ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ’ αἰ νῦν αἰ ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς ὄμοιος ἔπλεον καὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ὑπέσχετο αὐτοῖς, ἤν ἐπὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἱσσιν ᾿Αθηναίοι, ἵνα τὴν ᾿Αττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν, τὸτε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τούτον ἀφίστανται μετὰ Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων κοινῇ κοινομόσαντες.

2 καὶ Περδίκκας πείθει Χαλκιδέας τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσσῃ πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας καὶ καταβαλόντας ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐσ ᾿Ολυνθὸν μίαν τε πόλιν ταύτῃ ἱσχυρὰν ποιῆσασθαι: τοῖς τ’ ἐκλιπόντοι τούτοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς τῆς Μυγδονίας περὶ τὴν Βόλβην λίμνην ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι, ἐως ἄν ὁ πρὸς ᾿Αθηναίους πόλει-

1 ἐπιράσσειν, before ὅπως in all MSS., deleted by Poppe.
easier, in conjunction with them, to carry on the war. But the Athenians became aware of these designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the cities, ordered the commanders of their fleet (since they happened to be sending against the country of Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus son of Lycomedes and four others) to take hostages of the Potidaeans and pull down their wall, and also to keep a watch upon the neighbouring towns and prevent them from revolting.

LVII. The Potidaeans, on the other hand, sent envoys to Athens, to see if they could persuade them not to take any harsh measures with reference to themselves; but envoys of theirs went also to Lacedaemon in the company of the Corinthians, with the object of having assistance ready to hand in case of need. From the Athenians, with whom they carried on protracted negotiation, they obtained no satisfactory result, but on the contrary the ships destined to attack Macedonia proceeded to sail against themselves as well, whereas the magistrates of the Lacedaemonians promised them to invade Attica if the Athenians went against Potidaea; so they seized this opportunity and revolted, entering into a formal alliance with the Chalcidians' and Bottiaeans. Perdiccas at the same time persuaded the Chalcidians to abandon and pull down their cities on the sea-coast and settle inland at Olynthus, making there a single strong city; and he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a part of his own territory of Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as they should be at war

\*i.e. the Chalcidians of Thrace.\*
μος ἦ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπὸν τὸ καθαίροντες τὰς πόλεις καὶ ἐς πόλεμον παρεσκευάζοντο. ΛΙΧ. αἱ δὲ τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφικνοῦνται ἐσ τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης καὶ καταλαμβάνουσιν

2 τὴν τε Ποτίδαιαν καὶ τὰλλα ἀφεστηκότα. νομίσαντες δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἀδύνατα εἶναι πρὸς τε Περδίκκαν πολεμεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει καὶ τὰ ξυναφεστῶτα χωρία, τρέπονται ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν, ἐφ' ὀπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἔξεπέμποντο, καὶ καταστάντες ἐπολέμουν μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ τῶν Δέρδου ἄδελφον ἀνωθεν στρατιὰ ἐσβεβληκότων.

ΛΧ. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Κορίνθιοι, τῆς Ποτίδαιας ἀφεστηκυίας καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν νεῶν περὶ Μακεδονίαν οὐσῶν, δεδιότες περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ καὶ οἰκεῖον τῶν κύνδυνον ἡγούμενου πέμπουσιν ἑαυτῶν τε ἐθελοντας καὶ τῶν ἀλλων Πελοποννησίων μισθοὺ πείσαντες ἐξακοσίους καὶ χιλίους τοὺς πάντας

2 ὀπλίτας καὶ ψιλοὺς τετρακοσίους. ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Ἀδειμάντων, κατὰ φιλίαν τε αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἢκίστα οἱ πλείστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελοντας ἄνευσποντο· ἢ γὰρ τοῖς

3 Ποτειδαῖσι καὶ πυλαῖς τετρακοσίους. καὶ ἀφικνοῦνται τεσσαρακοστῆ ἴμερὰ ύποτερον ἐπὶ Θράκης ἡ Ποτειδαία ἀπέστη.

ΛΧΙ. Ἡλθε δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εὐθὺς ἦ ἀγγελία τῶν πόλεων ὅτι ἀφεστάσι, καὶ πέμπουσιν, ὡς ἦσθοντο καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀριστεῶς ἐπιπαρόντας, διςχιλίους ἑαυτῶν ὀπλίτας καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς πρὸς τὰ ἀφεστῶτα, καὶ Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιάδου πέμπτου αὐτῶν στρατηγὸν

2 οἱ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον καταλαμβάνουσιν.
with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to dismantle their cities, move inland, and prepare for war. LIX. But when the thirty ships of the Athenians reached the coast of Thrace, they found Potidaea and the other places already in revolt. Whereupon the generals, thinking it impossible with their present force to wage war with both Perdiccas and the places which had revolted, turned their attention to Macedonia, which was their destination at the start, and when they had got a foothold carried on war in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who had already invaded Macedonia from the interior with an army.

LX. Thereupon the Corinthians, seeing that Potidaea had revolted and the Attic ships were in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, were alarmed about the place and thinking that the danger came home to them, dispatched volunteers of their own and such other Peloponnesians as they induced by pay, in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops. The general in command was Aristeus son of Adimantus; and it was chiefly because of friendship for him that most of the soldiers from Corinth went along as volunteers; for he had always been on friendly terms with the Potidaeans. And they arrived on the coast of Thrace on the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidaea.

LXI. The news of the revolt of the cities quickly reached the Athenians also; and when they learned that troops under Aristeus were also on the way to support the rebels, they sent against the places in revolt two thousand of their own hoplites and forty ships, under Callias son of Calliades with four other generals. These first came to Macedonia and found
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νονσι τοὺς προτέρους χιλίους Θέρμην ἀρτι ἡρη-

3 κότας καὶ Πύδναν πολιορκοῦντας, προσκαθε-

ζώμενοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν Πύδναν ἐπολιορκησαν

μὲν, ἐπειτὰ δὲ ξύμβασιν πονησάμενοι καὶ ξυμ-

μαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκαν, ὡς αὐτοὺς

κατῆπεγεν ἡ Ποτείδαια καὶ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς παρελη-

λυθὼς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ

ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροιαν κάκειθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν1 καὶ

πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίον καὶ οὐκ ἔλοντες

ἔπορευόντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν

τρισχιλίοις μὲν ὀπλίταις ἐαυτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ τῶν

ξυμμάχων πολλοῖς, ἰππεῦσι δὲ ἐξακοσίοις Μακε-

donων τοῖς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Παυσανίουν ἀμα

5 δὲ νῆς παρέπλευον ἐβδομήκοντα. κατ' ὀλγον δὲ

προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γιγωνον καὶ

ἔστρατοπεδέσαντο.

2. Ποτειδαται δὲ καὶ οἱ μετὰ Ἀριστεῶς

Πελοποννήσιοι προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους

ἐστρατοπεδεύντο πρὸς Ὀλύνθου ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ

2 καὶ ἀγοράν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίητο. στρα-

τηγὸν μὲν οὐν τοῦ πεζοῦ παντὸς οἱ ξύμμαχοι

_hopant ] Airstea, τῆς δὲ ὑπ' Περδίκκαν. ἀπέστη

γάρ εὐθὺς πάλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνεμάχει

τοῖς Ποτειδαταις ἴδιαν ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ καταστήσας

3 ἄρχοντα. ἡν δὲ ἡ γνώμη τοῦ Ἀριστεῶς, τὸ μὲν

_cont ] οἱ Περδίκκου διακοσίαι ὑπ' Ὀλύνθῳ μένειν,

1 ἐπὶ Στρέψαν, Pluygers' certain emendation for ἐπιστρέ-

ψαντες of the MSS.

2 Madvig deletes, followed by Hude.
that the former thousand had just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part in the siege of Pydna. But afterwards they concluded an agreement and an alliance with Perdicas, being forced thereto by the situation of Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which compelled them to hasten, and then they withdrew from Macedonia. On their way they came to Beroea and thence to Strepsa,¹ and after an unsuccessful attempt upon this place proceeded overland to Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of their own and with many of their allies besides, and with six hundred Macedonian cavalry, who were under the command of Philip and Pausanias; and at the same time their ships, seventy in number, sailed along the coast. And marching leisurely they arrived on the third day at Gigonus, and went into camp.

LXII. The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus were awaiting the Athenians, encamped on the Olynthian side of the isthmus; and they had established a market outside of the city. The allies had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and Perdicas of the cavalry; for Perdicas had immediately deserted the Athenians again² and was now in alliance with the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus as his administrator at home. The plan of Aristeus was as follows: he was to hold his own army on the isthmus and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the Chalcidians and the other allies from outside of the isthmus³ and the two hundred horse furnished by Perdicas were to

¹ In Mygdonia, north of Therme.
² For his first desertion of the Athenians, see ch. lvii.
³ i.e. the Bottiaeans, who, like the Chalcidians, lived outside the isthmus.
καὶ δυτὰν Ἀθηναίοι ἐπὶ σφᾶς χωρῶσι, κατὰ νότου
βοηθοῦντας ἐν μέσῳ ποιεῖν αὐτῶν τοὺς πολεμοὺς.
4 Καλλίας δ' αὖ ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς καὶ οἱ
ξυνάρχοντες τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἵππεας καὶ τῶν
ξυμμάχων ὀλίγους ἐπὶ Ὁλυνθοῦ ἀποπέμπουσιν,
ὅπως εἰργωσὶ τοὺς ἐκείθεν ἐπιβοηθεῖν, αὐτοὶ δὲ
ἀναστήσαντες τὸ στρατόπεδον ἔχωρον ἐπὶ τὴν
5 Ποτείδαιαν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τῷ ἱσθμῷ ἐγένουτο
καὶ εἶδον τοὺς ἐναντίους παρασκευαζόμενοι ὡς
ἐς μάχην, ἀντικαθίσταντο καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ οὐ πολὺ
6 ὦστερον ξυνέμισγον. καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ τῶν Ἀρι-
στέως κέρας καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ἐκείνου ἦσαν Κορινθίων
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων λογάδες ἔτρεψαν τὸ καθ'
ἐαυτοὺς καὶ ἐπεξήλθον διώκοντες ἐπὶ πολὺ· τὸ
δὲ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον Ποτειδατῶν καὶ Πελο-
πονησίων ἤσσατο ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐς τὸ
τείχος κατέφυγεν.

Τοῦτο ἐπαναχωρῶν δὲ ὁ Ἀριστεὺς ἀπὸ τῆς
dιώξεως, ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸ ἄλλο στράτευμα ἱσσημένων,
ἡπόρησε μὲν ὁποτέρωσε διακινδυνεύσῃ χωρῆσας,
ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς Ὁλυνθοῦ ἡ ἐς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἐδοξεῖ
δ' οὖν ξυναγαγόντι τοὺς μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ ὡς ἐς
ἐλάχιστον χωρίον δρόμῳ βιάσασθαι ἐς τὴν
Ποτείδαιαν, καὶ παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χηλήν διὰ
τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενος τε καὶ χαλέπως, ὄλι-
gους μὲν τινας ἀποβαλὼν, τοὺς δὲ πλείους σώσας.
2 οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Ὁλυνθοῦ τοῖς Ποτειδαταῖς βοηθοὶ
remain at Olynthus; then when the Athenians should move against the forces of Aristeus, the others were to come up and attack them in the rear, and thus place the enemy between their two divisions. But Callias, the commander of the Athenians, and his colleagues sent the Macedonian cavalry and a few of the allies toward Olynthus, to shut off aid from that quarter, while they themselves broke camp and advanced against Potidaea. And when they arrived at the isthmus and saw the enemy preparing for battle, they took up their position facing them; and soon the two sides joined battle. And the wing led by Aristeus himself, which included the picked Corinthian and other troops, routed the forces opposed to them and pressed on a long distance in pursuit; but the rest of the army of the Potidaeans and the Peloponnesians was worsted by the Athenians and took refuge within the walls of Potidaea.

LXIII. When Aristeus returned from the pursuit and saw that the rest of the army was defeated, he was at a loss whether he should try to fight his way through towards Olynthus or into Potidaea. He determined, however, to bring his own troops together into as compact a body as possible and to force his way into Potidaea on a run. And he succeeded in getting in by way of the breakwater through the sea, with difficulty, indeed, and harassed by missiles; but though he lost a few men, he saved the greater number of them. Now when the battle began and the standards had been raised, the auxiliaries of

1 These signals were not for battle, but for the Olynthian auxiliaries to come, and as soon as it became clear, through the speedy success of the Athenians, that their object could not be accomplished, they were lowered.
Classen deletes, followed by Hude.

1 On the Athenian side were 600 Macedonian cavalry (ch. lxi. 4), on the Potidaean side 200 Macedonian cavalry under Perdiccas (ch. lxii. 3).

2 Thucydides omits the loss of the allies of the Athenians.

3 The wall on the isthmus side of the Potidaeans is the
the Potidaeans in Olynthus—which is only about sixty stadia distant and can be seen from Potidæa—advanced a short distance to give aid, and the Macedonian cavalry drew up in line against them to prevent it. But since the Athenians were soon proving the victors and the standards were pulled down, the auxiliaries retired again within the walls of Olynthus and the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians. And so no cavalry got into action on either side. After the battle the Athenians set up a trophy and gave up their dead under a truce to the Potidaeans. There were slain, of the Potidaeans and their allies a little less than three hundred, and of the Athenians alone about a hundred and fifty, and also their general Callias.

LXIV. The city wall on the isthmus side the Athenians immediately cut off by a transverse wall and set a guard there, but the wall toward Pallene was not shut off. For they thought their numbers were insufficient to maintain a garrison on the isthmus and also to cross over to Pallene and build a wall there too, fearing that, if they divided their forces, the Potidaeans and their allies would attack them. Afterwards, when the Athenians at home learned that Pallene was not blockaded, they sent sixteen hundred of their own hoplites under the command of Phormio son of Asopius; and he, when he arrived at Pallene, making Aphytis his base, brought his army to Potidæa, marching leisurely and ravaging τεῖχος of ch. lxii. 6; the wall to Pallene is that mentioned in ch. lvi. 2 as τῶς Παλληνῆς τεῖχος.

4 The investment of Potidæa was effected by walling off first the northern and then also the southern city wall by a blockading wall; on the west and east, where the city extended to the sea, the blockade was made with ships.
στρατόν, κατὰ βραχὺ προῖ ὑπὸ καὶ κείρων ἀμα τῇ γῇ
3 ώς δὲ οὖδεὶς ἐπεξέχει ἐς μάχην, ἀπετείχος
tὸ ἐκ τῆς Παλλήνης τεῖχος· καὶ οὕτως ἦδη κατε
cράτος ἡ Ποτείδαια ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἐπολλορκεῖτ
cαὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ναυσίν ἀμα ἑφορμοῦσαι.

LXV. Ἀριστεὺς δὲ ἀποτειχίσθεις ἀυτῆς κα
ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν ἔχων σωτηρίας, ἦ μὴ τι ἀπ
Πελοποννήσου ἢ ἄλλο παρὰ λόγον γίγνεται
ξυνεβούλευε μὲν πλὴν πεντακοσίων ἀνεμου τι
ῥήσασι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκπλεῦσαι, ὅπως ἐπὶ πλέ
ὸ σῖτος ἀντίσχη, καὶ αὐτὸς ἤθελε τῶν μενόντω
einai· ὡς δ' οὐκ ἔπειθε, βουλόμενος τὰ ἐπὶ τούτ
παρασκευάζειν καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἐξωθεῖν ἔξει ὃς ἄριστ
ἐκπλοῦν ποιεῖται λαθῶν τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν Ἀθ
2 ναιὼν· καὶ παραμένων ἐν Χαλκιδεῖσι τά τε ἄλ
ξυνεπολέμει καὶ Σερμυλίων λοχῆςας πρὸς
πόλει πολλοὺς διέθειρεν, ἐς τε τὴν Πελοπόν
3 σον ἐπράσσεν ὅτι ὁ φελία τις γενήσεται. μα
δὲ τῆς Ποτείδαιας τὴν ἀποτειχίσθην Φορμίων
ἔχων τοὺς ἐξακοσίους καὶ χελίους τὴν Χαλκιδὴν
καὶ Βοστικὴν ἐδίσκου καὶ ἐστὶν ἀ καὶ πολίσμα
εἴλεν.

LXVI. Τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Πελοποννησίω
αἵτιαν μὲν αὐταὶ προσγεγεύηντο· ἐς ἀλλήλο
τοῖς μὲν Κορινθίοις ὁτι τὴν Ποτείδαιαν ἐαυτ
οῦσαν ἀποκιάν καὶ ἀνδρᾶς Κορινθίων τε αι

1 Hude reads προσγεγεύηντο, with BCE.
2 Hude inserts, after Κορινθίοις, the words ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναῖοι following Reiske

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the country at the same time. And as no one came out against him to give battle he built a wall to blockade the Pallene wall. And so Potidæa was at length in a state of siege, which was prosecuted vigorously on both sides of it as well as by sea, where a fleet blockaded it.

LXV. As for Aristeus, now that Potidæa was cut off by the blockade and he had no hope of saving it unless help should come from the Peloponnesus or something else should happen beyond his expectation, he advised all the garrison except five hundred men to wait for a wind and sail out of the harbour, that the food might hold out longer, and he himself was ready to be one of those who should remain. But since he could not gain their consent, wishing to do the next best thing and to provide that their affairs outside should be put into the best possible condition, he sailed out, unobserved by the Athenian guard. He then remained among the Chalcidians, whom he assisted generally in carrying on the war, and especially by destroying a large force of Sermylians, whom he ambushed near their city; and meanwhile he kept up negotiations with the Peloponnesians to see if some aid could not be obtained. Phormio, however, after the investment of Potidæa was complete, took his sixteen hundred troops and ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice; and he also captured some towns.

LXVI. As between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians, then, these additional grounds of complaint had arisen on either side, the Corinthians being aggrieved because the Athenians were besieg-ing Potidæa, a colony of theirs with men in it from
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Πελοποννησίων ἐν αὐτῇ ὄντας ἐπολιόρκουν, τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἔς τοὺς Πελοποννησίους ὁτι ἐαυτῶν τε πόλεως ἐξεμαχία καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῆ ἀπεστησαν καὶ ἐλθόντες σφίσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἐμάχοντο μετὰ Ποτειδατῶν. οὐ μὲντοι ὃ γε πόλεμός πω ἐξυπερρώγει, ἀλλ’ ἐτὶ ἀνοκωχὴ ἤν ἴδια γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐπραξαν.

LXVII. Πολιορκουμένης δὲ τῆς Ποτειδαίας ὧν ἦσύχαζον, ἀνδρῶν τε σφίσιν ἐνόττων καὶ ἀμα περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ δεδιότες. παρεκάλουν τε εὐθὺς ἐς τὴν Δακεδαίμονα τοὺς ἐξεμαχύνας καὶ κατεβῶν ἐλθόντες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὁτι σπονδάς τε λευκόντες εἰεν καὶ ἄδικοιεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον.

2 Αὐγινῆται τε φανερῶς μὲν οὐ προσβεβομένοι, δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κρύφα δὲ, οὐχ ἢκιστα μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐνήγγον τοὺς πόλεμον, λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδάς. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαίμονοι προσπαρακαλέσαντες τῶν ἐξεμαχυναν καὶ̂ 1 εἰ τίς τι ἄλλος ἐφὴ ἡδικήσαθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν ποιήσαντες τὸν εἰσωθότα λέγειν ἐκέλευον. καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλήματα ἐποιοῦντο ὡς ἐκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δηλούντες μὲν καὶ ἔτερα οὐκ ὄλιγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἰργασθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγορᾶς παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς. 5 παρελθόντες δὲ τελευταίοι Κορίνθιοι καὶ τούς ἄλλους ἐάσαντες πρῶτον παροξύναν τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους ἐπείπον τοιάδε.

LXVIII. “Τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ’ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὀμιλίας

1 Hude reads τε καὶ with C and some inferior MSS.
Corinth and the Peloponnesus, the Athenians, because the Peloponnesians had brought about the revolt of a city that was an ally and tributary of theirs, and then had come and openly fought with the Potidaeans against themselves. As yet, however, the war had not openly broken out, but there was still a truce for in these things the Corinthians had acted only on their own authority.

LXVII. But when siege was laid to Potidaea they did not take it quietly, not only because Corinthians were in the town, but also because they were in fear about the place; and they immediately summoned the allies to Lacedaemon and, once there, they proceeded to inveigh against the Athenians on the ground that they had broken the treaty and were wronging the Peloponnesus. The Aeginetans also sent delegates—not openly, to be sure, for they feared the Athenians, but secretly—and, acting with the Corinthians, took a leading part in fomenting the war, saying that they were not autonomous as stipulated in the treaty. Then the Lacedaemonians sent out a summons to all the other allies who claimed to have suffered any wrong at the hands of the Athenians, and calling their own customary assembly bade them speak. Others came forward and stated their several complaints, and particularly the Megarians, who presented a great many other grievances, and chiefly this, that they were excluded from the harbours throughout the Athenian dominions and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty. Lastly the Corinthians, after they had first allowed the others to exasperate the Lacedaemonians, spoke as follows:—

LXVIII. "That spirit of trust which marks your domestic policy, O Lacedaemonians, and your relations
τοιούτους, εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους, ἦν τι λέγομεν, καθίστησιν· καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἐχετε, ἀμαθία δὲ πλέονι πρὸς τὰ ἔξω πράγματα χρῆσθε. πολλάκις γὰρ προαγορευόντων ἦμων ἄ ἐμέλλομεν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων βλάπτεσθαι, οὐ περὶ δὲν ἐδιδάσκομεν ἐκάστοτε τὴν μάθησιν ἐποιεῖσθε, ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων μᾶλλον ὑπενοεῖτε ὡς ἕνεκα τῶν αὐτοῖς ἡδία διαφόρων λέγουσιν· καὶ δὴ αὐτὸ οὐ πρὶν πᾶσχειν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἐργῷ ἐσμέν, τοὺς ξυμμάχους τούσδε παρεκαλέσατε, ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς ὦν ἢκιστα εἰπεῖν ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβρίζο- μενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὦμων ἀμελοῦμενοι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀφανείς ποὺ ὀντες ἴδικουν τὴν Ἑλλάδα, διδασκαλίας ἄν ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι προσέδειν νῦν δὲ τί δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν, ὃν τοὺς μὲν δεδουλωμένους ὀράτε, τοῖς δ' ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀυτοὺς, καὶ οὐχ ἢκιστα τοῖς ἴμετέροις ξυμμάχους, καὶ ἐκ πολλοῦ προ- παρεσκευασμένους, εἰ ποτὲ πολεμήσονται; οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυράν τε ὑπολαβόντες βία ἦμων εἰχον καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν; ὃν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἑπὶ Ὁράκης ἄποχρισθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικῶν ἀν μέγιστον παρέσχε τοῖς Πελοποννη- σίοις.

LXIX. "Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αὐτοί, τὸ τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά
with one another, renders you more mistrustful if we bring any charge against others, and thus while this quality gives you sobriety, yet because of it you betray a want of understanding in dealing with affairs abroad. For example, although we warned you time and again of the injury the Athenians were intending to do us, you refused to accept the information we kept giving you, but preferred to direct your suspicions against the speakers, feeling that they were actuated by their own private interests. And this is the reason why you did not act before we got into trouble, but it is only when we are in the midst of it that you have summoned these allies, among whom it is especially fitting that we should speak, inasmuch as we have the gravest accusations to bring, insulted as we have long been by the Athenians and neglected by you. And if they were wronging Hellas in some underhand way, you might have needed additional information on the ground of your ignorance; but as the case stands, what need is there of a long harangue, when you see that they have enslaved some of us\(^1\) and are plotting against others, notably against your—own allies, and that they have long been making their preparations with a view to the contingency of war? For otherwise they would not have purloined Corcyra, which they still hold in despite of us, and would not be besieging Potidaea—one of these being a most strategic point for operations on the Thracian coast, while the other would have furnished a very large fleet to the Peloponnesians.

LXIX. "And the blame for all this belongs to you, for you permitted them in the first instance to

\(^1\) Referring especially to the Aeginetans, in the other cases to the Megarians and Potidaeans.
κρατύναι καὶ ὄστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τεῖχη, ἐς τόδε τε αἰεὶ ἀποστεροῦντες οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὑπ’ ἐκείνων δεδουλωμένους ἐλευθερίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὑμετέρους ἢδη ξυμμάχους· οὐ γὰρ ὁ δουλωσά-
μενος, ἀλλ’ ὁ δυνάμενος μὲν παῦσαι, περιορῶν δὲ ἀληθέστερον αὐτὸ δρά, εἶπερ καὶ τὴν ἁξίωσιν τῆς
2 ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται. μόλις
dὲ νῦν γε ξυνήλθομεν καὶ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐπὶ φανεροῖς.
χρῆν γὰρ οὐκ εἰ ἄδικούμεθα ἐτί σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ
dαθ’ ὁ τι ἀμυνούμεθα· οἱ γὰρ ἐρωτοῦντες βεβουλευ-
μένοι πρὸς οὐ διεγνωκότας ἢδη καὶ οὐ μέλλοντες
3 ἑπέρχονται. καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα οὐα ὡδ’ οἱ ἸΘη-
ναῖοι καὶ ὅτι κατ’ ὁλίγον χωροῦσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς
tέλας. καὶ λανθάνειν μὲν οἴομενοι διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὄμων ἢςον θαρσοῦσί, γνώντες δὲ
4 εἰδότας περιορὰν ἱσχυρῶς ἐγκείσονται. ἡσυχά-
ζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ
dυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνούμενοι, καὶ
μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὐξήσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν,
5 διπλασιομένην δὲ καταλύοντες. καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε
ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὅν ἀρὰ ο λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει.
τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδων αὐτοὶ ἵσμεν ἐκ περάτων γῆς
πρότερον ἑπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα ή τὰ

1 οἱ γὰρ, so MSS.: Hude reads οἱ γε after Classen.

1 See ch. xc. ff.  2 See ch. cvii. 1.
3 Referring to the recent increase of the Athenian navy by
the accession of the Coreclyraean fleet.
strengthen their city after the Persian war,\(^1\) and afterwards to build their Long Walls,\(^2\) while up to this very hour you are perpetually defrauding of their freedom not only those who have been enslaved by them, but now even your own allies also. For the state which has reduced others to slavery does not in a more real fashion enslave them than the state which has power to prevent it, and yet looks carelessly on, although claiming as its preëminent distinction that it is the liberator of Hellas. And now at last we have with difficulty managed to come together, though even now without a clearly defined purpose. For we ought no longer to be considering whether we are wronged, but how we are to avenge our wrongs. For where men are men of action, it is with resolved plans against those who have come to no decision, it is at once and without waiting, that they advance. We know too by what method the Athenians move against their neighbours—that it is here a little and there a little. And as long as they think that, owing to your want of perception, they are undetected, they are less bold; but once let them learn that you are aware but complaisant, and they will press on with vigour. For indeed, O Lacedaemonians, you alone of the Hellenes pursue a passive policy, defending yourselves against aggression, not by the use of your power, but by your intention to use it; and you alone propose to destroy your enemies' power, not at its inception, but when it is doubling itself.\(^3\) And yet you had the reputation of running no risks; but with you, it would seem, repute goes beyond reality. For example, the Persian, as we ourselves know, came from the ends of the earth as far as the Peloponnesus before your forces went
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παρ’ ύμῶν ἄξιως προαπαντήσαι, καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὖν ἐκάς, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλ’ ἐγγύς ὄντας περιορᾷ, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπελθείν αὐτοῖ ἀμύνεσθαι βούλεσθε μᾶλλον ἐπιόντας καὶ ἐσ τόχας πρὸς πολλῷ δυνατωτέρους ἁγωνιζόμενοι καταστήναι, ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλεῖον σφαλέντα καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἥδη τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἁφ’ ύμῶν τιμωρίᾳ περιγεγενημένους. ἔπει αἱ γε ὑμέτεραι ἐπίπλες ἥδη τινὰς ποι καὶ ἀπαρασκεύοις διὰ τὸ πιστεύ-6 σαί ἔφθειραν. καὶ μηδείς ύμῶν ἐπ’ ἔχθρα τὸ πλέον ἢ αἰτία νομίσῃ τάδε λέγεσθαι αἰτία μὲν γὰρ φίλων ἀνδρῶν ἐστιν ἁμαρτανόντων, κατηγορία δὲ ἔχθρὼν ἀδικησάντων.

LXX. "Καὶ ἂμα, εἴπερ τινὲς καὶ ἄλλοι, νομίζομεν ἄξιοι εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκέων, ἄλλως τε καὶ μεγάλων τῶν διαφερόντων καθεστώτων, περὶ ὧν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῖν γε δοκεῖτε οὐδ’ ἐκλογίσασθαι πώποτε πρὸς οἴους ύμῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας καὶ ὃσον ύμῶν καὶ ὡς πᾶν διαφέροντας ὁ 2 ἀγών ἔσται. οἱ μὲν γε νεωτεροποιοὶ καὶ ἐπινοήσαι ὀξίς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ ἢ ἄν γνῶσιν, ύμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχουτα τε σῷξειν καὶ ἐπιγνώναι μηδέν καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τάναγκαια ἐξικέσθαι.

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forth to withstand him in a manner worthy of your power; and now you regard with indifference the Athenians who are not afar off, as the Persian was, but near at hand, and instead of attacking them yourselves, you prefer to ward them off when they attack, and incur hazard by joining in a struggle with opponents who have become far more powerful. Yet you know that the Barbarian failed mostly by his own fault, and that in our struggles with the Athenians themselves we have so far often owed our successes rather to their own errors than to any aid received from you; indeed, it is the hopes they have placed in you that have already ruined more than one state\(^1\) that was unprepared just because of trust in you. And let no one of you think that these things are said more out of hostile feeling than by way of complaint; for complaint is against friends that err, but accusation against enemies that have inflicted an injury.

LXX. "And besides, we have the right, we think, if any men have, to find fault with our neighbours, especially since the interests at stake for us are important. To these interests it seems to us at least that you are insensible, and that you have never even fully considered what sort of men the Athenians are with whom you will have to fight, and how very, how utterly, different they are from you. For they are given to innovation and quick to form plans and to put their decisions into execution, whereas you are disposed merely to keep what you have, to devise nothing new, and, when you do take action, not to carry to completion even what is indispensable.

\(^1\) Alluding perhaps to the Thasians (ch. ci.) and the Euboeans (ch. cxiv.).
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3 αὖθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ
παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς
εὐελπιδεῖς· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον τῆς τε δυνάμεως [ἐνδεὰ
πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεύ-
σαι τῶν τε δεινῶν μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθή-
σεσθαί. καὶ μὴ καὶ ἀοκνοὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς κελλητὰς
καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους· οἴονται γὰρ
οἱ μὲν τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ ἂν τι κτᾶσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τῷ
5 ἐξελθεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑτοῖμα ἂν βλάψαι. κρατοῦντες
τε τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπὶ πλείστου ἐξέρχονται καὶ
6 νικόμενοι ἐπὶ ἐλάχιστον ἀναπίπτουσιν. ἔτι δὲ
τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς
πόλεως χρώνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτη ἐς τὸ
7 πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς· καὶ ἃ μὲν ἂν ἐπινοή-
σαντες μὴ ἐπεξέλθωσιν, οἰκείων στέρεσθαι ἡγοῦν-
tαι, ἃ δὲ ἂν ἐπελθόντες κτῆσωνται, οὔγα πρὸς
τὰ μέλλοντα τυχεῖν πράξαντες, ἢν δὲ ἄρα τοῦ καὶ
πείρα σφαλῶσιν, ἀντελπίσαντες ἀλλὰ ἐπιλήρωσαν
τὴν χρείαν· μόνοι γὰρ ἔχονσι τε ὁμοίως καὶ
ἐλπίζουσιν ἢ ἂν ἐπινοήσωσι διὰ τὸ ταχείαν τὴν
8 ἐπιχείρησιν ποιεῖσθαι ὃν ἂν γνῶσιν. καὶ ταῦτα
μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων διὸ ὅλου τοῦ
αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν
ὑπαρχόντων διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μῆτε ἐνρή
ἀλλο τι ἤγείσθαι ὡς τὰ δέοντα πρᾶξαι ἐξομ-
φοράν τε οὐχ ἢσον ἥσυχαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ
Again, they are bold beyond their strength, venture-some beyond their better judgment, and sanguine in the face of dangers; while your way is to do less than your strength warrants, to distrust even what your judgment is sure of, and when dangers come to despair of deliverance. Nay more, they are prompt in decision, while you are dilatory; they stir abroad, while you are perfect stay-at-homes; for they expect by absence from home to gain something, while you are afraid that, if you go out after something, you may imperil even what you have. If victorious over their enemies, they pursue their advantage to the utmost; if beaten, they fall back as little as possible. Moreover, they use their bodies in the service of their country as though they were the bodies of quite other men, but their minds as though they were wholly their own, so as to accomplish anything on her behalf. And whenever they have conceived a plan but fail to carry it to fulfilment, they think themselves robbed of a possession of their own; and whenever they go after a thing and obtain it, they consider that they have accomplished but little in comparison with what the future has in store for them; but if it so happens that they try a thing and fail, they form new hopes instead and thus make up the loss. For with them alone is it the same thing to hope for and to attain when once they conceive a plan, for the reason that they swiftly undertake whatever they determine upon. In this way they toil, with hardships and dangers, all their life long; and least of all men they enjoy what they have because they are always seeking more, because they think their only holiday is to do their duty, and because they regard untroubled peace as a far
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9 ἀσχολίαν ἐπίστουν ὡστε εἰ τις αὐτοὺς ἐξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μῆτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἱσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους έαν, ὁρθῶς ἄν εἶποι.

LXXI. "Ταύτης μέντοι τοιαύτης ἀντικαθεστη-

κυίας πόλεως, ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι, διαμέλλετε καὶ
οἶσθε τὴν ἱσυχίαν οὐ τούτοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ
πλείστον ἄρκειν, οὐ ἂν τῇ μὲν παρασκευὴ δίκαια
πράσσωσι, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ, ἦν ἄδικονται, δῆλοι
ὡσι μὴ ἐπιτρέψοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ μή λυπείν τε
τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀμνόμενοι μὴ βλάπτεσθαι

2 τὸ ἱσον νέμετε. μόλις δ᾽ ἂν πόλει ὄμοια παροι-

κοῦντες ἐτυγχάνετε τούτον· νῦν δ᾽, ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι
ἐδηλώσαμεν, ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηθέντα

3 πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη δέ ὅσπερ τέχνης
αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν καὶ ἱσυχαζοῦση
μὲν πόλει τὰ ἁκίνητα νόμιμα ἁριστά, πρὸς
πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἴναι πολλῆς καὶ
τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ. δι᾽ ὅπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν
Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς πολυπερίας ἐπὶ πλέον ὑμῶν
κεκαίνωται.

4 "Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ὡρίσθω ὑμῶν ἡ βραδυ-

τῆς· νῦν δὲ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ Ποισιδεάταις, ὅσπερ
ὑπεδέξασθε, βοηθήσατε κατὰ τάχος ἐσβαλόντες
ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνδρας τε φίλους καὶ
ξυγγενεῖς τοῖς ἐχθρίστοις προῆσθε καὶ ἢμᾶς τοὺς
ἄλλους ἄθυμία πρὸς ἐτέραν τινὰ ξυμμαχίαν

1 i.e. you attempt to be fair on the principle that it is wise
not to offend others and so run the risk of injury which may

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greater calamity than laborious activity. Therefore if a man should sum up and say that they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to let other men have it, he would simply speak the truth.

LXXI. "And yet, although you have such a state ranged against you, O Lacedaemonians, you go on delaying and forget that a peaceful policy suffices long only for those who, while they employ their military strength only for just ends, yet by their spirit show plainly that they will not put up with it if they are treated with injustice; whereas you practise fair dealing on the principle of neither giving offence to others nor exposing yourselves to injury in self-defence. But it would be difficult to carry out such a policy successfully if you had as neighbour a state just like yourselves; whereas now, as we have just shown, your practices are old-fashioned as compared with theirs. But in politics, as in the arts, the new must always prevail over the old. It is true that when a state is at peace the established practices are best left unmodified, but when men are compelled to enter into many undertakings there is need of much improvement in method. It is for this reason that the government of the Athenians, because they have undertaken many things, has undergone greater change than yours.

"Here, then, let your dilatoriness end; at this moment succour both the Potidaeans and the rest of your allies, as you promised to do, by invading Attica without delay, that you may not betray your friends and kinsmen to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to seek some other arise in defending yourselves against the attacks you have provoked.
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5 τρέψητε. δρόμεν δ' ἄν ἄδικου οὐδὲν οὔτε πρὸς θεῶν τῶν ὀρκίων οὔτε πρὸς ἄνθρωπων τῶν αἰσθανομένων· λύουσι γὰρ σπονδᾶς οὐχ οἱ δι' ἐρημίαν ἄλλοις προσιόντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ βοηθοῦντες οἷς ἄν
6 ξυνομόσωσιν. βουλομένων δὲ ὑμῶν προθύμων εἶναι μενούμεν οὔτε γὰρ ὁσία ἀν ποιοῦμεν μεταβαλλόμενοι οὔτε ξυνηθεστέρους ἀν ἄλλους εὐροίμεν. πρὸς τάδε βουλεύσεθε εὗ καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πειράσθη μὴ ἐλάσσω εξηγεῖσθαι ἢ οἱ πατέρες ὑμῖν παρέδοσαν.

LXXII. Τοιαύτα μὲν οἱ Κορινθιοὶ εἶπον. τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων ἔτυχε γὰρ πρεσβεία πρότερον ἐν τῇ Δακεδαίμονι περὶ ἄλλων παροῦσα, καὶ ὡς ἦσθοντο τῶν λόγων, ἐδοξέων αὐτοῖς παριτητέα ἐστι τοὺς Δακεδαίμονίους εἰναι, τῶν μὲν ἐγκλημάτων πέρι μηδὲν ἀπολογησιμόνευσιν, ὡς αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν, δηλώσαι δὲ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς οὐ ταχέως αὐτοῖς βουλευτέον εἰη, ἀλλ' ἐν πλέονι σκεπτέον. καὶ ἄμα τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐβούλοντο σημῆναι ὅση εἴη δύναμιν, καὶ ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῖς τε πρεσβυτέροις ὡς ἦδεσαν καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις εξήγησιν ὅν ἀπειρο ἦσαν, νομίζοντες μᾶλλον ἀν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν λόγων πρὸς τὸ ἡσυχάζειν τραπέτσθαι ἢ πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν. προσελθόντες οὖν τοῖς Δακεδαίμονίοις ἐφασαν βούλεσθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰπέον, εἰ τι μὴ ἀποκωλῦοι. οἱ δὲ ἐκέλευον τε παρίεναι, καὶ παρελθόντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐλεγον τοιάδε.

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alliance. If we took such a course we should be committing no wrong either in the sight of the gods we have sworn by or of men of understanding; for treaties are broken not by those who when left unsupported join others, but by those who fail to succour allies they have sworn to aid. But if you mean to be zealous allies we will stay; for in that case we should be guilty of impiety if we changed our friends, nor should we find others more congenial. In view of these things, be well advised, and make it your endeavour that the Peloponnesian league shall be no weaker under your leadership than when you inherited it from your fathers.”

LXXII. Thus spoke the Corinthians. But there happened to be present at Lacedaemon an embassy of the Athenians that had come on other business, and when they heard the various speeches they deemed it advisable to appear before the Lacedaemonians, not indeed to make any defence on the charges brought by the cities, but to make clear with regard to the whole question at issue that the Lacedaemonians should not decide it hastily but should take more time to consider it. At the same time they wished to show how great was the power of their own city, reminding the older men of what they already knew, and recounting to the younger things of which they were ignorant, in the belief that under the influence of their arguments the Lacedaemonians would be inclined to peace rather than war. Accordingly they approached the Lacedaemonians and said that they also wished, if there was nothing to hinder, to address their assembly. The Lacedaemonians invited them to present themselves, and the Athenians came forward and spoke as follows:
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LXXIII. "Ἡ μὲν πρέσβευσις ἢμῶν οὐκ ἐς ἀντιλογίαν τοῖς υμετέροις ξυμμάχοις ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὣν ἡ πόλις ἐπεμψεν· αἰσθανόμενοι δὲ καταβοῦν ὦκ ὑλίγην οὕσαν ἢμῶν παρῆλθομεν, οὐ τοῖς ἐγκλήμασι τῶν πόλεων ἀντεροῦντες (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ δικασταῖς ὑμῖν οὔτε ἢμῶν οὔτε τούτων οἱ λόγοι ἂν γίγνοντο), ἀλλ’ ὅπως μὴ ῥαδίως περὶ μεγάλων πραγμάτων τοῖς ξυμμάχοις πειθόμενοι χείρον βουλεύσησθε, καὶ ἀμα βουλόμενοι περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λόγου τοῦ ἐς ἦμᾶς καθεστώτος δηλώσαι ὡς οὔτε ἀπεικότως ἔχομεν ἢ κεκτήμεθα, ἢ τε πόλις ἢμῶν ἄξια λόγου ἔστιν.

2 "Καὶ τὰ μὲν πάντων παλαιὰ τὸ δεῖ λέγειν, ὡς ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων μάρτυρες ἡ ὕψις τῶν ἀκουσμένων; τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ καὶ ὁσα αὐτοὶ ξύνιστε, εἰ καὶ δι’ ὥχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένως, ἀνάγκη λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ὅτε ἔδρωμεν, ἐπ’ ὥφελία ἐκινδυνεύετο, ἂς τοῦ μὲν ἔργου μέρος μετέσχετε, τού δὲ λόγου μὴ παντός, εἰ τι ὥφελεῖ,1 στερισκώμεθα. ῥηθήσεται δὲ (οὐ παρατίθεσις μᾶλλον ἐνεκα ἡ μαρτυρίου καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οίαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὐ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἄγων καταστήσεται.

3 "Φαμέν γὰρ Μαραθώνι τε μονοὶ προκινδυνεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ καὶ ὅτε τὸ ύστερον ἠλθεν,

1 ὥφελει Ε.
LXXIII. "Our embassy did not come here to enter into a dispute with your allies, but on the business for which our city sent us. Perceiving, however, that no small outcry is being made against us, we have come forward, not to answer the charges of the cities (for it can hardly be that either they or we are addressing you as judges), but in order that you may not, yielding to the persuasion of your allies, lightly make a wrong decision about matters of great importance. And at the same time we wish, as regards the whole outcry that has been raised against us, to show that we are rightfully in possession of what we have acquired, and that our city is not to be despised.

"Now, what need is there to speak about matters quite remote,\(^1\) whose only witnesses are the stories men hear rather than the eyes of those who will hear them told? But concerning the Persian War and all the other events of which you have personal knowledge, we needs must speak, even though it will be rather irksome to mention them, since they are always being paraded. For when we were performing those deeds the risk was taken for a common benefit, and since you got a share of the actual results of that benefit, we should not be wholly deprived of the credit, if there is any benefit in that. And our aim in the recital of the facts will be, not so much to deprecate censure, as to show by evidence with what sort of city you will be involved in war if you are not well advised.

"For we affirm that at Marathon we alone bore the first brunt of the Barbarian's attack, and that

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\(^1\) The Schol. remarks τὰ κατὰ 'Αμαζόνας καὶ ጮράκας καὶ ጮρακλείδας, favourite themes in eulogies, panegyric speeches, etc.
οὐχ ἰκανοὶ ὄντες κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι, ἔσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς παυδημεῖ ἐν Σαλαμίνι ξυνανμαχήσαι, ὁπερ ἐσχε μὴ κατὰ πόλεις αὐτῶν ἐπιπλέοντα τῆν Πελοπόννησον πορθεὶν, ἀδυνάτων ἀν ὄντων πρὸς ναῦς πολλὰς ἀλλήλους ἐπιβοθηεῖν. τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον αὐτῶς ἐποίησεν νικηθεὶς γὰρ ταῖς ναυσίν ὡς οὐκέτι αὐτῷ ὡμοίας οὕσης τῆς δυνάμεως κατὰ τάχος τῷ πλέον τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀνεχώρησεν.

LXXIV. "Τοιοῦτον μέντοι τούτον ξυμβάντος καὶ σαφῶς δηλωθέντος ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πράγματα ἐγένετο, τρία τὰ ὄφελωμότατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀρίθμον τε νεῶν πλείστον καὶ ἀνδρα στρατηγῶν ἔνεπτότατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην ναῦς μὲν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγων ἐλάσσοσοι τῶν δύο μοιρῶν, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ ἀρχοῦτα, διε ἀιτιώτατος ἐν τῷ στενῷ ναυμαχήσαι ἐγένετο, ὁπερ σαφέστατα ἔσωσε τὰ πράγματα, καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μᾶλιστα δὴ ἀνδρὰ ξένου τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐλθόντων προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηρότατην ἐδείξαμεν, οὐ γε, ἐπειδὴ ἠμῶν κατὰ γῆν οὐδὲς ἐβοήθει, τῶν ἄλλων ἥδη μέχρι ἴμῶν δουλεύοντων, ἡξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείραντες μηδ' ὡς τῷ τῶν περιλοίπων ξυμμάχων κοινῶν προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκεδασθέντες ἀχρείοι αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναύς κινδυνεύσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθῆναι ὅτι ἠμῶν οὐ

1 Probably a round number for 378 given by Hdt. viii. xiviii., of which the Athenian contingent (200, i.e. 180 + 20 lent to the Chalcidians, Hdt. viii. i.) could be spoken of as

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when he came again, not being able to defend ourselves by land, we embarked in a body on our ships and joined in the sea-fight at Salamis. This prevented his sailing against you city by city and ravaging the Peloponnesus, for you would have been unable to aid one another against a fleet so numerous. And the weightiest testimony to the truth of what we say was afforded by the enemy himself; for when his fleet was defeated, as if aware that his power was no longer a match for that of the Hellenes, he hastily withdrew with the greater part of his army.

LXXIV. "Such, then, was the issue of that battle, and clear proof was given thereby that the salvation of the Hellenes depended upon their ships. To that issue we contributed the three most serviceable elements, namely, the largest number of ships, the shrewdest general, and the most unfaltering zeal. Of the four hundred¹ ships our quota was a little less than two-thirds. The commander was Themistocles, who more than any other was responsible for our fighting the battle in the strait, which most surely was our salvation; and on this account you yourselves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited you.² And the zeal we displayed was that of utmost daring, for when there was no one to help us on land, since all the rest up to our very borders were already slaves, we resolved to abandon our city and sacrifice all our possessions; yet not even in that extremity to desert the common cause of the allies who remained, or by dispersing to render ourselves useless to them, but to embark on our ships and fight, and not to be angry because you failed to

¹ See Hdt. viii. cxxiv.; Plut. Them. xvii. 3.
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3 προτυμωρήσατε. ὡστε φαμέν οὖχ ἦσσον αὐτοὶ ὥφελησαι ὑμᾶς ἢ τυχεῖν τούτον. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τε οἰκουμένων τῶν πόλεων καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸ λοιπὸν νέμεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἐδείσατε ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ οὖχ ἦμὼν τὸ πλέον, ἐβοηθήσατε (ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν ἐτὶ σῶ, οὐ παρεγένεσθε), ὑμεῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τε τῆς οὐκ οὐσῆς ἐτὶ ὀρμώμενοι καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν βραχείᾳ ἐλπίδι οὐσῆς κινδυνεύοντες ἑπεσώσαμεν ὑμᾶς τε τὸ μέρος καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῷ Μήδῳ δείσαντες, ὡσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι, περὶ τῇ χώρᾳ, ἦ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὑστερον ἐσβήναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὡς διεφθαρμένοι, οὔδὲν ἀν ἐδει ἐτὶ ὑμᾶς 1 μὴ ἐχοντας ναῦς ἱκανὰς ναυμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἱσυχίαν ἃν αὐτῷ προσχώρησε τὰ πράγματα ἢ ἐβούλετο.

LXXV. “*Αρ’ ἀξιοὶ ἐσμεν, ὦ Δακεδαίμονι, καὶ προθυμίας ἐνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης ξυνεσεws ἀρχής γε ἃς ἐχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτωσ 2 ἀγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ’ ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἠθέλησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἦμιν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ἕξμμαχων 3 καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἤγεμόνας καταστίχαι. ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον

1 ὑμᾶς: Hude inserts ἐπὶ before ὑμᾶς.

1 cf. the taunt of Adimantus (Hdt. viii. lvii. 7), περὶ οὐδεμῆς ἐτὶ πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις, “You will fight for a country that is no more,” and the famous answer of Themistocles

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help us earlier. We therefore maintain that we on our part conferred upon you a benefit at least as great as we received; for whereas the population of the cities from which you brought aid was still undisturbed and you could hope to possess them in the future, and your motive was fear for yourselves rather than for us—at any rate you did not come near so long as we were still unharmed—we on our part, setting forth from a city that was no more, and risking our lives in behalf of one whose future hung upon but a slender hope, bore our part in saving both you and ourselves. But if we had acted as others did, and through fear of losing our territory had gone over to the Persians earlier in the war, or afterwards had lacked the courage to embark on our ships, in the conviction that we were already ruined, it would from that moment have been useless for you, with your inadequate fleet, to fight at sea, but the Persian's plans would have moved on quietly just as he wished.

LXXV. "Considering, then, Lacedaemonians, the zeal and sagacity of judgment which we displayed at that time, do we deserve to be regarded with this excessive jealousy by the Hellenes just on account of the empire we possess? And indeed we did not acquire this empire by force, but only after you had refused to continue to oppose what was left of the barbarian forces, and the allies came to us and of their own accord asked us to assume the leadership. It was under the compulsion of circumstances that

(Plut. viii. lxi. 8), ὡς εἶ ἐκὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέζων ἡπερ κελνοισι ἔστ' ἄν διηκόσιαι νέες σφί ἔσει πεπληρωμέναι, "We have a city and a country greater than yours as long as we have two hundred ships fully manned."
προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τὸ δέος, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ
δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὑστερον καὶ ὕφελιας,
καὶ οὐκ ἁσφαλές ἐτὶ ἔδοκει εἶναι, τοῖς πολλοῖς
ἀπηχθήμενοι καὶ τινῶν καὶ ἢδη ἀποστάντων
κατεστραμμένων, ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως
φίλων, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέν-
τας κινδυνεύειν (καὶ γὰρ ἄν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς
ἐμαξ ἐγίγνοντο): τάσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ ἐξυμ-
φέροντα τῶν μεγίστων περὶ κινδύνων εὐ τί-
θεσθαι.

LXXVI. "Τμεῖς γοῦν, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, τὰς
ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὑφέλιμον
καταστησάμενοι ἔξηγείσθη καὶ εἰ τότε ὑπο-
μείναντες διὰ παντὸς ἀπῆχθησθε ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ,
ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς, εὑ ἵσμεν μὴ ἄν ἢσσον ὑμᾶς λυπη-
ροὺς γενομένους τοῖς ἐξυμμάχοις καὶ ἀναγκασθέν-
τας ἄν ἢ ἄρχειν ἐγκρατῶς ἢ αὐτοὺς κινδυνεύειν.
2 οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστόν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν
οὐδ' ἀπό τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἄρχην τε
διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνείμεν
ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους
καὶ ὑφελίας, οὐδ' αὐ τρώτοι τοῦ τουλάχιστον ὑπάρ-
ξαντες, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καθεστῶς τῶν ἢσσων ὑπὸ τοῦ
dυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι, ἀξίων τε ἥμα νομί-
ζοντες εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες, μέχρι οὗ τὰ
ἐξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν

1 Hude inserts τρῖαν before τῶν μεγίστων, with van
Herwerden and Weil.
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we were driven at first to advance our empire to its present state, influenced chiefly by fear, then by honour also, and lastly by self-interest as well; and after we had once incurred the hatred of most of our allies, and several of them had already revolted and been reduced to subjection, and when you were no longer friendly as before but suspicious and at variance with us, it no longer seemed safe to risk relaxing our hold. For all seceders would have gone over to you. And no man is to be blamed for making the most of his advantages when it is a question of the gravest dangers.

LXXVI. "At any rate you, Lacedaemonians, in the exercise of your leadership over the Peloponnesian states regulate their polities according to your own advantage; and if in the Persian war you had held out to the end in the hegemony and had become unpopular in its exercise, as we did, you would certainly have become not less obnoxious to the allies than we are, and would have been compelled either to rule them with a strong hand or yourselves to risk losing the hegemony. Thus there is nothing remarkable or inconsistent with human nature in what we also have done, just because we accepted an empire when it was offered us, and then, yielding to the strongest motives—honour, fear, and self-interest—declined to give it up. Nor, again, are we the first who have entered upon such a course, but it has ever been an established rule that the weaker is kept down by the stronger. And at the same time we thought we were worthy to rule, and used to be so regarded by you also, until you fell to calculating what your interests were and resorted,

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1 i.e. by setting up oligarchies in them, cf. ch. xix.
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χρήσθε, ὅν οὐδεὶς πώ παρατυχὼν ἵσχύ τι κτήσασθαι προθείς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπητο.

3 ἔπαινεισθάι τε ἀξιοὶ, οἴτινες χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει ὡστε ἑτέρων ἄρχειν δικαίωτεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δύναμιν γένωνται.

4 ἀλλοις γ' ἂν οὐν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἥμετέρα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἰ τι μετριάζομεν, ἥμιν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ἁδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἐπαίνοις οὐκ εἰκότως περιέστη.

LXXVII. "Καὶ ἐλασσοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἐνυμβολαιαῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐνυμμάχους δίκαιοι καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὑμοίοις νόμοις πολισάντες ἄρα τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν. καὶ οὐδεὶς σκοπεῖ αὐτῶν, τοῖς καὶ ἄλλοθί που ἐχουσιν ἄρχην καὶ ἴσον ἡμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους μετρίοις οὕτως δι' ὧ τι τοῦτο οὐκ ὀνειδίζεται. βιάζεσθαι γὰρ οίς ἂν ἐξῆ, δικάζεσθαι οὐδέν προσδέονται.

3 οὶ δὲ εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσοῦ ὀμιλεῖν, ἢν τι παρὰ τὸ μὴ οἶχαῖα χρήναι ἢ γνώμη ἢ δυνάμει τῇ διὰ τὴν ἄρχήν καὶ ὁπωσοῦ ἐλασσοθῶσιν, οὐ τοῦ πλέονος μὴ στερισκόμενοι χάριν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐνδεός χαλεπώτερον φέρουσιν ἢ εἰ ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀποθέμενοι τῶν νόμων φανερῶς.

1 These seem to have been disputes in matters of trade tried before federal courts elsewhere than in Athens; whereas tās krίσεις refers to compulsory jurisdiction which Athens enforced upon her allies in her own courts.
as you do now, to the plea of justice—which no one, when opportunity offered of securing something by main strength, ever yet put before force and abstained from taking advantage. And they are to be commended who, yielding to the instinct of human nature to rule over others, have been more observant of justice than they might have been, considering their power. At least, if others should seize our power, they would, we think, exhibit the best proof that we show some moderation; but in our case the result of our very reasonableness is, perversely enough, obloquy rather than commendation.

LXXVII. “For although we are at a disadvantage in suits with our allies arising out of commercial agreements, and although in our own courts in Athens, where we have established tribunals, the same laws apply to us as to them, we are thought to insist too much upon our legal rights. And none of our allies observes why it is that those who hold dominion elsewhere, and are less moderate than we are toward their subjects, are not reproached on this account. It is because those who may use might have no need to appeal to right. But if ever our allies, accustomed as they are to associate with us on the basis of equality, come off second best in any matter, however trivial, contrary to their own notion that it ought to be otherwise, whether their discomfiture is due to a legal decision or to the exercise of our imperial power, instead of being grateful that they have not been deprived of what is of greater moment, they are more deeply offended because of their trifling inequality than if we had from the first put aside all legal restraints

2 Namely, their equality before the law.
ἐπλεονεκτούμεν. ἐκείνως δὲ οὖδ’ ἀν αὐτοὶ ἀντελεγον ὡς οὐ χρεῶν τὸν ἦσσω τῷ κρατοῦντι ύποχρεῖν. ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς έοικεν, οἱ ἀνθρωποί μᾶλλον ὁργίζονται ἡ βιαζόμενοι: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσον δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσους καταναγκάζεσθαι. ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τούτων πάσχοντες ἤνείχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἡμέτερα ἄρχῃ χαλεπῇ δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰκότως; τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς υπηκόοις. ὑμεῖς γ’ ἂν οὖν εἰ καθελόντες ἢμᾶς ἀρξαίτε, τάχα ἂν τὴν εὐνοιαν ἦν διὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος εἰλήφατε μεταβάλοιτε, εὑπερ οία καὶ τότε πρὸς τὸν Μήδου δι’ ὅλιγον ἡγησάμενοι υπεδείξατε, ὀμοία καὶ νῦν γνώσεσθε. ἀμεικτα γὰρ τά τε καθ’ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς νόμιμα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔχετε καὶ προσέτι εἰς ἐκαστος ἑξιῶν οὕτε τοῦτοι χρῆται οὖθ’ οῖς ἡ ἄλλη ’Ελλάς νομίζει.

LXXVIII. “Βουλεύσεθε οὖν βραδέως ὡς οὐ περὶ βραχέων, καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτρίας γυώμαις καὶ ἐγκλήμασι πεισθέντες οἰκεῖοι πόνον πρόσθησθε. τοῦ δὲ πολέμου τὸν παράλογον ὅσος ἐστὶ, πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γειέσθαι προδιάγνωστο μηκυνόμενος γὰρ φιλεῖ ἐς τὺχας τὰ πολλὰ περίστασθαι, δήν ἱσον τε ἀπέχομεν καὶ ὀποτέρως ἐσται ἐν ἂδηλῳ κιν- 3 δυνεύεται. ἱόντες τε οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἐς τοὺς πολέ- μους τῶν ἔργων πρότερον ἔχουνται, ἀ πρὸς τιν 132
and had openly sought our own advantage. In that case even they would not be setting up the claim that the weaker should not have to yield to the stronger. Men, it seems, are more resentful of injustice than of violence; for the former, they feel, is overreaching by an equal, whereas the latter is coercion by a superior. At any rate, they submitted to more grievous wrongs than these at the hands of the Persians, while our rule is hard to bear, as they think; and no wonder, for the present yoke is always heavy to subjects. Certainly you, should you overthrow us and obtain supremacy, would soon lose the good will which you have gained through fear of us—if indeed you mean again to show such temper as you gave a glimpse of at that time when for a little while you had the hegemony against the Persian.° For the institutions that prevail among you at home are incompatible with those of other peoples, and, besides, each one of you when he goes abroad uses neither these nor those which the rest of Greece is accustomed to.

LXXVIII. “Be slow, then, in your deliberations, for no slight matters are at stake; and do not, influenced by the opinions and accusations of others, burden yourselves needlessly with trouble of your own. Realise before you get into it how great are the chances of miscalculation in war. For when it is long drawn out, it is wont generally to resolve itself into a mere matter of chance; and over chance both sides equally have no control, and what the outcome will be is unknown and precarious. Most men rush into war and proceed to blows first, although that ought to be the last resort, and then,

° e.g. the conduct of Pausanias described in ch. cxxx.
δραν, κακοπαθοῦντες δὲ ἦδη τῶν λόγων ἀπτοῦνται.

4 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ πω τοιαύτῃ ἀμαρτίᾳ ὄντες οὔτ' αὐτοὶ οὖθ' ύμᾶς ὀρώντες λέγομεν ύμῖν, ἢς ἐτὶ αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδᾶς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην, ἡ θεοὺς τοὺς ὅρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἀρχοντας ταύτη ἢ ἂν ὑφηγήσθε.’’

LXXIX. Τοιαύτα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι εἶπον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων ἠκουσαν οἱ Δακεδαιμόνιοι τᾶ ἐγκλήματα τά ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἃ ἔλεξαν, μεταστησάμενοι πάντας ἐβουλεύοντο κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ τῶν παρόντων. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλεόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνώμαι ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡδὴ καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει παρελθὼν δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, ἀνήρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων, ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

LXXX. “Καὶ αὐτὸς πολλῶν ἡδὴ πολέμων ἐμπειρός εἰμι, ὁ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ύμῶν τους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἥλικίᾳ ὄρῳ, ὡστε μήτε ἀπειρία ἐπιθυμῆσαι τίνα τοῦ ἔργου, ὅπερ ἄν οἱ πολλοὶ πάθοιεν, 2 μήτε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀσφαλές νομίσαντα. εὐροίτε δ' ἄν τόνδε περὶ οὗ νῦν βουλεύεσθε σοὶ ἄν ἐλάχιστον γενόμενον, εἰ σωφρόνως τις αὐτὸν ἐκλογή-3 ξοιτο. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς

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when they are in distress, at length have recourse to words. But since we ourselves are not as yet involved in any such error and see that you are not, we urge you, while wise counsels are still a matter of free choice to both of us, not to violate the treaty or transgress your oaths, but to let our differences be settled by arbitration according to the agreement. But if you refuse, we shall invoke as witnesses the gods by whom our oaths were sworn, and shall endeavour to make reprisals on those who begin the war, following that path in which you have led the way.”

LXXIX. Thus the Athenians spoke. And when the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges brought by the allies against the Athenians, and what the latter said in reply, they caused all others to withdraw and deliberated by themselves on the situation before them. And the opinions of the majority tended to the same conclusion, namely, that the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that they must go to war without delay. But Archidamus their king, a man reputed to be both sagacious and prudent, came forward and spoke as follows:

LXXX. “I have both myself, Lacedaemonians, had experience in my day of many wars, and I see men among you who are as old as I am; no one of them, therefore, is eager for war through lack of experience, as would be the case with most men, nor because he thinks it a good or a safe thing. And you would find that this war about which you are now deliberating is likely to prove no trifling matter, if one should reflect upon it soberly. For in a contest with the Peloponnesians or the neighbouring states ¹

¹ By the Peloponnesians Thucydides means the Spartan alliance; the neighbouring states would then be the Peloponnesian states not in the alliance, e.g. Argos.
ἀστυγείτονας παρόμοιος ἡμῶν ἡ ἄλκη, καὶ διὰ ταχέων οὖν τε ἐφ' ἐκαστα ἔλθειν πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας οὗ γῆν τε ἐκαὶ ἔχουσι καὶ προσέπτι θαλάσσης ἐμπειρότατοι εἰσὶ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν ἄριστα ἐξηρτυται, πλούτῳ τε ἴδιῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἰπποὶς καὶ ὄπλοις καὶ ὀχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνί γε χωρίῳ Ἕλληνικῷ ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους πολλοὺς φόρον ὑποτελείς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρῆ πρὸς τούτους ῥαδίως πόλεμον ἀρασθαί καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκεύοις ἐπειχθῆναι;

πότερον ταῖς ναυσίν; ἀλλ' ἡσιοὺς ἐσμέν' εἰ δὲ μελετήσομεν καὶ ἀντιπαρασκευασόμεθα, χρόνος ἐνέσται. ἀλλὰ τοῖς χρήμασιν; ἀλλὰ πολλῷ πλέον ἐτι τούτῳ ἐλλειπομεν καὶ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν οὔτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἱδίων φέρομεν.

LXXXI. "Τάχ' ἂν τις θαρσοῖς ὅτι τοῖς ὄπλοις αὐτοῖς καὶ τῷ πλῆθει ὑπερφέρομεν, ὥστε 2 τὴν γῆν δησοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλῃ γῇ ἐστὶ πολλῇ ἢς ἄρχουσιν, καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ὅν 3 δένται ἐπάξονται. εἰ δ' αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἀφιστάναι πειρασόμεθα, δεῖσει καὶ τούτοις ναυσὶ 4 βοηθεῖν τὸ πλέον οὐσί νησιώταις. τὶς οὖν ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ πόλεμος; εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἡ ναυσὶ κρατήσομεν ἡ τὰς προσόδους ἀφαιρήσομεν ἀφ' ὅν τὸ ναυτικὸν 5 τρέφουσι, βλαψόμεθα τὰ πλείω. κακὸς τούτῳ 1

1 i.e. it is military rather than naval; similar, too, in the matter of wealth, equipment, absence of foreign resources, tributary allies, etc.

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our power is of the same type with theirs\(^1\) and we can be upon them quickly at every point; but when opposed to men whose territory is far away, who besides are beyond all others experienced in seamanship and are best equipped in all other respects, with wealth both private and public, ships, horses, arms and a larger population than is to be found in any other single district in Hellas, who have, moreover, numerous allies subject to tribute—against such men why should we lightly take up arms? In what do we place our trust that we should attack them unprepared? In our ships? But there we are inferior; and if we train and make ourselves ready to encounter them, that will take time. In our wealth then? But in that respect we are still more deficient, neither having money in the treasury of the state nor finding it easy to raise money from our private resources by taxation.\(^2\)

LXXXI. "Perhaps some of us are emboldened by our superiority in arms and numbers, which enables us freely to invade and lay waste their territory. But there is other territory in plenty over which they hold sway, and they will import by sea whatever they need. And if, on the other hand, we try to induce their allies to revolt, we shall have in addition to protect them with a fleet, since they are chiefly islanders. What then will be the character of the war we shall be waging? Unless we can either win the mastery on the sea or cut off the revenues by which they support their navy, we shall get the worst of it. And, if it comes to that, we can no longer even conclude an honourable peace,

\(^2\) The poverty of the Peloponnesians is referred to by Pericles in ch. cxli. 3. The statement is true especially of the Spartans, but also of all the rest except the Corinthians.
6 δόξομεν ἀρξαί μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς. μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνη γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρώμεθα ώς ταχὺ παυσθή- σεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἂν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμωρεν. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισίν αὐτῶν ύπο- λίπωμεν· οὕτως εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίους φρονήματι μήτε τῇ γῆ δουλεύσαι μήτε ύστερ ἀπείρους κατα- πλαγήναι τῷ πολέμῳ.

LXXXII. "Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀνασθήτως αὐτοῖς κελεύω τοὺς τε ἐξιμμάχους ἡμῶν ἐὰν βλάπτετιν καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας μὴ καταφωρᾶν, ἀλλὰ ὅπλα μὲν μῆτω κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι μήτε πόλεμον ἀγαν δηλοῦντας μὴθ' ὡς ἐπιτρέψομεν, κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἔξαρτυεθαι ἐξιμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ, καὶ Ἐλληνῶν καὶ βαρβάρων δὲ ποθέν τινα ἡ ναυτικὸς ἡ χρημάτων δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα (ἀνεπίφθονον δὲ, ὅσοι ύστερ καὶ ἡμέως ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλεύομεθα, μὴ "Ἐλληνας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρος προσλα- βόντας διασωθήναι), καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμα ἐκπορι- 2 ζώμεθα. καὶ ἂν μὲν ἔσακούσοι τι πρεσβευομένοιν ἡμῶν, ταῦτα ἀριστά· ἂν δὲ μὴ, διελθόντων ἐτῶν δύο καὶ τριῶν ἀμειὼν ἡδη, ἂν δοκῇ, πεφραγμένοι 3 ἰμεν ἐπ' αὐτούς. καὶ ὅσως ὀρόντες ἡμῶν ἡδη τὴν τε παρασκευὴν καὶ τοὺς λόγους αὐτῆ ὀμοία ὑπο- σημαίνοντας μᾶλλον ἄν εἰκοεῖν, καὶ γῆν ἐπὶ ἅμη- τον ἐχοντες καὶ περὶ παρόντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ οὕτω
especially if it is believed that we rather than they began the quarrel. For we assuredly must not be buoyed up by any such hope as that the war will soon be over if we but ravage their territory. I fear rather that we shall even bequeath it to our children, so improbable it is that the Athenians, high spirited as they are, will either make themselves vassals to their land, or, like novices, become panic-stricken at the war.

LXXXII. "Yet assuredly I do not advise you that you should blindly suffer them to injure our allies and allow their plotting to go undetected, but rather that you should adopt the following course: Do not take up arms yet, but send envoys to them and make complaints, without indicating too clearly whether we shall go to war or put up with their conduct; also in the meantime, let us proceed with our own preparations, in the first place by winning allies to our side, Barbarians as well as Hellenes, in the hope of obtaining from some quarter or other additional resources in ships or money (for those who, like ourselves, are plotted against by the Athenians are not to be blamed if they procure their salvation by gaining the aid, not of Hellenes only, but even of Barbarians); and let us at the same time be developing our resources at home. And if they give any heed to our envoys, there could be nothing better; but if not, then, after the lapse of two or three years, we shall at length be better equipped to go against them, if we decide to do so. Or perhaps when they see our preparations, and that our words correspond thereto, they will be more inclined to yield, for they will both have their land still unravaged and their deliberations will concern goods that are still theirs.
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4 ἐφθαρμενῶν βουλεύομενοι. μὴ γὰρ ἄλλο τι νομίσητε τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν ἢ ὁμηρον ἔχειν καὶ οἷς ἦσον ὅσω ἀμεινον ἐξείργασαι. ἦς φείδεσθαι χρὴ ὅσ ἐπὶ πλείστον, καὶ μὴ ἐς ἀπόνοιαν κατά-
5 στήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἀληπτοτέρους ἔχειν. εἰ γὰρ ἀπαράσκευοι τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐγκλήμασιν ἐπειχθέντες τεμοῦμεν αὐτὴν, ὅρατε ὅπως μὴ αἰσχιον καὶ ἀπορώτερον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ πράξο-
6 μεν. ἐγκλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἱδιωτῶν οἴνον τε καταλύσαι πόλεμον δὲ ξύμπαν-
τας ἀραμένους ἕνεκα τῶν ἱδίων, ὅν οἷς ὑπάρχει εἰδέναι καθ’ ὅ τι χωρῆσει, οὐ ράδιον εὑπρεπῶς θέσθαι.

LXXXIII. "Καὶ ἀνανδρία μηδενὶ πολλοὺς μιᾷ
2 πόλει μὴ ταχὺ ἐπελθεῖν δοκεῖτο εἶναι. εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἐλάσσοις χρήματα φέροντες ξύμμαχοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὀπλων τὸ πλέον, ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι’ ἥν τὰ ὅπλα ὠφελεί,
3 ἀλλως τε καὶ ἱππειρώτατος πρὸς θαλασσίους. πο-
ρισώμεθα οὖν πρῶτον αὐτὴν, καὶ μὴ τοῖς τῶν ξυμμάχων λόγοις πρότερον ἐπαιρώμεθα, οὔτε δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀποβαίνοντων τὸ πλέον ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα τῆς αἰτίας ἐξομεν, οὔτοι καὶ καθ’ ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν προίδωμεν.

LXXXIV. "Καὶ τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον, ὁ μέμ-
φονται μάλιστα Ἴμῶν, μὴ αἰσχύνεσθε. σπευ-
δοντες τε γὰρ σχολαίτερον ἄν παύσαισθε διὰ τὸ ἀπαράσκευοι ἐγχειρεῖν, καὶ ἁμα ἐλευθέραν καὶ
and as yet not ruined. For do not regard their land as anything but a hostage for us to hold, and a better hostage the better it is cultivated. You should therefore spare it as long as possible, instead of making them desperate and thus having a more intractable foe to deal with. For if, without adequate preparation, egged on by the complaints of our allies, we shall ravage their territory, beware lest we adopt a course which might rather\(^1\) result in disgrace and difficulties for the Peloponnesus. For complaints, indeed, whether brought by states, or by individuals, may possibly be adjusted; but when a whole confederacy, for the sake of individual interests, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee the issue, it is not easy to end it with honour.

LXXXIII. "And let no man think it pusillanimous that many states should hesitate to attack a single city. For they also have allies not less numerous than ours who pay tribute; and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, for it is money alone that makes arms serviceable, especially when an inland opposes a maritime power. Let us therefore provide ourselves with money first, instead of being carried away prematurely by the eloquence of our allies; and, just as it is we who shall bear the greater part of the responsibility for the consequences, whether for good or evil, so let it be our task also calmly to get some forecast of them.

