De finibus bonorum et malorum
CICERO

DE FINIBUS BONORUM
ET MALORUM

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MCMXIV
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book II</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book III</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book IV</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book V</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION.

The *de Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* is a treatise on the theory of Ethics. It expounds and criticizes the three ethical systems most prominent in Cicero’s day, the Epicurean, the Stoic and that of the Academy under Antiochus. The most elaborate of Cicero’s philosophical writings, it has had fewer readers than his less technical essays on moral subjects. But it is of importance to the student of philosophy as the only systematic account surviving from antiquity of those rules of life which divided the allegiance of thoughtful men during the centuries when the old religions had lost their hold and Christianity had not yet emerged. And the topics that it handles can never lose their interest.

The title ‘About the Ends of Goods and Evils’ requires explanation. It was Aristotle who put the ethical problem in the form of the question, What is the *Télos* or End, the supreme aim of man’s endeavour, in the attainment of which his Good or Well-being lies? For Aristotle, *Telos* connoted not only ‘aim,’ but ‘completion’; and he found the answer to his question in the complete development and right exercise of the faculties of man’s nature, and particularly of the distinctively human faculty of Reason. The life of the Intellect was the Best, the Chief Good; and lesser Goods were Means to the attainment of this End. Thus was introduced the notion of an ascending scale of Goods, and this affected the interpretation of the term *Telos*. *Telos* came to be understood as denoting not so much the end or aim of endeavour as the end or extreme
INTRODUCTION

point of a series, the topmost good. To this was naturally opposed an extreme of minus value, the topmost, or rather bottommost, evil. The expressions τέλος ἄγαθῶν, τέλος κακῶν, 'End of Goods, of Evils,' do not occur in extant Greek (though Diogenes has τελικὰ κακὰ, 'final evils'), but they are attested by Cicero's translation finis honorum et malorum. As a title for his book he throws this phrase into the plural, meaning 'different views as to the Chief Good and Evil.' Hence in title and to some extent in method, the de Finibus may be compared with such modern works as Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory and Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics.

Cicero as a writer on philosophy.

Cicero belongs to a type not unknown in English life, that of the statesman who is also a student and a writer. From his youth he aspired to play a part in public affairs, and the first step towards this ambition was to learn to speak. He approached Greek philosophy as part of a liberal education for a political career, and he looked on it as supplying themes for practice in oratory. But his real interest in it went deeper; the study of it formed his mind and humanized his character, and he loved it to the end of his life.

In his youth he heard the heads of the three chief Schools of Athens, Phaedrus the Epicurean, Diodotus the Stoic, and Philo the Academic, who had come to Rome to escape the disturbances of the Mithradatic War. When already launched in public life, he withdrew, at the age of 27 (79 B.C.), to devote two more years to philosophy and rhetoric. Six months were spent at Athens, and the introduction to de Finibus Book V gives a brilliant picture of his
INTRODUCTION

student life there with his friends. No passage more vividly displays what Athens and her memories meant to the cultivated Roman. At Athens Cicero attended the lectures of the Epicurean Zeno and the Academic Antiochus. Passing on to Rhodes to work under the leading professors of rhetoric, he there met Posidonius, the most renowned Stoic of the day. He returned to Rome to plunge into his career as advocate and statesman; but his Letters show him continuing his studies in his intervals of leisure. For many years the Stoic Diodotus was an inmate of his house.

Under the Triumvirate, as his influence in politics waned, Cicero turned more and more to literature. His earliest essay in rhetoric, the de Inventione, had appeared before he was twenty-five; but his first considerable works on rhetoric and on political science, the de Oratore, de Republica, and de Legibus, were written after his return from exile in 57. The opening pages of de Finibus Book III give a glimpse of his studies at this period. In 51 he went as Governor to Cilicia; and he wrote no more until the defeat of Pompey at Pharsalus had destroyed his hopes for the Republic.

After his reconciliation with Caesar and return to Rome in the autumn of 46, Cicero resumed writing on rhetoric. In February 45 came the death of his beloved daughter Tullia, followed soon after by the final downfall of the Pompeians at Munda. Crushed by public and private sorrow, he shut himself up in one of his country houses and sought distraction in unremitting literary work. He conceived the idea, as he implies in the preface to de Finibus, of rendering a last service to his country by bringing the
INTRODUCTION

treasures of Greek thought within the reach of the Roman public. Both his Academica and de Finibus were compiled in the following summer; the latter was probably presented to Brutus, to whom it is dedicated, on his visit to Cicero in August 45 (ad Att. XIII, 44). Seven months later Brutus was one of the assassins of Caesar. In the autumn of 44 Cicero flung himself again into the arena with his attack on Antony, which led to his proscription and death in December 43.

Excepting the de Oratore, de Republica and de Legibus, the whole of Cicero's most important writings on philosophy and rhetoric belong to 46-44 B.C. and were achieved within two years. Such a mass of work so rapidly produced could hardly be original, and in fact it made no claim to be so. It was designed as a sort of encyclopaedia of philosophy for Roman readers. Cicero's plan was to take each chief department of thought in turn, and present the theories of the leading schools upon it, appending to each theory the criticisms of its opponents. Nor had his work that degree of independence which consists in assimilating the thought of others and recasting it in the mould of the writer's own mind. He merely chose some recent hand-book on each side of the question under consideration, and reproduced it in Latin, encasing passages of continuous exposition in a frame of dialogue, and adding illustrations from Roman history and poetry. He puts the matter frankly in a letter to Atticus (XII, 52): "You will say, 'What is your method in such compositions?' They are mere transcripts, and cost comparatively little labour; I only supply the words, of which I have a copious flow." In de Finibus
INTRODUCTION

(I, 6) he rates his work a little higher, not without justice, and claims to be the critic as well as the interpreter of his authorities.

This method of writing was consonant with Cicero's own position in philosophy. Since his early studies under Philo he had been a professed adherent of the New Academy, and as such maintained a sceptical attitude on questions of knowledge. On morals he was more positive; though without a logical basis for his principles, he accepted the verdict of the common moral conscience of his age and country. Epicureanism he abhorred as demoralizing. The Stoics repelled him by their harshness and narrowness, but attracted him by their strict morality and lofty theology. His competence for the task of interpreting Greek thought to Rome was of a qualified order. He had read much, and had heard the chief teachers of the day. But with learning and enthusiasm he combined neither depth of insight nor scientific precision. Yet his services to philosophy must not be underrated. He introduced a novel style of exposition, copious, eloquent, impartial and urbane; and he created a philosophical terminology in Latin which has passed into the languages of modern Europe.

The de Finibus consists of three separate dialogues, each dealing with one of the chief ethical systems of the day. The exponents of each system, and the minor interlocutors, are friends of Cicero’s younger days, all of whom were dead when he wrote; brief notes upon them will be found in the Index. The role of critic Cicero takes himself throughout.

The first dialogue occupies Books I and II; in the xi
INTRODUCTION

former the Ethics of Epicurus are expounded, and
in the latter refuted from the Stoic standpoint. The
scene is laid at Cicero’s villa in the neighbourhood
of Cumae, on the lovely coast a little north of
Naples. The spokesman of Epicureanism is L. Man-
lius Torquatus, a reference to whose praetorship
(II, 74) fixes the date of the conversation at 50 B.C.,
shortly after Cicero’s return from his province of
Cilicia. A minor part is given to the youthful
C. Valerius Triarius.

In the second dialogue the Stoic ethics are ex-
pounded (in Book III) by M. Cato, and criticized (in
Book IV) from the standpoint of Antiochus by
Cicero. Cicero has run down to his place at Tuscu-
lum, fifteen miles from town, for a brief September
holiday, while the Games are on at Rome; and he
meets Cato at the neighbouring villa of Lucullus,
whose orphan son is Cato’s ward. A law passed by
Pompey in 52 B.C. is spoken of (IV, 1) as new, so
the date falls in that year; Cicero went to Cilicia
in 51.

The third dialogue (Book V) goes back to a much
earlier period in Cicero’s life. Its date is 79 and its
scene Athens, where Cicero and his friends are
eagerly attending lectures on philosophy. The posi-
tion of the “Old Academy” of Antiochus is main-
tained by M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus, and after-
wards criticized by Cicero from the Stoic point of
view; the last word remains with Piso. The others
present are Cicero’s brother and cousin, and his
friend and correspondent Titus Pomponius Atticus,
a convinced Epicurean, who had retired to Athens
from the civil disorders at Rome, and did not return
for over twenty years.

xii
INTRODUCTION

In Book I the exposition of Epicureanism probably comes from some compendium of the school, which seems to have summarized (1) Epicurus's essay *On the Telos*, (2) a résumé of the points at issue between Epicurus and the Cyrenaics (reproduced I, 55 ff), and (3) some Epicurean work on Friendship (I, 65-70).

The Stoic arguments against Epicurus in Book II Cicero derived very likely from Antiochus; but in the criticism of Epicurus there is doubtless more of Cicero's own thought than anywhere else in the work.

The authority for Stoicism relied on in Book III was most probably Diogenes of Babylon, who is referred to by name at III, 33 and 49.

In Books IV and V Cicero appears to have followed Antiochus.

Alexander the Great died in 323 and Aristotle in 322 B.C. Both Epicurus and Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, began to teach at Athens about twenty years later. The date marks a new era in Greek thought and Greek life. Speculative energy had exhausted itself; the schools of Plato and Aristotle showed little vigour after the death of their founders. Enlightenment had undermined religion, yet the philosophers seemed to agree about nothing except that things are not what they appear; and the plain man's mistrust of their conclusions was raised into a system of Scepticism by Pyrrho. Meanwhile the outer order too had changed. For Plato and Aristotle the good life could only be lived in a free city-state, like the little independent Greek cities which they knew; but these had now fallen under
INTRODUCTION

the empire of Macedon, and the barrier between Greek and barbarian was giving way. The wars of Alexander's successors rendered all things insecure, exile, slavery, violent death were possibilities with which every man must lay his account.

Epicureanism and Stoicism, however antagonistic, have certain common features corresponding to the needs of the period. Philosophy was systematized, and fell into three recognized departments, Logic, Physics and Ethics; and for both schools the third department stood first in importance. Both schools offered dogma, not speculation; a way of life for man as man, not as Greek citizen. Both abandoned idealism, saw no reality save matter, and accepted sense experience as knowledge. Both studied the world of nature only in order to understand the position of man. Both looked for a happiness secure from fortune's changes; and found it in peace of mind, undisturbed by fear and desire. But here the rival teachers diverged: Epicurus sought peace in the liberation of man's will from nature's law, Zeno in submission to it,¹ and in their conceptions of nature they differed profoundly.

Epicureanism: Canonic.

Formal Logic Epicurus dismissed as useless, but he raised the problem of knowledge under the heading of Canonic. The Canon or measuring-rod, the criterion of truth, is furnished by the sensations and by the πάθος or feelings of pleasure and pain. Epicurus's recognition of the latter as qualities of any state of consciousness and as distinct from the sensations of sight, hearing, etc., marks a notable

¹ *Et mihi res non me rebus subiungere conor,* says Horace of his lapses from Stoicism into Cyrenaicism.

xiv
INTRODUCTION

advance in psychology. The sensations and the feelings determine our judgment and volition respectively, and they are all 'true,' i.e., real data of experience. So are the προλήψεις, or 'preconceptions' by which we recognize each fresh sensation, i.e., our general concepts; for these are accumulations of past sensations. It is in ὑπολήψεις, 'opinions,' i.e., judgments about sensations, that error can occur. Opinions are true only when confirmed, or, in the case of those relating to imperceptible objects (e.g. the Void), when not contradicted by actual sensations. Thus Epicurus adumbrated, however crudely, a logic of inductive science.

His Natural Philosophy is touched on in de Finibus, Epicurean Physics. I, c. vi. It is fully set out in the great poem of Cicero's contemporary, Lucretius, who preaches his master's doctrine with religious fervour as a gospel of deliverance for the spirit of man. Epicurus adopted the Atomic theory of Democritus, according to which the primary realities are an infinite number of tiny particles of matter, indivisible and indestructible, moving by their own weight through an infinite expanse of empty space or Void. Our perishable world and all that it contains consists of temporary clusters of these atoms interspersed with void. Innumerable other worlds beside are constantly forming and dissolving. This universe goes on of itself: there are gods, but they take no part in its guidance; they live a life of untroubled bliss in the empty spaces between the worlds. The human soul like everything else is material; it consists of atoms of the smallest and most mobile sort, enclosed by the coarser atoms of the body, and dissipated when the
INTRODUCTION

body is dissolved by death. Death therefore means extinction.

Thus man was relieved from the superstitions that preyed upon his happiness,—fear of the gods and fear of punishment after death. But a worse tyranny remained if all that happens is caused by inexorable fate. Here comes in the doctrine of the Swerve, which Cicero derides, but which is essential to the system. Democritus had taught that the heavier atoms fell faster through the void than the lighter ones, and so overtook them. Aristotle corrected the error; and Epicurus turned the correction to account. He gave his atoms a uniform vertical velocity, but supposed them to collide by casually making a slight sideway movement. This was the minimum hypothesis that he could think of to account for the formation of things; and it served his purpose by destroying the conception of a fixed order in Nature. The capacity to swerve is shared by the atoms that compose the human soul; hence it accounts for the action of the will, which Epicurus regards as entirely undetermined. In this fortuitous universe man is free to make his own happiness.

In Ethics Epicurus based himself on Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates and founder of the School of Cyrene. With Aristippus he held that pleasure is the only good, the sole constituent of man's well-being. Aristippus had drawn the practical inference that the right thing to do is to enjoy each pleasure of the moment as it offers. His rule of conduct is summed up by Horace's Carpe diem. But this naive hedonism was so modified by Epicurus as to become in his hands an entirely different theory. Its principal tenets are: that the goodness of pleasure is a matter of direct...
INTRODUCTION

intuition, and is attested by natural instinct, as seen in the actions of infants and animals; that all men's conduct does as a matter of fact aim at pleasure; that the proper aim is to secure the greatest balance of pleasure over pain in the aggregate; that absence of pain is the greatest pleasure, which can only be varied, not augmented, by active gratification of the sense; that pleasure of the mind is based on pleasure of the body, yet that mental pleasure may far surpass bodily in magnitude, including as it does with the consciousness of present gratification the memory of past and the hope of future pleasure; that 'unnatural and unnecessary' desires and emotions are a chief source of unhappiness; and that Prudence, Temperance or self-control, and the other recognized virtues are therefore essential to obtain a life of the greatest pleasure, though at the same time the virtues are of no value save as conducive to pleasure.

This original, and in some respects paradoxical, development of hedonism gave no countenance to the voluptuary. On the contrary Epicurus both preached and practised the simple life, and the cultivation of the ordinary virtues, though under utilitarian sanctions which led him to extreme unorthodoxy in some particulars. Especially, he denied any absolute validity to Justice and to Law, and inculcated abstinence from the active duties of citizenship. To Friendship he attached the highest value; and the School that he founded in his Garden in a suburb of Athens, and endowed by will, was as much a society of friends as a college of students. It still survived and kept the birthday of its founder in Cicero's time.

Epicurus is the forerunner of the English Utilitarians; but he differs from them in making no attempt
INTRODUCTION

to combine hedonism with altruism. ‘The greatest happiness of the greatest number’ is a formula that has no counterpart in antiquity. The problem that occurs when the claims of self conflict with those of others was not explicitly raised by Epicurus. But it is against the egoism of his Ethics at least as much as against its hedonistic basis that Cicero’s criticisms are really directed.

The Stoics paid much attention to Logic. In this department they included with Dialectic, which they developed on the lines laid down by Aristotle, Grammar, Rhetoric, and the doctrine of the Criterion. The last was their treatment of the problem of knowledge. Like Epicurus they were purely empirical, but unlike him they conceded to the Sceptics that sensations are sometimes misleading. Yet true sensations, they maintained, are distinguishable from false; they have a ‘clearness’ which compels the ‘assent’ of the mind and makes it ‘comprehend’ or grasp the presentation as a true picture of the external object. Such a ‘comprehensible presentation,’ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, is the criterion of truth; it is ‘a presentation that arises from an object actually present, in conformity with that object, stamped on the mind like the impress of a seal, and such as could not arise from an object not actually present.’ So their much-debated formula was elaborated in reply to Sceptical critics. If asked how it happens that false sensations do occur—e.g., that a straight stick half under water looks crooked—the Stoics replied that error only arises from inattention; careful observation will detect the absence of one or other of the notes of ‘clearness.’ The Wise Man xviii
INTRODUCTION

never ‘assents’ to an ‘incomprehensible presenta-
tion.’

In contradiction to Epicurus, the Stoics taught that the universe is guided by, and in the last resort is, God. The sole first cause is a divine Mind, which realizes itself periodically in the world-process. But this belief they expressed in terms uncompromisingly materialistic. Only the corporeal exists, for only the corporeal can act and be acted upon. Mind therefore is matter in its subtlest form; it is Fire or Breath (spirit) or Aether. The primal fiery Spirit creates out of itself the material world that we know, and itself persists within the world as its heat, its ‘tension,’ its soul; it is the cause of all movement, and the source of life in all animate creatures, whose souls are detached particles of the world-soul.

The notion of Fire as the primary substance the Stoics derived from Heracleitus. Of the process of creation they offered an elaborate account, a sort of imaginary physics or chemistry, operating with the hot and cold, dry and moist, the four elements of fire, air, earth and water, and other conceptions of previous physicists, which came to them chiefly through the Peripatetics.

The world-process they conceived as going on according to a fixed law or formula (λόγος); effect following cause in undeviating sequence. This law they regarded impersonally as Fate, or personally as divine Providence; they even spoke of the Deity as being himself the Logos of creation. Evidences of design they found in the beauty of the ordered world and in its adaptation to the use and comfort of man. Apparent evil is but the necessary imperfection of the parts as parts; the whole is perfectly good.
INTRODUCTION

As this world had a beginning, so it will have an end in time; it is moving on towards a universal conflagration, in which all things will return to the primal Fire from which they sprang. But only for a moment will unity be restored. The causes that operated before must operate again; once more the creative process will begin, and all things will recur exactly as they have occurred already. So existence goes on, repeating itself in an unending series of identical cycles.

Such rigorous determinism would seem to leave no room for human freedom or for moral choice. Yet the Stoics maintained that though man's acts like all other events are fore-ordained, his will is free. Obey the divine ordinance in any case he must, but it rests with him to do so willingly or with reluctance. To understand the world in which he finds himself, and to submit his will thereto—herein man's well-being lies.

Stoic Ethics. On this foundation they reared an elaborate structure of Ethics. Their formula for conduct was 'To live in accordance with nature.' To interpret this, they appealed, like Epicurus, to instinct, but with a different result. According to the Stoics, not pleasure but self-preservation and things conducive to it are the objects at which infants and animals aim. Such objects are 'primary in the order of nature'; and these objects and others springing out of them, viz., all that pertains to the safety and the full development of man's nature, constitute the proper aim of human action. The instinct to seek these objects is replaced in the adult by deliberate intention; as his reason matures, he learns (if unperverted) to understand the plan of nature and to find his happiness in willing conformity with it. This rightness of
INTRODUCTION

understanding and of will (the Stoics did not separate the two, since for them the mind is one) is Wisdom or Virtue, which is the only good; their wrongness is Folly or Vice, the only evil. Not that we are to ignore external things: on the contrary, it is in choosing among them as Nature intends that Virtue is exercised. But the attainment of the natural objects is immaterial; it is the effort to attain them alone that counts.

This nice adjustment of the claims of Faith and Works was formulated in a series of technicalities. A scale of values was laid down, and on it a scheme of conduct was built up. Virtue alone is 'good' and 'to be sought,' Vice alone 'evil' and 'to be shunned'; all else is 'indifferent.' But of things indifferent some, being in accordance with nature, are 'promoted' or 'preferred' (προηγμένα), as having 'worth' (ἀξία), and these are 'to be chosen'; others, being contrary to nature, are 'de-promoted' (ἀποπροηγμένα) as having 'unworth' (ἀπαξία, negative value), and these are 'to be rejected'; while other things again are 'absolutely indifferent,' and supply no motive for action. To aim at securing 'things promoted,' or avoiding their opposites is an 'appropriate act' (καθηκόν): this is what the young and uncorrupted do by instinct. When the same aim is taken by the rational adult with full knowledge of nature's plan and deliberate intent to conform with it, then the 'appropriate act' is 'perfect,' and is a 'right action' or 'success' (κατόρθωμα). ¹ Intention, not

¹Cicero inevitably obscures the point in rendering καθηκόν by officium. To say that fungī officio, 'to do one's duty,' is not recte facere makes the doctrine sound more paradoxical than it really was.
INTRODUCTION

achievement, constitutes success. The only 'failure,' 'error' or 'sin' (the term ἀμάρτημα includes all these notions) is the conduct of the rational being who ignores and violates nature.

In identifying the Good with Virtue and in interpreting Virtue by the conception of Nature, the Stoics were following their forerunners the Cynics; but they parted company with the Cynics in finding a place in their scheme for Goods in the ordinary sense. For though they place pleasure among things 'absolutely indifferent,' their examples of things 'promoted'—life, health, wealth, etc.—are pretty much the usual objects of man's endeavour. Hence, whereas the Cynics, construing 'the natural' as the primitive or unsophisticated, had run counter to convention and even to decency, the Stoics in the practical rules deduced from their principles agreed in the main with current morality, and included the recognized duties to the family and the state.

But their first principles themselves they enunciated in a form that was violently paradoxical. Virtue being a state of inward righteousness they regarded as something absolute. Either a man has attained to it, when he is at once completely wise, good and happy, and remains so whatever pain, sorrow, or misfortune may befall him; or he has not attained to it, in which case, whatever progress he has made towards it, he is still foolish, wicked and miserable. So stated, the ideal was felt to be beyond man's reach. Chrysippus, the third head of the school, confessed that he had never known a Wise Man. Criticism forced the later Stoics to compromise. The Wise Man remained as a type and an ensample;
INTRODUCTION

but positive value was conceded to moral progress, and 'appropriate acts' tended to usurp the place that strictly belonged to 'right acts'.

The last system to engage Cicero's attention, that of his contemporary Antiochus, is of much less interest than the two older traditions with which he ranges it.

Within a century of the death of its founder Plato, the Academy underwent a complete transformation. Arcesilas, its head in the middle of the third century B.C., adopted the scepticism that had been established as a philosophical system by Pyrrho two generations before, and denied the possibility of knowledge. He was accordingly spoken of as the founder of a Second or New Academy. His work was carried further a century afterwards by Carneades. Both these acute thinkers devoted themselves to combating the dogmas of the Stoics. Arcesilas assailed their theory of knowledge; and Carneades riddled their natural theology with shafts that have served for most subsequent polemic of the kind. On the basis of philosophic doubt, the New Academy developed in Ethics a theory of reasoned probability as a sufficient guide for life.

The extreme scepticism of Carneades led to a reaction. Philo, who was his next successor but one, and who afterwards became Cicero's teacher at Rome, reverted to a more positive standpoint. Doing violence to the facts, he declared that the teaching of the Academy had never changed since Plato, and that Arcesilas and Carneades, though attacking the Criterion of the Stoics, had not meant to deny all possibility of knowledge. The Stoic 'comprehensi-
sion’ was impossible, but yet there was a ‘clearness’ about some impressions that gives a conviction of their truth.

Antiochus.

The next head, Antiochus, went beyond this ambiguous position, and abandoned scepticism altogether. Contradicting Philo, he maintained that the true tradition of Plato had been lost, and professed to recover it, calling his school the ‘Old Academy.’ But his reading of the history of philosophy was hardly more accurate than Philo’s. He asserted that the teachings of the older Academics and Peripatetics and of the Stoics were, in Ethics at all events, substantially the same, and that Zeno had borrowed his tenets from his predecessors, merely concealing the theft by his novel terminology.

The latter thesis is argued in de Finibus, Book IV, while Book V gives Antiochus’s version of the ‘Old Academic and Peripatetic’ Ethics, which he himself professed. His doctrine is that Virtue is sufficient for happiness, but that in the highest degree of happiness bodily and external goods also form a part. The Stoics will not call these latter ‘goods,’ but only ‘things promoted’; yet really they attach no less importance to them.

Antiochus could only maintain his position by ignoring nice distinctions. The Ethics of Aristotle in particular seem to have fallen into complete oblivion. Aristotle’s cardinal doctrines are, that well-being consists not in the state of virtue but in the active exercise of all human excellences, and particularly of man’s highest gift of rational contemplation; and that though for this a modicum of external goods is needed, these are but indispensable
INTRODUCTION

conditions, and in no way constituent parts, of the Chief Good.

The fact is that philosophy in Cicero's day had lost all precision as well as originality. It must be admitted that de Finibus declines in interest when it comes to deal with contemporary thought. Not only does the plan of the work necessitate some repetition in Book V of arguments already rehearsed in Book IV; but Antiochus's perversion of preceding systems impairs alike the criticism of the Stoics and the presentation of his own ethical doctrine.

The text of this edition is founded on that of The Text. Madvig, whose representatives have kindly permitted use to be made of the latest edition of his de Finibus, dated 1876. Madvig first established the text of the book; and it is from no lack of appreciation for his Herculean labours that I have ventured here and there to modify his results, whether by adopting conjectures suggested in his notes, or by preferring MSS. readings rejected by him, or conjectures made by other scholars and in one or two places by myself. In supplementing Madvig's work I have derived much help from the Teubner text of C. W. F. Müller, 1904. Madvig's punctuation I have altered throughout, both to conform it with English usage and also occasionally to suggest a different connection of thought.

Departures from Madvig's text (referred to as The critical Notes. Mdv.) are noted at the foot of the page. So also are MSS. variants of importance for the sense; in such places the readings of the three best MSS. and of the inferior group are usually given. But no attempt is made to present a complete picture of xxv
INTRODUCTION

the state of the MSS., for which the student must go to Madvig.

The MSS. of de Finibus are: A, Palatinus I, 11th c., which ends soon after the beginning of Book IV; B, Palatinus II; and E, Erlangensis, 15th c. These three form one family, within which B and E are more closely related. The other MSS. known to Madvig form a second family, inferior in general to the former, though, as Müller points out, not to be entirely dispensed with. Both families according to Madvig descend from a late and already considerably corrupted archetype.

Editions. The earliest edition is believed to have been printed at Cologne in 1467. Madvig’s great commentary (Copenhagen, 1839, 1869, 1876) supersedes all its predecessors. There is a small annotated edition, largely based upon Madvig, by W. M. L. Hutchinson (London, 1909).

Translations. English translations are those of Samuel Parker (Tully’s Five Books de Finibus, or Concerning the Last Objects of Desire and Aversion, done into English by S. P., Gent., revised . . . by Jeremy Collier, M.A., London, 1702; page-heading, Tully of Moral Ends; a 2nd edition published by Bliss, Oxford, 1812); of Guthrie (London, 1744); of Yonge (in Bohn’s series, 1848); and of J. S. Reid (Cambridge, 1883, now out of print). The first of these, and the German version of Kirchmann in the Philosophische Bibliothek (1868), I have consulted occasionally, the former with pleasure, but neither with much profit.

The fullest treatment in English of the subjects dealt with in de Finibus will be found in Zeller’s Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics and Eclectics. Zeller’s monumental work requires supplementing especially xxvi

Books of Reference
INTRODUCTION

in regard to Stoicism. Recent books of value are Arnold's *Roman Stoicism*, Hicks's *Stoic and Epicurean*, and Bevan's *Stoics and Sceptics*. Reid's edition of *Academica* is a mine of information about Cicero's philosophical work. For the sources, a selection for beginners is Adam's *Texts to Illustrate Greek Philosophy after Aristotle*.

I must express my gratitude to my friend Miss W. M. L. Hutchinson for reading the proofs of my translation and doing much to improve it. Nor can I forget my debt to the late Dr James Adam, whose lectures on *de Finibus* first aroused my interest in ethical theory.

H. R.
ERRATUM.

On p. 22, note, for Democritus read Epicurus.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

BOOK I
M. TULLII CICERONIS
DE
FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM
LIBER PRIMUS

1. I. Non eram nescius, Brute, cum quae summis ingeniiis exquisitaque doctrina philosophi Graeco sertonem tractavissent ea Latinis litteris mandaremus, fore ut hic noster labor in varias reprehensiones incurreret. Nam quibusdam, et iis quidem non admodum indoctis, totum hoc displicet philosophari. Quidam autem non tam id reprehendunt si remissius agatur, sed tantum studium tamque multam operam ponendam in eo non arbitrantur. Erunt etiam, et hi quidem eruditi Graecis litteris, contemptentes Latinas, qui se dicant in Graecis legendis operam malle consumere. Postremo aliquos futuros suspicor qui me ad alias litteras vocent, genus hoc scribendi, etsi sit elegans, personae tamen et dignitatis esse negent. Contra quos omnes dicendum breviter existimo. Quamquam philosophiae quidem vituperatoribus satis resonsum est eo libro quo a nobis philosophia defensa et collaudata est cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio. Qui liber cum et tibi probatus videretur et iis quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi, veritus ne movere hominum studia viderer, retinere non posse.\footnote{This book was called \textit{Hortensius}, and formed an introduction to Cicero's philosophical writings. Fragments only are extant.} Qui autem, si
DE FINIBUS

BOOK I

1 I. My dear Brutus,—The following essay, I am well aware, attempting as it does to present in a Latin dress subjects that philosophers of consummate ability and profound learning have already handled in Greek, is sure to encounter criticism from different quarters. Certain persons, and those not without some pretension to letters, disapprove of the study of philosophy altogether. Others do not so greatly object to it provided it be followed in dilettante fashion; but they do not think it ought to engage so large an amount of one’s interest and attention. A third class, learned in Greek literature and contemptuous of Latin, will say that they prefer to spend their time in reading Greek. Lastly, I suspect there will be some who will wish to divert me to other fields of authorship, asserting that this kind of composition, though a graceful recreation, is beneath the dignity of my character and position. To all of these objections I suppose I ought to make some brief reply. The indiscriminate censure of philosophy has indeed been sufficiently answered already in the book which I wrote in praise of that study, in order to defend it against a bitter attack that had been made upon it by Hortensius. The favourable reception which that volume appeared to obtain from yourself and from others whom I considered competent judges encouraged me to embark upon further undertakings; for I did not wish to be thought incapable of sustaining the interest that I had succeeded in arousing.

Preface: choice of subject defended;

Philosophy deserving of study.

2

3
CICERO DE FINIBUS

maxime hoc placeat, moderatius tamen id volunt fieri, difficilem quandam temperantiam postulant in eo quod semel admissum coerceri reprimique non potest; ut propemodum iustioribus utamur illis qui omnino avocent a philosophia, quam his qui rebus infinitis modum constituant in reque eo meliore quo maior sit mediocritatem desiderent. Sive enim ad sapientiam perveniri potest, non paranda nobis solum ea sed fruenda etiam est; sive hoc difficile est, tamen nec modus est ullus investigandi veri nisi inveneris, et quaerendi defetigatio turpis est cum id quod quae- ritur sit pulcherrimum. Etenim si delectamur cum scribimus, quis est tam invidus qui ab eo nos abducat? Sin laboramus, quis est qui alienae modum statuat industriae? Nam ut Terentianus Chremes non inhumanus, qui novum vicinum non vult

Fodere aut arare aut aliquid ferre denique—(non enim illum ab industria sed ab illiberali labore deterret), sic isti curiosi, quos offendit noster minime nobis iniucundus labor.

II. Iis igitur est difficilium satisfacere qui se Latina scripta dicunt contemnere. In quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. Quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini Romano est, qui Enni Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvi spernat aut

a Terence, Heautontimorumenos, 1. 1. 17.
BOOK I. i-ii

The second class of critics, who, however much they approve of philosophy, nevertheless would rather have it less eagerly prosecuted, are asking for a restraint that it is not easy to practise. The study is one that when once taken up admits of no restriction or control. In fact, the attitude of the former class, who attempt to dissuade us from philosophy altogether, seems almost less unreasonable than that of those who would set limits to what is essentially unlimited, and expect us to stop half-way in a study that increases in value the further it proceeds. If Wisdom be attainable, let us not only win but enjoy it; or if attainment be difficult, still there is no end to the search for truth, other than its discovery. It were base to flag in the pursuit, when the object pursued is so supremely lovely. Indeed if we like writing, who would be so churlish as to debar us from it? Or if we find it a labour, who is to set limits to another man's exertions? No doubt it is kind of Chremes in Terence's play to urge his new neighbour.

Neither to dig nor plough nor burdens bear: for it is not industry in general, but toil of a menial kind, from which he would deter him; but only a busybody would take exception to an occupation which, like mine, is a labour of love.

II. A more difficult task therefore is to deal with the objection of those who profess a contempt for Latin writings as such. What astonishes me first of all about them is this,—why should they dislike their native language for serious and important subjects, when they are quite willing to read Latin plays translated word for word from the Greek? Who has such a hatred, one might almost say, for the very name of Roman, as to despise and reject the Medea of Ennius.
CICERO DE FINIBUS


Utinam ne in nemore—
nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quæ autem de bene beatæque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus? quid habent cur Graeca anteponant iis quae et splendidide dicta sint neque sint conversa de Graecis? Nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos quidem Graecos est cur tam multis legant quam legendi sunt. Quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? Legimus tamen Diogenem, An-

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a The opening of Ennius's Medea Exsul, cp. Euripides, Medea 3f.
BOOK I. ii

or the Antiope of Pacuvius, and give as his reason that though he enjoys the corresponding plays of Euripides he cannot endure books written in Latin? What, he cries, am I to read The Young Comrades of Caecilius, or Terence's Maid of Andros, when I might be reading

the same two comedies of Menander? With this sort of person I disagree so strongly, that, admitting the Electra of Sophocles to be a masterpiece, I yet think Atilius's poor translation of it worth my while to read. 'An iron writer,' Licinius called him; still, in my opinion, a writer all the same, and therefore deserving to be read. For to be entirely unversed in our own poets argues either the extreme of mental inactivity or else a refinement of taste carried to the point of excess. To my mind no one can be styled a well-read man who does not know our native literature. If we read

Would that in forest glades—

just as readily as the same passage in the Greek, shall we object to having Plato's discourses on morality and happiness set before the reader in

Latin? And supposing that for our part we do not fill the office of a mere translator, but, while preserving the doctrines of our chosen authorities, add thereto our own criticism and our own arrangement: what ground have these objectors for ranking the writings of Greece above compositions that are at once brilliant in style and not mere translations from Greek originals? Perhaps they will rejoin that the subject has been dealt with by the Greeks already. But then what reason have they for reading the multitude of Greek authors either that one has to read? Take Stoicism: what aspect of it has Chrysippus left untouched? Yet we read Diogenes, Antipater,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

tipatum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios, in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonum. Quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? Quid? Epicurei num desistunt de iisdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? Quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis, iisdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est cur nostri a nostri non legantur?