LXXXIV. "And so be not ashamed of the slowness and dilatoriness for which they censure us most; for speed in beginning may mean delay in ending, because you went into the war without preparation, and, moreover, in consequence of our policy we have

\(^1\) i.e. than the opposite course.
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ευδοξοτάτην πόλιν διὰ παντὸς νεμόμεθα, καὶ δύναται μάλιστα σωφροσύνη ἐμφρων τοῦτ’ εἶναι: 2 μόνοι γὰρ δὴ αὐτὸ εὐπραγίας τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν, καὶ ἔμφοραῖς ἥσον ἔτερων εἰκομεν, τῶν τε ἐξ ἐπαίνῳ ἐξοτρυνόντων ἠμᾶς ἐπὶ τὰ δεινὰ παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐπαίρομέθα ἥδου, καὶ ἡν τις ἀρὰ ἐξ ὀν κατηγορία παροξύνη, οὐδὲν δὴ μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες ἀνεπείσθημεν. πολεμικοὶ τε καὶ εὐβουλοί διὰ τὸ εὐκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὦ̏ ἀιδῶς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία, εὐβουλοὶ δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδεύομενοι καὶ ἐξ ἐν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὡστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστείν, καὶ μή τὰ ἄχρεία ἐξεπεδοματ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφόμενοι ἀνομοίων ἐργῷ ἐπεξεύγαν, νομίζειν δὲ τὰς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίον εἰναι καὶ τὰς προσπη-πτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαμετάς. αἰεὶ δὲ ὡς πρός εὑ βουλευομένους τοὺς ἐναντίον ἐργῷ παρασκευα-ζόμεθα: καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἐκείνῳν ὡς ἀμαρτησομένων ἐχειν δεῖ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἠμῶν αὐτῶν ἀσφα-λῶς προνοομένων, πολὺ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεὶ

1 The speaker uses εὐκοσμον, rather than βραδον employed by the critics of Sparta, to suggest the contrast with impulsiveness or undue haste.
ever inhabited a city at once free and of fairest fame. And, after all, this trait in us may well be in the truest sense intelligent self-control, for by reason of it we alone do not become insolent in prosperity or succumb to adversity as much as others do; and when men try to goad us by praise into dangerous enterprises against our better judgment, we are not carried away by their flattery, or, if anyone goes so far as to attempt to provoke us to action by invective, we are none the more moved to compliance through vexation. Indeed, it is because of our orderly temper 1 that we are brave in war and wise in counsel—brave in war, because self-control is the chief element in self-respect, and respect of self, in turn, is the chief element in courage; and wise in counsel, because we are educated too rudely to despise the laws and with too much severity of discipline to disobey them, and not to be so ultra-clever in useless accomplishments 2 as to disparage our enemy's military preparations in brave words and then fail to go through with the business with corresponding deeds, but rather to consider that the designs of our neighbours are very much like our own and that what may befall from fortune 3 cannot be determined by speeches. But it is our way always to make our preparations by deeds, on the presumption that we go against opponents who are wise in counsel; and we ought never to build our hopes on the chance that they are going to make mistakes, but on the belief that we ourselves are taking safe precautions. And we must not believe that man

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1 With a glance at the Athenians' attention to culture, especially the art of elegant speech.
2 cf. the Corinthians' charge, ch. lxix. 5, that the Spartans trusted to chance.
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νομίζειν ἀνθρωπον ἀνθρώπον, κράτιστον δὲ εἶναι ὡστὶς ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις παιδεύεται.

LXXXV. "Ταῦτας οὖν ὅς οἱ πατέρες τε ἡμῖν παρέδοσαν μελέτας καὶ αὐτοὶ διὰ παντὸς ὦφελούμενοι ἔχομεν μὴ παρώμεν, μηδὲ ἑπειχθέντες ἐν βραχεὶ μορίῳ ἡμέρας περὶ πολλῶν σωμάτων καὶ χρημάτων καὶ πόλεων καὶ δόξης βουλεύσώμεν, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ἡσυχίαν. ἔξεστι δ’ ἡμῖν μᾶλλον ἐτέρων διὰ ἵσχύν. καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πέμπτε μὲν περὶ τῆς Ποτειδαίας, πέμπτε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοι φασίν ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων αὐτῶν δίκας δοῦναι ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν διδόντα οὐ πρότερον νόμιμον ὡς ἐπὶ ἀδικοῦντα ἰέναι. παρασκευάζεσθε δὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἀμα. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ κράτιστα βουλεύσεσθε καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις φοβερώτατα.”

3 Καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοιαῦτα ἐπεν παρελθὼν δὲ Σθενελάδας τελευταίος, εἰς τῶν ἐφόρων τότε ὃν, ἔλεξεν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ὁδε. LXXXVI. "Τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γιγνώσκω ἐπαινέσαντες γὰρ πολλα ἐαυτοὺς οὐδαμοῦ ἀντείπτον ὃς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ’ ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ξημίας ἀξίου εἰσὶν, ὅτι ἄντι ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένησθαι. ἦμεῖς δὲ ὁμοίοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμεν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμά—

1 Hude deletes with Krüger.
differs much from man, but that he is best who is trained in the severest discipline.

LXXXV. "These are the practices which our fathers bequeathed to us and we ourselves have maintained from the beginning to our profit; let us not abandon them, nor allow ourselves in a small portion of one day to be hurried into a decision which involves many lives, much money, many cities and a good name; but let us deliberate at our leisure. And this course is permitted to us more than to the supporters of the other view because of our strength. And send envoys to the Athenians to take up the question of Potidaea, and also to take up the matters wherein our allies claim that they are wronged. The chief reason for this is that they are ready to submit to arbitration, and it is not lawful to proceed forthwith against one who offers arbitration as though against a wrong-doer. But all the while prepare yourselves for the war. This decision will be best for yourselves and will inspire most fear in your foes."

Thus spoke Archidamus, and finally Sthenelaidas, one of the ephors at that time, came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows:

LXXXVI. "The long speeches of the Athenians I cannot understand; for though they indulged in much praise of themselves, they nowhere denied that they are wronging our allies and the Peloponnesus. And yet, if they conducted themselves well against the Persians in former times but are now conducting themselves ill toward us, they deserve two-fold punishment, because they used to be good and have become bad. But we are the same now as we were

1 cf. the Corinthians' praise of Athenian superiority, ch. lxx.
2 cf. ch. lxxviii. 4.
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χοις, ἂν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περιοψόμεθα ἄδικου-
μένους οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δ’ οὐκέτι
3 μέλλονσι κακῶς πάσχειν. Ἀλλοις μὲν γὰρ χρή-
ματὰ ἐστὶ καὶ νῆς καὶ ἱπποῦ, ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι
ἀγαθοὶ, οὐς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν,
οὐδὲ δίκαιοι καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ
άυτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει
4 καὶ παντὶ σθένει. καὶ ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύ-
εσθαί ἄδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς
μέλλοντας ἄδικείν μᾶλλον πρέπει πολὺν χρόνον
5 βουλεύεσθαι. ψηφίζεσθε οὖν, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
ἀξίως τῆς Σπάρτης τὸν πόλεμον καὶ μήτε τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους ἐάτε μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι, μήτε τοὺς
ξυμμάχους καταπροδιδόμεν, ἀλλὰ ξίν τοῖς θεοῖς
ἐπίωμεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄδικοντας.”

LXXXVII. Τοιαῦτα λέξας ἐπεψῆφίζεν αὐτὸς
ἐφορος ὃν ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

2 ὁ δὲ (κρίνοντι γὰρ βοη καὶ οὐ ψήφω) οὐκ ἐφη
diagignwoseis τὴν βοην ποτέρα μεῖζον, ἀλλὰ
βουλόμενοι αὐτοὺς φανερῶς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν
ηιμωπὶν ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὀρμήσαι ἔλεξεν·
""Οτω μὲν ύμῶν, ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, δοκοῦσι λε-
λύσθαι αἱ σπουδαὶ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄδικείν,
ἀναστήτως ἐς ἑκείνῳ τὸ χωρίον,” δείξας τὶ χωρίον
αὐτοῖς, "ὁτω δὲ μὴ δοκούσιν, ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θώτερα.”

3 ἀναστάιτες δὲ διεστησαν, καὶ πολλῷ πλείους
4 ἐγένοντο οἷς ἑδόκουν αἱ σπουδαὶ λελύσθαι. προσ-

1 Hude deletes, after Fr. Müller.
then, and if we are in our right minds, we shall not permit our allies to be wronged or even put off avenging their wrongs, since they cannot longer put off suffering them. Others, indeed, may have money in abundance and ships and horses, but we have brave allies, and they must not be delivered over to the Athenians; nor must we seek redress by means of legal processes and words when it is not in word only that we ourselves are being injured, but we must avenge them speedily and with all our might. And let no man tell us that it befits us to deliberate when a wrong is being done us; nay, it befits rather those who intend to do us a wrong to deliberate a long time. Vote, therefore, Lacedaemonians, for the war as beseems the dignity of Sparta, and do not permit the Athenians to become too great; and let us not prove false to our allies, but let us with the favour of the gods go against the wrong-doer.”

LXXXVII. When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken, he himself, since he was an ephor, put the vote to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. Now in their voting they usually decide by shout and not by ballot, but Sthenelaidas said that he could not distinguish which shout was the louder, and wishing to make the assembly more eager for war by a clear demonstration of their sentiment, he said: “Whoever of you, Lacedaemonians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and the Athenians are doing wrong, let him rise and go to yonder spot (pointing to a certain spot), and whoever thinks otherwise, to the other side.” Then they rose and divided, and those who thought the treaty had been broken were found to be in a large majority. Then they called in the

1 cf. ch. lxxx. 3.
καλέσαντες τε τοὺς ἐξωμάχους εἶπον ὅτι σφίσι μὲν δοκοίειν ἀδικεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, βούλεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἐξωμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψῆφον ἐπαγαγεῖν, ὅπως κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ποιῶνται, ἢν δοκῇ. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπὶ οίκου διαπραξάμενοι ταῦτα, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖῶν πρέσβεις ύστερον ἐφ' ἀπερ ἦλθον χρηματίσαντες.

6 Ἡ δὲ διαγρώμη αὐτῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ τὰς σπουδὰς λελύσθαι ἐγένετο ἐν τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει τῶν τριακοντοτύδων σπουδῶν προκεχωρηκών, αἱ ἐγένοντο μετὰ τὰ Ἐὐβοῖκα. ΛXXXVIII. ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπουδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ἐξωμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις οὖν φοβοῦμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μείζου δυνηθῶσιν, ὀρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἐλλάδος ὑποχειρίᾳ ἤδη ὄντα.

ΛXXXIX. Οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι τρόπῳ τοιῷδε ἦλθον ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐν οἷς ἡξηθησαν. ἐπειδὴ Μήδοι ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῆς Ἐυρώπης νικηθέντες καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ὑπὸ Ἐλλήνων καὶ οἱ καταφυγόντες αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσίν ἐς Μυκάλην διεφθάρησαν, Λεωτυχίδης μὲν ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ὀσπερ ἤγειτο τῶν ἐν Μυκάλῃ Ἐλλήνων, ἀπεχώρησεν ἐπὶ οίκου ἐξων τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐξωμάχους· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ

1 τοῦ τὰς σπουδὰς λελύσθαι, omitted by Hude, following van Herwerden.
allies and told them that, in their opinion, the Athenians were doing wrong, but that they wished to summon the whole body of the allies and put the vote to them, in order that they might all deliberate together and together undertake the war, if it should be so decided. And so the allies who were there went back home, having brought these matters to a settlement, and so did the Athenian envoys later, after they had finished the business on which they had come.

This decision of the assembly, that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year from the beginning of the thirty years' truce, which was made after the Euboean war. And the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war was determined, not so much by the influence of the speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them.

LXXXIX. For it was in the following manner that the Athenians found themselves face to face with those circumstances in dealing with which they rose to greatness. When the Persians had retreated from Europe, defeated on both sea and land by the Hellenes, and those of them who with their ships had taken refuge at Mycale had perished there, Leotychides, king of the Lacedaemonians, who was commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, went home with the allies from the Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, together with the allies from Ionia and the

1 A general convocation of the allies; at this time only part of them had been invited, according to ch. lxvii. See ch. cxix., where the plan is carried out.  
2 445 B.C.  
3 cf. ch. cxiv.  
4 At Salamis, Plataea, Mycale.
ΤΗΤΥΩΔΗΔΗΣ

'Iωνιᾶς καὶ 'Ελληστόντον ξύμμαχοι, ἡδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλέως, ὑπομείναντες Σηστόν ἐπολιόρκουν Μήδων ἐχόντων, καὶ ἐπιχειμάσαντες εἰλον αὐτῶν ἐκλειπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπεπλευσαν ἐξ 'Ελληστόντου ὡς ἐκαστοὶ κατὰ πόλεις. Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ βάρβαροι ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἀπῆλθον, διεκομίζοντο εὐθὺς ὅθεν ὑπεξέθεντο παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν περιούσαν κατασκευῆν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχέα εἰστήκει καὶ οἰκίαι αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ ἐπεπτώκεσαν, ὡλγαὶ δὲ περιήσαν, ἐν αἷς αὐτοὶ ἐσκόψαντο οἱ δυνάτοι τῶν Περσῶν.

ΧΩ. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἠλθον πρεσβείαν, τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἠδιον ἀν ὀρῷντες μήτ᾽ ἐκεῖνους μῆτ᾽ ἄλλου μηδένα τεῖχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ πλέον τῶν ξυμμάχων ἔξωτον ὑπερεύνων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὁ πρὶν οὐχ ύπήρχε, καὶ τὴν ἐσ τῶν Μηδικὸν πόλε-2 μον τόλμαν γενομένην. ἦξίοντι τε αὐτοὺς μὴ τειχίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου μάλλον ὁσοὶ εἰστήκει ξυγκαθέλειν μετὰ σφῶν τοὺς περιβόλους, τὸ μὲν βουλόμενον καὶ ὑποπτον τῆς γνώμης οὐ δηλοῦντες ἐσ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ὡς δὲ τοῦ βαρβάρου, εἰ αὖθις ἐπέλθοι, οὐκ ἀν ἔχοντος

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1 The contingents from the islands and the coast of Asia Minor, who, in consequence of the battle at Mycale and the
Hellespont, who were already in revolt from the King, remained at their task and besieged Sestos, which was held by the Persians; and passing the winter there they took it, as it had been deserted by the Barbarians; and after that the contingents of the several cities sailed away from the Hellespont. But the Athenian people, when the Barbarians had departed from their territory, straightway began to fetch back their wives and their children and the remnant of their household goods from where they had placed them for safety, and to rebuild the city and the walls; for of the encircling wall only small portions were left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins, only a few remaining in which the chief men of the Persians had themselves taken quarters.

XC. But the Lacedaemonians, perceiving what was in prospect, came on an embassy, partly because they themselves would have preferred to see neither the Athenians nor anyone else have a wall, but more because their allies urged them on through apprehension, not only of the size of the Athenian navy, which had hitherto not been large, but also of the daring they had shown in the Persian war. So they requested them not to rebuild their walls, but rather to join with them in razing the walls of whatsoever towns outside the Peloponnesus had them standing, giving no indication of their real purpose or of their suspicion with regard to the Athenians, but representing that the Barbarian, if he should attack them again, would not have any stronghold to make his advance of the victors to Abydos, had been received into the Hellenic alliance.

2 Salamis, Aegina, and Troezen; cf. Hdt. viii. xli.
THUCYRIDES

ἀπὸ ἑχυρῷ ποθεν, ὡσπερ νῦν ἐκ τῶν Ἡθῶν, ὅρμασθαι, τὴν τε Πελοπόννησον πᾶσιν ἔφασαν

3 ἀναξώρησίν τε καὶ ἀφορμὴν ἰκανὴν εἶναι. οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναῖοι Θεμιστοκλέους γυνὸμη τοὺς μὲν Δακε-

δαιμονίους ταῦτ’ εἰπόντας, ἀποκρινόμενοι ὅτι πέμ-

ψουσιν ὡς αὐτοὺς πρέσβεις περὶ ὧν λέγονσιν,

εὕθὺς ἀπῆλλαξαν ἑαυτὸν δ’ ἐκέλευεν ἀποστέλ-

λευν ὡς τάχιστα ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔς τὴν Δακεδαί-

μονα, ἀλλοὺς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐλομένους πρέσβεις

μὴ εὕθὺς ἐκπέμπειν, ἀλλ’ ἐπίσχειν μέχρι τοσοῦ-

tου ἔως ἕν τὸ τεῖχος ἰκανὸν ἄρωσιν ὡστε ἀπομα-

χεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ ἀναγκαιοτᾶτον ὤψους τεῖχιζειν δὲ

πάντας πανδημεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει,1 καὶ αὐτοὺς

καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας, φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου

μῆτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος ὅθεν τις ἀφελία

ἔσται ἐς τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καθαροῦντας πάντα.

4 καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτα διδάξας καὶ ὑπειπῶν, τὰλλα ὁτι

5 αὐτὸς τάκει πράξει, ψευτο. καὶ ἐς τὴν Δακεδαί-

μονα ἔλθων οὐ προσῆμεν πρὸς τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀλλὰ

dιῆγε καὶ προφασίζετο. καὶ ὅποτε τις αὐτῶν

ἔροιτο τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων οῖ τι οὐκ ἐπέχεται ἐπὶ

tὸ κοινὸν, ἔφη τοὺς ἐξυμπρέσβεις ἀναμένειν, ἀσχο-

λίας δὲ τῶν οὐσίας αὐτοὺς ὑπολειφθῆναι, προσ-

δέχεσθαι μέντοι ἐν τάχει ἰδέων καὶ θανμάζειν ὡς

οὕτω πάρεισιν.

ΧCl. Οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες τῶν μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ

ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν, τῶν2 δὲ ἀλλῶν ἀφικοῦ-

μένων καὶ σαφῶς κατηγοροῦντων ὅτι τειχιζεται

1 τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, Krüger brackets, followed by Hude. καὶ αὐτοὺς . . . παῖδας also bracketed by Hude, as not read by Schol.
2 Hude adopts Shilleto's conjecture αὐτοπτῶν.
base of operations, as lately he had made Thebes; the Peloponnesus, they added, was large enough for all, both as a retreat and as a base of operations. To these proposals of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, replied that they would send ambassadors to Sparta to discuss these matters, and so got rid of them without delay. Themistocles then proposed that they should send himself as speedily as possible to Lacedaemon; that they should then choose other ambassadors in addition, but, instead of sending them immediately, should wait until they should have raised the wall to such a height as was absolutely necessary for defence; and that the whole population of the city, men, women, and children, should take part in the wall-building, sparing neither private nor public edifice that would in any way help to further the work, but demolishing them all. After he had given these instructions, and an intimation that, for the rest, he would himself look after matters at Sparta, he departed. And when he came to Lacedaemon he did not present himself to the magistrates, but kept putting it off and making excuses; and whenever any one of those in authority asked why he did not come before the people, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues, who had stayed behind on account of some urgent business; he expected them however to come soon, and wondered that they were not already there.

XCl. And the Lacedaemonian magistrates were disposed to be content with this reply by reason of their friendship for Themistocles; but when everybody who came from Athens declared quite positively
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τε καὶ ἣδη ύψος λαμβάνει, οὐκ εἰχον ὅπως χρὴ
2 ἀπιστήσαι. γνοὺς δὲ ἐκεῖνος κελεύει αὐτοὺς μὴ λόγοις μᾶλλον παράγεσθαι ἢ πέμψαι σφῶν αὐ-
tῶν ἄνδρας οἰτίνες χρηστοί καὶ πιστῶς ἀναγγε-
3 λοῦσι σκεψάμενοι. ἀποστέλλουσιν οὖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κρύφα πέμπει κελεύων 1 ὡς ἥκιστα ἑπιφανῶς κατασχεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀφεῖναι πρὶν ἀν αὐτοὶ πάλιν κομισθῶσιν (ἡδὴ γὰρ καὶ ἤκουν αὐτῷ οἱ ξυμπρέσβεις, Ἀβρώ-
νιχὸς τε ὁ Λυσικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδῆς ὁ Λυσι-
μάχου. ἀγγέλλοντες ἔχειν ἱκανὸς τὸ τείχος) ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφᾶς, ὅποτε
4 σαφῶς ἀκούσειαν, οὐκέτι ἀφῶσιν. οἳ τε οὖν Ἀθηναίοι τοὺς πρέσβεις, ὥσπερ ἑπεστάλης κατεἰ-
χον, καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐπελθὼν τοῖς Λακεδαι-
μονίοις ἐνταῦθα δὴ φανερῶς εἰπεν ὅτι ἡ μὲν πόλις
σφῶν τετείχισται ἡδὴ ὡστε ἱκανὴ εἶναι σῶξειν
tους ἐνοικοῦντας, εἰ δὲ τι βούλονται Λακεδαι-
μόνιοι ἢ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πρεσβεύσθαι παρὰ σφᾶς
ὡς πρὸς διαγγελώσκοντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἴδει τά τε
5 σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά. τὴν τε γὰρ
πόλιν ὅτε ἐδόκει ἐκλιπεῖν ἄμεινον εἶναι καὶ ἐς τάς
ναῦς ἐσβῆναι, ἀνευ ἐκείνων ἐφασαν 2 γιόντες τολ-
μῆσαι, καὶ ὅσα αὐ μετ’ ἐκείνων βουλεύσθαι,
6 οὐδενὸς ὑστεροὶ γνώμη φανῆναι. δοκεῖν οὖν σφίσι
καὶ νῦν ἄμεινον εἶναι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν τείχος

1 Hude omits with Lex. Vindob.
2 Deleted by Krüger, followed by Hude.
that the wall was going up and was already attaining height, they did not know how to discredit it. Themistocles, however, when he perceived this bade them not to be misled by reports, but rather to send some trustworthy men of their own number who would see for themselves and bring back a faithful report. They did so, and Themistocles sent word secretly to the Athenians to detain the envoys as covertly as possible and not to let them go until they themselves returned—for by this time his colleagues, Habronichus son of Lysicles and Aristides son of Lysimachus, had joined him, with the news that the wall was high enough—the reason for his precaution being that he was afraid the Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, would then refuse to let them go. Accordingly the Athenians detained the envoys as they were directed, and Themistocles, appearing before the Lacedaemonians, at length told them frankly that the city was now walled and therefore in a position to protect its inhabitants, and that if the Lacedaemonians or their allies cared to negotiate any matter with them they must hereafter come to them with the understanding that they were dealing with men who were fully aware of what was for their own and the general interest. For when they thought it best to abandon their city and embark on their ships, they had resolved, said the ambassadors, upon this bold step without the advice of the Lacedaemonians, and again in all matters in which the Athenans took counsel with the Lacedaemonians they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment. Accordingly in the present instance also it seemed to them best that their city should have a wall, and that this course would be of great
The remains of the walls now seen around the Peiraeus are not those of the Themistoclean walls, which were destroyed at the end of the Peloponnesian War, but of the walls built by Conon in 393. A small part of these remains,
advantage both to themselves in particular, and to the whole body of the allies; for it was impossible for them, he added, to have equal or similar weight in the general councils of the alliance except on the basis of a military strength that was a match for theirs. Therefore, he concluded, the members of the alliance should either dispense with their walls one and all, or regard this act of the Athenians as justified.

XCII. On hearing this, the Lacedaemonians did not openly show any resentment against the Athenians; for they had sent their embassy to Athens, not to stop the work, but to offer, as they professed, a suggestion in the common interest, and besides, they entertained at that time the most friendly feelings for the Athenians on account of their zeal in opposing the Persians; since, however, they had failed in their purpose, they were secretly vexed. So the envoys on either side returned home without making any formal complaint.

XCIII. It was in this manner that the Athenians got their wall built in so short a time, and even to-day the structure shows that it was put together in haste.¹ For the lower courses consist of all sorts of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just as they were when the several workers brought them, and many columns from grave monuments and stones wrought for other purposes were built in. For the circuit-wall of the city was extended in on the flat ground north of the Peiraeus toward the mainland, answers exactly to Thucydides' description—being of solid stone and over 25 feet thick—but most of the remains are of two outer faces of stone, the intermediate spaces filled in with rubble and earth. On Munychia there is no trace anywhere of a solid wall of the age of Themistocles.

¹ For the lower courses consist of all sorts of stones, in some cases not even hewn to fit but just as they were when the several workers brought them, and many columns from grave monuments and stones wrought for other purposes were built in.
THUCYDIDES

λεως, καὶ διὰ τὸῦτο πάντα όμοίως κινοῦντες

3 ἡπείγοντο. ἔπεισε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς τὰ λοιπὰ

ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπήρκτο δ’ αὐτοῦ

πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἦς κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν

Ἀθηναίοις ἤρξε), νομίζων τὸ τε χωρίον καλὸν

εἶναι λιμένας ἔχων τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς, καὶ αὐτοὺς

ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐστὶ τὸ

κτήσασθαι δύναμιν (τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶ-

τος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὃς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστι), καὶ τὴν

5 ἀρχὴν εὔθυς ἔξυγκατεσκεύαζεν. καὶ ὁκοδόμησαν

τῇ ἐκείνου γυνώμη τὸ πάχος τοῦ τείχους ὅπερ ὤν

ἐτι δὴλόν ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ. δύο γὰρ ἀμαξί

ἐναντία ἀλλήλαις τοὺς λίθους ἐπῆγον, ἑντὸς δὲ

οὔτε χάλιξ οὔτε πῆλος ἦν, ἀλλὰ ξυνωρκοδομημέ-

νοι μεγάλοι λίθοι καὶ ἑντομῇ ἐγγώνοι, σιδήρῳ

πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὰ ἔξωθεν καὶ μολύβδῳ δεσμεύοντο.

τὸ δὲ υψὸς ἡμισὺ μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὐ διενοεῖτο.

6 ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναι

τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων τε ἐνο-

μίζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀχρειοτάτων ἀρκέσειν τὴν

φυλακὴν, τοὺς δὲ ἀλλοὺς ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆσεσθαι.

7 ταῖς γὰρ ναυσὶ μάλιστα προσέκειτο, ἰδὼν, ὡς

ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τῆς βασιλέως στρατιᾶς τὴν κατὰ

θύλασαν ἑφοδον εὐπορωτέραν τῆς κατὰ γῆν

οὕσαν τὸν τε Πειραιᾶ ὁφελήμωτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς

ἀνω πόλεως, καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρή-

1 The Peiraeus, here in widest sense, is the peninsula, the

heart of which is the steep height of Munychia, from which
every direction, and on this account they laid hands upon everything alike in their haste. Themistocles, moreover, persuaded them also to finish the walls of the Peiraeus, a beginning of which had been made during the year in which he was archon of the Athenians; for he considered that the Peiraeus with its three natural harbours was a fine site to develop and that to have become a nation of seamen would be a great advantage to the Athenians themselves, with a view to their acquisition of power—indeed it was he who first dared declare that they must apply themselves to the sea—and so he immediately took the first steps in this undertaking. And following his advice they built the wall round the Peiraeus of the thickness that may still be observed; for two wagons carrying the stones could meet and pass each other. Inside, moreover, there was neither rubble nor mortar, but stones of large size hewn square were closely laid together, bound to one another on the outside with iron clamps and lead. But the wall was completed to only about half of the height he originally intended, for what he wished was to be able to repel the assaults of the enemy by the very height and thickness of the wall, and he thought that a few men, and these the least effective, would suffice to guard it, while all the rest might man the ships. For Themistocles devoted himself particularly to the navy, because, as it seems to me, he had observed that the approach of the King's forces was easier by sea than by land; and he thought that the Peiraeus would prove more serviceable than the upper city, and often advised the Athenians, if ever they

it stretches into the sea like an indented leaf, forming three natural basins—the Peiraeus, Zea, Munychia.

Others render: immediately began to help them to lay the foundation of their empire.
THUCYDIDES

νει, ἂν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐσ αὐτῶν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς ἀνθίστασθαι. 8 Ἀθηναίοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐτειχίσθησαν καὶ τάλλα κατεσκευάζοντο εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν Μήδων ἀναχώρησεν.

ΧCIV. Παυσανίας δὲ ὁ Κλεομβροτοῦ ἐκ Λακεδαιμονοῦ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξεπέμφθη μετὰ εἰκοσὶ νεῶν ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἡγεμόνιον δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναίοι τριάκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 2 ἡμών πλῆθος. καὶ ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Κύπρον καὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέψαντο, καὶ ὑστερον ἐς Βυζάντιον Ἔβρων ἔχοντων καὶ ἐξεπολιόρκησαν ἐν τῇ τη ἡγεμονίᾳ. 1

ΧCV. Ἡδη δὲ βιαίου οὖναυτοῦ οἱ τῇ ἄλλοι Ἑλληνες ἠχθοντο καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα οἱ Ἰωνες καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἡλευθέρωντο φιοτῶντες τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτῶς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γέγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμόνες καὶ Παυσανία μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἦν πον 2 βιάζηται. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδέξαντό τε τοὺς λόγους καὶ προσεῖχον τὴν γνώμην ὡς οὖ περιοφόμενοι τάλλα τε καταστήσαμεν ἦ φαῖνοτο 3 ἀριστα αὐτοῖς. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μετεπέμπτοντο Παυσανίαν ἀνακρινοῦντες ὧν πέρι ἐπυπηθώντο καὶ γὰρ ἄδικα πολλῆ κατηγορέω τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἀφικνουμένων, καὶ τυραννίδος μᾶλλον ἐφαίνετο μίμησις ἦ

1 Hude transfers, with Krüger, ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ. to ch. xcvm., deleting ἐν after ἢδη.

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were hard pressed on land, to go down to the Peiraeus, and resist all their opponents with their fleet. It was in this way, then, that the Athenians got their walls built, and came to be engaged upon their other fortifications, immediately after the withdrawal of the Persians.

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias son of Cleombrotus was sent out from Lacedaemon in command of the Hellenes with twenty ships from Peloponnesus, accompanied by thirty Athenian ships and a multitude of other allies. They made also an expedition against Cyprus, subduing most of it, and afterwards, at the time of Pausanias' leadership, besieged Byzantium, which the Persians then held, and took it.

XCV. But, since he had already become headstrong, the rest of the Hellenes became disaffected, especially the Ionians and all who had been recently emancipated from the King. So they waited upon the Athenians and begged them in the name of their kinship to become their leaders, and to resist Pausanias if he should attempt to coerce them. The Athenians accepted their proposals and gave full attention to the matter with the determination to endure Pausanias' conduct no longer and to settle all other matters as should seem best to themselves. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias in order to interrogate him about reports they were hearing, for much wrongdoing was charged against him by the Hellenes who came to Sparta, and his behaviour seemed an aping of despotic power rather than the conduct of a general.

1 cf. ch. cxxx. 2.
2 As the mother city; cf. ch. ii. (end).
3 478 B.C.
4 στρατηγία. ξυνέβη τε αυτῷ καλείσθαι τε ἁμα
καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τῷ ἐκείνου ἐχθεῖν παρ’ Ἀθη-
ναίους μετατάξασθαι πλὴν τῶν ἀπὸ Πελοπον-
5 νήσου στρατιωτῶν. ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Λακεδαιμόνα
τῶν μὲν ἵδια πρὸς τινα ἀδικημάτων ἡθύνθη, τὰ
dὲ μέγιστα ἀπολύεται μὴ ἀδικεῖν· κατηγορεῖτο
dὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμὸς καὶ ἐδόκει σαφές-
6 στατὸν εἶναι. καὶ ἐκείνου μὲν οὐκέτι ἐκπέμπου-
σιν ἄρχοντα, Δόρκιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους τινάς μετ’
αὐτοῦ στρατιὰν ἔχοντας οὐ πολλήν· οῖς οὐκέτι
7 ἐφίεσαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, οἱ δὲ αὐ-
σθόμενοι ἀπῆλθον, καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ύστερον
ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι μὴ
σφίσιν οἱ ἐξίοντες χείρους γίγνωσται, ὅπερ καὶ
ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνείδουν, ἀπαλλαξίοντες δὲ καὶ
τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομί-
ζουτες ἰκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε
παρόντι ἑπιτηδείους.

XCVI. Παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τῇ
ἡγεμονίᾳ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν ξυμμά-
χων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μίσος, ἔταξαν ἃς τε ἐδει
παρέχειν τῶν πόλεων χρηματα πρὸς τὸν βάρ-
βαρον καὶ ἄς ναῦς πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμῦνεσθαι
2 ὥν ἔπαθον δηούντας τὴν βασιλείας χώραν. καὶ
Ἐλληνοταμίαι τότε πρωτον Ἀθηναίους κατέστη
ἀρχῇ, οἱ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον· οὕτω γὰρ ἀνομάσθη
And it so happened that he was cited before the court at the very time that the allies in vexation at him had gone over to the side of the Athenians, all except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. And although, on his return to Lacedaemon, Pausanias was held to account for any personal wrongs he had committed against individuals, yet on the principal charges he was acquitted of misconduct; for he was accused most of all of treasonable relations with the Persians, and it seemed to be a very clear case. And they did not again send him out as commander, but Dorcis, together with some others, with an inconsiderable force; but the allies did not entrust these with the chief command. And they, being now aware of the situation, went back home; and the Lacedaemonians sent out no other commanders thereafter, fearing that any who went out might be corrupted, as they saw had happened in the case of Pausanias; they also wanted to be rid of the Persian war, and thought that the Athenians were competent to take the leadership and were friendly to themselves at the time.

XCVI. After the Athenians had succeeded in this way to the leadership over the allies, who freely chose them on account of their hatred of Pausanias, they assessed the amount of their contributions, both for the states which were to furnish money for the war against the Barbarians and for those which were to furnish ships, the avowed object being to avenge themselves for what they had suffered by ravaging the King's territory. And it was then \(^1\) that the Athenians first established the office of Hellenic treasurers, who received the tribute; for so the

\(^1\) 476 B.C.
Τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἢν δ’ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθείς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἐξήκοντα, ταμιείων τε Δήλος ἢν αὐτοῖς καὶ αἱ ξύνοδοι ἐς τὸ ἱερὸν ἐγίγνυντο.

XCVII. Ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων τοσάδε ἐπῆλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχειρίσει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦτον πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ, ἀ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὸν βαύραρον αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς σφετέρους ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας καὶ Πελοποννησίων τοὺς αἰεὶ προστυγχάνοντας ἐν ἐκάστῳ. ἔγγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτι τοῖς πρὸ ἐμοῦ ἀπασίν ἐκλιπὲς τούτῳ ἢν τὸ χωρίον καὶ ἢ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά· τούτων δὲ ὀσπρ καὶ ἤψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ Ἐνυγγραφῇ Ἑλλανίκος, βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη· ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδεεξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἷῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη.

XCVIII. Πρῶτον μὲν Ἡιώνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμώνι Μήδων ἐχόντων πολυρκία εἶλον καὶ ἢνδραπόδισαν Κύμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος, ἐπειτα Σκύρου τὴν ἐν τῷ Ἀιγαίῳ νῆσον, ἢν φίλουν Δόλοπες, ἢνδραπόδισαν καὶ φύκησαν αὐτοὶ. πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους αὐτοῖς ἀνευ τῶν ἀλλῶν Εὐβοέων πόλεμος ἐγένετο, καὶ χρόνῳ ξυνέβησαν καθ’

1 Deleted by Hude, after Cobet.
contribution of money was termed. The amount of the tribute first assessed was four hundred and sixty talents, and the treasury of the allies was Delos, where the meetings were held in the temple.

XCVII. Exercising then what was at first a leadership over allies who were autonomous and took part in the deliberations of common assemblies, the Athenians, in the interval between this war and the Persian, undertook, both in war and in the administration of public affairs, the enterprises now to be related, which were directed against the Barbarian, against their own allies when they attempted revolution, and against such of the Peloponnesians as from time to time came into conflict with them in the course of each attempt. And I have made a digression to write of these matters for the reason that this period has been omitted by all my predecessors, who have confined their narratives either to Hellenic affairs before the Persian War or to the Persian War itself; and Hellanicus, the only one of these who has ever touched upon this period, has in his Attic History treated of it briefly, and with inaccuracy as regards his chronology. And at the same time the narrative of these events serves to explain how the empire of Athens was established.

XCVIII. First, then, under the leadership of Cimon son of Miltiades, they took by siege Eion on the Strymon, which the Persians held, and enslaved its inhabitants; then they enslaved Scyros, the island in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopians, and colonised it themselves. And a war arose between them and the Carystians, the other Euboans taking no part in it, and after a time terms

1 476 B.C.
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4 ὁμολογίαν. Ναξίως δὲ ἀποστάσι μετὰ ταύτα ἐπολέμησαν καὶ πολιορκία παρεστήσαντο. πρώτῃ τε αὐτῇ πόλις ξυμμαχία παρὰ τὸ καθεστήκος ἐδουλώθη, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἐκάστῃ ξυνέβη.¹

ΧCIX. Αὐτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι τε ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων καὶ μέγισται αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἐκδειαὶ καὶ λιποστράτιον εἰ τῷ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἐπράσσουν καὶ λυπηρῷ ἦσαν οὐκ εἰσθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες 2 τὰς ἀνάγκας. ἦσαν δὲ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὕτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσού βάδιον τε προσάγεσθαι ἤν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀφισταμένους· δὸν αὐτοὶ 3 αὐτίοι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκυνσιν ταύτην τῶν στρατεύων οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἷκον ὡς, χρήματα ἑτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ηὔξετο τὸ ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἦν ἐκείνου ξυμφέροιεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ, ὅποτε ἀποσταίνειν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἀπειροὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθισταντο.

C. Ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταύτα καὶ ἦ ἐπ' Εὐρυμεδοντι ποταμῷ ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ ² πεζομαχία καὶ ναυμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων πρὸς Μῆδους, καὶ ἐνίκων τῇ αὐτῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀμφότερα Ἀθηναῖοι.

¹ Deleted by Hude as probably not read by Schol.
² ἐν Παμφυλίᾳ, omitted by Hude and Stahl, with Codex M.
of capitulation were agreed upon. After this they waged war upon the Naxians, who had revolted, and reduced them by siege. And this was the first allied city to be enslaved in violation of the established rule; but afterwards the others also were enslaved as it happened in each case.

XCIX. Now while there were other causes of revolts, the principal ones were the failures in bringing in the tribute or their quota of ships and, in some cases, refusal of military service; for the Athenians exacted the tribute strictly and gave offence by applying coercive measures to any who were unaccustomed or unwilling to bear the hardships of service. And in some other respects, too, the Athenians were no longer equally agreeable as leaders; they would not take part in expeditions on terms of equality, and they found it easy to reduce those who revolted. For all this the allies themselves were responsible; for most of them, on account of their aversion to military service, in order to avoid being away from home got themselves rated in sums of money instead of ships, which they should pay in as their proportionate contribution, and consequently the fleet of the Athenians was increased by the funds which they contributed, while they themselves, whenever they revolted, entered on the war without preparation and without experience.

C. After this occurred at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia the land-battle and sea-fight of the Athenians and their allies against the Persians; and the Athenians were victorious in both on the

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1 465 B.C.
2 For this glorious victory of Cimon's, whose date (466 B.C.?) is not certain, cf. Diod. xi. 60; Plut. Cim. xii.
Κύμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ εἰλον τριήρεις Φωικών καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς διακοσίας. Χρόνῳ δὲ ύστερον ξυνέβη Θασίους αὐτῶν ἀποστῆναι διενεχθέντας περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας Θράκη ἐμπορίων καὶ τοῦ μετάλλου, ἡ ἐνέμοντο, καὶ ναυσὶ μὲν ἐπὶ Θάσον πλεύ−

3 σαντες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ναυμαχία ἐκράτησαν καὶ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν. ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμώνα πέμψαντες μυρίους οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, ως οἰκιούντες τὰς τότε καλουμένας Ἐννέα ὀδοὺς, νῦν δὲ Ἀμφίπολιν, τῶν μὲν Ἐννέα ὀδῶν αὐτοῖ ἐκράτησαν, ὡς εἰχον Ἡδω−

νοῖ, προελθὼντες δὲ τῆς Θράκης ἐς μεσόγειαν διεθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἡδωνίκῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Θρακῶν ξυμπάντων οὐς πολέμιον ἡν τὸ χωρίον 1 κτιζόμενον.

Cf. Θάσοι δὲ νικηθέντες μάχη καὶ πολυρκού−

2 μεν Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐπαρμένειν ἐκέλευν ἔσβαλοντας ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν. οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἐμέλλον, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ, ἐν ὧ καὶ οἱ Εἰλωτες αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν περιοίκων Θουριά−

2 ται τε καὶ Ἀιθανής ἐς Ἰθώμην ἀπέστησαν, πλεῖ−

1 465 B.C.
2 The Thasians had a gold mine at Skapte Hyle on the Thracian coast, from which they drew rich revenues; cf. Hdt. vi. xlvi. f.
same day under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades, and they took and destroyed triremes of the Phoenicians to the number of two hundred all told. And some time afterwards it came to pass that the Thasians revolted from them,² a quarrel having arisen about the trading posts and the mine³ on the opposite coast of Thrace, of which the Thasians enjoyed the profits. Thereupon the Athenians sailed with their fleet against Thasos, and, after winning a battle at sea, disembarked on the island. About the same time they sent to the river Strymon ten thousand colonists, consisting of Athenians and their allies, with a view to colonising the place, then called Nine Ways, but now Amphipolis; and though these colonists gained possession of Nine Ways, which was inhabited by Edoni, yet when they advanced into the interior of Thrace they were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the united forces of the Thracians, to whom the settlement of the place was a menace.

CI. As for the Thasians, who had been defeated in battle and were now besieged, they appealed to the Lacedaemonians and urged them to come to their aid by invading Attica. This, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and intended to keep their promise, but were prevented by the earthquake⁴ which occurred at the time ⁴ when both their Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and Aethaea revolted and went to Ithome.⁵ Most of the Helots

⁵ The Perioeci were the old inhabitants of the country, chiefly of Achaean stock, reduced to a condition of dependence, i.e. were not citizens, though not state-slaves as the Helots were.
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στοι δὲ τῶν Εἰλιώτων ἐγένοντο οἱ τῶν παλαιῶν Μεσσηνίων τότε δουλωθέντων ἀπόγονοι· ἦ καὶ
3 Μεσσηνίους ἐκλήθησαν οἱ πάντες. πρὸς μὲν οὖν 
tοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμη πόλεμος καθειστήκει Δακεδαι-
μονίως. Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ὑμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίους τείχος τε καθελόντες καὶ
ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἐδει ἀπο-
δοῦναι αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν φέρειν,
tὴν τε ἥπειρον καὶ τὸ μέταλλον ἄφεντες.

CII. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, ὡς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἐν
Ἰθώμη ἔμηκνυτο ὁ πόλεμος, ἀλλοις τε ἐπεκαλέ-
σαντο ἔμμαχους καὶ Ἀθηναίους· οἱ δ’ ἦλθον
2 Κίμωνος στρατηγοῦντος πλήθει οὐκ ὅλιγοι. μά-
λιστα δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐπεκαλέσαντο, ὅτι τειχομαχεῖν ἔδοκον δυνατοὶ εἶναι, τῆς δὲ πολιορκίας μακρὰς 
kαθεστηκνιάς τούτου ἐνδεὰ ἐφαίνετο. βία γὰρ
3 ἀν εἶλον τὸ χωρίον. καὶ διαφορὰ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς 
στρατεύας πρῶτον Δακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις 
φανερὰ ἐγένετο. οἱ γὰρ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐπειδῆ τὸ 
χωρίον βίᾳ ὁχ ἥλισκετο, δεῖσαντες τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων τὸ τολμηρόν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν, καὶ
ἀλλοφύλους ἀμα ἤγεσάμενοι, μὴ τι, ἦν παρα-
μείωσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰθώμη πεισθέντες νεωτερί-
σωσί, μόνοις τῶν ἔμμαχοι ἀπέπεμψαν, τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν ὦν δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν
4 προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι. οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναίοι ἐγνωσαν

1 Krüger deletes, followed by Huda.
were the descendants of the early Messenians who had been enslaved of old,¹ and hence were all called Messenians. The Lacedaemonians, then, were involved in war with the rebels on Ithome; and so the Thasians, who were in the third year of the siege, came to terms with the Athenians, pulling down their walls and delivering over their ships, agreeing to pay forthwith whatever sum of money should be required of them and to render tribute in future, and, finally, giving up both the mainland and the mine.

CII. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, when their war with the rebels on Ithome proved a long affair, appealed to their allies in general and especially to the Athenians, who came with a considerable force under the command of Cimon. The principal reason why an appeal was made to them was that they were reputed to be skilful in siege operations, whereas the long continuance of the siege showed their own deficiency in this respect; for otherwise they would have taken the place by assault. And it was in consequence of this expedition that a lack of harmony in the relations of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians first became manifest. For the Lacedaemonians, when they failed to take the place by storm, fearing the audacity and the fickleness of the Athenians, whom they regarded, besides, as men of another race, thought that, if they remained, they might be persuaded by the rebels on Ithome to change sides; they therefore dismissed them, alone of the allies, without giving any indication of their suspicion, but merely saying that they had no further need of them. The Athenians, however, recognized

¹ Referring to the mythical time of the first Messenian war.
οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίωνι λόγῳ ἀποσπεμπόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τινος ὑπόπτου γενομένου, καὶ δεινὸν ποιησάμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἄξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦτο παθεῖν, εὕρετο ἐπειδή ἀνεχώρησαν, ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἀργείων τοῖς ἐκεῖνοι πολεμίοις ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο, καὶ πρὸς Θεσσαλοὺς ἀμα ἀμφοτέροις οἱ αὐτοὶ ὅρκοι καὶ ξυμμαχία κατέστη.

CIII. Οἱ δ' ἐν Ἰθώμη ἀκάτῳ ἔτει, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐδύναντο ἀντέχειν, ξυνεύβησαν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐφ' ὧν ἐξίασιν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπόσπονδοι καὶ μηδέποτε ἐπιβήσονται αὐτῆς: ἦν δὲ τις ἀλίσκηται, τοῦ λαβόντος εἶναι δοῦλον. ἦν δὲ τι καὶ χρηστήριον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις Πυθικὸν πρὸ τοῦ, τὸν ἰκέτην τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ἰθωμῆτα ἅφιέ-ναι. ἐξῆλθον δὲ αὐτοὶ καὶ παῖδες καὶ γυναῖκες, καὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δεξάμενοι κατὰ ἕχοντος ἦδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατόκισαν, ἥν ἐστιν ἡρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὁξιλῶν ἔχοντων. προσεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς Ἀθη-ναῖοι ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες, ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὄρων πολέμῳ κατείχον. καὶ ἐσχοῖν Ἀθηναῖοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πη-γάς, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη φιλοδόμησαν Μεγαρεύσι

1 455 B.C.
that they were not being sent away on the more creditable ground, but because some suspicion had arisen; so because they felt indignant and considered that they had not deserved such treatment at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, the instant they returned home they gave up the alliance which they had made with the Lacedaemonians against the Persians and became allies of their enemies, the Argives. And an alliance at the same time, on the same terms and confirmed by the same oaths, was concluded by both the Athenians and the Argives with the Thessalians.

CIII. In the tenth year the rebels on Ithome found that they could hold out no longer and surrendered to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they should leave the Peloponnesus under a truce and should never set foot in it again; and if any of them should be caught there, he was to be a slave of his captor. Moreover, before this time the Lacedaemonians also received a Pythian oracle, which bade them let go the suppliant of Ithomean Zeus. So the Messenians left the Peloponnesus, themselves and their children and wives; and the Athenians received them, in consequence of the enmity to the Lacedaemonians already existing, and settled them at Naupactus, which they happened to have lately taken from its possessors, the Ozolian Locrians. And the Megarians also entered into alliance with the Athenians, revolting from the Lacedaemonians because the Corinthians were pressing them hard in a war about boundaries; and thus the Athenians secured Megara and Pegae, and they built for the Megarians the long walls which run from the city to

1 Pegae was the Megarian harbour on the Corinthian gulf: Nisaea, a nearer one, on the Saronic gulf.
καὶ Κορινθίους μὲν οὖχ ἦκιστα ἀπὸ τοῦτο τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἦρξατο πρῶτον ἐς 'Αθηναίους γενέσθαι.

CIV. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων τῶν πρὸς Αἰγύπτω, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ Μαρείας τῆς ὑπὲρ Φάρου πόλεως ἀπέστησεν Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλεῖω ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρχων γενόμενος Ἀθηναίους ἐπηγά-2 γετο. οἱ δὲ (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευό-μενοι ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμ-μάχων) ἤλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον, καὶ ἀναπλεύσαντες ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἐς τὸν Νείλον τοῦ τε ποταμοῦ κρατοῦντες καὶ τῆς Μέμφιδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος ὃ καλεῖται Δευκὸν τεῖχος ἐπολέμουν· ἐνῆσαν δὲ αὐτόθι Περ-σῶν καὶ Μηδῶν οἱ καταφυγόντες καὶ Αἰγυπτίων οἱ μὴ ἐξυπαστάντες.

CV. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶ ἀποβᾶσιν ἐς Ἀλιᾶς πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους μάχη ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐνίκων Κορίνθιοι. καὶ ὑστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἐναυμαχήσαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλεία Πελοποννησίων 2 ναυσί, καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίοι. πολέμοι δὲ κατα-στάντος πρὸς Αἰγυνήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ὡς' Αἰγύπη μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγυνητῶν (καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐκατέρως παρῆ-σαν), καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ναῦς ἔβδομήκοντα λαβόντες αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἀπέβησαν καὶ ἐπο-λιόρκουν Δεωκράτους τοῦ Στροίβου στρατηγοῦν-
BOOK I. ch. 4–cv. 2

Nisaea and held it with a garrison of their own troops. And it was chiefly because of this act that the vehement hatred of the Corinthians for the Athenians first arose.

CIV. Meanwhile Inaros, son of Psammetichus, a Libyan and king of the Libyans who are adjacent to Egypt, setting out from Mareia, the city just north of Pharos, caused the greater part of Egypt to revolt from King Artaxerxes,¹ and then, when he had made himself ruler, he called in the Athenians. And they left Cyprus,² where they happened to be on an expedition with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, and went to Egypt, and when they had sailed up the Nile from the sea, finding themselves masters of the river and of two-thirds of Memphis, they proceeded to attack the third part, which is called the White Fortress. And in this fortress were some Persians and Medes who had taken refuge there, and such Egyptians as had not joined in the revolt.

CV. The Athenians also made a descent with a fleet upon Halieis, where they had a battle with some Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the Corinthians won. And afterwards the Athenians fought a sea-fight at Cecryphaleia with a Peloponnesian fleet, in which the Athenians won. After this war broke out between the Athenians and the Aeginetans, and a great sea-fight occurred between the Athenians and the Aeginetans off Aegina, in which the allies of both sides were present. This the Athenians won and having taken seventy Aeginetan ships they descended upon their territory and laid siege to the city, Leocrates son of Stroebus,

¹ 460 B.C. ² cf. ch. xciv. 2.
3 τοις. ἔπειτα Πελοποννήσιοι ἀμύνειν βουλόμενοι Ἀιγινήταις ἐς μὲν τὴν Ἀιγινὴν τριακοσίων ὀπλίτας, πρότερον Κορινθίων καὶ Ἑπιδαυρίων ἐπικούρους, διεβίβασαν, τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας κατέλαβον καὶ ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα κατέβησαν Κορινθίοι μετὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, νομίζοντες ἀδυνάτους ἔσεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεγαρεύσιν ἐν τῇ Αἰγίνῃ ἀπούσῃ στρατίας πολλής καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῳ ὁποὺς ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ βοηθῶσιν, ἀπὸ Αἰγίνης ἀναστήσεθαι αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ Αθηναίοι τὸ μὲν πρὸς Αἰγίνη στράτευμα οὐκ ἐκίνησαν, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίπων οἱ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἵσορρόπου πρὸς Κορινθίους διεκρίθησαν ἀπὸ ἄλληλοι, καὶ ἐνόμισαν αὐτοὶ ἐκάτεροι οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχειν ἐν τῷ 6 ἔργῳ. καὶ οἱ μὲν Αθηναίοι (ἐκράτησαν γὰρ ὀμως μᾶλλον) ἀπελθόντων τῶν Κορινθίων τροπαίων ἔστησαν· οἱ δὲ Κορινθίοι κακιζόμενοι υπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων καὶ παρασκευασμένοι, ἡμέραις ύστερον δώδεκα μάλιστα ἔλθοντες ἀνθίστασαν τροπαίον καὶ αὐτοὶ ὡς νικήσαντες. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐκβοηθήσαντες ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων τοὺς τε τὸ τροπαῖον ἰστάντας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυμβαλόντες ἐκράτησαν. CVI. οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν, καὶ τι αὐτῶν μέρος οὐκ ὀλίγον προσβιασθέν καὶ διαμαρτὸν τῆς ὁδοῦ ἐσέπεσεν ἐς τοῦ χωρίον ἰδιώτου, ὑ ἐτυχεν

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being in command. Thereupon the Peloponnesians, wishing to aid the Aeginetans, sent into Aegina three hundred hoplites, who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and Epidaurians. Moreover, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Gera-neia, and made a descent upon the territory of Megara in conjunction with their allies, thinking that the Athenians would be unable to aid the Megarians, since many of their troops were away in Aegina and in Egypt, or if they should attempt it that they would have to withdraw from Aegina. The Athenians, however, did not disturb the army besieging Aegina, but with such forces as were left in the city, consisting of the oldest and the youngest men, marched into Megara, the general in command being Myronides. An indecisive battle was fought with the Corinthians, whereupon they separated, each side thinking they had not got the worst of it in the action. And the Athenians, who had in fact got rather the better of it, when the Corinthians withdrew, set up a trophy; but the Corinthians, being reproached by the older men in their city, made their preparations and about twelve days later came back and set up for themselves a rival trophy, as though they had won. Hereupon the Athenians made a sally from Megara, slew those who were setting up the trophy, and joining battle with the rest defeated them. CVI. The vanquished party now retreated, and a not inconsiderable portion of them, being hard pressed, missed their way and rushed into a piece of land belonging to

1 These performed military service only in extraordinary cases; the former were between fifty and sixty, the latter under twenty years of age.
THUCYDIDES

2 ὅρυγμα μέγα περιείρηγον καὶ οὐκ ήν ἔξοδος. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι γρόντες κατὰ πρόσωπόν τε ἐθρηνοῦν τοὺς ὑπλίτας καὶ περίστησαντες κύκλῳ τοὺς ψυλλοὺς κατέλευσαν πάντας τοὺς ἐσελθόντας, καὶ πάθος μέγα τοῦτο Κορινθίων ἐγένετο. τὸ δὲ πλῆθος αἰεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐπ' οἴκου.

CVII. Ὡρξαντο δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη Ἀθηναίοι ἐς θάλασσαν οἰκοδομεῖν, τὸ τε Φαληρόνδε καὶ τὸ ἐς Πειραιᾶ.

2 καὶ Φωκέων στρατευσάντων ἐς Δωριᾶς τὴν Δακεδαίμονίων μητρόπολιν, Βοιῶν καὶ Κυτίνιον καὶ Ἠρινέων, καὶ ἐλόντων ἐν τὸν πολισμάτων τούτων οἱ Δακεδαίμονιοι Νικομήδους τοῦ Κλεομβρότου ὑπὲρ Πλειστοάνακτος τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως, νέον δυνότο ἐτη, ἤγουμένων ἐβοήθησαν τοῖς Δωριεῖσιν ἑαυτῶν τε πεντακοσίοις καὶ χιλίοις ὑπλίταις καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίοις, καὶ τοὺς Φωκέας ὁμολογία ἀναγκάσαντες ἀποδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν.

3 ἀπεξώρουν πάλιν. καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτοὺς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλοιντο περαιοῦσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἐμελλόν κωλύσειν. διὰ δὲ τῆς Γερανείας οὐκ ἀσφαλές αὐτοῖς ἐφαίνετο Ἀθηναῖων ἔχοντων Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγὰς πορεύεσθαι 1 δύσοδος τε γὰρ ἡ Γεράνεια καὶ ἐφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τότε ἰσθάνοντο αὐτοῖς μέλλουτας καὶ ταύτῃ κωλύσειν. ἔδοξε δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐν Βοιωτίας περιμείνας ἡ σκέψασθαι ὥς τρόπῳ ἀσφαλέστατα διαπορεύσονται. τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄνδρες ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς

1 πορεύεσθαι deleted by Hude as not read by Schol

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some private person, which was enclosed by a great ditch and had no exit. And when the Athenians perceived this, they shut them in by barring the entrance with hoplites, and stationing light-armed troops all round stoned all who had entered. And this was a great calamity to the Corinthians; the main body of their army, however, returned home.

CVII. About this period the Athenians began to build their long walls to the sea, one to Phalerum, the other to the Peiraeus. And the Phocians made an expedition against the land of the Dorians, the mother-country of the Lacedaemonians, namely the towns of Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, one of which they captured; whereupon the Lacedaemonians, under the lead of Nicomedes son of Cleombrotus, acting for King Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, who was still a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians a force of fifteen hundred hoplites of their own and ten thousand of their allies, and after they had forced the Phocians to make terms and restore the city they began their return homeward. Now if they wished to take the sea-route and make their passage by way of the Crisaean Gulf, the Athenians were sure to take their fleet round the Peloponnesus and block their way; and to march over the Geranaean pass appeared to them hazardous, since the Athenians held Megara and Pegae. Besides, the Geranaean pass was not easy to traverse and was at all times guarded by the Athenians, and at this present time, as the Lacedaemonians perceived, they intended to block their way. So they decided to wait in Boeotia and consider how they might most safely cross over to the Peloponnesus. To this course they were partly influenced by some Athenians, who were

\[1\] 457 B.C.
τῶν Ἀθηναίων κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δὴ μόν τε κατα-
παύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα.
5 ἐβοήθησαν δὲ ἐπ’ αὐτούς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεῖ
καὶ Ἀργείων χίλιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων
ὡς ἐκαστοῦ. ξύμπαντες δὲ ἐγένοντο τετρακισχί-
λιοι καὶ μύριοι. νομίσαντες δὲ ἀπορεῖν ὅτι
διέλθωσιν, ἐπεστράτευσαν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τι καὶ τοῦ
7 δήμου καταλύσεως ὑποψία. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσ-
sαλῶν ἰππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχι-
kόν, οἱ μετέστησαν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ παρὰ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους.

CVIII. Γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης ἐν Τανάγρᾳ
τῆς Βουωτίας ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμ-
2 μαχοί, καὶ φόνος ἐγένετο ἀμφοτέρων πολὺς. καὶ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα ἐλθόντες καὶ
dευδροτομήσαντες πάλιν ἀπῆλθον ἐπ’ οὖκον διὰ
Γερανείας καὶ ἱσθμοῦ. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ δευτέρα καὶ
ἐξηκοστῇ ήμέρᾳ μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐστράτευσαν ἐς
3 Βοιωτοῦς Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ μάχη
ἐν Οἰνοφύτως Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας
ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βουωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος καὶ Τανα-
gραίων τὸ τείχος περιείλον καὶ Δοκρῶν τῶν
4 Ὀσποντίων ἐκατόν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλου-
sιωτάτους ἔλαβον, τὰ τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ
ἀπετέλεσαν. ὡμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται
μετὰ ταύτα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τείχῃ τε περιελόντες
καὶ ναύς παραδόντες φόρον τε ταξάμενοι ἐς τὸν
5 ἔπειτα χρόνον. καὶ Πελοπόννησον περιέπλευσαν
Ἀθηναίοι Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος,
secretly inviting them into their country, in the hope of putting an end to the democracy and to the building of the long walls. But the Athenians went out against the Lacedaemonians with their whole force and with one thousand Argives and contingents of the several allies, the whole body amounting to fourteen thousand men. And they undertook the expedition against them because they believed that they were at a loss how to get through, and partly too on a suspicion of a plot to overthrow the democracy. The forces of the Athenians were strengthened by some Thessalian cavalry, who came in accordance with the terms of the alliance, but they deserted to the Lacedaemonians in the course of the action.

CVIII. The battle took place\(^1\) at Tanagra in Boeotia, and in it the Lacedaemonians and their allies were victorious, and there was much slaughter on both sides. The Lacedaemonians then entered the Megarian territory, cut down the trees, and went back home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athenians, having made an expedition into Boeotia under Myronides, defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta, got control of Boeotia and Phocis, pulled down the walls of Tanagra, and took one hundred of the wealthiest men of the Opuntian Locrians as hostages. Meanwhile they completed their own long walls. After this the Aeginetans also capitulated to the Athenians, pulling down their walls, delivering up their ships, and agreeing to pay tribute in future.\(^2\) And the Athenians, under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, sailed round the Peloponnesus,

\(^1\) 456 B.C. \(^2\) 455 B.C.
καὶ τὸ νεώριον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐνέπρησαν καὶ Χαλκίδα Κορινθίων εἶλον καὶ Σικυωνίους ἐν ἀποβάσει τῆς γῆς máχῃ ἐκράτησαν.

CIX. Οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπέμενον, καὶ αὐτοὶς πολλαὶ ἱδέαι 2 πολέμων κατέστησαν τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐκράτουν τῆς Αἰγύπτου οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαιμονὰ Μεγάβαζον ἀνδρὰ Πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὅπως ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀπ' 3 Αἰγύπτου ἀπαγάγοι Ἀθηναίους. ὡς δὲ αὐτῷ οὐ προνυχῆρε καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλοῦτο, ὁ μὲν Μεγάβαζος καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν χρημάτων πάλιν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀνεκομίσθη, Μεγάβυζον δὲ τὸν Σωπύρον πέμπει ἀνδρὰ Πέρσην μετὰ στρατιάς πολλῆς· ὅς ἀφικόμενος κατὰ γῆν τοὺς τε Αἰγυπτίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους máχῃ ἐκράτησε καὶ ἐκ τῆς Μέμφιδος ἐξῆλασε τοὺς Ἑλλήνας καὶ τέλος ἐς Προσωπίτιδα τὴν νῆσον κατέκλησεν καὶ ἐποιλόρκει ἐν αὐτῇ ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ εἰς μῆνας, μέχρι ὧν ξηράνας τὴν διώρυχα καὶ παρατρέψας ἄλλη τὸ ύδωρ τὰς τε ναῦς ἔπὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ ἐποίησε καὶ τῆς νῆσου τὰ πολλὰ ἡπείρου, καὶ διαβὰς εἶλε τὴν νῆσον πεζῇ.

CX. Οὕτω μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα ἐφθάρη ἐξ ἐτῆ πολεμήσαντα· καὶ ὄλιγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην 2 ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι ἀπώλουντο. Αἰγυπτος δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ βασιλέα ἐγένετο πλήν Ἀμυρταῖον 182.
burned the dock-yard\(^1\) of the Lacedaemonians, took Chalcis, a city of the Corinthians, and making a descent upon the territory of the Sicyonians defeated them in battle.

CIX. Meanwhile the Athenians and their allies stayed on in Egypt and the war took on many forms. At first the Athenians had the mastery in Egypt, and the King sent to Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian, with a supply of money, in order that the Lacedaemonians might be induced to invade Attica and the Athenians thus be drawn away from Egypt. But when he found that matters did not advance and the money was being spent in vain, Megabazus betook himself back to Asia with the money that was left, and Megabyzus son of Zopyrus,\(^2\) a Persian, was despatched with a large army.\(^3\) He marched thither by land, and defeated the Egyptians and their allies in battle, drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months, then finally, by diverting the water into another course, drained the canal and left the ships high and dry, converting the greater part of the island into mainland; then he crossed over dry-shod and took the island.

CX. Thus this undertaking of the Hellenes came to naught after a war of six years;\(^4\) and but few out of many, making their way through Libya into Cyrene, escaped with their lives; the most of them perished. And all Egypt again came under the King's dominion, except Amyrtaeus, the king of the

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\(^1\) Gytheum, on the Laconian gulf.
\(^2\) Hero of the capture of Babylon, Hdt. III. clx.
\(^3\) Diodorus gives him with Artabazus 300,000 men (xi. 75) and 300 ships (xi. 77).
\(^4\) 454 B.C.
ΤΟΥ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσι βασιλέως οὖν τὸ τούτου δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τε τοῦ ἔλους οὐκ ἐδύναυτο ἔλειν καὶ ἄμα 3 μαχιμώτατοι εἰσὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων οἱ ἔλειοι. Ἰνάρως δὲ ὁ Λιβύων βασιλεύς, ὃς τὰ πάντα ἐπραξε περὶ τῆς Αἰγύπτου, προδοσίᾳ ληφθεῖς ἀνεσταυρώθη, ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ξυμμαχίδος πεντήκοντα τριήρεις διάδοχοι πλέουσαι ἐσ Αἰγύπτου ἔσχον κατὰ τὸ Μενδήσιον κέρας, οὐκ εἰδότες τῶν γεγονότων οὕτως καὶ αὐτοῖς ἐκ τε γῆς ἐπιπεσόντες πέζοι καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης Φοινίκων ναυτικὸν διέφθειραν τὰς πολλὰς τῶν νεών, 4 αἱ δὲ ἐλάσσονος διέφυγον πάλιν. τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατεύαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐσ Αἰγύπτου οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

СΧΙ. 'Εκ δὲ Θεσσαλίας Ὀρέστης ὁ Ἐχεκρατίδος νίος τοῦ Θεσσαλῶν βασιλέως φεύγων ἐπεισεν Ἀθηναίοις ἑαυτὸν κατάγειν καὶ παραλαβόντες Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Φωκέας ὅντας ξυμμάχους οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐστράτευσαν τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἐπὶ Φάρσαλον, καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μή προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλῶν (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν έιργον), τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐχ έἰλον, οὐδ' ἀλλο προ-
χώρει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὃν ἐνεκα ἐστράτευσαν, ἀλλ' ἀπεχώρησαν πάλιν Ὀρέστην ἔχουτες ἀπρακτοί.

2 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὠστερὸν χίλιοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς ἐν Πηγαῖς ἐπιβάντες (εἶχον δ' αὐτοὶ τὰς Πηγαῖς) παρέπλευσαν ἐσ Σικυόνα Περικλέους τοῦ Ἐανθίππου στρατη-
γοῦντος, καὶ ἀποβάντες Σικυωνίων τοὺς προσμεί-
marshes; for the Persians were unable to capture him, both on account of the extent of the marsh and because the marsh people are the best fighters among the Egyptians. Inaros, however, the king of the Libyans, who had been the originator of the whole movement in Egypt, was taken by treachery and impaled. And when fifty triremes, which sailed to Egypt from Athens and the rest of the confederacy to relieve the fleet there, put in at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, quite unaware of what had happened, the infantry fell upon them from the shore and a Phoenician fleet from the sea and destroyed most of the ships, a small number only escaping. So ended the great expedition against Egypt of the Athenians and their allies.

CXI. And now Orestes son of Echecriatas, king of the Thessalians, who was exiled from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And they, taking along some Boeotians and Phocians who were allies, made an expedition against Pharsalus in Thessaly. And though they made themselves masters of the land, so far as this was possible without going far from their camp—for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed them in—they failed to capture the city and indeed none of the other objects of their expedition was attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, having Orestes with them.

Not long after this one thousand Athenians, embarking on the ships at Pegae, which was now in their possession, sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, and disembarking defeated in battle the Sicyonians.

1 cf. Hdt. ii. cxl.; iii. xv.
2 454 B.C. 
3 cf. ch. ciii. 4.
3 ξαντας μαχη ἐκράτησαν. καὶ εὐθὺς παραλαβόντες Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ διαπλεύσαντες πέραν, τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν, οὐ μέντοι εἶλόν γε, ἀλλ' ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου.

CXXII. "Τστερον δὲ διαλιπόντων ἔτων τριῶν σπουδαὶ γίγνονται Πελοποινησίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις 2 πεντέτεις. καὶ Ἐλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἔσχον οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, ἐς δὲ Κύπρον ἐστρατεύοντο ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων Κίμωνος 3 στρατηγοῦντος, καὶ ἐξήκοντα μὲν νῆς ἐς Αἰγυπτίων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔπλευσαν Ἀμυρταῖον μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσι βασιλέως, αἱ δὲ 4 ἀλλαὶ Κίτιον ἐπολιόρκουν. Κίμωνος δὲ ἀποθανόντος καὶ λιμοῦ γενομένου ἀπεχώρησαν ἀπὸ Κιτίων, καὶ πλεύσαντες ὑπὲρ Σαλαμίνος τῆς ἐν Κύπρῳ Φοίνιξι καὶ Κυπρίοις καὶ Κήλιξιν ἐναυμάχησαν καὶ ἐπεξομάχησαν ἁμα, καὶ νικήσαντες ἀμφότερα ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου καὶ αἱ δὲ Ἀἰγυπτίων νῆς πάλιν ἄζειλθοῦσα μετ' αὐτῶν. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφῶι ιερὸν παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς· καὶ αὐθίς ὑστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν.

CXXIII. Καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναίοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἐχόντων Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἀλλ' ἀττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἐστράτευσαν ἐαυτῶν μὲν χίλιοις ὀπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυμμάχων ὡς ἐκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμια ὑντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἐλόντες καὶ

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who came out against them. Immediately thereafter, taking along some Achaeans and sailing across the gulf, they made an expedition against Oeniadae in Acarnania and laid siege to it; but failing to take it they went back home.

CXII. Three years afterwards a truce was made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, to last five years. And the Athenians did abstain from warfare against Hellenes, but they made an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies, under the command of Cimon. Sixty of these ships sailed to Egypt on the summons of Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, while the others laid siege to Citium. But Cimon died and a famine arose, and so they withdrew from Citium; and on their way home, when off Salamis in Cyprus, they fought the Phoenicians, Cyprians and Cilicians by sea and on land. Gaining the victory in both battles they went back home, and with them returned the ships that had been in Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called sacred war, and getting possession of the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedition, got possession of it, and delivered it again to the Phocians.

CXIII. Some time after this the Athenians under the command of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus, with one thousand hoplites of their own and the respective quotas of their allies, made an expedition against Orchomenus and Chaeroneia and some other places in Boeotia, which were in the possession of the Boeotian exiles and therefore hostile. And after taking

1 451 B.C.  2 449 B.C.  3 447 B.C.
ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες. πορευομένοι δ’ αὐτοῖς ἐν Κορωνείᾳ ἐπιτίθενται οὗ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Δοκροί μετ’ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ ξύντας ἔλαβον. καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναίοι πᾶσαν, σπουδᾶς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ’ ὃ τοὺς ἀνδρας κομισοῦνταί, καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτονομοὶ πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

CXIV. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον Εὐβοία ἀπέστη ἀπὸ Ἀθηναίων. καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν διαβεβηκότος ἢδη Περικλέους στρατιὰ Ἀθηναίων ἤγγελθη αὐτῷ ὅτι Μέγαρα ἀφέστηκε καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι μέλλουσιν ἐσβάλλειν ἐς τὴν Ὄττικήν καὶ οἱ φρουροὶ Ἀθηναίων διεφθαρμένοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ Μεγαρῶν, πλὴν ὅσοι ἐς Νίσαιαν ἀπέφυγον ἐπαγγέλομενοι δὲ Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀπέστησαν οἱ Μεγαρίδες. ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμισε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς

2 Εὐβοίας. καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς Ὅττικῆς ἐς Ἑλευσίνα καὶ Θριώξε οὐ σβάλοντες ἐδύσαντες Πλειστοανακτὸς τοῦ Παυσανίου βασιλέως Δακεδαιμονίων ἠγομένου, καὶ τὸ πλέον

3 οὐκέτι προελθόντες ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου. καὶ Ἀθηναίοι πάλιν ἐς Εὐβοίαν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντο κατεστρέψαντο πᾶσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογία κατεστήσαντο, Ἐστιαῖας δὲ ἐξοικίσαντες αὐτοί τὴν γῆν ἐσχον.
BOOK I. cxiii. 1–cxiv. 3

Chaeroneia and selling its inhabitants into slavery, they placed a garrison in it and departed. But while they were on the march they were attacked at Coronea by the Boeotian exiles from Orchomenus, together with some Locrians and Euboean exiles and others who held the same political views, and were defeated, some of the Athenians being slain and others taken alive. Accordingly the Athenians evacuated the whole of Boeotia, making a treaty upon the stipulation that they should receive back their prisoners. And so the Boeotian exiles were restored, and they as well as all the rest of the Boeotians again became autonomous.

CXIV. Not long after this Euboea revolted from Athens; and Pericles had just crossed over to the island with an Athenian army when word was brought to him that Megara had revolted, that the Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that all the Athenian garrison had been destroyed by the Megarians except such as had escaped to Nisaea. The Megarians had effected this revolt by bringing Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians to their aid. So Pericles in haste brought his army back again from Euboea. After this the Peloponnesians, under the command of Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, advanced into Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria, ravaging the country; but without going further they returned home. Thereupon the Athenians again crossed over into Euboea under the command of Pericles and subdued the whole of it; the rest of the island they settled by agreement, but expelled the Hestiaeans from their homes and themselves occupied their territory.

2 Setting up democracies, etc. cf. C.I.A. iv. 27 a.
THUCYDIDES

CXV. 'Αναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ' Εὔβοιας οὐ πολλῷ ύστερον σπουδᾶς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Δακε-
δαμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους τριακοντούτεις, ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν καὶ Πηγάς καὶ Τροιζήνα καὶ
'Αχαιαν' ταῦτα γὰρ εἰχον 'Αθηναίοι Πελοπον-
νησίων.