7 III. Quamquam si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem ut verterunt nostri poetae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. Sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen ne faciam interdictum puto. Locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit ut id apte fieri possit; ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Menandro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo quo minus omnes mea legant. Utinam esset ille Persius! Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis; quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. Facete is quidem, sicut alia\(^1\); sed neque tam docti tum erant ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. Ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te, ne Graecis qui-

\(^{1}\) alia Mdv.; alias MSS.

\(^{a}\) Lucilius, the satirist, 148-103 B.C., avowed that he wrote for the moderately learned like Lelius, not for great scholars like Persius: ‘Persium non curo legere, Lelium Decimum volo’ (Cic. de Or. 2.25). In the next sentence here Cicero seems to refer to some other passage of Lucilius, in which he put his claims still lower and professed to write for illiterate provincials, not for cultured noblemen like Scipio Africanus Minor and P. Rutilius Rufus.
BOOK I. ii-iii

Mnesarchus, Panaetius, and many others, not least our friend Posidonius. Again, Theophrastus handles topics previously treated by Aristotle, yet he gives us no small pleasure all the same. Nor do the Epicureans cease from writing as the spirit moves them on the same questions on which Epicurus and the ancients wrote. If Greek writers find Greek readers when presenting the same subjects in a different setting, why should not Romans be read by Romans?

III. Yet even supposing I gave a direct translation of Plato or Aristotle, exactly as our poets have done with the plays, would it not, pray, be a patriotic service to introduce those transcendent intellects to the acquaintance of my fellow-countrymen? As a matter of fact, however, this has not been my procedure hitherto, though I do not feel I am debarred from adopting it. Indeed I expressly reserve the right of borrowing certain passages, if I think fit, and particularly from the philosophers just mentioned, when an appropriate occasion offers for so doing; just as Ennius regularly borrows from Homer, and Afranius from Menander. Nor yet shall I object, like our Lucilius, to all the world's reading what I write. I only wish his Persius were alive to-day! and still more Scipio and Rutilius, in fear of whose criticism Lucilius protests that he writes for the public of Tarentum, Consentia and Sicily. Here of course, as elsewhere, he is not to be taken too seriously. As a matter of fact, there were not such learned critics in his day, to tax his best efforts; and also his writings are in a lighter vein: they show consummate wit, but no great erudition. I, however, need not be afraid of any reader, if I am so bold as to dedicate my book to you, who rival even
CICERO DE FINIBUS
dem cedentem in philosophia, audeam scribere?
Quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus
gratissimo mihi libro quem ad me de virtute misisti.
Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire ut abhorreant
a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et
horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius.
Quibus ego assentior, dum modo de iisdem rebus ne
Graecos quidem legendos putent. Res vero bonas
verbès electis graviter ornateque dictas quis non
legat? Nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a
9 Scaevola est praetore salutatus Athenis Albucius.
Quem quidem locum cum multa venustate et omni
sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola:

"Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque
Sabinum,
Municipem Ponti, Tritanni, centurionum,
Praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signife-
rumque,
Maluisti dici; Graece ergo praetor Athenis,
Id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto:
'Xαîρε,' inquam, 'Tite!' Lictores, turma omnis
cohorsque¹:
'Xαîρε, Tite!' Hinc hostis mi Albucius, hinc
inimicus."

¹cohorsque Manutius, Mdv.; chorusque, MSS.

10
the Greeks as a philosopher. Still, you yourself challenged me to the venture, by dedicating to me your delightful essay *On Virtue*. But I have no doubt that the reason why some people take a dislike to Latin literature is that they have happened to meet with certain illiterate and uncouth productions which are bad Greek books in worse Latin versions. I have no quarrel with these persons, provided that they also refuse to read the Greek writers on the same subjects. But given a noble theme, and a refined, dignified and graceful style, who would not read a Latin book? Unless it be some one ambitious to be styled a Greek out-and-out, as Albucius was greeted by Scaevola when the latter was praetor at Athens. I am again referring to Lucilius, who relates the anecdote with much neatness and point; he puts the following excellent lines into the mouth of Scaevola:

"You vow'd, Albucius, that to suit ye
'Twas as a Greek we must repute ye;
'Roman' and 'Sabine' being names
Your man of *ton* and taste disclaims!
You scorn'd to own your native town,—
Which bore such captains of renown
As Pontius and Tritannius bold,
Who in the van Rome's ensigns hold.
And so, at Athens when I lay,
And your respects you came to pay,
My worship, humouring your freak,
Gave you good-morrow straight in Greek,
With 'Chaire, Titus!' 'Chaire,' bawl
Guards, aides-de-camps, javelin-men and all!
—Hence comes it that Albucius hates me,
Hence as his bitterest foe he rates me."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

10 Sed iure Mucius. Ego autem mirari satis non\(^1\) queo, unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. Non est omnino hic docendi locus, sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. Quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poetis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit?

\(\text{IV.}\) Ego vero, quoniam\(^2\) forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor prae sidium in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, in eo quoque elaborare ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istic tanto opere pugnare qui Graeca legere malint, modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magno opere desiderent. Qui autem alia malunt scribi a nobis, aque essesse debent, quod et scripta multa sunt, sic ut plura nemini e nostris, et scribentur fortasse plura si vita suppeditet; et tamen qui diligenter haec quae de philosophia litteris mandamus legere assueverit, iudicabit nulla ad legendum his esse potiora. Quid est enim in

\(^1\)mirari satis non Mdv. (satis mirari non Or.); mirari non MSS.

\(^2\)quoniam Mdv., cum MSS.

12
BOOK I. iii-iv

Mucius's sarcasm was however deserved. But for my part I can never cease wondering what can be the origin of the exaggerated contempt for home products that is now fashionable. It would of course be out of place to attempt to prove it here, but in my opinion, as I have often argued, the Latin language, so far from having a poor vocabulary, as is commonly supposed, is actually richer than the Greek. When have we, that is to say when have our competent orators or poets, at all events since they have had models to copy, ever lacked any of the resources either of the florid or the chaste style?

IV. In my own case, just as I trust I have done my duty, amidst the arduous labours and perils of a public career, at the post to which the Roman people appointed me, so it is assuredly incumbent on me also to use my best endeavours, with such zeal, enthusiasm and energy as I possess, to promote the advancement of learning among my fellow-countrymen. Nor need I be greatly concerned to join issue with people who prefer to read Greek, provided that they actually do read it and do not merely pretend to do so. It is my business to serve those who desire to enjoy both literatures, or who, if books in their own language are available, do not feel any great need of Greek ones. Those again who would rather have me write on other subjects may fairly be indulgent to one who has written much already—in fact no one of our nation more—and who perhaps will write still more if his life be prolonged. And even were it not so, anyone who has made a practice of studying my philosophical writings will pronounce that none of them are better worth reading than the present treatise. For what problem...
CICERO DE FINIBUS

vita tanto opere quaerendum quam cum omnia in
philosophia, tum id quod his libris quaeritur, qui sit
finis, quid extremum, quid ultimum quo sint omnia
bene vivendi recteque faciendi consilia referenda;
quid sequatur natura ut summum ex rebus expeten-
dis, quid fugiat ut extremum malorum? Qua de re
cum sit inter doctissimos summa dissensio, quis alie-
um putet eius esse dignitatis quam mihi quisque
tribuat, quid in omni munere vitae optimum et
verissimum sit exquirere? An, partus ancillae
sitne in fructu habendus, disseretur inter principes
civitatis, P. Scaevolam Maniumque Manilium, ab
iisque M. Brutus dissentiet (quod et acutum genus
est et ad usus civium non inutile, nosque ea scripta
reliquaque eiusdem generis et legitimus libenter et
legemus); haec quae vitam omnem continent
neglegentur? Nam ut sint illa vendibiliora, haec
uberiora certe sunt. Quamquam id quidem licebit
iis existimare qui legerint. Nos autem hanc omnem
quaestionem de finibus bonorum et malorum fere
a nobis explicatam esse his litteris\(^1\) arbitramur, in
quibus, quantum potuimus, non modo quid nobis
probaretur sed etiam quid a singulis philosophiae
disciplinis diceretur persecuti sumus.

13 V. Ut autem a facillimis ordiamur, prima veniat

\(^1\)litteris: Mdv. with others conjectures libris.
BOOK I. iv-v

does life offer so important as all the topics of philosophy, and especially the question raised in these volumes—What is the End, the final and ultimate aim, which gives the standard for all principles of right living and of good conduct? What does Nature pursue as the thing supremely desirable, what does she avoid as the ultimate evil? It is a subject on which the most learned philosophers disagree profoundly; who then can think it derogatory to such esteem as each may assign to me, to investigate what is the highest good and the truest rule in every relationship of life? Are we to have our leading statesmen debating such topics as whether the offspring of a female slave is to be considered as belonging to the party who has hired her, Publius Scaevola and Manius Manilius upholding one opinion and Marcus Brutus the contrary (not but what such discussions raise nice points of law, as well as being of practical importance for the business of life; and we read and shall continue to read with pleasure the treatises in question and others of the same nature); and shall these questions which cover the entire range of conduct be neglected? Legal handbooks no doubt command a reader a sale, but philosophy is unquestionably richer in interest. However, this is a point that may be left to the reader to decide. In the present work we believe we have given a more or less exhaustive exposition of the whole subject of the Ends of Goods and Evils. The book is intended to contain so far as possible a complete account, not only of the views that we ourselves accept, but also of the doctrines enunciated by all the different schools of philosophy.

V. To begin with what is easiest, let us first pass

15
CICERO DE FINIBUS

in medium Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est; quam a nobis sie intelleges expositam, ut ab ipsis qui eam disciplinam probant non soleat accuratius explicari. Verum enim invenire volumus, non tamquam adversarium aliquem convincere.

Accurate autem quondam a L. Torquato, homine omni doctrina erudito, defensa est Epicuri sententia de voluptate, a meque ei responsum, cum C. Triarius, in primis gravis et doctus adulescens, ei disputationi interesset. Nam cum ad me in Cumanum salutandi causa uterque venisset, paeca primo inter nos de litteris, quarum summum erat in utroque studium; deinde Torquatus, "Quoniam nacti te," inquit, "sumus aliquando otiosum, certe audiam quid sit quod Epicurum nostrum non tu quidem oderis, ut fere faciunt qui ab eo dissentiunt, sed certe non probes, eum quem ego arbitror unum vidisse verum maximisque erroribus animos hominum liberavisse et omnia tradidisse quae pertinent ad bene beateque vivendum; sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari quod ista Platonis, Aristotelis, Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit. Nam illud quidem adduci vix possum, ut ea quae senserit ille tibi non vera videantur." "Vide quantum," inquam, "fallare, Torquate. Oratio me istius philosophi non offendit; nam et complectitur verbis quod vult et dicit plane quod intellegam; et tamen ego a philosopho, si afferat elloquentiam, non asperner, si
BOOK I. v

in review the system of Epicurus, which to most men is the best known of any. Our exposition of it, as you shall see, will be as accurate as any usually given even by the professed adherents of his school. For our object is to discover the truth, not to refute an opponent.

An elaborate defence of the hedonistic theory of Epicurus was once delivered by Lucius Torquatus, a scholar of consummate erudition; to him I replied, and Gaius Triarius, a youth of remarkable learning and seriousness of character, assisted at the discussion. Both of these gentlemen had called to pay me their respects at my place at Cumae. We first exchanged a few remarks about literature, of which both were enthusiastic students. Then Torquatus said, "As we have for once found you at leisure, I am resolved to hear the reason why you regard my master Epicurus, not indeed with hatred, as do most of those who do not share his views, but at all events with disapproval. I myself consider him as the one person who has discerned the truth, and who has delivered men from the gravest errors and imparted to them all there is to know about right conduct and happiness. The fact is, I think that you are like our friend Triarius, and dislike Epicurus because he has neglected the graces of style that you find in your Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. For I can scarcely bring myself to believe that you think his opinions untrue." "Let me assure you, Torquatus," said I, "that you are entirely mistaken. With your master's style I have no fault to find. He expresses his meaning adequately, and gives me a plain intelligible statement. Not that I despise eloquence in a philosopher if he has it to offer, but..."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

non habeat, non admodum flagitem. Re mihi non aeque satisfacit¹, et quidem locis pluribus. Sed 'quot homines, tot sententiae'; falli igitur possimus."

"Quamobrem tandem," inquit, "non satisfacit? te enim iudicem aequum puto, modo quae dicat ille bene noris." "Nisi mihi Phaedrum," inquam, "mentitum aut Zenonem putas, quorum utrumque audivi, cum mihi nihil sane praeter sedulitatem probarent, omnes mihi Epicuri sententiae satis notae sunt; atque eos quos nominavi cum Attico nostro frequenter audivi, cum miraret ille quidem utrumque, Phaedrum autem etiam amaret; cotidieque inter nos ea quae audiebamus conferebamus, neque erat umquam controversia quid ego intellegeremen, sed quid probarem."

VI. "Quid igitur est?" inquit; "audire enim cupio quid non probes." "Principio," inquam, "in physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus. Democritea dicit, perpauca mutans, sed ita ut ea quae corrigere vult mihi quidem depravare videatur. Ille atomos quas appellat, id est corpora individua propter soliditatem, censest in infinito inani, in quo nihil nec summum nec insimum nec medium nec intimum² nec extremum sit, ita ferri ut concussionibus inter se cohaerescant, ex quo efficientur

¹ satisfacit Mdv. as below; MSS. here satisfecit.
² intimum Jonas, Müller; ultimum Mdv. with MSS.

* Terence, Phormio 454.
BOOK I. v-vi

I should not greatly insist on it if he has not. But his matter I do not find so satisfactory, and that in more points than one. However, 'many men, many minds' a so it is possible that I am mistaken.' "What is it, pray," he said, "to which you take exception? For I recognize you as a just critic, provided you really know what his doctrines are." "Oh," said I, "I know the whole of Epicurus's opinions well enough,—unless you think that Phaedrus or Zeno did not tell me the truth. I have heard both of them lecture, though to be sure they convinced me of nothing but their own devotion to the system. Indeed I regularly attended those professors, in company with our friend Atticus, who for his part had an admiration for them both, and a positive affection for Phaedrus. Every day we used to discuss together in private what we had heard at lecture, and there was never any dispute as to what I could understand; the question was, what I could accept as true."

VI. "Well then, what is the point?" said he; "I should very much like to know what it is that you disagree with." "Let me begin," I replied, "with the subject of Natural Philosophy, which is Epicurus's particular boast. Here, in the first place, he is entirely second-hand. His doctrines are those of Democritus, with a very few modifications. And as for the latter, where he attempts to improve upon his original, in my opinion he only succeeds in making things worse. Democritus believes in certain things which he terms 'atoms,' that is, bodies so solid as to be indivisible, moving about in a vacuum of infinite extent, which has neither top, bottom nor middle, neither centre nor circumference. The motion of these atoms is such that they collide and so cohere together; and from c2
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ea quae sint quaeque cernantur omnia; eumque motum atomorum nullo a principio sed ex aeterno tempore intelligi convenire. Epicurus autem, in quibus sequitur Democritum, non fere labitur. Quamquam utriusque cum multa non probo, tum illud in primis, quod, cum in rerum natura duo quaerenda sint, unum quae materia sit ex qua quaeque res efficiatur, alterum quae vis sit qua quae quisque efficiat, de materia disseruerunt, vim et causam efficiendi reliquerunt. Sed hoc commune vitium; illae Epicuri propriae ruinae: censebatur enim eadem illa individua et solida corpora ferri deorsum suo pondere ad lineam; hunc naturalem esse omnium corporum motum; deinde ibidem homo acutus, cum illud occurreret, si omnia deorsum e regione ferrentur et, ut dixi, ad lineam, numquam fore ut atomus altera alteram posset attingere, itaque attulit rem commenticiarum: declinare dixit atomum perpaulum, quo nihil posset fieri minus; ita effici complexiones et copulationes et adhaesiones atomorum inter se, ex quo efficeretur mundus omnesque partes mundi quaeque in eo essent. Quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit quidem quod vult. Nam et ipsa declinatio ad libidinem fingitur (ait enim declinare atomum sine causa, quo nihil turpius physico quam fieri quid-

\[1\] quidem inserted by edd.
BOOK I. vi

this process result the whole of the things that exist and that we see. Moreover, this movement of the atoms must not be conceived as starting from a beginning, but as having gone on from all eternity. Epicurus for his part, where he follows Democritus, makes no serious blunders. Still, there is a great deal in each of them with which I do not agree, and especially this: in the study of Nature there are two questions to be asked, first, what is the matter out of which each thing is made, second, what is the force by which it is made; now Democritus and Epicurus have discussed the question of matter, but they have not considered the question of force or the efficient cause. But this is a defect shared by both; I now come to the lapses peculiar to Epicurus. He believes that these same indivisible solid bodies are borne by their own weight perpendicularly downward, which he holds is the natural motion of all bodies; but then in the very same breath, being sharp enough to recollect that if they all travelled downwards in a straight line, and, as I said, perpendicularly, no one atom would ever be able to overtake any other atom, he consequently introduced an idea of his own invention: he said that the atom makes a very tiny swerve, —the smallest divergence possible; and so are produced entanglements and combinations and cohesions of atoms with atoms, which result in the creation of the world and all its parts, and of all that in them is. Now not only is the whole of this affair a piece of childish fancy, but it does not even achieve the result that its author desires. The swerving is itself an arbitrary fiction; for Epicurus says the atoms swerve without a cause,—yet this is the capital offence in a natural philosopher, to speak of some-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quam sine causa dicere), et illum motum naturalem omnium ponderum, ut ipse constituit, e regione inferiori locum petentium, sine causa eripuit atomis; nec tamen id cuius causa haec finixerat assecutus est.

Nam si omnes atomi declinabunt, nullae umquam cohaerentes; sive aliae declinabunt, aliae suo nutu recte ferentur, primum erit hoc quasi provincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique ferantur, deinde eadem illa atomorum (in quo etiam Democritus haeret) turbulenta concursio hunc mundi ornatum efficere non poterit. Ne illud quidem physici, credere aliquod esse minimum; quod profecto numquam putavisset si a Polyaeo familiari suo geometrica discere maluisset quam illum etiam ipsum dedocere. Sol Democrito magnus videtur, quippe homini erudito in geometricaque perfecto; huic pedalis fortasse: tantum enim esse censet quantus videtur, vel paulo aut maiorem aut minorem. Ita quae mutat ea corrumpit, quae sequitur sunt tota Democriti, atomi, inane, imagines, quae eiōλα nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus sed etiam cogitemus; infinitio ipsa, quam ῥεφία vocant, tota ab illo est, tum innumerabiles mundi qui et orientur et intereant.

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a Democritus explained sight as being caused by the impact on the eye of films or husks which are continually being thrown off from the surface of objects. These 'images,' penetrating to the mind through the pores of the body, also caused mental impressions.
thing taking place uncaused. Then also he gratuitously deprives the atoms of what he himself declared to be the natural motion of all heavy bodies, namely, movement in a straight line downwards, and yet he does not attain the object for the sake of which this fiction was devised. For, if all the atoms swerve, none will ever come to cohere together; or if some swerve while others travel in a straight line, at their own will and pleasure, in the first place this will be tantamount to assigning to the atoms their different spheres of authority, some to travel straight and some sideways; while secondly (and this is a weak point with Democritus also) this riotous hurly-burly of atoms could not possibly result in the ordered beauty of the world we know. Again, it is unworthy of a natural philosopher to deny the infinite divisibility of matter; an error that assuredly Epicurus would have avoided, if he had been willing to let his friend Polyaenus teach him geometry instead of making Polyaenus himself unlearn it. Democritus, being an educated man and well versed in geometry, thinks the sun is of vast size; Epicurus considers it perhaps a foot in diameter, for he pronounces it to be exactly as large as it appears, or a little larger or smaller. Thus where Epicurus alters the doctrines of Democritus, he alters them for the worse; while for those ideas which he adopts, the credit belongs entirely to Democritus,—the atoms, the void, the images,\(^{a}\) or as they call them, \textit{eidōla}, whose impact is the cause not only of vision but also of thought; the very conception of infinite space, \textit{apeiria} as they term it, is entirely derived from Democritus; and again the countless numbers of worlds that come into existence and pass out of
CICERO DE FINIBUS

cotidie. Quae etsi mihi nullo modo probantur, tamen Democritum, laudatum a ceteris, ab hoc, qui eum unum secutus esset, nollem vituperatum.

22 VII. "Iam in altera philosophiae parte, quae est quaerendi ac disserendi, quae λογική dicitur, istor vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet; non quomodo efficiatur conclusaturque ratio tradit; non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur ostendit; iudicia rerum in sensibus ponit, quibus si semel aliquid falsi pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat. . . .

23 . . . Confirmat autem illud vel maxime quod ipsa natura, ut ait ille, sciscat et probet, id est voluptatem et dolorem. Ad haec et quae sequamur et quae fugiamus refert omnia. Quod quamquam Aristippi est a Cyrenaicisque melius liberiusque defenditur, tamen eiusmodi esse iudico ut nihil homine videatur indignus. Ad maiora enim quaedam nos natura genuit et conformavit, ut mihi quidem videtur. Ac fieri potest ut errem; sed ita prorsus existimo, neque eum Torquatum qui hoc primus cognomen invenit1 aut torquem illum hosti detraxisse ut aliquam ex eo perciperet corpore voluptatem aut cum Latinis tertio consulatu

1 invenit B, E; inveniret A and inf. MSS.

a In Greek Logic διάλεγμα, the method of defining a species by dividing and subdividing a genus: cp. Bk. II. § 26.

b The interpretation is here uncertain, and probably more than one sentence has been lost.

24
existence every day. For my own part I reject these doctrines altogether; but still I could wish that Democritus, whom every one else applauds, had not been vilified by Epicurus who took him as his sole guide.

VII. "Turn next to the second division of philosophy, the department of Method and of Dialectic, which is termed Logike. Of the whole armour of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition; he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed. . . .

... He lays the very greatest stress upon that which, as he declares, Nature herself decrees and sanctions, that is the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root of every act of choice and of avoidance. This is the doctrine of Aristippus, and it is upheld more cogently and more frankly by the Cyrenaics; but nevertheless it is in my judgment a doctrine in the last degree unworthy of the dignity of man. Nature, in my opinion at all events, has created and endowed us for higher ends. I may possibly be mistaken; but I am absolutely convinced that the Torquatus who first won that surname did not wrest the famous necklet from his foe in the hope of getting from it any physical enjoyment, nor did he fight the battle of the Veseris against the Latins in his third consulship for the sake
CICERO DE FINIBUS

confligisse apud Veserim propter voluptatem. Quod vero securi percussit\(^1\) filium, privavisse se etiam videtur multis voluptatibus, cum ipsi naturae patrioque amori praetulerit ius maiestatis atque imperi.

"Quid? T.\(^2\) Torquatus, is qui consul cum Cn. Octavio fuit, cum illam severitatem in eo filio adhibuit quem in adoptionem D. Silano emancipaverat, ut eum, Macedonum legatis accusantibus quod pecunias praetorem in provincia cepisse arguerent, causam apud se dicere iuberet, reque ex utraque parte audita pronuntiaret eum non talem videri fuisset in imperio quales eius maiores fuisset, et in conspectum suum venire vetuit, numquid tibi videtur de voluptatibus suis cogitavisse? Sed ut omittam pericula, labores, dolorem etiam quem optimus quisque pro patria et pro suis suscipit, ut non modo nullam captet sed etiam praetereat omnes voluptates, dolores denique quosvis suscipere malit quam deserere ullam offici partem, ad ea quae hoc non minus declarant sed videntur leviora veniamus. Quid tibi, Torquate, quid huic Triario litterae, quid historiae cognitioque rerum, quid poetarum evolutio, quid tanta tot versusum memoria voluptatis affert? Nec mihi illud dixeris: Haec enim ipsa mihi sunt voluptati, et erant illa Torquatis. Numquam hoc ita defendit Epicurus neque Metrodorus aut quisquam eorum qui aut saperet aliquid.

\(^1\) percussit Mdv.; percusserit MSS.
\(^2\) T. edd. from Liv. epit. 54; L. MSS.
of pleasure. Indeed in sentencing his son to be beheaded, it would seem that he actually deprived himself of a great deal of pleasure; for he sacrificed his natural instincts of paternal affection to the claims of state and of his military office.

"Then, think of the Titus Torquatus who was consul with Gnaeus Octavius; when he dealt so sternly with the son who had passed out of his paternal control through his adoption by Decius Silanus—when he summoned him into his presence to answer to the charge preferred against him by a deputation from Macedonia, of accepting bribes while prætor in that province—when, after hearing both sides of the case, he gave judgment that he found his son guilty of having conducted himself in office in a manner unworthy of his ancestry, and banished him for ever from his sight,—think you he had any regard for his own pleasure? But I pass over the dangers, the toils, the actual pain that all good men endure for country and for friends, not only not seeking pleasure, but actually renouncing pleasures altogether, and preferring to undergo every sort of pain rather than be false to any portion of their duty. Let us turn to matters seemingly less important, but equally conclusive. What actual pleasure do you, Torquatus, or does Triarius here, derive from literature, from history and learning, from turning the pages of the poets and committing vast quantities of verse to memory? Do not tell me that these pursuits are in themselves a pleasure to you, and that so were the deeds I mentioned to the Torquati. That line of defence was never taken by Epicurus or Metrodorus, nor by any one of them if he possessed any intelligence or had mastered the doctrines of your school.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

aut ista didicisset. Et quod quaeritur saepe cur tam multi sint Epicurei, sunt aliae quoque causae, sed multitudinem haec maxime allicit quod ita putant dici ab illo, recta et honesta quae sint, ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam, id est voluptatem. Homines optimi non intellectunt totam rationem everti si ita res se habeant. Nam si concederetur, etiamsi ad corpus nihil referatur, ista sua sponte et per se esse iucunda, per se esset et virtus et cognitio rerum, quod minime ille vult, expetenda.

"Haec igitur Epicuri non probo," inquam. "De cetero vellem equidem aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructior (est enim, quod tibi ita videri necesse est, non satis politus iis artibus quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur), aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. Quamquam te quidem video minime esse deterritum."

VIII. Quae cum dixisset, magis ut illum provocarem quam ut ipse loquerer, tum Triarius leniter arridens: "Tu quidem," inquit, "totum Epicurum paene e philosophorum choro sustulisti. Quid ei reliquisti nisi te, quoquo modo loqueretur, intellegere quid diceret? Aliena dixit in physicis, nec ea ipsa quae tibi probarentur. Si qua in iis corrigere voluit, deteriora fecit. Disserendi artem nullam habuit. Voluptatem cum summum bonum diceret, primum in eo ipso parum vidit, deinde hoc quoque
Again, as to the question often asked, why so many men are Epicureans, though it is not the only reason, the thing that most attracts the crowd is the belief that Epicurus declares right conduct and moral worth to be intrinsically and of themselves delightful, which means productive of pleasure. These worthy people do not realize that, if this is true, it upsets the theory altogether. If it were admitted that goodness is spontaneously and intrinsically pleasant, even without any reference to bodily feeling, then virtue would be desirable for its own sake, and so also would knowledge; but this Epicurus by no means allows.

"These then," said I, "are the doctrines of Epicurus that I cannot accept. For the rest, I could desire that he himself had been better equipped with learning (since even you must recognize that he is deficient in that liberal culture which confers on its possessor the title of an educated man) or at all events that he had not deterred others from study. Although I am aware that he has not succeeded in deterring you."

VIII. I had spoken rather with the intention of drawing out Torquatus than of delivering a discourse of my own. But Triarius interposed, with a smile: "Why, you have practically expelled Epicurus altogether from the philosophic choir. What have you left to him except that, whatever his style may be, you find his meaning intelligible? His doctrines in Natural Philosophy were second-hand, and in your opinion unsound at that; and his attempts to improve on his authority only made things worse. Dialectic he had none. His identification of the Chief Good with pleasure in the first place was in itself an error, and secondly this also was not original; for it
CICERO DE FINIBUS

alienum; nam ante Aristippus, et ille melius. Addi-

\(^1\) iracundae Mdv.; iracundiae MSS.
BOOK I. viii

had been said before, and said better, by Aristippus. To crown all you added that Epicurus was a person of no education." "Well, Triarius," I rejoined, "when one disagrees with a man, it is essential to say what it is that one objects to in his views. What should prevent me from being an Epicurean, if I accepted the doctrines of Epicurus? especially as the system is an exceedingly easy one to master. You must not find fault with members of opposing schools for criticizing each other's opinions; though I always feel that insult and abuse, or ill-tempered wrangling and bitter, obstinate controversy are beneath the dignity of philosophy." "I am quite of your mind," said Torquatus; "it is impossible to debate without criticizing, but it is equally impossible to debate properly with ill-temper or obstinacy. But I have something I should like to say in reply to all this, if it will not weary you." "Do you suppose," said I, "that I should have said what I have, unless I wanted to hear you?" "Then would you like me to make a rapid review of the whole of Epicurus's system, or to discuss the single topic of pleasure, which is the one main subject of dispute?" "Oh," I said, "that must be for you to decide." "Very well then," said he, "this is what I will do, I will expound a single topic, and that the most important. Natural Philosophy we will postpone; though I will undertake to prove to you both your swerve of the atoms and size of the sun, and also that very many errors of Democritus were criticized and corrected by Epicurus. But on the present occasion I will speak about pleasure; not that I have anything original to contribute, yet I am confident that what I say will command even your acceptance." "Be assured," I said,
CICERO DE FINIBUS


IX. "Primum igitur," inquit, "sic agam ut ipsi auctori huius disciplinae placet: constituant quid et quale sit id de quo quaerimus, non quo ignorare vos arbitrer, sed ut ratione et via procedat oratio. Quaerimus igitur quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum, quod omnium philosophorum sententia tale debet esse ut ad id omnia referri oporteat, ipsum autem nusquam. Hoc Epicurus in voluptate ponit, quod summum bonum esse vult summumque malum dolorem; idque instituit docere sic: Omne animal simul atque natum sit voluptatem appetere eaque gaudere ut summo bono, dolorem aspernari ut summum malum et quantum possit a se repellere; idque facere nondum depravatum, ipsa natura incorrupte atque integre indicante. Itaque negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione quamobrem voluptas expetenda, fugiendus dolor sit. Sentiri haec\(^1\) putat, ut calere ignem, nivem esse albam, mel dulce, quorum nihil oportere exquisitis rationibus confirmare, tantum satis esse admonere. (Interesse enim inter argumentum conclusionemque rationis et inter mediocrem animadversionem atque admonitionem: altera occulta

\(^1\) haec A; hoc Mdv. with other MSS.
BOOK I. viii-ix

"that I shall not be obstinate, but will gladly own myself convinced if you can prove your case to my satisfaction." "I shall do so," he rejoined, "provided you are as fair-minded as you promise. But I prefer to employ continuous discourse rather than question and answer." "As you please," said I. So he began.

IX. "I will start then," he said, "in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what is the essence and quality of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict. Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, he thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse

Pleasure the Chief Good; proved by the universal instinct to seek it and to shun pain.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quaedam et quasi involuta aperiri, altera prompta et aperta indicari.¹) Etenim quoniam detractis de homine sensibus reliqui nihil est, necesse est quid aut ad naturam aut contra sit a natura ipsa iudicari. Ea quid percipit aut quid iudicat, quo aut petat aut fugiat aliquid, praeter voluptatem et dolorem? Sunt autem quidam e nostris qui haec subtilius velint tradere, et negent satis esse quid bonum sit aut quid malum sensu iudicari, sed animo etiam ac ratione intellegi posse et voluptatem ipsam per se esse expetendum et dolorem ipsum per se esse fugiendum. Itaque aiunt hanc quasi naturalem atque insitam in animis nostris inesse notionem ut alterum esse appetendum, alterum aspernandum sentiamus. Alii autem, quibus ego assentior, cum a philosophis compluribus permulta dicantur cur nec voluptas in bonis sit numeranda nec in malis dolor, non existimant oportere nimium nos causae confidere, sed et argumentandum et accurate disserendum et rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant.

X. "Sed ut perspiciatis unde omnis iste natus error sit voluptatem accusantium doloremque laudantium, totam rem aperiam, eaque ipsa quae ab illo inventore veritatis et quasi architecto beatae vitae dicta sunt explicabo. Nemo enim ipsam voluptatem quia voluptas sit aspernatur aut odit aut fugit, sed quia consequuntur magni dolores eos qui ratione voluptatem sequi nesciunt. Neque porro quisquam est qui do-

¹ indicari inf. MS.; iudicari Mdv. with other MSS.
BOOK I. ix-x

and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance? Some members of our school however would refine upon this doctrine; these say that it is not enough for the judgment of good and evil to rest with the senses; the facts that pleasure is in and for itself desirable and pain in and for itself to be avoided can also be grasped by the intellect and the reason. Accordingly they declare that the perception that the one is to be sought after and the other avoided is a natural and innate idea of the mind. Others again, with whom I agree, observing that a great many philosophers do advance a vast array of reasons to prove why pleasure should not be counted as a good nor pain as an evil, consider that we had better not be too confident of our case; in their view it requires elaborate and reasoned argument, and abstruse theoretical discussion of the nature of pleasure and pain.