2 "Εκτὸς δὲ ἔτει Σαμίως καὶ Μιλησίως πόλεμος
ἐγένετο περὶ Πρήνης· καὶ οἱ Μιλησίοι ἑλασ-
σούμενοι τῷ πολέμῳ παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐλθόντες
κατεβόων τῶν Σαμίων. Ἑυνεπελάβοντο δὲ καὶ ἐξ
αὐτῆς τῆς Σάμου ἀνδρῶν ἰδίωται, νεωτέρισαι

3 βουλόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν.¹ πλεύσαντες οὖν
'Αθηναίοι ἐς Σάμον ναυσὶ τεσσαράκοντα δήμο-
κρατίαν κατέστησαν καὶ ὁμήρους ἔλαβον τῶν
Σαμίων πεντήκοντα μὲν παῖδας, ἱσοὺς δὲ ἀνδρας,
καὶ κατέθεντο ἐς Δήμουν καὶ φρουρᾶν ἐγκατα-

4 λιπόντες ἀνεχώρησαν. τῶν δὲ Σαμίων ἦσαν γὰρ
τινες οὐ ὑπέμειναν, ἀλλ' ἐφυγον ἐς τὴν ἡπει-
ρον, ἐυνθέμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοῖς δυνατω-
τάτοις καὶ Πισσοῦθυν τῷ 'Τστάσποι τοῦ ξυμμαχίαν,
ὅς εἰχε Σάρδεις τότε, ἐπικούρους τε ἐξελέξαντες
ἐς ἐπτακοσίους διέβησαν ὑπὸ νῦκτα ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

5 καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν καὶ ἐκρα-
τήσαν τῶν πλείστων, ἐπείτα τοὺς ὁμήρους ἐκ-
κλέψαντες ἐκ Δήμου τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν,
καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς τοὺς 'Αθηναίων καὶ τοὺς
ἀρχοντας οἱ ἦσαν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐξέδοσαν Πισ-
σοῦθυν, ἐπὶ τε Μιλητοῦ εὐθὺς παρασκευάζουτο
στρατεύειν. Ἐυναπέστησαν δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυ-
ζάντιοι.

¹ τὴν πολιτείαν seems not to have been read by the Schol.,
and so is deleted by van Herwerden and Hude.

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CXV. Withdrawing their troops from Euboea not long afterwards they made a truce with the Lacedaemonians and their allies which was to last for thirty years, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea; for these were the places belonging to the Peloponnesians which the Athenians then held.

Six years later a war arose between the Samians and the Milesians about the possession of Priene, and the Milesians, who were being worsted in the war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians. They were seconded in their complaint by some private citizens from Samos itself who wished to revolutionize the government. So the Athenians sailed to Samos with forty ships and set up a democracy, taking as hostages of the Samians fifty boys and as many men, whom they deposited in Lemnos; then they withdrew from Samos, leaving a garrison behind. Some of the Samians, however, did not stay, but fled to the mainland, first making an alliance with the most influential men who remained in the city and with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, then satrap of Sardis; and collecting mercenary troops to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by night to Samos. First they attacked the popular party and got most of them into their power; then they secretly got their hostages out of Lemnos and revolted from Athens, handing over to Pissuthnes the Athenian officers and garrison that were on the island, and at once set about preparing an expedition against Miletus. And the Byzantines also joined in their revolt.

1 440 B.C.
THUCYDIDES

CXVI. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὃς ἠσθοῦντο, πλεύσαντες ναυσίν ἐξήκοντα ἐπὶ Σάμου ταῖς μὲν ἐκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἐχρήσαντο (ἐτυχών γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ Καρίας ἐς προσκοπὴν τῶν Φοινικῶν νεῶν οἰχόμεναι, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Δέσβου περιαγγέλ- λουσαι βοηθεῖν), τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυσὶ καὶ τέσσαρις Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγοῦντος ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς Τραγία τῇ νῆσῳ Σαμίων ναυσίν ἐβδομήκοντα, δὲν ἦσαν αἱ εἶκοσι στρατιώ- tides (ἐτυχών δὲ αἱ πᾶσαι ἀπὸ Μιλήτου πλέ- 2 ουσαι), καὶ ἑνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι. ὦστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἔβοηθησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν νῆσες τεσσαράκοντα καὶ Χίων καὶ Δεσβίων πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι, καὶ ἀποβάντες καὶ κρατούντες τῷ πεζῷ ἐπολιόρκουν τρισὶ τείχεσι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἁμα. 3 Περικλῆς δὲ λαβὼν ἐξήκοντα ναῦς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐφορμουσῶν φχετο κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ Καύνου καὶ Καρίας, ἔσαγγελθέντων ότι Φοινικῶς νῆσες ἐπ' αὐτοῖς πλέουσιν φχετο γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Σάμου πέντε ναυσὶ Στησαγόρας καὶ ἄλλοι ἐπὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας.

CXVII. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ Σάμιοι ἑξαπιναὶς ἐκπλουν ποιησάμενοι ἀφάρκτω τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἐπιπεσόντες τὰς τε προφυλακίδας ναῦς διέφθειραν καὶ ναυμαχοῦστες τὰς ἀνταναγομένας ἐνίκησαν, καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης τῆς καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐκράτησαν ἤμέρας περὶ τέσσαρας καὶ δέκα καὶ ἐσεκομίσαντο 2 καὶ ἐξεκομίσαντο ἀ ἐβοῦλοντο. ἔλθοντος δὲ Περικλέους πάλιν ταῖς ναυσὶ κατεκλήσθησαν. καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ὦστερον προσεβοηθήσαν

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CXVI. But when the Athenians heard of this they sailed for Samos with sixty ships. Sixteen of these, however, they did not make use of on this enterprise, for these had already gone, some toward Caria to keep watch upon the Phoenician ships, others towards Chios and Lesbos to summon aid; but with forty-four ships, under the command of Pericles and nine others, they fought a sea-fight at the island of Tragia against seventy ships of the Samians, of which twenty were transport-ships, the whole fleet being on the way back from Miletus; and the Athenians were victorious. Later, having received a reinforcement from Athens of forty ships and from the Chians and Lesbians of twenty-five, they disembarked, and being superior to the Samians with their infantry proceeded to invest the city with three walls, at the same time blockading it by sea as well. But Pericles took sixty ships away from the blockading fleet and departed in haste towards Caunus in Caria, a report having come that a Phoenician fleet was sailing against his forces; for Stesagoras and others had gone from Samos with five vessels to fetch the Phoenician ships.

CXVII. Meanwhile the Samians suddenly made a sally and fell upon the Athenian naval station, which was unprotected by a stockade, destroying the guardships and defeating in a sea-fight the ships that put out against them. And for about fourteen days they were masters of the sea off their coast, bringing in and carrying out whatever they wished; but when Pericles came they were again blockaded by sea. And afterwards a reinforcement came from Athens

1 Sophocles was on the fleet, as one of the ten generals of the year.
τεσσαράκοντα μὲν αἱ μετὰ Θουκυδίδου καὶ "Αγνώνος καὶ Φορμίωνος νῆς, εἶκοσι δὲ αἱ μετὰ Τληπολέμου καὶ 'Αντικλέους, έκ δὲ Χίου καὶ
3 Δέσβου τριάκοντα. καὶ ναυμαχίαν μὲν τινα βραχείαν ἐποίησαντο οἱ Σάμιοι, ἀδύνατοι δὲ οὔτε ἀντίσχειν ἐξεπολυορκήθησαν ἐνάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία, τεῖχος τε καθελόντες καὶ ὀμήρους δόντες καὶ ναύς παραδόντες καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδούναι. ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι ὠσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπῆκοι εἶναι.

CXVIII. Μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη γίγνεται οὐ πολλοῖς ἐτεσίν ὑστερον τὰ προειρημένα, τά τε Κερκυραῖκα καὶ τὰ Ποτειδατικά καὶ ὁσα πρό-
2 φασις τοῦτο τοῦ πολέμου κατέστη. ταῦτα δὲ ἐξύμπαντα ὁσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἑλλήνες πρὸς τε ἄλληλους καὶ τὸν Βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἐτεσὶ πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦτο τοῦ πολέμου· ἐν οἷς οἱ 'Αθηναίοι τὴν τε ἄρχην ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως. οὶ δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυνεν ἐὰν ἐπὶ βραχύ, ἥσυχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, οὖντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς λέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἤν μὴ ἀναγκάζονται, τὸ δὲ τὲ 1 καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειρηγόμενοι, πρῶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ᾑρετο καὶ τῆς
1 τὸ δὲ τί, so MSS.: τότε δ' ἔτι is read by Hude, after Reiske (Dion. H. τότε δὲ τί).

1 Possibly the historian, as some have thought; others explain as the son of Melesias and opponent of Pericles; still others as the poet from the deme of Acherdus.

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of forty ships under the command of Thucydides, Hagnon and Phormio, twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. Now the Samians did indeed put up a sea-fight for a short time, but they were unable to hold out, and in the ninth month were reduced by siege and agreed to a capitulation, pulling down their walls, giving hostages, delivering over their ships, and consenting to pay back by instalments the money spent upon the siege. The Byzantines too came to terms, agreeing to be subjects as before.

CXVIII. It was not many years after this that the events already narrated occurred, namely the Coreclyraean affair, the Potidaean, and all the other incidents that furnished an occasion for this war. And all these operations of the Hellenes, against one another and against the Barbarian, took place in the interval of about fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of this war. It was in this period that the Athenians established their rule more firmly and themselves advanced to great power. And the Lacedaemonians, though aware of their growing power, made no attempt to check it, except to a trifling extent, remaining indifferent the greater part of the time, since they had never been quick to go to war except under compulsion, and in this case were in some degree precluded from interference by wars of their own. But at last the power of the Athenians began clearly to exalt itself and they were

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2 439 B.C.
3 Hardly four years, since the naval battle between the Coreclyraeans and Corinthians seems to have occurred 435 B.C.
4 Chs. xxiv-lv.
5 Chs. liv-lxvi.
6 The transactions in the Spartan assembly, chs. lxvii-lxxxviii.
7 479-432 B.C.
8 The Helot rebellion, ch. ci. et seq.
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ξυμμαχίας αυτῶν ἦπτοντο. τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνα-
σχέτων ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ’ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι
πάση προθυμία καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχὺς, ἢν δύ-
νωνται, ἀραμένοις δὴ τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.

3 Αὐτοὶς μὲν οὖν τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους διέγνωστο
λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπονδὰς καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
ἀδικεῖν, πέμψαντες δὲ ἐς Δελφοὺς ἐπηρώτων τὸν
θεὸν εἰ πολεμοῦσιν ἁμείνον ἔσται. ὁ δὲ ἀνείλεν
αὐτοῖς, ώς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσιν νίκην
ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρα-
καλοῦμενος καὶ ἀκλητος. CXIX. Αὐθίς δὲ τοὺς
ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες ψήφον ἐβούλοντο
ἐπαγαγεῖν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν. καὶ ἐλθόντων τῶν
πρέσβεων ἀπὸ τῆς ξυμμαχίας καὶ ξυνόδου γενο-
μένης οἳ τε ἄλλοι εἶπον ἢ ἐβούλοντο, κατηγο-
ροῦντες οἱ πλείους τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸν πόλεμον
ἀξιοῦντες γίνεσθαι, καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι δεηθέντες
μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις πρότερον ἐκάστων ἱδίᾳ
ὡστε ψηφίσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον, δεδιότες περὶ τῇ
Ποτειδαίᾳ μὴ προδιαφαρῆ, παρόντες δὲ καὶ τότε
καὶ τελευταίοι ἐπελθόντες ἔλεγον τοιάδε.

CXX. Ὁ οὖν Λακεδαιμονίους, ὁ ἄνδρες
ξύμμαχοι, οὐκ ἂν ἐτι αἰτιασαίμεθα χως οὐ καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἐψηφισμένοι τὸν πόλεμον εἰσὶ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐς
τούτο νῦν ξυσήγαγον. χρὴ γὰρ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας
τὰ ἵδια ἐξ ᾗ σον νέμοντας τὰ κοινὰ προσκοπεῖν,
ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἐκ πάντων προτιμῶνται.
laying hands upon their allies. Then the Lacedaemonians could bear it no longer, but determined that they must attack the Athenian power with all zeal and overthrow it, if they could, by undertaking this war.

The Lacedaemonians themselves, then, had decided that the treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were in the wrong, and sending to Delphi they asked the god if it would be advisable for them to go to war. The god answered them, as it is said, that if they warred with all their might, victory would be theirs, and said that he himself would help them, whether invoked or uninvoked. CXIX. But they wished to summon their allies again and put to them the question whether they should go to war. And when the envoys from the allies had come and an assembly was held, the others said what they wished, most of them complaining of the Athenians and demanding that the war should be entered upon, and especially the Corinthians. They had already, before the meeting, privately begged the allies city by city to vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa would be destroyed before help came, and now, being also present at this meeting, they came forward last of all and spoke as follows:

CXX. “Men of the allies, we can no longer complain of the Lacedaemonians that they have not both themselves voted for the war and also brought us together for this object. And that is right; for it is the duty of leaders, while equitably considering their particular interests, to have special regard for the general weal, just as in other matters they are

1 Resuming the narrative interrupted at the end of ch. lxxxviii.
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2 ἡμῶν δὲ ὅσοι μὲν Ἀθηναίοις ἡδὴ ξυνηλλάγησαν οὖχι διδαχῆς δέονται ὡστε φυλάξασθαι αὐτούς· τοὺς δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐν πόρῳ κατρωκημένους εἰδέναι χρῆ ὅτι, τοῖς κάτω ἢ μὴ ἀμώνωσι, χαλεπωτέραν ἔξουσι τὴν κατακομιδὴν τῶν ὁραίων καὶ πάλιν ἀντίληψιν ὄν ἡ θάλασσα τῇ ἥπειρῳ δίδωσι, καὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων μὴ κακοὺς κρίτας ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι, προσδέξθαι δὲ ποτε, εἰ τὰ κάτω πρόσωπο, κἂν μέχρι σφῶν τὸ δεινὸν προελθεῖν, καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐχ

3 ἦσον νῦν Βουλευσθαῖ. δὶ ὀπερ καὶ μὴ ὁκνεῖν δεῖ αὐτοὺς τὸν πόλεμον ἀντ' εἰρήνης μεταλαμβάνειν. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μὲν ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄδικοιτο, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ἄδικουμένους ἐκ μὲν εἰρήνης πολεμεῖν, εὗ δὲ παρασχόν ἐκ πολέμου πάλιν ἐξυμβήναι, καὶ μὴτε τῇ κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχία ἐπαίρεσθαι μήτε τῷ ἡσύχῳ τῇ εἰρήνης

4 ἡδόμενου ἄδικείσθαι· ὡ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονήν ὁκνῶν τάχιστ’ ἀν ἀφαιρεθεὶ τῆς ῥαστῶνς τὸ τερπνὸν δὶ ὀπερ ὁκνεῖ, εἰ ἡσυχάζοι, ὃ τε ἐν πολέμῳ εὐτυχίᾳ πλεονάζων οὐκ ἐντεθύμηται

5 θράσει ἀπίστῳ ἐπαιρόμενος. πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γνωσθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλείω καλῶς δοκοῦντα Βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοὐναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη.

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1 εἰ ἡσυχάζοι deleted by Hude, after Lehner.
honoured above all. Now those of us who have had dealings with the Athenians in the past do not need to be taught to be on our guard against them. But those who dwell more in the interior and away from any trade-route should be warned that, if they do not aid those who are on the seashore, they will find it more difficult to bring the products of the land down to the sea and to get in return what the sea gives to the mainland; and that they should not be careless judges of what is said here, as though it were no concern of theirs, but should expect that, if they abandon the seacoast to its fate, the danger may possibly some day reach them, and that they are deliberating upon their own interests no less than upon ours. They ought not, therefore, to hesitate a moment to adopt war in place of peace. For though it is the part of men of discretion to remain tranquil should they not be wronged, it behooves brave men, when wronged, to go from peace to war, but when a favourable opportunity offers to abandon war and resume peace again, allowing themselves neither to be elated by success in war nor to be so enamoured of the quiet of peace as to submit to wrong. For he who for the sake of his comfort shrinks from war is likely, should he remain tranquil, very speedily to forfeit the delights of ease which caused him to shrink; and he who presumes upon his success in war has failed to reflect how treacherous is the confidence which elates him. For many enterprises which were ill-planned have succeeded because the adversary has proved to be still worse advised, and yet more, which to all appearances were well advised, have turned out the opposite way and brought disgrace. For no one ever carries out a
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ἐνδυμεῖται γὰρ ὁδεῖς ὀμοία 1 τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἀσφαλείας μὲν δοξάζωμεν, μετὰ δέος δὲ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐλλείπομεν.

CXXI. "Ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν καὶ ἀδικούμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἐγείρομεν καὶ ἰκανὰ ἔχοντες ἐγκλήματα, καὶ ὅταν ἀμυνόμεθα Ἀθηναίους, καταθησόμεθα 2 αὐτῶν ἐν καιρᾷ. κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατήσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλῆθει προὔχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῆ, ἐπείτα ὀμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ 3 παραγγελλόμενα ἱόντας, ναυτικὸν τε, φί ἱσχύουσιν, ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπαρχοῦσης τε ἐκάστους οὐσίας ἐξαρτυσόμεθα καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὅλυμπία χρημάτων δανείσμα γὰρ ποιησάμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἰοὶ τ' ἐσμὲν μισθῷ μείζον τοὺς ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν ναυβάτας. ὥνητη γὰρ ἡ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἡ οἰκεία: ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἢσον ἂν τοῦτο πάθοι, τοῖς σώμασι τὸ πλέον ἱσχύουσα ἡ 4 τοῖς χρήμασιν. μιᾶ τε νίκη ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀλίσκονται εἰ δ' ἀντίσχοιες, μελετήσωμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν πλέον χρόνῳ τὰ ναυτικά, καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἱσον καταστήσωμεν, τῇ γε ἐνυψυχίᾳ δῆσθαι περιεσόμεθα: ὁ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἐχομεν φύσει ἀγαθὸν, ἐκεῖνοις οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο διδαχῇ, δ

1 Reiske's correction for ὀμοία of the MSS.

1 cf. II. xiii. 4, where Pericles suggests a similar resource. The Delphic oracle favoured the Peloponnesians, according to ch. cxviii. 3.
plan with the same confidence with which he conceives it; on the contrary we form our fond schemes with a feeling of security, but when it comes to their execution, we are possessed by fear and fall short of success.

CXXI. "And so now in our own case, it is because we are suffering wrongs and have ample grounds for complaint that we are stirring up this war, and as soon as we have avenged our wrongs upon the Athenians we will bring the war to an end when occasion offers. And for many reasons we are likely to prevail: first, because we are superior in point of numbers and in military experience; secondly, because we all with one accord obey the word of command; and, thirdly, on the sea, where their strength lies, we shall be able to equip a fleet, not only with the means which we severally possess, but also with the funds stored up at Delphi and Olympia. For by contracting a loan we can use the inducement of higher pay to entice away from them their mercenary sailors; for the forces of the Athenians are made up of hirelings rather than of their own citizens, whereas ours, whose strength lies more in the quality of the men than in the pay they get, would be less subject to such defection. And so, if we win a single victory at sea, in all probability they are defeated. If, however, they should still hold out, we on our part shall have more time for practice in seamanship, and as soon as we have brought our skill to a parity with theirs, in courage, assuredly, we shall be superior. For the excellence that nature has given us cannot become theirs through instruction, whereas

1 Through the mercenary sailors flocking to the Peloponnesian side for higher pay.

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δ' ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιστήμη προὔχουσι, καθαίρετον ἡμῖν 5 ἐστὶ μελέτη. χρήματα δὲ ὡστε ἐχεῖν ἐστι αὐτὰ, οἷσομεν. ἡ δεινὸν ἀν εἰη εἰ οἱ μὲν ἐκεῖνων ξύμμαχοι ἐπὶ δουλεία τῇ αὐτῶν φέροντες οὐκ ἀπερροῦσιν, ἡμείς δ' ἐπὶ τῷ τιμωρούμενοι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀμα δῷζεσθαι οὐκ ἀρα δαπανησομεν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μη ὑπ' ἐκεῖνων αὐτὰ ἀφαιρεθέντες αὐτοῖς τούτοις κακῶς πάσχειν.

CXXII. "Τπάρχουσι δὲ καὶ άλλαί ὁδοὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἡμῖν, ξυμμάχων τε ἀπόστασις, μάλιστα παραίρεσις οὕσα τῶν προσόδων αἰς ἱσχύουσι, καὶ ἐπιτείχισμος τῇ χώρᾳ, ἄλλα τε ὁσα οὐκ ἂν τις νῦν προῖδοι. ήκιστα γάρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἢφ' αὐτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνάται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον· ἐν ὕ ο μὲν εὐφρήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ' ὄργισθείς περὶ αὐτῶν οὖν ἐλάσσω πταίει.

2 "Ενθυμώμεθα δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἡμῶν ἦσαν ἐκάστοις πρὸς ἀντιπάλους περὶ γῆς ὅρων αἱ διαφοραὶ, οἰστον ἂν ἢν νῦν δὲ πρὸς ξύμπαντάς τε ἡμᾶς 'Αθηναίοι ἰκανοὶ καὶ κατὰ πόλιν ἐτὶ δυνατώτερον ὡστε, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἄθροι καὶ κατὰ ἐθνη καὶ ἐκαστόν ἅστυ μὲν γνώμη ἀμυνούμεθα αὐτούς, δία γε ὅτας ἡμᾶς ἀπόνως χειρώσονται. καὶ τὴν ἦσαν, εἰ καὶ δεινὸν τῷ ἀκούσαι, ἵστω οὖν

1 καθαίρετον, which Hude adopts from C and G (ex corr.), against καθαίρετον of the other MSS., is confirmed by the echo in Dio C. xliii. 11, τὸ μὲν γὰρ κτητὸν διὰ βραχεὸς τοῖς τὸν νοῦν αὐτῷ προσέχουσι καὶ καθαίρετον μελέτη εἶναι.

2 Dobree's correction for αὐτῶν of nearly all MSS.
the advantage they have in skill can be acquired by us through practice. And as to the money we need to accomplish all this, we shall provide it by contributions; or strange were it, if their allies should never fail to pay tribute to ensure their own slavery, but we, to secure at once vengeance upon our enemies and safety for ourselves, shall prove unwilling to spend money, aye, and that we may not be robbed of that very wealth and withal have it used to our destruction.

CXXII. "But we have other ways also of waging war—inducing their allies to revolt, which is the best means of depriving them of the revenues in which their strength consists, the planting of forts in their territory, and all the other measures which one cannot now foresee. For war least of all conforms to fixed rules, but itself in most cases has to form its plans to suit the occasion as its own resources allow; when, therefore, a man keeps his temper cool while dealing with war, he is more likely to be safe, while he who loses his temper over it makes more blunders.

"And let us reflect also that, if we individually were involved in a dispute about mere boundary-lines with an enemy who was no more than our equal, that might be borne; but as the case stands, the Athenians are quite a match for us all together, and still more powerful against us city by city. Hence, unless all of us together, every nation and town, with one accord resist them, they will easily overpower us because we shall be divided. And as to defeat—even though this is terrible to hear, let it

1 Or, reading αὐτῷ with the MSS., "makes blunders through his own fault as much as anything," i.e. "the man who loses his head has only himself to blame for his disasters."
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3 ἀλλο τι φέρονταν ἡ ἀντικρυς δουλείαν· δ καὶ λόγω ἐνδοιασθήναι αἰσχρον τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ πόλεις τοσάδε ὑπὸ μιᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν ὃ ἡ δικαίως δοκοίμεν ἐὰν πάσχειν ἡ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τῶν πατέρων χείρος φαίνεσθαι, οὐ τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν· ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς βεβαιοῦμεν αὐτό, τύραννον δὲ ἐὼμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν, τοὺς δ' ἐν μιᾶ μονάρχοις ἄξιοιμεν καταλύειν. καὶ οὐκ ἰσμεν ὅπως τάδε τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων ξυμφορῶν ἀπῆλλακται, ἄξυνεσίας ἡ μαλακίας ἡ ἀμελείας. οὐ γὰρ δὴ πεφευγότες αὐτὰ ἐπὶ τὴν πλείστους δὴ βλάψαις καταφρόνησιν κεχωρίκατε, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ πολλοὺς σφάλλειν τὸ ἐναντίον ὄνομα ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται.

CXXIII. "Τὰ μὲν οὖν προγεγενημένα τὶ δεῖ μακρότερον ἡ ἐς ὅσον τοῖς νῦν ξυμφέρει αἰτιᾶσθαι; περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπειτα μελλόντων τοῖς παροῦσι βοηθοῦντας χρὴ ἐπιταλαιπωρεῖν (πάτριον γὰρ ἡμῖν 1 ἐκ τῶν πόνων τὰς ἁρετὰς κτᾶσθαι), καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλειν τὸ ἔθος, εἰ ἄρα πλούτῳ τε νῦν καὶ ἐξουσία ὁλίγον προφέρετε (οὐ γὰρ δικαίον ἄ τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐκτῆθη τῇ περιουσίᾳ ἀπολέσθαι), ἀλλὰ θαρσοῦντας ἴναι κατὰ πολλὰ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, τοῦ τε θεοῦ χρῆσαντος καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποσχομένου

1 With C, the other MSS. have ἡμῖν.

1 καταφρόνησις is that proud and haughty spirit which precedes and invites a fall. It seems impossible to reproduce in
be well understood that it brings nothing else than downright slavery. That such an outcome should even be spoken of as a possibility, or that so many cities might suffer ill at the hands of one, is a disgrace to the Peloponnesus. In such a case men would say of us, either that we deserved our fate, or that through cowardice we submitted to it, and that we were clearly degenerate sons of our fathers, who liberated Hellas, whereas we, so far from making this liberty secure, should be allowing a city to be established as a tyrant in our midst, though we claim the reputation of deposing the monarchs in single states. We know not how such a course can be acquitted of one of the three gravest errors, stupidity or cowardice, or carelessness. For I cannot suppose that, escaping those errors, you have reached that most fatal spirit of proud disdain which has ruined so many men that it has taken on a new name, that of despicable folly.

CXXIII. "With regard, however, to what is past and done, what need is there to find fault at length, except in so far as that is profitable for what is present? But with a view to what shall be hereafter, we should devote every effort to the task in hand—for to win virtue by toils is our heritage—and make no change of custom because you now have a slight superiority in wealth and power; for it is not right that attributes which have been won through poverty should be lost through prosperity. Nay, you should go into the war with confidence, and for many reasons: the god has spoken through his oracle and promised that he

English the assonance of the words καταφροδίης ἀφροσύνη. Thucydides was fond of paronomasia; cf. ch. xxxiii. 4.

Or, "the rewards of virtue"—honour, renown.
ΤΗ ΩΕΝ  

δύσποικίς, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἐλλάδος ἀπάσης 

ξυναγωγισμένης, τὰ μὲν φόβω, τὰ δὲ ὁφελίμα.  

2 σπονδάς τε οὐ λύσετε πρότεροι, ἃς γε καὶ ὁ θεός 

κελεύων πολεμεῖν νομίζει παραβεβάσθαι, ἥδι-

κημέναις δὲ μᾶλλον βοηθήσετε: λύσοι γὰρ οὐχ 

οἱ ἄμμινομενοι, ἀλλ' οἱ πρότεροι ἐπιόντες.  

CXXIV. "Ὅστε πανταχόθεν καλῶς ὑπάρχον 

ὑμῖν πολεμεῖν καὶ ἡμῶν κοινὴ τάδε παραινούντων, 

εἴτε περ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταῦτα1 ξυμφέροντα καὶ 

πόλεσι καὶ ἱδιώταις εἶναι, μὴ μέλλετε Ποτει-

δείταις τε ποιεῖσθαι τιμωρίαν οὐσί Δωριέσσι 

καὶ ύπὸἸόνων πολυορκουμένοις, οὐ πρότερον 

ἡν τοὺσκατέτηκαν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετέλθειν τὴν 

ἐλευθερίαν, ὥς οὐκέτι ἐνδέχεται περιμένοντας 

tοὺς μὲν ἡδὴ βλάπτεσθαι, τοὺς δ', εἰ γνωσθησό-

μεθα ξυνελθόντες μὲν, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ ἀπολμώντες, 

2 μὴ πολὺ ύστερον τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχειν ἀλλὰ νομί-

σαίται ἐς ἀνάγκην ἀφίχθαι, δὲ ἀνδρεῖς ἡμιμαχοι, 

καὶ ἀμα τάδε ἄριστα λέγεσθαι, ψηφίσασθε τὸν 

πόλεμον μὴ φοβηθέντες τὸ αὐτίκα δεινόν, τῆς δ' 

ἀπ' αὐτοῦ διὰ πλείονος εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμήσαντες: 

ἐκ πολέμου μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνη μᾶλλον βεβαιοῦται, 

ἀφ' ἱσυχίας δὲ μὴ πολεμῆσαι οὐχ ὀμοίως ἀκίν-

3 δύνουν. καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῇ Ἐλλάδι 

πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὀμοίως 

καθεστάναι, ὡστε τῶν μὲν ἡδὴ ἀρχεῖν, τῶν δὲ  

1 So Hude, after Reiske (ταύτα F, ταύτα γρ.α2); ταύτα 

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himself will help you; all the rest of Hellas will join you in the struggle, partly through fear and partly through self-interest; and, finally, you will not be the ones to break the treaty, inasmuch as the god, in bidding you go to war, considers it to have been transgressed already, but you will be going to the defence of a treaty that has been violated. For it is not those who fight in self-defence that break a treaty, but those who attack others unprovoked.

CXXIV. "So then, since from every quarter a favourable opportunity offers itself to you to go to war, and since we recommend this course in the common interest—if it be true that identity of interest¹ is the surest policy for states and individuals to follow—make haste to succour the Potidaeans, who are Dorians and besieged by Ionians—the reverse of what used to be—and to recover the liberty of the rest; since it will no longer do for us to wait, when some are already being injured, and others, if it shall become known that we have had a meeting and dare not defend ourselves, will soon suffer the same fate. On the contrary, men of the allies, recognize that we are now facing the inevitable, and at the same time that this proposal is for the best; and vote for the war, not fearing the immediate danger, but coveting the more enduring peace which will result from the war. For peace is more firmly established when it follows war, but to refuse to go to war from a desire for tranquillity is by no means so free from danger. And so, in the conviction that the state which has set itself up as a tyrant in Hellas is a menace to all alike, ruling over some already and

¹ Or, reading ταυτα, "if it be most certain that this course (i.e. declaration of war) is advantageous for states as well as individuals."
THUCYDIDES

diανοεῖσθαι, παραστησόμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ
αὐτοὶ τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς
νῦν δεδουλωμένους "Ἐλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν."

CXXV. Τοιαῦτα μὲν ὦ Κορίνθιοι εἶπον. οἱ
δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐπειδὴ ἀφ᾽ ἀπάντων ἦκουσαν
γρώμην, ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοῖς ξυμμάχους ἀπασίν
όσοι παρῆσαν ἔξις καὶ μείζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πό-
2
λευ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πόλεμεῖ. δεδογ-
μένον δὲ αὐτοῖς εὐθὺς μὲν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖν
ἀπαρασκεύουσι οὕσιν, ἐκπορίζεσθαι δὲ, ἐδόκει ἐκά-
στοις ἃ πρόσφορα ἦν καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέλλῃσιν.
όμως δὲ καθισταμένοι ὃν ἐδε ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ
dietrίβη, ἔλασσον δὲ, πρὶν ἐσβάλειν ἐς τὴν
'Αττικήν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἀρασθαὶ φανερῶς.

CXXVI. 'Εν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπρεσβεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ
πρὸς τοὺς 'Αθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιοῦμενοι,
ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολε-
2
μεῖν, ἢν μὴ τι ἐσακοῦσιν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν
πρέσβεις πέμψαντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον
3 τοὺς 'Αθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἑλαύνειν τῆς θεοῦ. τὸ
δὲ ἄγος ἦν τοιόνδε. Κύλων ἦν 'Αθηναίος ἀνήρ
Ὀλυμπιούκης τῶν πάλαι εὐγενῆς τε καὶ δυνατός·
ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένεως Μεγαρέως
ἀνδρός, δὲ κατ᾽ ἐκείνου τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννει
4 Μεγάρων. χρωμένῳ δὲ τῷ Κύλωνι ἐν Δελφοῖς
ἀνεῖλεν ὁ θεὸς ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἐορτῇ
5 καταλαβεῖν τὴν 'Αθηναίων ἄκροπολιν. ὁ δὲ παρὰ
τε τοῦ Θεαγένους δύναμιν λαβὼν καὶ τοὺς φίλους
ἀναπέσας, ἐπειδὴ ἐπῆλθεν Ὀλύμπια τὰ ἐν
Πελοποννήσῳ, κατέλαβε τὴν ἄκροπολιν ὡς ἐπὶ
τυραννίδι, νομίσας ἐορτήν τε τοῦ Διὸς μεγίστην
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designing to rule over others, let us attack and reduce it, and henceforth dwell in security ourselves and set free those Hellenes who are already enslaved."

CXXV. Thus spoke the Corinthians. And the Lacedaemonians when they had heard the opinions of all, put the vote in succession to all the allied states which were present, both great and small; and the majority voted for war. But though the decision was made it was impossible for them to take up arms at once, as they were unprepared; it was determined, however, that the several states should make the fitting preparations and that there should be no delay. Nevertheless, in providing themselves with what was needed there was spent, not indeed a full year, but somewhat less, before they invaded Attica and took up the war openly.

CXXVI. During this interval they kept sending embassies to the Athenians and making complaints, that they might have as good a pretext as possible for making war, in case the Athenians should refuse to consider them. And first the Lacedaemonian envoys bade the Athenians drive out the "curse of the goddess." The curse was as follows: There was an Athenian in days of old named Cylon, a victor at Olympia, of noble birth and powerful; and he had married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian, who was at that time tyrant of Megara. Now Cylon consulted the oracle at Delphi, and the god in answer told him to seize the Acropolis of Athens "at the greatest festival of Zeus." So he obtained a force from Theagenes and, persuading his friends to help, when the Olympic festival in the Peloponnesus came on he seized the Acropolis with a view to making himself tyrant; for he thought that the
On this first attempt to establish a tyranny in Athens, see also Hdt. v. lxxi; Plut. Solon, xii. It was not a rising of the people against the nobles, but the attempt of an ambitious man who aspired to royal power, supported only by a few friends and a body of Megarian soldiers. To the mass.
Olympic festival was not only the greatest festival of Zeus, but also in a manner was connected with him as having won an Olympic victory. But whether the oracle meant the greatest festival in Attica or somewhere else he did not go on to consider, and the oracle did not make it clear. For, in fact, the Athenians also have a festival in honour of Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called, a very great festival celebrated outside the city, whereat all the people offer sacrifices, many making offerings peculiar to the country instead of victims. But Cylon, thinking that he was right in his opinion, made his attempt. And the Athenians, when they were aware of it, came in a body from the fields against them and sitting down before the Acropolis laid siege to it. But as time passed the Athenians grew weary of the siege and most of them went away, committing the task of guarding to the nine Archons, to whom they also gave full power to settle the whole matter as they might determine to be best; for at that time the nine Archons transacted most of the public business. But Cylon and those who were being besieged with him were in hard straits through lack of food and water. So Cylon and his brother escaped; but the rest, when they were in great distress and some of them were even dying of hunger, sat down as suppliants at the

of the people it seemed to portend subjection to Megara, so they flocked in to crush the movement, not, as Cylon hoped, to support it.

2 A scholiast suggests cakes (πέμπτα) made in the forms of animals.

3 i.e. before the legislation of Solon; from that time the power of the Archons decreased, and was restricted chiefly to judicial functions.
11 ἀκροπόλει, ἀναστήσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Ἁθηναίων ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ὡς ἔωρον ἀποθνῄσκοντας ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐφ’ ὃ μὲν κακὸν ποιήσουσιν, ἀπαγαγόντες ἀπέκτειναν καθεξομένους δὲ τινας καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ ἀπεχρήσαντο. καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐναγείς καὶ ἀλιτήριοι τῆς θεοῦ ἔσείνοι τε ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ ἀπ’ ἐκείνων. ἔλασαν μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ Ἁθηναῖοι τοὺς ἐναγείς τούτους, ἔλασε δὲ καὶ Κλεομένης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὡστερον μετὰ Ἁθηναίων στασιαζόντων, τοὺς τε ζώοντας ἐλαύνοντες καὶ τῶν τεθνεότων τὰ ὀστά ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον κατῆλθον μέντοι ὡστερον, καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν ἐτὶ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ πόλει.

CXXVII. Τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν δὴθεν τοῖς θεοῖς πρῶτον τιμωροῦντες, εἰδότες δὲ Περικλέα τὸν Ξανθίππου προσεχόμενον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν μητέρα καὶ νομίζοντες ἐκπεσόντος αὐτοῦ βάλειν ἄν ¹ σφίσι προ-2 χωρεῖν τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἁθηναίων. οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἡλπίζουν παθεῖν ἄν αὐτῶν τοῦτο ὅσοι διαβολῆν οἴσειν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὡς καὶ διὰ τὴν 3 ἐκείνου ξυμφορᾶν τὸ μέρος ἔσται ὁ πόλεμος. ἦν

¹ Added by Stahl.

1 Of Athena Polias.
2 The sanctuary of the Eumenides, which lay between the Acropolis and the Areopagus.
altar 1 on the Acropolis. And the Athenians who had been charged with guarding them, when they saw them dying in the temple, caused them to arise on promise of doing them no harm, and leading them away put them to death; and some who in passing by took refuge at the altar of the Awful Goddesses 2 they dispatched even there. For this act both they and their descendants 3 were called accursed and sinners against the Goddess. Accordingly the accursed persons were driven out not only by the Athenians but also at a later time by Cleomenes the Lacedaemonian, with the help of a faction of the Athenians, during a civil strife, when they drove out the living and disinterred and cast out the bones of the dead. Afterwards, however, they were restored, and their descendants are still in the city.

CXXVII. It was this "curse" that the Lacedaemonians now bade the Athenians drive out, principally, as they pretended, to avenge the honour of the gods, but in fact because they knew that Pericles son of Xanthippus was implicated in the curse on his mother's side, 4 and thinking that, if he were banished, they would find it easier to get from the Athenians the concessions they hoped for. They did not, however, so much expect that he would suffer banishment, as that they would discredit him with his fellow-citizens, who would feel that to some extent his misfortune 5 would be the cause of the

3 Chiefly the Alcmaeonidae, whose head was Megacles, Archon at the time of Cylon's attempt.

4 Pericles was a descendant in the sixth generation from Megacles, his mother Agariste being niece of the Alcmaeonid Cleisthenes (Hdt. VI. cxxxii.).

5 As belonging to the accursed family.
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γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν ἤναντιόντο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἶα ὑπείκειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὄρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.

CXXVIII. Ἀντεκέλευνον δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸ ἀπὸ Ταϊνάρου ἄγος ἔλαυνειν. οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀναστήσαντες ποτε ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ Ποσείδῶνος ἀπὸ Ταϊνάρου τῶν Εἰλώτων ἰκέτας ἀπαγαγόντες διέφθειραν δι' ὁ δὴ καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς νομίζουσι τὸν μέγαν 2 σεισμὸν γενέσθαι ἐν Σπάρτῃ. ἐκέλευνον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Χαλκιοίκου ἄγος ἔλαυνειν αὐτοὺς· ἐγένετο δὲ 3 τοιοῦτε. ἔπειδὴ Παυσανίας ο λακεδαιμόνιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς ἐν Ἐλλησπόντῳ καὶ κριθεὶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀπελύθη μὴ ἀδικεῖν, δημοσίᾳ μὲν οὐκέτι ἐξεπέμφθη, ἱδία δὲ αὐτὸς τριήρη λαβὼν Ἑρμονίδα ἀνευ Λακεδαιμονίων ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἐλλησπόντον, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν Μεσοκοῦ πόλεμον, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πράσσειν, ὦσπερ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐφείμενος τῆς 4 Ἐλληνικῆς ἀρχῆς. εὐεργεσίαν δὲ ἀπὸ τοὺς πρῶτον ἐς βασιλέα κατέθετο καὶ τοῦ παντὸς 5 πράγματος ἀρχὴν ἐποίησατο. Βυζάντιον γὰρ

1 Van Herwerden deletes, followed by Hude.

1 cf. ch. ci. 2.
war. For being the most powerful man of his time and the leader of the state, he was opposed to the Lacedaemonians in all things, and would not let the Athenians make concessions, but kept urging them on to the war.

CXXVIII. The Athenians answered with the demand that the Lacedaemonians should drive out the curse of Taenarus. For the Lacedaemonians had on one occasion caused some suppliant Helots to leave their refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus, then had led them off and put them to death; and the Lacedaemonians believe that it was because of this sacrilege that the great earthquake¹ befell them at Sparta. And the Athenians also bade them drive out the curse of Athena of the Brazen House.² And this is the way it was incurred. After Pausanias the Lacedaemonian had been recalled by the Spartans, on the first occasion,³ from his command on the Hellespont, and on trial had been acquitted of wrong-doing, he was never again sent out in a public capacity, but privately and on his own account he took a trireme of Hermione without authority of the Lacedaemonians and came to the Hellespont, to take part, as he pretended, in the Persian war, but in reality to carry on an intrigue with the Great King—an enterprise to which he had set his hand in the first instance also, his aim being to become master of all Hellas. He had namely first laid up for himself with the King a store of gratitude in the following circumstances, and thus had begun the whole affair. When he was in that quarter before, after

² So called from her temple or shrine in the citadel at Sparta. Pausanias says (iii. xvii. 2) both temple and statue were of bronze. ³ 477 B.C. cf. ch. xcix. 3.
ελών τῇ προτέρα παρουσία μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχώρησιν (εἰξον δὲ Μήδοι αὐτὸ καὶ βασιλεῖς προσήκοντες τινες καὶ ἐνυγγενεῖς, οἱ ἐάλωσαν ἐν αὐτῷ τότε) τούτους οὐς ἑλαβεν ἀποπεμπει βασιλεῖς κρύφα τῶν ἄλλων ἐμμαχῶν, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἀπέδρασαν αὐτῶν. ἔπρασσε δὲ ταύτα μετὰ Γογγύλου τοῦ Ἑρετρίδως, ὕπερ ἑπέτρεψε τὸ τε Βυζάντιον καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν τὸν Γογγύλου φέροντα αὐτῷ. ἐνεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε ἐν αὐτῇ, ὡς ὡστερον ἀνηρέθη.

" Παυσανίας ο ήγεμών τῆς Σπάρτης τούσδε τε σοι χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος ἀποπέμπει δορὶ ἐλών, καὶ γνώμην ποιοῦμαι, εἰ καὶ σοι δοκεῖ, θυγατέρα τε τὴν σὴν γῆμαι καὶ σοι Σπάρτην τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα ὑποχείριον ποιῆσαι. δύνατὸς δὲ δοκῶ εἰναι ταύτα πράξαι μετὰ σοῦ βουλευόμενος. εἰ οὖν τι σε τούτων ἄρέσκει, πέμπτε ἀνδρὰ πιστὸν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν δι' οὐ τὸ λοιπὸν τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα." τοσαῦτα μὲν ἡ γραφὴ ἐδιήλου.

ΟΧΧΙΧ. Ἐρέξες δὲ ἦσθη τε τῇ ἐπιστολῇ καὶ ἀποστέλλει ὁ Ἀρτάβαζου τὸν Φαρνάκου ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καὶ κελεύει αὐτὸν τὴν τε Δασκυλίτιν σατραπεῖαν παραλαβεῖν Μεγαβάτην ἀπαλλάξαντα, ὅς πρότερον ἤρχε, καὶ παρὰ Παυσανίαν ἐς Βυζάντιον ἐπιστολὴν ἀντεπετίθει αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα διαπέμψαι καὶ τὴν σφραγίδα ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ ἦν τι αὐτῷ Παυσανίας παραγγέλλῃ περὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πραγμάτων, πράσσειν ὡς ἀριστα καὶ πιστότατα. ο δὲ ἀφικόμενος τά τε ἄλλα ἐποιήσεν.
the return of the Hellenic fleet from Cyprus,¹ he had taken Byzantium, then in the possession of the Persians, and certain connections and kinsmen of the King were captured in the place when the city fell. These prisoners he sent back to the King without the knowledge of the allies in general, whom he gave to understand that they had escaped from him. And he was carrying on this intrigue in concert with Gongylus the Eretrian, the very man whom he had placed in charge of Byzantium and the captives. And he also sent a letter by Gongylus to the King, in which the following was written, as was afterwards discovered:

"Pausanias, the Spartan commander, wishing to do you a favour, sends you back these men whom he took with the spear. And I make the proposal, if it seems good to you also, to marry your daughter and to make Sparta and the rest of Hellas subject to you. And I am able, I think, to accomplish these things with the help of your counsel. If any of these things pleases you, send a trusty man to the sea, and through him we shall in future confer." So much the letter disclosed.

CXXIX. Xerxes was pleased with the letter, and sent Artabazus son of Pharnaces to the sea, commanding him to take over the satrapy of Dascylium, superseding Megabates, who was governor before; and he charged him with a letter in reply to Pausanias, bidding him transmit it to him in Byzantium as quickly as possible and to show him the seal, and if Pausanias should give him any direction about the King's affairs, to execute it with all care and fidelity. And he on his arrival did

¹ cf. ch. xciv. 2.
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ωσπερ εήρητο καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν διέπεμψεν. ἀντενεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε:

3. "Ὥδε λέγει βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης Παυσανίας: καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐς μοι πέραν θαλάσσης ἐκ Βυζαντίου ἐσώσας κείσεται σοι ἐνεργεία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἶκῳ ἐστὶν, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς ἄπό σοῦ ἀρέσκομαι. καὶ σε μήτε νῦν μήθε ἡμέρα ἐπισκέτω ὡστε ἀνείναι πράσσειν τι ὅν ἔμοι ὑπισχυεῖ, μηδὲ χρυσὸν καὶ ἀργύρου δαπάνη κεκώλυσο μηδὲ στρατιὰς πλήθει, εἰ ποι δεὶ παραγγέλεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μετ’ Ἀρταβάζου ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ὅν σοι ἐπέμψα, πράσσε ταρσῶν καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ σὰ ὅπῃ κάλλιστα καὶ ἀριστα ἔξει ἀμφοτέρως."

CXXX. Ταῦτα λαβὼν ὁ Παυσανίας τὰ γράμματα, ὅν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιᾶσιν ἡγεμονίαν, πολλῷ τότε μᾶλλον ἢρτο καὶ οὐκέτι ἑδύνατο ἐν τῷ καθεστῶτι τρόπῳ βιοτεῦει, ἀλλὰ σκευᾶς τε Μῆδικας ἐνδυόμενος ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου ἔχῃ καὶ διὰ τῆς Θράκης πορευόμενον αὐτὸν Μῆδοι καὶ Αἰγύπτιοι ἐδορυφόρουν, τράπεζὰν τε Περσικὴν παρεῖδετο καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἑδύνατο, ἀλλ’ ἔργοις βραχέσι προνάδηλον ἀ τῇ γηνωμῇ 2 μειζόνως ἐς ἑπείτα ἐμέλλε πράξειν. δυσπρόσοδον τε αὐτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρήτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὡστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσέλθαι: δι’ ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ ἐυμμαχίᾳ μετέστη.

CXXXI. Οἱ δ’ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι τὸ τε πρῶτον δ’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀνεκάλεσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ
other things as he was told and transmitted the letter. And this reply of the King ran as follows:

"Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias: As touching the men whom thou didst save for me out of Byzantium beyond the sea, a store of gratitude is laid up for thee, of record, in our house forever, and with thy words also I am pleased. And let neither night nor day stay thee to make thee remiss in performing aught of what thou dost promise me; and let nothing hinder thee, either expense of gold and silver or number of troops, if there be need of their presence anywhere; but with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent to thee, transact with confidence my business and thine as shall be most honourable and best for both of us."

CXXX. When Pausanias received this letter, although even before this he had been held in high consideration by the Hellenes because he had led them at Plataea, he was then far more elated and could no longer bring himself to live in the usual manner of his people, but clad himself in Persian apparel whenever he went forth from Byzantium, and when he travelled through Thrace a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians attended him; he had his table served in Persian style, and indeed could not conceal his real purpose, but by such trifling acts showed plainly what greater designs he purposed in his heart to accomplish thereafter. And so he made himself difficult of access, and indulged in such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the allies went over to the Athenians.

CXXXI. Now it was just this conduct that had caused the Lacedaemonians in the first instance to
The ✠staff was a staff used for writing dispatches. The Lacedaemonians had two round staves of one size, the one kept at Sparta, the other in possession of commanders.
recall Pausanias, when they learned of it; and when this second time, on his sailing away in the ship of Hermione without their authority, it was evident that he was acting in the very same manner—when, after being forcibly dislodged from Byzantium by the Athenians, instead of returning to Sparta, he settled at Colonae in the Troad and was reported to the ephors to be intriguing with the Barbarians and tarrying there for no good purpose—then at length they held back no longer, but sent a herald with a skytale-dispatch, in which they told him not to lag behind the herald, or the Spartans would declare war upon him. And he, wishing to avoid suspicion as far as possible, and confident that he could dispose of the charge by the use of money, returned the second time to Sparta. And at first he was thrown into prison by the ephors, who have the power to do this in the case of the king himself; then, having contrived after a time to get out, he offered himself for trial to any who might wish to examine into his case.

CXXXII. There was, indeed, no clear proof in the possession of the Spartans, either his personal enemies or the state at large, on the strength of which they could with entire confidence proceed to punish a man who was of the royal family and held high office for the time being—for as cousin of Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, who was king and still a minor, he was acting as regent for him; but he, by his disregard of propriety, and particularly by abroad. A strip of paper was rolled slantwise round the staff and the dispatch written lengthwise on it; when unrolled the dispatch was unintelligible, but rolled slantwise round the commander's skytale it could be read.
A golden tripod set upon a three-headed bronze serpent (Hdt. ix. lxxxi.). The gold tripod was carried off by the Phocians in the Sacred War (Paus. x. xiii. 5), but the bronze pillar, eighteen feet high, of three intertwined snakes, was removed by the Emperor Constantine to Constantinople.
his aping of the Barbarians, gave them much ground for suspecting that he did not want to remain an equal in the present order of things at Sparta. And they went back into his past and scrutinized all his other acts, to see if perchance he had in his mode of life departed from established customs, and they recalled especially that he had once presumed, on his own authority, to have inscribed on the tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes dedicated as first fruits of the spoils they had won from the Persians, the following elegiac couplet:

“When as captain of the Hellenes he had destroyed the Persian host, Pausanias dedicated this memorial to Phoebus.”

Now the Lacedaemonians had immediately chiselled off these verses and inscribed on the tripod by name all the cities which had had a part in overthrowing the Barbarians and had together set up this offering. The act of Pausanias, however, was felt at the time to have been a transgression, and now that he had got into this further trouble, it stood out more clearly than ever as having been but a prelude to his present designs. They were informed also that he was intriguing with the Helots; and it was even so, for he was promising them freedom and citizenship if they would join him in a revolt and help him accomplish his whole plan. But not even then, nor relying on certain Helots who had turned informers, did they think it best to take harsh measures against him; they

and placed in the hippodrome, the modern Atmeidan, where it still is. It contains the names of thirty-one Greek states which took part in the Persian War.

2 The distich was composed by Simonides.
αὐτῶν, χρώμενοι τῷ τρόπῳ ὕπερ εἰώθασιν ἐσ φᾶς αὐτοὺς, μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἀνδρὸς Σπαρ-
τιάτου ἀνεν ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων βου-
λευσαί τι ἀνήκεστον, πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς, ὡς
λέγεται, ο μέλλων τάς τελευταίας βασιλεῖ
ἐπιστολάς πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον κομίσεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀρ-
γύλιος, παιδικὰ ποτέ ὅν αὐτοῦ καὶ πιστότατος
ἐκεῖνῳ, μηνυθής γίγνεται, δείξας κατὰ ἐνθύμησίν
tινα ὅτι οὐδεὶς πω τῶν πρὸ ἕαυτοῦ ἀγγελῶν
πάλιν ἀφίκετο, καὶ παρασημηνάμενος, ἵνα, ἢν
ψευσθῇ τῆς δόξης ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνός τι μεταγράψαι
αἰτήσῃ, μὴ ἐπιγνῷ, λύε τὰς ἐπιστολάς, ἐν αἷς
ὕπονήσας τι τοιούτον προσεπεστάλθαι καὶ αὐ-
τοῦ ἥνρεν ἐγγεγραμμένον κτείνειν.

CXXXIII. Τότε δὴ οἱ ἔφοροι δείξαντος αὐτοῦ
τὰ γράμματα μᾶλλον μὲν ἐπίστευσαν, αὐτήκουι
καθ᾽ ὁμοληθέντες ἐτὶ γενέσθαι αὐτοῦ Παυσανίου τι
λέγοντος, ἀπὸ παρασκευῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ
Ταύναρον ἱκέτου οἰχομένου καὶ σκηνωσαμένου
διπλῆν διαφράγματι καλύβην, ἐς ἦν τῶν
ἔφορων ἡντὸς τινὰς ἔκρυψε, καὶ Παυσανίου ὡς
αὐτοῦ ἐλθόντος καὶ ἐρωτώντος τῆν πρόφασιν τῆς
ἰκετείας ἥσθοντο πάντα σαφῶς, αἰτιωμένου τοῦ
ἀνθρώπου τά τε περὶ αὐτοῦ γραφέντα καὶ τάλλ’
ἀποφαίνοντος καθ’ ἐκαστον, ὡς οὐδὲν πώποτε
αὐτοῦ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς βασιλέα διακονίαις παραβά-
λοιτο, προτιμηθεῖν δὲ ἐν ἢσῳ τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν

1 τῶν τε ἔφορων in the MSS.; Poppos deletes τε.
adhered to their usual method in dealing with men of their own class—not to be hasty, in the case of a Spartan, in adopting an irrevocable decision unless they had indisputable proofs. But at last, as it is said, the man who was to take to Artabazus Pausanias’ last letter to the King, a man of Argilus who had once been a favourite of his and had hitherto been most loyal to him, turned informer. For he took fright when he called to mind that no previous messenger had ever come back again; and so, having made a counterfeit seal, in order that his act might not be discovered, in case he should be wrong in his suspicion or in case Pausanias should ask to make some alteration in the letter, he opened the letter and in fact found written therein, as he suspected he should find something of the sort to have been directed, an order for his own death.

CXXXIII. At this point the ephors, when the man showed them the letter, were at last more nearly convinced, but they wished besides to hear with their own ears some word from Pausanias' own lips; so in accordance with a prearranged plan the man went as a suppliant to Taenarus and put up there a hut divided by a partition. In the inner room of the hut he concealed some of the ephors, and when Pausanias visited him and asked the reason of his taking the position of a suppliant, they heard clearly everything that was said: they heard the man accuse Pausanias of having written the order about himself, reveal the other items of the plot in detail, and protest that, though he had never yet compromised Pausanias in his errands to the King, the special honour awarded him was no better than that which the common run of his servants
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diaκόνων ἀποθανεῖν, κἀκεῖνοι αὐτά τε ταῦτα ἔννοιομολογοῦντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἐδόντος ὀργίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πίστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἀδίδοντος τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἄξιοντος ὡς τάχιστα πορεύεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὰ πρασόμενα διακωλύειν.

CXXXIV. Ἀκούσαντες δὲ ἀκριβῶς τότε μὲν ἀπῆλθον οἱ ἔφοροι, βεβαίως δὲ ἦδη εἰδότες εἰν τῇ πόλει τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐποιοῦντο. λέγεται δ' αὐτῶν μέλλουτα ἐνυπηφήσεσθαι ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ, ἐνὸς μὲν τῶν ἐφόρων τὸ πρόσωπον προσίόντος ὡς εἴδε, γνώναι ἐφ' ὅ ἐχώρει, ἀλλου δὲ νεύματι ἀφανεῖ χρησαμένου καὶ δηλώσαντος εὐνοίας, πρὸς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Χαλκιοίκου χωρῆσαι δρόμω καὶ προκαταφυγείν ἢν δ' ἐγγύς τὸ τέμενος. καὶ ἐς οἴκημα οὐ μέγα δὴ ἢ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐσελθὼν, ἵνα μὴ ὑπαίθριος

1 ταλαιπωροῖν, ἥσυχαζεν. οἱ δὲ τὸ παραυτίκα μὲν ὑστέρησαν τῇ διώξει, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τοῦ τε οἰκήματος τῶν ὀρφον ἁφείλον καὶ τὰς θύρας ἐνδον ὄντα τηρήσαντες αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπολαβοῦντες ἐσῳ ἀπωκοδόμησαν, προσκαθεξὺμενοι τε ἐξεπολιορκησαν λιμῷ. καὶ μέλλουτος αὐτοῦ ἀποψύχειν ὡςπερ εἰχεν εἰν τῷ οἰκήματι, αἰσθάνεις ἑξαγούσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ ἐτυ ἐμπυόν ὄντα, καὶ ἐξακθεῖς ἀπέθανε παραχρῆμα. καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐμέλλησαν μὲν ἐς τῶν Καιάδαν, οὕτε τοὺς κακούργους, ἐσ-

1 ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ deleted by Hude, after Krüger.

1 The temple would have been polluted if he had been allowed to die there.

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received—to be put to death; and they heard Pausanias acknowledge these same things, urge the man not to be angry with him this time, offer him a guarantee that he might leave the temple in safety, and finally request him to go on his way with all speed and not frustrate the negotiations.

CXXXIV. When the ephors had heard all the details they went back home for the present, but inasmuch as they now had certain knowledge, they were planning to make the arrest in the city. And the story goes that when Pausanias was about to be arrested in the street, he saw the face of one of the ephors as he was approaching and realised for what purpose he was coming, and that another ephor out of friendship warned him by giving a covert nod, whereupon he set off on a run for the temple of Athena of the Brazen House, and reached the refuge first, as the sacred precinct was near by. Entering then into a building of no great size belonging to the temple, that he might not suffer from exposure under the open sky, he kept quiet. For the moment then the ephors were distanced in their pursuit, but afterwards they took the roof off the building and, watching until he was inside and shutting off his retreat, walled up the doors; then they invested the place and starved him to death. And when he was about to expire, imprisoned as he was in the building, they perceived his condition and brought him out of the temple still breathing; but when he was brought out he died immediately. It was their first intention to cast him into the Caeadas, where

2 A cleft in the mountains not far from the city, probably near the modern Mistra, into which in early times prisoners, in later, corpses of criminals, were thrown; cf. Strabo, viii. v. 7; Paus. iv. xviii. 3.
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βάλλειν. ἐπειτα ἐδοξε πλησίον ποιν κατορύξαι. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς τὸν τε τάφον ὕστερον ἐχρησε τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις μετενεγκεῖν οὕτε ἀπέθανε (καὶ νῦν κεῖται ἐν τῷ προτεμενίσματι, ὁ γραφὴ στῆλαι δηλοῦσι), καὶ ὃς ἄγος αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ πεπραγμένον δύο σώματα ἀνθ' ἐνὸς τῇ Χαλκιδίκῃ ἀποδοῦναι. οἱ δὲ ποιησάμενοι χαλκοὺς ἀνδριάν-τας δύο ὃς ἀντὶ Παυσανίου ἀνέθεσαν.

CXXXV. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὃς καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄγος κρίναντος, ἀντεπέταξαν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐλαύνειν αὐτό.

2 Τοῦ δὲ μηδίσμου τοῦ Παυσανίου οἱ Λακεδαι-μόνιοι πρέσβεις πέμψαντες παρὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ξυνεπητιώντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, ὡς ήρησκον ἐκ τῶν Παυσανίου ἐλέγχων, ἥξιον τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς κολάζεσθαι αὐτῶν. οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες (ἐτυχε γὰρ ὁστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἀργεί, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον) πέμπουσι μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐτοίμων οὖν ἐνυδιωκέων ἀνδρας ὃς εἰρήτο ἄγειν ὅπου ἄν περιτύχωσιν.

CXXXVI. 'Ο δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς προαισθόμενος φεύγει ἐκ Πελοπόννησου ἐς Κέρκυραν, ὃν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης. δεδεῖαι δὲ φασκόντων Κέρκυραιῶν

1 cf. ch. cxxviii. 1.
2 εὐεργέτης, benefactor, a title of honour bestowed upon him, either because he took the part of the Corcyraeans in a dispute with Corinth (Plut. Them. xxiv), or because he had
they throw malefactors; but afterwards they decided to bury him somewhere near the city. But the god at Delphi afterwards warned the Lacedaemonians by oracle to transfer him to the place where he died (and he now lies in the entrance to the precinct, as an inscription on some columns testifies), and that they should recompense Athena of the Brazen House with two bodies in place of one, since their act had brought a curse upon them. So they had two bronze statues made and dedicated them to Athena to be a substitute for Pausanias.

CXXXV. Thus it was that the Athenians,¹ in response to the demand of the Lacedaemonians, ordered them to drive out the curse of Taenarus, seeing that the god also declared it to be a curse.

But when Pausanias was thus convicted of treasonable dealings with Persia, the Lacedaemonians sent envoys to the Athenians and accused Themistocles also of complicity in the plot, in accordance with discoveries they had made in connection with their investigation about Pausanias; and they demanded that he be punished in the same way. The Athenians agreed, but as he happened to have been ostracised, and, though living in Argos, frequently visited other parts of the Peloponnesus also, they sent some men, accompanied by the Lacedaemonians (who were quite ready to join in the pursuit), with instructions to arrest him wherever they chanced to find him.

CXXXVI. But Themistocles, forewarned, fled from the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, since he was a benefactor² of the Corecyraeans. As they, however, alleged that they were afraid to keep him and thus excused their absence (Schol.) in the Persian war (Hdt. vii. cxv). Themistocles relied upon the right of asylum, which had doubtless been decreed him as ἑυεργέτης.
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ἐξειν αὐτὸν ὡστε Δακεδαιμονίωις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ἀπεχθέσθαι, διακομίζεται ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν
2 ἡπειρον τὴν καταντικρύ. καὶ διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν προστεταγμένων κατὰ πῦστιν ἡ χωροίη,
ἀναγκάζεται κατὰ τι ἀπόροι παρὰ Ἄρμητον τὸν
Μολοσσῶν βασιλέα ὄντα αὐτῷ οὐ φίλον κατα-
λύσαι. καὶ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔτυχεν ἐπιδημῶν, ὁ δὲ τῆς
γυναικὸς ἱκέτης γενόμενος διδάσκεται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς
tὸν παῖδα σφὸν λαβὼν καθέξεσθαι ἑπὶ τὴν
4 ἔστιαν. καὶ ἔλθόντος οὐ πολὺ ύστερον τοῦ
Ἄρμήτου δῆλοῖ τε ὃς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἄξιοι, εἰ τι
ἀρα αὐτὸς ἀντεῖπεν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναίων δεομένω,
φεύγοντα τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου
πολλῷ ἄσθενεστέρου1 ἐν τῷ παρόντι κακῶς πά-
σχειν, γενναῖον δὲ εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἴσου τιμωρεῖσθαι. καὶ ἀμα αὐτὸς μὲν ἐκείνῳ
χρείας τινὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐς τὸ σῶμα σώζεσθαι ἐναν-
tιωθήναι, ἐκείνου δ’ ἂν, εἰ ἐκδοίη αὐτὸν (ἐἰπῶν
ὑπὸ ὧν καὶ ἐφ’ ὃ διώκεται), σωτηρίας ἂν τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀποστερῆσαι.

CXXXVII. Ὅ δὲ ἀκούσας ἀνίστησί τε αὐτὸν
μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ νίεος (ὦσπερ καὶ ἔχων αὐτὸν2
ἐκαθέξετο, καὶ μέγιστον ἢν ἱκέτευμα τούτο) καὶ
ὕστερον οὐ πολλῷ τοῖς τε Δακεδαιμονίοις καὶ
Ἀθηναίοις ἐλθοῦσι καὶ πολλὰ εἰποῦσιν οὐκ
ἐκδίδωσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀποστέλλει βουλόμενον ὡς βασι-
λέα πορευθῆναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν θαλασσαν πεζῇ
2 ἐς Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου.1 ἐν ἦ ὁλκάδος τυχῶν

1 The reading of nearly all the better MSS.; Hude and
many other recent editors adopt the correction of Graevianus
ἀποστερῆσαν.
2 Hude deletes, as not read by the Scholiast.

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incur the enmity of the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, he was conveyed by them across to the mainland opposite. And being pursued by those who had been appointed to the task, according as they could learn the course he was taking, he was forced in some strait to take lodging with Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not friendly to him. Admetus happened not to be at home, but Themistocles approached his wife as a suppliant and was instructed by her to take their child and seat himself on the hearth. And when Admetus returned after a short time, Themistocles declared who he was and urged that, if he had ever opposed any request Admetus had made to the Athenians, he ought not to take vengeance on him when a fugitive; for in his present plight he might come to harm at the hands of a far weaker man than Admetus, whereas the noble thing to do was to take vengeance on fair terms upon equals. Besides, he added, he had opposed Admetus merely in the matter of a petition and not of his personal safety; whereas Admetus, if he gave him up to his pursuers (telling who these were and what the charge against him), would deprive him of the salvation of his life.

CXXXVII. Admetus, hearing this, raised him up, together with his own son, even as he still sat holding him, this being the most potent form of supplication. And when, not long afterwards, the Athenians and Lacedaemonians came and made urgent demands for him, Admetus would not give him up, but, since he wished to go to the King, gave him an escort overland to Pydna on the other sea, the capital of Alexander.¹ There he found a

¹ The Aegean. ² King of Macedonia.
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ἀναγομένης ἐπ' Ἰωνίας καὶ ἔπιβας καταφέρεται χειμῶνι ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναῖον στρατόπεδον ὁ ἐπολι-όρκει Νάξον. καὶ (ἂν γὰρ ἀγνὼς τοῖς ἐν τῇ νηῒ) δείσας φράζει τῷ ναυκλήρῳ ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ δι' ἄ

feύγει, καὶ εἴ μη σώσει αὐτόν, ἡφη ἐρείν ὅτι

χρήμασι πεισθεῖν αὐτὸν ἀγεῖ· τῇ δὲ ἄσφαλειαν

εἶναι μηδένα ἐκβήναι ἐκ τῆς νεώς μέχρι πλοῦς

γένηται· πειθομένῳ δ' αὐτῷ χάριν ἀπομηνήσεσθαι

cat' ἄξιαν. ὁ δὲ ναύκληρος ποιεῖ τε ταῦτα καὶ

ἀποσαλεύσας ἥμεραν καὶ νύκτα ὑπὲρ τοῦ στρατο-

3 πέδου ὑστερον ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Ἔφεσον, καὶ ο

Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐκεῖνον τε ἐθεράπευσε χρημάτων

δόσει (ἂνθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὑστερον ἐκ τε Ἀθηνῶν

παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ἐξ Ἀργοῦς ἄ ὑπεξέκειτο),

καὶ μετὰ τῶν κάτω Περσῶν τινος πορευθεῖς ἄνω

ἐσπέμπει γράμματα πρὸς βασιλέα Ἀρταξέρξην

tὸν Ἐρξον νεωστὶ βασιλεύουτα. ἐδήλου δὲ ἦ

γραφῇ ὅτι "Θεμιστοκλῆς ἦκω παρὰ σὲ, ὡς κακὰ

μὲν πλεῖστα Ἑλληνῶν εἰργασμαί τὸν ύμετερον

οίκον, ὅσον χρόνον τὸν σὸν πατέρα ἐπιοῦτα ἐμὸι

ἀνάγκη ἤμυνόμην, πολὺ δ' ἔτι πλεῖω ἁγαθά, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ ἄσφαλεὶ μὲν ἐμὸι, ἐκεῖνῳ δὲ ἐν

ἐπικινδύνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγήγνετο. καί μοι

εὐεργεσία ὁφείλεται (γράψας τὴν τε ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος

προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρῆσεως καὶ τῆς τῶν

γεφυρῶν, ἦν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε διʻ
merchant vessel putting off for Ionia, and going on board was driven by a storm to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading Naxos. Themistocles became afraid and told the captain who he was (for he was unknown to those on board) and why he was in flight, adding that if he did not save him he would tell the Athenians that he had been bribed to give him passage; their only chance for safety, he explained, was that no one be allowed to leave the ship until the voyage could be resumed, and he promised that if he complied with his request he would make a fitting return for the favour. The captain did as he was bidden, and after riding out the gale for a day and a night just outside the Athenian station, duly arrived at Ephesus. And Themistocles rewarded him handsomely with a gift of money (for he soon received from his friends in Athens and from Argos the funds which he had deposited for safekeeping); then proceeding into the interior with one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, he sent on a letter to King Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, who had lately come to the throne. And the letter ran as follows: "I, Themistocles, am come to you, who of all Hellenes did your house most harm so long as your father assailed me and I was constrained to defend myself, but still greater good by far when, his retreat being in progress, I was in security and he in dire peril. And there is a kindness due to me (here he related the timely warning to retreat given at Salamis, and the failure of the Hellenic fleet to destroy the bridges at that time,¹ which he falsely

¹ For Themistocles' advice given to Xerxes to retreat before it was too late and his claim about the non-destruction of the bridges, cf. Hdt. viii. cviii–cx.
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αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν), καὶ νῦν ἔχων σε μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι πάρειμι διωκόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν σήν φιλίαν. Βούλομαι δὲ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐπισχῶν αὐτὸς σοι περὶ δῶν ἴκω δηλώσαι.”

CXXXVIII. Βασιλεὺς δὲ, ώς λέγεται, ἔθαυμασέ τε αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ἐκέλευε ποιεῖν οὕτω. ὃ δὲ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ δὴ ἐπέσχε τῆς τε Περσίδος γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο κατενόησε καὶ τῶν 2 ἐπιτηδευμάτων τῆς χώρας· ἄφικόμενος δὲ μετὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν γῆγεται παρ’ αὐτῷ μέγας καὶ ὁσος ὄυδεὶς πω ᾿Ελλήνων διά τε τὴν προσπάρχουσαν ἄξιωσιν καὶ τοῦ ᾿Ελληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα ἦν ὑπετίθει αὐτῷ δουλῶσειν, μάλιστα δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πείραν 3 διδοὺς ἐξεντὸς φαίνεσθαι. ἢν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς, βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ᾿ισχύν δηλώσας, καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι· οἰκεία γὰρ ἐξενέσει καὶ οὗτε προμαθῶν εἰς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἐπιμαθῶν, (τὸν τε παραχρῆμα δι’ ἑλαχίστης βούλησις κράτιστος γνώμων) καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής· καὶ ἄ μὲν μετὰ χείρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἴος τε, ὅν δ’ ἀπειρος εἰ, κρίναι ἰκανῶς οὐκ ἀπῆλλακτο, τὸ τε ἀμεινου ἡ χειρον ἐν

1 Or, as some take it, “character.” cf. Plut. Them. xxviii τὸ φρόνημα καὶ τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ, the boldness of his spirit.
claimed to have been due to his own efforts), and now I am here, having it in my power to do you great good, being pursued by the Hellenes on account of my friendship to you; and my desire is to wait a year and then in person explain to you that for which I am come."

CXXXVIII. The King, it is said, marvelled at his purpose and bade him do as he desired. And Themistocles, in the interval of his waiting, made himself acquainted, as far as he could, with the Persian language and with the customs of the country; but when the year was ended he came to the King and became more influential with him than any of the Hellenes ever had been before, both because of the reputation he already enjoyed and of the hope which he kept suggesting to him that he would make all Hellas subject to him, but most of all in consequence of the insight he manifested, of which he gave repeated proofs. For indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or later study, he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future. Moreover, he had the ability to expound to others the enterprises he had in hand, and on those which he had not yet essayed he could yet without fail pass competent judgment; and he could most clearly foresee the issue for better

\[2\] i.e. without knowledge acquired either before or after the occasion for action had arisen.
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τῷ ύφανεὶ ἕτι προεὼρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ἔυμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὕτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο.

4 Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτά τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δὲ τινες καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἀ

5 ὑπέσχετο. μυνμεῖοι μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ ἔστι τῇ Ἀσιανῇ ἐν τῇ ἄγορᾷ· ταύτης γὰρ ἦρχε τῆς χώρας, δόντος βασιλέως αὐτῶ Μαγνησίαν μὲν ἄρτον, ἢ προσέφερε πεντήκοντα τάλαντα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ, Λάμψακον δὲ οἶνον (ἐδόκει γὰρ πολυοινότατον τῶν τότε εἶναι), Μυσύντα δὲ ὁψον.

6 τὰ δὲ ὅστα φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκεῖνον καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἢξίων θάπτειν ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσία φεύγοντος. τὰ μὲν κατὰ Παυσανίαν τὸν Δακεδαιμόνιον καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναίον λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ' ἐαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν.