X. "But I must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of reprobating pleasure and extolling pain arose. To do so, I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness. No one rejects, dislikes or avoids pleasure itself, because it is pleasure, but because those who do not know how to pursue pleasure rationally encounter consequences that are extremely painful. Nor again is there anyone who loves or

p2

But this instinct is qualified by calculation: men aim at the greatest surplus of pleasure over pain.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

lorem ipsum quia dolor sit amet, consectetur, adipisci
velit, sed quia nonnumquam eius modi tempora incidunt
ut labore et dolore magna aliquam quaerat volupta-
tem. Ut enim ad minima veniam, quis nostrum
exercitationem ullam corporis suscipit laboriosam,
nisi ut aliquid ex ea commodi consequatur? Quis
autem vel eum iure reprehenderit qui in ea voluptate
velit esse quam nihil molestiae consequatur, vel illum
qui dolorem eum fugiat quo voluptas nulla pariatur?

33 At vero eos et accusamus et iusto odio dignissimos
ducimus qui blanditiis praesentium voluptatum dele-
niti atque corrupti quos dolores et quas molestias
excepturi sint occaecati cupiditate non provident,
similique sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollitia
animi, id est laborum et dolorum fuga. Et harum
quidem rerum facilis est et expedita distinctio. Nam
libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio
cumque nihil impedit quo minus id quod maxime
placeat facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda
est, omnis dolor repellendus. Temporibus autem
quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessita-
tibus saepe eveniet ut et voluptates repudiandae sint
et molestiae non recusandae. Itaque earum rerum
hic tenetur a sapiente delectus ut aut reiciendis
voluptatibus maiores alias consequatur aut perferendis
doloribus asperiores repellat.

34 "Hanc ego cum teneam sententiam, quid est
cur verear ne ad eam non possim accommodare
Torquatnos nostros? quos tu paulo ante cum me-
moriter tum etiam erga nos amice et benevole

36
BOOK I.

pursues or desires to obtain pain of itself, because it is pain, but because occasionally circumstances occur in which toil and pain can procure him some great pleasure. To take a trivial example, which of us ever undertakes laborious physical exercise, except to obtain some advantage from it? But who has any right to find fault with a man who chooses to enjoy a pleasure that has no annoying consequences, or one who avoids a pain that produces no resultant pleasure? On the other hand, we denounce with righteous indignation and dislike men who are so beguiled and demoralized by the charms of the pleasure of the moment, so blinded by desire, that they cannot foresee the pain and trouble that are bound to ensue; and equal blame belongs to those who fail in their duty through weakness of will, which is the same as saying through shrinking from toil and pain. These cases are perfectly simple and easy to distinguish. In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain circumstances and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.

"This being the theory I hold, why need I be afraid of not being able to reconcile it with the case of the Torquati my ancestors? Your references to them just now were historically correct, and also showed your kind and friendly feeling towards myself; but..."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

collegisti; nec me tamen laudandis maiorisibus meis
corrupisti nec segniorem ad respondendum reddidisti.
Quorum facta quemadmodum, quaeo, interpretarisis?
Sicine eos censes aut in armatum hostem impetum
fecisse aut in liberos atque in sanguinem suum tam
crudeles fuisse, nihil ut de utilitatis, nihil ut de
commodis suis cogitarent? At id ne ferae quidem
faciunt, ut ita ruant itaque turbent ut earum motus
et impetus quo pertinante non intellegamus; tu tam
egregios viros censes tantas res gessisse sine causa?

35 Quae fuerit causa mox videre; interea hoc tenebo, si
ob aliquam causam ista, quae sine dubio praeclara
sunt, fecerint, virtutem iis per se ipsam causam non
fuisse.—Torquem detraxit hosti.—Et quidem se texit
ne interiret.—At magnum periculum adiit.—In oculis
quidem exercitus.—Quid ex eo est consecutus?—
Laudem et caritatem, quae sunt vitae sine metu
degendae praesidia firmissima.—Filium morte multa-
vit.—Si sine causa, nollem me ab eo ortum, tam
importumo tamque crudeli; sin ut dolore suo sanciret
militaris imperi disciplinam exercitumque in gravissi-
mo bello animadversionis metu conterret, saluti
prospexit civium, qua intellegebat contineri suam.

36 Atque haec ratio late patet. In quo enim maxime
consuevit iactare vestra se oratio, tua praesertim, qui
studiose antiqua persequeris, claris et fortibus viris
all the same I am not to be bribed by your flattery
of my family, and you will not find me a less resolute
opponent. Tell me, pray, what explanation do you
put upon their actions? Do you really believe that
they charged an armed enemy, or treated their
children, their own flesh and blood, so cruelly, with-
out a thought for their own interest or advantage?
Why, even wild animals do not act in that way;
they do not run amok so blindly that we cannot dis-
cern any purpose in their movements and their on-
slaughts. Can you then suppose that those heroic
men performed their famous deeds without any
motive at all? What their motive was, I will con-
sider in a moment: for the present I will confidently
assert, that if they had a motive for those undoubt-
edly glorious exploits, that motive was not a love of
virtue in and for itself.—He wrested the necklet
from his foe.—Yes, and saved himself from death.—
But he braved great danger.—Yes, before the eyes
of an army.—What did he get by it?— Honour and
esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life.
—He sentenced his own son to death.—If from no
motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone
so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by
inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority
as a commander, and to tighten the reins of
discipline during a very serious war by holding
over his army the fear of punishment, then his
action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow-
citizens, upon which he knew his own depended.
And this is a principle of wide application.
People of your school, and especially yourself, who
are so diligent a student of history, have found a
favourite field for the display of your eloquence in
CICERO DE FINIBUS

commemorandis eorumque factis non emolumento aliquo sed ipsius honestatis decore laudandis, id totum evertitur eo delectu rerum quem modo dixi constito, ut aut voluptates ommittantur maiorum voluptatum adipiscendarum causa aut dolores suscipiantur maiorum dolorum effugiendorum gratia.

37 XI. "Sed de clarorum hominum factis illustribus et gloriosis satis hoc loco dictum est. Erit enim iam de omnium virtutum cursu ad voluptatem proprius disserendi locus. Nunc autem explicabo voluptas ipsa quae qualisque sit, ut tollatur error omnis imperitorum intellegaturque ea quae voluptaria, delicata, mollis habeatur disciplina quam gravis, quam continens, quam severa sit. Nōn enim hanc solam sequimur quae suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet et cum iucunditate quadam percipitur sensibus, sed maximam voluptatem illam habemus quae percipitur omni dolore detracto. Nam quoniām, cum privamur dolore, ipsa liberatione et vacuitate omnis molestiae gaudemus, omne autem id quo gaudemus voluptas est (ut omne quo offendimur dolor), doloris omnis privatio recte nominata est voluptas. Ut enim, cum cibo et potione fames sitisque depulsa est, ipsa detractio molestiae consecutionem affert voluptatis, sic in omni re doloris amotio successionem efficit
BOOK I. x-xi

recalling the stories of brave and famous men of old, and in praising their actions, not on utilitarian grounds, but on account of the splendour of abstract moral worth. But all of this falls to the ground if the principle of selection that I have just mentioned be established,—the principle of forgoing pleasures for the purpose of getting greater pleasures, and enduring pains for the sake of escaping greater pains.

XI. "But enough has been said at this stage about the glorious exploits and achievements of the heroes of renown. The tendency of all of the virtues to produce pleasure is a topic that will be treated in its own place later on. At present I shall proceed to expound the essence and the quality of pleasure itself, and shall endeavour to remove the misconceptions of ignorance and to make you realize how serious, how temperate, how austere is the school that is supposed to be sensual, lax and luxurious. The pleasure we pursue is not that kind alone which affects our physical being with a definite delightful feeling,—a positively agreeable perception of the senses; on the contrary, the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in itself a source of gratification. But everything that causes gratification is a pleasure (just as everything that causes annoyance is a pain). Therefore the complete removal of pain has correctly been termed a pleasure. For example, when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its
CICERO DE FINIBUS

38 voluptatis. Itaque non placuit Epicuro medium esse quiddam inter dolorem et voluptatem; illud enim ipsum quod quibusdam medium videretur, cum omni dolore careret, non modo voluptatem esse verum etiamsummam voluptatem. Quisquis enim sentit quemadmodum sit affectus, eum necesse est aut in voluptatessesse aut in dolore. Omnis autem privatione doloris putat Epicurus terminari summam voluptatem, ut postea variari voluptas distinguique possit, augeri amplificariquene non possit. At etiam Athenis, ut a patre audiebam, facete et urbane Stoicos irridente, statua est in Ceramicoco Chrysippi sedentis porrecta manu, quae manus significet illum in hac esse rogiatiuncula delectatum: 'Numquidnam manus tua, sic affecta quemadmodum affecta nunc est, desiderat?'—'Nihil sane.'—'At si voluptas esset bonum, desideraret.'—'Ita credo.'—'Non est igitur voluptas bonum.' Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat si loqui posset. Conclusum est enim contra Cyrenaicos satis acute, nihil ad Epicurum. Nam si ea sola voluptas esset quae quasi titillaret sensus, ut ita dicam, et ad eos cum suavitatem afferret et illabernetur, nec manus esse contenta posset nec ulla pars vacuitate doloris sine iucundo motu voluptatis. Sin autem summavoluptas est, ut Epicuro placet, nihil dolore, primum tibi recte, Chrysippe, concessum est, 39

42
BOOK I. xi

Epicurus consequently maintained that there is no such thing as a neutral state of feeling intermediate between pleasure and pain; for the state supposed by some thinkers to be neutral, being characterized as it is by entire absence of pain, is itself, he held, a pleasure, and, what is more, a pleasure of the highest order. A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain. But complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree. Yet at Athens, so my father used to tell me when he wanted to air his wit at the expense of the Stoics, in the Ceramicus there is actually a statue of Chrysippus seated and holding out one hand, the gesture being intended to indicate the delight which he used to take in the following little syllogism: ‘Does your hand want anything, while it is in its present condition?’ Answer: ‘No, nothing.’—‘But if pleasure were a good, it would want pleasure.’—‘Yes, I suppose it would.’—‘Therefore pleasure is not a good.’ An argument, as my father declared, which not even a statue would employ, if a statue could speak; because though it is cogent enough as an objection to the Cyrenaics, it does not touch Epicurus. For if the only kind of pleasure were that which so to speak tickles the senses, an influence permeating them with a feeling of delight, neither the hand nor any other member could be satisfied with the absence of pain unaccompanied by an agreeable and active sensation of pleasure. Whereas if, as Epicurus holds, the highest pleasure be to feel no pain, Chrysippus’s interlocutor, though justified in making his first admission, that
CICERO DE FINIBUS

nihil desiderare manum cum ita esset affecta, secundum non recte, si voluptas esset bonum, fuisse desideraturam. Idcirco enim non desideraret quia quod dolore caret id in voluptate est.

40 XII. “Extremum autem esse bonorum voluptatem ex hoc facillime perspici potest: Constituamus aliquem magnis, multis, perpetuis fruentem et animo et corpore voluptatibus, nullo dolore nec impediente nec impendente; quem tandem hoc statu praestabiliorem aut magis expetendum possimus dicere? Inesse enim nesse est in eo qui ita sit affectus et firmitatem animi nec mortem nec dolorem timentis, quod mors sensu careat, dolor in longinquitate levis, in gravitate brevis soleat esse, ut eius magnitudinem celeritas; diurnitatem allevatio consoletur. Ad ea cum accedit ut neque divinum numen horreat nec praeteritas voluptates effluere patiatur earumque assidua recordatione laetetur, quid est quod huc possit, quo melius sit,¹ accedere? Statue contra aliquem confectum tantis animi corporisque doloribus quanti in hominem maximi cadere possunt, nulla spe proposta fore levis aliquando, nulla praeterea neque praesenti nec exspectata voluptate; quid eo miserius dici aut fingi potest? Quod si vita doloribus referta maxime fugienda est, summum profecto malum est vivere cum dolore; cui sententiae consensus est ultimum esse bonorum cum voluptate vivere. Nec enim habet nostra mens quidquam ubi

¹quo melius sit Müller; quod melius sit Mdv. with MSS.
BOOK I. xi-xii

his hand in that condition wanted nothing, was not justified in his second admission, that if pleasure were a good, his hand would have wanted it. And the reason why it would not have wanted pleasure is, that to be without pain is to be in a state of pleasure.

XII. "The truth of the position that pleasure is the ultimate good will most readily appear from the following illustration. Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable? One so situated must possess in the first place a strength of mind that is proof against all fear of death or of pain; he will know that death means complete unconsciousness, and that pain is generally light if long and short if strong, so that its intensity is compensated by brief duration and its continuance by diminishing severity. Let such a man moreover have no dread of any supernatural power; let him never suffer the pleasures of the past to fade away, but constantly renew their enjoyment in recollection,—and his lot will be one which will not admit of further improvement. Suppose on the other hand a person crushed beneath the heaviest load of mental and of bodily anguish to which humanity is liable. Grant him no prospect of ultimate relief in view; let him neither have nor hope to have a gleam of pleasure. Can one describe or imagine a more pitiable state? If then a life full of pain is the thing most to be avoided, it follows that to live in pain is the highest evil; and this position implies that a life of pleasure is the ultimate good. In fact the mind
CICERO DE FINIBUS

consistat tamquam in extremo, omnesque et metus et aegritudines ad dolorem referuntur, nec praeterea est res ulla quae sua natura aut sollicitare possit aut angere.

42 "Praeterea et appetendi et refugiendi et omnino rerum gerendarum initia proficiscuntur aut a voluptate aut a dolore. Quod cum ita sit, perspicuum est omnes rectas res atque laudabiles eo referri ut cum voluptate vivatur. Quoniam autem id est vel summum vel ultimum vel extremum bonorum (quod Graeci τέλος nominant) quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes, fatendum est summum esse bonum iucunde vivere.

XLIII. "Id qui in una virtute ponunt et splendore nominis capti quid natura postulet non intellegunt, errore maximo, si Epicurum audire voluerint, libera-buntur. Istae enim vestrae eximiae pulchraeque virtutes nisi voluptatem essicerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur? Ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis sed bonae valetudinis causa probamus, et gubernatoris ars, quia bene navigandi rationem habet, utilitate, non arte laudatur, sic sapientia, quae ars vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur quod est tamquam artifex conquirendae et compa-

43 randae voluptatis. (Quam autem ego dicam volu-

a i.e. pain of body: dolorem here has its strict sense.

46
BOOK I. xii-xiii

possesses nothing in itself upon which it can rest as final. Every fear, every sorrow can be traced back to pain; there is no other thing besides pain which is of its own nature capable of causing either anxiety or distress.

42 "Pleasure and pain moreover supply the motives of desire and of avoidance, and the springs of conduct generally. This being so, it clearly follows that actions are right and praiseworthy only as being a means to the attainment of a life of pleasure. But that which is not itself a means to anything else, but to which all else is a means, is what the Greeks term the Telos, the highest, ultimate or final Good. It must therefore be admitted that the Chief Good is to live agreeably.

XIII. "Those who place the Chief Good in virtue alone are beguiled by the glamour of a name, and do not understand the true demands of nature. If they will consent to listen to Epicurus, they will be delivered from the grossest error. Your school dilates on the transcendent beauty of the virtues; but were they not productive of pleasure, who would deem them either praiseworthy or desirable? We esteem the art of medicine not for its interest as a science but for its conduciveness to health; the art of navigation is commended for its practical and not its scientific value, because it conveys the rules for sailing a ship with success. So also Wisdom, which must be considered as the art of living, if it effected no result would not be desired; but as it is, it is desired, because it is the artificer that procures and produces pleasure. (The meaning that I attach to pleasure must by this time be clear to you, and you must not be biased against my argu-

47
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ptatem iam videtis, ne invidia verbi labefactetur oratio mea.) Nam cum ignorance rerum bonarum et malarum maxime hominum vita vexetur, ob eum-que errorem et voluptatibus maximis saepe priventur et durissimis animi doloribus torqueantur, sapientia est adhibenda, quae et terroribus cupiditatibusque detractis et omnium falsarum opinionum temeritate derepta certissimam se nobis ducem praebeat ad voluptatem. Sapientia enim est una quae maestitiam pellat ex animis, quae nos exhorrescere metu non sinat; qua praeceptrice in tranquillitate vivi potest, omnium cupiditatum ardore restincto. Cupiditates enim sunt insatiabiles, quae non modo singulos homines sed universas familias evertunt, totam etiam labefactant saepe rem publicam. Ex cupiditatibus odia, discidia, discordiae, seditiones, bella nascuntur. Nec eae se foris solum iactant nec tantum in alios caeco impetu incurrunt, sed intus etiam in animis inclusae inter se dissident atque discordant; ex quo vitam amarissimam necesse est effici, ut sapiens solum, amputata circumcissaque inanitate omni et errore, naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere. Quae est enim aut utilior aut ad bene vivendum aptior partitio quam illa qua est usus Epicurus? qui unum genus posit earum cupiditatum quae essent et naturales et necessariae, alterum quae naturales essent nec tamen necessariae, tertium quae nec naturales nec necessariae; quarum ea ratio est ut necessariae nec opera multa nec impensa expleantur; ne naturales quidem multa desiderant, propter ea
ment owing to the discreditable associations of the term.) The great disturbing factor in man's life is ignorance of good and evil; mistaken ideas about these frequently rob us of our greatest pleasures, and torment us with the most cruel pain of mind. Hence we need the aid of Wisdom, to rid us of our fears and appetites, to root out all our errors and prejudices, and to serve as our infallible guide to the attainment of pleasure. Wisdom alone can banish sorrow from our hearts and protect us from alarm and apprehension; put yourself to school with her, and you may live in peace, and quench the glowing flames of desire. For the desires are incapable of satisfaction; they ruin not individuals only but whole families, nay often shake the very foundations of the state. It is they that are the source of hatred, quarrelling and strife, of sedition and of war. Nor do they only flaunt themselves abroad, or turn their blind onslaughts solely against others; even when imprisoned within the heart they quarrel and fall out among themselves; and this cannot but render the whole of life embittered. Hence only the Wise Man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set. Nothing could be more instructive, more helpful to right living, than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quod ipsa natura divitias quibus contenta sit et para-
biles et terminatas habet; inanium autem cupiditi-
tatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest.

46 XIV. Quod si vitam omnem perturbari videmus
errore et inscientia, sapientiamque esse solam quae nos
a libidinum impetu et a formidinum terrore vindicet et
ipsius fortunae modice ferre doceat injurias et omnes
monstret vias quae ad quies et tranquillitatem
ferant, quid est cur dubitemus dicere et sapientiam
propter voluptates expetendum et insipientiam pro-
pter molestias esse fugiendum?

47 "Eademque ratione ne temperantium quidem pro-
pter se expetendum esse dicemus, sed quia pacem
animis afferat et eos quasi concordia quadam placet
ac leniat. Temperantia est enim quae in rebus
aut expetendis aut fugiendis ut rationem sequamur
monet. Nec enim satis est iudicare quid faciendum
non faciendumve sit, sed stare etiam oportet in eo
quod sit iudicatum. Plerique autem, quod tenere
atque servare id quod ipsi statuerunt non possunt,
victi et debilitati obiecta specie voluptatis tradunt
se libidinibus constringendos nec quid eventurum
sit provident, ob eamque causam propter voluptatem
et parvam et non necessarium et quae vel aliter
pararetur et qua etiam carere possent sine dolore,
tum in morbos graves, tum in damna, tum in dede-
cora incurrunt, saepe etiam legum iudiciorumque

48 poenis obligantur. Qui autem ita frui volunt volu-
uptatibus ut nulli propter eas consequantur dolores, et

\[a\textit{ inanis} \text{hollow, vain, unreal, as the opposite of} \text{natural'}
\] (cf. § 53 and Bk. II. § 26), means 'based on a false idea of
\text{what is good or necessary'}: \textit{ai de} \textit{\(\tau \nu \nu \varepsilon \tau i \nu \mu \mu \omega \nu \)} \textit{o\theta e} \textit{f\nu i \kappa i a i}
\textit{\omega\nu e \alpha \nu a \gamma \kappa a \i a i, a\lambda \lambda a} \textit{\pi a \rho a \kappa e \nu \eta \nu \delta \zeta \alpha \nu \gamma i \nu \mu \mu \nu a i. \text{Epicurus in}}
\text{Diogenes Laertius 10. 149.}
BOOK I. xiii-xiv

riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary* desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

XIV. If then we observe that ignorance and error reduce the whole of life to confusion, while Wisdom alone is able to protect us from the onslaufs of appetite and the menaces of fear, teaching us to bear even the affronts of fortune with moderation, and showing us all the paths that lead to calmness and to peace, why should we hesitate to avow that Wisdom is to be desired for the sake of the pleasures it brings and Folly to be avoided because of its injurious consequences?

"The same principle will lead us to pronounce that Temperance;

Temperance also is not desirable for its own sake, but because it bestows peace of mind, and soothes the heart with a tranquillizing sense of harmony. For it is temperance that warns us to be guided by reason in what we desire and avoid. Nor is it enough to judge what it is right to do or to leave undone; we also need to abide by our judgment. Most men however lack tenacity of purpose; their resolution weakens and succumbs as soon as the fair form of pleasure meets their gaze, and they surrender themselves prisoners to their passions, failing to foresee the inevitable result. Thus for the sake of a pleasure at once small in amount and unnecessary, and one which they might have procured by other means or even denied themselves altogether without pain, they incur serious disease, or loss of fortune, or disgrace, and not infrequently become liable to the penalties of the law and of the courts of justice. Those on the other hand who are resolved so to enjoy their pleasures as to avoid all painful consequences there-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

qui suum iudicium retinent ne voluptate victi faciant id quod sentiant non esse faciendum, ii voluptatem maximam adipiscuntur praetermittenda voluptate. Idem etiam dolorem saepe perpetiuntur ne, si id non faciant, incidant in maiorem. Ex quo intelle-gitur nec intemperantiam propter se esse fugiendam, temperantiamque expetendum non quia voluptates fugiat sed quia maiores consequatur.

49 XV. "Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. Nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit, nec patientia nec assiduitas nec vigiliae nec ipsa quae laudatur industria, ne fortitudo quidem, sed ista sequimur ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus quantum efficere possi-mus molestia liberemus. Ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo imbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, multi amicos, nonnulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui affecti sunt in eadem causa sunt qua antequam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est ut meminerit maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, me-diocrium nos esse dominos, ut si tolerabiles sint feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. Quibus rebus
BOOK I. xiv-xv

from, and who retain their faculty of judgment and avoid being seduced by pleasure into courses that they perceive to be wrong, reap the very highest pleasure by forgoing pleasure. Similarly also they often voluntarily endure pain, to avoid incurring greater pain by not doing so. This clearly proves that Intemperance is not undesirable for its own sake, while Temperance is desirable not because it renounces pleasures, but because it procures greater pleasures.

XV. "The same account will be found to hold good of Courage. The performance of labours, the endurance of pains, are not in themselves attractive; nor are patience, industry, watchfulness, nor yet that much lauded virtue, perseverance, nor even courage; but we aim at these virtues in order to live without anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be free from pain of mind and body. The fear of death plays havoc with the calm and even tenor of life, and to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and feebly is a pitiable thing; such weakness has caused many men to betray their parents or their friends, some their country, and very many utterly to ruin themselves. So on the other hand a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow. It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life's theatre, when the play has ceased to please us. These considerations prove
CICERO DE FINIBUS

intellegitur nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici quia dolorem pariant, has optari quia voluptatem.

50 XVI. "Iustitia restat, ut de omni virtute sit dictum; sed similia fere dici possunt. Ut enim sapientiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem copulas esse docui cum voluptate ut ab ea nullo modo nec divelli nec dis-trahi possint, sic de iustitia iudicandum est, quae non modo numquam nocet cuiquam, sed contra semper aliquid impertit¹ cum sua vi atque natura, quod tranquillet animos, tum spe nihil earum rerum de-futurum quas natura non depravata desideret. Et² quemadmodum temeritas et libido et ignavia semper animum excruciant et semper sollicitant turbulentaeque sunt, sic improbitas si³ cuius in mente con-sedit, hoc ipso quod adest turbulenta est; si vero molita quidpiam est, quamvis occulte fecerit, num-quam tamen id confidet fore semper occultum. Plerumque improborum facta primo suspicio inse-quitur, dein sermo atque fama, tum accusator, tum iudex; multi etiam, ut te consule, ipsi se indicave-runt. Quod si qui satis sibi contra hominum con-scientiam saepi esse et muniti videntur, deorum tamen horrent, easque ipsas sollicitudines quibus eorum animi noctesque diesque exeduntur a dis im-mortalibus supplici causa importari putant. Quae autem tanta ex improbis factis ad minuendas vitae

¹ impertit supplied by Müller; Mdv. marks lacuna.
² Et inserted by Mdv.
³ improbitas si supplied by Mdv. (cp. improborum, improbe, improbis, improbitatem below).
that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they bring pain, the latter coveted because they produce pleasure.

"It remains to speak of Justice, to complete the list of the virtues; but this admits of practically the same treatment as the others. Wisdom, Temperance and Courage I have shown to be so closely linked with Pleasure that they cannot possibly be severed or sundered from it. The same must be deemed to be the case with Justice. Not only does Justice never cause anyone harm, but on the contrary it always brings some benefit, partly owing to its essentially tranquillizing influence upon the mind, partly because of the hope that it warrants of a never-failing supply of the things that uncorrupted nature really needs. And just as Rashness, Licence and Cowardice ever torment the mind, ever awaken trouble and discord, so Unrighteousness, when firmly rooted in the heart, causes restlessness by the mere fact of its presence; and if once it has found expression in some deed of wickedness, however secret the act, yet it can never feel assured that it will always remain undetected. The usual consequences of crime are, first suspicion, next gossip and rumour, then comes the accuser, then the judge; many wrongdoers have even turned evidence against themselves, as happened in your consulship. And even if any think themselves well fenced and fortified against detection by their fellow-men, they still dread the eye of heaven, and fancy that the pangs of anxiety night and day gnawing at their hearts are sent by Providence to punish them. But what can wickedness contribute
molestias accessio potest fieri, quanta ad augendas
omn conscientiae factorum tum poena legum odioque
civium? Et tamen in quibusdam neque pecuniae
modus est neque honoris neque imperi nec libidinum
nece epularum nec reliquarum cupiditatum, quas nulla
praeda umquam improbe parta minuit, potiusque in-
flammata, ut coercendi magis quam dedocendi esse
videantur. Invitat igitur vera ratio bene sanos ad
iustitiam, aequitatem, fidelem. Neque homini infanti
aut impotenti iniuste facta conducunt, qui nec facile
efficere posset quod conceper nec obtinere si effecerit,
et opes vel fortuna vel ingeni liberalitati magis con-
veniunt, qua qui utuntur benevolentiam sibi conciliant et,
quod aptissimum est ad quiete vivendum,
caritatem; praeertim cum omni nulla sit causa
peccandi: quae enim cupiditates a natura profici-
scuntur, facile explentur sine ulla iniuria; quae autem
inanest sunt, iis pandendum non est, nihil enim de-
siderabile concupiscunt; plusque in ipsa iniuria detri-
menti est quam in iis rebus emolumenti quae pariuntur
iniuria. Itaque ne iustitiam quidem recte quis dixerit
per se ipsam optabilem, sed quia iucunditatis vel
plurimum afferat. Nam diligi et carum esse iucundum
est propterea quia tuiorem vitam et voluptatum1
pleniorem efficit. Itaque non ob ea solum incom-
moda quae eveniunt improbis fugiendam improbita-
tem putamus, sed multo etiam magis quod, cuius in

1 voluptatum Müller; voluptatem Mdv. with MSS.
towards lessening the annoyances of life, commensurate with its effect in increasing them, owing to the burden of a guilty conscience, the penalties of the law and the hatred of one's fellows? Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inso-much that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation. Men of sound natures, therefore, are summoned by the voice of true reason to justice, equity and honesty. For one without eloquence or resources dishonesty is not good policy, since it is difficult for such a man to succeed in his designs, or to make good his success when once achieved. On the other hand, for the rich and clever generous conduct seems more in keeping, and liberality wins them affection and good will, the surest means to a life of peace; especially as there really is no motive for transgressing: since the desires that spring from nature are easily gratified without doing any man wrong, while those that are imaginary ought to be resisted, for they set their affections upon nothing that is really wanted; while there is more loss inherent in Injustice itself than there is profit in the gains it brings. Hence Justice also cannot correctly be said to be desirable in and for itself; it is so because it is so highly productive of gratification. For esteem and affection are gratifying, because they render life safer and fuller of pleasure. Hence we hold that Unrighteousness is to be avoided not simply on account of the disadvantages that result from being unrighteous, but even far more because when it dwells in a man's
CICERO DE FINIBUS

animo versatur, numquam sinit eum respirare, numquam acquiescere.

54 "Quod si ne ipsarum quidem virtutum laus, in qua maxime ceterorum philosophorum exultat oratio, repere exitum potest nisi dirigatur ad voluptatem, voluptas autem est sola quae nos vocet ad se et alliciat suapte natura, non potest esse dubium quin id sit summum atque extremum bonorum omnium, beatueque vivere nihil aliud sit nisi cum voluptate vivere.

55 XVII. "Huic certae stabilique sententiae quae sint coniuncta explicabo brevi. Nullus in ipsis error est finibus bonorum et malorum, id est in voluptate aut in dolore, sed in iis rebus peccant cum e quibus haec efficiantur ignorant. Animi autem voluptates et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus (itaque concedo quod modo dicebas, cadere causa si qui e nostris aliter existimant, quos quidem video esse multos, sed imperitos); quamquam autem et laetitiam nobis voluptas animi et molestiam dolor afferat, eorum tamen utrumque et ortum esse e corpore et ad corpus referri; nec ob eam causam non multo maiores esse et voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis. Nam corpore nihil nisi praesens et quod adest sentire possimus, animo autem et praeterita et futura. Ut enim aequo doleamus [animo], cum corpore dolemus, fieri tamen permagna accessio potest si aliquod aeternum et infinitum impen-

1[animo] bracketed by Mdv.

a This chapter appears to be an unintelligent transcript of a summary of the Epicurean answers to the following Cyrenaic criticisms: (1) pleasure is sometimes rejected, owing to mental perversion, (2) all pleasure is not bodily, (3) bodily pleasures are stronger than mental ones, (4) absence of pain is not pleasure, (5) memory and anticipation of pleasure are not real pleasures.

b See § 25 above.
BOOK I. xvi-xvii

heart it never suffers him to breathe freely or know a moment's rest.

54  "If then even the glory of the Virtues, on which all the other philosophers love to expatiate so eloquently, has in the last resort no meaning unless it be based on pleasure, whereas pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically attractive and alluring, it cannot be doubted that pleasure is the one supreme and final Good and that a life of happiness is nothing else than a life of pleasure.

55  XVII. "The doctrine thus firmly established has corollaries which I will briefly expound. (1) The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain. (2) Again, we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones (and therefore I allow your contention that any Epicureans who think otherwise put themselves out of court; and I am aware that many do, though not those who can speak with authority); but although men do experience mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert arise out of and are based upon bodily sensations. (3) Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And
CICERO DE FINIBUS
dere malum nobis opinemur. Quod idem licet transferre
in voluptatem, ut ea maior sit si nihil tale metuamus.

56 Iam illud quidem perspicuum est, maximam animi
aut voluptatem aut molestiam plus aut ad beatam aut
ad miseram vitam asserre momenti quam eorum
utrumvis si aeque diu sit in corpore. Non placet
autem detracta voluptate aegritudinem statim conse-
qui, nisi in voluptatis locum dolor forte successerit;
at contra gaudere nosmet omittendis doloribus,
etiamsi voluptas ea quae sensum moveat nulla suc-
cesserit; eoque intellegi potest quanta voluptas sit
non dolere. Sed ut iis bonis erigimur quae expecta-
mus, sic laetamur iis quae recordamur. Stulti autem
malorum memoria torquentur; sapientes bona praeter-
terta grata recordatione renovata delectant. Est
autem situm in nobis ut et adversa quasi perpetua
oblivione obruamus et secunda iucunde ac suaviter
meminerimus. Sed cum ea quae praeterierunt acri
animo et attento intuemur, tum fit ut aegritudo se-
quatur si illa mala sint, si bona, laetitia.

XVIII. "O praeclaram beate vivendi et apertam et
simplicem et directam viam! Cum enim certe nihil
hominis possit melius esse quam vacare omni dolore et
molestia perfruique maximis et animi et corporis
voluptatibus, videtisne quam nihil praetermittatur
quod vitam adiuvet, quo facilius id quod propositum
est summum bonum consequamur? Clamat Epicurus,
is quem vos nimis voluptatibus esse deditum dicitis,
non posse iucunde vivi nisi sapienter, honeste iuste-
que vivatur, nec sapienter, honeste, iuste nisi iucunde.

60
BOOK I. xvii-xviii

the same consideration may be transferred to pleas-
sure: a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any
56 apprehension of evil. This therefore clearly ap-
pears, that intense mental pleasure or distress con-
tributes more to our happiness or misery than a
bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration. (4) But we
do not agree that when pleasure is withdrawn un-
easiness at once ensues, unless the pleasure happens
to have been replaced by a pain: while on the other
hand one is glad to lose a pain even though no active
sensation of pleasure comes in its place: a fact that
serves to show how great a pleasure is the mere
57 absence of pain. (5) But just as we are elated by
the anticipation of good things, so we are delighted
by their recollection. Fools are tormented by the
remembrance of former evils; to wise men memory
is a pleasure—by it they renew the goods of the past.
We have the power if we will both to obliterate
our misfortunes by a sort of permanent forgetfulness
and to summon up pleasant and agreeable memories
of our successes. But when we concentrate our mental
vision closely on the events of the past, then sorrow
or gladness ensues according as these were evil or good.

XVIII. "Here is indeed a royal road to happiness
—open, simple, and direct! For clearly man can
have no greater good than complete freedom from
pain and sorrow coupled with the enjoyment of the
highest bodily and mental pleasures. Notice then
how the theory embraces every possible enhancement
of life, every aid to the attainment of that Chief
Good which is our object. Epicurus, the man whom
you denounce as a voluptuary, cries aloud that no
one can live pleasantly without living wisely, honour-
ably and justly, and no one wisely, honourably and
CICERO DE FINIBUS

58 Neque enim civitas in seditione beata esse potest nec in discordia dominorum domus; quo minus animus a se ipsè dissidens secumque discordans gustare partem ullam liquidae voluptatis et liberae potest. Atqui pugnantibus et contrariis stultiis consiliisque semper utens nihil quieti videre, nihil tranquilli potest.