CXXXIX. Δακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης προσβείας τοιαῦτα ἐπέταξαν τε καὶ ἀντεκελεύσθησαν περὶ τῶν ἐναγων τῆς ἐλάσεως· ὑστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρὰ Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι ἐκέλευον καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι, καὶ μάλιστά γε πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι

Hude deletes, after Cobet.

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or worse that lay in the still dim future. To sum up all in a word, by force of native sagacity and because of the brief preparation he required, he proved himself the ablest of all men instantly to hit upon the right expedient.

He died a natural death, an illness taking him off, though some say that he put an end to his own life by poison when he realised it to be impossible to fulfil his promises to the King. There is a monument to him at Magnesia in Asia, in the marketplace; for he was governor of this country, the King having given him, for bread, Magnesia, which brought in a revenue of fifty talents a year, for wine, Lampsacus, reputed to be the best wine country of all places at that time; and Myus for meat. But his bones, his relations say, were fetched home by his own command and buried in Attica unknown to the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury him there, as he had been banished for treason. Such was the end of Pausanias the Lacedaemonian and of Themistocles the Athenian, the most distinguished of the Hellenes of their time.

CXXXIX. The Lacedaemonians then had on the occasion of their first embassy directed the Athenians, and received a counter demand from them, to take such measures about the expulsion of the accursed. Later, however, they frequently repaired to Athens and bade them withdraw from Potidaea, and give Aegina its independence, and above all they declared in the plainest terms that they could avoid war only by rescinding the decree about the

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1 For the various accounts, see Cic. Brut. xi. 43; Plut. Them. xxxi.; Diod. xi. 58; Ar. Eq. 83.
2 Taking up the narrative from ch. cxxvi.
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μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ὦ εἶρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρησθαί τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ
2 μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ. οἰ δ’ Ἀθηναίοι οὔτε τάλλα ὑπήκοουν οὔτε τὸ ψῆφισμα καθήκον ἐπικαλοῦντες ἑπεργασίαν Μεγαρεύσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀφοίτου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχῆν
3 τῶν ἀφισταμένων. τέλος δὲ ἀφικομένων τῶν τελευταίων πρέσβεων ἐκ Δακεδαίμονος, Ῥαμφίου
tε καὶ Μελησίππου καὶ Ἀγησάνδρου, καὶ λεγόν-
tων ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ὄν πρότερον εἰώθεσαν,1 αὐτὰ
dὲ τάδε ὅτι "Δακεδαίμονιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην ἐναι, εἰη δ’ ἂν, εἰ τοὺς "Ελλήνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε," ποιήσαντες ἐκκλησίαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι γνώ-
μας σφίσιν αὐτοῖς προστίθεσαν, καὶ ἐδόκει ἄπαξ
περὶ ἀπάντων βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι.
4 καὶ παριώτες ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ ἔλεγον, ἐπ’ ἀμ-
φότερα γυγόμενοι ταῖς γυνῶμαις καὶ ὡς χρῆ
πολεμεῖν καὶ ὡς μὴ ἐμπόδιον εἶναι τὸ ψῆφισμα
εἰρήνης, ἀλλὰ καθελεῖν, καὶ παρελθὼν Περικλῆς
ὁ Ξανθίππου, ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐκείνον τῶν χρόνων πρῶ-
tος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατῶ-
tatos, παρῆνε τοιάδε.

CXL. "Τῆς μὲν γυνῶμης, ὡς Ἀθηναίοι, αἰεὶ τῆς
αὐτῆς ἐχομαι μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίως, καὶ περ
εἶδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθο-
μένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας,
πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἕμμορφας καὶ τὰς γυνῶμας τρεπομέ-

1 εἰώθεσαν deleted by Hude.

1 See ch. lxvii. 4, and the references in Ar. Acharn. 520–3 and 533 f. The date of the decree must have been near the outbreak of the war (432).
Megarians, in which they were forbidden to use any of the ports in the Athenian empire or even the Athenian market. But the Athenians would pay no heed to their other demands and declined to rescind the decree, charging the Megarians with encroachment upon the sacred land and the border-land not marked by boundaries, and also with harbouring runaway slaves. But at last a final embassy came from Lacedaemon, consisting of Ramphias, Melesippus, and Agesander, who said nothing of the demands they had hitherto been wont to make, but only this: "The Lacedaemonians desire peace, and there will be peace if you give the Hellenes their independence." Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly and gave their citizens an opportunity to express their opinions; and it was resolved to consider the whole question and then give their answer once for all. And many others came forward and spoke, in support of both sides of the question, some urging that war was necessary, others that the decree should not stand in the way of peace, but should be rescinded; and finally Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the foremost man of the Athenians at that time, wielding greatest influence both in speech and in action, came forward and advised them as follows:

CXL. "I hold, men of Athens, to the same judgment as always, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are not as a rule moved by the same spirit when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their judgments in

The reference is, first, to the tillage of land dedicated to the Eleusinian goddesses; second, to land still in dispute between Athens and Megara, and therefore unmarked.
νους. ὁρῶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὀμοία καὶ παραπλήσια ξυμβουλευτέα μοι οὖντα, καὶ τοὺς ἀναπειθομένους ὑμῶν δικαῖο τοῖς κοινῇ δόξασιν, ἢν ἂρα τί καὶ σφαλλόμεθα, ὑμᾶς ἂν κατορθοῦντας τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφόρας τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἥσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διαινοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. δι' ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρά λόγον ξυμβῆ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτίασθαι.

2 "Δακεδαμόνιοι δὲ πρότερον τε δὴλοι ἦσαν ἐπιβουλεύουντες ἡμῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἤκιστα. εἰρήμενον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλους διδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἄ ἐχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πω ἦττας οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται, βούλονται δὲ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἡ λόγοις τὰ ἐγκλήματα διαλύεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτάσσοντες ἤδη καὶ οὐκέτι αἰτιώμενοι πάρεισιν. Ποτείδαιας τε γὰρ ἀπανίστασθαι κελεύουσι καὶ Αἰγιαν αὐτόνυμον ἀφιέναι καὶ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψῆφισμα καθαιρεῖν· οὶ δὲ τελευταίοι οὔδε ἢκοντες καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας προαγορεύοντι αὐτοῦμον ἀφιέναι. 4 ὑμῶν δὲ μηδεῖς νομίσῃ περὶ βραχέως ἂν πολέμειν, εἰ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψῆφισμα μὴ καθέλοιμεν, ὃπερ μάλιστα προύχονται εἰ καθαιρεθεὶ μὴ ἂν γιγνεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον, μηδὲ ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτιάν ὑπολίπησθε ὡς διὰ μικρὸν ἐπολεμήσατε. τὸ γὰρ βραχύ τι τούτο πᾶσαν ὑμῶν ἔχει τὴν Βεβαιώσιμως 240
accordance with events. And now also I see that I must give you the same or nearly the same advice as in the past, and I demand that those of you who are persuaded by what I shall say shall support the common decisions, even if we should in any way fail, or else, in case of success, claim no share in the good judgment shown. For it is just as possible for the course of events to move perversely as for the plans of men; and it is for that very reason that we commonly lay upon fortune the blame for whatever turns out contrary to our calculations.

"As for the Lacedaemonians, it was perfectly clear before that they were plotting against us, and it is now clearer than ever. For whereas it was expressly stipulated that we should submit our differences to arbitration, each side meanwhile keeping what it had, they have never yet asked for arbitration themselves nor do they accept it now when we make the offer. What they want is to redress their grievances by war rather than by discussion, and they are here dictating already and no longer expostulating. For they order us to raise the siege of Potidaea, restore the independence of Aegina, and rescind the Megarian decree; and these men that are just come boldly proclaim that we must give all the Hellenes also their independence. But let no one of you think that we shall be going to war for a trifling matter, if we should refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—the thing they especially insist upon, saying that there will be no war if it is rescinded—and do not let there remain in your minds any self-reproach that it was a small matter for which you went to war. For this trifling thing involves nothing less than the
καὶ πείραν τῆς γυνώμης, οἷς εἰ ξυγχωρήσετε, καὶ ἄλλο τι μεῖζον εὐθὺς ἐπιταχθήσεσθε ὡς φόβῳ καὶ τούτῳ ὑπακούσαντες· ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσατε αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵσου ὑμῖν μᾶλλον προσφέρεσθαι. CXL1. αὐτόθεν δὴ διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν πρὶν τι βλαβῆναι, ἢ εἰ πολεμήσωμεν, ὡσπερ ἔμουγε ἀμεινον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ μεγάλη καὶ ἐπὶ βραχεία ὁμοίως προφάσει μὴ εἴξοντες μηδὲ ἔξοι φόβῳ ἐξοντες ἢ κεκτήμεθα. τήν γὰρ αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν ἢ τε μεγίστη καὶ ἡ ἑλαχίστη δικαίωσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων πρὸ δίκης τοῖς πέλας ἐπιτασσομένη.

2 "Τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῶν ἐκατέρως ὑπαρχόντων ὡς οὐκ ἀσθενέστερα ἔξομεν γνώτε καθ’

3 ἐκαστον ακούοντες. αὐτουργοί τε γὰρ εἰσὶ Πελο-

4 πονησίοι καὶ οὔτε ἰδιὰ οὔτ’ ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἔστιν, ἐπειτὰ χρονίων πολέμων καὶ διαποντίων ἀπειροὶ διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ

5 πενίας ἐπιφέρειν. καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὔτε ναῦς πλη-

6 ροῦν οὔτε πεξὰς στρατιάς πολλάκις ἐκπέμπειν δύνανται, ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων τε ἀμα ἀπόντες καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν δαπανώντες καὶ προσέτε καὶ θαλάσσης
eirhómenon: ai de periouchiai toui polémuos

7 mállon h ai biainoi esfórai anékhousin. sówmái
tis etoiómoteroi oi autourgoi tōn antherōtōn h

1 i.e. by the superior navy of the Athenians.

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vindication and proof of your political conviction. If you yield this point to them you will immediately be ordered to yield another and greater one, as having conceded this first point through fear; whereas by a downright refusal you will give them clearly to understand that they must be more disposed to deal with you on terms of equality. CXLI. So make up your minds, here and now, either to take their orders before any damage is done you, or, if we mean to go to war,—as to me at least seems best—do so with the determination not to yield on any pretext, great or small, and not to hold our possessions in fear. For it means enslavement just the same when either the greatest or the least claim is imposed by equals upon their neighbours, not by an appeal to justice but by dictation.

"But as regards the war and the resources of each side, make up your minds, as you hear the particulars from me, that our position will be fully as powerful as theirs. For the Peloponnesians till their hands with their own hands; they have no wealth, either private or public; besides, they have had no experience in protracted or transmarine wars, because, owing to their poverty, they only wage brief campaigns separately against one another. Now people so poor cannot be manning ships or frequently sending out expeditions by land, since they would thus have to be away from their properties and at the same time would be drawing upon their own resources for their expenses, and, besides, are barred from the sea as well. Again, it is accumulated wealth, and not taxes levied under stress, that sustains wars. Men, too, who till their own lands
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χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, τὸ μὲν πιστῶν ἔχοντες ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων κἂν περιγενέσθαι, τὸ δὲ οὐ βέβαιον μὴ οὐ προαναλώσειν, ἀλλὰς τε κἂν παρὰ δόξαν,

6 ὅπερ εἰκός, ὁ πόλεμος αὐτοῖς μηκύνηται. μάχῃ μὲν γὰρ μᾶ ὄρος ἀπανταὶ Ἑλληνας δυνατοὶ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἀντίσχειν, πολεμεῖν δὲ μὴ πρὸς ὁμοίαν ἀντιπαρασκευὴν ἀδύνατοι, ὅταν μῆτε βουλευτηρίῳ ἐνὶ χρώμενοι παραχρημά τὶ ὡς ἐπιτελῶσι πάντες τε ἱσόψηφοι ὄντες καὶ ὑμῖν ὀμόφυλοι τὸ ἔφ᾽ ἐαυτὸν ἐκαστος σπεύδη,

7 ἐξ δὲν φιλεῖς μηδὲν ἐπιτελέσ γίγνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὡς μάλιστα τιμωρήσασθαί τινα βουλοῦνται, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἥκιστα τὰ οἰκεία φθεῖραι. χρόνιοι τε ἡπιοπαίστες ἐν βραχεῖ μὲν μορίῳ σκοποῦσι τι τῶν κοινῶν, τῷ δὲ πλέον τὰ οἰκεία πράσσουσι, καὶ ἐκαστὸς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν οἶται βλάψειν, μέλειν δὲ τινὶ καὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ἐαυτοῦ τὶ προϊδεῖν, ὡστε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ ἀπάντων ἰδίᾳ δοξάσματι λανθάνειν τὸ κοινὸν ἀθρόον φθειρόμενον. CXLII. μέγιστον δὲ, τῇ τῶν χρημάτων σπάνει κωλύονται, ὅταν σχολῇ αὐτὰ πορίζομενοι διαμέλλωσιν· τοῦ δὲ πολέμου οἱ καίροι οὐ μενετοί.

2 "Καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ἡ ἐπιτείχισις οὐδὲ τὸ ναυτικὸν

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are more ready to risk their lives in war than their property; for they have confident hope of surviving the perils, but no assurance that they will not use up their funds before the war ends, especially if, as may well happen, the war is protracted beyond expectation. Indeed, although in a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are strong enough to withstand all the Hellenes, yet they are not strong enough to maintain a war against a military organisation which is so different from theirs, seeing that they have no single general assembly, and therefore cannot promptly put into effect any emergency measure; and as they all have an equal vote and are of different races they each strive to advance their own interests. In such circumstances it usually happens that nothing is accomplished. And indeed it could scarcely be otherwise, for what some of them want is the greatest possible vengeance upon a particular enemy, others the least possible damage to their own property. And when after many delays they do meet, they give but a scant portion of their time to the consideration of any matter of common concern, but the larger portion to their own individual interests. And each one thinks no harm will come from his own negligence, but that it is the business of somebody else to be provident on his behalf; and so, through all separately cherishing the same fancy, universal ruin comes unperceived upon the whole body. CXLII. And what is most important, they will be hampered by scarcity of money, seeing that providing it slowly they are subject to delays; but the opportunities of war wait for no man.

"Moreover, neither the planting of forts in our
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3 αὐτῶν ἡξιον φοβηθήναι. τὴν μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλιν ἀντίπαλον κατασκευάσασθαι, ἢ ποι ἐν πολεμίᾳ τε καὶ οὐχ ἥσσον ἐκεῖνος
4 ἡμῶν ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων· φρούριον δὲ εἰ ποιήσονται, τῆς μὲν γῆς βλάπτοιεν ἃν τι μέρος κατα-

dρομαίς καὶ αὐτομολίαις, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανὸν γε ἔσται ἐπιτειχίζειν τε κωλύειν ἡμᾶς πλεύσαντας
eν τῇ ἐκείνῳ καὶ, ἃπερ ἰσχύομεν, ταῖς ναυσίν
5 ἀμύνεσθαι. πλέον γὰρ ὡμως ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν τοῦ
kατὰ γῆν ἐκ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐμπειρίας ἢ 'κεῖνοι
6 ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἡπειρον ἐς τὰ ναυτικά· τὸ δὲ τῆς
θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι οὐ ῥαδίως αὐτοῖς
7 προσγενήσεται. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ
eὑθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξειργασθέ πω· πῶς δὴ
ἀνδρεῖς γεωργοὶ καὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι, καὶ προσέτι
οὐδὲ μελετῆσαι εἰσόμενοι διὰ τὸ υφ' ἡμῶν πολ-
lαίς ναυσίν αἰεὶ ἐφορμεῖσθαι, ἡξιον ἀν τι δρέφεν;
8 πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγας ἐφορμοῦσας κἀν διακιν-
dυνεύσειαν πλήθει τὴν ἀμαθίαν θρασύνοντες,

pollaíes de eirgómenoi ἦσυχασοντες, καὶ ἐν τῷ
μὴ μελετῶντι ἡξυνετώτερον ἐσονταί καὶ δι' αὐτὸ
9 καὶ ὁκινρότεροι. τὸ δὲ ναυτικοῦ τέχνης ἐστὶν,

ὡςπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδεχεται,ὅταν τύχῃ,

ἐκ παρέργου μελετᾶσθαι, ἄλλα μᾶλλον μηδὲν
ἐκεῖνῳ πάρεργον ἄλλο γίγνεσθαι.

1 cf. ch. exxii. 1.

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territory\textsuperscript{1} need cause us to be afraid, nor yet their navy. For as regards the first, it is a difficult matter even in time of peace to construct here a city that will be a match for ours, to say nothing of doing this in a hostile country and at a time when we have fortifications quite as strong to oppose them. But suppose they do establish a fort; although they might injure a part of our territory by making raids and receiving our deserters, yet that will not be sufficient to prevent us from sailing to their land and building forts there, or making reprisals with our fleet, wherein our strength lies. For we have gained more experience of operations on land from our career on the sea than they of naval operations from their career on land. As for their acquiring the art of seamanship, that is an advantage they will not easily secure; for even you, who began practising it immediately after the Persian war, have not yet brought it to perfection. How then could men do anything worth mention who are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially since they will not even be permitted to practise, because we shall always be lying in wait for them with a large fleet? For if they had to cope with only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps risk an engagement, in their ignorance getting courage from their mere numbers; but if their way is blocked by a large fleet, they will remain inactive, their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, and that in itself will make them more timid. Seamanship, like any other skill, is a matter of art, and practice in it may not be left to odd times, as a by-work; on the contrary, no other pursuit may be carried on as a by-work to it.
CXLIII. “Εἶ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὄλυμπίασιν ἡ Δελφοὶς χρημάτων μισθὸς μείζον πειράμα ἡμῶν ὑπολαβείν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων, ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων δεινῶν ἄν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τὸ δε ὑπάρχει καὶ, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἡ ἀπασα ἡ ἄλλη Ἐλλάς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ κινδύνῳ οὐδεὶς ἄν δέξαιτο τῶν ξένων τήν τε αὐτοῦ φεύγειν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἥσσονος ἀμα ἐλπίδος ὑλίγον ἥμερῶν ἕνεκα μεγάλου μισθοῦ δόσεως ἐκείνοις ἐξυπαγωγίζεσθαί.

3 “Καὶ τὰ μὲν Πελοποννησίων ἔμοιγε τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια δοκεῖ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἡμέτερα τούτων τε ὑπὲρ ἐκείνοις ἐμεμψάμην ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπὸ μεγάλα ἔχειν. ἦν τε ἐπὶ την χώραν ἡμῶν πεζῆ ὴσων, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων πλευσούμεθα, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἔσται Πελοποννήσου τε μέρος τι τμηθῆναι καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀπασαν’ οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὔχ ἔξουσιν ἄλλην ἀντιλαβεῖν ἀμαχεί, ἡμῖν δὲ ἔστι γῆ πολλή καὶ ἐν νῆσοις καὶ κατ’ ἡπειροῦ μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος. οὐκεπάσθη δὲ· εἰ γὰρ ἦμεν νησίωται, τίνες ἄν ἄληπτότεροι ἤσαν; καὶ νῦν χρῆ (ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων διανοθέτετας τήν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφεῖναι, τῆς δὲ θαλάσσης καὶ

1 The mercenaries drawn from the states of the Athenian confederacy; no one of those who had taken part with the Peloponnesians would be allowed to return to his native city.

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CXLIII. "Then again, if they should lay hands upon the money at Olympia or Delphi and try to entice away the mercenaries among our sailors by the inducement of higher pay, that indeed might be a dangerous matter if we were not a match for them, assuming that both citizens and our resident aliens have manned our ships. But as a matter of fact we are a match for them, and, what is of the highest importance, we have citizens for pilots, and our crews in general are more numerous and better than those of all the rest of Hellas. And no one of our mercenaries, when it came to facing the risk, would elect to be exiled from his own land and, with a lesser hope of victory at the same time, fight on their side because of the offer of a few days' high pay.

"Such, as it seems to me at least, or approximately such, is the situation as far as the Peloponnesians are concerned; as regards our own, I believe we are free from the defects I have remarked upon in them, and that we have in other respects advantages which more than counterbalance theirs. If they march against our territory, we shall sail against theirs; and the devastation of a part of the Peloponnesus will be quite a different thing from that of the whole of Attica. For they will be unable to get other territory in its place without fighting, while we have an abundance of territory both in the islands and on the mainland. A great thing, in truth, is the control of the sea. Just consider: if we were islanders, who would be more unassailable? So, even now, we must, as near as may be, imagine ourselves such and relinquish our land and houses, but keep watch over the sea and the city;
πόλεως φυλακην ἐξειν, καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ ἀυτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι (κρατήσαντες τε γὰρ αὐθίς οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι μαχοῦμεθα καὶ ἢν σφαλώμεν, τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων, ὅθεν ἵσχύσωμεν, προσαπόλλυται· οὐ γὰρ ἱσυχάσουσι μὴ ἰκανῶν ἡμῶν ὄντων ἐπ' ἀυτοὺς στρατεύειν), τὴν τε ὀλοφυρσὶν μὴ οἰκίων καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων· οὐ γὰρ τάδε τούς ἀνδρας, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀνδρες ταύτα κτώνται. καὶ εἰ σώμην πεῖσειν ὑμᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἄν ἐξελθόντας ἐκέλευον αὐτὰ δημος καὶ δείξαι Πελοποννησίοις ὅτι τούτων γε ἔνεκα οὐχ ὑπακούσεσθε.

CXLIV. "Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἀλλὰ ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθελήτη ἄρχην τε μὴ ἐπικτάσθαι ἄμα πολεμοῖντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαίρετοι μὴ προσπίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων 2 διανοίας. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἄμα τοῖς ἐργοῖς δηλωθήσεται· νῦν δὲ τούτωι ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν, Μεγαρέας μὲν ὅτι ἐάσομεν ἀγορὰ καὶ λιμέσι χρῆσθαι, ἢν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἕξωνήσασι μὴ ποιῶσι μήτε ἡμῶν μήτε τῶν ἠμετέρων ξυμμάχων (οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνο κωλύει ἐν¹ ταῖς σπουδαῖς οὔτε τόδε), τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφῆσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχουντες ἐσπεισάμεθα καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς ἐαυτῶν

¹ ἐν deleted by Hude, after Dion. H.
and we must not give way to resentment against the Peloponnesians on account of our losses and risk a decisive battle with them, far superior in numbers as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them again in undiminished number, and if we fail, our allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as well; for they will not keep quiet when we are no longer able to proceed in arms against them. And we must not make lament for the loss of houses and land, but for men; for these things do not procure us men, but men these. Indeed, had I thought that I should persuade you, I should have urged you to go forth and lay them waste yourselves, and thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for the sake of such things, yield them obedience.

CXLIV. "Many other considerations also lead me to hope that we shall prove superior, if you will consent not to attempt to extend your empire while you are at war and not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of the enemy's plans. But these matters will be explained to you on some later occasion when we are actually at war; at the present time let us send the envoys back with this answer: As to the Megarians, that we will permit them to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians on their part will cease passing laws for the expulsion of aliens so far as concerns us or our allies (for nothing in the treaty forbids either our action or theirs); as to the states in our confederacy, that we will give them their independence if they were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon as they on their part

1 cf. II. xiii.
ἀποδώσας πόλεσι μὴ σφίσιν τοῖς Δακεδαίμονίοις, ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάστοις ὡς βούλονται: δίκας τε ὅτι ἐθέλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνούμεθα. ταῦτα γὰρ δίκαια καὶ πρέποντα ἁμα τῇ δι' τῇ πόλει ἀποκρίνασθαι.

3 εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι ἀνάγκη πολέμειν (ἦν δὲ ἐκούσιοι μᾶλλον δεχόμεθα, ἢςον ἐγκεισομένους τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐξομεν), ἐκ τε τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων ὅτι καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτῃ μέγισται τιμαὶ περιγίγνονται, οἱ γοῦν πατέρες ἡμῶν ὑποστάντες Μήδους καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοσώνδε ὀρμώμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐκλιπόντες, γυνώμη τε πλέον ἡ τύχη καὶ τόλμη μείζονι ἡ δυνάμει τὸν τε βάρβαρον ἀπειράντω καὶ ἐς τὰδε προῆγαγον αὐτά: ὥν οὐ χρὴ λείπεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τε ἑχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἐπιγιγγόμενοις πειρᾶσθαι αὐτὰ μὴ ἐλάσσω παραδόναι.

CXLV. Ὁ μὲν Περικλῆς τοιαύτα εἶπεν. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι νομίσαντες ἁριστὰ σφίσι παρανεῖν αὐτὸν ἐψηφίσαντο ὑ ἐκέλευε, καὶ τοῖς Δακεδαίμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκεῖνου γυνώμη, καθ' ἐκαστά τε ὡς ἐφρασε καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν, οὐδὲν κελευόμενοι ποιήσεων, δίκη δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἐτοίμοι εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ

1 Deleted by Hude, following Schol.
grant the states in their alliance the right to exercise independence in a manner that conforms, not to the interest of the Lacedaemonians, but to the wishes of the individual states; and as to arbitration, that we are willing to submit to it in accordance with the treaty, and will not begin war, but will defend ourselves against those who do. This answer is just and at the same time consistent with the dignity of the city. But we must realise that war is inevitable, and that the more willing we show ourselves to accept it, the less eager will our enemies be to attack us, and also that it is from the greatest dangers that the greatest honours accrue to a state as well as to an individual. Our fathers, at any rate, withstood the Persians, although they had no such resources as ours, and abandoned even those which they possessed, and by their resolution more than by good fortune and with a courage greater than their strength beat back the Barbarian and advanced our fortunes to their present state. And we must not fall short of their example, but must defend ourselves against our enemies in every way, and must endeavour to hand down our empire undiminished to posterity."

CXLV. Such were the words of Pericles: and the Athenians, thinking that he was advising them for the best, voted as he directed, and answered the Lacedaemonians according to his bidding, both as regards the particulars as he set them forth and on the whole question, to the effect that they would do nothing upon dictation, but were ready in accordance with the treaty to have all complaints adjusted by arbitration on a fair and equal basis. So the
οἱ μὲν ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου καὶ οὐκέτι ύστερον ἐπρεσβεύοντο.

CXLVI. Αἰτίαι δὲ αὐταὶ καὶ διαφοραὶ ἐγένοντο ἄμφοτέροις πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀρξάμεναι εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ καὶ Κερκύρα. ἐπεμύγνυντο δὲ ὁμοὶ ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτον ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δὲ οὐ’ σπονδῶν γὰρ εὗρεν τὰ γεγονόμενα ἢν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.
Lacedaemonian envoys went back home and thereafter came on no further missions.

CXLVI. These were the grounds of complaint and the causes of disagreement on both sides before the war, and they began to appear immediately after the affair of Epidamnus and Corecyra. Nevertheless the two parties continued to have intercourse with one another during these recriminations and visited each other without heralds,\(^1\) though not without suspicion; for the events which were taking place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty and furnished an occasion for war.

\(^1\) *i.e.* without the formalities which are indispensable after war is declared.
BOOK II
I. Ἀρχεται δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐνθένδε ἦδη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποιησίων καὶ τῶν ἐκατέροις ξυμμάχων, ἐν ὧν οὐτε ἐπεμήνυτο ἐτι ἀκήρυκτι παρ’ ἄλλη-λους καταστάντες τε ἐξενεχῶς ἐπολέμουν, καὶ γέγραπται ἐξῆς ὡς ἐκαστα ἐγίγνετο κατὰ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα.

II. Τέσσαρα καὶ δέκα μὲν ἐτη ἐνέμειναν αἳ τριακοντούτεις σπονδαὶ αἳ ἐγένοντο μετ’ Ἐὔβοιας ἄλωσιν. τῶ δὲ πέμπτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἐτεὶ, ἐπὶ Χρυσίδος ἐν Ῥρηγε τὸτε πεντήκοντα δυοῖν δέοντα ἐτη ἱερωμένης καὶ Λινησίου ἐφόρου ἐν Ὑπάρτῃ καὶ Πυθοδώρου ἐτὶ τέσσαρας μῆνας ἀρχοντος Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ μάχῃ μηνὶ ἐκτῷ καὶ δεκάτῳ, ἀμα ἢρι ἀρχομένῳ Ἐπικαιρίων ἀνδρεῖς ὀλίγῳ πλείους τριακοσίων (ηγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν βουωταρχοῦντες Πυθαγείλος τε ὁ Φυλείδου καὶ Διέμπορος ὁ Ὅνητορίδου) ἐσήλθον περὶ πρῶ-τον ὕπνου ἐξ ὀπλοῖς ἐς Πλάταιαν τῆς Βοιωτίας

1 Hude's correction for ἐκτῷ καὶ ἄμα of the MSS. Lipsius suggested ἐκτῷ καὶ δεκάτῳ καὶ.

1 The mode of reckoning customary in the time of Thucydides, and continued long afterwards. In such a scheme the summer included the spring and the winter the autumn.
BOOK II

I. At this point in my narrative begins the account of the actual warfare between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians and their respective allies. While it continued they ceased having communication with one another except through heralds, and when once they were at war they waged it without intermission. The events of the war have been recorded in the order of their occurrence, summer by summer and winter by winter.¹

II. For fourteen years the thirty years' truce which had been concluded after the capture of Euboea remained unbroken; but in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood ² at Argos, and Aenesias was ephor at Sparta, and Pythodorus had still four months to serve as archon at Athens, in the sixteenth month after the battle of Potidaea, at the opening of spring, some Thebans, a little more than three hundred in number, under the command of the Boeotarchs Pythangelus son of Phylecidas and Diemporos son of Onetoridas, about the first watch of the night entered under arms into Plataea, a

the summer period was equal to about eight months, the winter to about four.

² The commencement of the war is fixed according to the forms of reckoning customary in the three most important Hellenic states.
2 οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίδα. ἐπηγάγοντο δὲ καὶ ἀνέφαξαν τὰς πύλας Πλαταιῶν ἄνδρες, Ναυκλείδης τε καὶ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοῦ, βουλόμενοι ἱδίας ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διαφθείραι καὶ τὴν πόλιν

3 Ὁθῆβαιοις προσποιήσατο. ἔπραξαν δὲ ταῦτα δι’ Ἐυρυμάχου τοῦ Λεοντιάδου, ἄνδρος Ὁθῆβαιῶν δυνατώτατον. προϊδόντες γὰρ οἱ Ὁθῆβαιοι ὅτι ἔσοντο ὁ πόλεμος, ἐβούλοντο τὴν Πλάταιαν αἰεὶ σφίσι διάφορον οὖσαν ἐτί ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ τοῦ πολέμου μῆπω φανεροῦ καθεστῶτος προκαταλαβεῖν. ἦ καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἐλαθον ἐσελθόντες, φυλακὴς οὐ προκαθεστηκυνίας. θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ὄπλα τοῖς μὲν ἐπαγαγόμενοι οὐκ ἐπείθοντο ὥστε εὔθες ἐργοῦ ἕχεσθαι καὶ ἵναι ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκίας τῶν ἐχθρῶν, γνώμην δ’ ἐποιοῦντο κηρύγμασι τε χρήσασθαι ἐπιτηθείοις καὶ ἐς ξύμβασιν μᾶλλον καὶ φιλίαν τὴν πόλιν ἄγαγεῖν (καὶ ἀνείπεν οὐ κῆρυξ, εἰ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ’ αὐτοὺς τὰ ὄπλα), νομίζοντες σφίσι ραδίως τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ προσχωρῆσει τὴν πόλιν.

III. Οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς ὡς ὑσθοῦντο ἐνδοὺ τε ὅντας τοὺς Ὁθῆβαιοὺς καὶ ἐξαπιναίως κατειλημμένην τὴν πόλιν, καταδείκτας καὶ νομίζοντες πολλὰ πλείους ἐσεληλυθέναι (οὐ γὰρ ἔωρον ἐν τῇ νυκτί) πρὸς ξύμβασιν ἐχώρησαν καὶ τοὺς λόγους δεξά- 260
town of Boeotia which was in alliance with Athens. They had been invited over by some Plataeans, Naucleides and his partisans, who opened the gates for them, intending, with a view to getting power into their hands, to destroy the citizens who were of the opposite party and make over the city to the Thebans. And they had conducted their intrigue through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a man of great influence at Thebes. For, as Plataea was always at variance with them, the Thebans, foreseeing that the war \( ^1 \) was coming, wished to get possession of it while there was still peace and before the war had yet been openly declared. And so they found it easier to make their entry unobserved, because no watch had been set to guard the city. And when they had grounded their arms in the market-place, instead of following the advice of those who had invited them over, namely to set to work at once and enter the houses of their enemies, they determined rather to try conciliatory proclama-
tions and to bring the city to an amicable agreement. The proclamation made by herald was that, if anyone wished to be an ally according to the hereditary usages of the whole body of the Boeotians, he should take his weapons and join them. For they thought that in this way the city would easily be induced to come over to their side.

III. And the Plataeans, when they became aware that the Thebans were inside, and that the city had been taken by surprise, took fright, and, as it was night and they could not see, thinking that a far greater number had come in, they con-
cluded to make terms, and, accepting the proposals

\[ ^1 \text{i.e. the war between Athens and Sparta.} \]
μενοὶ ἴσως τε καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐς οὐδένα
2 οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον. πράσσοντες δέ πως ταῦτα
κατενόησαν οὐ πολλοὺς τοὺς Ἡθβαίους ὄντας καὶ
ἐνόμισαν ἐπιθεὶμενοι ῥαδίως κρατήσειν· τῷ γὰρ
πλῆθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βουλομένων ἑν τῶν
3 Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι. ἔδοκεν οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα
eίναι καὶ ἐξυπνεόντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινοὺς
tοίχους παρ' ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὀδῶν
φανεροί ὄσιν ἵοντες, ἀμάξας τε ἄνευ τῶν ὑπο-
ζυγίων ἐς τὰς ὀδούς καθίστασαν, ἵνα ἀντὶ τείχους
ἡ, καὶ τάλλα ἐξήρτουν ἢ ἐκαστον ἐφαίνετο πρὸς
4 τὰ παρόντα ἕμφορον ἐσέσθαι. ἔπει δὲ ὡς ἐκ
τῶν δυνατῶν ἐτοίμα ἦν, φυλάξαντες ἐτὶ νύκτα
καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον ἔχωρον ἐκ τῶν ὀικιῶν
ἐπ' αὐτούς, ὅπως μὴ κατὰ φῶς θαρσαλεωτέροι
οὕς προσφέροντο καὶ σφίσιν ἐκ τοῦ ῥή-
γισσοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερῶτεροι ὄντες ἴσοιος
ὁπὶ τῆς σφετέρας ἐμπειρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν.
προσέβαλον τε εὐθὺς καὶ ἐξ χειρὰς ἴσον κατὰ
tάχος.

IV. Οἱ δ' ὡς ἐγνωσαν ἐξηπατημένοι, ἐξυπνεστρέ-
φοντό τε ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς προσβολὰς
2 ἡ προσπίπτοιεν ἀπεωθοῦντο. καὶ δὲς μὲν ἡ τρίς
ἀπεκρούσαντο, ἐπειτα πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτῶν τε
προσβαλόντων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν
ἀμα ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν κραυγῇ τε καὶ ὀλολυγῇ
χρωμένων λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων, καὶ
ὑετοῦ ἀμα διὰ νυκτὸς πολλοῦ ἐπιγενομένου, ἐφο-
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made to them, raised no disturbance, especially as the Thebans did no violence to anyone. But, as it happened, while they were negotiating the terms they perceived that the Thebans were few in number, and thought that by an attack they might easily overpower them; for it was not the wish of the majority of the Plataeans to withdraw from the Athenian alliance. So it was determined to make the attempt, and they began to collect together, reaching each other's houses by digging through the party-walls that they might not be seen going through the streets, and they placed wagons without the draught-animals in the streets to serve as a barricade, and took other measures as each appeared likely to be advantageous in the present emergency. And when all was ready as far as they could make it so, waiting for the time of night just before dawn, they sallied from their houses against the Thebans, not wishing to attack them by day when they might be more courageous and would be on equal terms with them, but at night when they would be more timid and at a disadvantage, in comparison with their own familiarity with the town. And so they fell upon them at once, and speedily came to close quarters.

IV. The Thebans, when they found they had been deceived, drew themselves up in close ranks and sought to repel the assaults of the enemy wherever they fell upon them. And twice or three times they repulsed them; then when the Plataeans charged upon them with a great uproar, and at the same time the women and slaves on the house-tops, uttering screams and yells, kept pelting them with stones and tiles—a heavy rain too had come on
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βῆθησαν καὶ τραπόμενοι ἐφευργοῦν διὰ τῆς πόλεως, ἀπειροὶ μὲν οὖντες οἱ πλείους ἐν σκότῳ καὶ πηλῷ τῶν διόδων ἢ χρῆ σωθῆμαι (καὶ γὰρ τελευτῶντος τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα ἢν), ἐμπείρους δὲ ἔχοντες τούς διώκοντας τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν,1 ὥστε διεφθείροντο πολλοί. τῶν δὲ Πλαταιῶν τις τὰς πύλας ἢ ἐσῆλθον καὶ αἵπερ ἦσαν μόναι ἀνεφγιμέναι, ἔκλησε στυρακίῳ ἀκοντίῳ ἀντὶ βαλάνου χρησάμενος ἐς τὸν μοχλὸν, ὥστε μηδὲ ταύτῃ ἔξοδον ἐτιείναι. διωκόμενοι δὲ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἱ μὲν τινες αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἀναβάντες ἔρριψαν ἐς τὸ ἔξω σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ διεφθάρησαν οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ, κατὰ πύλας ἐρήμους γυναικὸς δούσης πέλεκυν λαθόντες2 διακόψαντες τὸν μοχλὸν ἐξῆλθον οὐ πολλοί (αὐθησίς γὰρ ταχεῖα ἐπεγένετο), ἀλλοί δὲ ἀλλῇ τῆς πόλεως σποράδες ἀπώλλυντο. τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον καὶ ὅσον μάλιστα ἦν ἐξυνεστραμμένον ἐσπίπτουσιν ἐς οἰκήμα μέγα, ὅ ἦν τοῦ τείχους καὶ αἳ3 θύραι ἀνεφγιμέναι ἐτυχον αὐτοῦ, οἴομενοι πύλας τὰς θύρας τοῦ οἰκήματος εἶναι καὶ ἀντικρυς διόδουν ἐς τὸ ἔξω. ὀρῶντες δὲ αὐτοὺς οἱ Πλαταιῆς ἀπειλημμένους ἐβουλεύοντο εἴτε κατακαύσωσιν ὦσπερ ἑχούσιν, εὕμπρησαντες τὸ οἰκήμα, εἴτε τί ἄλλῳ χρήσωνται. τέλος δὲ

1 τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν Hude deletes, after van Herwerden.
2 καὶ of MSS. after λαθόντες deleted by van Herwerden.
3 So Hude with CG; αἳ πλησίον θύραι ABEFm2. Didot and Haase would transpose thus: τοῦ τείχους πλησίον καὶ αἳ θύραι.
during the night—they became panic-stricken and turned and fled through the city; and since most of them were unfamiliar with the thoroughfares by which they must save themselves amid the darkness and mud—for these things happened at the end of the month\(^1\)—, whereas their pursuers knew full well how to prevent their escape, many of them consequently perished. One of the Plataeans, moreover, had closed the gates by which they had entered—the only gates which had been opened—using the spike of a javelin instead of a pin to fasten the bar, so that there was no longer a way out in that direction either. And being pursued up and down the city, some of them mounted the wall and threw themselves over, most of these perishing; others succeeded in getting out by an unguarded gate without being observed, cutting through the bar with an axe which a woman gave them—but not many, for they were soon discovered; and others got isolated in various parts of the city and were put to death. But the greater number, those who had kept more together than the others, rushed into a large building abutting upon\(^2\) the wall whose doors happened to be open, thinking that the doors of the building were city-gates and that there was a passage right through to the outside. And the Plataeans, seeing that they were cut off, began to deliberate whether they should set fire to the building and burn them up without more ado or what other disposition they should make of them.

\(^1\) When there would be no moon.

\(^2\) Or, as most MSS. read, “a large building . . . whose doors near by happened to be open”; with Didot and Haase, “a large building near the wall whose doors . . . ”
οὕτωι τε καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι τῶν Θηβαίων περιήγαν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πλανώμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοῖς Πλαταιεύσι παραδούνα της οἷς πλανώμενοι καὶ τὰ ὁπλα χρύσασθαι ὦ τι ἄν βούλωνται.

V. Οἱ μὲν δὴ ἐν τῇ Πλαταιᾷ οὕτως ἐπεπράγμα-

2 βοήθουν. ἀπέχει δὲ ἡ Πλάταια τῶν Θηβῶν

3 ραδίως διαβατός ἦν. πορευόμενοι τε ἐν ύπερ τοὶ

4 τῶν ποταμῶν μὲν ποταμὸς διαβάντες ύπαρκον παρε-

5 καὶ οἱ μὲν ταῦτα διεκούοντο· οἱ δὲ Πλαταῖοι ἐτι

1 Added by Bredow and Baumeister.
BOOK II. iv. 7–v. 5

But finally these and the other Thebans who survived and were wandering up and down the city came to an agreement with the Plataeans to surrender themselves and their arms, to be dealt with in any way the Plataeans wished.

V. The Thebans in Plataea had fared thus; but the main body of the Thebans, who were to have come in full force while it was still night, on the chance that things might not go well with those who had entered the city, received while on the way news of what had happened and were now hastening to the rescue. Now Plataea is about seventy stadia distant from Thebes, and the rain that had come on during the night delayed their coming; for the river Asopus was running high and was not easy to cross. And so, marching in the rain and crossing the river with difficulty, they arrived too late, some of their men having already been slain and others taken captive alive. And when the Thebans learned what had happened, they began to plot against the Plataeans who were outside the city—there were, of course, men in the fields and household property, as the trouble had come unexpectedly in time of peace—for they desired to have such men as they could lay hands on as hostages for those within, in case any of them had chanced to be taken captive. Such then were their plans; but the Plataeans, while the Thebans were still deliberating, suspected that something of the sort would be done, and fearing for those outside sent out a herald to the Thebans, saying that they had done an impious thing in trying to seize their city in time of peace, and they bade them do no injury outside the walls; if they did, they on their part would put to death
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ξώντας: ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἄποδώσειν αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἄνδρας. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ταῦτα λέγουσι καὶ ἐπομόσαι φασίν αὐτούς. Πλαταίης δ' οὖν ὁμολογοῦσι τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθὺς ὑποχέσθαι ἄποδώσειν, ἄλλα λόγων πρῶτον γενομένων ἢν τι ξυμβαίνωσι, καὶ ἐπομόσαι οὐ 7 φασίν. ἐκ δ' οὖν τῆς γῆς ἀνεχώρησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντες: οἳ δὲ Πλαταίης ἐπειδὴ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας κατὰ τάχος ἐσεκομίσαντο, ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἄνδρας εὐθὺς. ἦσαν δὲ ὁγδοίκοντα καὶ ἐκατὸν οἱ ληφθέντες, καὶ Εὐρύμαχος αὐτῶν ἦν, πρὸς ὃν ἔπραξαν οἱ προδιδόντες.

VI. Τούτῳ δὲ ποιήσαντες ἐς τε τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλου ἐπεμποῦν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους ἀπέδοσαν τοῖς Θηβαίοις, τὰ τε ἐν τῇ πόλει καθίσταντο πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἢ ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς. 2 τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις ἠγγέλθη εὐθὺς τὰ περὶ τῶν Πλαταιῶν γεγενημένα, καὶ Βοιωτῶν τε παρα- χρῆμα ξυνέλαβον ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ ἐς τὴν Πλαταιαν ἐπεμψαν κήρυκα, κελέουντες εἰπεῖν μηδὲν νέωτερον ποιεῖν περὶ τῶν ἄνδρῶν ὁδὸς ἐχοσι Θηβαίων, πρὶν ἄν τι καὶ αὐτοὶ βουλεύ- 3 σωσὶ περὶ αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἠγγέλθη αὐτοῖς ὅτι τεθυηκότες εἰεν. ἀμα γὰρ τῇ ἐσόδῳ γιγνομένῃ τῶν Θηβαίων ὁ πρῶτος ἄγγελος ἔξηγε, ὁ δὲ δεύ- τερος ἄρτι νευκηκέμενων τε καὶ ξυνειλημμένων, καὶ τῶν ύστερον οὐδὲν ἤδεσαν. οὔτω δὴ ὡς εἰδότες οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐπέστελλον· ὁ δὲ κηρυξ ἀφικόμενος 268
the men whom they held captive, but if the Thebans withdrew from their territory they would restore the men to them. Now this is the account which the Thebans give, and they allege that the Plataeans confirmed their promise with an oath; the Plataeans do not admit that they promised to restore the men at once, but only that they would do so in case they should come to an agreement after preliminary negotiations, and they deny that they swore to it. At any rate, the Thebans withdrew from their territory without doing any injury; but the Plataeans, as soon as they had hastily fetched in their property from the country, straightway slew the men. And those who had been taken captive were one hundred and eighty in number, one of them being Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had negotiated.

VI. When they had done this, they sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead under a truce to the Thebans, and settled the affairs of the city as seemed best to them in the emergency. The report of what had been done in Plataea was made to the Athenians promptly; and they instantly apprehended all the Thebans who were in Attica and sent a herald to Plataea, bidding him tell them to take no extreme measures regarding the Thebans whom they held captive until they themselves should have taken counsel about them; for the news had not arrived that the men had been put to death. For the first messenger had set out at the time the Thebans were entering the city, the second immediately after their defeat and capture, and the Athenians knew nothing of later events. Consequently the Athenians sent their orders without knowing the facts; and the herald on his
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4 ἥπερ τοὺς ἀνδρας διεφθαρμένους. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύσαντες ἐς Πλάταιαν σῖτόν τε ἐσήγαγον καὶ φρουροὺς ἐγκατέλιπον, τῶν τε ἀνθρώπων τοὺς ἀχρειοτάτους ξύν γυναιξὶ καὶ παισίν ἐξεκόμισαν.

VII. Γεγενημένου δὲ τοῦ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς ἔργου καὶ λευμένων λαμπρῶς τῶν σπουδῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς πολεμήσοντες, παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, πρεσβείας τε μέλλοντες πέμπειν παρὰ βασιλέα καὶ ἀλλοσε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, εἶποθεν τινα ὑφελίαν ἥπτιζον ἑκάτεροι προσλήψεσθαι, πόλεις τε ξυμμαχίδας ποιούμενοι ὅσαι ἤσαν ἐκτὸς τῆς 2 ἑαυτῶν δυνάμεως. καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχοῦσαι εἰς Ἡταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τάκεινων ἐλομένοις ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν 1 ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσομένων, καὶ ἀργύριον ῥητὸν ἐτοιμάζειν, τά τε ἅλλα ἴσυχάξοντας καὶ Ἀθηναίους δεχομένους μιᾶ νη ἦς 3 ἀν ταῦτα παρασκευασθῆ. Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τὴν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ξυμμαχίαν ἐξῆταξον καὶ ἐς τὰ περὶ Πελοπόννησον μᾶλλον χωρία ἐπρεσβεύσοντο, Κέρκυραν καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ Ἀκαρναν καὶ Ζάκυνθον, ὀρῶντες, εἰ σφίσι φίλια ταῦτ' εἴη

1 ἐπετάχθη διακοσίας Hude, with Herbst (ἐπετάχθη σ').

2 Referring, in the one case, to the unsuccessful embassy of the Lacedaemonians to the King mentioned in ch. lxvii.;
arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians, marching to Plataea, brought in food and left a garrison,\(^1\) taking away the least efficient of the men along with the women and children.

VII. Now that the affair at Plataea had occurred and the treaty had been glaringly violated, the Athenians began preparing for war, and the Lacedaemonians and their allies also began; both sides were making ready to send embassies to the King and to the barbarians of any other land,\(^2\) where either of them hoped to secure aid, and they were negotiating alliances with such cities as were outside of their own sphere of influence. The Lacedaemonians, on their part, gave orders to those in Italy and Sicily who had chosen their side\(^3\) to build, in proportion to the size of their cities, other ships, in addition to those which were already in Peloponnesian ports, their hope being that their fleet would reach a grand total of five hundred ships, and to provide a stated sum of money; but as to other matters, they were instructed to remain inactive and to refuse their ports to Athenians if they came with more than a single ship, until these preparations had been completed. The Athenians, on the other hand, began to examine their existing list of allies and also sent embassies more particularly to the countries lying about the Peloponnesus—Coreyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus—perceiving that if they were sure of the friendship of these

\(^1\) Referring to the Dorian colonies in Italy and Sicily (cf. III. lxxxvi. 2), which, however, contributed no ships till 412 B.C. (cf. VIII. xxvi. 1).
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βεβαιώς, πέριξ τήν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσοντες.

VIII. Ὅλοιοι τε ἐπενόουν οὐδὲν ἀμφότεροι, ἀλλ' ἔρρωντο ἐς τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἀπεικότως· ἀρχόμενοι γὰρ πάντες ὄξυτερον ἀντιλαμβάνονται, τότε δὲ καὶ νεότης πολλὴ μὲν οὖσα ἐν τῇ Πελο-

ποννήσῳ, πολλὴ δ' ἐν ταῖς Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἀκουσίωσ ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἦπτετο τοῦ πολέμου. η τε ἄλλῃ Ἐλλάς ἀπασα μετέώρος ἦν ξυνιοσῶν τῶν πρῶ-

2 των πόλεων. καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγου ἦδον ἐν τε τοῖς μέλλουσι

3 πολεμήσειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν. ἔτι δὲ Ἁρλὸς ἐκινήθη ὁλίγον πρὸ τούτων, πρότερον οὔπω σεισθεῖσα ἀφ' οὗ Ἐλληνες μέμνημηται. ἐλέγετο δὲ καὶ ἐδόκει ἐπὶ τοῖς μέλλονσι γενή-

σεθαι σημήναι· εἰ τε τὴ ἄλλο τοιουτότροπον ξυνέβη γενέσθαι, πάντα ἀνεξητεῖτο. Ἡ δὲ εὐνοία παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προεπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν. ἔρρωτο τε πᾶς καὶ ἱδιώτης καὶ πόλις εἰ τι δύναιτο καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐργῷ ξυνεπιλαμβάνειν αὐτοῖς· ἐν τούτῳ τε κεκωλύσθαι ἐδοκεὶ ἕκαστῳ τὰ πράγ-

5 ματα φ' μὴ τις αὐτὸς παρέσται. οὔτως ἐν¹ ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλεῖοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθήναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβοῦμενοι.

¹ Added by Stephanus.
places they would be able to encircle the Peloponnesus and subdue it.

VIII. There was nothing paltry in the designs of either side; but both put their whole strength into the war, and not without reason, for men always lay hold with more spirit at the beginning, and at this time, in addition, the young men, who were numerous both in the Peloponnesus and in Athens, were unfamiliar enough with war to welcome it. All the rest of Hellas was in anxious suspense as its foremost cities came into conflict with each other. And many were the prophecies recited and many those which oracle-mongers chanted, both among the peoples who were about to go to war and in the Hellenic cities at large. Moreover, only a short time before this, Delos had been shaken, although it had not before been visited by an earthquake within the memory of the Hellenes.\(^1\) This was said and believed to be ominous of coming events, and indeed every other incident of the sort which chanced to occur was carefully looked into.

The general good-will, however, inclined decidedly to the side of the Lacedaemonians, especially since they proclaimed that they were liberating Hellas. Every person and every state was strongly purposed to assist them in every possible way, whether by word or by deed, and each man thought that wherever he could not himself be present, there the cause had suffered a check. To such an extent were the majority of the Hellenes enraged against the Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their sway, others fearful of falling under it.

\(^1\) Probably an intentional contradiction of Hdt. vi. xcviii., where it is stated that an earthquake occurred shortly before the battle of Marathon, but none later.
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IX. Παρασκευὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ γνώμη τοιαύτη ὀρμητο. πόλεις δὲ ἐκάτεροι τάσδε ἔχοντες ξυμ-2 μάχους ἐσ τὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο. Δακεδαιμο-νίων μὲν οἶδε ξύμμαχοι. Πελοποννήσιοι μὲν οἱ ἐντὸς ἵσθμοῦ πάντες πλὴν Ἀργείων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν (τούτος δὲ ἐσ ἀμφιτέρους φιλία ἢν. Πελληνίης δὲ Ἀχαιῶν μόνοι ξυνεπολέμουν τὸ πρῶτον, ἐπειτα δὲ ὕστερον καὶ ἀπαντες), ἐξὶ δὲ Πελοποννήσου Μεγαρῆς, Βοιωτοῦ, Δοκροῖ, Φωκῆς, Ἀμπρακιῶτα,3 Δευκάδιοι, Ἀνακτόριοι. τούτων ναυτικῶν παρεί-χοντο Κοσώθιοι, Μεγαρῆς, Σικυώνιοι, Πελληνίης, Ἡλείων, Ἀμπρακιῶτα, Δευκάδιοι, ἰππέας δὲ Βοιωτοῦ, Φωκῆς, Δοκροῖ, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι πόλεις4 πεζὸν παρείχον.1 αὕτη μὲν Δακεδαιμονίων ξυμμαχία: Ἀθηναίων δὲ Χίου, Λέσβων, Πλα-ταιῆς, Μεσσηνίων οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ, Ἀκαρνάνων οἱ πλείους, Κερκυραίων, Ζακύνθιοι, καὶ ἄλλαι πόλεις αἱ υποτελεῖς οὕσαι ἐν ἐθνεὶς τοσοίσδε, Καρία ἡ ἐπὶ θαλάσσης, Δωρίδας Καρσί πρόσοικοι, Ἰωνία, Ἐλλήσποντος, τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, νῆσοι ὡσα ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ Κρήτης πρὸς ἥλιον5 ἀνίσχοντα2 πλὴν Μῆλου καὶ Θῆρας. τούτων ναυτικῶν παρείχοντο Χίου, Λέσβων, Κερκυραίων,6 οἱ δ' ἄλλοι πεζὸν καὶ χρήματα. ξυμμαχία μὲν αὕτη ἐκατέρω καὶ παρασκευὴ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἢν.

Χ. Οί δὲ Δακεδαιμόνιοι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιαῖς εὐθὺς περιήγησιν κατὰ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καὶ

1 Herbst deletes, followed by Hude.
2 Before πλὴν C gives πᾶσαι αἱ Κυκλάδες, the other MSS. πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι Κυκλάδες. Deleted by Dobree.
IX. Such were the preparations and such the feelings with which the Hellenes went into the conflict. And the states which each side had as its allies when it entered the war were as follows. These were the allies of the Lacedaemonians: all the Peloponnesians south of the Isthmus with the exception of the Argives and Achaeans (these latter had friendly relations with both sides, and the Pellenians were the only Achaeans who at first took part in the war with the Lacedaemonians, though eventually all of them did), and outside of the Peloponnesus the Megarians, Boeotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. Of these, the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians furnished ships, while cavalry was contributed by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, and infantry by the other states. These were the allies of the Lacedaemonians. Those of the Athenians were: the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians of Naupactus, most of the Acarnian, the Corcyraeans, the Zacynthians, and in addition the cities which were tributary in the following countries: the seaboard of Caria, the Dorians adjacent to the Carians, Ionia, the Hellespont, the districts on the coast of Thrace, and the islands which lie between the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, with the exception of Melos and Thera. Of these, the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans furnished ships, the rest infantry and money. Such were the allies of each side and the preparations they made for the war.

X. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedaemonians sent word around to the various
ΤΗΝ ἐξ ἐνμμαχίδα στρατιὰν παρασκευάζεσθαι τὰϊς πόλεσι τὰ τε ἐπιτήδεια οία εἰκὸς ἐπὶ ἔξοδον ἐκδημον ἔχειν, ὡς ἐσβαλοῦντες ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν.

2 ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκάστοις ἐτοίμα γίγνοιτο, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τὸν εἰρημένον ἐξυήθαν τὰ δύο μέρη ἀπὸ 3 πόλεως ἐκάστης ἐς τὸν ἵσθμόν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πάν τὸ στράτευμα ἐυνειλεγμένον ἦν, Ἀρχιδαμὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων, ὀσπερ ἥγειτο τῆς ἐξόδου ταύτης, ἐγκαλέσας τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων πασῶν καὶ τοὺς μάλιστα ἐν τέλει καὶ ἀξιολογοφότατοι παρῆκεν τοιάδε. ¹

XI. "Αὐρής Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ ἐνμμαχοί, καὶ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν πολλὰς στρατείας καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ καὶ ἐξ ἐποίησαντο, καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν οἱ πρεσβυτέροι οὐκ ἀπειρο πολέμων εἰσίν· ὁμως δὲ τῆς ὑπὸ μείζονα παρασκευῆν ἔχοντες ἐξηλθομεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πόλιν δυνατωτάτην νῦν ἐρχόμεθα, καὶ αὐτοὶ πλείστοι καὶ 2 ἀριστοι στρατεύοντες. δικαίων οὖν ἡμᾶς μίτε τῶν πατέρων χείρος φαίνεσθαι μίτε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῆς δόξης ἐνδεεστέρους. ἢ γαρ Ἑλλᾶς πᾶσα τῆς ὅρμη ἑπιρται καὶ προσέχει τὴν γνώμην, εὔνοιαν ἐχουσα διὰ τὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐχθὸς πρᾶξαι

3 ἡμᾶς ἂ ἐπινοοῦμεν, οὐκον χρή, εἰ τῷ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἐπιέναι καὶ ἀσφάλεια πολλῇ εἶναι μὴ ἄν ἐλθεῖν τους ἐναντίους ἡμῶν διὰ μάχης, τούτων ἐνεκα ἀμελέστερον τὴ παρασκευασμένους χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόλεως ἐκάστης ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατιώτην τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν αἰεὶ προσδέχεσθαι ἐς

¹ Sintenisl correction for παρεῖναι τοιάδ' ἔλεξεν of the MSS.
states in the Peloponnesus and their confederacy outside the Peloponnesus to make ready such troops and supplies as it was appropriate they should have for a foreign expedition, their intention being to invade Attica. When everything was ready in the several states, two-thirds of the contingent of each state assembled at the appointed time at the Isthmus. And when the whole army was assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who was to be the leader of this expedition, called together the generals of all the states as well as the chief officials and the most notable men, and exhorted them as follows:

XI. "Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both in the Peloponnesus and beyond it, and the elder men also amongst us do not lack experience in warfare, yet never before have we taken the field with a greater armament than this; but though we were never more numerous and puissant, it is also a very powerful state we now go against. It is but right, therefore, that we neither should show ourselves worse men than our fathers nor wanting to our own fame. For all Hellas is stirred by this enterprise of ours, and fixes her gaze upon it, and being friendly to us on account of their hatred of the Athenians hopes that we shall succeed in carrying out our designs. Therefore, even if some of us may think that we are going against them with superior numbers and that in all likelihood the enemy will not risk a pitched battle with us, we must not on that account be a whit less carefully prepared when we advance, but rather must officer and soldier of every state for his own part be always expecting to encounter
κύδωνον τινα ἥξειν. ἀδήλα γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου τὰ πολλὰ καὶ δὴ ὀργῆς αἱ ἐπι- χειρήσεις γίγνονται: πολλάκις τε τὸ ἔλασσον πλήθος δεδίδος ἁμείνου ἡμύνατο τοὺς πλέονας διὰ τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκευούς γενέσθαι. χρὴ δὲ αἰεὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ τῇ μὲν γνώμη θαρσαλέους στρατεύειν, τῷ δ’ ἐργῷ δεδίότας παρεσκευάσθαι. οὔτω γὰρ πρὸς τε τὸ ἐπιέναι τοῖς ἐναντίοις εὐφυχότατοι ἄν εἶεν, πρὸς τε τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι ἀσφαλέστατοι.

6 Ὅμως δὲ οὖν ἐπὶ ἀδύνατον ἀμύνεσθαι οὕτω πόλιν ἐρχόμεθα, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἄριστα παρε- σκευασμένην, ὡστε χρὴ καὶ πάνυ ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἴδειν αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὄρμηνται εἰν ὃ οὕτω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὀρῶσιν ἡμᾶς δηοῦντάς τε καὶ τάκεινων φθείροντας. πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοσι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτικόν ὀρᾶν πάσχοντάς τι ἄρθες ὀργῇ προσπίπτει, καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλείστα ἐς ἐργον καθίστανται. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων εἰκὸς τοῦτο δρᾶσαι, οὐ ἀρχεῖν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἄξιοῦσι καὶ ἑπιόντες τὴν τῶν πέλας ἔρνην μᾶλλον ἡ τῆς αὐτῶν ὀρᾶν. ὡς οὖν ἐπὶ τοσαῦτην πόλιν στρατεύοντες καὶ μεγίστην δόξαν οἰσόμενοι τοῖς τε προγόνοις καὶ ύμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, ἐπεσθε ὅτη ἀν τις ἡγήται, κόσμου καὶ φυλακὴν περὶ παντὸς ποιοῦμενοι καὶ τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ὁξέως δεχόμενοι κάλλιστον

1 οὕτω deleted by Hude, after Madvig.
some danger. For the events of war cannot be foreseen, and attacks are generally sudden and furious; and oftentimes a smaller force, made cautious by fear, overmatches a larger number that is caught unprepared because it despises the foe. One should, however, when campaigning in an enemy's country always be bold in spirit, but in action cautious and therefore prepared. For thus men will be most valorous in attacking their opponents and most secure against assault.

"And we are going against a city which is not so powerless to defend itself as some may think, but is perfectly prepared in all respects; we have therefore every reason to expect them to risk a battle, if they have not already set out before we are yet there, at any rate when they see us in their territory laying it waste and destroying their property. For with all men, when they suffer an unwonted calamity, it is the sight set then and there before their eyes which makes them angry, and when they are angry they do not pause to think but rush into action. And the Athenians are even more likely than most men to act in this way, since they are more disposed to claim the right to rule over others and to attack and ravage their neighbours' land than to see their own ravaged. Realising, then, how powerful is the city against which you are taking the field, and how great is the fame, for better or for worse, which you are about to win for your ancestors and for yourselves from the outcome, follow wherever your officers lead you, regarding good order and vigilance as all-important, and sharply giving heed to the word of command; for this is the fairest as well as the safest thing—for
ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΟΥΝΑΣ ΕΝΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΥΣ ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ.

ΧΙΙ. ΤΟΣΑΤΑ ΕΙΠΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΛÙΣΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΞΥΛΛΟ-
ΓΟΥ Ό' ΑΡΧΙΔΑΜΟΣ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΠΠΟΥ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ἈΠΟΣΤΕΛΛΕΙ
ΕΣ ΤΑΣ 'ΑΘΗΝΑΣ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΑΚΡΙΤΟΥ, ΆΝΔΡΑ ΣΠΑΡΤΙΑ-
ΤΗΝ, ΕΙ' ΤΙ ΑΡΑ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΕΝΔΟΙΧΕΝ ΟΙ 'ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ ὌΡΩN-
2 ΤΕΣ ΣΦΑΣ ΉΔΗ ΕΝ ὌΔΩ ΟΥΝΑΣ. ΟΙ ΔΕ ΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΕΔΕ-
ΞΑΝΤΟ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΕΣ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΝ ΟΥΔ' ΕΠΙ ΤΟ ΚΟΙΝΩΝ. ὍΝ
ΓΑΡ ΠΕΡΙΚΛΕΟΥΣ ΓΗΜΗΝ ΠΡΟΣΕΡΩΝ ΝΕΙΝΙΚΗΚΟΙΝΑ ΚΗ-
ΡΥΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΕΣΒΕΙΑΝ ΜΗ ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ ΛΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ
ΕΞΕΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΜΕΝΩΝ. ἈΠΟΤΕΜΠΟΥΣΙΝ ΟΥΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΠΡΩ
ΑΚΟΥΣΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΚΕΛΕΥΟΝ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΌΡΩΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΑΥΘΗΜΕΡΟΝ,
ΤΟ ΤΕ ΛΟΙΠΟΝ ΑΝΑΧΩΡΗΣΑΝΤΑΣ ΕΠΙ ΤΑ ΣΦΕΤΕΡΑ
ΑΥΤΩΝ, ὩΝ ΤΙ ΒΟΥΛΩΝΤΑΙ, ΠΡΕΣΒΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ. ΞΥΜ-
ΠΕΜΠΟΥΣΙ ΤΕ ΤΟ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΠΠΟ ΆΓΩΝΟΥΣ, ΌΠΩΣ
3 ΜΗΔΕΙΝ ΕΥΘΥΓΗΝΗΤΑΙ. Ο ΔΕ ΕΠΕΙΔΗ ΕΠΙ ΤΟΙΣ ὌΡΙΟΙΣ
ΕΓΕΝΕΤΟ ΚΑΙ ΕΜΕΛΛΕ ΔΙΑΛÙΣΕΣΘΑΙ, ΤΟΣΟΝΔΕ ΕΙΠΩΝ
ἘΠΟΡΕΥΕΤΟ ὍΤΙ "ἩΔΕ ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς "ΕΛΛΗΣΙ ΜΕΓΑ-
4 ΛΩΝ ΚΑΚΩΝ ἈΡΧΕΙ." ὩΣ ΔΕ ἩΦΙΚΕΤΟ ΕΣ ΤΟ ΣΤΡΑΤΟ-
ΠΕΔΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΓΝΩ Ό ΑΡΧΙΔΑΜΟΣ ΌΤΙ ΟΙ 'ΑΘΗΝΑΙΟΙ
ΟΥΔΕΝ ΠΩ ΕΝΔΩΣΟΥΣΙΝ, ΟΥΤΩ ΔΗ ἌΡΑΣ ΤΟ ΣΤΡΑΤΩ
5 ΠΡΟΥΧΩΡΕΙ ΕΣ ΤΗΝ ΓΗΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ. ΒΟΙΩΤΟΙ ΔΕ ΜΕΡΟΣ
ΜΕΝ ΤΟ ΣΦΕΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ἩΠΕΙΑΣ ΠΑΡΕΙΧΟΝΤΟ
ΠΕΛΟΠΟΥΝΗΣΙΟΙΣ ΕΥΣΤΡΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ, ΤΟΙΣ ΔΕ ΛΕΙΠΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ
ΕΣ ΠΛΗΤΑΙΑΝ ἘΛΘΟΝΤΕΣ ΤΗΝ ΓΗΝ ἘΔΗΟΝ.

ΧΙΙΙ. 'ΕΤΙ ΔΕ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΛΟΠΟΥΝΗΣΙΩΝ ΕΥΛΛΕΙΟΜΕ-

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a great host to show itself subject to a single discipline."

XII. With these words Archidamus dismissed the assembly. He then first sent Melesippus son of Diocritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in the hope that the Athenians, when they saw that the Lacedaemonians were already on the march, might be somewhat more inclined to yield. But they did not allow him to enter the city, much less to appear before the assembly; for a motion of Pericles had already been carried not to admit herald or embassy after the Lacedaemonians had once taken the field. They accordingly dismissed him without hearing him, and ordered him to be beyond their borders that same day; and in future, they added, the Lacedaemonians must first withdraw to their own territory before sending an embassy, if they had any communication to make. They also sent an escort along with Melesippus, in order to prevent his having communication with anyone. And when he arrived at the frontier and was about to leave his escort, he uttered these words before he went his way, "This day will be the beginning of great evils for the Hellenes." When he came to the army, and Archidamus had learned that the Athenians would not as yet make any concession, then at length they broke camp and advanced into Athenian territory. And the Boeotians not only supplied their contingent¹ and the cavalry to serve with the Peloponnesians, but also went to Plataea with their remaining troops and proceeded to ravage the country.

XIII. While the Peloponnesian forces were still

¹ i.e. two-thirds of their full appointment; cf. ch. x. 2.
νων τε ἐς τὸν ἴσθμὸν καὶ ἕν ὀδῷ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐσβαλεῖν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου, στρατηγὸς δὲν Ἀθηναίων δέκατος αὐτές, ὡς ἔγνω τὴν ἐσβολὴν ἐσομένην, ὑποτοπῆσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος δὲν ἔτυγχανε, μὴ πολλάκις ἢ αὐτῶς ἰδίᾳ βουλόμενος χαρίζεσθαι τοὺς ἄγρους αὐτοῦ παραλίπῃ καὶ μὴ δηώσῃ, ἢ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων κελευσάντων ἐπὶ διαβολὴ τῇ ἕαυτοῦ γένηται τότῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄγνη ἐλαύνειν προεῖπον ἑνεκα ἐκείνου, προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένοι εἰ, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δὲ ἄγρους τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οἰκίας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δηώσωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δημόσια εἶναι, καὶ μηδεμίαν οἱ 2 ὑποψίαιν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι. παρήγαγε δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἀπερ καὶ πρότερον, παρα- σκευάζεσθαι τε ἐς τῶν πόλεμον καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων ἐσκομιζεσθαί, ἐς τε μάχην μὴ ἐπεξεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐσελθόντας φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, ἣπερ ἱσχύουσιν, ἔξαρτόσθαι, τὰ τε τῶν ἐφιμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἑκεῖν, λέγων τὴν ἱσχὺν αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων εἶναι τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμη καὶ 3 χρημάτων περιουσία κρατεῖσθαι. θαρσεῖν τε

1 τῶν χρημάτων τῆς προσόδου deleted by Hude, after van Herwerden.

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collecting at the Isthmus and while they were on the march but had not yet invaded Attica, Pericles son of Xanthippus, who was one of the ten Athenian generals, when he realised that the invasion would be made, conceived a suspicion that perhaps Archidamus, who happened to be a guest-friend of his, might pass by his fields and not lay them waste, doing this either on his own initiative, in the desire to do him a personal favour, or at the bidding of the Lacedaemonians with a view to creating a prejudice against him, just as it was on his account that they had called upon the Athenians to drive out the pollution. So he announced to the Athenians in their assembly that while Archidamus was indeed a guest-friend of his, this relationship had certainly not been entered upon for the detriment of the state; and that in case the enemy might not lay waste his fields and houses like the rest, he now gave them up to be public property, and asked that no suspicion should arise against himself on that account. And he gave them the same advice as before about the present situation: that they should prepare for the war, should bring in their property from the fields, and should not go out to meet the enemy in battle, but should come into the city and there act on the defensive; that they should equip their fleet, in which their strength lay, and keep a firm hand upon their allies, explaining that the Athenian power depended on revenue of money received from the allies, and that, as a general rule, victories in war were won by abundance of money as well as by wise policy. And he bade them be of good courage, as on

1 cf. I. cxxvii. 1.
2 cf. I. cxliii.
In the MSS., after ἐλάσσονος, deleted by Abresch.

About £120,000, or §583,200. The original amount at the institution of the Confederacy of Delos was 460 talents (i. xevi. 2). The figure here given is an average amount, because the assessment was revised every four years at the Panathenaea.

These figures, and all other equivalents of Greek financial statements, are purely conventional, inasmuch as the purchasing power of money was then very much greater than now.

The ordinary revenue, apart from the tribute, consisted of customs duties, tax on sales, poll tax on resident aliens,
an average six hundred talents\(^1\) of tribute were coming in yearly from the allies to the city, not counting the other sources\(^2\) of revenue, and there were at this time still on hand in the Acropolis six thousand talents\(^3\) of coined silver (the maximum amount had been nine thousand seven hundred talents, from which expenditures had been made for the construction of the Propylae\(^4\) of the Acropolis and other buildings,\(^5\) as well as for the operations at Potidaea). Besides, there was uncoined gold and silver in public and private dedications, and all the sacred vessels used in the processions and games, and the Persian spoils and other treasures of like nature, worth not less than five hundred talents.\(^6\) And he estimated, besides, the large amount of treasure to be found in the other temples. All this would be available for their use, and, if they should be absolutely cut off from all other resources, they might use even the gold plates with which the statue of the goddess herself was overlaid.\(^7\) The statue, as he pointed out to them, contained forty talents' weight of pure gold, and it was all removable.\(^8\) This treasure they might use for self-preservation, but they must replace as much as they

\(^1\) About £1,940,000, or $9,428,400.

\(^2\) Completed about 432 B.C.

\(^3\) Such as the Parthenon, the Odeum, and the Telesterion at Eleusis (see Plut. Per. xiii.).

\(^4\) About £100,000, or $486,000.

\(^5\) The chryselephantine statue of Athena by Phidias in the Parthenon.