59 Quod si corporis gravioribus morbis vitae iucunditas impeditur, quanto magis animi morbis impediri necesse est! Animi autem morbi sunt cupiditates immensae et inanes divitiarum, gloriae, dominationis, libidinosarum etiam voluptatum. Accedunt aegritudines, molestiae, maerores, qui exedunt animos conficiuntque curis hominum non intellegentium nihil dolendumesse animo quod sit a dolore corporis praesenti futurove seiunctum. Nec vero quisquam stultus non horum morborum aliquo laborat; nemo igitur stultus¹ non miser. Accedit etiam mors, quae quasi saxum Tantalo semper impendet; tum superstitione, qua qui est imbutus quietus esse numquam potest. Praeterea bona praeterita non meminertur, praesentibus non fruuntur; futura modo exspectant, quae quia certa esse non possunt, conficiuntur et angore et metu; maximeque cruciantur cum sero sentiunt frustra se aut pecuniae studuisse aut imperii aut opibus aut gloriae. Nullas enim consequuntur voluptates quarum potiendi spe inflammati multos labores magnosque susceperant. Ecce autem alii minuti et angusti, aut omnia semper desperantes, aut ma-

¹ stultus Baiter, Müller; est Mdv. with MSS.

62
justly without living pleasantly. For a city rent by faction cannot prosper, nor a house whose masters are at strife; much less then can a mind divided against itself and filled with inward discord taste any particle of pure and liberal pleasure. But one who is perpetually swayed by conflicting and incompatible counsels and desires can know no peace or calm.

Why, if the pleasantness of life is diminished by the more serious bodily diseases, how much more must it be diminished by the diseases of the mind! But extravagant and imaginary desires, for riches, fame, power, and also for licentious pleasures, are nothing but mental diseases. Then, too, there are grief, trouble and sorrow, which gnaw the heart and consume it with anxiety, if men fail to realize that the mind need feel no pain unconnected with some pain of body, present or to come. Yet there is no foolish man but is afflicted by some one of these diseases; therefore there is no foolish man that is not unhappy.

Moreover, there is death, the stone of Tantalus ever hanging over men's heads; and superstition, that poisons and destroys all peace of mind. Besides, they do not recollect their past nor enjoy their present blessings; they only look forward to those of the future, and as these are of necessity uncertain, they are consumed with agony and terror; and the climax of their torment is when they perceive too late that all their dreams of wealth or station, power or fame, have come to nothing. For they never attain any of the pleasures, the hope of which inspired them to undergo all their arduous toils. Or look again at others, petty, narrow-minded men, or confirmed pessimists, or spiteful, envious, ill-tempered creatures, unsociable, abusive, cantankerous; others again enslaved
CICERO DE FINIBUS

levoli, invidi, difficiles, lucifugi, maledici, morosi,\(^1\) alii autem etiam amatorii levitatibus dediti, alii petulanties, alii audaces, protervi, iidem intemperantes et ignavi, numquam in sententia permanentes, quas ob causas in eorum vita nulla est intercapedo molestiae. Igitur neque stultorum quisquam beatus neque sapientium non beatus. Multoque hoc melius nos veriusque quam Stoici. Illi enim negant esse bonum quidquam nisi nescio quam illam umbram quod appellant honestum, non tam solido quam splendido nomine; virtutem autem nixam hoc honesto nullam requirere voluptatem atque ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam.

62 XIX. "Sed possunt haec quadam ratione dici non modo non repugnantibus, verum etiam approbantibus nobis. Sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus inducit: finitas habet cupiditates; neglegit mortem; de dis immortalibus sineullo metu vera sentit; non dubitat, si Ita melius sit, migrare de vita. His rebus instructus semper est in voluptate. Neque enim tempus est ullum quo non plus voluptatum habeat quam dolorum. Nam et praeterita grate meminit et praesentibus ita potitur ut animadvertat quanta sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex futuris, sed expectat illa, fruitor praesentibus; ab iisque vitiiis quae paulo ante collegi abest plurimum, et cum stultorum vitam cum sua comparat, magna afflictur voluptate. Dolores autem si qui incurrunt, numquam vim tantam habent ut non plus habeat sapiens quod gaudeat quam quod angatur. Optime vero Epicurus, quod 'exiguam' dixit 'fortunam intervenire sapienti,

\(^1\) morosi Lamminus; monstrosi Mdv. with MSS.

63

64
to the follies of love, impudent or reckless, wanton, headstrong and yet irresolute, always changing their minds. Such failings render their lives one unbroken round of misery. The conclusion is that no foolish man can be happy, nor any wise man fail to be happy. This is a truth that we establish far more conclusively than do the Stoics. For they maintain that nothing is good save that vague phantom which they entitle Moral Worth, a title more splendid than substantial; and say that Virtue resting on this Moral Worth has no need of pleasure, but is herself her own sufficient happiness.

XIX. "At the same time this Stoic doctrine can be stated in a form which we do not object to, and indeed ourselves endorse. For Epicurus thus represents the Wise Man as always happy: his desires are kept within bounds; death he disregards; he has a true conception, untainted by fear, of the Divine nature; if it be expedient to depart from life, he does not hesitate to do so. Thus equipped he enjoys perpetual pleasure, for there is no moment when the pleasures he experiences do not outbalance the pains; since he remembers the past with delight, grasps the present with a full realization of its pleasantness, and does not rely upon the future; he looks forward to it, but finds his true enjoyment in the present. Also he is entirely free from the vices that I instanced a few moments ago, and he derives no inconsiderable pleasure from comparing his own existence with the life of the foolish. Moreover, any pains that the Wise Man may encounter are never so severe but that he has more cause for gladness than for sorrow. Again, it is a fine saying of Epicurus that 'the Wise Man is but little interfered
CICERO DE FINIBUS

maximasque ab eo et gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari; neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse quam ex hoc percipiatur quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavist esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum vim. In physicis plurimum posuit. Ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugnantiumve ratio potest perspici; omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignorance rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles exsistunt saepe formidines; denique etiam morati melius erimus cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. Tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus. Nisi autem rerum natura perspecta erit, nullo modo poterimus sensuum iudicia defendere. Quidquid porro animo cernimus, id omne oritur a sensibus; qui si omnes veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique poterit aliquid cognosci et percipi. Quos qui tollunt et nihil posse percipi dicunt, ii remotis sensibus ne

a Epicurus discarded the orthodox Logic (cp. § 22), but attacked some of its problems in the light of his Natural Philosophy: e.g. denying necessity in Nature, he denied the Law of the Excluded Middle (Academica 2. 97, and see W. M. L. Hutchinson, de Finibus p. 234). The 'criterion' or test of truth he treated under the head of 'Canonic' (κανών, regula, a measuring-rod). Being based on his theory of sensation (§ 21), 'Canonic' was ranged under 'Physic' (Diogenes Laertius, 10. 30). It made the senses infallible, and the sole source of knowledge; and it gave rules for testing the validity of inference from sensation, which are a crude adumbration of a Logic of Induction.
with by fortune: the great concerns of life, the things that matter, are controlled by his own wisdom and reason'; and that 'no greater pleasure could be derived from a life of infinite duration than is actually afforded by this existence which we know to be finite.' Logic, on which your school lays such stress, he held to be of no effect either as a guide to conduct or as an aid to thought. Natural Philosophy he deemed all-important. This science explains to us the meaning of terms, the nature of predication, and the law of consistency and contradiction; secondly, a thorough knowledge of the facts of nature relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance, which is often in itself a cause of terrifying apprehensions; lastly, to learn what nature's real requirements are improves the moral character also. Besides, it is only by firmly grasping a well-established scientific system, observing the Rule or Canon that has fallen as it were from heaven to afford us a knowledge of the universe—only by making that Canon the test of all our judgments, that we can hope always to stand fast in our belief, unshaken by the eloquence of any man. On the other hand, without a full understanding of the world of nature it is impossible to maintain the truth of our sense-perceptions. Further, every mental presentation has its origin in sensation; so that no knowledge or perception is possible, unless all sensations are true, as the theory of Epicurus teaches that they are. Those who deny the validity of sensation and say that nothing can be perceived, having excluded
CICERO DE FINIBUS

id ipsum quidem expedire possunt quod disserunt. Praeterea sublata cognitione et scientia tollitur omnis ratio et vitae degendae et rerum gerendarum. Sic e physicis et fortitudo sumitur contra mortis timorem et constantia contra metum religionis et sedatio animi, omnium rerum occultarum ignorance sublata, et moderatio, natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis, et, ut modo docui, cognitionis regula et iudicio ab eodem illo constituto veri a falso distinctio traditur.

65 XX. "Restat locus huic disputationi vel maxime necessarius, de amicitia, quam si voluptas sumnum sit bonum affirmatis nullam omnino fore; de qua Epicurus quidem ita dicit, omnium rerum quas ad beate vivendum sapientia comparaverit nihil esse maius amicitia, nihil uberius, nihil iucundius. Nec vero hoc oratione solum sed multis magis vita et factis et moribus comprobavit. Quod quam magnum sit fictae veterum fabulae declarant, in quibus tam multis tamque variis, ab ultima antiquitate repetitis, tria vix amicorum paria reperiuntur, ut ad Orestem pervenias profectus a Theseo. At vero Epicurus una in domo, et ea quidem angusta, quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges! quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. Sed ad rem redeamus; de hominibus dici non ne-

66 cessae est. Tribus igitur modis video esse a nostris de amicitia disputatum. Alii, cum eas voluptates
BOOK I. xix-xx

the evidence of the senses, are unable even to expound their own argument. Besides, by abolishing knowledge and science they abolish all possibility of rational life and action. Thus Natural Philosophy supplies courage to face the fear of death; resolution to resist the terrors of religion; peace of mind, for it removes all ignorance of the mysteries of nature; self-control, for it explains the nature of the desires and distinguishes their different kinds; and, as I showed just now, the Canon or Criterion of Knowledge, which Epicurus also established, gives a method of discerning truth from falsehood.

65 XX. "There remains a topic that is pre-eminently germane to this discussion, I mean the subject of Friendship. Your school maintains that if pleasure be the Chief Good, friendship will cease to exist. Now Epicurus's pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct. How great a thing such friendship is, is shown by the mythical stories of antiquity. Review the legends from the remotest ages, and, copious and varied as they are, you will barely find in them three pairs of friends, beginning with Theseus and ending with Orestes. Yet Epicurus in a single house and that a small one maintained a whole company of friends, united by the closest sympathy and affection; and this still goes on in the Epicurean school. But to return to our subject, for there is no need of personal instances: I notice that the topic of friendship has been treated by Epicureans in three ways. (1) Some have denied

69
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quae ad amicos pertinenter negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. Ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. Nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest.

67 Atque ut odia, invidiae, despirationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautorices fidelissimae sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi; quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. Quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus neque vero ipsum amicitiam tueri nisi aequiter amicos et nos met ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia et amicitia cum voluptate connectitur. Nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aequo atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. Quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum quo in se ipsum, quoque labores propter suam voluptatem suscipieret, eosdem suscipiet propter amici voluptatem. Quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quemadmodum eae semper voluptatibus inhaerent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. Praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem,' inquit, 'sententia confirmavit animum ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret ma-

70
that pleasures affecting our friends are in themselves to be desired by us in the same degree as we desire our own pleasures. This doctrine is thought by some critics to undermine the foundations of friendship; however, its supporters defend their position, and in my opinion have no difficulty in making good their case. They argue that friendship can no more be sundered from pleasure than can the virtues, which we have discussed already. A solitary, friendless life must be beset by secret dangers and alarms. Hence reason itself advises the acquisition of friends; their possession gives confidence, and a firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just as hatred, jealousy and contempt are hindrances to pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also creator of pleasure alike for our friends and for ourselves. It affords us enjoyment in the present, and it inspires us with hopes for the near and distant future. Thus it is not possible to secure uninterrupted gratification in life without friendship, nor yet to preserve friendship itself unless we love our friends as much as ourselves. Hence this unselfishness does occur in friendship, while also friendship is closely linked with pleasure. For we rejoice in our friends' joy as much as in our own, and are equally pained by their sorrows. Therefore the Wise Man will feel exactly the same towards his friend as he does towards himself, and will exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as he would for his own. All that has been said about the essential connexion of the virtues with pleasure must be repeated about friendship. Epicurus well said (I give almost his exact words): 'The same creed that has given us courage to overcome all fear of ever-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

\textit{\textit{\ldots \ldots quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae \ldots \ldots praesidium esse firmissimum.}}' Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendum putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. Itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum insti-
tuendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem, cum autem usus progregiens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. Etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra exer-
cendi aut venandi, consuetudine adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit\textsuperscript{1} et iustius? Sunt autem qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium ut ne minus amicos quam se ipsos diligant. Quod et posse fieri intellegimus et saepe evenire\textsuperscript{2} videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse quod coniunctione tali sit aptius.

"Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri.

XXI. "Quapropter si ea quae dixi sole ipso illu-
stiora et clariora sunt, si omnia hausta\textsuperscript{3} \textit{\textit{\ldots \ldots e fonte naturae, si tota oratio nostra omnem sibi fidem}}

\textsuperscript{1}poterit most edd.; \textit{potuerit} Mdv. with MSS.
\textsuperscript{2}evenire Holm; \textit{\textit{\ldots \ldots enim}} Mdv. with MSS.
\textsuperscript{3}omnia dixi hausta MSS.; dixi bracketed by Mdv.

72
BOOK I. xx-xxi

lasting or long-enduring evil hereafter, has discerned that friendship is our strongest safeguard in this present term of life.’—(2) Other Epicureans though by no means lacking in insight are a little less courageous in defying the opprobrious criticisms of the Academy. They fear that if we hold friendship to be desirable only for the pleasure that it affords to ourselves, it will be thought that it is crippled altogether. They therefore say that the first advances and overtures, and the original inclination to form an attachment, are prompted by the desire for pleasure, but that when the progress of intercourse has led to intimacy, the relationship blossoms into an affection strong enough to make us love our friends for their own sake, even though no practical advantage accrues from their friendship. Does not familiarity endear to us localities, temples, cities, gymnasia and playing-grounds, horses and hounds, games and field-sports? Then how much more natural and reasonable that it should have the same result in the case of our intercourse with our fellow-men!—(3) The third view is that wise men have made a sort of compact to love their friends no less than themselves. We can understand the possibility of this, and indeed we often see it happen. Clearly no more effective means to happiness could be found than such an alliance.

“All these considerations go to prove not only that the rationale of friendship is not impaired by the identification of the Chief Good with pleasure, but also that without this no foundation for friendship whatsoever can be found.

XXI. “If then the theory I have set forth is clearer and more luminous than daylight itself; if it is derived entirely from Nature’s source; if my

73
sensibus confirmat, id est incorruptis atque integris testibus, si infantes pueri, mutae etiam bestiae paene loquuntur, magistra ac duce natura, nihil esse pro-
spерum nisi voluptatem, nihil asperum nisi dolorem, 
de quibus neque depravate iudicant neque corrupte, 
nonne ei maximam gratiam habere debemus qui hac 
exaudita quasi voce naturae sic eam firme graviterque 
comprehenderit ut omnes bene sanos in viam plac-
tae, tranquillae, quietae, beatae vitae deduceret? 
Qui quod tibi parum videtur eruditus, ea causa est 
quod nullam eruditionem esse duxit nisi quae beatae 
vitae disciplinam iuvaret. An ille tempus aut in 
poetis evolvendis, ut ego et Triarius te hortatore 
facimus, consumeret, in quibus nulla solida utilitas 
omnisque puerilis est deléctatio, aut se, ut Plato, in 
musicis, geometria, numeris, astra contereret, quae 
et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse non possunt et si 
essent vera nihil afferrent quo iuncundius, id est quo 
melius viveremus; — eas ergo artes perseveretur, 
vivendi artem tantam tamque operosam et perinde 
fructuosam relinqueret? Non ergo Epicurus ineru-
ditus, sed ĭ indocti qui quae pueros non didicisse 
turpe est ea putant usque ad senectutem esse di-
scenda.” Quae cum dixisset, “Explicavi,” inquit, 
“sententiam meam et eo quidem consilio, tuum 
iudicum ut cognoscerem, quae mihi facultas, ut id 
meo arbitratu facerem, ante hoc tempus numquam 
est data.”
BOOK I. xxi

whole discourse relies throughout for confirmation on the unbiased and unimpeachable evidence of the senses; if lisping infants, nay even dumb animals, prompted by Nature's teaching, almost find voice to proclaim that there is no welfare but pleasure, no hardship but pain—and their judgment in these matters is neither sophisticated nor biased—ought we not to feel the greatest gratitude to him who listened to this utterance of Nature's voice, and grasped its import so firmly and so fully that he has guided all sane-minded men into the paths of peace and happiness, calmness and repose? You are pleased to think him uneducated. The reason is that he refused to consider any education worth the name that did not help to school us in happiness.