\(^6\) According to Plut. Per. xxxi., Phidias, by the advice of Pericles, laid on the gold in such a way that it could all be removed and weighed.
6 ἀντικαταστήσαι πάλιν. χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτω ἔθαρσυνεν αὐτούς· ὀπλίτας δὲ τρισχίλιοις καὶ μυρίους εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν
7 παρ ἐπαλξὶν ἐξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ πρῶτον ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπὸ τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων καὶ μετοίκων ὅσοι ὀπλίται ἦσαν. τοῦ
τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους στάδιοι ἦσαν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἄστεως καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ φυλασσόμενον τρεῖς καὶ τεσσαράκοντα (ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ὁ καὶ ἄφυλακτων ἦν, τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε μακροῦ καὶ τοῦ Φαληρικοῦ), τὰ δὲ μακρὰ τείχη πρὸς τῶν Πειραιῶν τεσσαράκοντα σταδίων, ὧν τὸ ἐξωθὲν ἔτηρεῖτο, καὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶν ἕνων Μονυχία ἐξήκοντα μὲν σταδίων ὁ ἅπας περίβολος, τὸ δ' ἐν φυλακῇ ὃν ἤμισυ τοῦ-
8 του. ἰππέας δὲ ἀπέφαινε διακοσίων καὶ χιλίων ἔνων ἰπποτοξόταις, ἐξακοσίων δὲ καὶ χιλίων τοξόταις, καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίμους τριακοσίας.
9 ταῦτα γὰρ ὑπήρχεσ 'Ἀθηναίων καὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσω ἐκαστα τοῦτων, ὅτε ἡ ἐσβολή τὸ πρῶτον ἐμέλλε Πελοποννησίων ἐσεθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθισταιντο. ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἰάπερ εἰώθει Περικλῆς ὡς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.

XIV. Οἱ δὲ 'Ἀθηναίοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπείθοντο τε καὶ ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν παῖδας καὶ γυναικας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ἃ κατ' ὅλοιν

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took. As to their resources in money, then, he thus sought to encourage them; and as to heavy-armed infantry, he told them that there were thirteen thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they were composed of the oldest and the youngest citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed. For the length of the Phalerian wall was thirty-five stadia to the circuit-wall of the city, and the portion of the circuit-wall itself which was guarded was forty-three stadia (a portion being left unguarded, that between the Long Wall and the Phalerian); and the Long Walls to the Peiraeus were forty stadia in extent, of which only the outside one was guarded; and the whole circuit of the Peiraeus including Munichia was sixty stadia, half of it being under guard. The cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including mounted archers, the bow-men sixteen hundred, and the triremes that were seaworthy three hundred. For these were the forces, and not less than these in each branch, which the Athenians had on hand when the first invasion of the Peloponnesians was impending and they found themselves involved in the war. And Pericles used still other arguments, as was his wont, to prove that they would be victorious in the war.

XIV. After the Athenians had heard his words they were won to his view, and they began to bring in from the fields their children and wives, and also

1 The age limits were eighteen to sixty, those from eighteen to twenty (περὶπολοῖ) being called on only for garrison duty within the bounds of Attica. The age of full citizenship was twenty.
ἐχρῶντο, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν οἰκίων καθαρούντες τὴν ξύλωσιν πρόβατα δὲ καὶ ύποξύγια ἐς τὴν Εὐβοιαν διεσέργαστο καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς ἐπίκει-2
tέας. χαλεπῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ εἰωθέναι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς διαιτᾶσθαι ἢ ἀνά-ςτασις ἐγίγνετο. ΧV. Ξυνεβεβήκει δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ pάνω ἀρχαῖον ἐτέρων μᾶλλον Ἀθηναίοις τούτοι. ἔπὶ γὰρ Κέκροπος καὶ τῶν πρῶτων βασιλέων ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἐς Θησέα αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεις ὁκεῖτο πρυ-
tανεία τε ἔχουσα καὶ ἀρχοντας, καὶ ὡς τί δείσειαν, οὐ ξυνήσαν βουλευσόμενοι ὡς τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ ἐκαστὸι ἐπολίτευνοι καὶ ἐβουλεύσαντο καὶ τινες καὶ ἐπολέμησαν ποτε αὐ-
tῶν, ὡσπερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνιοι μετ' Εὐμόλπου πρὸς 2 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενό-
μενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατός τά τε ἄλλα διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἀλ-
λων πόλεων τά τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τάς ἀρχας ἔς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὕσαν, ἐν βουλευτήριον ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανεῖον, ξυνόκισε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστοὺς ἄπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἡνάγκασε μιᾶ πόλει ταύτης χρῆσθαι, ἢ ἀπάντων ἡδὴ ξυν-
tελοῦντων ἐς αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ Θησέως τοῖς ἐπείτα· καὶ ξυνοίκια ἐξ ἐκείνου Ἀθηναίων ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῇ θεῷ ἐορτὴν δημοτελῆ ποιοῦσιν.

3 Τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἡ νῦν οὕσα πόλις

1 Others render: “since all were now counted as belonging to it.”
their household furniture, pulling down even the woodwork of the houses themselves; but sheep and draught-animals they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. And the removal was a hard thing for them to accept, because most of them had always been used to live in the country.

XV. And this kind of life had been the characteristic of the Athenians, more than of any other Hellenes, from the very earliest times. For in the time of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, Attica had been divided into separate towns, each with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as they had nothing to fear they did not come together to consult with the king, but separately administered their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, he not only re-organized the country in other respects, but abolished the councils and magistracies of the minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into union with what is now the city, establishing a single council and town hall, and compelled them, while continuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, since all were now paying their taxes to it, and was such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. And from his time even to this day the Athenians have celebrated at the public expense a festival called the Synoecia, in honour of the goddess.

Before this what is now the Acropolis was the

2 "Feast of the Union," celebrated on the sixteenth of the month Hecatombaeon.

3 i.e. before the Synoecismus, or union of Attica under Theseus.
ἡν, καὶ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον μάλιστα τετραμένον. τεκμηρίον δὲ· τὰ γὰρ ιερὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν ἑστι, καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἱδρυται, τὸ τε τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ 'Ὀλυμπίου καὶ τὸ Πύθιον καὶ τὸ τῆς Γῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ 1 ἐν Λίμναις Διονύσου, ὥ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια τῇ δωδεκάτη 2 ποιεῖται ἐν μηνὶ Ἀνθεστηρίων, ὀστερ καὶ οἱ ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων Ἰωνες ἐτί καὶ νῦν νομίζουσιν. ἱδρυται δὲ 5 καὶ ἄλλα ιερὰ ταύτῃ ἁρχαίᾳ. καὶ τῇ κρήνῃ τῇ νῦν μὲν τῶν τυράννων οὔτως σκευασάντων 'Εὑνεακρούνῳ καλουμένῃ, τὸ δὲ πάλαι φανερῶν τῶν πηγῶν οὐσῶν Καλλιρρόη ὁμομασμένη ἐκεῖνοί τε ἐγγύς οὔσῃ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἐχρώντο, καὶ νῦν ἐτί ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁρχαίου πρὸ τε γαμικῶν καί ἐς ἄλλα 6 τῶν ιερῶν νομίζεται τῷ ύδατι χρῆσθαι. καλεῖται δὲ διὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ταύτῃ κατοίκησιν καὶ ἡ ἀκρόπολις μέχρι τοῦτο ἐτί ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων πόλις.

XVI. Τῇ δ' οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ κατὰ τὴν χώραν αὐτονόμων οἰκίσει 3 οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνφυκίσθησαν, διὰ τὸ ἐθος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς ὅμως οἱ πλείους τῶν τε ἁρχαίων καὶ τῶν ὑστερον

1 Added by Cobet.
2 τῇ δωδεκάτῃ deleted by Hude, after Torstrick.
3 μετείχον, in the MSS. before οἱ Ἀθηναίοι, deleted by Dreissen.

1 It is taken for granted that these temples were ancient foundations.
city, together with the region at the foot of the Acropolis toward the south. And the proof of this is as follows: On the Acropolis itself are the sanctuaries of the other gods as well as of Athena, and the sanctuaries which are outside the Acropolis are situated more in that quarter of the city, namely those of Olympian Zeus, of Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in Limnae, in whose honour are celebrated the more ancient Dionysia the twelfth of the month Anthesterion, just as the Ionian descendants of the Athenians also are wont even now to celebrate it. In that quarter are also situated still other ancient sanctuaries. And the fountain now called Enneacrunus, from the fashion given it by the tyrants, but which anciently, when the springs were uncovered, was named Callirrhoe, was used by people of those days, because it was close by, for the most important ceremonials; and even now, in accordance with the ancient practice, it is still customary to use its waters in the rites preliminary to marriages and other sacred ceremonies. And, finally, the Acropolis, because the Athenians had, there in early times a place of habitation, is still to this day called by them Polis or city.

XVI. Because, then, of their long-continued life of independence in the country districts, most of the Athenians of early times and of their descendants down to the time of this war, from force of habit, even after their political union with the city, continued

2 A lacuna in the text is generally assumed; Classen would supply καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς after θεῶν ἔστι, and I translate this.

3 The Anthesteria, contrasted with the Lenaea, which was also an ancient festival, but of less antiquity. The city Dionysia was of comparatively recent origin.

4 Enneacrunus, Nine Conduits; Callirrhoe, Fair Stream.
μέχρι τούτου τοῦ πολέμου πανοικησίας 1 γενόμενοι τε καὶ οἰκήσαντες, οὐ βραδίως τὰς ἀναστάσεις ἐποιοῦντο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄρτι ἀνειληφότες τὰς 2 κατασκευὰς μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἐφερον οἰκίας τε καταλείποντες καὶ ἵερα ἃ διὰ παντὸς ἢν αυτοῖς ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον πολιτείας πάτρια, διατίαν τε μέλλοντες μεταβάλλειν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τῆν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπον ἕκαστος.

ΧVII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, ὀλίγοις μὲν τισιν ὑπῆρχον οἰκήσεις καὶ παρὰ φίλων τινᾶς ἢ οἰκείων καταφυγῆ, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὰ τε ἐρήμα τῆς πόλεως ὡκησαν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ἡρῶα πάντα πλὴν τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τοῦ Ἑλευσινίου καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο βεβαίως κληστὸν ἢν τὸ τε Πελαργικὸν 2 καλοῦμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τῆν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπάρατον τε ἢν μὴ οἰκείων καὶ τι καὶ Πυθικὸν μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόῦτο διεκόλυνε, λέγον ὡς “Τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἄργον ἁμείνων,” ὁμος 2 ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρήμα ἀνάγκης ἐξοφικῆθη. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ το ἐντείου τούναντιου ξυμβηκήναι ἢ προσε- δέχοντο, οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν παράνομον ἐνοίκησιν αἰ ξυμφοράς γενέσθαι τῇ πόλει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν πόλε-

1 πανοικησία placed by Hude, following Lipsius, after βραδίως.
2 With C and a popular decree found in 1830 (C.I.A., iv. 27 b); the other MSS. Πελαργικὸν.

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to reside, with their households, in the country where they had been born; and so they did not find it easy to move away, especially since they had only recently finished restoring their establishments after the Persian war. They were dejected and aggrieved at having to leave their homes and the temples which had always been theirs,—relics, inherited from their fathers, of their original form of government—and at the prospect of changing their mode of life, and facing what was nothing less for each of them than forsaking his own town.

XVII. And when they came to the capital, only a few of them were provided with dwellings or places of refuge with friends or relatives, and most of them took up their abode in the vacant places of the city and the sanctuaries and the shrines of heroes, all except the Acropolis and the Eleusinium and any other precinct that could be securely closed. And the Pelargicum,\(^1\) as it was called, at the foot of the Acropolis, although it was under a curse that forbade its use for residence, and this was also prohibited by a verse-end of a Pythian oracle to the following effect:

“The Pelargicum unoccupied is better,”

nevertheless under stress of the emergency was completely filled with buildings. And the oracle, as it seems to me, came true, but in a sense quite the opposite of what was expected; for it was not on account of the unlawful occupation of the place that the city was visited by the calamities, but it was on

\(^1\) A fortification built by the “Pelasgians” on the west side of the Acropolis, the only side accessible to an enemy. It was to the space below and above this fortification that the curse attached.
μον ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς οἰκήσεως, ὅν οὐκ ὄνομάζειν τὸ μαντεῖον προῆδει μὴ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῷ ποτε αὐτὸ κατοι-κισθησόμενον. κατεσκευάσαντο δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πόλεσι τῶν τείχων πολλοὶ καὶ ὡς ἐκαστὸς πον ἔδύνατο· οὐ γὰρ ἐχώρησε ξυ νελθόντας αὐτοὺς ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ὑστερον δὴ τα τε μακρὰ τείχῃ νυκταν κατανειμάμενοι καὶ τοὺ Πειραιῶς τὰ πολλά. ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡπτοντο, ξυμμάχους τε ἀγειροντες καὶ τῇ Πελο-

5 πονήσῳ ἐκατόν νεών ἐπίπλουν ἔξαρτύντες καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν τούτῳ παρασκευὴς ἦσαν.

XVIII. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν Πελοπονησίων προϊόν όφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόν πρῶτον, ἦπερ ἐμελλον ἐσβαλείν. καὶ ώς ἐκαθέζουτο, προσβολὰς παραπολευάζοντο τῷ τείχει ποιησώ-

2 μενοι μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλω τρόπῳ· ἡ γὰρ Οἰνόη οὔσα ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐτετείχιστο καὶ αὐτῷ φομφίῳ όι Ἀθηναίοι ἑχρῶντο ὅποτε πόλεμος καταλάβοι. τάς τε οὖν προσβολὰς ἡτρεπτίζοντο καὶ ἄλλως ἐνδιέτριψαν

3 χρόνον περὶ αὐτήν. αὖτιαν δὲ οὐκ ἐλαχίστην Ἀρχίδαμος ἔλαβεν ἄπ' αὐτοῦ, δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακὸς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτίθειοι, οὐ παραινῶν προθύμως πολεμεῖν· ἐπειδή τε ξυνελέγετο ὁ στρατὸς, ἢ τε ἐν τῷ ἱσθμῷ ἐπιμονὴ χειρομένη καὶ κατὰ τὴν

1 cf. I. lxxx.-lxxxv.

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account of the war that there was the necessity of its occupation, and the oracle, although it did not mention the war, yet foresaw that the place would never be occupied for any good. Many also established themselves in the towers of the city walls, and wherever each one could find a place; for the city did not have room for them when they were all there together. But afterwards they distributed into lots and occupied the space between the Long Walls and the greater part of the Peiraeus. And while all this was going on, the Athenians applied themselves to the war, bringing together allies and fitting out an expedition of one hundred ships against the Peloponnesus. The Athenians then, were in this stage of their preparations.

XVIII. Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing and the first point it reached in Attica was Oenoe, where they intended to begin the invasion. And while they were establishing their camp there, they prepared to assault the wall with engines and otherwise; for Oenoe, which was on the border between Attica and Boeotia, was a walled town, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians whenever war broke out. So the Lacedaemonians went on with their preparations to assault the place, and in this and other ways wasted time. And it was for his conduct here that Archidamus was most severely censured, though it was thought that in the levying of the war, too, he had been slack and had played into the hands of the Athenians when he did not advise the Peloponnesians to make war with vigour. Again, when the army was being collected, he was criticized for the delay which occurred at the Isthmus, and afterwards for the leisurely way in
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ἀλλὰν πορείαν ἢ σχολαίοτης διέβαλεν αὐτῶν, 4 μάλιστα δὲ ἦν τῇ Ὀινόῃ ἐπίσχεσις. οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ, καὶ ἐδόκουν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπελθόντες ἀν διὰ τά- χους πάντα ἔτι ἔξω καταλαβεῖν, εἴ μὴ διὰ τὴν ἐκείνου μέλλησιν. ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὀργῇ ὁ στρατὸς τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἶχεν. ὃ ἐκ, προσ- δεχόμενος, ὡς λέγεται, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς γῆς ἐτί ἀκεραιού ὦσις ἐνδώσειν τι καὶ κατοκήσειν περιυδεῖν αὐτὴν τρηθεῖσαν, ἀνείχεν.

XIX. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι προσβάλοντες τῇ Ὀινόῃ καὶ πάσαν ἱδέαν πειράσαντες οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἐλεῖν, οὐ τε Ἀθηναίοι οὐδὲν ἐπεκηρυκεύοντο, οὔτω δὴ ὀρμήσαντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταία 1 γενόμενα ἡμέρα ὀγδοηκοστῇ μάλιστα, θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικῆν ἤγειτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευγιδάμος, Λακεδαι- 2 μοιῶν βασιλεὺς. καὶ καθεξόμενοι ἐτεμνοῦν πρῶ- τον μὲν Ἔλευσιν καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πεδίον καὶ προπήν τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἵππεων περὶ τοὺς Ἐρετῶν καλουμένος ἐποιήσαντο· ἐπειτα προο- χόρον ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ Ἀιγάλεων ὀρος διὰ Κρωπίας ἐως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ἀχαρνᾶς, χωρίον μέ- γιστον τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῶν δημῶν καλουμένων, καὶ καθεξόμενοι ἐς αὐτὸν στρατόπεδόν τε ἐποιήσαντο χρόνον τε πολὺν ἐμμείναντες ἐτεμνοῦν.

XX. Γνώμη δὲ τοιάδε λέγεται τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον

1 τῶν ἐσελθόντων Ὑθείαν, in the MSS. after Πλαταίας, deleted by Classen.

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which the march was made, but most of all for the halt at Oenoe. For in the interval the Athenians continued to bring their property into the city and the Peloponnesians believed that but for his procrastination they could have advanced quickly and found everything still outside. Such was the resentment felt by the army toward Archidamus while they were sitting still. But the reason, it is said, why he kept holding back was that he expected the Athenians would make some concession while their territory was still unravaged and would be loath to see it laid waste.

XIX. When, however, after assaulting Oenoe and trying in every way to take it they were not able to do so, the Athenians meanwhile making no overtures, then at length they set off from there, about eighty days after the events at Plataea, when it was midsummer and the corn was ripe, and invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians. Making a halt they proceeded to ravage, first of all, the territory of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, and they routed the Athenian cavalry near the streams called Rheiti; then they advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleos on their right through Cropia, until they came to Acharnae, the largest of the demes of Attica, as they are called. Halting in the town they made a camp, where they remained for a long time ravaging the country.

XX. And it is said that the motive of Archidamus

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1 The reference is to the Attic summer, which included spring. The date was about the end of May, the average time for cutting grain in Attica.

2 A deme between Aegaleos and Parnes.
περί τε τὰς Ἀχαρνᾶς ὡς ἐς μάχην ταξάμενον μεῖναι καὶ ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἐκείνη τῇ ἐσβολῇ οὐ καταβῆναι τοὺς γὰρ Ἀθηναίους ἦλπίζεν, ἀκμάζοντάς τε νεότητι πολλῆ καὶ παρεσκευασμένους ἐς πόλεμον ὡς οὔπω πρῶτον, ὥσες ἀν ἐπεξελθεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν οὐκ ἄν περιδεῖν τρηθῆναι. ἐπειδὴ οὖν αὐτῷ ἐς Ἕλευσίνα καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίον πεδίον οὐκ ἀπήντησαι, πεῖραν ἐποιεῖτο περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνᾶς καθήμενος εἶ ἐπεξέλασιν ἄμα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐφαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεύσαι, ἄμα δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀχαρνηίς μέγα μέρος ὄντες τῆς πόλεως (τρισχίλιων γὰρ ὅπλιται ἐγένοτο) οὐ περὸψεσθαι ἐδόκουν τὰ σφέτερα διαφθαρέντα, ἀλλὰ ὀρμήσειν καὶ τοὺς πάντας ἐς μάχην. εἰ τε καὶ μὴ ἐπεξέλθοιει ἐκείνη τῇ ἐσβολῇ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδε-έστερον ἤδη ἐς τὸ ὑστερον τὸ τε πεδίον τεμεῖν καὶ ἐς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν χωρήσεσθαι τοὺς γὰρ Ἀχαρνέας ἐστερημένους τῶν σφετέρων οὐχ ὀμοίως προθύμους ἔσεθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀλλῶν κινδυνεύσεως, στάσιν δὲ ἐνέσεσθαι τῇ γνώμῃ. τοιαῦτῃ μὲν διανοίᾳ ὁ Ἀρχίδαμος περὶ τὰς Ἀχαρνᾶς ἦν.

XXI. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ μέχρι μὲν οὐ περὶ Ἕλευσίνα καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίον πεδίον ὁ στρατὸς ἦν καὶ τινα ἐλπίδα εἰχον ἐς τὸ ἐγγυτέρῳ αὐτοὺς μὴ προϊέναι, μεμνημένοι καὶ Πλευστοάνακτα τὸν Παυσανίου Δακεδαίμονίων βασιλέα, ὅτε ἐσβαλὼν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἕλευσίνα καὶ Ῥωμαῖος στρατὸς Πελοποννησίων πρὸ τοῦ δουὲ τοῦ πολέμου τέσσαρι καὶ δέκα ἔτεσιν ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι.
in waiting about Acharnae with his troops ready for battle, instead of descending into the plain during this invasion, was as follows: He cherished the hope that the Athenians, who were at their very best as regards the multitude of their youth and prepared for war as never before, would perhaps come out against him and not look on and see their land ravaged. So when they did not come to meet him at Eleusis and in the Thriasian plain, he settled down in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, to make a test whether they would come out; for not only did that seem to him a suitable place for his camp, but also the Acharnians were an important part of the state, their hoplites numbering three thousand, and he thought that they would not look on and see their fields ravaged, but would urge the whole people also to fight. And even if the Athenians should not come out against him during this invasion, he would thenceforward proceed with less apprehension to ravage the plain and even advance to the very walls of the city; for the Acharnians, once stripped of their own possessions, would not be as eager to incur danger as before in behalf of the lands of the rest, and so a division would arise in the counsels of the Athenians. It was with this design that Archidamus stayed at Acharnae.

XXI. Now so long as the Peloponnesian army remained in the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, the Athenians retained hope that they would not advance nearer; for they remembered that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, when fourteen years before this war he had invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians and proceeded as far as Eleusis and Thria, had advanced
προεθύμων (δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡ φυγὴ αὐτῶ ἐγένετο ἐκ Σπάρτης δόξαντι χρήμασι πεισθήναι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν). ἔπειδὴ δὲ περὶ Ἀχαρνῶν εἶδον τὸν στρατὸν ἐξήκοντα σταδίους τῆς πόλεως ἀπέχοντα, οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιούντο, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰκός, γῆς τεμνομένης ἐν τῷ ἔμφανεί, ὁ οὐπω ἐοράκεσαν οὐ γε νεώτεροι, οὐδ' οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πλήν τὰ Μηδίκα, δεινῶν ἐφαίνετο καὶ ἐδόκει τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ μάλιστα τῇ νεότητι ἔπεξέργασαν καὶ μὴ περισσοτέροι. κατὰ ξυστάσεις τε γεγυμνοὶ έν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἦσαν, οἱ μὲν κελεύοντες ἐπεξέργασαν, οἱ δὲ τινὲς οὐκ ἔθνες. χρησμολόγου τε ἣδου χρησμούς παντοίους, ὁν ἀκροάσθαρ ὡς ἐκαστος ὁρμήτω. οἳ τε Ἀχαρνῆς οἴομενοι παρά σφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔλαχιστην μοῖραν εἶναι Ἀθηναίων, ὡς αὐτῶν ἡ γῆ ἐτέμνετο, ἐνήγον τὴν ἔξοδον μάλιστα. παντὶ τε τρόπῳ ἀνηρέθιστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὅργῃ εἶχον, καὶ ὁ παρῆνεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνησεν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς δὲν οὐκ ἐπεξέργασίαν, αὐτῶν τε σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον πάντων δὲν ἐπασχόν.

XXII. Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρο- νοῦντας, πιστεύον δὲ όρθως γνωρίσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξέργασίαν, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὅργῃ τι μᾶλλον ἡ γνώμη ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τὴν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε

1 With CEG; ἐφιγμης ΑΒΜ.
no farther but had gone back again. (And indeed this was the cause of his banishment from Sparta, since he was thought to have been bribed to retreat.) But when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of Acharnae, only sixty stadia from the city, they thought the situation no longer tolerable; on the contrary, it naturally appeared to them a terrible thing when their land was being ravaged before their eyes, a sight which the younger men had never seen, or even the older men except in the Persian war; and the general opinion, especially on the part of the younger men, was that they ought to go forth and put a stop to it. They gathered in knots and engaged in hot disputes, some urging that they should go out, others opposing this course. Oracle-mongers were chanting oracles of every import, according as each man was disposed to hear them. And the Acharnians, thinking that no insignificant portion of the Athenian people lived at Acharnae, insisted most of all upon going out, as it was their land that was being devastated. Thus in every way the city was in a state of irritation; and they were indignant against Pericles, and remembering none of his earlier warnings they abused him because, though their general, he would not lead them out, and considered him responsible for all their sufferings.

XXII. Pericles, however, seeing them exasperated at the present moment and that their intentions were not for the best, and convinced that his judgment was right about refusing to go out, would not convoke a meeting of the assembly or any gathering whatever, for fear that if they got together there would be an outbreak of passion without judgment that would end in some serious
καὶ δὲ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν.

2 ἵππεας μέντοι ἐξέπεμπεν αἰεὶ τοῦ μὴ προδρόμους ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιᾶς ἐσπιπτοῦτος ἐσ τούς ἀγροὺς τούς ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν· καὶ ἱππομαχία τις ἐγένετο βραχεία ἐν Φρυγίωι τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τέλει ἐνὶ τῶν ἵππεῶν καὶ Θεσσαλῶν μετ’ αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Βοιωτῶν ἵππεας, ἐν ὄντες ἐλασσον ἐσχον οἳ Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Θεσσαλοί μέχρι οὗ προσβοηθησάντων τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς τῶν ὀπλιτῶν τροπὴ ἐγένετο αὐτῶν καὶ ἀπέθανον τῶν Θεσσαλῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων οὐ πολλοί, ἀνείλουτο μέντοι αὐτοὺς αὐθημερὸν ἀσπόνδους. καὶ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαῖον τῇ ύστεραι ἐστησαν.

3 ἡ δὲ βοήθεια αὐτὴ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ξυμμαχικὸν ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίωις, καὶ ἀφίκοντο παρ’ αὐτοὺς Λαρισάιοι, Φαρσάλιοι, Κραννώνιοι, Πυράσιοι, Γυρτώνιοι, Φεραιοί. ἠγούντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἐκάτερος, ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχοντες.

XXIII. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐπεξήγαγαν αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἐς μάχην, ἀραντες ἐκ τῶν Ἀχαρνῶν ἐδήμουν τῶν δήμων τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν μεταξύ Πάρνηθος καὶ Βριλησσοῦ ὀροὺς.

2 ὅτων δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἀπέστειλαν τὰς ἐκατον ναῦς περὶ Πελοπόννησου ἄσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ αὐτῶν

1 Παράσιοι, in MSS. after Φαρσάλιοι, deleted by Heringa.
mistake; moreover he guarded the city, and as far as he could kept it free from disturbances. He did, however, constantly send out detachments of cavalry to prevent flying parties from the main army from raiding the fields near the city and ravaging them; and there was a cavalry skirmish at Phrygia between a company of Athenian horsemen, assisted by some Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry, in which the Athenians and Thessalians fully held their own, until their heavy infantry came to the support of the Boeotians, when they were routed. A few of the Thessalians and the Athenians were killed, but their bodies were recovered the same day without a truce; and on the next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. This auxiliary force of the Thessalians was sent to the Athenians in accordance with an ancient alliance, and those who came were Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Crannonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. And their leaders were, from Larissa, Polymedes and Aristonous, each representing his own faction, and from Pharsalus Menon; and the others had their own commander city by city.

XXIII. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, when the Athenians did not come out to do battle with them broke up their camp at Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes which lie between Mt. Parnes and Mt. Brilessus. But while they were still in their territory the Athenians sent out on an expedition round the Peloponnesus the hundred ships which they had been equipping, and on

1 cf. i. cii. 4.
2 More generally known as Pentelicus, so called from the deme Pentele on its southern slope.
3 cf. ch. xvii. 4.
καὶ τὸξότας τετρακοσίους ἐστρατηγεῖ δὲ Καρκίνου τε Ἡνοτίμου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους
καὶ Σωκράτης ὁ Ἀντιγένους. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄραντες τῇ παρασκευῇ ταύτῃ περιέπλεον, οἱ δὲ Πελο-
ποννήσιοι χρόνον ἐμμείναντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὁσον
εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀνεχώρησαν διὰ Βοιωτῶν, οὐχ
ὕπερ ἐσέβαλον. παρίστεσ κἐ Ὄρωπτὸν τὴν γῆν
τὴν Γραίκην καλομένην ἤν νέμονται Ὄρωπτοι
Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκουσι, ἐδήσαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς
Πελοπόννησον διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις ἐκαστοῖ.

XXIV. Ἀναχωρησάντων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθη-
ναῖοι φυλακάς κατεστήσαντο κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ
θάλασσαν, ὥσπερ δὴ ἔμελλον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
πολέμου φυλάξειν· καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἀπὸ τῶν
ἐν τῇ ἄκροπόλει χρημάτων ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῖς ἔξαίρετα
ποιησάμενοι χωρίς θέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλοῦν, ἀλλ’
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν πολεμεῖν ἢν δὲ τις εἰπῇ ἢ ἐπι-
ψηφίση κινεῖν τὰ χρήματα ταύτα ἐς ἅλλο τι,
ḥν μὴ οἱ πολέμιοι νηήτη στρατῷ ἐπιπλέωσι τῇ
πόλει καὶ δὲ ἀμύνασθαι, θάνατον ξημίαν ἐπέ-

2 θεντο. τριήρεις τε μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτους ἐποιή-
σαντο κατὰ τῶν ἐνιαυτῶν ἐκατὸν τὰς βελτίστας
καὶ τριήράρχους αὐταῖς, ὥν μὴ χρησθαί μηδεμιὰ
ἐς ἅλλο τι ἢ μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
κινδύνου, ἢν δὲ.

1 Named after the ancient town of Πραία (Hom. Β 498).
them a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers; and the generals in command were Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. So they set sail with this force and began their cruise; the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, remained in Attica for as long a time as they were provisioned and then withdrew through Boeotia, taking a different route from that by which they had entered Attica. They passed by Oropus and laid waste the district called Graïce, which the Oropians occupy as subjects of the Athenians. Then on their return to the Peloponnesus they were dismissed to their several cities.

XXIV. After the retreat of the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians set guards to keep watch both by land and sea, their purpose being to maintain a like guard throughout the war. They decided also to set apart one thousand talents of the money stored on the Acropolis as a special reserve fund, and not to spend it, but to use the rest to carry on the war; and if anyone should make or put to vote a proposal to touch this money except in the one case that the enemy should attack the city with a fleet and they should have to defend it, death was to be the penalty. And along with this sum of money they set apart for special service each year one hundred of the very best triremes, appointing trierarchs to command them, and no one of these ships was to be used in any other way than in connection with this particular fund in dealing with the same danger should the emergency arise.

2 This was written before 412/11, when Oropus was captured by the Boeotians.

3 About £200,000, or $972,000. This was part of the 6,000 talents stored on the Acropolis (ch. xiii. 3).
XXV. Οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἐκατον ναυσὶ περὶ Πελο-
πόννησον Ἀθηναίοι καὶ Κερκυραῖοι μετ’ αὐτῶν
πεντήκοντα ναυσὶ προσβεβοθηκότες καὶ ἄλλοι
tinēs tōn ἐκεῖ ἐξυμμάχων ἀλλα τε ἐκάκουν περι-
πλέοντες καὶ ἐς Μεθώνην τῆς Δακωνικῆς ἀπο-
βάντες τῷ τείχει προσέβαλον, ὡστὶ ἠσθενεὶ καὶ
ἀνθρώπων ὑπὲρ ἐνόντων. ἔτυχε δὲ περὶ τούς
χώρους τοῦτος Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος, ἁνὴρ
Σπαρτιάτης, φρουρὰν ἔχων, καὶ αἰσθόμενος ἐβοή-
θει τοῖς ἐν τῷ χώρῳ μετὰ ὀπλιτῶν ἐκατον.
διαδραμὼν δὲ τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον,
ἐσκεδασμένον κατὰ τὴν χώραν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τείχος
tετραμμένον, ἐσπίπτει ἐς τὴν Μεθώνην καὶ ὀλί-
γους τινὰς ἐν τῇ ἐσδρομῇ ἀπολέσας τῶν μεθ’
αὐτοῦ τὴν τε πόλιν περιποίησε καὶ ἀπὸ τούτος
tοῦ τομῆματος πρῶτον τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον
ἐπηνέθη ἐν Σπάρτῃ. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι ἀράντες
παρέπλεον, καὶ σχόντες τῆς Ἡλείας ἐς Φειάν
ἐσόμουν τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ δύο ἡμέρας καὶ προσβοθη-
σαντας τῶν ἐκ τῆς κοίλης Ἡλιδος τριακοσίων
λογάδας καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος
棼 Ἡλείων μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν. ἀνέμου δὲ κατίοντος
μεγάλου χειμαζόμενοι ἐν ἀλιμένῳ χωρίῳ, οἱ μὲν
πολλοὶ ἐπέβησαν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ περιέπλεον
tῶν Ἰχθύν καλούμενον τὴν ἅκραν ἐς τὸν ἐν τῇ
Φειᾶ λιμένα, οἱ δὲ Μεσσήνιοι ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἄλλοι
tinēs, οἱ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπιβήσαι, κατὰ γῆν χωρῆ-
σαντες τὴν Φειᾶν αἱροῦσιν. καὶ ὦστερον αἱ τε
νήσει περιπλεύσασαν ἀναλαμβάνοντι αὐτοὺς καὶ
ἐξανάγονται ἐκλείποντες Φειᾶν, καὶ τῶν Ἡλείων
ἡ πολλή ἤδη στρατιὰ προσεβεβοθήκει.
XXV. Meanwhile the Athenians who had been despatched in the hundred ships around the Peloponnesus, together with the Corecyraeans, who had reinforced them with fifty ships, and some of their other allies in that quarter, were pillaging various places as they cruised about, and in particular disembarked at Methone in Laconia and assaulted its walls, which were weak and without adequate defenders. But Brasidas, son of Tellis, a Spartan, happened to be in that neighbourhood with a guarding party, and seeing the situation he set out with one hundred hoplites to relieve the garrison. Dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country and was occupied solely with the fortress, he threw his force into Methone, losing a few of his men in the rush, and thus saved the city. This daring exploit, the first of the kind in the war, was acknowledged at Sparta by a vote of thanks. The Athenians then weighed anchor and continued their cruise along the coast, and putting in at Pheia in Elis ravaged the land for two days, defeating in battle a rescue-party of three hundred picked men gathered from the lowlands of Elis and from the immediate neighbourhood of Pheia. But a heavy gale of wind arose, and since they were exposed to the storm in a harbourless region, most of them embarked on their ships and sailed round the promontory called Ichthys into the harbour at Pheia. Meanwhile the Messenians and some others, who could not get on board, marched overland and took Pheia. Afterwards, when the fleet had rounded the promontory, it took up these men, abandoned Pheia, and put out to sea, for meanwhile the main body of the Eleans had come to the rescue. The Athenians now resumed their voyage
πλεύσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπὶ ἄλλα χωρία ἔδησον.

XXVI. Ῥῶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τούτον Ἀθηναίοι τριάκοντα ναῦς ἐξεπεμψαν περὶ τὴν Δοκρίδα καὶ Ἔυβοίας ὑμᾶς φυλακῆς ἔστρατήγει 2 δὲ αὐτῶν Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίος. καὶ ἀποβάσεις ποιησάμενος τῆς τε παραβαλασσίου ἐστίν ἄ ἐδῆσε καὶ Θρόνιον εἶλεν, ὀμήρους τε ἔλαβεν αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν Ἀλόπη τοὺς βοηθήσαντας Δοκρών μάχη ἐκράτησεν.

XXVII. Ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ Αἰγινήτας τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει τούτῳ ἐξ Αἰγίνης Ἀθηναίοι, αὐτοὺς τε καὶ παιδας καὶ γυναίκας, ἐπικαλέσαντες οὕχ ἢκίστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τὴν Αἰγίναν ἀσφαλέστερον ἐφαίνετο τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐπικειμένην αὐτῶν πέμψαντας ἐποίκους ἔχειν. καὶ ἐξεπέμψαν ύστερον οὐ πολλῷ ἐς αὐτὴν τοὺς 2 οἰκήτορας. ἐκπεσοῦσι δὲ τοῖς Αἰγινήταις οἱ Δακεδαμόνιοι ἐδοσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι, κατὰ τε τὸ Ἀθηναίων διάφορον καὶ ὅτι σφῶν εὐεργετάτω ἦσαν ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμὸν καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν. ἦ δὲ Θυρεάτις γῆ μεθορία τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Δακονικῆς ἐστίν, ἐπὶ θάλασσαν καθήκουσα. καὶ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθα ὄκησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐσπάρησαν κατὰ τὴν δέλλην Ἐλλάδα.

XXVIII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους νομηνία κατὰ σελήνην, ὦσπερ καὶ μόνον δοκεῖ εἶναι γίγνεσθαι

1 κατ’ read by Hude, after Madvig.
along the coast, and visiting other places to commit depredations.

XXVI. About this same time the Athenians sent out thirty ships to operate around Locris and at the same time to serve as a guard for Euboea. These were under the command of Cleopompus son of Clinias, who made descents upon various places along the seaboard and ravaged them, captured Thronium, some of whose inhabitants he took as hostages, and at Alope defeated in battle the Locrians who came to the defence of the town.

XXVII. In the course of this summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina, together with their wives and children, making it their main charge against them that they were responsible for the war in which they were involved; besides Aegina lay close to the Peloponnesus, and it was clearly a safer policy to send colonists of their own to occupy it. And indeed they soon afterwards sent thither the settlers. As for the Aeginetan refugees, the Lacedaemonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in and its territory to cultivate, moved to do this not only by the hostility of the Aeginetans towards the Athenians but also because the Aeginetans had done them a service at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots.\(^1\) Now the district of Thyrea is the border country between Argolis and Laconia, extending down to the sea. There some of the Aeginetans settled, while some were scattered over the rest of Hellas.

XXVIII. During the same summer at the beginning of a lunar month\(^2\) (the only time, it seems, when

\(^1\) cf. i. ci. 2.

\(^2\) August 3rd, 431 B.C.
δυνατῶν, ὁ ἰός εξέλιπε μετὰ μεσημβρίαν καὶ πάλιν ἀνεπληρώθη, γενόμενος μηνοείδης καὶ ἀστέρων τινῶν ἐκφανέντων.

XXIX. Καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Νυμφόδωρον τὸν Πύθεω, ἀνδρα Ἀρδηρίτην, οὐ εἰχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν Ὁσῖλκης, δυνάμενον παρ’ αὐτῷ μέγα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρότερον πολέμιον νομίζοντες πρόζευν έποιήσαντο καὶ μετεπέμψαντο, Βουλόμενοι Σιτάλκην σφίσα τὸν Τήρησ, Ὑθρικά, βασιλέα, ξύμμαχον 2 γενέσθαι. ὁ δὲ Τήρης οὗτος ὁ τοῦ Σιτάλκου πατήρ πρῶτος Ὁδρύσαυς τὴν μεγάλην βασιλείαν ἐπὶ πλέον τῆς ἄλλης Ὁράκης ἐποίησεν: πολὺ 3 γὰρ μέρος καὶ αὐτόνομον ἐστὶ Θρικῶν. Τηρεῖ δὲ τῷ Πρόκυπτῃ τὴν Πανδίονος ἀπ᾽ Ἀθηνῶν σχόντι γνώικα προσήκει ὁ Τήρης οὗτος οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς Ὁράκης ἐγένοντο, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν Δαιλία τῆς Φωκίδος ὑνί καλομένην γῆς ὁ Τηρεύς 1 ὁκεῖ, τότε ὑπὸ Ὁρακῶν οἰκουμένης, καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ περὶ τὸν Ἰτυν αἱ γνώικαι εἰς τῇ γῇ ταύτῃ ἔπραξαν (πολλοίς δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰς ἁγδόνος μνήμη Δαιλίας ἡ ὀρνις ἐπωνόμασθαι), εἰκός τε καὶ τὸ κήδος Πανδίωνα ξύναψαθαι τῆς θυγατρός διὰ τοσοῦτον ἐπ᾽ ὥφελια τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλους μᾶλλον ἡ διὰ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἢ Ὁδρύσαυς ὁδόι. Τήρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἐχων βασιλεὺς 2

1 Deleted by Hude, after van Herwerden, as not read by the Scholiast.
2 τε, in the MSS. after βασιλεὺς, deleted by Classen.

1 i.e. their representative to look after Athenian interests in the country of Sitalces and Tereus. The latter had violated 310
such an occurrence is possible) the sun was eclipsed after midday; it assumed the shape of a crescent and became full again, and during the eclipse some stars became visible.

XXIX. In this summer, too, Nymphodorus son of Pythes, a man of Abdera, whose sister Sitalces had to wife, and possessing great influence with Sitalces, the Athenians made their proxenus 1 with that king, although they had hitherto regarded him as an enemy; and they summoned him to Athens, wishing to gain Sitalces, son of Teres and king of the Thracians, as their ally. Now this Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to found the great kingdom of the Odrysians, which extended over the larger part of Thrace; for a considerable portion of the Thracians are independent. This Teres is not in any way connected with Tereus who took from Athens to be his wife Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor indeed did they come from the same Thrace. Tereus dwelt at Daulia in the land now called Phocis, which was then occupied by Thracians, and it was in that land that the women 2 perpetrated their deed upon Itys. In fact many of the poets, when they refer to the nightingale, call it the bird of Daulia. Besides it was natural for Pandion to contract the marriage alliance for his daughter at so short a distance as Daulia with a view to mutual protection, rather than among the Odrysians, who are many days' journey distant. Teres, however, whose name was not the same as the other's, was the first king to attain Philomela, sister of Procne, and cut out her tongue to prevent her telling of it; but she revealed it by weaving the story into a piece of tapestry.

2 The women, i.e. Procne and Philomela, who murdered Itys, son of Procne.
4 πρώτος ἐν κράτει Ὁδρυσῶν ἐγένετο. οὗ δὴ οὖν τὸν Σιτάλκην οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ξύμμαχον ἐποιοῦντο, βουλόμενοι σφίζει τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία καὶ
5 Περδίκκαν ἔννεπελεῖν αὐτὸν. ἐλθὼν τε ἐς τὰς Ἀθῆνας ὁ Νυμφόδωρος τὴν τε τοῦ Σιτάλκου ξυμμαχιάν ἐποίησε καὶ Σάδοκον τὸν νῦν αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναίον, τὸν τε ὑπὲρ Θράκης πόλεμον ὑπεδέχετο καταλύσειν: πείσειν γὰρ Σιτάλκην πέμπειν στρα- τιὰν Θρακίαν Ἀθηναίοις ἵππεων τε καὶ πελ- 
6 ταστῶν. ἔννεπβιβάσε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Θέρμην αὐτῷ ἐπείσεν ἀποδοῦναι: ἔννεπτράτευσε τε εὐθὺς Περδίκκας ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας 
7 μετὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Φορμίωνος. οὕτω μὲν Σιτάλ- κης τε ὁ Τήρεως, Θρακῶν βασιλέως, ξύμμαχος ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Περδίκκας ὁ Ἀλεξάνδρου, Μακεδόνων βασιλέως. 

XXX. Οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἐκατον ναυσὶ Ἀθηναίοι ἔτι ὄντες περὶ Πελοπόννησου Σῶλλιών τε Κορινθίων πόλισμα αἴροντι καὶ παραδιδόσι Παλαι- 

1 Ῥωνίων Ἀκαρνάνων μόνοις τὴν γῆν καὶ πόλιν νέμεσθαι καὶ Ἀστακῶν, ὡς Εὐαρχός ἐτυράννει, λαβόντες κατὰ κράτος καὶ ἐξελάσαντες αὐτὸν τὸ 
2 χωρίον ἔς τὴν ξυμμαχίαν προσεποιησαντο. ἐπὶ τῇ Κεφαληνίαν τὴν νῆσον προσπλεῦσαντες προσηγγάγοντο ἀνευ μάχης: κεῖται δὲ ἡ Κεφαλ- 

3 Ληνία κατὰ Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ Λευκίδα τετράπολίς οὔσα, Παλῆς, Κράνιοι, Σαμαῖοι, Πρῶνοι. οὕστε- 

4 ὁ οὐ πολλῷ ἀνεχώρησαν αἰ νῆσες ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας.
great power among the Odrysians. And it was his son, Sitalces, whom the Athenians wanted to make their ally, wishing him to help in subduing the places on the coast of Thrace and Perdiccas. So Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the alliance with Sitalces, and got Sadocus son of Sitalces made an Athenian citizen; and he promised also to bring the war in Thrace to an end, saying that he would persuade Sitalces to send the Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, he brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas and the Athenians, whom he persuaded to restore Therme\(^1\) to him. Perdiccas immediately joined forces with the Athenians under Phormio\(^2\) and took the field against the Chalcidians. It was in this way that Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the Athenians, and also Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians.

XXX. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships, who were still operating on the Peloponnesian coast, took Sollium, a town belonging to the Corinthians, which they then handed over, the territory as well as the city, to the people of Palaerius in Acarnania, for their exclusive occupation. They also stormed Astacus, which Euarchus ruled as tyrant, drove him out, and incorporated the place in their confederacy. Sailing then to the island of Cephallenia, they brought it over to their side without a battle. Now Cephallenia lies over against Acarnania and Leucas and is a union of four communities, the Palians, Cranians, Samaeans, and Pronnians. And not long afterwards the ships withdrew to Athens.

\(^1\) cf. i. lxi. 2. \(^2\) cf. i. lxiv. 2; lxv. 3.
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XXXI. Περὶ δὲ τὸ φθινόπωρον τοῦ θέρους τοῦτον Ἀθηναίοι πανθημεῖ, αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι, ἐσεβάλον ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα Περικλέους τοῦ Ξαυθίππου στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ οἱ περὶ Πελοπόννησον Ἀθηναίοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκατόν ναυσίν (ἐτυχὸν γὰρ ἦδη ἐν Αἰγίνῃ οὔντες ἐπὶ οίκου ἀνακομιζόμενοι) ὡς ἠσθοντο τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανστρατίᾳ ἐν Μεγάροις οὔντας, ἐπλευσαν παρ’ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ ἐνυμηείχθησαν. στρατόπεδον τε μέγιστον δὴ τοῦτο ἄθροον Ἀθηναίων ἐγένετο, ἀκμαζούσης ἐτὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ οὕπω νεοσηκυίας· μυρίων γὰρ ὀπλιτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἦσαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι (χωρὶς δ’ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐν Ποσειδαία ἀτριχήλιοι ἦσαν), μέτοικοι δὲ ἐξεσεβαλοῦν οὐκ ἐλάσσους τρισχιλίων ὀπλιτῶν, χωρὶς δὲ ὁ ἄλλος ὁμιλος ψιλῶν οὐκ ὀλίγος. δηώσαντες δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῆς γῆς ἀνεχώρησαν. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἅλλαι ύστερον ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ ἐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ἐσβολαὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα καὶ ἰππέων καὶ πανστρατίᾳ, μέχρι οὗ Νίσαια εὕλω ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων.

XXXII. Ἐτείχίσθη δὲ καὶ Ἀταλάντη ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων φρούριον τοῦ θέρους τοῦτον τελευτώντος, ἢ ἐπὶ Λοκροῖς τοῖς Ὀπουντίοις νῆσος, ἐρήμη πρότερον οὕσα, τοῦ μὴ ληστᾶς ἐκπλέουσας ἐξ Ὀποῦντος καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Λοκρίδος κακουργεῖν τὴν Εὔβοιαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει τούτω μετὰ τὴν Πελοποννησίων ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀναχώρησιν ἐγένετο.

XXXIII. Τοῦ δ’ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Εὐ-αρχὸς ὁ Ἀκαρνάν, βουλόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἀστακὸν
XXXI. Toward the autumn of this year the Athenians with all their military forces, drawn both from the citizens and the resident aliens, invaded Megaris under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus, who was general.¹ The Athenians of the fleet of one hundred ships operating around Peloponnesus, who happened to be at Aegina on their way home, when they heard that the whole military force of the city was at Megara, sailed over and joined them. This was the largest army of Athenians that had ever been assembled in one body, for the city was still at the height of its strength and not as yet stricken by the plague; the Athenians themselves numbered not less than ten thousand heavy infantry, not including the three thousand at Potidaea,² and there were three thousand heavy-armed aliens who took part in the invasion, and, besides, a considerable body of light-armed troops. After they had ravaged most of the Megarian country they retired. Later on in the course of the war still other invasions were made by the Athenians into Megaris every year, both with the cavalry and with the whole army, until Nisaea was captured.³

XXXII. Towards the end of this summer the Athenians also fortified and garrisoned Atalante, the island which lies off Opuntian Locris and had hitherto been unoccupied. Their object was to prevent pirates sailing from Opus and the other ports of Locris and ravaging Euboea. These were the events which took place during this summer after the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Attica.

XXXIII. But in the ensuing winter Euarchus the Acarnanian, wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded

¹ i.e. one of the ten generals elected annually.
² cf. i. lxi. 4. ³ iv. lxvi.-lxix.
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κατελθείν, πείθει Κορινθίους τεσσαράκοντα ναυσὶ καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ χίλιους ὁπλίτας ἐαυτὸν κατάγειν πλεύσαντας, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικούρους των προσεμισθώσατο· ἦρχον δὲ τῆς στρατιᾶς Εὔφαμίδας τε ὁ Ἀριστωνῦμοι καὶ Τιμόξενος ὁ

2 Τιμοκράτους καὶ Εύμαχος ὁ Χρύσιδος. καὶ πλεύσαντες κατήγαγον καὶ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τῆς περὶ θάλασσαν ἐστιν ἀ χωρία βουλόμενοι προσποίησασθαι καὶ πειραθέντες, ὡς οὐκ

3 ἐδύναντο, ἀπέπλευον ἐπ’ οἴκου. σχόντες δ’ ἐν τῷ παράπλω ἐς Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ ἀποβασίν ποιησάμενοι ἐς τὴν Κρανίων γῆν, ἀπατηθέντες ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξ ὀμολογίας τινὸς ἄνδρας τε ἀποβάλλουσι σφῶν αὐτῶν, ἐπιθεμένων ἀπροσδοκήτως τῶν Κρανίων, καὶ βιαίοτερον ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκομίσθησαν ἐπ’ οἴκου.

XXXIV. Ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶν Ἀθηναίοι τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ χρώμενοι δημοσίᾳ ταφᾶς ἐποιησάντο τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρῶτων ἀποθανόν·

2 τῶν ἐπόπτων τοιῷδε. τὰ μὲν ὅστα προτίθενται τῶν ἀπογενομένων πρότριτα σκηνῆς ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἐπιφέρει τῷ αὐτῷ ἐκαστὸς ἢν τι βούληται·

3 ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορὰ ἦ, λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας ἀγούσιν ἀμαξαὶ, ἕνεκας ἐκάστης μίαν ἔνεστι δὲ τὰ ὅστα ἢς ἐκαστὸς ἢν φυλῆς. μία δὲ κλίνη κενὴ φέρεται ἐστρωμένη τῶν ἀφανῶν, οἱ ἂν μὴ

4 εὐρέθωσιν ἐς ἀναίρεσιν. ξυνεκφέρει δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων, καὶ γυναικεῖς πάρεισιν αἱ προσήκουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον ὀλοφυρόμεναι.

316 ¹ Hude inserts δέκα, following Gertz.
the Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred heavy infantry and restore him to power, and for this purpose he himself hired some mercenaries. The commanders of the expedition were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis. They did in fact sail over and restore him; and wishing to acquire some other places along the seaboard of Acarnania they made the attempt but failed, and thereupon sailed for home. As they skirted the coast they touched at Cephallenia, where they made a descent upon the territory of the Cranians; here deceived by the inhabitants through some sort of agreement they lost a few of their men by an unexpected attack of the Cranians, and finally, after they had got out to sea with considerable difficulty, managed to get back home.

XXXIV. In the course of the same winter the Athenians, following the custom of their fathers, celebrated at the public expense the funeral rites of the first who had fallen in this war. The ceremony is as follows. The bones of the departed lie in state for the space of three days in a tent erected for that purpose, and each one brings to his own dead any offering he desires. On the day of the funeral coffins of cypress wood are borne on wagons, one for each tribe, and the bones of each are in the coffin of his tribe. One empty bier, covered with a pall, is carried in the procession for the missing whose bodies could not be found for burial. Any one who wishes, whether citizen or stranger, may take part in the funeral procession, and the women who are related to the deceased are present at the
5 τιθέασιν οὖν ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῷ δημόσιον σήμα, ὁ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προαστείου τῆς πόλεως καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν αὐτῷ θαπτούσι τοὺς ἑκ τῶν πολέμων πλήν γε τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶν: ἐκεῖνων δὲ διαπρεπή τὴν ἀρετὴν κρίναντες αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐποίησαν.
6 ἐπειδὰν δὲ κρύψωσι γῆ, ἀνήρ ήρημένος ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ὃς ἄν γνώµη τε δοκῇ μὴ ἄξινες εἶναι καὶ ἄξιώσει προῆκη, λέγει ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς ἐπαινοῦν 7 τὸν πρέποντα· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπέρχονται. ὥστε μὲν θαπτοῦσιν· καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου, 8 ὡς πότε ἔμβαινε αὐτοῖς, ἔχρομον τῷ νόμῳ. ἐπὶ δὲ οὖν τοῖς πρότοις τοῖς Περικλῆς ὁ Ἐαυθίππον ἡρέθη λέγειν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ καιρὸς ἐλάμβανε, προελθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ σήματος ἐπὶ βῆμα υψηλὸν πεποιημένον, ὅπως ἀκούοιτο ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ ὅμιλου, ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

XXXV. "Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἤδη εἰρηκότων ἐπαίνοντο τοῖς προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τῶν λόγων τόνδε, ὡς καλὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν πολέμων θαπτομένως ἀγορεύεσθαι αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ δὲ ἁρκοῦν ἂν ἐδοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργῳ ἄριστον ἐργαὶ καὶ δηλοῦνται τὰς τιμὰς, οἷα καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ τάφου τόνδε δημοσίᾳ παρασκευασθέντα ὁράτε, καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνδρὶ πολλῶν ἀρετὰς κινδυνεύεσθαι εὐ τε καὶ χείρον εἰπόντι πιστευθῆναι.

2 χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν ἐν φί μόλις καὶ ἡ

1 The Outer Cerameicus, just outside the Dipylon gate. This street was to Athens what the Appian Way was to Rome.
burial and make lamentation. The coffins are laid in the public sepulchre, which is situated in the most beautiful suburb of the city; there they always bury those fallen in war, except indeed those who fell at Marathon; for their valour the Athenians judged to be preëminent and they buried them on the spot where they fell. But when the remains have been laid away in the earth, a man chosen by the state, who is regarded as best endowed with wisdom and is foremost in public esteem, delivers over them an appropriate eulogy. After this the people depart. In this manner they bury; and throughout the war, whenever occasion arose, they observed this custom. Now over these, the first victims of the war, Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to speak. And when the proper time came, he advanced from the sepulchre and took his stand upon a platform which had been built high in order that his voice might reach as far as possible in the throng, and spoke as follows:

XXXV. "Most of those who have spoken here in the past have commended the law-giver who added this oration to our ceremony, feeling that it is meet and right that it should be spoken at their burial over those who have fallen in war. To me, however, it would have seemed sufficient, when men have proved themselves brave by valiant acts, by act only to make manifest the honours we render them—such honours as to-day you have witnessed in connection with these funeral ceremonies solemnized by the state—and not that the valour of many men should be hazarded on one man to be believed or not according as he spoke well or ill. For it is a hard matter to speak in just measure on an occasion where it is with difficulty that belief in the speaker's
δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται. ο̣ τε γὰ̣ρ ἔσωιδως κα̣ὶ εὐνοῦς ἀκροτής τάχ' ἃν τι ἐνδε-εστέρως πρὸς ἀ βούλεται τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομι-σεις δηλούσθαι, ο̣ τε ἄπειρος ἐστὶν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, εἰ τι ὑπὲρ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀκοῦι. μέχρι γὰ̣ρ τοῦ̣ς ἀνεκτοί ο̣ι ἐπαίνοι εἰσι̣ περὶ̣ ἐτέρων λεγόμενοι, ἐς ὁ̣ σον ἃν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαστὸς οὕττα ἰκανὸς εἶναι δρᾶσαι τί ὅν ἦκουσαν τῷ̣ δὲ ὑπερβάλλοντι αὐτῶν φθονοῦντες ἥδη καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺ̣ς πάλαι οὕτως ἐδο-κιμάσθη ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν, χρῆ καὶ ἐμὲ ἐπόμενον τῷ̣ νόμῳ πειρᾶσθαι ὑμῶν τῆς ἐκάστου Βουλῆσεως τε καὶ δόξης τυχεῖν ὡς ἑπὶ̣ πλεῖστον.

XXXVI. "Ἀρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν προγόνων πρῶτον δικαίων γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ πρέπουν δὲ ἀμα ἐν τῷ̣ τοιῷ̣δε τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην τῆς μνήμης διδοθαι. τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκούντες διαδοχῇ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων μέχρι τοῦ̣ τοῦ̣ ἐλευ-θέρων εἰτ ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαι. καὶ ἐκείνων τε ἄξιοι ἐπαίνοι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν κτησά-μενοι γὰρ πρὸς οίς ἐδέξαντο ὃσπερ ἐχομεν ἀρχὴν

3 οὐκ ἀπόνως, ἡμῖν τοῖς νῦν προσκατέλιπον, τὰ̣ δὲ̣ πλεῖων αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς οἴδε οἱ νῦν ἔτι οὔντες μάλιστα ἐν τῇ καθεστηκυῖα ἡλικία ἐπηνυξίσαμεν, καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς πᾶσι̣ παρεσκευάσαμεν καὶ ἐς 4 πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην αὐταρκεστάτην. ὅν ἔγω

1 Those enumerated by Pericles in ch. xii. —money, army and navy.

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accuracy is established. For the hearer who is cognizant of the facts and partial to the dead will perhaps think that scant justice has been done in comparison with his own wishes and his own knowledge, while he who is not so informed, whenever he hears of an exploit which goes beyond his own capacity, will be led by envy to think there is some exaggeration. And indeed eulogies of other men are tolerable only in so far as each hearer thinks that he too has the ability to perform any of the exploits of which he hears; but whatever goes beyond that at once excites envy and unbelief. However, since our forefathers approved of this practice as right and proper, I also, rendering obedience to the law, must endeavour to the best of my ability to satisfy the wishes and beliefs of each of you.

XXXVI. "I shall speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and at the same time fitting, on an occasion like this, to give them this place of honour in recalling what they did. For this land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an unbroken line of successive generations, they by their valour transmitted to our times a free state. And not only are they worthy of our praise, but our fathers still more; for they, adding to the inheritance which they received, acquired the empire we now possess and bequeathed it, not without toil, to us who are alive to-day. And we ourselves here assembled, who are now for the most part still in the prime of life, have further strengthened the empire in most respects, and have provided our city with all resources, so that it is sufficient for itself both in peace and in war. The military exploits whereby
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τὰ μὲν κατὰ πολέμους ἔργα, οἷς ἔκαστα ἔκτηθη, ἢ εἶ τι αὐτοὶ ἢ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πόλεμον ἐπιώντα προθύμως ἧμιννάμεθα, μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος, εάσω ἀπὸ δὲ οἷς τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἠλθομεν ἐπ’ αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ’ οίας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἷων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας πρῶτον ἐξεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἐπαίνον, νομίζων ἐπὶ τῷ παρόντι οὐκ ἂν ἀπρεπῇ λεχθῆναι αὐτὰ καὶ τόν πάντα ὀμιλὸν καὶ ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ξύμφορον εἶναι ἐπακούσαι αὐτῶν.

XXXVII. “Χρώμεθα γὰρ πολιτεία ὧν ζηλούση τοὺς τῶν πέλας νόμους, παράδειγμα δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ οίντες τισὶν ἡ μιμούμενοι ἐτέρους. καὶ ὅνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ’ ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖων δημοκρατία κέκληται, μέτεστι δὲ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἵσον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἄξιωσιν, ὡς ἔκαστος ἐν τῷ εὐδοκιμεῖ, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλέον ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἄπ’ ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ’ αὐτακαταπενᾶν, ἔχων δὲ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἄξιωματος ἄφανείᾳ 2 κεκώλυται, ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύσωμεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ’ ἠμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δὲ ὅργῆς τῶν πέλας, εἰ καθ’ ἡδονῆν τι δρᾶ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἄξιο-1 πόλεμον, Hude adopts Haase’s conjecture πολέμον.

1 Alluding to the Spartans, whose institutions were said to have been borrowed from Crete; in fact, throughout the whole speech the contrast is with Spartan conditions.
our several possessions were acquired, whether in any case it were we ourselves or our fathers that valiantly repelled the onset of war, Barbarian or Hellenic, I will not recall, for I have no desire to speak at length among those who know. But I shall first set forth by what sort of training we have come to our present position, and with what political institutions and as the result of what manner of life our empire became great, and afterwards proceed to the praise of these men; for I think that on the present occasion such a recital will be not inappropriate and that the whole throng, both of citizens and of strangers, may with advantage listen to it.

XXXVII. "We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbours; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some follow, rather than the imitators of other peoples. It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. And not only in our public life are we liberal, but also as regards our freedom from suspicion of one another in the pursuits of every-day life; for we do not feel resentment at our neighbour

2 Possible allusion to the embassy sent from Rome in 454 B.C. to examine the laws of Solon (Livy, iii. 31).
μίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὁψεί ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι. ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἱδία προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ οὖντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὁσοι τε ἐπὶ ὦφελίς τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται καὶ ὁσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνῃς ὁμολογομένην φέρονσιν.

XXXVIII. "Καὶ μὴν καὶ τῶν πόλεων πλείστας ἀναπαύλας τῇ γνώμῃ ἐπορισάμεθα, ἀγώσι μέν γε καὶ θυσίαις διενεργοῖς νομίζοντες, ἱδίαις δὲ κατασκευαῖς εὔπρεπεσιν, ὡν καθ' ἡμέραν ἡ τέρψις
tὸ λυπηρὸν ἐκπλήσσει, ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα, καὶ
ξυμβαίνει ἡμῖν μηδὲν οἰκειοτέρα τῇ ἀπολαύσει τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ γιγνόμενα καρποῦσθαι ἢ καὶ τὰ
tῶν ἀλλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

XXXIX. "Διαφέρομεν δὲ κἂν ταῖς τῶν πολεμικῶν μελέταις τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖσδε. τὴν τε γὰρ
πόλιν κοινὴν παρέχομεν καὶ οὐκ ἔστων ὡτε ξενη-
λασίας ἀπείρομέν τινα ἡ μαθήματος ἡ θεάμα-
tος, ὡμὴ κρυφθεὶν ἄν τις τῶν πολεμίων ἰδὼν
ὡφεληθεὶς πιστεύοντες οὐ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς τὸ

1 Referring especially to the contests at the chief festivals, like the Panathenaea and Dionysia, which by their artistic setting and performance were recreations of mind and spirit quite as much as physical exercises.

2 Thucydides refers to the spiritual no less than to the physical products which the greatness of Athens attracts to her, to the poetry, music, and art which find there a con-
if he does as he likes, nor yet do we put on sour looks which, though harmless, are painful to behold. But while we thus avoid giving offence in our private intercourse, in our public life we are restrained from lawlessness chiefly through reverent fear, for we render obedience to those in authority and to the laws, and especially to those laws which are ordained for the succour of the oppressed and those which, though unwritten, bring upon the transgressor a disgrace which all men recognize.

XXXVIII. "Moreover, we have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance; and the delight we each day find in these things drives away sadness. And our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands.

XXXIX. "We are also superior to our opponents in our system of training for warfare, and this in the following respects. In the first place, we throw our city open to all the world and we never by exclusion acts debar any one from learning or seeing anything which an enemy might profit by observing if it were not kept from his sight; for we place our dependence, not so much upon prearranged devices to genial home as well as to articles of commerce. On these latter compare a passage in the pseudo-Xenophontic Constitution of Athens (ii. 7), written somewhat earlier than this portion of Thucydides' history: "Whatever desirable thing is found in Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Egypt, Lydia, the Pontus, the Peloponnesus, or anywhere else, all these things are brought together at Athens on account of her mastery of the sea."
Pericles here hints at his policy, outlined in ch. xiii. 2, of always acting on the defensive when the enemy forces are distinctly superior.
deceive, as upon the courage which springs from our own souls when we are called to action. And again, in the matter of education, whereas they from early childhood by a laborious discipline make pursuit of manly courage, we with our unrestricted mode of life are none the less ready to meet any equality of hazard. And here is the proof: When the Lacedaemonians invade our territory they do not come alone but bring all their confederates with them, whereas we, going by ourselves against our neighbours' territory, generally have no difficulty, though fighting on foreign soil against men who are defending their own homes, in overcoming them in battle. And in fact our united forces no enemy has ever yet met, not only because we are constantly attending to the needs of our navy, but also because on land we send our troops on many enterprises; but if they by chance engage with a division of our forces and defeat a few of us, they boast that they have repulsed us all, and if the victory is ours, they claim that they have been beaten by us all. If, then, by taking our ease rather than by laborious training and depending on a courage which springs more from manner of life than compulsion of laws, we are ready to meet dangers, the gain is all ours, in that we do not borrow trouble by anticipating miseries which are not yet at hand, and when we come to the test we show ourselves fully as brave as those who are always toiling; and so our city is worthy of admiration in these respects, as well as in others.

XL. "For we are lovers of beauty yet with no extravagance and lovers of wisdom yet without weakness. Wealth we employ rather as an opportunity for action than as a subject for boasting;
πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινα αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἕργῳ αἰσχρον. ἐνι τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκείων ἁμα καὶ πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ ἐτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐυδεώς γνῶναι: μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶν ὑμᾶς μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ’ ἀχρείον νομίζομεν, καὶ αὐτὸί ἦτοι κρίνομεν γε ἡ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδείκθηναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ πρότερον ἦ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἔλθειν διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὡστε τολμᾶν τε ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογήξεσθαι· ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὀκνον φέρειν. κράτιστοι δ’ ἂν ψυχὴν δικαίως κρίθηκαν οἱ τὰ τε δεινὰ καὶ ήδέα σαφέστατα γνωσκόντες καὶ διὰ ταύτα μὴ ἀποτρεπόμενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων. καὶ τὰ ἐς ἁρετὴν ἐνημπτιόμεθα τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὑ, ἀλλὰ ὑδῶντες κτῶμεθα τοὺς φίλους. βεβαιότερος δὲ ὁ δράσας τὴν χάριν ὡστε ὄφειλομένην δι’ εὐνοίας ὧ δέδωκε σφύζειν· ὁ δὲ ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος, εἰδὼς οὐκ ἐς χάριν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὀφείλημα τὴν ἁρετὴν ἀποδώ-

1 ἐτέροις <ἐτερα>, Hude. 2 Hude reads οἱ αὐτοῖο.

1 As contrasted with the Spartans, whose officials made the most important decisions.
and with us it is not a shame for a man to acknowledge poverty, but the greater shame is for him not to do his best to avoid it. And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, but as good for nothing; and we Athenians decide public questions for ourselves or at least endeavour to arrive at a sound understanding of them, in the belief that it is not debate that is a hindrance to action, but rather not to be instructed by debate before the time comes for action. For in truth we have this point also of superiority over other men, to be most daring in action and yet at the same time most given to reflection upon the ventures we mean to undertake; with other men, on the contrary, boldness means ignorance and reflection brings hesitation. And they would rightly be adjudged most courageous who, realizing most clearly the pains no less than the pleasures involved, do not on that account turn away from danger. Again, in nobility of spirit, we stand in sharp contrast to most men; for it is not by receiving kindness, but by conferring it, that we acquire our friends. Now he who confers the favour is a firmer friend, in that he is disposed, by continued goodwill toward the recipient, to keep the feeling of obligation alive in him; but he who owes it is more listless in his friendship, knowing that when he repays the kindness it will count, not as a favour bestowed, but as a debt.

2 This must be the meaning of the ἀπέ clause, but something is perhaps wrong with the text.
5 σων. καὶ μόνοι οὗ τὸν ἐγερθούσος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἁδεῖς τινα ὠφελοῦμεν.

XLI. "Ἐνενελών τε λέγω τῇ τε πᾶσαι πόλει τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνδρὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστ’ ἃν εἰδή καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ’ ἃν 2 εὔτραπέλως τὸ σώμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι. καὶ ὃς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμμος τάδε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργῶν ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτὴ ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως, ἢν ἀπὸ τῶν τῶν τρόπων ἐκτησάμεθα, 3 σημαίνει. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πείραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει υφ’ οἰων κακοπαθεῖ, οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόων κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπὸ ἄξιων 4 ἄρχεται. μετὰ μεγάλων δὲ σημείων καὶ οὐ δὴ τοις ἀμάρτυρόν γε τῇ δύναμιν παρασχόμενοι τοῖς τε νῦν καὶ τοῖς ἐπειτα θαυμασθησόμεθα, 1 οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἐπεσει μὲν τὸ αὐτῖκα τέρψει, τῶν δ’ ἐργῶν τῇ ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει, ἀλλ’ πᾶσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατόν τῇ ἠμετέρᾳ τόλμῃ καταναγκάσαντες γενέσθαι, πανταχοῦ δὲ μνημεία 5 κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἁίδια ξυγκατοικίσαντες. περὶ τοιαῦτης οὖν πόλεως οίδε τε γενναίως δικαιοῦντες

1 καὶ, before οὐδὲν in the MSS., deleted by Krüger.

1 The reference is to Athenian colonies and cleruchies, which, according to the bearing of the natives, had been
repaid. And, finally, we alone confer our benefits without fear of consequences, not upon a calculation of the advantage we shall gain, but with confidence in the spirit of liberality which actuates us.

XLI. "In a word, then, I say that our city as a whole is the school of Hellas, and that, as it seems to me, each individual amongst us could in his own person, with the utmost grace and versatility, prove himself self-sufficient in the most varied forms of activity. And that this is no mere boast inspired by the occasion, but actual truth, is attested by the very power of our city, a power which we have acquired in consequence of these qualities. For Athens alone among her contemporaries, when put to the test, is superior to the report of her, and she alone neither affords to the enemy who comes against her cause for irritation at the character of the foe by whom he is defeated, nor to her subject cause for complaint that his masters are unworthy. Many are the proofs which we have given of our power and assuredly it does not lack witnesses, and therefore we shall be the wonder not only of the men of to-day but of after times; we shall need no Homer to sing our praise nor any other poet whose verses may perhaps delight for the moment but whose presentation of the facts will be discredited by the truth. Nay, we have compelled every sea and every land to grant access to our daring, and have everywhere planted\(^1\) everlasting memorials both of evil to foes and of good to friends. Such, then, is the city for which these men nobly fought and died, deeming it their duty not to let her attended with ill consequences for these (\textit{e.g.} Oreos, and later Aegina) or good (\textit{e.g.} on the Thracian coast).
μὴ ἀφαίρεθήναι αὐτὴν μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, καὶ τῶν λειπομένων πάντα τινά εἰκὸς ἐθέλειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς κάμνειν.

XLII. "Δι' ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐμῆκυνα τὰ περὶ τῆς πόλεως, διδασκαλίαν τε ποιούμενος μὴ περὶ ἵσουν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀγώνα καὶ οἷς τῶν ἴδεν ὑπάρχει ὁμοίως, καὶ τὴν εὐλογίαν ἀμα ἐφ' οἷς νῦν λέγω

2 φανερὰν σημεῖοι καθιστάς. καὶ εἴρηται αὐτῆς τὰ μέγιστα: ἢ γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὑμνησα, αἱ τῶν καὶ τῶν τοιῶν ἀρεταὶ ἐκόσμησαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πολλοῖς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἰσόρροπος ὡσπέρ τῶν ὁ λόγος τῶν ἔργων φανεῖν. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι δηλοῦν ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν πρώτη τε μνήμουσα καὶ τελευταία

3 βεβαιοῦσα ἢ νῦν τῶν καταστροφῆ. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τάλλα χείροι δίκαιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προτίθεσθαιἀγαθῶ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφαινόμενος κοινῶς μᾶλλον

4 ὀφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἐβλαψαν. τῶν δὲ οὔτε πλούτου τις τὴν ἐτὶ ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη οὔτε πενίας ἐλπίδι, ὡς κἀν ἐτὶ δια-φυγὼν αὐτὴν ἕπλοτήσειεν, ἀναβολὴν τοῦ δεινοῦ ἐποίησατο· τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑναντίων τιμωρίαν ποθε-νοτέραν αὐτῶν λαβόντες καὶ κινδύνων ἀμα τούδε καλλιστον νομίσαντες ἐβουλήθησαν μετ' αὐτοῦ

1 αὐτὴν: Hude brackets.
be taken from them; and it is fitting that every man who is left behind should suffer willingly for her sake.

XLII. "It is for this reason that I have dwelt upon the greatness of our city; for I have desired to show you that we are contending for a higher prize than those who do not enjoy such privileges in like degree, and at the same time to let the praise of these men in whose honour I am now speaking be made manifest by proofs. Indeed, the greatest part of their praise has already been spoken; for when I lauded the city, that was but the praise wherewith the brave deeds of these men and men like them have already adorned her; and there are not many Hellenes whose fame would be found, like theirs, evenly balanced with their deeds. And it seems to me that such a death as these men died gives proof enough of manly courage, whether as first revealing it or as affording its final confirmation. Aye, even in the case of those who in other ways fell short of goodness, it is but right that the valour with which they fought for their country should be set before all else; for they have blotted out evil with good and have bestowed a greater benefit by their service to the state than they have done harm by their private lives. And no one of these men either so set his heart upon the continued enjoyment of wealth as to become a coward, or put off the dreadful day, yielding to the hope which poverty inspires, that if he could but escape it he might yet become rich; but, deeming the punishment of the foe to be more desirable than these things, and at the same time regarding such a hazard as the most glorious of all, they chose, accepting the hazard, to be avenged.
τοὺς μὲν τιμωρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἀφίεσθαι, ἐλπίδι μὲν τὸ ἄφανες τοῦ κατορθώσεως ἐπιτρέψαντες, ἔργῳ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἢδη ὀρωμένου σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἄξιούντες πεποιθέναι καὶ εν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ παθεῖν κάλλιον ἤ γηγοσμένου ἢ τὸ ἐνδόντες σφόδρεσθαι, τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἐφυγον, τὸ δ' ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν, καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἀμα ἀκμῆ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν.

XLIII. 'Καὶ οἶδε μὲν προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει τοιοίτε οὐ εἴρηντο· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς χρὴ ἄσφαλεστέραν μὲν εὔχεσθαι, ἀτολμοτέραν δὲ μηδὲν ἄξιον τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολεμίους διάνοιαν ἔχειν, σκοποῦντας μὴ λόγῳ μόνῳ τὴν ὠφελίαν, ἢν ἢν τις πρὸς οὐδὲν χείρον αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας μηκῦνοι, λέγων οὐσα ἐν τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ἀμύνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐνεστιν, ἄλλα μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἑραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτής, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμομένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅποτε καὶ πείρα τοῦ σφαλεῖν, οὐκ οὖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν γε τῆς σφετέρας ἀρετῆς ἄξιούντες στερίσκειν, κάλλιστον δὲ ἔφανον

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1 So most MSS. Hude reads τῷ with CG.
2 καί: Hude brackets.
3 Dobree's correction for μᾶλλον of the MSS. Hude inserts δεῖν and retains μᾶλλον.
4 Deleted by Hude.
5 υμᾶς: Hude brackets.
upon the enemy and to relinquish these other things, trusting to hope the still obscure possibilities of success, but in action, as to the issue that was before their eyes, confidently relying upon themselves. And then when the moment of combat came, thinking it better to defend themselves and suffer death rather than to yield and save their lives, they fled, indeed, from the shameful word of dishonour, but with life and limb stood stoutly to their task, and in the brief instant ordained by fate, at the crowning moment not of fear but of glory, they passed away.

XLIII. "And so these men then bore themselves after a manner that befits our city; but you who survive, though you may pray that it be with less hazard, should resolve that you will have a spirit to meet the foe which is no whit less courageous; and you must estimate the advantage of such a spirit not alone by a speaker's words, for he could make a long story in telling you—what you yourselves know as well as he—all the advantages that are to be gained by warding off the foe. Nay rather you must daily fix your gaze upon the power of Athens and become lovers of her, and when the vision of her greatness has inspired you, reflect that all this has been acquired by men of courage who knew their duty and in the hour of conflict were moved by a high sense of honour, who, if ever they failed in any enterprise, were resolved that at least their country should not find herself deserted by their valour, but freely sacrificed to her the fairest offering ¹ it was in

¹ ἵπαυς, a joint contribution, the regular term for a contribution made for mutual benefit, e.g. to a common meal, to a benevolent society, etc. Demosthenes (cont. Mid. 27) represents the state as a sort of benefit society to which every citizen owes a contribution.
THUCYDIDES

2 αυτῇ προϊέμενοι. κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώματα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγήρων ἔσπαινον ἐλάμβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον, οὐκ ἐν φίλι εἰς δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι αἰεὶ καὶ λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ αἰείμνηστος καταλέιπεται. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σημαίνει ἐπιγραφῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ μη προσηκούσῃ ἀγραφοῖς μνήμη παρ’ ἐκάστῳ τῆς γνώμης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδιαιτᾶται. οὕς γὰρ υμεῖς ξηλώσαντες καὶ τὸ εὐδαιμον τὸ ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ’ ἐλεύθερον τὸ εὔψυχον κράναντες, μὴ περιοράσθη τοὺς πολεμικοὺς κινδύνους. οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακοπραγοῦντες δικαίοτερον ἀφειδοὺς ἄν τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἐλπὶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλὰ οἷς ἡ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ ἐν τῷ ζήν ἐτὶ κινδυνεύεται καὶ ἐν οἷς μάλιστα μεγάλα τὰ διαφέροντα, ἢ τι πταίσωσιν. ἀλγεινοτέρα γὰρ ἀνδρὶ γε φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἢ μετὰ τοῦ μαλακισθῆναι κάκωσις ἢ ὁ μετὰ ῥώμης καὶ κοινῆς ἐλπίδος ἀμα γιγνόμενος ἀναίσθητος θάνατος.

XLIV. “Δι’ οὕτω καὶ τοὺς τῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοκέας, ὁσοὶ πάρεστε, οὐκ ὁλοφύρομαι μᾶλλον ἡ παραμυθήσομαι. ἐν πολυτρόποις γὰρ ξυμφοραῖς ἐπιστανται τραφέντες: τὸ δ’ εὔτυχές, οὐ ἀν τῆς εὐπρεπεστάτης λάχωσιν, ὁσπέρ οὐδέ μὲν ὑπὶ, τελευτής, υμεῖς δὲ λύπης, καὶ οἷς ἐνευδαιμονήσαί τε ὁ βίος ὁμοίως καὶ ἐντελευτήσαί εὐνεμετρήθην.

1 ἐν τῷ, in some MSS. before, in others after, μετὰ τοῦ, deleted by Bredow.
2 Hude reads τόδε εὐτυχές, following Abresch.

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their power to give. For they gave their lives for the common weal, and in so doing won for themselves the praise which grows not old and the most distinguished of all sepulchres—not that in which they lie buried, but that in which their glory survives in everlasting remembrance, celebrated on every occasion which gives rise to word of eulogy or deed of emulation. For the whole world is the sepulchre of famous men, and it is not the epitaph upon monuments set up in their own land that alone commemorates them, but also in lands not their own there abides in each breast an unwritten memorial of them, planted in the heart rather than graven on stone. Do you, therefore, now make these men your examples, and judging freedom to be happiness and courage to be freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of war. For it is not those that are in evil plight who have the best excuse for being unsparing of their lives, for they have no hope of better days, but rather those who run the risk, if they continue to live, of the opposite reversal of fortune, and those to whom it makes the greatest difference if they suffer a disaster. For to a manly spirit more bitter is humiliation associated with cowardice than death when it comes unperceived in close company with stalwart deeds and public hopes.

XLIV. "Wherefore, I do not commiserate the parents of these men, as many of you as are present here, but will rather try to comfort them. For they know that their lives have been passed amid manifold vicissitudes; and it is to be accounted good fortune when men win, even as these now, a most glorious death—and you a like grief—and when life has been meted out to them to be happy in no less than to
2 χαλεπών μὲν οὖν οίδα πείθειν ὦν, ὦν καὶ πολλάκις ἔξετε ὑπομνήματα ἐν ἄλλων εὐτυχίαις, αἷς ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἡγάλλεσθε· καὶ λύπη οὐχ ὄν ἄν τις μὴ πειρασάμενος ἁγαθῶν στερισκηταί, ἀλλ’ οὕ τον ἄν
3 ἐθὰς γενόμενος ἁφαίρεσθη. καρτερεὶν δὲ χρή καὶ ἄλλων παίδων ἐπίδιδ οἷς ἔτι ἡλικία τέκνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι: ἱδία τε γὰρ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων λήθη οἱ ἐπιγιγνόμενοι τισιν ἔσονται, καὶ τῇ πόλει διχόθεν, ἐκ τε τοῦ μὴ ἔρμηνουθαι καὶ ἀσφαλεία, ξυνοίσει· οὐ γὰρ οἶν τε ἵσου τι ἡ δίκαιοι βουλεύσθαι οὐ ἀν μὴ καὶ παῖδας ἐκ τοῦ ὀμοίου παραβαλλόμενοι
4 κινδυνεύσωσιν. ὅσοι δ’ αὖ παρηθήκατε, τόν τε πλέονα κέρδος ὁν ἡπυηχεῖτε βίον ἡγεῖσθε καὶ τόνδε βραχὺν ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τῇ τῶν εὐκλείας κουφίζεσθε. τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρείῳ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδαῖν εἰς τινές φασι, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι.

XLV. ‘Παίσι δ’ αὖ ὅσοι τῶνδε πάρεστε ἦ ἀδελφοῖς ὁρῶ μέγαν τὸν ἀγώνα (τὸν γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ἄπας εἰώθεν ἐπαινεῖν), καὶ μόλις ἂν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς οὐχ ὀμοίοι, ἀλλ’ ὅλως χείρους

1 No one could be a member of the Boule or Senate till he was thirty, when he was almost certain to be married; and, according to Deinarchus (§71), no man was allowed to speak in the Assembly until he had legitimate male issue (Zimmern).
2 e.g Simonides. cf. Plut. Moral. 786 b: Σιμώνιδης ἔλεγε πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας αὐτῷ φιλαργυρίαν, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπε-
die in. It will be difficult, I know, to persuade you of the truth of this, when you will constantly be reminded of your loss by seeing others in the enjoyment of blessings in which you too once took delight; and grief, I know, is felt, not for the want of the good things which a man has never known, but for what is taken away from him after he has once become accustomed to it. But those of you who are still of an age to have offspring should bear up in the hope of other children; for not only to many of you individually will the children that are born hereafter be a cause of forgetfulness of those who are gone, but the state also will reap a double advantage—it will not be left desolate and it will be secure. For they cannot possibly offer fair and impartial counsel who, having no children to hazard, do not have an equal part in the risk. But as for you who have passed your prime, count as gain the greater portion of your life during which you were fortunate and remember that the remainder will be short; and be comforted by the fair fame of these your sons. For the love of honour alone is untouched by age, and when one comes to the ineffectual period of life it is not 'gain' as some say, that gives the greater satisfaction, but honour.

XLV. "But for such of you here present as are sons and brothers of these men, I see the greatness of the conflict that awaits you—for the dead are always praised—and even were you to attain to surpassing virtue, hardly would you be judged, I will not say

στερημένος διὰ τὸ γῆρας ἡδονῶν ὑπὸ μῖας ἐτὶ γηροβοσκεῖται, τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαλείου, Simonides replied to those who charged him with love of money, that, deprived by old age of other pleasures, he is still comforted by one, that of gain.
κρίθειτε. φθόνος γὰρ τοῖς ξώσι πρὸς τὸ ἀντί-
παλον,1 τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐμποδῶν ἀνανταγωνίστῳ εὐνοία
τετίμηται.
2 "Εἶ δὲ με δεῖ καὶ γυναικείας τι ἀρετῆς, ὅσαι
νῦν ἐν χηρείᾳ ἔσονται, μνησθήναι, βραχείᾳ
παραμένει ἀπαν σημανῶ. τῆς τε γὰρ ὑπαρχοῦ-
σης φύσεως μὴ χείροσι γενέσθαι ὑμῖν μεγάλῃ ἢ
dόξα καὶ ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς πέρι ἡ
ψόγον ἐν τοῖς ἀρσεσι κλέος ἦ.
XLVI. "Εἴρηται καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγῳ κατὰ τὸν
νόμον ὅσα εἰχον πρόσφορα, καὶ ἔργῳ οἱ θαπτό-
μενοι τὰ μὲν ἡδὲ κεκόσμηται, τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς
παἶδας τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε δημοσία ἢ πόλεις μέχρι ἡβίς
θρέφει, ὥφελιμον στέφανον τοῖςδέ τε καὶ τοῖς
λειτομένοις τῶν τοιώντε ἀγώνων προτιθείσα:
ἄθλα γὰρ οἰς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ
2 ἄνδρες ἄριστοι πολιτεύουσιν. νῦν δὲ ἀπολο-
φυράμενοι ὑπὸ προσήκει ἑκάστῳ ἀπίτες;"
XLVII. Τοιόσοδε μὲν ὁ τάφος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ
χειμῶνι τοῦτῳ καὶ διελθόντος αὐτοῦ πρῶτον
2 ἐτος τοῦ πολέμου τούτου ἐτελεύτα. τοῦ δὲ θέ-
ρους εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμ-
μαχοι τὰ δύο μέρη ὀσπέρ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐσέ-
βαλον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν (:['γειτο δὲ 'Ἀρχίδαμος ο
Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς), καὶ καθε-
3 ξομενοι ἑδήσουν τὴν γῆν. καὶ ὄντων αὐτῶν οὐ

1 πρὸς τὸ ἀντίπαλον, the reading of ABFM[G]; τὸν ἀντί-
pαλον CE. Hude reads τῶν ἀντίπάλων, after Croiset.
their equals, but even a little inferior. For there is envy of the living on account of rivalry, but that which has been removed from our path is honoured with a good-will that knows no antagonism.

"If I am to speak also of womanly virtues, referring to those of you who will henceforth be in widowhood, I will sum up all in a brief admonition: Great is your glory if you fall not below the standard which nature has set for your sex, and great also is hers of whom there is least talk among men whether in praise or in blame.

XLVI. "I have now spoken, in obedience to the law, such words as I had that were fitting, and those whom we are burying have already in part also received their tribute in our deeds;\(^1\) besides, the state will henceforth maintain their children at the public expense until they grow to manhood, thus offering both to the dead and to their survivors a crown of substantial worth as their prize in such contests. For where the prizes offered for virtue are greatest, there are found the best citizens. And now, when you have made due lament, each for his own dead, depart."

XLVII. Such were the funeral ceremonies that took place during this winter, the close of which brought the first year of this war to an end. At the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before,\(^2\) invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and establishing themselves proceeded to ravage the country. And before they had been many days in

\(^1\) i.e. the honours shown them throughout the rest of the ceremony, described in ch. xxxiv, as contrasted with the words of the eulogist.  
\(^2\) cf. ch. x. 2.
πολλὰς πω ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἡ νόσος πρῶτον ἦρξατο γενέσθαι τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, λεγόμενον μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλαχόσε ἐγκατασκήνησαι καὶ περὶ Δήμουν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις χωρίοις, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτος γε λοιμὸς οὐδὲ φθορὰ οὕτως ἀνθρώπων οὐδαμοῦ ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἦρκοιν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἄγνοια, ἀλλ' αὐτὸι μάλιστα ἐθυμίσκον ὅσῳ καὶ μάλιστα προσήσαν, οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεία τέχνη οὐδεμία· ὅσα τε πρὸς ἱεροῖς ἰκέτευσαν ἡ μαντείας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἱερήσαντο, πάντα ἁνωφελῆ ἤν, τελευτῶντες τε αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νυκώμενοι.

XLVIII. Ἡρξατο δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς λεγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Ἁγιύπτου, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ ἐς Ἁγιύπτουν καὶ Διβύην κατέβη καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλέως γῆν τὴν πολλήν. ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ἐξαπιναῖς ἐνέπεσε, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ Πειραιᾷ ἦγατο τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ ἐλέχθη ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐμβαθεῖν. ὃ γὰρ οὕτω ἦσαν αὐτοῖς. ὁστερον δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν ἄφικετο καὶ ἐθυμήσαν πολλῷ μάλλον ἥδη. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἐκαστὸς χιγιώσκει καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης ἄφ' ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀστινος νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἰκανάς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶνον τε ἐγήγεντο λέξῳ καὶ ἄφ' ὅν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἰ ποτὲ καὶ ἀυθίς ἐπιπέσοι,

1 ἦν: Hude deletes.
2 δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σχεῖν, in the MSS. after εἶναι, deleted by Gesner; Hude deletes ἰκανάς εἶναι and ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι, with F. Mueller.

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Attica, the plague began for the first time to show itself among the Athenians. It is said, indeed, to have broken out before in many places, both in Lemnos and elsewhere, though no pestilence of such extent nor any scourge so destructive of human lives is on record anywhere. For neither were physicians able to cope with the disease, since they at first had to treat it without knowing its nature, the mortality among them being greatest because they were most exposed to it, nor did any other human art avail. And the supplications made at sanctuaries, or appeals to oracles and the like, were all futile, and at last men desisted from them, overcome by the calamity.

XLVIII. The disease began, it is said, in Ethiopia beyond Egypt, and then descended into Egypt and Libya and spread over the greater part of the King's territory. Then it suddenly fell upon the city of Athens, and attacked first the inhabitants of the Peiraeus, so that the people there even said that the Peloponnesians had put poison in their cisterns; for there were as yet no public fountains there. But afterwards it reached the upper city also, and from that time the mortality became much greater. Now any one, whether physician or layman, may, each according to his personal opinion, speak about its probable origin and state the causes which, in his view, were sufficient to have produced so great a departure from normal conditions; but I shall describe its actual course, explaining the symptoms, from the study of which a person should be best able,

1 It is perhaps impossible to identify the plague of Athens with any known disease. Grote describes it as an eruptive typhoid fever. It has perhaps more symptoms in common with typhus than with any other disease.
μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχωι τι προειδῶς μὴ ἁγνοεῖν, ταύτα δηλῶσοι αὐτός τε νοσήσας καί αὐτὸς ἰδῶν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

XLIX. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὠμολογεῖτο ἐκ πάντων, μάλιστα δὴ ἐκείνο άνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγχανεν ὦν· εἰ δὲ τις καὶ προὐκαμνέ 2 τι, ἐς τούτῳ πάντα ἀπεκρίθη. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης ὑγιεῖς ὄντας πρῶτον μὲν τῆς κεφαλῆς θέρμαι ἵσχυραί καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθήματα καὶ φλόγωσις ἐλάμβανε, καὶ τὰ ἐντός, ἡ τε φάρυξ καὶ ἡ γλώσσα, εὐθὺς αἰματώδη ἦν καὶ πνεύμα ἄτοπον καὶ δυσώδες

3 ἤφειν· ἐπείτα ἐξ αὐτῶν πταρμός καὶ βράγχος ἐπεγίγνετο, καὶ ἐν οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατέβαινεν ἐς τὰ στήθη ὁ πόνος μετὰ βηχῶς ἵσχυρον· καὶ ὅποτε ἐς τὴν καρδίαν στηρίζειεν, ἀνέστρεφε τε αὐτήν καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι ὤσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν

4 ὄνομασμέναι εἰσὶν ἐπῆσαν, καὶ αὐταῖ μετὰ ταλαι- πωρίας μεγάλης, λύγες τε τοῖς πλείοσιν ἐνέπιπτε κενὴ σπασμὸν ἐνδιδούσα ἵσχυρόν, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ ταύτα λωφήσαντα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ πολλῷ ύστερον.

5 καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐξωθεὶν ἀπτομένῳ τὸς σῶμα οὐτ' ἀγαν θερμὸν ἦν οὕτε χλωρόν, ἀλλ' ὑπέρυθρον, πελετόνον, φλυκταίναις μικραῖς καὶ ἐλκεσιν ἐξην- θηκός· τὰ δὲ ἐντός οὕτως ἐκαίετο ὡστε μήτε τῶν πάνω λεπτῶν ἰματίων καὶ συνδόνων τὰς ἐπιβολὰς μηδ' ἄλλο τι ἡ γυμνοὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, ἤδιστα τε ἄν ἐς ὑδωρ ψυχρὸν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ῥίπτειν (καὶ πολλοὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἡμελημένων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐδρασάν ἐς φρέατα) τῇ δίψῃ ἀπαύστῳ ξυνεχόμενοι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθειστήκει τὸ τε πλέον καὶ ἐλασσοῦν πο-

1 Added by Hude.
having knowledge of it beforehand, to recognize it if it should ever break out again. For I had the disease myself and saw others sick of it.

XLIX. That year, as was agreed by all, happened to be unusually free from disease so far as regards the other maladies; but if anyone was already ill of any disease all terminated in this. In other cases from no obvious cause, but suddenly and while in good health, men were seized first with intense heat of the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes, and the parts inside the mouth, both the throat and the tongue, immediately became blood-red and exhaled an unnatural and fetid breath. In the next stage sneezing and hoarseness came on, and in a short time the disorder descended to the chest, attended by severe coughing. And when it settled in the stomach, that was upset, and vomits of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, these also attended by great distress; and in most cases ineffectual retching followed producing violent convulsions, which sometimes abated directly, sometimes not until long afterwards. Externally, the body was not so very warm to the touch; it was not pale, but reddish, livid, and breaking out in small blisters and ulcers. But internally it was consumed by such a heat that the patients could not bear to have on them the lightest coverings or linen sheets, but wanted to be quite uncovered and would have liked best to throw themselves into cold water—indeed many of those who were not looked after did throw themselves into cisterns—so tormented were they by thirst which could not be quenched; and it was all the same whether they drank much or little.
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6 τὸν. καὶ ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἰσυχάζειν καὶ ἡ ἀγρυπνία ἐπέκειτο διὰ παντὸς. καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὃςουτερχρόνον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἀκμάζοι, οὐκ ἐμαραίνετο, ἀλλ' ἀντείχε παρὰ δόξαν τῇ ταλαιπωρίᾳ, (ὅπερ ἡ διεφθείροντο οἱ πλείστοι ἐναταιοὶ καὶ ἐβδομαίοι, ώπθ' τοῦ ἐντὸς καύματος ἔτι ἔχοντες τι δυνάμεως, ἢ εἰ διαφύγοιεν, ἐπικατιόντος τοῦ νοσήματος ἐς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ ἐλκώσεως τε αὐτῇ ἵσχυρὰς ἐγγυγομένης καὶ διαρροίας ἀμα ἄκρατον ἐπιπιπτοῦσης οἱ πολλοὶ ὑστερον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν διεφθείροντο.

7 διεξῆει γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος ἀνωθεν ἀρξάμενον τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρῶτον ἱδρυθὲν κακόν, καὶ εἰ τις ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων περιγένειτο, τῶν ὑπὸ ἀκρω-

8 τηρίων ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεσήμαινεν κατέσκηπτε γὰρ καὶ ἐς αἰδοία καὶ ἐς ἀκρας χειρας καὶ πόδας, καὶ πολλοὶ στερισκόμενοι τούτων διέφευγον, εἰσὶ δ' οἱ καὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. τοὺς δὲ καὶ λήθη ἑλάβε τὸ παρατικα ἀναστάντας πάντων ὀμοίως καὶ ἡγνόησαν σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους.

L. Γενόμενον γὰρ κρείσσον λόγου τὸ εἰδώς τῆς νόσου τά τε ἀλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἐκάστῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ δὲ ἐδήλωσε μάλιστα ἀλλο τῷ ὁ ἡ τῶν εὐντρόφων τυτὰ γὰρ ὅρνεα καὶ τετράποδα ὅσα ἀνθρώπων ἀπτε-ται πολλῶν ἀτάφων γενομένων ἢ οὔ προσήει ἡ 2 γενσάμενα διεφθείρετο. τεκμήριον δὲ τῶν μὲν

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They were also beset by restlessness and sleeplessness which never abated. And the body was not wasted while the disease was at its height, but resisted surprisingly the ravages of the disease, so that when the patients died, as most of them did on the seventh or ninth day from the internal heat, they still had some strength left; or, if they passed the crisis, the disease went down into the bowels, producing there a violent ulceration, and at the same time an acute diarrhoea set in, so that in this later stage most of them perished through weakness caused by it. For the malady, starting from the head where it was first seated, passed down until it spread through the whole body, and if one got over the worst, it seized upon the extremities at least and left its marks there; for it attacked the privates and fingers and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, though some lost their eyes also.\(^1\) In some cases the sufferer was attacked immediately after recovery by loss of memory, which extended to every object alike, so that they failed to recognize either themselves or their friends.

L. Indeed the character of the disease proved such that it baffles description, the violence of the attack being in each case too great for human nature to endure, while in one way in particular it showed plainly that it was different from any of the familiar diseases: the birds, namely, and the fourfooted animals, which usually feed upon human bodies, either would not now come near them, though many lay unburied, or died if they tasted of them. The evidence for this is that birds of this kind became

\(^1\) Evidently as the result of gangrene, due to stoppage of circulation. This after-effect of typhus was of common occurrence in the outbreak in the Balkans in 1915.

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τοιούτων ὄρνθων ἐπίλειψις σαφῆς ἐγένετο, καὶ
οὐχ ἔωρωντο οὔτε ἄλλως οὔτε περὶ τοιούτων οὐδὲν·
οἰ δὲ κύνες μᾶλλον αἰσθήσιν παρεῖχον τοῦ ἀπο-
βαίνοντος διὰ τὸ ξυνδιαιτᾶσθαι.

II. Τὸ μὲν οὖν νόσημα, πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα παρα-
λίποντι ἀτοπίας, ὡς ἐκάστῳ ἐτύγχανε τι διαφε-
ρόντως ἐτέρῳ πρὸς ἐτερον γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἦν
ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν. καὶ ἄλλο παρελύπει κατ’
ἐκείνου τὸν χρόνον οὐδὲν τῶν εἰσωθότων· ὃ δὲ καὶ
2 γένοιτο, ἐς τούτο ἐτελεύτα. ἔθυμσκον δὲ οἱ μὲν
ἀμελεία, οἱ δὲ καὶ πάνυ θεραπευόμενοι. ἐν τε
οὐδὲν κατέστη ἱαμα ὡς εἶπεῖν ὅ τι χρὴν προσφέ-
ροντας ὁφελεῖν (τὸ γάρ τω ξυνενεγκὸν ἄλλον
3 τούτο ἔβλαπτε), σῶμα τε αὐτάρκες ἃν οὐδὲν διε-
φάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἄλλα
πάντα ἐξυμήρει καὶ τὰ πάση διαίτη θεραπευόμενα,
4 δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἢν τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ τε ἄθυμία,
ὅποτε τις αἰσθοῖντα κάμνων (πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀνέλ-
πιστον εὗθν τραπόμενοι τῇ γυνώμῃ πολλῷ μᾶλ-
λον προείντο σφᾶς αὐτοῦς καὶ οὐκ ἀντεῖχον), καὶ
ὅτι ἐτερος ἄφ’ ἐτέρον θεραπείᾳ ἀναπιμπλάμενοι
ὦσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθυμσκοι καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον
5 φθόρον τούτο ἐνεποίει. εἶτε γὰρ μὴ ἥθελοιν δε-
διότες ἄλληλοις προσιέναι, ἀπώλυντο ἑρήμοι,
καὶ οἰκία πολλαὶ ἐκενώθησαν ἀπορία τοῦ θερα-
πεύσοντος· εἶτε προσίοιεν, διεφθείροντο, καὶ μᾶ—
noticeably scarce, and they were no longer to be seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while the dogs gave a still better opportunity to observe what happened, because they live with man.

LI. Such, then, was the general nature of the disease; for I pass over many of the unusual symptoms, since it chanced to affect one man differently as compared with another. And while the plague lasted there were none of the usual complaints, though if any did occur it ended in this. Sometimes death was due to neglect, but sometimes it occurred in spite of careful nursing. And no one remedy was found, I may say, which was sure to bring relief to those applying it—for what helped one man hurt another—and no constitution, as it proved, was of itself sufficient against it, whether as regards physical strength or weakness, but it carried off all without distinction, even those tended with all medical care. And the most dreadful thing about the whole malady was not only the despondency of the victims, when they once became aware that they were sick, for their minds straightway yielded to despair and they gave themselves up for lost instead of resisting, but also the fact that they became infected by nursing one another and died like sheep. And this caused the heaviest mortality; for if, on the one hand, they were restrained by fear from visiting one another, the sick perished uncared for, so that many houses were left empty through lack of anyone to do the nursing; or if, on the other hand, they visited the sick, they perished,

1 i.e. "no constitution was of itself strong enough to resist or weak enough to escape the attacks" (Jowett).
λιστα οἱ ἀρετῆς τι μεταποιούμενοι αἰσχύνη γὰρ ἠφείδουν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐσίοντες παρὰ τοὺς φίλους, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις τῶν ἀπογιγνόμενων τελευτώντες καὶ οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἐξέκαμμον ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
6 κακοῦ νικώμενοι. ἔπει πλέον ὃς ὁμοὶ οἱ διαπε-φευγότες τὸν τε θυνήσαντα καὶ τὸν πονούμενον ὕκτιζοντο διὰ τὸ προειδέιναι τε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἥδη ἐν τῷ θαρσαλέω εἶναι· διὸ γὰρ τὸν αὐτόν, ὃστε καὶ κτείνειν, οὐκ ἐπελάμβανεν. καὶ ἐμακαρίζοντο τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ αὐτοὶ τῷ παραχρήμα περι-χαρεῖ καὶ ἐς τὸν ἐπειτὰ χρόνου ἐλπίδος τι εἶχον κούφης μηδὲ ἂν ὑπ’ ἄλλου νοσήματός ποτε ἐπὶ διαφθαρῆναι.

I. 'Επίεσε δ’ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον πρὸς τῷ ὑπάρ-χοντι πόνῳ καὶ ἡ εὐγνωμική ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ
2 ἀστυ, καὶ οὐχ ἦσου τοὺς ἐπελθόντας. οἰκεῖοι
gambar οὐχ ὑπαρχοῦσών, ἄλλ’ ἐν καλύβαις πυγηραίς
ὁρα ἔτοις διαιτωμένων ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ
kόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκρὸι ἐπ’ ἄλληλοις ἀποθη-σκόντες ἐκεῖντο καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλυπτοῦντο καὶ
περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἡμιθνῆτες τοῦ ὑδατος
3 ἐπιθυμίαι. τὰ τε ιερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνυντο νεκρῶν
πλέα ἢν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθησκόντων ὑπερβιαζο-
mένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὃ
ti γένοιτο, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτράπωντο καὶ ιερῶν
4 καὶ ὀσίων ὁμοίως. νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταρά-
χθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς ταφάς,
especially those who made any pretensions to goodness. For these made it a point of honour to visit their friends without sparing themselves at a time when the very relatives of the dying, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the calamity, were growing weary even of making their lamentations. But still it was more often those who had recovered who had pity for the dying and the sick, because they had learnt what it meant and were themselves by this time confident of immunity; for the disease never attacked the same man a second time, at least not with fatal results. And they were not only congratulated by everybody else, but themselves, in the excess of their joy at the moment, cherished also a fond fancy with regard to the rest of their lives that they would never be carried off by any other disease.

LII. But in addition to the trouble under which they already laboured, the Athenians suffered further hardship owing to the crowding into the city of the people from the country districts; and this affected the new arrivals especially. For since no houses were available for them and they had to live in huts that were stifling in the hot season, they perished in wild disorder. Bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead people rolled about in the streets and, in their longing for water, near all the fountains. The temples, too, in which they had quartered themselves were full of the corpses of those who had died in them; for the calamity which weighed upon them was so overpowering that men, not knowing what was to become of them, became careless of all law, sacred as well as profane. And the customs which they had hitherto observed regarding burial were all thrown into confusion, and
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ἐθαπτοῦν δὲ ὡς ἐκαστὸς ἑδύνατο. καὶ πολλοὶ ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας ἐτράποντο σπάνει τῶν ἐπι-
τηδείων διὰ τὸ συχνὸς ἤδη προτεθύναν σφίσιν·
ἐπὶ πυρᾶς γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας φθάσαντες τοὺς νήσαν-
τας οἱ μὲν ἐπιθέντες τὸν έαυτῶν νεκρὸν υφίπτον,
οἳ δὲ καιομένου ἄλλου ἐπιβαλόντες ἀνωθέν δυ
φέροιεν ἀπησαν.

I.III. Πρῶτον τε ἦρξε καὶ ἐς τάλλα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ πλέον ἀνομίας τὸ νόσημα. ῥαῦν γὰρ ἐτόλμα
τις ὁ πρότερον ἀπεκρύπτετο μὴ καθ’ ἢδονήν
ποιεῖν, ἀγχίστροφον τὴν μεταβολὴν ὀρῶντες τῶν
τε εὐδαιμόνων καὶ αἰφνιδίως θυησκοῦτοι καὶ τῶν
οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθὺς δὲ τάκεινον
2 ἐχώντων. ὡστε ταχείας τὰς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς
τὸ τερπνὸν ἡξίουν ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τὰ τε σώ-
3 ματα καὶ τὰ χρῆματα ὅμως ἡγούμενοι. καὶ τὸ
μὲν προταλαιπωρεῖν1 τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ οὐδεὶς πρό-
θυμος ἦν, ἄδηλον νομίζων εἰ πρὶν ἐπ’ αὐτὸ ἐλθεῖν
διαφθαρῆσαι, ὁ τι δὲ ἦδη τε ἢδυ πανταχόθεν τε
ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλέον, τούτῳ καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρῆσιμον
4 κατέστη. θεῶν δὲ φόβος ἡ ἀνθρώπων νόμος οὐ-
δεὶς ἀπείργη, τὸ μὲν κρίνοντες ἐν ὁμοίῳ καὶ σέβειν
καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρᾶν ἐν ἴσῳ ἀπολλυμένους,
tῶν δὲ ἀμαρτημάτων οὐδεὶς ἐλπίζων μέχρι τοῦ

1 With CE, the other MSS. προσταλαιπωρεῖν.

1 ἢ.δονήν

i.e. they concealed the fact that they were acting after
their own pleasure (the μὴ being induced by the negative
idea in ἀπεκρύπτετο).

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they buried their dead each one as he could. And many resorted to shameless modes of burial because so many members of their households had already died that they lacked the proper funeral materials. Resorting to other people's pyres, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would put on their own dead and kindle the fire; others would throw the body they were carrying upon one which was already burning and go away.

LI. In other respects also the plague first introduced into the city a greater lawlessness. For where men hitherto practised concealment, that they were not acting purely after their pleasure, they now showed a more careless daring. They saw how sudden was the change of fortune in the case both of those who were prosperous and suddenly died, and of those who before had nothing but in a moment were in possession of the property of the others. And so they resolved to get out of life the pleasures which could be had speedily and would satisfy their lusts, regarding their bodies and their wealth alike as transitory. And no one was eager to practise self-denial in prospect of what was esteemed honour, because everyone thought that it was doubtful whether he would live to attain it, but the pleasure of the moment and whatever was in any way conducive to it came to be regarded as at once honourable and expedient. No fear of gods or law of men restrained; for, on the one hand, seeing that all men were perishing alike, they judged that piety and impiety came to the same thing, and, on the other, no one expected that he

2 Or, reading προσταλαίπωρεῖν, "to take trouble about what was esteemed honour."
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dίκην γενέσθαι βιούς ἂν τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀντιδοῦναι, 
πολὺ δὲ μείζω τὴν ἤδη κατεψυχήσεμένην σφῶν 
ἐπικρεμασθῆναι, ἣν πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰκὸς εἶναι τοῦ 
βίου τι ἀπολαῦσαι.

LIV. Τοιούτω μὲν πάθει οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περιπε-
σόντες ἐπιέξοντο, ἀνθρώπων τ' ἐνδον θυσίακόντων 
2 καὶ γῆς ἔξω δησυμένης. ἐν δὲ τῷ κακῷ οἷα εἰκὸς 
ἀνεμνήσθησαν καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐπούς, φάσκοντες οἱ 
πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ἄδεσθαι “Ｈξει Δωριάκος πό-
3 λεμος καὶ λοιμὸς ἀμ' αὐτῷ.” ἐγένετο μὲν οὖν ἔρις 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ λοιμὸν οὐκομάσθαι εν τῷ ἔπει 
ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀλλὰ λιμόν, ἐνίκησε δὲ ἔπι τοῦ 
παρόντος εἰκότως λοιμὸν εἰρήσθαι οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρω-
ποί πρὸς ἀ ἐπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιούντο. ἢν 
δὲ γε οἷμαι ποτὲ ἄλλος πόλεμος καταλάβῃ Δω-
ρικὸς τοῦτο ὕστερος καὶ ξυμβῇ γενέσθαι λιμόν, 
4 κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς οὕτως ἄσονται. μνήμη δὲ ἐγένετο 
καὶ τοῦ Δακεδαίμονίων χρηστηρίου τοῖς εἰδόσιν, 
ὅτε ἐπερωτῶσιν αὐτοῖς τὸν θεὸν εἰ χρὴ πολεμεῖν 
ἀνείλε κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ 
5 αὐτὸς ἐφή ξυλλήψεσθαι. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ χρη-
στηρίου τὰ γεγονόμενα ἡκαζον ὁμοία εἶναι. ἐσβε-
βληκότων δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἡ νόσος ἡρξατο 
eυθὺς. καὶ ἐς μὲν Πελοπόννησον οὐκ ἐσήλθεν, ὃ 
τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, ἐπενείματο δὲ Ἀθῆνας μὲν

1 cf. i. cxviii. 3.
would live to be called to account and pay the penalty of his misdeeds. On the contrary, they believed that the penalty already decreed against them, and now hanging over their heads, was a far heavier one, and that before this fell it was only reasonable to get some enjoyment out of life.

LIV. Such then was the calamity that had befallen them by which the Athenians were sore pressed, their people dying within the walls and their land being ravaged without. And in their distress they recalled, as was natural, the following verse which their older men said had long ago been uttered:

“A Dorian war shall come and pestilence with it.”

A dispute arose, however, among the people, some contending that the word used in the verse by the ancients was not λοιμός, “pestilence,” but λιμός, “famine,” and the view prevailed at the time that “pestilence” was the original word; and quite naturally, for men’s recollections conformed to their sufferings. But if ever another Dorian war should visit them after the present war and a famine happen to come with it, they would probably, I fancy, recite the verse in that way. Those, too, who were familiar with it, recalled that other oracle given to the Lacedaemonians, when, in answer to their inquiry whether they should go to war, the god responded that if they “warred with all their might victory would be theirs,” adding that he himself would assist them.¹ Now so far as the oracle is concerned, they surmised that what was then happening was its fulfilment, for the plague broke out immediately after the Peloponnesians had invaded Attica; and though it did not enter the Peloponnesus to any extent, it devastated Athens most of all, and next

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μάλιστα, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα. ταύτα μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γενόμενα.

LV. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδή ἐτέμουν τὸ πεδίον, παρῆλθον ἐς τὴν Πάραλον γῆν καλουμένην μέχρι Λαυρείου, οὐ τὰ ἄργυρεα μέταλλα ἐστίν Ἀθηναίοις. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐτέμουν ταύτην γὰρ, ἐπειτα δὲ τὴν πρὸς 

2 Ἔβδομον τε καὶ Ἀνδρον τετραμμένην. Περικλῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς ὦν καὶ τότε περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτήν γυνώμην εἰχεν ὠσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἑσβολῆ.

LVI. Ἐτι δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐς τὴν παραλίαν ἔλθειν, ἐκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ παρεσκευάζοντο, καὶ ἐπειδή 

2 ἐτοίμα ἦν, ἀνήγετο. ἦγε δ' ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν ὀπλίτας Ἀθηναίων τετρακισχίλιους καὶ ἱππέας τριακοσίους ἐν ναυσίν ἱππαγωγοῖς πρῶτον τότε ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νεῶν ποιηθεὶσας. ξυνεστρατεύοντο δὲ 

3 καὶ Χίοι καὶ Λέσβιοι πεντήκοντα ναυσίν. ὅτε δὲ ἀνήγετο ἡ στρατιὰ αὐτὴ Ἀθηναίων, Πελοποννήσιοι κατέλιπον τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὄντας ἐν τῇ 

4 παραλίᾳ. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἐτέμουν τῆς γῆς τῆν πολλῆν, καὶ πρὸς τῆν πόλιν προσβάλοντες ἐς ἐλπίδα μὲν ἢλθον 

5 τοῦ ἔλειν, οὐ μέντοι προκυχώρθησε γε. ἀναγαγόμενοι δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἐπίδαυρου ἐτέμουν τὴν τῇ Τροζηνίδα γῆν καὶ Ἀλιάδα καὶ Ἐρμιονίδα. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα πάντα ἐπιθαλάσσια τῆς Πελοποννήσου. 

6 ἄραντες δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀφίκοντο ἐς Πρασιάς, τῆς
to Athens the places which had the densest population. So much for the history of the plague.

LV. The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, advanced into the district called Paralus as far as Laurium, where are the silver mines of the Athenians. And first they ravaged that part of this district which looked towards the Peloponnesus, and afterwards the part facing Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, who was general, still held to the same policy as during the earlier invasion, insisting that the Athenians should not take the field against them.

LVI. But before they had left the plain and entered the Paralus, Pericles had begun to equip a fleet of a hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnesus, and when all was ready he put to sea. He took with him on the ships four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred cavalry in horse-transports, then employed for the first time, which had been made out of the old galleys. The Chians and Lesbians also took part in the expedition with fifty ships. And when this armament of the Athenians put to sea, the Peloponnesians whom they left in Attica were already in the Paralian district. On reaching Epidaurus in the Peloponnesus the Athenians ravaged most of that land; they also attacked the city, but, though they at first had hopes of taking it, they did not succeed. Then, leaving Epidaurus, they went to sea again, and ravaged the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, which are all on the Peloponnesian coast. Sailing next from this region they

\[1\] The plain referred to was that about Athens, while the Paralian district was the sea-coast, or south-eastern part, terminating in the promontory of Sunium.
Λακωνικὴς πόλισμα ἐπιθαλάσσιον, καὶ τῆς τε 
γῆς ἔτεμον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πόλισμα εἶλον καὶ ἐπόρ-
θησαν. ταῦτα δὲ ποιήσαντες ἐπὶ οἴκου ἀνεχώ-
ρησαν. τοὺς δὲ Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι κατέλαβοι 
ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ οὖντας, ἀλλ’ ἀνακεχωρηκότας.

LVII. Ὅσον δὲ χρόνον οἱ τε Πελοποννησίοι 
ήσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ τῇ Ἀθηναίων καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐστράτευον ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν, ἡ νόση ἐν τῇ στρα-
τιᾷ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐφθειρε καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὡστε 
καὶ ἐλέχθη τοὺς Πελοποννησίους δείσαντας τὸ 
νόσημα, ὡς ἐπυνθάνοντο τῶν αὐτομόλων ὦτὶ ἐν 
τῇ πόλει εὐθεῖα καὶ θάπτοντας ἀμα ἑσθανοντο,

2 θάσσον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἔξελθειν. τῇ δὲ ἐσβολῇ ταῦτη 
πλεῖστον τε χρόνον ἐνέμειναν καὶ τὴν γῆν πᾶσαν 
ἔτεμον· ἡμέρας γὰρ τεσσαράκοντα μᾶλιστα ἐν τῇ 
γῇ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐγένοντο.

LVIII. Τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους Ἀγωνον ὁ Νικίου 
καὶ Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου, ξυστράτηγοι οὕτε 
Περικλέους, λαβόντες τὴν στρατιάν ἤπερ ἐκεῖνος 
ἐχρήσατο ἐστράτευσαν εὐθὺς ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς 
ἐπὶ Θρίκης καὶ Ποτείδαιαν ἐτί πολιορκομένην, 
ἀφικόμενοι δὲ μηχανάς τε τῇ Ποτείδαιᾳ προσέ-

2 φεροῦν καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπειρῶντο ἔλειν. προν-
χώρει δὲ αὐτοῖς οὕτε ἡ αἰρέσις τῆς πόλεως οὕτε 
τάλλα τῆς παρασκευῆς ἀξίως· ἐπιγενομένη γὰρ 
ἡ νόσος ἐνταῦθα δὴ πάνω ἐπίσεις τοὺς Ἀθη-


1 On the expedition against the Peloponnesian coasts, cf. 
ch. lvi. 2 cf. i. lxiv.
came to Prasiae, a town on the coast of Laconia, where they not only ravaged parts of the country, but also captured the town itself and pillaged it. After they had completed these operations they went back home, where they found that the Peloponnesians were no longer in Attica but had retired.

LVII. During this entire period, while the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the fleet of the Athenians was on the expedition, the plague was making havoc among the Athenians, both in their fleet and in the city. The statement was therefore made that the Peloponnesians left Attica in haste because they were afraid of the disease, since they not only heard from deserters that it was in the city, but also could see them burning their dead. In this invasion, however, they remained in Attica longer than at any other time, and also ravaged the entire country; indeed they were in Attica almost forty days.

LVIII. In the same summer Hagnon son of Nicias and Cleopompus son of Clinias, colleagues of Pericles, taking the armament which he had employed, at once set out on an expedition against the Chalcidians in Thrace and against Potidaea, which was still under siege, and on their arrival they brought siege-engines to bear upon Potidaea, and tried in every way to take it. But no success commensurate with the appointments of the expedition attended their efforts, either in their attempt to capture the city or otherwise; for the plague broke out and sorely distressed the Athenians there, playing such havoc in the army that even the Athenian soldiers of the first expedition, who had hitherto been in good health, caught the infection

The 3,000 soldiers of the first expedition; cf. ch. xxxi. 2 and i. lxii. 4.
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χρόνῳ ύμαίνοντας. Φορμῶν δὲ καὶ οἱ ἔξακόσιοι
καὶ χίλιοι οὐκέτι ἦσαν περὶ Χαλκιδέας. ὁ μὲν
οὖν Ἀγωνον ἀνεχώρησε ταῖς ναυσίν ἐς τὰς Ἀθη-
νας, ἀπὸ τετρακισχιλίων ὀπλιτῶν χιλίους καὶ
πεντήκοντα τῇ νόσῳ ἀπολέσας ἐν τεσσαράκοντα
μάλιστα ἡμέραις· οἱ δὲ προτεροὶ στρατιῶται
κατὰ χώραν μένοντες ἐπολιοῦρκον τὴν Ποτει-
δαιαν.

LIX. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν ἑσβολὴν τῶν
Πελοποννησίων οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἦ τε γη αὐτῶν
ἐτέμητο τὸ δεύτερον καὶ ἡ νόσος ἐπέκειτο ἄμα
καὶ ὁ πόλεμος, ἦλλοιντο τὰς γυνόμας, καὶ τὸν
μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αὐτίᾳ εἶχον ὡς πείσαντα σφᾶς
πολεμεῖν καὶ δι’ ἐκεῖνον ταῖς ἔμφοραις περι-
πεττωκότες, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους ὤρ-
μυντο ξυγχωρεῖν καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες
ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀπρακτοὶ ἐγένοντο. πανταχόθεν τε
τῇ γυνώμη ἄποροι καθεστικότες ἐνέκειντο τῷ
3 Περικλεῖ. ὁ δὲ ὅρῳν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα
χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἀπερ αὐτὸς
ηλπίζε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας (ἐτὶ δ’ ἐστρατήγει)
ἐβουλεῖ θαρσῦναι τε καὶ ἄπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζό-
μενον τῆς γυνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἡπιώτερον καὶ ἀδε-
έστερον καταστήσας παρελθὼν δὲ ἔλεξε τοιάδε.

LI. "Καὶ προσδεχομένῳ μοι τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς
ὑμῶν ἐς με γεγένηται (ἀισθάνομαι γὰρ τὰς αἰτίας)
καὶ ἐκκλησίαν τοῦτον ἑνεκα ξυνήγαγον, ὅπως
ὑπομνήσω καὶ μέμψωμαι εἰ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς ἦ ἐμοὶ
from Hagnon's troops. Phormio, however, and his sixteen hundred men, were no longer in Chalcidice. Accordingly Hagnon took his fleet back to Athens, having lost by the plague in about forty days one thousand and fifty out of a total of four thousand hoplites; but the soldiers of the former expedition remained where they were and continued the siege of Potidæa.

LIX. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians the Athenians underwent a change of feeling, now that their land had been ravaged a second time while the plague and the war combined lay heavily upon them. They blamed Pericles for having persuaded them to go to war and held him responsible for the misfortunes which had befallen them, and were eager to come to an agreement with the Lacedaemonians. They even sent envoys to them, but accomplished nothing. And now, being altogether at their wits' end, they assailed Pericles. And when he saw that they were exasperated by the present situation and were acting exactly as he had himself expected, he called a meeting of the assembly—for he was still general—wishing to reassure them, and by ridding their minds of resentment to bring them to a milder and less timorous mood. So he came forward and spoke as follows:

LX. "I have been expecting these manifestations of your wrath against me, knowing as I do the causes of your anger, and my purpose in calling an assembly was that I might address to you certain reminders, and remonstrate if in any case you are either angry

1 cf. i. lxiv. 2. Phormio's departure must have occurred before the events described in ch. xxxi. 2, but is nowhere mentioned.
2 χαλεπαίνετε ἣ ταῖς ἄξιοκεφάλαις εἴκετε. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἣγοῦμαι πόλιν πλεῖον ἄξιον πλεῖον ἄξιον πλεῖον τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν.

3 εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην. καλῶς μὲν γὰρ φερόμενος ἀνήρ τὸ καθ’ ἐαυτὸν διαφθειρο-μένης τῆς πατρίδος οὐδὲν ἦσσον ξυμπόλλυται, κακοτυχών δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον.

4 διασφάζεται. ὅποτε οὖν πόλις μὲν τὰς ἰδίας ἄξιοκεφάλας οῖα τε φέρειν, εἰς δὲ ἐκαστὸς τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρὴ πάντας ἄμυνειν αὐτῇ, καὶ μὴ ὅ νῦν ύμεῖς δρᾶτε, ταῖς κατ’ οἶκον κακο-πραγίαις ἐκπεπληγμένοι τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀφίεσθε, καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν παρανέσαντα πολεμεῖν καὶ ύμᾶς αὐτούς οἱ ξυμπέμψωτε δ’ αἰτίας ἔχετε.

5 καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτο ἀνδρὶ ὑγρήςσεθε ὅς οὐνεδοὺς ἦσσον οἴομαί εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων.

6 κρείσσων. ὁ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἵσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη ὁ τε ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσνους, οὐκ ἀν ὀμοίως τι οἰκεῖως φράξων προσόντος δὲ καὶ τοῦτε, χρῆμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ἐξεπεπεκτατοῦτον ἐνός ἀν πωλοῖτο.

7 ὁςτ’ εἰ μοι καὶ μέσως ἡγοῦμενοι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων προσεῖναι αὐτὰ πολεμεῖν ἐπείσθητε, οὐκ ἀν εἰκότως νῦν τοῦ γε ἄδικεῖν αἰτίαν φεροῖμην.
with me or are giving way to your misfortunes without reason. For in my judgment a state confers a greater benefit upon its private citizens when as a whole commonwealth it is successful, than when it prospers as regards the individual but fails as a community. For even though a man flourishes in his own private affairs, yet if his country goes to ruin he perishes with her all the same; but if he is in evil fortune and his country in good fortune, he is far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, the state may bear the misfortunes of her private citizens but the individual cannot bear hers, surely all men ought to defend her, and not to do as you are now doing—proposing to sacrifice the safety of the commonwealth because you are dismayed by the hardships you suffer at home, and are blaming both me who advised you to make war and yourselves who voted with me for it. And yet I, with whom you are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, both to determine upon the right measures and to expound them, and as good a patriot and superior to the influence of money. For he who determines upon a policy, and fails to lay it clearly before others, is in the same case as if he never had a conception of it; and he who has both gifts, but is disloyal to his country, cannot speak with the same unselfish devotion; and if he have loyalty also, but a loyalty that cannot resist money, then for that alone everything will be on sale. If, therefore, when you allowed me to persuade you to go to war, you believed that I possessed these qualities even in a moderate degree more than other men, it is unreasonable that I should now bear the blame, at any rate, of wrong-doing.
LXI. "Καὶ γὰρ ὁις μὲν αἱρεσίς γεγένηται τάλλα εὐτυχοῦσι, πολλὴ ἄνοια πολεμήσαι: εἰ δ' ἀναγκαίον ἦν ἡ εἰδοτας εὐθὺς τοῖς πέλας ύπακοῦσαι ἡ κινδυνεύσαντας περιγενέσθαι, ὁ φυγὼν
2 τὸν κίνδυνον τοῦ υποστάντος μεμπτότερος. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἑξίσταμαι· ύμεῖς δὲ μεταβάλλετε, ἐπειδὴ ἐξεβη ὑμῖν πεισθήναι μὲν ἀκεραίοις, μεταμέλειν δὲ κακομένοις, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ ύμετέρῳ ἀσθενεὶ τῆς γνώμης μὴ ὀρθοῦν φαίνεσθαι, διότι τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἥδη τὴν αἰσθησιν ἐκάστῳ, τῆς δὲ ὄφελίας ἀπεστιν ἔτι ἡ δῆλωσις ἀπασι, καὶ μεταβολῆς μεγάλης,
3 ἡ διάνοια ἐγκαρτερεῖν ἄν ἔγνωτε. δουλοί γὰρ φρόνημα τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαίνω· ο ἡμῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοὺς οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ κατὰ τὴν νόσον γεγένηται.
4 ὦμως δὲ πόλιν μεγάλην οἰκοῦντας καὶ ἐν ἰθεσιν ἀντιπάλους αὐτῇ τεθραμμένους χρεῶν καὶ ξυμ-
    φοραῖς ταῖς μεγίσταις εἰθέλειν ύφίστασθαι καὶ τὴν ἕξισιν μη ἀφανίζειν (ἐν ἰσογὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι
dικαιοῦσι τῆς τε ύπαρχούσης δόξης αἰτιάσθαι ὅστις μαλακία ἐπλείπει καὶ τῆς μὴ προσηκούσης μισεῖν τὸν θρασύτητι ὀρεγόμενον), ἀπαλγησαντας

1 Described by Pericles in the Funeral Oration, chs. xxxvii-xlii.

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LXI. "For though I admit that going to war is always sheer folly for men who are free to choose, and in general are enjoying good fortune, yet if the necessary choice was either to yield and forthwith submit to their neighbours' dictation, or by accepting the hazard of war to preserve their independence, then those who shrink from the hazard are more blameworthy than those who face it. For my part, I stand where I stood before, and do not recede from my position; but it is you who have changed. For it has happened, now that you are suffering, that you repent of the consent you gave me when you were still unscathed, and in your infirmity of purpose my advice now appears to you wrong. The reason is that each one of you is already sensible of his hardships, whereas the proof of the advantages is still lacking to all, and now that a great reverse has come upon you without any warning, you are too dejected in mind to persevere in your former resolutions. For the spirit is cowed by that which is sudden and unexpected and happens contrary to all calculation; and this is precisely the experience you have had, not only in other matters, but especially as regards the plague. Nevertheless, seeing that you are citizens of a great city and have been reared amid customs which correspond to her greatness,¹ you should willingly endure even the greatest calamities and not mar your good fame. For as all men claim the right to detest him who through presumption tries to grasp a reputation to which he has no title, so they equally claim a right to censure him who through faint-heartedness fails to live up to the reputation he already enjoys. You should, rather, put away your grief for private ills
δὲ τὰ ἵδια τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.

ΛΧII. "Τὸν δὲ πόνον τὸν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, μὴ γένηται τε πολὺς καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον περιγενώμεθα, ἀρκεῖτω μὲν ύμῖν καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐν οἷς ἄλλοτε πολλάκις γε δὴ ἀπέδειξα οὐκ ὅρθως αὐτοῦ ὑποπτευόμενον, δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὦ μοι δοκεῖτε οὗτ' αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθήναι ὑπάρχον ύμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὗτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις· οὔδ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους 2 ύμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔώρων. οὔεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν εὐμμάχων μόνων ἀρχεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρήσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ύμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους οὖντας, ἐφ’ ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε καὶ ἧν ἐπὶ πλέον βουληθήτε· καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅστις τῇ ὑπαρχοῦσῃ παρασκευῇ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ πλέοντας ύμᾶς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος τῶν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κωλύσει. 3 ὃστε οὖ κατὰ τὴν τῶν οἰκίων καὶ τῆς γῆς χρείαν, ὧν μεγάλων νομίζετε ἐστερηθήσαι, αὕτη ἡ δύναμις φαίνεται· οὐδ' εἰκὸς χαλεπῶς φέρειν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ὢν οὐ κηπίων καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου πρὸς ταύτην νομίζαντας ὀλιγορήσαι καὶ γνώναι ἐλευθερίαν μέν, ἣν ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι αὐτῆς διασώσωμεν, ῥαδίως ταῦτα ἀναληψομένην, ἄλλων δὲ
and devote yourselves to the safety of the common-wealth.

LXII. "As to the hardships involved in this war, and your misgivings lest they prove very great and we succumb after all, let those arguments suffice which I have advanced on many other occasions in order to convince you that your fears are groundless. But there is one point I propose to lay before you on which, I think, you have never yourselves as yet reflected, in spite of the advantage it gives you as regards your empire and its greatness, and which I have never previously dealt with in my speeches, and should not have done so now—for it makes a somewhat boastful claim—had I not seen that you are unreasonably dejected. You think that it is only over your allies that your empire extends, but I declare that of two divisions of the world which lie open to man's use, the land and the sea, you hold the absolute mastery over the whole of one, not only to the extent to which you now exercise it, but also to whatever fuller extent you may choose; and there is no one, either the Great King or any nation of those now on the earth, who will block your path as you sail the seas with such a naval armament as you now possess. This power, therefore, is clearly not to be compared with the mere use of your houses and fields, things which you value highly because you have been dispossessed of them; nor is it reasonable that you should fret about them, but you should make light of them, regarding them in comparison with this power as a mere flower-garden or ornament of a wealthy estate, and should recognize that freedom, if we hold fast to it and preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let
υπακούσασι καὶ τὰ προκεκτημένα φίλειν ἐλασ-
σοῦσθαι, τῶν τε πατέρων μὴ χείρους κατ’ ἀμφό-
τερα φανῆναι, οὐ μετὰ πόνων καὶ οὐ παρ’ ἄλλων
dεξάμενου κατέσχον τε καὶ προσέτι διασώσαντες
παρέδοσαν ὑμῖν αὐτά (αἰσχίνοι δὲ ἔχοντας ἁφαι-
ρεθῆναι ἤ κτωμένους ἄτυχῆσαι), ἤνει δὲ τοῖς
ἐχθροῖς ὁμόσε μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ
καταφρονήματι, αὐχεμα μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀμα-
θίας εὔτυχοις καὶ δειλῶ των ἐγγύνεται, κατα-
φρόνησις δὲ ὅς ἂν καὶ γνώμη πιστεύῃ τῶν ἐναντίων
5 περιέχειν, ὅ ἢμῖν υπάρχειν καὶ τὴν τόλμαν ἀπὸ
tῆς ὁμοίας τύχης ἢ ξύνεσις ἐκ τοῦ ὑπέρφρονος
ἐχυρωτέραν παρέχεται, ἐλπίδι τε ἂσον πιστεύει,
ἡς ἐν τῷ ἀπόρῳ ἡ ἰσχύς, γνώμη δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρ-
χόντων, ἢς βεβαιοτέρα ἡ πρόνοια.

ΛXIII. "Τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμω-
μένῳ ἂπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ὥστε ἀπαντεῖς ἀγάλλεσθε,
βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς
τιμὰς διώκειν· μηδὲ νομίσαι περὶ ἐνὸς μόνου, δου-
λείας ἂντ’ ἐλευθερίας, ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀρχῆς στερήσεως καὶ κινδύνου ὁν ἐν τῇ ἄρχῃ ἀπῇ-
2 χθεσθε. ἢς οὖν’ ἐκκτίημαι ἔτι ὑμῖν ἔστων, εἰ τις
καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδώς ἀπραγμοσύνη

1 So most editors with Gmc2; all other MSS. προσκεκτη-
μένα except Μ προσκεκτημένα.
men once submit to others and even what has been won in the past has a way of being lessened. You must therefore show yourselves not inferior in either of these two respects to your fathers, who by their own labours, and not by inheritance, not only acquired but also preserved this empire and bequeathed it to you (and it is a greater disgrace to let a possession you have be taken away than it is to attempt to gain one and fail); and you must go to meet your enemies not only with confidence in yourselves, but with contempt for them. For even a coward, if his folly is attended with good luck, may boast, but contempt belongs only to the man who is convinced by his reason that he is superior to his opponents, as is the case with us. And, where fortune is impartial, the result of this feeling of contempt is to render courage more effective through intelligence, that puts its trust not so much in hope, which is strongest in perplexity, as in reason supported by the facts, which gives a surer insight into the future.

LXIII. "You may reasonably be expected, moreover, to support the dignity which the state has attained through empire—a dignity in which you all take pride—and not to avoid its burdens, unless you resign its honours also. Nor must you think that you are fighting for the simple issue of slavery or freedom; on the contrary, loss of empire is also involved and danger from the hatred incurred in your sway. From this empire, however, it is too late for you even to withdraw, if any one at the present crisis, through fear and shrinking from action does indeed

1 Or, reading τὰ προσεκτημένα, "freedom and all that freedom gives" (= πρὸς τὴν ἁλευθερία κεκτημένα, as Poppo explains).
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άνδραγαθίζεται. ὲς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἦδη ἔχετε αὐτὴν, ἢν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφεῖναι
3 δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον. τάχιστ' ἂν τε πόλιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑτέρους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν καὶ εἰ ποὺ ἐπὶ
σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκίσσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγ-
μον οὐ σφάζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγ-
μένον, οὔτε ἐν ἀρχοῦσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ' ἐν
ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν.

LXIV. "Τμεῖς δὲ μήτε ὑπὸ τῶν τοιῶν πολι-
tῶν παράγεσθε μήτε ἐμὲ ἀνέ δ' ὅργης ἔχετε, ὃ καὶ
αὐτοί ξυνδιέγνωτε πολεμεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἐπελθόντες οἱ
ἐναντίοι ἐδρασαν ἀπερ εἰκὸς ἂν μὴ ἐθελησάντων
ὕμων ὑπακούειν, ἐπιγεγένται τε πέρα δι' ὑπὸ προσ-
edεχόμεθα ἢ νόσος ἢ δὲ, πράγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν
πάντων ἐλπίδος κρείσσον γεγενημένον. καὶ δὲ
αὐτὴν οἱ ὅτι μέρος τὶ μᾶλλον ἐτὶ μισοῦμαι, οὐ
dικαίως, εἰ μὴ καὶ ὅταν παρὰ λόγον τί εὗ πράξῃτε
2 ἐμοὶ ἀναθήσετε. φέρειν δὲ χρῆ τά τε δαιμόνια
ἀναγκαίως τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως
tαῦτα γὰρ ἐν ἔθει τῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει πρότερον τε ἂν
3 νῦν τε μὴ ἐν ὑμῶν κωλυθῇ. γνῶτε δὲ ὅνομα μέγι-
στον αὐτὴν ἐχουσαν ἐν ἀπασίν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ
tαῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν, πλείστα δὲ σώματα καὶ
πόνους ἀνηλωκέναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην
dὴ μέχρι τοῦτο κεκτημένην, ἢς ὡς ἄιδιον τοῖς ἐπι-

1 Dobree deletes, followed by Hude.
seek thus to play the honest man; for by this time the empire you hold is a tyranny, which it may seem wrong to have assumed, but which certainly it is dangerous to let go. Men like these would soon ruin a state, either here, if they should win others to their views, or if they should settle in some other land and have an independent state all to themselves; for men of peace are not safe unless flanked by men of action; nor is it expedient in an imperial state, but only in a vassal state, to seek safety by submission.

LXIV. "Do not be led astray by such citizens as these, nor persist in your anger with me,—for you yourselves voted for the war the same as I—just because the enemy has come and done exactly what he was certain to do the moment you refused to hearken to his demands, even though, beyond all our expectations, this plague has fallen upon us—the only thing which has happened that has transcended our foresight. I am well aware that your displeasure with me has been aggravated by the plague; but there is no justice in that, unless you mean to give me also the credit whenever any unexpected good fortune falls to your lot. But the right course is to bear with resignation the afflictions sent by heaven and with fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy; for such has been the practice of this city in the past, and let it find no impediment in yourselves. And realize that Athens has a mighty name among all mankind because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but more freely than any other city has lavished lives and labours upon war, and that she possesses to-day a power which is the greatest that ever existed down to our time. The memory of
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γιγνομένοις, ἢν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδώμεν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι), μνήμη καταλείπεται, Ἦλληνων τε ὅτι Ἕλληνες πλείστων δὴ ἦρξαμεν καὶ πολέμοις μεγίστοις ἀντέχομεν πρὸς τε ξύμπαντας καὶ καθ’ ἐκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πᾶσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην φυκήσαμεν. καίτοι ταῦτα ὁ μὲν ἀπράγμων μέμψατ’ ἂν, ὁ δὲ δρᾶν τι καὶ αὐτὸς βουλόμενος ἡγήσαμεν. εἰ δὲ τις μὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει. τὸ δὲ μισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πάσι μὲν ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἔτεροι ἐτέρων ἤξισαν ἀρχεῖν· ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὅρθως βουλεύεται. μύσος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει, ἡ δὲ παραυτίκα τε λαμπρότης καὶ ἐς τὸ ἐπειτα δόξα αἰείμνυστος καταλείπεται. ύμεῖς δὲ ἐς τε τὸ μέλλον καλῶν προγνώντες ἐς τε τὸ αὐτῖκα μὴ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἕδη προθύμῳ ἀμφότερα κτήσασθε, καὶ Δακεδαιμονίους μὴ ἐπικηρυκεύσθε μὴτε ἐνδηλοί ἐστε τοῖς παροῦσι πόνοις βαρυνόμενοι, ὃς οἴνινες πρὸς τὰς εὐμφορὰς γνώμῃ μὲν ἰκίστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὕτωι καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἱδιωτῶν κράτιστοι εἰσιν.’’

LXV. Τοιαῦτα ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειράτο τούς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν τῇ γυνῶ-2 μην. οἱ δὲ δημοσία μὲν τοῖς λογοῖς ἀνεπείδθοντο καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς Δακεδαιμονίους ἐτὶ ἐπεμπον ἐς τε τὸν πόλεμον μᾶλλον ὀρμήντο, ἱδία δὲ

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this greatness, even should we now at last give way a little—for it is the nature of all things to decay as well as to grow—will be left to posterity forever, how that we of all Hellenes held sway over the greatest number of Hellenes, in the greatest wars held out against our foes whether united or single, and inhabited a city that was the richest in all things and the greatest. These things the man who shrinks from action may indeed disparage, but he who, like ourselves, wishes to accomplish something will make them the goal of his endeavour, while every man who does not possess them will be envious. To be hated and obnoxious for the moment has always been the lot of those who have aspired to rule over others; but he who, aiming at the highest ends, accepts the odium, is well advised. For hatred does not last long, but the splendour of the moment and the after-glory are left in everlasting remembrance. Do you, then, providently resolving that yours shall be honour in ages to come and no dishonour in the present, achieve both by prompt and zealous effort. Make no overtures to the Lacedaemonians and do not let them know that you are burdened by your present afflictions; for those who in the face of calamities show least distress of spirit and in action make most vigorous resistance, these are the strongest, whether they be states or individuals.”

LXV. By such words Pericles endeavoured to cure the Athenians of their anger toward him, and to divert their minds from their present ills. And as regards public affairs they were won over by his arguments, sending no further envoys to the Lacedaemonians, and were more zealous for the war; but
Τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐλυποῦντο, ὅ μὲν δῆμος ὅτι ἀπ’ ἐλασσόνων ὀρμώμενος ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων, οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελείς κατασκευαὶς ἀπολωλεκότες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πόλεμον ἀντ’ εἰρήνης έχοντες. οὐ μέντοι πρότερον γε οἱ ξύμπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐξημίωσαιν

χρήμασιν. ΄URRENT LINE

πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν, ὥν μὲν περὶ τὰ ὀικεῖα ἐκαστὸς ἦλιγει ἀμβλύτεροι ἥδη ὄντες, ὥν δὲ η ξύμπασα πόλις προσεδεῖτο πλείστου ἄξιον νομίζειντο εἰναι. ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προῦστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρῖως έξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν, καὶ ἐγένετο ἐπ’ ἐκείνου μεγίστη, ἐπειδὴ τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ὑν τούτῳ προγνοὺς τὴν δύναμιν.

Ἐπεβίω δὲ δύο ἔτη καὶ ἐξ μῆνας· καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἀπέθανεν, ἐπὶ πλέον ἔτι ἐγνώσθη ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ ἤ ἐσ τοῦ πόλεμον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡσυχάζοντάς τε καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν θεραπεύοντας καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μηδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἐφ’ ορίσεσθαι· οἱ δὲ ταῦτα τε πάντα ἐς τοῦντιον ἐπράξαν καὶ ἄλλα ἐς τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἰναι κατὰ τὰς ἵδιας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἱδια κέρδη κακῶς ἔσ τι εἰς σφάς αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς

1 Hude inserts ἐν with Madvig.

1 Eighty talents, according to Diod. xii. xlv.; but according to Plut. Per. xxxv. estimates varied from fifteen to sixty
in private they were distressed by their sufferings; for the commons, having less to start with, had been deprived even of this, while the upper classes had lost their beautiful estates in the country, both buildings and costly furniture, and above all they had war instead of peace. Indeed one and all they did not give over their resentment against him until they had imposed a fine upon him. But not long afterwards, as is the way with the multitude, they chose him again as general and entrusted him with the whole conduct of affairs; for they were now becoming individually less keenly sensible of their private griefs, and as to the needs of the state as a whole they esteemed him invaluable. For so long as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the city in safety, and it was under him that Athens reached the height of her greatness; and, after the war began, here too he appears to have made a far-sighted estimate of her strength.

Pericles lived two years and six months beyond the beginning of the war; and after his death his foresight as to the war was still more fully recognized. For he had told the Athenians that if they would maintain a defensive policy, attend to their navy, and not seek to extend their sway during the war, or do anything to imperil the existence of the state, they would prove superior. But they not only acted contrary to his advice in all these things, but also in matters that apparently had no connection with the war they were led by private ambition and private greed to adopt policies which proved injurious both talents. The charge was embezzlement, according to Plato, Gorg. 576 a.
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ξυμμάχους ἔπολευσαν, ἃ κατορθοῦμενα μὲν τοῖς ἰδιώταις τιμή καὶ ὧφελία μᾶλλον ἦν, σφαλέντα δὲ τῇ πόλει ἐς τὸν πόλεμον βλάβη καθίστατο.

8 αὐτῶν δὲ ἦν ὁτι ἐκείνος μὲν δυνατός ὁυ τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθερως, καὶ οὐκ ἦγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἡ αὐτοῖς ἠγε, διὰ τὸ μὴ κτώμενος ἐξ οὐ προσηκόντων τὴν ὅνωσιν πρὸς ἠδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἔχουν ἐπ’ ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὅργην τι ἀντειπεῖν. ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθοῦτό τι αὐτοῦς παρὰ καίρον ὑβρεί θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ διδιότας αὐ ἄλογως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. ἐγίγνετο τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἐργῷ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἄρχῃ. οἱ δὲ ὑστερον ἵσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὁρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἐκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἑτράποντο καθ’ ἠδονᾶς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι.

9 ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς εἰ μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἄρχῃν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, δει τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὐς ἐπῆσαν, ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέμψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἱδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ

1 The reference is especially to the Sicilian expedition; the pernicious results were seen in the Decelean war.

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as to themselves and their allies; for these policies, so long as they were successful, merely brought honour or profit to individual citizens, but when they failed proved detrimental to the state in the conduct of the war. And the reason for this was that Pericles, who owed his influence to his recognized standing and ability, and had proved himself clearly incorruptible in the highest degree, restrained the multitude while respecting their liberties, and led them rather than was led by them, because he did not resort to flattery, seeking power by dishonest means, but was able on the strength of his high reputation to oppose them and even provoke their wrath. At any rate, whenever he saw them unwarrantably confident and arrogant, his words would cow them into fear; and, on the other hand, when he saw them unreasonably afraid, he would restore them to confidence again. And so Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen. But the successors of Pericles, being more on an equality with one another and yet striving each to be first, were ready to surrender to the people even the conduct of public affairs to suit their whims. And from this, since it happened in a great and imperial state, there resulted many blunders, especially the Sicilian expedition, which was not so much an error of judgment, when we consider the enemy they went against, as of management; for those who were responsible for it, instead of taking additional measures for the proper support of the first troops which were sent out, gave themselves over to personal intrigues for the sake of

2 For the history of this expedition, see Books vi and vii.
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12 ἓμου προστασίας τὰ τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράξθησαν. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν Σικελία ἀλλη τε παρασκευῇ καὶ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ τῷ πλέονι μορίῳ καὶ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἤδη ἐν στάσει ὄντες ὅμως δέκα¹ μὲν ἔτη ἀντείχον τοῖς τε πρότερον ὑπάρχοντι πολεμίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σικελίας μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐτὶ τοῖς πλέοσιν ἀφεστηκόσι, Κύρω τε ὑστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, δὲ παρείχε χρήματα Πελοποννησίοις ἐς τὸ ναυτικόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἐνέδοσαν ἢ αὐτοῖ τοῖ ² σφίσιν αὐτοῖς κατὰ τάς ἱδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν. τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλεὶ ἐπερίσσευσε τὸτε ἄφ' ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω καὶ πάνυ ἀν ραδίως περιγενέσθαι τὴν πόλιν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

LXVI. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμονίου καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους ἐστάτευσαν ναυσίν ἑκατὸν ἐς Ζάκυνθον τὴν νῆσον, ἢ κεῖται ἀντιπέρας Ἡλιδος' εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀχαιῶν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄποικοι καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ξυνεμάχων. ἐπέπλεον δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων χίλιοι ὀπλιταῖ καὶ Κυήμος Σπαρτιάτης ναύαρχος. ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐδήσαν τὰ πολλὰ. καὶ ἐπειδὴ οὐ ξυνεχώρουν, ἀπέπλευσαν ἐπὶ οἴκου.

LXVII. Καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ἀριστεύς Κορίνθιος καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις Ἀνήριστος καὶ Νικόλαος καὶ Πρατόδαμος καὶ

¹ MSS. read τρία, but Hude follows Haacke in reading δέκα. So also van H., Cl., Stahl, F. Mueller, Croiset, Marchant. ὅκτω is preferred by Shilleto, Aem. Mueller.
² Deleted by van Herwerden, followed by Hude.
gaining the popular leadership and consequently not only conducted the military operations with less rigour, but also brought about, for the first time, civil discord at home. And yet, after they had met with disaster in Sicily, where they lost not only their army but also the greater part of their fleet, and by this time had come to be in a state of sedition at home, they nevertheless held out ten years not only against the enemies they had before, but also against the Sicilians, who were now combined with them, and, besides, against most of their allies, who were now in revolt, and later on, against Cyrus son of the King, who joined the Peloponnesians and furnished them with money for their fleet; and they did not finally succumb until they had in their private quarrels fallen upon one another and been brought to ruin. Such abundant grounds had Pericles at that time for his own forecast that Athens might quite easily have triumphed in this war over the Peloponnesians alone.

LXVI. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their allies made an expedition with a hundred ships to the island of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. The Zacynthians are colonists of the Achaean in the Peloponnesus and were in alliance with the Athenians. On board the ships were one thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, and Cnemus a Spartan was admiral. And making a descent upon the land they ravaged most of it; but as the inhabitants would not come to terms they sailed back home.

LXVII. And at the end of the same summer 430 B.C. Aristeus a Corinthian, three Lacedaemonian envoys, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodamus, also Timagoras
Τεγεάτης Τιμαγόρας καὶ Ἀργείως ἵδια Πόλλις, πορεύομενοι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡς βασιλέα, εἰ πῶς πείσειαν αὐτὸν χρῆματι τε παρασχεῖν καὶ ἐνιμπολεμεῖν, ἀφικνοῦνται ὡς Σιτάλκην πρῶτον τὸν Τήρεω ἐς Ὁράκην, βουλόμενοι πεῖσαι τε αὐτὸν, εἰ δύναιτο, μεταστάντα τῆς Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίας στρατεύσαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ποτείδαιαν, οὐ ἦν στρατεύμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων πολιορκοῦν, καὶ ἤπερ ὀρμήτου, δε ἐκείνῳ πορευθῆναι πέραν τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ὡς Φαρνάκην τὸν Φαρναβάζου, ὡς αὐτοῦς ἐμέλλειν ἡ βασιλέα ἀναπέμψειν. παρατυχόντες δὲ Ἀθηναίων πρέσβεις Λέαρχος Καλλιμάχου καὶ Ἀμεινάδης Φιλήμονος παρὰ τῷ Σιτάλκῃ πείθουσι τὸν Σάδοκον τὸν γεγενημένον Ἀθηναῖον, Σιτάλκου υἱόν, τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐγχειρίσαι σφίσιν, ὅπως μὴ διαβάντες ὡς βασιλέα τὴν ἐκείνου πόλιν τὸ μέρος βλάψωσιν. ὁ δὲ πεισθεὶς πορευόμενος αὐτοὺς διὰ τῆς Ὁράκης ἐπὶ τὸ πλοῖον ὡς ἐμέλλον τὸν Ἑλλησπόντου περαιώσειν, πρὶν ἔσβαινεν ξυλλαμβάνει, ἄλλους δὲ ξυμπέμψας μετὰ τοῦ Λεάρχου καὶ Ἀμεινάδου, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἐκείνοις παραδοῦναι: οἱ δὲ λαβόντες ἐκόμησαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν ἔσπαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Ἀριστέα μὴ αὐθίς σφᾶς ἐτὶ πλεῖον κακοουργη διαφυγόν, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὰ τῆς Ποτείδαιας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Ὁράκης πάντα ἐφαίνετο πράξας, ἀκρίτους καὶ βουλομένους ἐστὶν ἃ εἰπεὶν αὐθημερὸν ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγα

1 Because Argos was a neutral state; cf. ch. ix. 2.
2 Then satrap of Dascylium; cf. i. cxxix. 1.
3 cf. ch. xxix. 5.
of Tegea and Pollis of Argos, the last acting in a private capacity, set out for Asia to the King's court to see if they might persuade him to furnish money and join in the war. On their way they came first to Sitalces son of Teres in Thrace, their desire being to persuade him, if possible, to forsake the Athenian alliance and send a force to relieve Potidæa, where an Athenian army was conducting the siege; and also, in pursuance of their object, with his help to cross the Hellespont to Pharmaces son of Pharnabazus, who was to escort them up the country to the King. But two Athenian envoys, Learchus son of Callimachus and Ameiniades son of Philémon, who chanced to be visiting Sitalces, urged Sadocus son of Sitalces, who had been made an Athenian citizen, to deliver the men into their hands, that they might not cross over to the King and do such injury as might be to his adopted city. To this Sadocus agreed, and sending some troops to accompany Learchus and Ameiniades, seized them as they journeyed through Thrace before they embarked on the boat by which they were to cross the Hellespont. They were then, in accordance with his orders, delivered to the Athenian envoys, who took them and brought them to Athens. When they arrived, the Athenians, in fear that Aristeus might escape and do them still more harm, because he had evidently been the prime mover in all the earlier intrigues at Potidæa and along the coast of Thrace, put them all to death on that very day without a trial, though they wished to say something in their own defence, and threw their bodies into a

Possibly τὴν ἐκείνην πόλιν τὸ μέρος means "a city in a measure his own."
Alcmaeon, the elder brother of Amphilochus, had slain their mother Eriphyle (cf. ch. cii. 5). The foundation of

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pit, thinking it justifiable to employ for their own protection the same measures as had in the first instance been used by the Lacedaemonians when they killed and cast into pits the traders of the Athenians and their allies whom they caught on board merchantmen on the coast of the Peloponnesus. For at the beginning of the war all persons whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea they destroyed as enemies, whether they were fighting on the side of the Athenians or not even taking part on either side.

LXVIII. About the same time, as the summer was ending, the Ambraciots themselves, with many of the barbarians whom they had summoned to their standard, made an expedition against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia. And enmity between them and the Argives first began from the following circumstance. Amphilochus son of Amphiaraus, when he returned home after the Trojan war, was dissatisfied with the state of affairs at Argos,¹ and therefore founded Amphilochian Argos on the Ambracian gulf, and occupied the country of Amphilochia, calling the town Argos after the name of his own fatherland. And this city was the largest in Amphilochia and had the wealthiest inhabitants. But many generations later the Amphilochians, under the stress of misfortunes, invited in the Ambraciots, who bordered on Amphilochia, to share the place with them, and these first became Hellenes and adopted their present dialect in consequence of their union with

Amphilochian Argos is ascribed by other authors (Strabo, vii. 326 c; Apollod. iii. 7) to Alcmaeon or to his son Amphilochus.
κιώτων ἐξοικησάντων· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφιλοχοῖοι
6 βάρβαροί εἰσιν. ἐκβάλλουσιν οὖν τοὺς Ἀργείους
οἱ Ἀμπρακίωται χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἵσχοσι τὴν
7 πόλιν· οἱ δὲ Ἀμφιλοχοῖ γενομένου τούτου διδό-
ασιν ἑαυτοὺς Ἀκαρνάσι, καὶ προσπαρακαλέσαν-
τες ἀμφότεροι Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐ αὐτοῖς Φορμύωνά
τε στρατηγὸν ἐπεμψαν καὶ ναὸς τρικόντα,
ἀφικομένου δὴ τοῦ Φορμύωνος αἰροῦσι κατὰ κρά-
τος Ἀργος καὶ τοὺς Ἀμπρακίωτας ἡμιδραπόδισαν,
κοινῇ τε ὅκισαν αὐτὸ Ἀμφιλοχοῖ καὶ Ἀκαρνάνες.
8 μετὰ δὲ τούτο ἡ ἐξυμμαχία πρῶτον ἐγένετο Ἀθη-
9 ναίοι καὶ Ἀκαρνάσιοι· οἱ δὲ Ἀμπρακίωται τὴν
μὲν ἐχθρὰν ἐς τοὺς Ἀργείους ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρα-
ποδισμοῦ σφῶν αὐτῶν πρῶτον ἐποιήσαντο, ὕστε-
ρον δὲ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τήνδε τὴν στρατεῖαν
ποιοῦντες ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ Χαόνων καὶ ἄλλων
τινῶν τῶν πλησιοχώρων βαρβάρων ἐλθόντες δὲ
πρὸς τὸ Ἀργος τῆς μὲν χώρας ἐκράτουν, τὴν δὲ
πόλιν ὡς οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἐλείν προσβαλόμενες,
ἀπεχώρησαν ἐπ' οἴκου καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ ἐθν.
tοσαῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ θέρει ἐγένετο.

LXIX. Τοῦ δὲ ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Ἀθη-
ναίοι ναύς ἐστειλαν εἶκοσι μὲν περὶ Πελοπόννησον
καὶ Φορμίωνα στρατηγὸν, ὁς ὀρμώμενος ἐκ Ναυ-
πάκτου φυλακὴν εἰς μήτ' ἐκπλεῖν ἐκ Κορινθίου
καὶ τοῦ Κρισάου κόλπου μηδένα μήτ' ἐστπλεῖν,
ἐτέρας δὲ ἐξ ἐπὶ Καρίας καὶ Δυκίας καὶ Μελή-
σανδρον στρατηγὸν, ὅπως ταῦτα τε ἄργυρολογῶσι
καὶ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἐώσιν
αὐτόθεν ὀρμώμενον βλάπτειν τῶν πλοίων τῶν
ὀλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Φασίλιδος καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ
the Ambraciots; but the rest of the Amphilochians are still barbarians. Now in course of time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and themselves seized the city. But the Amphilochians, when this happened, placed themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and together they called in the Athenians, who sent to them Phormio as general with thirty ships. On the arrival of Phormio they took Argos by storm and reduced the Ambraciots to slavery, and Amphilochians and Acarnanians settled there together. It was after this that the alliance between the Athenians and the Acarnanians was first established. The Ambraciots first conceived their enmity toward the Argives from this enslavement of their own countrymen; and afterwards in the course of the war they made this expedition, which consisted, besides themselves, of Chaonians and some of the other barbarian tribes of the neighbourhood. And when they came to Argos, although they dominated the country, they were unable to take the city by assault; they therefore went home and the several tribes disbanded. Such were the events of the summer.

LXIX. During the ensuing winter the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus under the command of Phormio, who, making Naupactus his base, kept watch there, so that no one might sail either out of Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf or in; and six other ships were sent to Caria and Lycia, under Melesander as general, to collect arrears of tribute in these places and to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from establishing a base in these regions and molesting the merchantmen sailing from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the mainland in that
2 τῆς ἐκείθεν ἠπελρου. ἀναβὰς δὲ στρατιὰ 'Αθηναίων τε τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς τὴν Λυκίαν ὁ Μελήσανδρος ἀποθνῄσκει καὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς μέρος τι διεφθείρε νικηθείς μάχῃ.

LXX. Τού δ' αὐτοῦ χειμώνος οἱ Ποτειδαῖαι ἐπειδὴ οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο πολιορκοῦμενοι ἀντέχειν, ἀλλ' αὐτ' τε ἐσβολαῖ ἐς τὴν 'Αττικὴν Πελοποννησίων οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀπανίστασαν τοὺς 'Αθηναίους, ὃς τε σῖτος ἐπελελοίπει, καὶ ἀλλὰ τε πολλὰ ἐπεγεγένητο αὐτῶθι ἡδη βρώσεως περὶ ἀναγκαίας καὶ τινες καὶ ἀλληλῶν ἐγέγεντό, σύνῳ δ' λόγους προσφέρουσι περὶ ξυμβάσεως τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τῶν 'Αθηναίων τοῖς ἐπὶ σφίσι τεταγμένοις, Ἐνοφώντι τε τῷ Εὐριπίδου καὶ Ἑστιοδώρῳ τῷ 'Αριστοκλείδου καὶ Ψανομάχῳ τῷ Καλλιμάχου.

2 οἱ δὲ προσεδέξαντο, ὁρῶντες μὲν τῆς στρατιᾶς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν ἐν χωρίῳ χειμερινῷ, ἀνηλωκυίας δὲ ἐκη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια τάλαντα ἐς τὴν 3 πολιορκίαν. ἐπὶ τοῦδε σὺν ξυνέβησαν, ἐξελθέειν αὐτοὺς καὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναίκας καὶ τοὺς ἐπικούρους ξὺν ἐνὶ ἰματίῳ, γυναίκας δὲ ξὺν δυοῖν, καὶ 4 ἀργύριον το ῥητὸν ἔχοντας ἐφόδιον. καὶ οἱ μὲν υπόσπονδοι ἐξῆλθον ἐς τε τὴν Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ ἐκαστὸς ἐδύνατο. 'Αθηναίοι δὲ τούς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπητιάσαντο ὃ τι ἀνευ αὐτῶν ξυνέβησαν (ἔνομιξον γὰρ ἀν κρατήσαι τῆς πόλεως ἐ ἐβούλοντο), καὶ ὑστερον ἐποίκους ἐπεμψαν ἐαυτῶν ἐς 5 τὴν Ποτείδαιαν καὶ κατόκισαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἐν τῷ 386
quarter. But Melesander, going inland into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and of allied troops, was defeated in battle and slain, losing a number of his troops.

LXX. During the same winter the Potidaeans found themselves no longer able to endure the siege; and the raids which the Peloponnesians made into Attica did not cause the Athenians to raise the siege any more than before. Their grain had given out, and in addition to many other things which by this time had befallen them in their efforts to get bare subsistence some had even eaten their fellows. In this extremity they made proposals for a capitulation to the Athenian generals who were in charge of the operations against them, namely Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. And the generals accepted their proposals, seeing the distress which the army was suffering in an exposed place, and taking into consideration that Athens had already spent two thousand talents on the siege. So a capitulation was made on the following terms, that the Potidaeans, with their children and wives and the mercenary troops, were to leave the city with one garment apiece—the women, however, with two—retaining a fixed sum of money for the journey. So they left Potidæa under a truce and went into Chalcidice or wherever each was able to go. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting terms without consulting them—for they thought they could have become masters of the place on their own terms; and afterwards sent settlers of their own into Potidæa and colonized it. These things

1 cf. i. lviii. 1.  2 £400,000, $1,944,000.  3 cf. i. lx. 1.
χειμώνι ἐγένετο, καὶ δεύτερον ἔτος τὸ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῶδε ὁ Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν.

LXXI. Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγνωμένου θέρους οἱ Πελο-
πονησίωι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐς μὲν τὴν Ἀττικὴν
οὐκ ἐσέβαλον, ἐστράτευσαν δὲ ἐπὶ Πλάταιαν.
ήγεῖτο δὲ Ἀρχιδάμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαι-
μονίων βασιλεὺς καὶ καθίσας τὸν στρατὸν ἐμέλλε
δηώσειν τὴν γῆν· οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῆς εὐθὺς πρέσβεις
πέμψαντες παρ' αὐτῶν ἔλεγον τοιάδε·

2 "Ἀρχιδάμε καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ δίκαια
ποιεῖτε οὐδ' ἄξια οὔτε ὑμῶν οὔτε πατέρων ὑπὸ
ἐστε, ἐς γῆν τὴν Πλαταιῶν στρατεύοντες. Παυ-
σανίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομήροτος, Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἐλευ-
θερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀπὸ τῶν Μῆδων μετὰ
Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἐθελησάντων ἑξυνάρασθαι τὸν κίν-
δυνον τῆς μάχης ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, θύσας ἐν
tῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορὰ ἱερὰ Διὸ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ
ξυναλέσας πάντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀπεδίδου
Πλαταιεύσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἑχοντας
αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεύσας τε μηδένα ποτὲ
ἀδίκως ἐπ' αὐτοὺς μηδ' ἐπὶ δουλεία· εἰ δὲ μῆ,
ἀμύνειν τοὺς παρὸντας ξυμμάχους κατὰ δύναμιν.

3 τάδε μὲν ἡμῖν πατέρες οἱ ύμέτεροι ἔδοσαν ἀρετῆς
ἐνεκα καὶ προδημίας τῆς ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς κινδύ-
νους γενομένης, ύμεις δὲ τάναντία δράτε· μετὰ
γὰρ Θηβαίων τῶν ἡμῖν ἐχθριστῶν ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ τῇ
4 ἡμετέρα ἰκετε. μάρτυρας δὲ θεοὺς τοὺς τε
ὄρκιοις τὸτε γενομένους ποιούμενοι καὶ τοὺς ὑμε-
τέρους πατρίως καὶ ἡμετέρους ἐγχωρίους, λέ-
γομεν ύμῖν γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα μὴ ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ

1 τὸ δεύτερον in the MSS.; τὸ deleted by Poppo.
happened in the winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.

LXXI. In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians and their allies did not invade Attica, but made an expedition against Plataea. Their leader was Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, and when he had encamped his army he was about to ravage the land; but the Plataeans straightway sent envoys to him, who spoke as follows:

"Archidamus and Lacedaemonians, you are acting unjustly, and in a manner unworthy either of yourselves or of the fathers from whom you are sprung, when you invade the territory of the Plataeans. For Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, when he had freed Hellas from the Persians, together with such of the Hellenes as chose to share the danger of the battle\(^1\) that took place in our territory, offered sacrifice in the market-place of the Plataeans to Zeus Eleutherius, and calling together all the allies restored to the Plataeans their land and city to hold and inhabit in independence, and no one was ever to march against them unjustly or for their enslavement; but in that case the allies then present were to defend them with all their might. These privileges your fathers granted to us on account of the valour and zeal we displayed amid those dangers, but you do the very contrary; for with the Thebans, our bitterest enemies, you are come to enslave us. But calling to witness the gods in whose names we then swore and the gods of your fathers and of our country, we say to you, wrong not the land of Plataea nor violate your oaths, but suffer

\(^1\) The battle of Plataea, 479 B.C.
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παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὀρκοὺς, ἔαν δὲ οἰκεῖν αὐτονόμους καθάπερ Παυσανίας ἐδικαίωσεν."

LXXII. Τοσαῦτα εἰπόντων τῶν Πλαταιῶν Ἀρχίδαμος ὑπολαβὼν εἶπεν·

"Δίκαια λέγετε, ὦ ἄνδρες Πλαταίης, ἥν ποίητε ὀμοία τοῖς λόγοις. καθάπερ γὰρ Παυσανίας ὦμιν παρέδωκεν, αὐτοί τε αὐτονομεῖσθε καὶ τοὺς ἀλλούς ξυνελευθεροῦτε ὥσοι μετασχόντες τῶν τότε κινδύνων ὦμιν τε ξυνώμοσαν καὶ εἰσὶ νῦν ὑπ' Αθηναίων, παρασκευὴ δὲ τοσιδέ καὶ πόλεμος γεγένηται αὐτῶν ἔνεκα καὶ τῶν ἀλλων ἔλευθερώσεως. ἦς μάλιστα μὲν μετασχόντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμμείνατε τοῖς ὀρκοῖς· εἲ δὲ μῆ, ἀπερ καὶ προτερον ἢδη προυκαλεσάμεθα, ἦσυχιαν ἀγετε νεμόμενοι τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἔστε μηδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων, δεχέσθε δὲ ἀμφοτέρους φίλους, ἐπὶ πολέμῳ δὲ μηδετέρους. καὶ τάδε ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει."

2 'Ὁ μὲν Ἀρχίδαμος τοσαῦτα εἶπεν· οἱ δὲ Πλαταιῶν πρέσβεις ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα ἐσῆλθον ἐς τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τῷ πλήθει τὰ ῥηθέντα κοινώσαντες ἀπεκρίναντο αὐτῷ ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσιν εἰη ποιεῖν ἄ προκαλεῖται ἄνευ Ἀθηναίων (παίδεσ γὰρ σφὼν καὶ γυναίκες παρ' ἐκεῖνοι εἰεν), δεδεναί δὲ καὶ περὶ τῇ πᾶσῃ πόλει μὴ 'κεῖνων ἀποχωρησάντων Ἀθηναίοι ἑλθόντες σφίσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἣ Θηβαιοί, ὡς ἐνορκω ἄντες κατὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρους δεχέσθαι, αὖθις σφὼν τὴν πόλιν 3 πειράσσωσι καταλαβεῖν. ὁ δὲ θαρσύνων αὐτοῦς πρὸς ταῦτα ἐφη·

"Τμεῖς δὲ πόλιν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας ἡμῖν παράδοτε

1 Omitted by Hude, with Lex. Vindob.
us to live independent, according as Pausanias granted that to us as our right."

LXXII. When the Plataeans had so spoken, Archidamus answered and said:

"What you say is just, men of Plataea, if what you do is consistent with your words. For according as Pausanias bestowed that privilege upon you, so do you assert your own independence and help us to set free the others also who, having shared in the dangers of that time, swore the same oaths with you, and are now in subjection to the Athenians; for it is to recover their freedom and that of the rest that these great preparations for war have been made. Therein you should take part, if possible, and yourselves abide by the oaths; otherwise keep quiet, as we have already proposed, continuing to enjoy your own possessions; take part with neither side, receive both sides as friends but for hostile purposes neither. And this will be satisfactory to us."

Thus spoke Archidamus; and the Plataean envoys, on hearing him, went into the city, and after reporting to the people what had been said, answered him, that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without the consent of the Athenians—for their children and wives were in Athens¹—adding that they feared for the very existence of the state; for after the departure of the Lacedaemonians the Athenians would come and veto the plan, or else the Thebans, claiming that they were included in the stipulations about receiving both sides, would try again to seize their city. But he, endeavouring to reassure them with regard to these matters, said:

"You need only consign the city and your houses

¹ cf. ch. vi. 4.
τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ γῆς ὅρους ἀποδείξατε καὶ δένδρα ἁριθμῷ τὰ ύμετέρα καὶ ἄλλο εἰ τι 
δυνατὸν ἐς ἁριθμὸν ἐλθεῖν αὐτοὶ δὲ μεταχωρή-
σατε ὅποι βουλευσθεί, ἐώς ἄν ὁ πόλεμος ἢ ἐπειδὰν 
δὲ παρέλθῃ, ἀποδώσομεν ύμῖν ἄ ἄν παραλά-
βωμεν. μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο ἐξομεν παρακαταθήκην, 
ἐργαζόμενοι καὶ φορᾶν φέροντες ἡ ἄν ύμῖν μέλλη 
ἵκαιν ἔσεσθαι."

LXXIII. Οἱ δ ἀκούσαντες ἐσῆλθον αὐθίς ἐς 
τὴν πόλιν, καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους 
ἐλέξαν ὅτι βουλονται ἐποκαλεῖται Ἀθηναίοις 
κοινώσαι πρὸτον καὶ, ἡν πείθωσιν αὐτοὺς, ποιεῖν 
ταῦτα· μέχρι δὲ τούτου σπείρασθαι σφίσιν ἐκε-
λευνο καὶ τὴν γῆν μὴ δηοῦν. ὁ δὲ ἡμέρας τε 
ἐσπείρατο ἐν αἷς εἰκός ἡν κομισθήμαι καὶ τὴν γῆν 
2 οὐκ ἐτέμνεν. ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ Πλαταιής πρέσβεις 
ὡς τοὺς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ βουλευσάμενοι μετ' αὐ-
τῶν πάλιν ἦλθον ἀπαγγέλλοντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει 
3 τοιάδε· "Οὔτ' ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς 
Πλαταιῆς, ἄφ' οὗ ἔμμαχοι ἐγενόμεθα, Ἀθηναῖοί 
φασιν ἐν οὐδενὶ ύμᾶς προέσθαι ἀδικομένους οὐτε 
νῦν περιώψεσθαι, βοηθήσειν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν. 
ἐπισκήπτουσί τε ύμῖν πρὸς τῶν ὅρκων οὐς οἱ 
πατέρες ὦμοσαν μηδὲν νεωτερίζειν περὶ τὴν 
ζύμμαχίαν."

LXXIV. Τοιαῦτα τῶν πρέσβεων ἀπαγγειλάν-
των οἱ Πλαταιής ἐβουλεύσαντο Ἀθηναίους μὴ 
προδίδοναι, ἄλλῳ ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ γῆν τεμισμένην, 
εἰ δὲ, ὄροντας καὶ ἄλλο πᾶσχοντας ὁ τι ἄν
to us, the Lacedaemonians, pointing out to us the boundaries of your land and telling us the number of your trees and whatever else can be numbered; then as for yourselves migrate to whatever place you please, remaining there while the war lasts; but as soon as the war is over we will give back to you whatever we have received; until then we will hold it all in trust, working the land and paying you whatever rent will satisfy you."

LXXIII. With this answer the Plataean envoys went again into the city, and after they had conferred with the people replied that they wished first to communicate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they could gain their consent would do what he proposed; but meanwhile they requested him to grant them a truce and not to ravage the land. And so he made a truce for the number of days within which their representatives could be expected to go and return, and did not lay waste their land. But the Plataean envoys went to the Athenians and after consulting with them returned with the following message to the people at home: "The Athenians assure you, Plataeans, that as in times past, since you became their allies,¹ they have never on any occasion deserted you when you were being wronged, so now they will not suffer you to be wronged, but will assist you with all their might. They therefore adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to break off the alliance."

LXXIV. When the envoys reported this answer, the Plataeans determined not to betray the Athenians, but to endure even to see their lands laid waste, if need be, and to suffer whatever else might happen;

¹ About 520 B.C. cf. III. lxviii. 5.
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ξυμβαίνη: εξελθείν τε μηδένα ἦτο, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ τοῦ τείχους ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι ἀδύνατα σφίσι ποιεῖν
2 ἔστιν ἀ Δακεδαιμόνιοι προκαλοῦνται. ὡς δὲ ἀπεκρίναντο, ἐντεῦθεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐς ἐπιμαρ-
τυρίαν καὶ θεῶν καὶ ήρωων τῶν ἐγχωρίων Ἀρχι-
3 δαμος ὁ βασιλεὺς κατέστη λέγων ὅδε ἃ “Θεοὶ
ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἡρώες, ξυν-
ιστορέσ ἐστε ὅτι οὔτε τὴν ἄρχην ἄδικως, ἔκληπτον-
των δὲ τῶνδε προτέρων τὸ ἐγκύκλιον, ἐπὶ γῆν
τήνδε ἦλθομεν, ἐν ᾗ οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν εὐξάμενοι
ὑμῖν Μήδων ἐκράτησαν καὶ παρέσχετε αὐτὴν
εὐμενὴ ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς “Ελλησιν, οὔτε νῦν,
ἡν τι ποιῶμεν, ἄδικησομεν προκαλεσάμενοι γὰρ
πολλὰ καὶ εἰκότα οὐ τυγχάνομεν. ξυγγνώμονες
δὲ ἐστε τῆς μὲν ἄδικίας κολάξεσθαι τοῖς ὑπάρ-
χουσι προτέροις, τῆς δὲ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοῖς
ἐπιφέρουσι νομίμως.”

LXXV. Τοσαῦτα ἐπιθειάσας καθίστη ἐς πόλε-
μον τὸν στρατόν. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν περιεσταύρω-
σαν αὐτοὺς τοῖς δευδρεῖν ἃ ἐκοψαν, τοῦ μηδένα
ἐπεξεῖναι, ἐπεὶ τά χῶμα ἔχουσι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν,
ἐλπίζουστε ταχίστην τὴν 1 αὔρεσιν ἐσεθαι αὐ-
2 τῶν στρατεύματος τοσοῦτον ἐργαζομένου. ξύλα
μὲν οὖν τέμνοντες ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος παρφοκοδό-
μου ἐκατέρωθεν, φορμηδὸν ἀντὶ τοῖχων τιθέντες,
ὅπως μὴ διαχέοιτο ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸ χῶμα. ἐφόρουν

1 Added by Classen.
further, that no one should thereafter leave the city, but that the answer should be given from the walls that they found it impossible to do what the Lacedaemonians proposed. And when they had made answer, thereupon king Archidamus first stood forth calling the gods and heroes of the country to witness in the following words: "Ye gods and heroes who protect the land of Plataea, be our witnesses that we did no wrong in the beginning, but only after the Plataeans first abandoned the oath we all swore did we come against this land, where our fathers, invoking you in their prayers, conquered the Persians, and which you made auspicious for the Hellenes to fight in, and that now also, if we take any measures, we shall be guilty of no wrong; for though we have made them many reasonable proposals we have failed. Grant therefore your consent, that those be punished for the wrong who first began it, and that those obtain their revenge who are seeking to exact it lawfully."

LXXV. After this appeal to the gods he began hostilities. In the first place the Lacedaemonians, using the trees which they had cut down, built a stockade round Plataea, that in future no one might leave the place; then they began raising a mound against the town, hoping that with so large an army at work this would be the speediest way of taking it. So they cut timber on Cithaeron and built a structure alongside the mound on either side of it, laying the logs like lattice-work ¹ to form a sort of wall, that the mound might not spread too much. Then they

¹ A frame was made like lattice-work or mat-work, the timbers crossing each other at right angles (‡‡).
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δὲ ὑλὴν ἐς αὐτὸ καὶ λίθους καὶ γῆν καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο
3 ἀνύτευν μέλλου ἐπιβαλλόμενον. ἡμέρας δὲ ἔχουν ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ νῦκτας ξυνεχῶς, διηρημένοι κατ' ἀναπάυλας, ὡστε τοὺς μὲν φέρειν, τοὺς δὲ ὑπνον τε καὶ σίτον αἱρεῖσθαι. Λακεδαιμονίων τε οἱ ἐναγαγοί ἐκάστης πόλεως ἡυπεφήστωτες
4 ἡμᾶς ἀρχαιοὺς εἰς τὸ ἔργον. οἱ δὲ Πλαταίης ὁρῶντες τὸ χῶμα αἱρόμενον, ξύλινον τείχος ξυνθέντες καὶ ἐπιστήσαντες τῷ ἐαυτῶν τείχει ἡ προσεχοῦτο, ἐσφυκόδωμον ἐς αὐτὸ πλίνθους ἐκ τῶν ἔγγυς οἷο-
5 κιῶν καθαίροντες. ἐξύδεσμος δ' ἦν αὐτοῖς τὰ ἥπα, τοῦ μὴ υψηλῶν γιγνόμενον ἀσθενές εἶναι τὸ οἰκοδόμημα, καὶ προκαλύμματα εἰχε δέρσεις καὶ διφθέρας, ὡστε τοὺς ἐργαζόμενους καὶ τὰ ἥπα μῆτε πυρφόρους οἰστοῖς βάλλεσθαι ἐν ἁσφαλείᾳ
6 τε εἶναι. ὑρετο δὲ τὸ υψός τοῦ τείχους μέγα, καὶ τὸ χῶμα οὐ σχολαίτερον ἀντανῄει αὐτῷ. καὶ οἱ Πλαταίης τοιόνδε τι ἐπινοοῦσιν διελύντες τοῦ τείχους ἡ προσέπιπτε τὸ χῶμα ἐσεφόρουν τὴν γῆν.

LXXVI. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι αἰσθόμενοι ἐν ταρσοῖς καλάμου πηλὼν ἐνύλλοντες ἐσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ διηρημένον, ὅπως μὴ διαχέομενον ὡσπερ ἡ γῆ
2 φοροῖτο. οἱ δὲ ταύτῃ ἀποκληθόμενοι τοῦτο μὲν ἐπέχουν, ὑπόνομον δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὀρύξαντες καὶ ξυντεκμήράμενοι ὑπὸ τὸ χῶμα ὑφεῖλκον αὖθις παρὰ σφᾶς τὸν χουν καὶ ἐλάνθανον ἑπὶ πολὺ

1 With ABEFM and Suid. Hude reads, with CG, οἱ ἐναγαγοὶ καὶ ἐκάστης πόλεως <οἱ> ἐφεστῶτες.

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brought and threw into the space wood and stones and earth and anything else which when thrown on would serve to build up the mound. And for seventy days and nights continuously they kept on raising the mound, divided into relays, so that while some were carrying others might take sleep and food; and the Lacedaemonian commanders of auxiliaries together with the officers in charge of the contingents from the several cities kept them at their task. But the Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, put together a framework of wood which they set on top of their own wall at the point where the mound was being constructed, and inside this frame they put bricks which they took from the neighbouring houses. The timbers served to hold the bricks together, preventing the structure from becoming weak as it attained height, and they were protected by coverings of skins and hides, so that the workmen and woodwork might be safe and shielded from incendiary arrows. The wall was mounting to a great height, and the opposing mound was rising with equal speed, when the Plataeans thought of a new expedient. They made an opening in that part of the city wall where the mound came into contact with it, and began to draw the earth in.

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians became aware of this, and threw into the breach clay packed in reed-mats that it might not filter through like the loose earth and be carried away. But the besieged, thwarted in this direction, gave up that plan and dug a mine from the town, and, guessing when they had got beneath the mound, once more began to draw away the earth to their side, this time from underneath; and for a long time they worked
τούς ἔξω, ὡστε ἐπιβάλλοντας ἕσσον ἀνύτειν ὑπαγομένου αὐτοῖς κάτωθεν τοῦ χώματος καὶ ἵζονον τοὺς αἰεί ἐπὶ τὸ κενοῦμενον. δεδιότες δὲ μὴ οὐδ οὔτω δύνωνται ὀλίγοι πρὸς πολλοὺς ἀντέχειν, προσεπεξηγήρων τόδε τὸ μὲν μέγα οἰκοδόμημα ἐπαύσαντο ἐργαζόμενοι τὸ κατὰ τὸ χώμα, ἐνθεν δὲ καὶ ἐνθεν αὐτοῦ ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ βραχέος τείχους ἐκ τοῦ ἐντὸς μηνοείδες ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσωκοδόμουν, ὅπως, εἰ τὸ μέγα τείχος ἀλίσκοιτο, τοῦτ' ἀντέχοι, καὶ δέοι τοὺς ἐναντίους αὐθίς πρὸς αὐτὸ χοῦν, καὶ προχωροῦντας ἐσω διπλάσιον τε πόνον ἤχειν καὶ ἐν ἀμφίβολῳ μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι.

4 ἄμα δὲ τῇ χώσει καὶ μηχανὰς προσήγον οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι τῇ πόλει, μίαν μὲν ἡ τοῦ μεγάλου οἰκοδομήματος κατὰ τὸ χώμα προσαχθείσα ἐπὶ μέγα τε κατέσεισε καὶ τοὺς Πλαταιᾶς ἐφόβησεν, ἄλλας δὲ ἀλλή τοῦ τείχους, ὡς βρόχους τε περιβάλλουσι τε ἀνέκλων οἱ Πλαταιῆς, καὶ δοκοὺς μεγάλας ἀρτήσαντες ἀλύσεις μακραῖς σιδηραῖς ἀπὸ τῆς τομῆς ἐκατέρωθεν ἀπὸ κεραιῶν δύο ἐπικεκλιμένων καὶ ὑπερτεινουσῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τείχους ἀνελκύσαντες ἐγκαρσίας, ὅποτε προσπεσεῖσθαι πη μέλλοι ἢ μηχανῆ, ἀφίεσαν τὴν δοκοῦ χαλαρᾶς ταῖς ἀλύσεις καὶ οὐ διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοντες, ἢ δὲ ῥύμη ἐμπιπτοῦσα ἀπεκάύλυζε τὸ προῦχον τῆς ἐμβολῆς.

LXXVII. Μετὰ δὲ τούτῳ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι, ὡς αὐτὲς μηχαναὶ οὐδὲν ὄφελον καὶ τῷ χώματι
unnoticed by those outside, so that in spite of what they heaped on these made less progress, because their mound, as it was sapped from below, constantly kept settling down into the hollow space. But fearing that even so they would not be able to hold out, few as they were against a multitude, they devised this further expedient: they stopped working on the high structure opposite the mound, and starting at the low part of the wall on either side of it they began building a crescent-shaped rampart on the inward or city side of it, in order that, if the high wall should be taken, this might offer resistance; the enemy would thus have to raise a second mound to oppose the new rampart, and as they advanced and came inside the crescent they would not only have their labour twice over, but would also be more exposed to attack on both sides. But the Peloponnesians, while going on with their mound, also brought up engines against the city: one was moved forward over the mound, and shook down a great part of the high structure, terrifying the Plataeans, while others were brought to bear at different parts of the wall. But the Plataeans threw nooses over these and pulled them up. They also suspended great beams by long iron chains attached at either end to two poles which rested on the wall and extended over it; then they hauled up the beams at right angles\(^1\) to the battering-ram and when it was about to strike anywhere let go the beam by allowing the chains to run slack and not keeping hold of them; whereupon the beam would fall with a rush and break off the head of the battering-ram.

LXXVII. After this, the Peloponnesians, seeing that their engines were doing no good and that the

\(^1\) i.e. parallel to the wall.


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to ἀντίτειχισμα ἔγινετο, νομίσαντες ἀπορον εἰ

ναὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἔλειν τὴν πόλιν

2 πρὸς τὴν περιτείχισιν παρεσκευάζοντο. πρότε-

ρον δὲ πυρὶ ἐδοξείν αὐτοῖς πειρᾶσαι εἰ δύναντο

πνεύματος γενομένου ἐπιφλέξαι τὴν πόλιν οὐσαν

οὐ μεγάλην. πᾶσαν γὰρ δὴ ἰδέαν ἐπενόουν, εἰ πως

σφίσιν ἀνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολιορκίας προσαχθεῖν.

3 φοροῦντες δὲ ὕλης φακέλους παρέβαλον ἀπὸ

tοῦ χώματος ἐς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον τοῦ τείχους

καὶ τῆς προσχώσεως, ταχύ δὲ πλήρους γενομένου

diὰ πολυχειρίαν ἐπιπαρένησαν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πό-

λεως ὡς ἐδύναντο ἀπὸ τοῦ μετεώρου πλεῖστον

ἐπισχείν, ἐμβαλόντες δὲ πῦρ ξυν θεῖῳ καὶ πίσσῃ

4 ἥψαν τὴν ὕλην. καὶ ἐγένετο φλὸξ τοσαύτη ὅσην

οὐδεὶς πω ἦς γε ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον χειροποιήτου

εἰδεν' ἡδὲ γὰρ ἐν ὅρεσιν ὕλη τριφθείσα ὑπ᾽ ἀνέ-

μων πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου πῦρ καὶ φλόγα

5 ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀνήκεν. τοῦτο δὲ μέγα τε ἦν καὶ τοὺς

Πλαταιᾶς τάλλα διαφυγόντας ἐλαχίστον ἐδέσθε

dιαφθειραὶ: ἐντὸς γὰρ πολλοῦ χωρίου τῆς πόλεως

οὐκ ἦν πελάσαι, πνεύμα τε εἰ ἐπεγένετο αὐτή

ἐπίφορον, ὁπερ καὶ ἦλπιζον οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἂν

6 διέφυγον. νῦν δὲ καὶ τόδε λέγεται ξυμβῆναι,

уется πολὺ καὶ βροντὰς γενομένας σβέσαι τὴν

φλόγα καὶ οὕτως παισθῆναι τὸν κίνδυνον.

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counter-wall was keeping pace with the mound, and concluding that it was impracticable without more formidable means of attack to take the city, began to make preparations for throwing a wall about it. But before doing that they decided to try fire, in the hope that, if a wind should spring up, they might be able to set the city on fire, as it was not large; indeed, there was no expedient they did not consider, that they might if possible reduce the city without the expense of a siege. Accordingly they brought faggots of brushwood and threw them down from the mound, first into the space between the wall and the mound; and then, since the space was soon filled up by the multitude of workers, they heaped faggots also as far into the city as they could reach from the height, and finally threw fire together with sulphur and pitch upon the wood and set it afire. And a conflagration arose greater than any one had ever seen up to that time, kindled, I mean, by the hand of man; for in times past in the mountains when dry branches have been rubbed against each other a forest has caught fire spontaneously therefrom and produced a conflagration. And this fire was not only a great one, but also very nearly destroyed the Plataeans after they had escaped all earlier perils; for in a large part of the city it was not possible to get near the fire, and if on top of that a breeze had sprung up blowing toward the city, which was precisely what the enemy were hoping for, the Plataeans would not have escaped. But as it was, this also is said to have happened—a heavy thunder-shower came on and quenched the flames, and so the danger was checked.
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LXXVIII. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπειδή καὶ τούτου διήμαρτον, μέρος μὲν τι καταλιπόντες τοῦ στρατοῦ, τὸ δὲ πλέον ἁφέντες περιετείχίζον τὴν πόλιν κύκλῳ διελόμενοι κατὰ πόλεις τὸ χωρίον τάφρος δὲ ἐντὸς τε ἦν καὶ ἔξωθεν ἐξ ἂς ἐπλινθεύ-2 σαντο. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ ἀρκτον-ροῦ ἐπιτολάς, καταλιπόντες φυλακᾶς τοῦ ἡμίσεος τείχους (τὸ δὲ ἡμῖσιν Βοιωτοῦ ἐφύλασσον) ἀνεχώ-ρησαν τῷ στρατῷ καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

3 Πλαταιῆς δὲ παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναικές καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους τε καὶ πλῆθος τὸ ἀχρεῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρότερον ἐκκεκομισμένοι ἦσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθηναίας, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐπολιορκοῦντο ἐγκαταλελειμ-μένου τετρακόσιοι, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ ὁγδοίκοντα, γυ-ναῖκες δὲ δέκα καὶ ἐκατὸν σιτοποιοῦ. τοσοῦτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἕμπαντες ὅτε ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν καθι-σταντο, καὶ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἦν ἐν τῷ τείχει οὗτε δοῦλος οὐτ' ἐλεύθερος. τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ Πλαταιῶν πολιορκία κατεσκευάζη.

LXXIX. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους καὶ ἅμα τῆς τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἐπιστρατείας Ἀθηναῖοι δισχίλιοι ὀπλίταις ἐαυτῶν καὶ ἅπευσι διακοσίοις ἐπεστρά-τευσαν ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἔπε Θράκης καὶ Βοττιάνους ἀκμάζοντος τοῦ σίτου ἐστρατήγηε δὲ 2 Ξενοφόνον ὁ Εὐριπίδος τρίτος αὐτὸς. ἐλθόντες δὲ υπὸ Σπάρτωλον τὴν Βοττικὴν τῶν σίτου διέφθει-ραν. ἐδόκει δὲ καὶ προσχωρήσειν ἡ πόλις υπὸ 402
LXXVIII. When the Peloponnesians had failed in this attempt also, they dismissed the larger part of their army, leaving only a portion of it, and proceeded to throw a wall around the city, apportioning the space to the several cities; and there were ditches both inside and outside the wall, out of which they had taken the clay for the bricks. And when the wall was entirely finished about the time of the rising of Arcturus,¹ they left a guard to watch one half of the wall (the Thebans guarded the other half), and withdrew the main army, the troops dispersing to their several cities. But the Plataeans had previously had their children and wives, as well as the oldest men and the unserviceable part of the population, removed to Athens, and the men left behind to undergo the siege were only four hundred of their own number and eighty Athenians, besides one hundred and ten women to prepare the food. This was the number all told when the siege began, and there was no one else within the walls, slave or free-man. Such were the conditions under which the siege of the Plataeans was established.

LXXIX. During the same summer, when the corn was in full ear,² while the expedition against Plataea was in progress, the Athenians with two thousand hoplites of their own and two hundred cavalry marched against the Chalcidians in Thrace and the Bottiaeans, under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides and two others. And coming to Spartolus in Bottice they destroyed the grain. It was believed, moreover, that the city would be delivered over to them by a party inside the town which was

¹ About the middle of September.
² In the month of May.
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τινων ἐνδοθεν πρασσόντων προπεμψάντων δὲ ἐσ 'Ολυνθον τῶν οὐ ταυτὰ βουλομένων ὁπλίται τε ἥλθον καὶ στρατιὰ ἐς φυλακήν· ἦς ἐπεξελθούσης ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτᾶς τὸς μάχην καθίστανται οἱ 'Αθη-


ναιοὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῇ πόλει. καὶ οἱ μὲν ὁπλίται τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ἐπίκουροι τινῶς μετ' αὐτῶν νικών-

tαι ὑπὸ τῶν 'Αθηναίων καὶ ἀναχωροῦσιν ὑπὸ τῇ Σπαρτὰς, οἱ δὲ ἵππης τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ψυλλό-


νικῶσι τοὺς τῶν 'Αθηναίων ἵππεας καὶ ψυλλόσ.


4 εἶχον δὲ τινας οὐ πολλοὺς πελταστὰς ἐκ τῆς Κρούσιδος γῆς καλομένης. ἄρτι δὲ τῆς μάχης ἑγεμο-


νέμησις ἐπιβοηθοῦσιν ἄλλοι πελτασταὶ ἐκ τῆς Ὀλυνθου. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Σπαρτᾶς ψυλλοὶ ὃς εἶδον, θαρ-


σάντες τοῖς τε προσγυγυμένοις καὶ ὧτι πρῶτον οὐχ ἦσθεςτο, ἐπιτίθενται αὐτῖς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἵπ-


πεων καὶ τῶν προσβοιωθησάντων τοῖς 'Αθηναίων. καὶ ἀναχωρούσι πρὸς τὰς δύο τάξεις ὡς κατέληπον παρὰ τοῖς σκευο-


6 φόροις. καὶ ὅποτε μὲν ἔπιοιεν οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι, ἐνε-


dίδοσαν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐνέκειτο καὶ ἐσπηκόντιξον.


οἱ τε ἵππης τῶν Ἑλλήνων προσπεπεύοντες ἥ δοκοὶ ἐσέβαλλον, καὶ οὐχ ἦκεστα φοβήσαντες ἐπεβαλλο-


ντοὺς 'Αθηναίους καὶ ἐπεδώξαι ἐπὶ πολύ. 7 καὶ οἱ μὲν 'Αθηναίοι εἰς τὴν Ποτείδαιαν καταφεύ-


γουσί, καὶ ὡστερον τοὺς νεκροὺς ὑποσπόνδους κομισάμενοι εἰς τὰς 'Αθηνας ἀναχωροῦσι τῷ περι-


όντι τοῦ στρατοῦ ἀπέθανον δὲ αὐτῶν τριάκοντα


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negotiating with them; but the opposite faction forestalled this by sending word to Olynthus, and some hoplites and other troops arrived to garrison the place. Now when these made a sally from Spartolus, the Athenians were drawn into a battle with them under the very walls of the city, and although the hoplites of the Chalcidians and some mercenaries with them were defeated by the Athenians and retreated into Spartolus, the cavalry of the Chalcidians and the light-armed troops defeated the Athenian cavalry and light-troops; for the Athenians had a few targeteers from the land called Crousis,¹ and just after the battle was over another force of targeteers came from Olynthus to the help of the garrison. And when the light-armed troops in Spartolus saw them, emboldened by these accessions and because they had not been worsted before, they again, assisted by the Chalcidian cavalry and those who had newly come to their support, attacked the Athenians, who now fell back upon the two companies which they had left with their baggage. And whenever the Athenians advanced, they gave way, but when the Athenians retreated they kept close at their heels, hurling javelins at them. Then the Chalcidian cavalry, riding up, kept charging the Athenians wherever opportunity offered, and throwing them into utter panic routed them and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians took refuge in Potidea, and afterwards, having recovered their dead under a truce, returned to Athens with what remained of their army; and they had lost three hundred and thirty

¹ This is evidently a remark in explanation of the presence of light-troops with the Athenians, for there had come from Athens only heavy-armed infantry and cavalry; cf. § 1 above.
καὶ τετρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάντες. οἱ δὲ Χαλκιδῆς καὶ Βοσπόροι τροπαίον τε ἔστησαν καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς αὐτῶν ἀνελόμενοι διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

LXXX. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους, οὐ πολλῷ ύστερον τούτων, Ἀμπρακιώται καὶ Χαόνες, βουλόμενοι Ἀκαρνανίαν τὴν πᾶσαν καταστρέψασθαι καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἀποστῆσαι, πείθουσι Δακεδαιμονίους ναυτικὸν τε παρασκευάζειν ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ ὀπλίτας χίλιους πέμψαι ἐπ' Ἀκαρνανίαν, λέγουτες ὅτι, ἢν ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῷ ἀμαμετὰ σφῶν ἔλθωσιν, ἀδυνάτων ὄντων ξυμβοηθεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης Ἀκαρνανών ῥάδιός Ἀκαρνανίαν σχόντες καὶ τῆς Ζακύνθου καὶ Κεφαλληνίας κρατήσουσι, καὶ ὁ περίπλοιος οὐκέτι ἔσοιτο Ἀθηναίοις ὁμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον. 2 ἐλπίδας δ' εἰναι καὶ Ναυπακτον λαβεῖν. οἱ δὲ Δακεδαιμονίων πεισθέντες Κυῆμον μὲν ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα καὶ τοὺς ὀπλίτας ἐπὶ ναυσὶν ὀλίγαις εὐθὺς πέμπουσι, τὸ δὲ ναυτικὸ περιήγγειλαν παρασκευασμένῳ ὡς τὰχίστα πλεῖν ἐς Δευκάδα.

3 ἦσαν δὲ Κορίνθιοι ξυμπροθυμούμενοι μάλιστα τοῖς Ἀμπρακιώταις ἀποίκοις οὕσιν. καὶ τὸ μὲν ναυτικὸν ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου καὶ Σικυόνου καὶ τῶν ταύτῃ χωρίων ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦν, τὸ δ' ἐκ Δευκάδος καὶ Ἀνακτορίου καὶ Ἀμπρακίας πρότερον 4 ἀφικόμενον ἐν Δευκάδι περιεμενεν. Κυῆμος δὲ καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ χίλιοι ὀπλίται ἐπειδὴ ἐπεραιώθησαν λαθόντες Φορμίωνα, ὅς ἦρχε τῶν εἴκοσι 406.
men and all their generals. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, and then, after they had taken up their own dead, dispersed to their several cities.

LXXX. During the same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, wishing to subdue the whole of Acarnania and detach it from Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out a fleet from the countries of the Doric alliance and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania, saying that, if they joined forces with them, bringing ships and infantry, it would be an easy matter first to occupy Acarnania since the Acarnanians on the seacoast would be unable to aid those inland, and then to make themselves masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia also: after that the Athenians would no longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the same way as before; and there was a chance of taking Naupactus also. The Lacedaemonians agreed and at once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral, and the hoplites on a few ships, and sent round orders to the allied fleet to make their preparations and sail as soon as possible to Leucas. And the Corinthians were especially eager to support the enterprise of the Ambraciots, who were colonists of theirs. The contingent of the fleet to come from Corinth and Sicyon and the places in that quarter was still under preparation, but that from Leucas and Anactorium and Ambracia, arriving first, waited at Leucas. As for Cnemus and the thousand hoplites, as soon as they had succeeded in crossing over without being detected by Phormio, who was in command of the

1 i.e. because of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet along their coast.  
2 cf. ch. lxvi. 2.
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νεῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν αὐτῷ ἐπεὶ Ναῦπακτον ἐφρού- ΡΟΥΝ, εὐθὺς παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν κατὰ γῆν
5 στρατείαν. καὶ αὐτῶ παρῆσαν Ἑλλήνων μὲν
Ἀμπρακιῶται καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ Δευκάδιοι
καὶ οὕς αὐτῶσ ἡχῶν ἤλθε χίλιοι Πελοποννησίων,
βάρβαροι δὲ Χαόνες χίλιοι ἀβασίλευτοι, ὅν
ήγουντο ἑπτησίῳ προστατεία ἔκ τοῦ ἄρχικοῦ
γένους Φώτιος καὶ Νικάνωρ. ἔμφεστατεύνου
δὲ μετὰ Χαόνες καὶ Θεσπρωτοῖ ἀβασίλευτοι.
6 Μολοσσοὺς δὲ ἦγε καὶ Ἀτιντάνας Σαβύλινθος
ἐπίτροπος δὲν Θάρυππος τοῦ βασιλέως ἔτι παιδῶ
οντος, καὶ Παραναίος Ὀροιδος βασιλεύων.
Ὀρέσται δὲ χίλιοι, δὲν ἀβασίλευν Αὐτίκος,
μετὰ Παραναίων ἐμφεστατεύνου Ὀροίδῳ Ἀν-
7 τίχον ἑπιτρέψατος. ἔπεμψε δὲ καὶ Περδίκκας
κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων χίλιους Μακεδόνων, οἶ
8 ύστερον ἠλθον. τοῦτο τῷ στρατῷ ἐπορεύετο
Κυήμος οὗ περιμείνας τὸ ἀπὸ Κορίνθου ναυτικόν,
καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἀργείας ἱόντες Διμναίαν, κὼμην
ἀτείχιστον, ἑπόρθησαν. ἀφικνοῦνται τῇ ἕπὶ
Στράτουν, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, νο-
μίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην πρότην λάβοιεν, ῥαδίως
σφίασ ἀλλα προσχωρήσειν.
LXXXI. Ἀκαρνάνες δὲ αἰσθόμενοι κατὰ 
τῇ πολλῆν στρατιὰν ἐσβεβληκοῦν ἐκ 
τῇ θαλάσσῃ ναυσίν ἀμα τοὺς πολεμίους παρεσα-
μένους, οὐτε ἑνεβοήθουν ἐφύλασσον τῇ τὰ αὐτῶ
ἐκαστοί, παρὰ τῃ Φορμίων ἐπεμπον κελεύοντες
ἀμύνειον ὁ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἐφη εἶναι ναυτικοῦ ἐκ
Κορίνθου μέλλοντος ἐκπλείν Ναῦπακτον ἐρήμην
2 ἀπολιπεῖν. οὶ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμα-
twenty Athenian ships that were on guard off Naupactus, they began at once to prepare for the expedition by land. He had with him, of Hellenic troops, some Ambraciots, Anactorians and Leucadians, and the thousand Peloponnesians whom he himself brought; of barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who, having no king, were led by Photius and Nicanor of the ruling clan who had the annual presidency. With the Chaonian contingent were also some Thesprotians, who likewise have no king. A force of Molossians and Atintanians were led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of king Tharyps, who was still a boy, and of Paravaeans by their king, Oroedus. With the Paravaeans were a thousand Orestians whose king, Antiochus, had entrusted them to Oroedus. And Perdiccas also sent, without the knowledge of the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With this army Cnemus set out, not waiting for the fleet from Corinth; and as they passed through the territory of Argos they sacked Limnaea, an unwalled village. Finally they arrived at Stratus, the largest city of Acarnania, thinking that if they could take this first, the other places would readily come over to them.

LXXXI. Now when the Acarnanians perceived that a large army had invaded them by land and that the enemy would soon be at hand with a fleet by sea as well, they did not attempt combined resistance, but guarding severally their own possessions they sent to Phormio urging him to aid them. But he said that he could not leave Naupactus unprotected, as a hostile fleet was about to sail from Corinth. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians and their

1 cf. ch. lxix. 1. 2 Amphilochoian Argos; cf. ch. lxviii. 1.
καὶ τριὰ τέλη ποιήσαντες σφῶν αυτῶν ἐξώρουν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Στρατίων πόλιν, ὅπως ἐγγὺς στρατοπεδεύσαμενοι, εἰ μὴ λόγῳ πεῖθοιεν, ἔργῳ πειράματος τοῦ τείχους. καὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν ἔχοντες προσήχαν Χαόνες καὶ οἱ ἅλλοι βάρβαροι, ἐκ δὲ αὐτῶν Δευκάδιοι καὶ Ἀνακτόριοι καὶ οἱ μετὰ τούτων, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Κνῆμος καὶ οἱ Πελοπονήσιοι καὶ Ἀμπρακιώται διείχον δὲ πολὺ ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐδὲ ἐσφυγόντο. 

καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἔλληνες τεταγμένοι τε προσήχαν καὶ διὰ φυλακῆς ἔχοντες, ἔως ἐστρατοπεδεύσαμαντο ἐν ἐπιτηδείῳ· οἱ δὲ Χαόνες σφίζει τε αὐτῶς πιστεύουντες καὶ ἄξιομενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκείνης ἥπειρωτῶν μαχιμωτατοι εἶναι οὔτε ἐπέσχον τοῦ στρατόπεδου καταλαβένην, χωρίσαντες τε ρύμη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων ἐνόμισαν αὐτοβοἰ ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἔλειν καὶ αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον γενέσθαι γνώντες δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Στρατίων ἔτι προσιόντασ καὶ ἡγησάμενοι, μεμνημένων εἰ κρατήσειαν, οὔκ ἂν ἕτη σφίζει τοὺς Ἔλληνας ὁμοίως προσελθεῖν, προλοχίζουσι δὴ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐνέδραις, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ἦσαν, ἐκ τε τῆς πόλεως ὀμόσε χωρίσαντες καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνεδρῶν προσπίπτουσιν. καὶ ἔσφοβον καταστάντων διαφθείρονται τε πολλοὶ τῶν Χαόνων, καὶ οἱ ἅλλοι βάρβαροι ὃς εἶδον αὐτοὺς ἐνδόντας, οὐκέτι ὑπέμειναν, ἄλλ' ἐσ φυγὴν κατέστησαν. τῶν δὲ Ἔλληνικῶν στρατοπέδων οὐδετεροῦ ἢσθετο τῆς μάχης, διὰ τὸ πολὺ προσβληθεῖν αὐτοὺς καὶ στρατόπεδον οἰηθῆναι καταληψομένων.
allies, dividing their troops into three divisions, advanced towards the city of the Stratians, their purpose being to encamp near by, and then, if they could not prevail upon them by parleying, to assault the wall. As they advanced, the centre was held by the Chaonians and the other barbarians, while on their right were the Leucadians and Anactorians and those who accompanied them, and on the left Cnemus with his Peloponnnesians and the Ambraciots; and the divisions were far apart from each other, sometimes, not even in sight. And the Hellenic troops as they advanced maintained their ranks and were on their guard until they encamped in a suitable place; but the Chaonians, who were not only confident of themselves but were also recognised as very excellent fighting men by the inhabitants of that part of the mainland, did not halt to make camp, but advanced with a rush along with the other barbarians, thinking that they could take the town at the first assault, and thus gain the glory for themselves. But the Stratians noticed that they were still advancing, and thinking that, if they could overcome them while isolated, the Hellenes would no longer be as ready to attack them, set ambushes in the outskirts of the town, and as soon as the barbarians were close at hand, closed in upon them from the city and from the ambushes and fell upon them. Thrown into a panic, many of the Chaonians were slain, and the other barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer held their ground, but took to flight. But neither of the Hellenic divisions was aware of the battle, because their allies had gone far ahead of them, and they thought that they were
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8 νοὺς ἐπείγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐνέκειντο φεύγοντες οἱ βαρβαροί, ἀνελάμβανον τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ξυναγόντες τὰ στρατόπεδα ἦσύχαζον αὐτοῦ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐς χεῖρας μὲν οὐκ ἱόντων σφίζοι τῶν Στρατίων διὰ τὸ μῆπω τοὺς ἄλλους Ἀκαρνάνας ξυμβεβοηθεὶς ἀποθεοῦν δὲ σφενδονώντων καὶ ἐς ἀποριάν καθιστάντων· οὐ γὰρ ἢν ἄνευ ὁπλῶν κινηθῆναι. δοκοῦσι δὲ οἱ Ἀκαρνάνες κράτιστοι εἶναι τούτο ποιεῖν. LXXXII. ἐπειδὴ δὲ νῦς ἐγένετο, ἀναχωρήσας ὁ Κνῆμος τῇ στρατῇ κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀναπον ποταμὸν, ὃς ἀπέχει σταδίους ὅγιον ἱκοντα Στράτου, τοὺς τε νεκροὺς κομίζεται τῇ υστεραίᾳ ὑποστόνδους καὶ Οἰνιαδῶν ξυμπαραγενομένων κατὰ φιλίαν ἄναχωρεῖ παρ’ αὐτοὺς πρὶν τὴν ξυμβοθείαν ἐλθεῖν. κάκειθεν ἐπὶ οἰκον ἀπῆλθον ἐκαστοί. οἱ δὲ Στράτιοι τροπαίον ἐστησαν τῆς μάχης τῆς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους.

LXXXIII. Τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπον ναυτικόν, ὁ ἑδεῖ παραγενέσθαι τῷ Κνῆμῳ, ὅπως μὴ ξυμβοθεσουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω Ἀκαρνανεσις, οὐ παραγίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἤναγκάσθησαν περὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἡμέρας τῇ ἐν Στράτῳ μάχῃ ναυμαχησαι πρὸς Φορμίωνα καὶ τὰς εἰκοσὶ ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἱ ἐφρούρουν ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ. ὁ γὰρ Φορμίων παραπλέοντας αὐτούς ἐξε τοῦ κόλπου ἐτήρει, βουλόμενος ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ ἐπιθέεσθαι.

2 οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ ἐπέλεον μὲν οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχία, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικῶτερον παρεσκευασμένοι ἐς τὴν Ἀκαρνανίαν καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἱ ὁμοιομοί πρὸς ἐπτὰ καὶ τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς τὰς σφετέρας τολμήσαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰκοσὶ ταῖς

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pressing on in order to find a camp. But when the barbarians in their flight broke in upon them, they took them in and uniting their two divisions kept quiet there during the day, the Stratians not coming to close quarters with them, because the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet come to their support, but using their slings against them from a distance and distressing them; for it was not possible for them to stir without armour; and indeed the Acarnanians are famous for their excellence in the use of the sling.

LXXXI. But when night came on, Cnemus hastily retreated with his army to the river Anapus, which is eighty stadia distant from Stratus, and on the following day took up his dead under a truce; and since the Oeniadae had joined his expedition in token of their friendly feelings, he withdrew to their country before the combined forces of the Acarnanians had arrived, and from there they returned severally to their homes. As for the Stratians, they set up a trophy of their battle with the barbarians.

LXXXIII. Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and from the other allies on the Crisaeian Gulf, which was to have joined Cnemus in order to prevent the Acarnanians on the sea-coast from aiding those in the interior, did not arrive, but was obliged, about the day of the battle at Stratus, to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian ships which were on guard at Naupactus. For Phormio was watching them as they sailed along the coast out of the gulf, preferring to attack them in the open water. Now the Corinthians and their allies on their way to Acarnania were not equipped for fighting at sea, but rather for operations on land, and they had no idea that the Athenians with their twenty ships would dare to
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ἐαυτῶν ναυμαχίαν ποιήσασθαι ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντάς τε ἐὼρων αὐτούς, παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κομιζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρών τῆς Ἀχαίας πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπέρας ἥπειρον διαβάλλοντες ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατείδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χαλκίδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπλέοντας σφίσι καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ἀφορμισάμενοι,1 οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τῶν 4 πορθμῶν. στρατηγοὶ δὲ ἤσαν μὲν καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐκάστων οὐ παρεσκευάζοντο, Κορινθίων δὲ Μαχάων καὶ Ἰσοκράτης καὶ Ἀγαθαρχίδας. 5 καὶ οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐτάξαντο κύκλῳ τῶν νεῶν ὡς μέγιστον οἷοί τ’ ἤσαν μὴ διδόντες διέκπλον, τὰς πρόφασις μὲν ἔξω, ἔσω δὲ τὰς πρύμνας, καὶ τὰ τε λεπτὰ πλοῖα ἀ ξυνέπλει ἐντὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ πέντε ναῦς τὰς ἀριστὰ πλεούσας, ὅπως ἐκπλέοιεν διὰ βραχέος παραγιγνόμεναι, εἰ πη προσπίπτοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι.

LXXXIV. Οἱ δ’ Ἀθηναίοι κατὰ μίαν ναῦν τεταγμένου περιεπλέον αὐτούς κύκλῳ καὶ ξυνήγον ἐς ὄλγον, ἐν χρῷ ἀιεὶ παραπλέοντες καὶ δόκησιν παρέχοντες αὐτίκα ἐμβαλεῖν προείρητο δ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ Φορμίωνος μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν πρὶν ἀν 2 αὐτῶς σημῆν. ἥλπιζε γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐ μενεῖν τὴν

1 Bloomfield’s correction for ὄφορμισάμενοι of the MSS.

1 Or, retaining ὄφορμισάμενοι, “they had tried to anchor under cover of night, but had been detected.”
bring on an engagement with their own forty-seven. When, however, they saw that the Athenians kept sailing along the opposite coast as long as they themselves continued to skirt the southern shore, and when, as they attempted to cross from Patrae in Achaia to the mainland opposite, making for Acarnania, they observed that the Athenians were bearing down upon them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and finally when, during the night, they had tried to slip their moorings and get away but had been detected, under these circumstances they were forced to fight in the middle of the channel. Their fleet was commanded by generals from the several states which contributed contingents, the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians drew up their ships in as large a circle as they could without allowing the enemy an opportunity to break through, prows outward, sterns inward; and inside the circle they placed the light boats which accompanied them, and also five of their swiftest ships, in order that they might have only a short distance to sail out and bring support at any point where the enemy attacked.

LXXXIV. As for the Athenians, drawn up in single column they kept sailing round the Peloponnesian fleet in a circle, hemming it into a narrower and narrower space, always just grazing by and giving the impression that they would charge at any moment. But orders had been given by Phormio not to attack until he should give the signal; for he hoped that the enemy’s ships would not keep in line,

2 i.e. in the open water between Patrae and the mouth of the Evenus, as opposed to the regions along the shore of the Gulf, where their fleet might run into a harbour.

3 See note on i. xl. 3.
Τάξιν, ὃσπερ ἐν γῇ πεζῆν, ἄλλα ξυμπεσεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλας τὰς ναῦς καὶ τὰ πλοία ταραχὴν παρέξειν, εἴ τ' ἐκπνεύσειεν ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἑω, οὐδένα χρόνον ἑσυχασειν αὐτοὺς· καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἐφ' αὐτῷ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, ὅποταν βούληται, τῶν νεῶν ἄμεινον πλεον-3 σῶν, καὶ τότε καλλίστην γίγνεσθαι. ὡς δὲ τὸ τε πνεῦμα κατήκει καὶ αἱ νῆς ἐν ὅλῃ ὡδῇ οὐσαί ὑπ' ἄμφοτέρων, τοῦ τε ἀνέμου τῶν τε πλοίων, ἀμα προσκειμένων ἔταράσσουτο, καὶ ναῦς τε νη ἐποιεπιπτε καὶ τοῖς κοντοῖς διεώθουντο, βοή τε χρώμενοι καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀντιφυλακῆς τε καὶ λοιδορία οὐδὲν κατήκουν οὔτε τῶν παραγγελλο-μένων οὔτε τῶν κελευστῶν, καὶ τὰς κωπὰς ἄδυνα-τοι οὔτε ἐν κλύδωνι ἀναφέρειν ἄνθρωποι ἀπειροι τοῖς κυβερνήταις ἀπειθεστέρας τας ναῦς παρεί-χουν, τότε δὴ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον σημαίνει, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι προσπεσόντες πρῶτον μὲν κατα-δύοντοι τῶν στρατηγίδων νεῶν μίαν, ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐγρηγείαν διέφθειρον, καὶ κατεστη-σαν ἐς ἄλκης μὲν μήδενα τρέπεσθαι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῆς ταραχῆς, φεύγειν δὲ ἐς Πάτρας καὶ Δύμην 4 τῆς Ἁχαίας. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναίοι καταδιώξαντες καὶ ναῦς δώδεκα λαβόντες τοὺς τε ἀνδρας ἐξ αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους ἀνέλομενοι ἐς Μολύκρειον ἀπε-πλεον, καὶ τροπαίον στήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥίῳ καὶ ναῶν ἀναθέντες τῷ Ποσειδῶν ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς 5 Ναύπακτον. παρεπλευσαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Πελοπον-
like infantry on land, but would fall foul of one another, and also be thrown into confusion by the small boats, and then if the breeze for which he was waiting while he sailed round, which usually blew from the gulf towards dawn, should spring up, they would not remain steady for any length of time. As for the attack, he thought that was in his power whenever he chose, since his ships were better sailers, and that then was the most favourable moment for it. So when the wind began to come up, and the ships, already hemmed in a narrow space, were being thrown into confusion both by the violence of the wind and the pressure of the small boats, when ship was dashing against ship and the crews were trying to push them apart with poles, all the while keeping up such shouts and warning cries and abuse of one another that they could not hear either the word of command or the coxswains' calls, and, finally, when the inexperienced rowers, unable to get their oars clear of the water in a heavy sea, were rendering the ships less obedient to the helmsmen, then at this critical moment Phormio gave the signal. Thereupon the Athenians fell upon them; first they sank one of the admirals' ships, and then destroyed the rest as well wherever they came upon them, reducing them to such straits that in their confusion no one turned for defence, but all fled to Patrae and Dyme in Achaia. But the Athenians gave chase, and after they had captured twelve ships and had taken on board most of their crews sailed away to Molycreum; then they set up a trophy on Rhium, dedicated a ship to Poseidon, and returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also
νήσιοι εύθύς ταῖς περιλοίποις τῶν νεῶν ἐκ τῆς Δύμης καὶ Πατρῶν ἐς Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἦλειων ἐπὶ
νειοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ Δευκάδος Κυήμος καὶ αἰ ἐκεῖνων
νῆσος, ἂς ἐδει ταύτας ἐξυμμείξαι, ἀφικνοῦνται μετὰ
tῆν ἐν Στράτῳ μάχην ἐς τὴν Κυλλήνην.

LXXXV. Πέμπουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
τῷ Κυήμῳ ἔμβολους ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς Τιμοκράτη
καὶ Βρασίδαν καὶ Δυκόφρονα, κελεύοντες ἀλλην
ναυμαχίαν βέλτιον παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὑπ’
2 ὀλίγων νεῶν εἰργησθαι τῆς θαλάσσης. ἔδοκει γὰρ
αὐτοῖς ἀλλως τε καὶ πρῶτον ναυμαχίας πειρασα-
μένους πολὺς ὁ παράλογος εἶναι καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτο
φῶντο σφῶν τὸ ναυτικὸν λείπεσθαι, γεγενήσθαι
dὲ τινα μαλακίαν, οὐκ ἀντιτιθέντες τὴν Ἀθηναίων
ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐμπειρίαν τῆς σφετέρας δι’ ὀλίγου
3 μελέτης. ὡργῇ οὖν ἀπέστελλον. οἱ δὲ ἀφικό-
μενοι μετὰ τοῦ Κυήμου ναῦς τε προσπεριήγγειλαν
κατὰ πόλεις καὶ τὰς προὕπαρχούσας ἐξηρτύνοντο
4 ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν. πέμπει δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐς
τὰς Ἀθηναίς τὴν τε παρασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἀγγελοῦν-
tας καὶ περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἢν ἐνίκησαν φράσον-
tας καὶ κελεύων αὐτῶ ναῦς ὁτι πλέιστας διὰ
τάχους ἀποστείλαι, ὡς καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐκάστην ἐλ-
5 πίδος οὐσῆς αἰεὶ ναυμαχήσεων. οἱ δὲ ἀποπέμ-
πουσιν εἰκοσὶ ναῦς αὐτῶ, τῷ δὲ κομίζοντι αὐτὰς
προσεπέστειλαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ἀφικέσθαι.
Νικίας γὰρ Κρῆς Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὄν πείθει

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sailed away immediately with the ships that were left, proceeding from Dyme and Patrae along the coast to Cyllene, the shipyard of the Eleans; and Cnemus likewise, coming from Leucas together with the ships from that quarter which were to have joined the Corinthian fleet, came to Cyllene after the battle at Stratus.

LXXXV. The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron as advisers to Cnemus, directing them to make better preparation for another sea-fight, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the issue of the recent battle seemed to them utterly incomprehensible, especially since this was their first attempt at a sea-fight, and they could not believe that their fleet was so greatly inferior, but thought that there had been cowardice somewhere, failing to take into account the long experience of the Athenians as compared with their own brief practice. In a rage, then, they dispatched the advisers. And these on their arrival, acting in conjunction with Cnemus, sent round a call to the allied cities for additional ships, and set about equipping those already at hand, with a view to a sea-fight. And Phormio on his part sent messengers to Athens to give information of the enemy's preparations and to tell about the battle which they had won, urging them also to send to him speedily as many ships as possible, since there was always a prospect that a battle might be fought any day. So they sent him twenty ships, but gave the commander in charge of them special orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was a proxenus of theirs, persuaded

1 The contingents from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, ch. lxxx. 2, 3.  2 See ch. xxix. 1, note.
αυτοὺς ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεύσαι, φάσκων προσποιήσειν αὐτὴν οὕτων πολεμάν ἐπῆγε δὲ Πολυχνίταις χαριζόμενος ὁμόροις τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν.

6 καὶ ὁ μὲν λαβὼν τὰς ναύς ὀχετο ἐς Κρήτην καὶ μετὰ τῶν Πολυχνιτῶν ἐδήμου τὴν γῆν τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν, καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνέμων καὶ ἀπλοίας ἐνδιέτριψεν οὐκ ὀλύνων χρόνων.

LXXXVI. Οἱ δ’ ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐν τούτῳ, ἐν δ’ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι περὶ Κρήτην κατείχοντο, παρεσκευασμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν παρέπλευσαν ἐς Πάνορμον τὸν Ἀχαϊκόν, οὕτε αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προσ-

2 εὐβοβηθῆκε. παρέπλευσε δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Μολυκρικὸν καὶ ὠρμίσατο ἐξω αὐτοῦ

3 ναυσίν εἰκοσί, αἰστερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησεν. ἦν δὲ τούτῳ μὲν τὸ Ῥίον φίλιον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, τὸ δ’ ἔτερον Ῥίον ἐστὶν ἀντιπέρας τὸ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ. διέχετον δὲ ἀπ’ ἄλληλων στάδίων μάλιστα ἐπτὰ τῆς βαλάσσης, τοῦ δὲ Κρισαίου κόλπου

4 στόμα τοῦτο ἔστων. ἐπὶ οὖν τὸ Ῥίο χαὶ τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἀπέχοντο οὕ τοι πολὺ τοῦ Πανόρμου, ἐν δ’ αὐτοῖς ὁ πεζὸς ἦν, ὀρμίσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ναυσίν ἐπτὰ καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα,1 ἐπειδὴ καὶ τοὺς

5 Ἀθηναίοις εἴδον. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ἓς ἐπτὰ ἠμέρας ἀνθώρμοις ἄλληλοις μελετώντες τε καὶ παρασκευαζόμενοι τὴν ναυμαχίαν, γνώμην ἔχοντες οἱ μὲν μὴ ἐκπλείν ἐξῳ τῶν Ῥίων ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, φοβοῦμενοι τὸ πρότερον πάθος, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐσπλείν ἐς τὰ στενὰ, νομίζοντες πρὸς ἑκείνων εἶναι τὴν ἐν

6 ὀλίγῳ ναυμαχίαν. ἐπειτὰ ὁ Κύῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἀλλοὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων στρατηγοί, βουλόμενοι ἐν τάχει τὴν ναυμαχίαν ποιῆσαι πρὶν

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1 Hude reads πεντήκοντα, with Q.
them to sail against Cydonia, a hostile town, promising to bring it over to the Athenians; but he was really asking them to intervene to gratify the people of Polichne, who are neighbours of the Cydonians. So the officer in charge took the ships, went to Crete, and helped the Polichnitans to ravage the lands of the Cydonians, and by reason of winds and stress of weather wasted not a little time.

LXXXVI. Meantime, while the Athenians were detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, equipped and ready for a battle, sailed along the coast to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponnesians had come to their support. And Phormio also sailed along the coast to the Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with the twenty ships with which he had fought before. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians, and opposite is the other Rhium, that in the Peloponnese; and the distance between them is about seven stadia by sea, constituting the mouth of the Crisaean Gulf. Accordingly the Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians come to anchor, likewise anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Achaian Rhium, which is not far from Panormus, where their land-forces were. And for six or seven days they lay at anchor opposite one another, practising and preparing for battle, the one side resolved not to sail outside the two Rhia into the open water, fearing a recurrence of their disaster, the other not to sail into the straits, thinking that fighting in a narrow space was in the enemy's favour. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, wishing to bring on the engagement
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LXXXVII. "'H μὲν γενομένη ναυμαχία, δ' ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, εἰ τις ἄρα δὲ αὐτὴν ὑμῶν φοβεῖται τὴν μέλλουσαν, οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχει τέκ- 

2 μαρσίν τὸ ἐκφοβήσασιν. τῇ τε γὰρ παρασκευὴ 

ἐνδεὴς ἐγένετο, ὡσπερ ἵστε, καὶ οὐχὶ εἰς ναυμα- 

χίαν μᾶλλον ἡ ἐπὶ στρατεῖαν ἐπλέομεν. ξυνέβη 

dὲ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐναντιωθήμα 

καὶ ποὺ τι καὶ ἡ ἀπειρία πρῶτον ναυμαχοῦντας 

3 ἐσφῆλεν. ὡστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν τὸ 

ἡσάσθαι προσεγένετο, οὔδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης 

tὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δὲ τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ 

ἀντιλογίαν, τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς τῷ ἀποβάντι ἄμ- 

βλύνεσθαι, νομίσαι δὲ ταῖς μὲν τύχαις ἐνδέχεσθαι 

σφάλλεσθαι τοὺς ἄνθρώπους, ταῖς δὲ γνώμαις 

tοὺς αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ ὅρθως τὸ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, καὶ μὴ 

ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἀνδρείου παρόντος προβαλλομένους 

4 εἰκότως ἄν ἐν τινὶ κακοὶς γενέσθαι. οὐμῶν δὲ οὐδ 

ἡ ἀπειρία τοσοῦτον λείπεται ὡς οὐκ ὀλίγῃ προῦ- 

χετε: τῶνδε δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἣν μᾶλλοντα φο- 

βείσθη, ἀνδρείαν μὲν ἔχουσα καὶ μνήμην ἔξει ἐν 

tῶ δεινῷ ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ ἐμαθεῖν, ἀνευ δὲ εὐψυχίας 

οὐδεμᾶ τέχνη πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους ἰσχύει. φόβου 

γὰρ μνήμην ἐκπλήσσει, τέχνη δὲ ἀνευ ἀλκής οὗ- 

1 Hude writes ὅρθως and deletes ἀνδρεῖος (with Badham).
soon, before reinforcements came from Athens, first called their soldiers together, and seeing that most of them were frightened on account of their previous defeat and not eager for battle, encouraged them and spoke as follows:

LXXXVII. "The recent sea-fight, Peloponnesians, if possibly it has caused any man among you to be afraid of the one before us, affords no just grounds for your alarm. For our preparation was deficient, as you know, and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as operations on land; and it happened, furthermore, that not a few of the chances of war were against us, and doubtless also our inexperience had something to do with our failure in the first sea-fight. It was not then our cowardice that brought about defeat, nor is it right that the spirit, which force cannot conquer, but which has in it something defiant, should be dulled and blunted by the outcome of mere chance; rather you ought to reflect that although men may suffer reverse in their fortunes, yet in their spirit brave men are rightly considered always brave, and when courage is present no inexperience can properly be urged as an excuse for being cowards under any circumstances. And, after all, your inexperience is more than counterbalanced by your superiority in daring; and though the enemy's skill, which you particularly dread, will indeed, so long as bravery goes with it, have the presence of mind in the moment of danger to put into effect the lessons it has learned, yet without valour no amount of proficiency avails against such dangers. For fear drives presence of mind away, and skill without
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5 δὲν ὠφελεῖ. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐμπειρότερον αὐτῶν τὸ τολμηρότερον ἀντιτάξασθε, πρὸς δὲ τὸ διά τὴν ἡσυχαν δεδιέναι τὸ ἀπαράσκευον τότε τυχεῖν.

6 περιγράφεται δὲ ἡμῖν πλήθος τε νεῶν καὶ πρός τῇ γῇ οἰκεία οὐσίη ὁπλιτῶν παρόντων ναυμαχεῖν τὰ δὲ πολλά τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἁμεινὸν παρεσκευασμένοι.

7 μένων τὸ κράτος ἐστίν. ὡστε οὐδὲ καθ' ἐν εὐρήσκομεν εἰκότως ἢ ἡμᾶς σφαλλομένους καὶ ὅσα ἡμάρτομεν πρότερον, νῦν αυτὰ ταῦτα προσγενόμενα διδασκαλίαν παρέξει.

8 διαβούλειν τοὺς κυβερνήτας καὶ ναῦτα τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔκαστος ἐπέστη, χώσαν μὴ προλείπουντες ἢ ἀν τὸς προστάχθη.

9 τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χειρὸν τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἠμεῖς παρασκευάζομεν καὶ οὐκ ἐνδώσομεν πρόφασιν οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἢν δὲ τὶς ἀρὰ καὶ βουλήθη, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεποῦσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμῆσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἄθλοις τῆς ἀρετῆς.

LXXXVIII. Τοιαῦτα μὲν τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις οἱ ἀρχόντες παρεκελεύσαντο. ὁ δὲ Φορμίων δεδίως καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὀρρωδίαν καὶ αἰσθόμενος ὅτι τὸ πλῆθος τῶν νεῶν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ξυνιστάμενοι ἐφοβοῦντο, ἐβούλετο ξυγκαλέσας θαρσοῦντες καὶ παραίνεσιν ἐν τῷ 2 παρόντι ποιῆσασθαι. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε καὶ προπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλήθος νεῶν τοσοῦτον, ἢν ἐπιπλέξη, ὃ τι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον ἐστὶ, καὶ οἱ στρατίωται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἄξιωσιν ταύτην

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intrepidity is of no avail. Therefore, against their greater experience set your greater daring, and against the fear caused by your defeat set the accident of your being at the moment unprepared. You have the advantage, both in number of ships and in fighting close to the land, which is friendly to us, and you are supported by hoplites; and victory is generally on the side of those who are the more numerous and better prepared. There is accordingly not a single reason that we can find why we should fail; and as to our earlier mistakes, the very fact that they were made will teach us a lesson. Be of good courage, then, and let each man, both helmsman and sailor, follow our lead as best he can, not leaving the post to which he may be assigned. We shall prepare for the attack at least as well as your former commanders, and shall give no one an excuse to act like a coward; but if anyone should be inclined that way, he shall be punished with the penalty he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured with rewards such as befit their valour.”

LXXXVIII. With such words the Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men. But Phormio, being himself also uneasy about the apprehension felt by his troops, and observing that they were gathering in knots amongst themselves in alarm at the superior number of the enemy’s ships, wished to call them together in order to hearten them and make an exhortation to suit the present emergency. For in the past he had always told them, by way of bracing their minds, that there was no number of ships, however great, whose attack men such as they could not withstand; and his sailors had long since held among themselves the conviction that they,
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εἰλήφεσαν μηδένα ὥχλον Ἀθηναίοι ὄντες Πελο-

3 ποινησίων νεῶν ὑποχωρεῖν: τότε δὲ πρὸς τὴν
παροῦσαν ὅψιν ὅρῶν αὐτούς ἄθυμοῦντας ἐβοῦ-
λετο ὑπόμνησιν ποιήσασθαι τοῦ θαρσεῖν, καὶ
ξυγκαλέσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε.

LXXXIX. "Ὀρῶν ὑμᾶς, ὁ ἄνδρες στρατιῶται,
πεφοβημένους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναυτίων ξυνεκά-
λεσα, οὐκ ἄξιων τὰ μὴ δεινά ἐν ὄρρωδιᾳ ἔχειν.

2 οὕτωι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὸ προενικήσθαι καὶ
μηδ' αὐτοὶ οἴεσθαι ὡμοίοι ἡμῖν εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος
τῶν νεῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἱσον παρεσκευάσαντο.
ἐπειτα ὁ μάλιστα πιστεύοντες προσέρχονται, ὡς
προσήκον σφίσιν ἄνδρείοις εἶναι, οὐ δὲ ἄλλο τι
θαρσοῦσιν ἢ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ πεζῷ ἐμπειρίαν τὰ
πλεῖω κατορθοῦντες καὶ οὕνεις σφίς καὶ ἐν τῷ

3 ναυτικῷ ποιήσειν τὸ αὐτὸ. τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου
ἡμῖν μᾶλλον νῦν περιέσται, εἰπερ καὶ τούτως ἐν
ἐκείνῳ, ἐπεὶ εὐνυχία γε οὐδὲν προφέρουσι, τῷ
dὲ ἐκάτεροι τι εἶναι ἐμπειρότεροι θρασύτεροι ἐσμέν.

4 Δακεδαιμόνιοι τε ἡγούμενοι αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν σφε-
tέραν δόξαν ἀκοντας προσάγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς
ἐς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐνεχείρησαν

5 ἴσσηθέντες παρὰ πολὺ αὐθίς ναυμαχεῖν. μὴ δὴ
 αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε. πολὺ δὲ ύμεῖς ἐκεί-
νοις πλείω φόβον παρέχετε καὶ πιστότερον κατὰ

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being Athenians, must never give ground before any number of Peloponnesian ships. But at this time, seeing that they were dispirited by what they saw before their eyes, and wishing to remind them of their old-time confidence, he called them together and spoke as follows:

LXXXIX. "Observing that you have become alarmed, soldiers, at the numbers of the enemy, I have called you together, because I do not want you to be in dread of imaginary dangers. For, in the first place, it is just because these men have been beaten before, and do not even themselves believe that they are a match for us, that they have provided themselves with this large and disproportionate number of ships; then, too, as regards their courage,—the thing on which they chiefly rely when they come against us, as if it were their peculiar province to be brave,—the only reasonable ground they have for confidence is that their experience in fighting on land has generally brought them success, and so they think this will achieve the same result for them at sea as well. But in all reason the advantage to-day will rather be ours, if they on their side have it on land; for in valour assuredly they are nowise superior, but we are both more confident just as in any way we have more experience. Besides, since the Lacedaemonians lead their allies for their own glory, the majority of them have to be dragged into battle against their will, for otherwise they would never, after their decisive defeat, have attempted to fight a second time at sea. Hence you need not fear their daring. On the contrary, you inspire in them a dread far greater and better justified, both because you have already
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τε τὸ προνεικηκέναι καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἡγοῦνται μη 
μέλλοντάς τι άξιον τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ πράξειν ἀνθί-
6 στασθαὶ ὑμᾶς. ἀντίπαλοι μὲν γὰρ οἱ1 πλείους, 
ὡσπερ οὕτω, τῇ δυνάμει τὸ πλέον πίσυνοι ἢ τῇ 
γνώμῃ ἐπέρχονται; οὗ δὲ ἐκ πολλῷ ὑποδεικτέρων 
καὶ ἀμα οὔκ ἀναγκαζόμενοι, μέγα τι τῆς διανοίας 
τὸ βέβαιον ἔχοντες ἀντιτολμῶσιν. ἡ λογιζόμενοι 
οὕτω τῷ οὔκ εἰκότι πλέον πεφόβηνται ὑμᾶς ἢ τῇ 
7 κατὰ λόγον παρασκευὴ. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ στρατό-
πεδα ἦδη ἔπεσεν ὑπ᾽ ἔλασσόνων τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ, ἔστι 
δὲ ἂ καὶ τῇ ἀτολμίᾳ· ὄν οὐδετέρου ἥμεις νῦν 
8 μετέχομεν. τόν δὲ ἀγώνα οὔκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἐκὼν 
eίναι ποιήσομαι οὐδ᾽ ἐσπλεύσομαι ἐς αὐτόν. ὁρῶ 
γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς πολλὰς ναῦς ἀνεπιστήμονας ὀλίγας 
ναυσὶν ἐμπείροις καὶ ἀμείνων πλεούσαις ἡ στενο-
χωρία οὐ ξυμφέρει. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐπιπλεύσειε 
tis ὅς χρὴ ἐς ἐμβολὴν μὴ ἔχον τὴν πρόσοψιν 
tῶν πολεμίων ἐκ πολλοῦ, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἀποχωρήσειεν 
ἐν δέοντι πιεζόμενοι· διέκπλοι τε οὔκ εἰσὶν οὐδ᾽ 
ἀναστροφαί, ἀπερ νεῶν ἀμείνων πλεονύσων ἔργα 
ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη ἂν εἴη τὴν ναυμαχίαν πεζο-
μαχίαν καθίστασθαι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οἱ πλείους 
9 νῆς κρείσσους γίγνονται. τούτων μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ

1 Hude adopts Madvig's conjecture ἥ for οἱ.
defeated them and because they think that you would not be facing them at all unless you expected to achieve a result commensurate with the very great odds. For most men, when, like our present opponents, they are equal to their foes, rely more upon their strength when they advance to the attack than upon their resolution; whereas those who dare oppose them with greatly inferior numbers, and at the same time without being compelled to do so, must possess in a high degree the quality of unwavering resolution. Taking all these things into consideration, our enemies have come to fear us more on account of what is amazing in our conduct than they would if our preparations were less out of proportion to their own. Furthermore, many an army has before now been overthrown by smaller numbers through its own want of experience, and some too through a deficiency of daring, and at this moment we can be charged with neither. As for the contest, I will not risk it in the gulf if I can help it, nor will I sail into the gulf. For I am aware that a confined space is not an advantage to a fleet of a few ships which are better sailers and have experienced crews, when it is opposed to a large number of ships which are badly managed. For one cannot charge properly upon an enemy ship to ram her side, through not having a clear view of her a long way off; nor can one retire at need when hard pressed; and there is no chance for such manoeuvres as breaking through the line or whirling around to ram, though these are precisely the proper tactics of fast sailing ships, but the sea-fight would have to be turned into a land-battle, and in that case it is the larger fleet that wins. For these
ἐξώ τὴν πρόνοιαν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὑμεῖς δὲ εὐτακτοὶ παρὰ ταῖς ναυσὶ μένοντε τὰ τε παραγ-γελλόμενα ὡξέως δέχεσθε, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ δὴ ὅλγον τῆς ἐφορμήσεως οὐσῆς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγήν περὶ πλείστον ἤγεισθε, ὅ ἐς τα ἀρρατία τῶν πολεμικῶν ἡμεῖς δὲ μεγάς ὑμῖν, ἡ καταλύσαι Πελοποννησίων τὴν ἐπιτίδα τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐγγυτέρω καταστήσαι Ἀθηναίοι τὸν φόβον περὶ τῆς θαλάσσης. ἀναμιμησκώ δ' αὐτή ὑμᾶς ὅτι νεικῆκατε αὐτῶν τοὺς πολλούς: ἡσσημένων δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὑμῖν ἐθέλουσιν αἱ γυναικὶ πρὸς τοὺς αὐτούς κινδύνους ὁμοία εἰναι.

ΧC. Τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ Φορμίων παρεκελεύσατο. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ὑμῖν ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἀκοντας ἐσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀναγαγό-μενοι ἁμα ἐώ ἐπέπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτῶν γῆν ἐσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου δεξιῷ κέρα ἡγουμένω, ὡς περὶ καὶ ὡρμον. 2 ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῶ εἰκοσι ἐταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσασ ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον αὐτοὺς πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτῶς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτην

1 Hude reads πολεμιῶν, with C.
2 With CG; the other MSS. and the Schol. ἐπὶ.
3 Hude deletes ἐπὶ, after Krüger.

In the first sea-fight the Peloponnesians had forty-seven ships (ch. lxxxiii. 3) against Phormio’s twenty (ch. lxxxiii. 1); in the second battle the Peloponnesians had seventy-seven ships (ch. lxxxvi. 4). Since the Peloponnesians lost twelve ships in the first battle (ch. lxxxiv. 4), the expression “most of them” is not quite exact here.

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matters, however, I shall make provision to the best of my ability. As for you, keep good order, stay near your ships, give heed sharply to the word of command, especially since the two fleets are at watch so near one another; and when it comes to action, regard discipline and silence, which are generally advantageous in warfare, but especially so at sea, as all important, and ward off the enemy yonder in a manner worthy of your past exploits. The contest is a momentous one for you—whether you are to shatter the hopes which the Peloponnesians have in their fleet, or to bring closer home to the Athenians their fear about the sea. Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of them already; and when men have once suffered defeat, their spirit is never the same as before if they are called upon to face the same dangers.”

XC. Such were the words with which Phormio also encouraged his men. And the Peloponnesians, when the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows to meet them, wished to draw them in against their will; so they put out to sea at dawn, and, after lining up their ships four deep, sailed along their own shore towards the inner part of the gulf, in the same order as they had lain at anchor, their right wing leading the way. Upon their right wing they had placed their twenty best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio got the impression that their objective was Naupactus

2 Or, as some take it, “in a column four abreast.”
3 Only now the four ships which had lain at anchor one behind the other sailed, after the turn to the right, abreast.
4 Or, retaining ἀντὶ instead of παρὰ, “after lining up their ships four deep against their own shore (i.e. with it at their backs), sailed toward the inner part of the gulf . . .”,

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παραπλέοι, μή διαφύγουεν πλέοντες τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναίοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' 
3 αὐταὶ αἱ νῆες περικλῆσειαν. ὁ δὲ, ὁπερ ἐκεῖνοι προσεδέχοντο, φοβηθεῖσι περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ ὄντι, ὡς ἔωρα ἀναγομένους αὐτοὺς, ἀκὼν καὶ κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐμβιβάσας ἔπλευ παρὰ τὴν γῆν καὶ ὁ 
4 πεξὸς ἀμα τῶν Μεσσηνίων παρεβοίθει. ἰδόντες 
δὲ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι κατὰ μίαν ἐπὶ κέρως παρα-
πλέοντας καὶ ἡδὴ ὡντας ἐντὸς τοῦ κόλπου τε 
καὶ πρὸς τῇ γῇ, ὁπερ ἐβούλουντο μάλιστα, ἀπὸ 
σημείον ἐνὸς ἀφυὸ ἐπιστρέψαντες τὰς ναύς μετ-
ωπηδοῦ ἐπλεον ὡς εἰχὲ τάχους ἐκαστὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς 
Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἤλπιζον πάσας τὰς ναύς ἀπολι-
5 ψεσθαί. τῶν δὲ ἐνδεκα μὲν τινες αἴπερ ἤγοιντο ὑπεκφεύγουσι τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννήσιων καὶ 
τῆν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὑρυχωρίαν. τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπικαταλαβόντες ἐξέωσάν τε πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὑπο-
φευγούσας καὶ διέφθειραν, ἀνδρὰς τε τῶν Ἀθη-
6 ναίων ἀπέκτειναν ὅσοι μὴ ἐξένευσαν αὐτῶν. καὶ 
τῶν νεῶν τινας ἀναδούμενοι ἐίλκου κενάς (μῖαν 
δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶχον ἡδη), τὰς δὲ τινας οἱ 
Μεσσηνιοὶ παραβοηθήσαντες καὶ ἐπεσβαίνουντες 
ξὺν τοῖς ὀπλοῖς ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐπιβάντες 
ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων μαχόμενοι ἀφείλουντο
ἐλκομένας ἡδη.

ΧΣI. Ταύτη μὲν οὖν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐκρά-
τουν τε καὶ διέφθειραν τὰς Ἀττικὰς ναύς· αἱ δὲ 
ἐκκοσὶ νῆες αὐτῶν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως ἐδι-
ωκον τὰς ἐνδεκα ναύς τῶν Ἀθηναίων αἴπερ
and should, following the coast, sail in that direction to its aid, the Athenians might not be able to escape their attack by sailing outside their wing, but might be enveloped by these ships. Now he did just what they expected him to do; when he saw them put to sea, fearing for the safety of the place, which was unprotected, he reluctantly and in haste embarked his crews and sailed along the coast, the Messenian army moving along the shore to support him. And when the Peloponnesians saw that they were skirting the coast in single file and were already inside the gulf and close to shore, which was just what they most desired, at one signal they suddenly veered about, bore down with ships in line as fast as each could upon the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. But eleven of these, which were in the lead, got past the Peloponnesian wing, as it swung round, and escaped into the open water; but the rest were overtaken, driven ashore as they attempted to escape, and disabled, and all the Athenians on them who did not succeed in swimming ashore were slain. Some of the ships they made fast to their own and proceeded to tow away empty—though they had already captured one with its crew—but some others, which were already in tow, were taken from them by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, rushed armed as they were into the sea, boarded the ships, and fought from their decks.

XCI. In this quarter, then, the Peloponnesians were victorious and had disabled the Athenian ships; but the twenty ships covering their right wing were pursuing the eleven Athenian ships which had got
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ὑπεξέφυγον τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν. καὶ φθάνουσιν αὐτοὺς πλὴν μιᾶς νεὼς προκατ-φυγοῦσαι πρὸς τὴν Ναύπακτον, καὶ σχοῦσαι ἀντίπροφοι κατὰ τὸ Ἀπολλώνιον παρεσκευά-ζοντο ἀμυνούμενοι, ἦν ἐς τὴν γῆν ἐπὶ σφᾶς

2 πλέωσιν. οἱ δὲ παραγενόμενοι ύστερον ἐπαιά-νιζον τε ἅμα πλέοντες ὡς νεικηκότες, καὶ τὴν μίαν ναῦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν ὑπόλοιπον ἐδίωκε

3 Λευκάδια ναῦς μία πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων. ἔτυχε δὲ ὅλκας ὀρμοῦσα μετέωρος, περὶ ἣν ἡ Ἀττική ναῦς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα τῇ Λευκάδιᾳ

4 διωκούσῃ ἐμβάλλει μέση καὶ καταδύει. τοῖς μὲν οὖν Πελοποννησίοις γευμένου τούτου ἀπροσδο-κήτου τε καὶ παρὰ λόγον φόβος ἐμπίπτει, καὶ ἅμα ἀτάκτως διώκοντες διὰ τὸ κρατεῖν αἱ μὲν τινες τῶν νεῶν καθεῖσαι τὰς κόπας ἐπέστησαν τοῦ πλοῦ, ἀξύμφορον δρόντες πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ὀλίγου ἀντεξόμησιν, βουλόμενοι τὰς πλεῖους περιμεῖναι, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς βράχεα ἀπειρία χωρίων ὤκειλαν.

XCII. Τοὺς δ' Ἀθηναίους ἰδόντας ταῦτα γιγνό-μενα θάρσος τε ἠλαβε καὶ ἀπὸ ἐνὸς κελεύσματος ἐμβοηθοῦντες ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ὄφρησαν. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ἀτα-ξίαν ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ὑπέμειναν, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐτράποντο ἐς τὸν Πάνορμον, ὀθονηπερ ἀνηγάγοντο.

2 ἐπιδιώκοντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναίοι τὰς τὴ ἐγχύσ οὕσας μάλιστα ναῦς ἠλαβον ἐξ καὶ τὰς ἔαυτῶν ἀφεί-λοντο ἄς ἔκεινοι πρὸς τῇ γῇ διαφθείραντες τὸ
past them as they swung round and had escaped into the open water. And all the eleven except one reached Naupactus ahead of them, and riding at anchor off the Temple of Apollo, prows outward, made ready to defend themselves if the enemy put in toward the shore to attack them. When the Peloponnesians came up they were singing the paean as they rowed as if they were victorious already, and one Leucadian ship, far ahead of the rest, was chasing the single Athenian ship which lagged behind. But, as it chanced, a merchantman was lying at anchor in deep water and this the Athenian ship succeeded in reaching first and, sailing round it, rammed the pursuing Leucadian vessel amidships and sank her. At this unexpected and amazing feat consternation fell upon the Peloponnesians, who were, moreover, pursuing in disorder because they had the upper hand; on some of their ships the rowers sank their oars into the water and checked the headway of their vessels, intending to await the main body of their fleet—a serious mistake to make in the face of an enemy lying near and ready for the charge—while others, unfamiliar with the waters there, ran aground in the shallows.

XCII. As for the Athenians, when they saw what was happening, they took courage, and at a single word of command gave a shout and dashed at them. But the Peloponnesians had made so many mistakes and were at present in such disorder, that, although they resisted a little while, they soon turned and fled to Panormus, whence they had put to sea. The Athenians gave chase, and not only captured the six ships that were nearest, but also recovered their own ships which the enemy had disabled in the beginning.
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πρῶτον ἀνεδήσαντο· ἀνδρας τε τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναι
3 ναυ, τυνᾶς δὲ καὶ ἐξώγρησαν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Λευκαδίας νεῶς, ἢ περὶ τὴν ὀλκάδα κατέδυ, Τιμοκράτης ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος πλέων, ὡς ἡ ναῦς διεθείρετο, ἐσφαξέν ἑαυτόν, καὶ ἐξέπεσεν ἐς τὸν Ναυπακτίων
4 λιμένα. ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαίον ἔστησαν ὅθεν ἀναγαγόμενοι ἐκράτησαν, καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυάγια ὡς πρὸς τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἢν ἀνείλοντο, καὶ τοῖς ἑναντίοις τὰ ἐκείνων ὑπό
5 στούνδα ἀπέδοσαν. ἔστησαν δὲ καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι τροπαίον ὡς νεικηκότες τῆς τροπῆς, ἂς πρὸς τῇ γῇ διέθειραν ναῦς· καὶ ἦν περ ἔλαβον ναῦν, ἀνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Ῥión τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν παρὰ τὸ
6 τροπαίον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα φοβοῦμενοι τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐσπελευσαν ἐς τὸν κόλπον τὸν Κρισαίου καὶ Κορινθοῦ ἄπαντες
7 πλὴν Λευκαδίων. καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Κρήτης Ἀθηναίοι ταῖς εἶκοσὶ ναυσίν, αἷς ἔδει πρὸ τῆς ναυμαχίας τῷ Φορμίωνι παραγενέσθαι, οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως τῶν νεῶν ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν Ναυπακτον. καὶ τὸ θέρος ἐτελεύτα.

XCVIII. Πρὶν δὲ διαλύσαι τὸ ἐς Κορινθόν τε καὶ τὸν Κρισαίον κόλπον ἀναχωρήσαν ναυτικόν, ὁ Κυῆμος καὶ ὁ Βρασίδας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἄρχομένου τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐβούλοντο διδαξάντων τῶν Μεγαρέων ἀποπειράσαι τῶν Πειραιῶς τὸν λιμένος τῶν Ἀθηναίων· ἢν δὲ ἀφύλακτος καὶ ἀκληστὸς εἰκότως διὰ τὸ

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of the fight near the shore and taken in tow; and of the men they killed some and took others alive. But Timocrates the Lacedaemonian, who was on board the Leucadian ship which was sunk near the merchantmen, slew himself when he saw that his ship was lost, and his body was washed up in the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians now withdrew and set up a trophy at the place from which they had set out and won the victory; and they took up their dead and such of the wrecked ships as were close to their own shore, giving back to the enemy under a truce those which belonged to them. But the Peloponnesians also set up, in token of victory, a trophy for the defeat of the ships which had been disabled near the shore. And the ships which they had taken they dedicated on the Achaean Rhium by the side of the trophy. And after this, fearing the reinforcements expected from Athens, they sailed under cover of night into the Crisaean Gulf and to Corinth, all except the Leucadians. And not long after their retreat the twenty Athenian ships from Crete, which were to have joined Phormio in time for the battle, arrived at Naupactus. And so the summer ended.

XClIII. However, before dispersing the fleet which had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf, at the beginning of the winter Cnemus and Brasidas and the other Peloponnesian commanders, instigated by the Megarians, wished to make an attempt upon the Peiraeus, the port of Athens; for it was unguarded and unclosed, and quite naturally, since the Athen-

1 The point is not certain; either near the Molycrian Rhium (ch. lxxxvi. 2), or off the Apollonium (ch. xci. 1).
2 cf. ch. lxxxvi. 6. 3 cf. ch. lxxxv. 5.
2 ἐπικρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ ναυτικῷ. ἔδοκεί δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἐκαστὸν τὴν κώπην καὶ τὸ υπηρέσιον καὶ τὸν τροπωτὴρα πεζῇ ἴέναι ἐκ Κορίνθου ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἀθήνας θάλασσαν, καὶ ἀφικομένους κατὰ τάχος ἐς Μέγαρα καθελκύσαντας ἐκ Νισαιας τὸν νεωρίον αὐτῶν τεσσαράκοντα ναύς, αἱ ἔτυχον αὐτόθι οὐσαι, πλεῦσαι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ. οὔτε γὰρ ναυτικὸν ἐν προφυλάσσον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε προσδοκία οὐδεμία μὴ ἂν ποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξαπιναίως οὕτως ἐπιπλέοντες, ἐπεὶ οὔτ' ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἂν, καθ' ἁσυχίαν δ' ἐ'i διανοοῦντο, μὴ οὐκ ἂν προαιρεθῶσθαι.

3 ὡς δὲ ἐδοξεῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἐχώρουν εὐθὺς· καὶ ἀφικομενοὶ νυκτὸς καὶ καθελκύσαντες ἐκ τῆς Νισαιας τὰς ναύς ἐπλεον ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Πειραιᾶ οὐκέτι, ὡσπερ διευνοῦντο, καταδείοντες τὸν κίνδυνον (καὶ τὸς καὶ ἄνεμος αὐτοῦς λέγεται κωλύσαι), ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Σαλαμίνος τὸ ἀκρωτήριον τὸ πρὸς Μέγαρα ὁρῶν· καὶ φρούριον δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἦν καὶ νεῶν τριῶν φυλακὴ τοῦ μὴ ἐσπλεῖν Μεγαρεύσι μηδὲ ἐκπλεῖν μηδὲν. τὸ τε φρουρίῳ προσέβαλον καὶ τὰς τριήρεις ἀφείλησαν κενάς, τὴν τε ἀλλην Σαλαμίνα ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσόντες ἐπόρθουν.

XCIV. Ἔς δὲ τὰς 'Αθηνας φρυκτοὶ τε ἦροντο πολέμιοι καὶ ἐκπληξίς ἐγένετο οὐδεμίας τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἑλάσσων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀστεὶ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὕστο τοὺς πολέμιους ἐσπεπλευ-κέναι ἢδη, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Πειραιεὶ τὴν τε Σαλαμίνα ὑρῆσθαι καὶ παρὰ σφάς ὅσον οὐκ ἐσπλεῖν αὐτοὺς·

1 So Hude, adopting Madvig's conjecture δ' (for οὐδ') and punctuating after τολμῆσαι ἂν.

2 Hude inserts γὰρ after φρούριον, with van Herwerden, and includes in parentheses φρούριον... μηδέν.

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ians were decidedly superior at sea. And it was
determined that each sailor, taking his oar and
cushion and oar-loop, should go on foot from Corinth
to the sea on the Athenian side and hastening to
Megara should launch from the docks at Nisaea forty
ships of theirs which chanced to be there, and then
sail straight for the Peiraeus. For there was no
fleet on guard in the harbour, nor was there any ex-
pectation that the enemy would ever suddenly attack
it in this way, since they would not dare such a
thing openly, and if they should plan it secretly
they would not fail to be detected in time. But
once they had determined upon the scheme they set
to work immediately. Reaching Nisaea at night
they launched the ships and sailed, not now to the
Peiraeus as they had intended, since they were ap-
palled by the risk—and a wind, too, is said to have
prevented them—but to the promontory of Salamis
that looks towards Megara. There was a fort here
and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from
entering or leaving the harbour of the Megarians.
This fort they assaulted, towed away the triremes
without their crews, and ravaged the rest of Salamis,
falling on the inhabitants unawares.

XCIV. Meanwhile fire-signals indicating a hostile
attack were flashed to Athens, where a panic was
caused as great as any in this war.¹ For the
inhabitants of the city thought that the enemy
had already entered the Peiraeus, and those of
the Peiraeus that they had taken Salamis and
were all but sailing into their own harbour—as

¹ This must refer to the so-called Decelean War (or last ten
years of the Peloponnesian War), for in viii. xcvi. 1 we
read that a panic occurred greater than any before (τοῖς
Ἀθηναῖοις . . ἐκπανηκίσ μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρίν παρέστη).
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διπέρ ἂν, εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν μὴ κατοκνήσαι, ἰδίως
2 ἐγένετο· καὶ οὐκ ᾧν ἀνέμος ἐκώλυσεν. Βοηθη-
σαντες δὲ ἀμί ήμέρα παυνήμει οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς τὸν
Πειραιᾶ ναῦς τε καθείλκον καὶ ἐσβάντες κατὰ
σπουδὴν καὶ πολλῷ θορύβῳ ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶν ἐπὶ
tὴν Σαλαμίνα ἐπέλεουν, τῷ πεζῷ δὲ φυλακᾶς τοῦ
3 Πειραιῶς καθίσταντο. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι ὡς
ησθάνοντο τὴν βοηθείαν, καταδραμόντες τῆς Σα-
λαμίνος τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λεῖαν
λαβόντες καὶ τὰς τρεῖς ναῦς ἐκ τοῦ Βουδόρου τοῦ
φρουρίου κατὰ τάχος ἐπὶ τῆς Νισαιάς ἀπέπλεουν·
ἐστὶ γὰρ ὁ τι καὶ αἱ νῆς αὐτοῦς διὰ χρόνου
καθελκυσθεῖσαι καὶ οὕδεν στέγουσαι ἐφόβουν.
αφικόμενοι δὲ ὡς Μέγαρα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Κορίνθου
4 ἀπεχώρησαν πεζῷ· οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι κατα-
λαβόντες πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμίνι ἀπέπλευσαν καὶ
αὐτοῦ· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο φυλακὴν ἥδη τοῦ Πειραιῶς
μᾶλλον τὸ λοιπὸν ἐποιοῦντο λιμένων τε κλῆσει
καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἐπιμελείᾳ.

XCV. Ὅτι δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, τοῦ χει-
μῶνος τοῦτον ἄρχομένου, Σιτάλκης ὁ Τήρεω
'Οδρύσης, Θρακῶν βασιλεὺς, ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ
Περδίκκαν τὸν 'Αλεξάνδρου, Μακεδονίας βασι-
λέα, καὶ ἐπὶ Χαλκιδέας τοὺς ἐπὶ Θράκης, δύο
ὑποσχέσεις τὴν μὲν βουλόμενος ἀναπτράξαι, τὴν
2 δὲ αὐτὸς ἀποδοῦναι. ὁ τε γὰρ Περδίκκας αὐτῷ
ὑποσχόμενος, εἰ Ἀθηναίοις τε διαλλάξειν ἐαυτῶν
κατ' ἀρχὰς τῷ πολέμῳ πιεζόμενον καὶ Φιλιπποῦ
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indeed might easily have happened if the enemy had resolved that there should be no flinching; and no mere wind would have prevented them. But at dawn the Athenians hastened down to the Peiraeus with all their forces, launched ships, and embarking in haste and with much confusion sailed with the fleet to Salamis, setting their land-forces to guard the Peiraeus. The Peloponnesians had already overrun most of Salamis and had taken prisoners and booty and the three ships at the fort of Budorum, when they saw the relief expedition coming, whereupon they sailed in haste toward Nisaea; to some extent too there was apprehension about their own ships, which had not been drawn down into the sea for a long time and were anything but water-tight. On reaching Megara they withdrew on foot to Corinth, and the Athenians, finding them no longer at Salamis, likewise sailed back. After this they kept stricter guard over the Peiraeus, closing up the harbour¹ as well as taking other precautions.

XCV. About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, a son of Teres, king of the Thracians, made an expedition against Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and against the Chalcidians of Thrace, wishing to exact fulfilment of one promise and to make good another. For when Perdiccas was being hard pressed at the beginning of the war he had made Sitalces a promise on condition that he should reconcile him to the Athenians and should not bring back his brother Philip, who was

¹ i.e. by prolonging the walls at the entrance so as to leave only a narrow passage in the centre, which could be closed by a chain.
τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πολέμιον ὄντα μὴ καταγάγοι ἐπὶ βασιλεία, ἀ ὑπεδέξατο οὖκ ἐπετελεῖ· τοὺς τε Ἀθηναίοις αὐτὸς ὠμολογήκει ὅτε τὴν γυμμαχίαν ἐποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπὶ Ὑφάκης Χαλκιδικῶν πόλεμον
3 καταλύσειν. ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἐνεκα τὴν ἐφοδον ἐποιεῖτο καὶ τὸν τε Φιλίππου υἱὸν Ἀμύνταν ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλεία τῶν Μακεδόνων ἤγε καὶ τῶν Ἀθη-
ναίων πρέσβεις, οἱ ἐτυχοῦν παρόντες τούτων ἐνεκα, καὶ ἤγεμόνα Ἀγνωνα· ἐδει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθη-
nαίους ναυσὶ τε καὶ στρατιὰ ὡς πλείστη ἐπὶ τοὺς Χαλκιδέας παραγενέσθαι.

XCVI. Ἄνιστησιν οὖν ἐκ τῶν Ὄδρυσων ὀρμῶ-
μενος πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ Ἁἴμου τε ὄρους καὶ τῆς Ὀρὸς Ἐράκας ὄσων ἦρχε μέχρι θα-
lάσσῃς ἐς τὸν Ἐβεείνων τε πόντου καὶ τὸν Ἐλλησποντοῦ, ἐπείτα τοὺς ὑπερβιάντι Αἴμον
Γέτας καὶ ὅσα ἀλλὰ μέρη ἐντὸς τοῦ Ἰστρον πο-
tαμοῦ πρὸς θάλασσαν μᾶλλον τῆν τοῦ Ἐβεείνου
πόντου κατακόμητο· εἰσὶ δ' οἱ Γέται καὶ οἱ ταυτὴ
ὅμοροι τε τοῖς Σκύθαις καὶ ὄμοσκευοι, πάντες
2 ἱπποτοξόται. παρεκάλει δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρεινῶν
Θρακῶν πολλοὺς τῶν αὐτοῦ ὀρυμῶν καὶ μαχαιρο-
φόρων, οὗ Δίοι καλοῦνται, τῆς Ὀρὸς ὥσ τοῦ πλεῖ-
στοι οἰκοῦντες· καὶ τοὺς μὲν μισθῶ ἐπειδεῖν, οἱ δ'
3 ἐθελοῦνται ξυνηκολούθουν. Ἄνιστη δὲ καὶ Ἀγριά-

1 ἐς . . . Ἐλλῆσποντοῦ deleted by Hude and others as not
read by the Schol. (μέχρι θαλάσσης, ἐς τοῦ Ἐβεείνου πόντου
καὶ τοῦ Ἐλλῆσποντοῦ). Classen understands the Schol. to
support the text reading.

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hostile, to make him king; but Perdiccas would not fulfil his promise. On the other hand, Sitalces had made an agreement with the Athenians, at the time he entered into the alliance with them, to bring to an end their war with the Chalcidians in Thrace. For both these reasons, then, he now began the invasion, and he took with him Philip's son, Amyntas, with a view to making him king of the Macedonians, as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to see him on this business, and Hagnon as commander; for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet and as large an army as possible for the war against the Chalcidians.

XCVI. Sitalces, accordingly, beginning with the Odrysians, summoned to his standard, first the Thracians under his sway between the mountains Haemus and Rhodope and the sea,—as far as the shores of the Euxine and the Hellespont,—then, beyond Haemus, the Getae, and all the other tribes that are settled south of the river Ister in the general direction of the seaboard of the Euxine sea; and the Getae and the people of that region are not only neighbours of the Scythians but are also equipped like them, all of them being mounted archers. And he summoned also many of the mountain Thracians who are independent and wear short swords, who are called Dii, most of them inhabiting Rhodope; and some of these were won to his service by pay, while others came along as volunteers. He called out, further, the

1 cf. ch. xxix. 4. 2 Philip died meanwhile. 3 As commander of expected Athenian troops, which however failed to come (ch. ci. 1) 4 cf. ch. ci. 1. 5 The modern Balkans. 6 Now Despotodagh. 7 Danube.
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νας καὶ Δαυιδόνος καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἔθνη Παιονικά, δὲν ἦρχε· καὶ ἐσχατοὶ τῆς ἄρχῆς οὗτοι ἦσαν· μέχρι γὰρ Δαυιδῶν Παιόνων καὶ τοῦ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ, δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Σκόμβρου όρους δι᾽ Ἀγρια- νῶν καὶ Δαυιδῶν ἤει,1 ὥριζετο ἡ ἄρχη τὰ πρὸς

4 Παῖονας αὐτοῦμον ἦδη. τὰ δὲ πρὸς Τριβαλ- λούς, καὶ τούτους αὐτοῦμον, Τρήτες ὥριζον καὶ Τιλαταιόν· οἰκοῦν δ’ οὗτοι πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ Σκόμβρου όρους καὶ παρῆκουσι πρὸς ἡλίου δύσιν μέχρι τοῦ Ὅσκιον ποταμοῦ. ἤει δ’ οὗτος ἐκ τοῦ όρους θεντερ καὶ ὁ Νέστος καὶ ὁ Ἔβρος· ἔστι δὲ ἐρήμων τὸ όρος καὶ μέγα, ἐχόμενον τῆς Ῥοδόπης.

XCVII. Ἐγένετο δὲ ἡ ἄρχη ἡ Ὀδρυσῶν με- γεθος ἐπὶ μὲν θάλασσαν καθήκουσα ἀπὸ Ἀβ- δῆρων πόλεως ἐς τὸν Εὐξεινὸν πόντον μέχρι Ἰστρον ποταμοῦ· αὕτη περίπλους ἔστιν ἡ γῆ τὰ εὐνομώτατα, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ πρύμναν ἵστηται τὸ πνεύμα, νηπιαγωγύλη τεσσάρων ἡμερῶν καὶ ἴσων νυκτῶν· ὅδ͂ῳ δὲ τὰ εὐνομώτατα ἐς Ἀβ- δῆρων ἐς Ἰστρον ἀνὴρ εὐξεῖων εὐδεκατάιοις τελεῖ.

2 τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαῦτη ἢν, ἐς ἡπειρον δὲ ἀπὸ Βυζαντίου ἐς Δαυιδόνος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Στρυμόνα (ταύτῃ γὰρ διὰ πλεῖστῳ ἀπὸ θα- λάσσης ἀνω ἐγκλυνετο) ἡμερῶν ἀνδρὶ εὐξεῖων τριῶν καὶ δέκα ἀνύσαι. φόρος τε ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρ- βάρου καὶ τῶν Ἐλληνίδων πόλεων ὄσωντερ

1 οὗ, in the MSS. before ὥριζετο, deleted by Arnold.

1 Paeonian tribes that dwelt in the mountain regions bordering on Macedonia, watered by the Upper Strymon and the Axius; most of them were afterwards subject to Macedonia.

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Agrianians and Laeaeans, and all the other Paeonian tribes which were under his sway. These peoples were at the outer limits of his empire; for the bounds of his empire extended, on the side towards the Paeonians, who are independent, as far as the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon, which flows from mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianians and the Laeaeans. On the side toward the Triballi, who also are independent, the boundary is formed by the Treres and Tilataeans; and these dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and extend toward the west as far as the river Oscius. This river has its source in the same mountains as the Nestus and the Hebrus—a mountain range of great extent and uninhabited that is adjacent to Rhodope.

XCVII. Now the empire of the Odrysians in respect to its size extended along the sea-coast from the city of Abdera to the Euxine Sea as far as the river Ister. This stretch of coast constitutes a voyage for a merchant-vessel, if the shortest course is taken and the wind keeps steady astern, of four days and as many nights; but the journey by land from Abdera to the Ister can be accomplished by an active man, taking the shortest route, in eleven days. Such was its extent on its seaboard; but inland the distance from Byzantium to the Laeaeans and the river Strymon—for this was its inland point farthest distant from the sea—it is possible for an active man to cover in thirteen days. As for the tribute which came in from the barbarian territory and from all the Hellenic cities over which the

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2 Now Struma. 3 Now Isker.
4 Now Masta. 5 Now Maritza.
6 Coinciding in the main with modern Bulgaria.
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ἡρξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ύστερον Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλείστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων ἀργυρίου μάλιστα δύναμις, ἀ χρυσὸς καὶ ἀργυρός ἦν· καὶ δώρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρίς δὲ ὅσα ύφαντά τε καὶ λεία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυνα-στεύονσι τε καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν. κατεστή-σαντο γὰρ τούναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον ὄντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ὀραξίλαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἦ διδόναι (καὶ αἴσχυν ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν), ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἑχρή-σαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δώρα.

4 ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἦλθεν ἵσχύος. τὸν γὰρ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ὅσαι μεταξὺ τοῦ Ἰονίου κόλπου καὶ τοῦ Ἐνδείκου πόντου μεγίστη ἐγένετο χρημάτων προσόδῳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἰσχύι δὲ μάχης καὶ στρατοῦ πλήθει πολὺ δευτέρᾳ

5 μετὰ τὴν Σκυθῶν. ταύτῃ δὲ ἀδύνατα ἐξισούσθαι οὖν ὅτι τὰ ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἔθνος ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τι δυνατὸν Σκύθαις ὁμογενώμονοις πᾶσιν ἀντιστήναι. οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν

1 Nephew and successor of Sitalces; cf. ch. ci. 5, 6; iv. ci. 5.
2 £81,000, $388,800.
3 Among the Persians the monarch gave rather than re-

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Odrysians acquired sway in the time of Seuthes—who, succeeding Sitalces on the throne, brought the revenues to their maximum—its value was about four hundred talents in coin, and was paid in gold and silver; and gifts equal in value to the tribute, not only of gold and silver, but besides these all manner of stuffs, both embroidered and plain, and other articles for household use, were brought as offerings to the king, and not for him only, but also for the subordinate princes and nobles of the Odrysians. For these kings had established a custom which was just the opposite of that prevailing in the kingdom of the Persians, namely, to take rather than to give; indeed it was more disgraceful for a man not to give when asked than to ask and be refused. This custom was observed among the other Thracians also; but the Odrysian kings, as they were more powerful, followed it more extensively; indeed it was not possible to accomplish anything without giving gifts. Consequently the kingdom attained to a great degree of power. For of all the kingdoms in Europe between the Ionian Gulf and the Euxine Sea it was the greatest in revenue of money and in general prosperity; but as regards the strength and size of its army, it was distinctly inferior to the Scythian kingdom. With that not only are the nations of Europe unable to compete, but even in Asia, nation against nation, there is none which can make a stand against the Scythians if they all act in concert. However, with

1 Contradicting Hdt. v. iii.: Θρήσκων δὲ έθνος μεγιστόν ἔστιν μετά γε Ἥπειρος πάντων ἀνθρώπων: εἰ δὲ ὅτι ἐνὸς ἄρχοι τὸ φρονέοι κατὰ τοῦτο, άμαχον τ' ἐν εἴη καὶ πολλῷ κράτιστον πάντων ἐθνῶν κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμῆν.
ἐς τὴν ἄλλην εὐβοιλίαν καὶ ξύνεσιν περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἐς τὸν βίον ἄλλοις ὁμοιοῦνται.

XCVIII. Σιτάλκης μὲν οὖν χώρας τοσαύτης βασιλεύων παρεσκευάζετο τὸν στρατόν. καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἐτοίμα ἦν, ἀρας ἐπορεύετο ἐπὶ τὴν Μακεδονίαν πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἄρχῆς, ἔπειτα διὰ Κερκίνης ἐρήμου ὄρους, ὁ ἐστὶ μεθόριον Σιντῶν καὶ Παιόνων. ἐπορεύετο δὲ δὲ αὐτοῦ τῇ ὁδῷ ἦν πρότερον αὐτὸς ἐποιήσατο τεμῶν τὴν ὕλην, ὅτε ἐπὶ Παιόνας ἐστράτευσεν.

2 τὸ δὲ ὀρος εἴ 'Οδρυσῶν διόντες ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν εἰχὸν Παιόνας, ἐν ἀριστερᾷ δὲ Σιντῶν καὶ Μαίδοις. διελθόντες δὲ αὐτὸ ἀφίκοντο ἐς Δό-

3 βηρον τὴν Παιονικήν. πορευομένῳ δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπε-

γίγνετο μὲν οὐδὲν τοῦ στρατοῦ εἰ μή τι νόσῳ,

προσεγίγνετο δὲ. πολλοὶ γὰρ τῶν αὐτονόμων

Θρακῶν ἀπαράκλητοι ἐφ' ἀρπαγήν ἡκολούθουν,

ὡςτε τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος λέγεται οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε

4 καὶ δέκα μυριάδων γενέσθαι καὶ τούτον τὸ μὲν

πλέον πεζὸν ἦν, τριτημόριον δὲ μάλιστα ἵππικόν.

τοῦ δ' ἵππικοῦ τὸ πλεῖστον αὐτοῦ 'Οδρύσαι

παρεῖχοντο καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς Γέται. τοῦ δὲ πεζοῦ

οἱ μαχαίροφόροι μαχιμώτατοι μὲν ἥσαν οἱ ἐκ τῆς

'Ροδόπης αὐτόνομοι καταβάντες, ὁ δὲ ἄλλος ὦμ-

λος ξύμμεικτος πλήθει φοβερῶτατος ἡκολούθει.

XCIX. Εὐνηθροίζοντο οὖν ἐν τῇ Δοβήρῳ καὶ

παρεσκευάζοντο ὅπως κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν

ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν, ὡς ὁ Περδίκκας ἤρχεν. 448
reference to wise counsel and intelligence about the things that belong to the enrichment of life the Scythians are not to be compared with other nations.

XCVIII. Such then was the extent of the country over which Sitalces ruled at the time when he was preparing his army. But when everything was ready, he set out for Macedonia, proceeding first through his own territory, then through the desolate range of Cercine, which lies between the Sinti and Paeonians. And he passed over this mountain by the road which he himself had constructed before, when he made an expedition against the Paeonians, cutting a path through the forest. As his army crossed the mountain, leaving the country of the Odrysians, they had the Paeonians on the right and on the left the Sinti and Maedi; and when they came out on the other side they arrived at Doberus in Paeonia. On the march his army suffered no loss, except from sickness, but rather was augmented; for many of the independent Thracians joined the expedition unsummoned, in the hope of plunder, so that the whole number is said to have been not less than a hundred and fifty thousand, the greater part being infantry, about one-third cavalry. Of the cavalry the Odrysians themselves furnished the largest contingent, and next to them the Getae; while of the infantry the sword-wearers, independent tribes that came down from Mount Rhodope, were the best fighters, the rest of the army that followed, a miscellaneous horde, being formidable chiefly on account of its numbers.

XCIX. So Sitalces’ army was being mustered at Doberus and preparing to pass over the mountain crest and descend upon lower Macedonia, of which
2 τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Δυνακησταῖ καὶ Ἕλληνωταί καὶ ἀλλα έθνη ἑπάνωθεν, ἃ ξύμμαχα μὲν ἐστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπῆκοα, βασιλείας δ' ἔχει
3 καθ' αὐτά. τὴν δὲ παρὰ θάλασσαν νῦν Μακε-δονιᾶν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Περδίκκοις πατηρ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον οὖντες ἐξ Ἀργοὺς πρῶτοι ἐκτήσαντο καὶ ἐβασίλευσαν ἀναστήσαντες μάχῃ ἐκ μὲν ΠιΕρίας Πιέρας, οἱ ὑστεροῦν ύπὸ τὸ Πάγγαιον πέραν Στρυμόνος φήσαν Πάγητα καὶ ἄλλα χωρία (καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πιερίκος κόλπος καλεῖται ἢ ύπὸ τῷ Παγγαίῳ πρὸς θάλασσαν γῆ), ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας καλομέ-νης Βοττιαίους, οἱ νῦν ὁμοροι Χαλκιδέων οἰκοῦ-4 σιν τῆς δὲ Παιονίας παρὰ τὸν Ἅξιον ποταμὸν στενῆν τυν καθήκουσαν ἀνωθεν μέχρι Πέλλης καὶ θαλάσσης ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ πέραν Ἅξιον μέχρι Στρυμόνος τὴν Μυγδονίαν καλομένην Ἡδώνας ἐξελάσαντες νέμονται. ἀνέστησαν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς Π. Εορδίας καλομένης 'Εορδούς, ὅν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐφθάρσαν, βραχὺ δὲ τι αὐτῶν περὶ Φύσκαν κατώκηται, καὶ ἐξ Ἄλμωπιᾶς Ἀλμωπας. 5 ἐκράτησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐθνῶν οἱ Μακεδόνες οὕτω ἀ καὶ νῦν ἔτει ἔχουσι, τὸν τε Ἀνδεμοῦντα καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν καὶ Μακεδόνων αὐτῶν πολλῆς. τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν Μακεδόνια καλεί-6 ται καὶ Περδίκκας Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλεύς αὐτῶν ἥν ὀτε Σιτάλκης ἐπῆει.
Perdiccas was ruler. For the Macedonian race includes also the Lyncestians, Elimiotes, and other tribes of the upper country, which, though in alliance with the nearer Macedonians and subject to them, have kings of their own; but the country by the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first acquired and made their kingdom by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were originally Temenidae from Argos. They defeated and expelled from Pieria the Pierians, who afterwards took up their abode in Phagres and other places at the foot of Mount Pangaenus beyond the Strymon (and even to this day the district at the foot of Mount Pangaenus toward the sea is called the Pierian Valley), and also, from the country called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, who now dwell on the borders of the Chalcidians; they acquired, further, a narrow strip of Paeonia extending along the river Axius¹ from the interior to Pella and the sea; and beyond the Axius they possess the district as far as the Strymon which is called Mygdonia, having driven out the Edonians. Moreover, they expelled from the district now called Eordia the Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a small portion is settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; and also from Almopia the Almopians. These Macedonians also made themselves masters of certain places, which they still hold, belonging to the other tribes, namely, of Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, as well as of a large part of Macedonia proper. But the whole is now called Macedonia, and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king when Sitalces made his invasion.

¹ Now Vardar.
C. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Μακεδόνες οὗτοι ἐπιόντος πολλοῦ στρατοῦ ἀδύνατος ὤντες ἀμύνεσθαι ἐς τε τὰ καρτερὰ καὶ τὰ τείχη ὅσα ἦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἐσεκο-

2 μίσθησαν. ἦν δὲ οὐ πολλὰ, ἀλλὰ ύστερον Ἀρχέ-

λαος ὁ Περδίκκου νῦς βασιλεύς γενόμενος τὰ

νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ὁκοδόμησε καὶ ὄδοις ἑυθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τάλλα διεκόσμησε τὰ 

κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὀπλοῖς καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρα-

σκευῇ κρείσσοντι ἡ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς

3 ὁκτὼ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι. ὁ δὲ στρατὸς τῶν

Θρακῶν ἐκ τῆς Δοβήρου ἐσέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν ἐς 

τὴν Φιλίππου πρότερον οὖσαν ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶλεν 

Εἰδομενὴν μὲν κατὰ κράτος, Γορτυνίαν δὲ καὶ 

'Αταλάντην καὶ ἄλλα ἄττα χωρία ὁμολογία διὰ 

τὴν 'Αμύντου φιλίαν προσχωροῦντα, τοῦ Φιλίπ-

που νύεσ, παρόντος: Εὐρωπόν δὲ ἐπολιόρκησαν

4 μὲν, ἑλεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐδύναντο. ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν 

ἄλλην Μακεδονίαν προνυχώρει τὴν ἐν ἀριστερὰ 

Πέλλης καὶ Κύρρου. ἐσω δὲ τούτων ἐς τὴν 

Βοστιαίαν καὶ Πιερίαν οὐκ ἄφικοντο, ἀλλὰ τὴν 

τε Μυγδονίαν καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ 'Ανθεμωῦντα

5 ἐδήμου. οἱ δὲ Μακεδόνες πεζῶ μὲν οὐδὲ διενοῦν-

το ἀμύνεσθαι, ἱπποὺς δὲ προσμεταπεμφάμενοι 

ἀπὸ τῶν ἄνω ἐυμμάχων, ὅτι δοκοῖ, ὁλύνοι πρὸς 

πολλοὺς ἑσέβαλλον ἐς τὸ στράτευμα τῶν Θρα-

κῶν. καὶ ἦ μὲν προσπέσοιεν, οὐδεῖς ὑπέμεινεν 

ἀνδρας ἱππέας τε ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τεθωρακισμένους, 

ὑπὸ δὲ πλῆθος περικλημένοι αὐτοὺς πολλα-


1 τὲ, in the MSS. after ὑστερ, deleted by Haacke.
C. The Macedonians of this region, unable to defend themselves against so great an invading army, betook themselves to the strong places and fortresses that were in the country. These were not many; but subsequently Archelaus son of Perdiccas, when he became king,\(^1\) built those that are now in the country, and cut straight roads, and in general organized his country for war by providing cavalry, arms and other equipment beyond anything achieved by all the eight kings who preceded him. But the Thracian army, advancing from Doberus, invaded first the province which before had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other places capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas son of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces; moreover they laid siege to Europolis, but were unable to take it. Next they advanced into the other part of Macedonia, which is to the west of Pella and Cyrrhus. Beyond these places, however, into Bottiaeae and Pieria, they did not penetrate, but ravaged Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians, on the other hand, did not even think of defending themselves with infantry, but calling upon their allies in the interior for additional cavalry, though few against many, they dashed in among the Thracian army wherever they chose. And wherever they charged no one could withstand them, for they were good horsemen and protected by cuirasses; but since they were constantly being hemmed in by superior numbers and found themselves

\(^1\) 413–399 B.C. He was as famous for the splendour and success of his reign as for the crimes by which he obtained the throne.
πλασίω τῷ ὁμίλῳ ἐς κινδυνον καθίστασαι: ὥστε
tέλος ἡσυχίαν ἤγουν, οὐ νομίζοντες ἰκανοὶ εἶναι
πρὸς τὸ πλέον κινδυνεύειν.

C. Ὅ δὲ Σιτάλκης πρὸς τε τῶν Περδικκαν
λόγοις ἐποιεῖτο ὡς ἑνέκα ἐστράτευσε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ
οἱ Ἄθηναιοι οὐ παρῆσαν ταῖς ναυσίν ἀπιστοῦντες
αὐτῶν μὴ ἤξειν (ὄντα δὲ καὶ πρέσβεις ἐπεμψαν
αὐτῶ), ἐς τε τοὺς Χαλκιδέας καὶ Βοττιάνους
μέρος τι τοῦ στρατοῦ πέμπτε, καὶ τειχῆρες ποιή-
2 σας ἐδίστη τὴν γῆν. καθημένου δὲ αὐτοῦ περὶ
tοὺς χώρους τούτους οἱ πρὸς νότον οἰκοῦντες
Θεσσαλιν καὶ Μάγνητες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὕπηκοοι
Θεσσαλῶν καὶ οἱ μέχρι Θερμοπολῶν Ἕλληνες
ἐφοβήθησαν μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ σφάς ὁ στρατὸς χωρῆση,
3 καὶ ἐν παρασκευῇ ἦσαν. ἐφοβήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ
πέραν Στρυμόνος πρὸς βορεὰν Ὀρὰκες ὅσοι πεδία
εἶχον, Παναῖοι καὶ Ὄδομαντοι καὶ Δρῶι καὶ
4 Δερσαῖοι· αὐτόνομοι δὲ εἰσὶ πάντες. παρέσχε δὲ
λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς τῶν Ἅθηναιῶν πολεμίους
"Η Ἕλληνας μὴ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὸ ξυμ-
5 μαχικὸν καὶ ἐπὶ σφάς χωρῆσωσιν. ά δὲ τὴν τε
Χαλκιδικὴν καὶ Βοττικὴν καὶ Μακεδονίαν ᾧμα
ἐπέχων ἐφθειρε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ οὔδεν ἐπράσ-
σετο ὡς ἑνεκα ἐσέβαλε, καὶ ἴ στρατιὰ σῖτόν τε
οὐκ εἶχεν αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἐταλαντώρει,
ἀναπείθεται ὑπὸ Σεύθου τοῦ Σπαραδόκου, ἀδελ-
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imperilled by the horde that was many times their own number, they finally desisted, thinking that they were not strong enough to fight with the larger force.

CI. Sitalces now began to hold parleys with Perdiccas about the matters for which he had undertaken the expedition; and since the Athenians (who did not believe that Sitalces would come, though they sent gifts and envoys to him) had not arrived with their promised fleet, he despatched part of his army into the territory of the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up within their walls ravaged their lands. But while he was staying in the neighbourhood of these places, the peoples which dwell to the south—the Thessalians, the Magnesians and other subjects of the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far south as Thermopylae—became frightened lest the host should come against them also, and so were making preparations. The same alarm was felt also by the Thracians who inhabit the plain beyond the Strymon to the north, that is, the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersaeans, independent tribes. He gave occasion also to a rumour which spread even to the Hellenes hostile to Athens, that the Thracians might be led on by the Athenians in accordance with the terms of their alliance and come against them too. But meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the same time Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia; and then, since none of the original objects of his invasion was being accomplished, and his army was without food and was suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sparadocus, a
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φιδοῦ ὄντος καὶ μέγιστον μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ δυναμένου, ὥστ’ ἐν τάχει ἀπελθεῖν. τὸν δὲ Σεῦθην κρύφα Περδίκκας ὑποσχόμενος ἄδελφην ἑαυτοῦ δώσειν καὶ χρήματα ἐπ’ αὐτῇ προσποιεῖται. καὶ ὁ μὲν πεισθεὶς καὶ μείνας τριάκοντα τὰς πάσας ἡμέρας, τούτων δὲ ὀκτὼ ἐν Χαλκιδεύσι, ἀνεχώρησε τῷ στρατῷ κατὰ τάχος ἐπ’ οίκου. Περδίκκας δὲ ὑστερου Στρατονίκην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἄδελφην δίδωσι Σεῦθη, ὥσπερ ὑπέσχετο. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν Σιτάλκου στρατεύαν οὕτως ἐγένετο.

CII. Οἱ δὲ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ Ἀθηναίοι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ χειμῶνος, ἑπειδὴ τὸ τῶν Πελοποιησίων ναυτικὸν διελύθη, Φορμίωνος ἤγομένου ἐστράτευσαν, παραπλεύσαντες ἐπ’ Ἀστακοῦ καὶ ἀποβάντες ἐσ τὴν μεσόγειαν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας τετρακοσίως μὲν ὀπλίταις Ἀθηναίοι τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν, τετρακοσίως δὲ Μεσσηνίων, καὶ ἐκ τε Στράτου καὶ Κορόντων καὶ ἄλλων χωρίων ἄνδρας οὐ δοκοῦντας βεβαιοὺς εἶναι ἐξῆλθαν, καὶ Κύνητα τὸν Θεολύτου ἐς Κόροντα καταγαγόντες ἀνεχώρησαν 2 πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς. ἐς γὰρ Οἰνιάδας αἰεὶ ποτε πολεμίους ὄντας μόνους Ἀκαρνάνων οὐκ ἔδοκεν δυνατὸν εἶναι χειμῶνος ὄντος στρατεύειν· ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελώος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγραίων καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων καὶ διὰ τοῦ Ἀκαρνανικοῦ πεδίου, ἄνωθεν μὲν παρὰ Στράτου πόλιν, ἐς θάλασσαν δ’ ἔξεις παρ’ Οἰνιάδας καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλιμνάζων, ἀπορον ποιεῖ 456
nephew and next to him in power,\(^1\) to go back home at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly won over by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his sister in marriage and a dowry with her. So Sitalces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days in all, eight of which had been spent among the Chalcidians, returned home with his army with all speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such, then, is the history of the expedition of Sitalces.

CII. During the same winter the Athenians in Naupactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had been disbanded, made an expedition under the command of Phormio. They first skirted the coast in the direction of Astacus, and then, disembarking, invaded the interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian hoplites from the ships and four hundred Messenian. And after they had expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places such men as were regarded as disloyal, and had restored Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned again to their ships. For it seemed impracticable in winter to make a campaign against Oeniadae, whose inhabitants alone of the Acarnanians were always hostile; for the river Achelous, which rises in Mount Pindus and flows through the country of the Dolopians, Agraean, and Amphilochians and then through the Acarnanian plain, passes by the city of Stratus high up the stream, but by Oeniadae empties into the sea, where it surrounds the city with marshes, thus rendering military operations there impossible in

\(^1\) Sadocus, Sitalces' own son, who had been received into Athenian citizenship (ch. xxix. 5; lxvii. 2), must have died before this time. The nephew Seuthes succeeded to the throne in 424 B.C. (iv. ci. 4).
3 ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεύειν. κεῖνται δὲ καὶ τῶν νῆσων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἱ πολλαὶ καταντικροῦ Ὀινιαδῶν τοῦ Ἀχελώου τῶν ἐκβολῶν οὐδὲν ἀπέχουσαι, ὡστε μέγας ὁ ποταμὸς προσχοῖ αἰεὶ καὶ εἰσὶ τῶν νῆσων αἱ ἥπειρονται, ἐξπίς δὲ καὶ πάσας οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ ἀν χρόνῳ
4 τούτῳ παθεῖν· τὸ τε γὰρ ἔμενα ἐστὶ μέγα καὶ πολὺ καὶ θολερόν, αἱ τε νῆσοι πυκναί, καὶ ἄλλη-

lais τῆς προσχώσεως τὸ μὴ σκεδάνυνυσθαι ἡ ἕων-

desμοι γίγνονται, παραλλὰξ καὶ οὐ κατὰ στοῖχον κείμεναι, οὐδὲ ἔχουσαι εὐθείας διόδους τοῦ ὕδατος
5 ἐς τὸ πέλαγος. ἔρημοι δ’ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμέωνι τῷ Ἀρμιάρεω, ὅτε δὴ ἀλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ τῶν φοίνων τῆς μητρός, τὸν Ἀπόλλωνο ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, ὑπει-

πότα οὐκ εἶναι λύσιν τῶν δείμάτων πρὶν ἀν εὑρόν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρᾳ κατοικίζηται ἦτις ὃτε ἐκτείνε τὴν μητέρα μήπω ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἑωρᾶτο μηĎὲ
6 γῆ ὑν, ὥς τῆς γε ἄλλης αὐτῷ μεμιασμένης. ὁ δ’ ἀπορῶν, ὡς φασί, μόλις κατενόησε τὴν πρόσχω-

σων ταύτην τοῦ Ἀχελώου, καὶ ἐδόκει αὐτῷ ἰκανὴ ἄν κεχώσθαι δίαιτα τῷ σώματι ἀφ’ οὕτερ κτείνας τὴν μητέρα οὐκ ὅλιγον χρόνον ἐπλανάτο. καὶ κατοικισθεῖς ἐς τοὺς περὶ Ὀινιάδας τόπους ἐνυνά-

στευσέ τε καὶ ἀπὸ Ἀκαρνάνος παιδὸς ἑαυτοῦ τῆς χώρας τὴν ἑπωνυμίαν ἐγκατέληπεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἀλκμέωνα τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα παρελάβομεν.

1 Hude brackets τὸ μὴ σκεδάνυνυσθαι, following Stahl.
winter by reason of the water. Besides, most of the Echinades islands lie opposite to Oeniodai at no great distance from the mouths of the Achelous, so that the river, which is large, keeps making fresh deposits of silt, and some of the islands have already become part of the mainland, and probably this will happen to all of them in no great while. For the stream is wide and deep and turbid, and the islands are close together and serve to bind to one another the bars as they are formed, preventing them from being broken up, since the islands lie, not in line, but irregularly, and do not allow straight channels for the water into the open sea. These islands are uninhabited and not large. There is a story that when Alemaeon son of Amphiarus was a wanderer after the murder of his mother, Apollo directed him by oracle to inhabit this land, intimating that he would have no release from his fears until he should find and settle in a country which at the time he killed his mother had not yet been seen by the sun, and was not even land then, for all the rest of the earth had been polluted by him. And he, in his perplexity, at last, as the story goes, observed this sand-bar formed by the Achelous, and he surmised that during the long time he had been wandering since he had slain his mother enough land would have been silted up to support life in. So he settled there in the region of Oeniodai, founded a principality, and left to the country its name Acarnania, after that of his son Acarnan. Such is the tradition which we have received concerning Alemaeon.

1 Eriphyle.
THUCYDIDES

CIII. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὁ Φορμίων ἀραντες ἐκ τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ναυπακτον ἀμα ἤρι κατέπλευσαν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, τοὺς τε ἐλευθέρους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ἐκ τῶν ναυμαχιῶν ἄγοντες, οἱ ἀνὴρ ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρὸς ἐλύσαν, καὶ τὰς ναῦς ἃς ἐἴλουν. καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἔτελεύτα σοῦτος, καὶ τρίτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἔτελεύτα τῷ δὲ ὁν Θουκυδίδης ἔνεγραψεν.
CIII. The Athenians and Phormio set out from Acarnania and arrived at Naupactus, and later, at the beginning of spring, sailed back to Athens, bringing with them the captured ships and also the prisoners of free birth whom they had taken in the sea-fights. These were exchanged man for man. And this winter ended, concluding the third year of this war of which Thucydides wrote the history.
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I cannot understand

what you mean to say.
superior - open city - teach
as model - allow... in
where two have a short tour or have...? it can see a
allow... profit
- trying to define a metaphor

Themistocles I. 14. 3
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90. 3
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