Was he to spend his time, as you encourage Triarius and me to do, in perusing poets, who give us nothing solid and useful, but merely childish amusement? Was he to occupy himself like Plato with music and geometry, arithmetic and astronomy, which starting from false premises cannot be true, and which moreover if they were true would contribute nothing to make our lives pleasanter and therefore better? Was he, I say, to study arts like these, and neglect the master art, so difficult and correspondingly so fruitful, the art of living? No! Epicurus was not uneducated: the real philistines are those who ask us to go on studying till old age the subjects that we ought to be ashamed not to have learnt in boyhood.” Thus concluding, he added: “I have explained my own view, but solely with the object of learning what your verdict is. I have never hitherto had a satisfactory opportunity of hearing it.”
CICERO DE FINIBUS

BOOK II
M. TULLII CICERONIS
DE
FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM
LIBER SECUNDUS

1 I. Hic cum uterque me intueretur seseque ad audi-endum significarent paratos, "Primum," inquam, "deprecor ne me tamquam philosophum putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum, quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magno opere umquam probavi. Quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiae iure dici potest, quidquam tale fecit? Eorum erat iste mos qui tum sophistae nominabantur; quorum e numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu 'poscere quaestionem,' id est iubere dicere qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium, dice-rem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum

2 ad nostros philosophos esset. Sed et illum quem no-minavi et ceteros sophistas, ut e Platone intellegi potest, lusos videmus a Socrate. Is enim percontando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea quae ii respondissent si quid videretur diceret. Qui mos cum a posteriori-bus non esset retentus, Arcesilas eum revocavit insti-tuitque ut ii qui se audire vellent non de se quaere- rent sed ipsi dicerent quid sentirent; quod cum dixissent, ille contra. Sed eum qui audiebant quoad poterant defendebant sententiam suam; apud ceteros
DE FINIBUS

BOOK II

1. Upon this they both looked at me, and signified their readiness to hear me. So I began: "First of all, I beg of you not to imagine that I am going to deliver you a formal lecture, like a professional philosopher. That is a procedure which even in the case of philosophers I have never very much approved. Socrates, who is entitled to be styled the father of philosophy, never did anything of the sort. It was the method of his contemporaries the Sophists, as they were called. It was one of the Sophists, Gorgias of Leontini, who first ventured in an assembly to 'invite a question,' that is, to ask anyone to state what subject he desired to hear discussed. A bold undertaking, indeed, I should call it a piece of effrontery, had not this custom later on passed over into our own school. But we see that Socrates made fun of the aforesaid Gorgias and the rest of the Sophists also, as we can learn from Plato. His own way was to question his interlocutors and by a process of cross-examination to elicit their opinions, so that he might express his own views by way of rejoinder to their answers. This practice was abandoned by his successors, but was afterwards revived by Arcesilas, who made it a rule that those who wished to hear him should not ask him questions but should state their own opinions; and when they had done so he argued against them. But whereas the pupils of Arcesilas did their best to defend their own position, with the rest of the philosophers the student who has put a question

Refutation of Epicurean Ethics. Cicero replying to Torquatus proposes to adopt the Socratic method.
CICERO DE FINIBUS
autem philosophos qui quaesivit aliquid tacet; quod quidem iam fit etiam in Academia. Ubi enim is qui audire vult ita dixit: 'Voluptas mihi videtur esse summum bonum,' perpetua oratione contra disputatur, ut facile intelligi possit eos qui aliquid sibi videri dicant non ipsos in ea sententia esse sed audire velle 3 contraria. Nos commodius agimus. Non enim solum Torquatus dixit quid sentiret sed etiam cur. Ego autem arbitror, quamquam admodum delectatus sum eius oratione perpetua, tamen commodius, cum in rebus singulis insistas et intellegas quid quisque concedat, quid abnuat, ex rebus concessis concludi quod velis et ad exitum perveniri. Cum enim fertur quasi torrens oratio, quamvis multa cuiusquemodi rapiat, nihil tamen teneas, nihil reprehendas,¹ nusquam orationem rapidam coerceras.

"Omnis autem in quaerendo quae via quadam et ratione habetur oratio praescribere primum debet, ut quibusdam in formulis: EA RES AGETUR, UT INTER QUOS disseritur conveniat quid sit id de quo disseratur. 4 II. Hoc positum in Phaedro a Platone probavit Epicurus sensitque in omni disputatione id fieri oportere. Sed quod proximum fuit non vidit. Negat enim definiri rem placere, sine quo fieri interdum non reprehendas Mdv. with B; other MSS. apprehendas.

¹ P h a e d r u s 2 3 7 B.
is then silent; and indeed this is nowadays the custom in the Academy too. The would-be learner says, for example, 'The Chief Good in my opinion is pleasure,' and the contrary is then maintained in a formal discourse; so that it is not hard to realize that those who say they are of a certain opinion do not actually hold the view they profess, but want to hear what can be argued against it. We are adopting a more profitable mode of procedure, for Torquatus has not only told us his own opinion but also his reasons for holding it. Still, for my part, though I enjoyed his long discourse very much, I believe all the same that it is better to stop at point after point, and make out what each person is willing to admit and what he denies, and then to draw such inferences as one desires from these admissions and so arrive at one's conclusion. When the exposition goes rushing on like a mountain stream in spate, it carries along with it a vast amount of miscellaneous material, but there is nothing one can take hold of or rescue from the flood; there is no point at which one can stem the torrent of oratory.

"However, in philosophical investigation a methodical and systematic discourse must always begin by formulating a preamble like that which occurs in certain forms of process at law, 'This shall be the point at issue'; so that the parties to the debate may be agreed as to what the subject is about which they are debating. II. This rule is laid down by Plato in the *Phaedrus,* and it was approved by Epicurus, who realized that it ought to be followed in every discussion. But he failed to see what this involved. For he says that he does not hold with giving a definition of the thing in question; yet
CICERO DE FINIBUS

potest ut inter eos qui ambigunt conveniat quid sit id de quo agatur; velut in hoc ipso de quo nunc disputamus. Quaerimus enim finem bonorum; possimus ne hoc scire quale sit, nisi contulerimus inter nos, cum finem bonorum dixerimus, quid finis, quid etiam sit ipsum bonum? Atqui haec patefactio quasi rerum opertarum, cum quid quidque sit aperitur, definitio est; qua tu etiam imprudens utebare nonnumquam. Nam hunc ipsum sive finem sive extremum sive ultimum definiebas id esse quo omnia quae recte fieren referrentur neque id ipsum usquam referretur. Praeclare hoc quidem. Bonum ipsum etiam quid esset fortasse si opus fuisse definisses aut quod esset natura appetendum, aut quod prodesset, aut quod iuvaret, aut quod liberet modo. Nunc idem, nisi molestum est, quoniam tibi non omnino displicet definire et id facis cum vis, velim definias quid sit voluptas, de quo omnis haec quaestio est." "Quis, quaesos," inquit, "est qui quid sit voluptas nesciat aut qui quo magis id intellegat definitionem aliquam desideret?" "Me ipsum esse dicerem," inquam, "nisi mihi viderer habere bene cognitam voluptatem et satis firme conceptam animo atque comprehensam. Nunc autem dico ipsum Epicurum nescire et in eo nutare, eumque qui crebro dicat diligenter oportere exprimi quae vis
BOOK II. ii

without this it is sometimes impossible for the disputants to agree what the subject under discussion is; as, for example, in the case of the very question we are now debating. We are trying to discover the End of Goods; but how can we possibly know what the nature of this is, without comparing notes as to what we mean, in the phrase 'End of Goods,' by the term 'End' and also by the term 'Good' itself? Now this process of disclosing latent meanings, of revealing what a particular thing is, is the process of definition; and you yourself now and then unconsciously employed it. For you repeatedly defined this very conception of the End or final or ultimate aim as 'that to which all right actions are a means while it is not itself a means to anything else.' Excellent so far. Very likely had occasion arisen you would have defined the Good itself, either as 'the naturally desirable,' or 'the beneficial,' or 'the delightful,' or just 'that which we like.' Well then, if you don't mind, as you do not entirely disapprove of definition, and indeed practise it when it suits your purpose, I should be glad if you would now define pleasure, the thing which is the subject of the whole of our present inquiry.' "Dear me," cried Torquatus, "who is there who does not know what pleasure is? Who needs a definition to assist him to understand it?" "I should say that I myself was such a person," I replied, "did I not believe that as a matter of fact I do fully understand the nature of pleasure, and possess a well-founded conception and comprehension of it. As it is, I venture to assert that Epicurus himself does not know what pleasure is, but is in two minds about it. He is always harping on the necessity of carefully sifting out the meaning
CICERO DE FINIBUS

subiecta sit vocibus, non intellegere interdum quid
sonet haec vox voluptatis, id est quae res huic voci
subiciatur.”

III. Tum ille ridens: “Hoc vero,” inquit, “opti-
mum, ut is qui finem rerum expetendarum volupta-
tem esse dicat, id extremum, id ultimum bonorum,
id ipsum quid et quale sit nesciatur!” “Atqui,” in-
quam, “aut Epicurus quid sit voluptas aut omnes
mortales qui ubique sunt nesiiunt.” “Quonam,”
inquit, “modo?” “Quia voluptatem hanc esse sen-
tiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et iucun-
ditate quadam perfunditur.” “Quid ergo? istam
voluptatem,” inquit, “Epicurus ignorat?” “Non
semper,” inquam; “nam interdum nimir etiam
novit, quippe qui testificetur ne intellegere quidem
se posse ubi sit aut quod sit ullam bonum praeter
illud quod cibo et potionem et aurium delectatione et
obscena voluptate capiatur. An haec ab eo non di-
cuntur?” “Quasi vero me pudeat,” inquit, “isto-
rum aut non possim quemadmodum ea dicantur
ostendere!” “Ego vero non dubito,” inquam, “quin
facile possis, nec est quod te pudeat sapienti assentiri
qui se unus, quod sciam, sapientem profiteri sit ausus.
Nam Metrodorum non puto ipsum professum, sed,
cum appellaretur ab Epicuro, repudiare tantum bene-
84
BOOK II. ii-iii

underlying the terms we employ, and yet he occasion-
ally fails to understand what is the import of
the word 'pleasure;' that is, what is the thing that
underlies the word.”

III. Torquatus laughed. “Come, that is a good joke,” he said, “that the author of the doctrine
that pleasure is the End of things desirable, the
final and ultimate Good, should actually not know
what manner of thing pleasure itself is!” “Well,” I replied, “either Epicurus does not know what
pleasure is, or the rest of mankind all the world over
do not.” “How so?” he asked. “Because the
universal opinion is that pleasure is a sensation
actively stimulating the percipient sense and diffus-
ing over it a certain agreeable feeling.” “What
then?” he replied; “does not Epicurus recognize
pleasure in your sense?” “Not always,” said I;
“now and then, I admit, he is only too well ac-
quainted with it; for he solemnly avows that he
cannot even understand what Good there can be or
where it can be found, apart from that which is
derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears,
and the grosser forms of gratification. Do I mis-
represent his words?” “Just as if I were ashamed
of all that,” he cried, “or unable to explain the sense
in which it is spoken!” “Oh,” said I, “I haven’t
the least doubt you can explain it with ease. And
you have no reason to be ashamed of sharing the
opinions of a Wise Man—who stands alone, so far
as I am aware, in venturing to arrogate to himself
that title. For I do not suppose that Metrodorus
himself claimed to be a Wise Man, though he did
not care to refuse the compliment when the name
was bestowed upon him by Epicurus; while the
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ficium noluisse; septem autem illi non suo sed popu-
8 lorum suffragio omnium nominati sunt. Verum hoc
loco sumo verbis his eandem certe vim voluptatis
Epicurum nosse quam ceteros. Omnes enim iucun-
dum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece _nonce, 
Latine voluptatem vocant.” “Quid est igitur,” in-
quit, “quod requiras?” “Dicam,” inquam, “et qui-
dem discendi causa magis quam quo te aut Epicurum
reprensum velim.” “Ego quoque,” inquit, “didi-
cerim libentius si quid attuleris quam te reprende-
rim.” “Tenesne igitur,” inquam, “Hieronymus
Rhodius quid dicat esse summum bonum, quo putet
omnia referri oportere?” “Teneo,” inquit, “finem
illi videri nihil dolere.” “Quid? idem iste,” in-
9 quam, “de voluptate quid sentit?” “Negat esse
eam,” inquit, “propter se expetendum.” “Aliud
igitur esse censet gaudere, aliud non dolere.” “Et
quidem,” inquit, “vehementer errat; nam, ut paulo
ante docui, augendae voluptatis finis est doloris omnis
amotio.” “Non dolere,” inquam, “istud quam vim
habeat postea videro; aliam vero vim voluptatis esse,
alam nihil dolendi, nisi valde pertinax fueris, con-
cedas necesse est.” “Atqui reperies,” inquit, “in
hoc quidem pertinacem; dici enim nihil potest
verius.” “Estne, quaeo,” inquam, “sitienti in bi-
86
Seven Wise Men of old received their appellation not by their own votes, but by the universal suffrages of mankind. Still, for the present I take it for granted that in the utterance in question Epicurus undoubtedly recognizes the same meaning of 'pleasure' as everybody else. Every one uses the Greek word hēdonē and the Latin voluptas to mean an agreeable and exhilarating stimulation of the sense. "Well then," he asked, "what more do you want?" "I will tell you," I said, "though more for the sake of ascertaining the truth than from any desire to criticize yourself or Epicurus." "I also," he replied, "would much rather learn anything you may have to contribute, than criticize your views." "Do you remember, then," I said, "what Hieronymus of Rhodes pronounces to be the Chief Good, the standard as he conceives it to which all other things should be referred?" "I remember," said he, "that he considers the End to be freedom from pain." "Well," said I, "what is the same philosopher's view about pleasure?" "He thinks that pleasure is not desirable in itself." "Then in his opinion to feel pleasure is a different thing from not feeling pain?" "Yes," he said, "and there he is seriously mistaken, since, as I have just shown, the complete removal of pain is the limit of the increase of pleasure." "Oh," I said, "as for the formula 'freedom from pain,' I will consider its meaning later on; but unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same as 'pleasure.'" "Well, but on this point you will find me obstinate," said he; "for it is as true as any proposition can be." "Pray," said I, "when a man is thirsty, is there any
CICERO DE FINIBUS

bendo voluptas?" "Quis istud possit," inquit, "negare?" "Eademne quae restincta sit?" "Immo alio genere. Restincta enim sitis stabilitatem voluptatis habet, illa autem voluptas ipsius restinc-
tionis in motu est." "Cur igitur," inquam, "res
tam dissimiles eodem nomine appellass?" "Quid paulo ante," inquit, "dixerim nonne meministi,,cum
omnis dolor detractus esset, variari, non augeri vol-
uptatem?" "Memini vero," inquam; "sed tu istuc
dixti bene Latine, parum plane. Varietas enim
Latinum verbum est, idque proprie quidem in dis-
paribus coloribus dicitur, sed transfertur in multa
disparia: varium poema, varia oratio, varii mores,
varia fortuna, voluptas etiam varia dici solet, cum
percipitur e multis dissimilibus rebus dissimiles effi-
cientibus voluptates. Eam si varietatem diceres, in-
tellegerem, ut etiam non dicente te intellego; ista
varietas quae sit non satis perspicio, quod ais cum
dolore careamus tum in summa voluptate nos esse,
cum autem vescamur iis rebus quae dulcem motum
afferant sensibus, tum esse in motu voluptatem, quae¹
faciat varietatem voluptatum, sed non augeri illam
non dolendi voluptatem, quam cur voluptatem ap-
pelles nescio."

IV. "An potest," inquit ille,² "quidquam esse

¹ quae MSS.; qui Davis, Mdv., but cp. § 75.
² inquit ille or ille inquit MSS.; ille Mdv. brackets.

88
pleasure in the act of drinking?” “That is undeniable,” he answered. “Is it the same pleasure as the pleasure of having quenched one’s thirst?” “No, it is a different kind of pleasure. For the pleasure of having quenched one’s thirst is a ‘static’ pleasure, but the pleasure of actually quenching it is a ‘kinetic’ pleasure.” “Why then,” I asked, “do you call two such different things by the same name?” “Do you not remember,” he replied, “what I said just now, that when all pain has been removed, pleasure may vary in kind but cannot be increased in degree?” “Oh, yes, I remember,” said I; “but though your language was quite correct in form, your meaning was far from clear. ‘Variation’ is a good Latin term; we use it strictly of different colours, but it is applied metaphorically to a number of things that differ: we speak of a varied poem, a varied speech, a varied character, varied fortunes. Pleasure too can be termed varied when it is derived from a number of unlike things producing unlike feelings of pleasure. If this were the variation you spoke of, I could understand the term, just as I understand it even without your speaking of it. But I cannot quite grasp what you mean by ‘variation’ when you say that when we are free from pain we experience the highest pleasure, and that when we are enjoying things that excite a pleasant activity of the senses, we then experience an active or ‘kinetic’ pleasure that causes a variation of our pleasant sensations, but no increase in the former pleasure that consists in absence of pain—although why you should call this ‘pleasure’ I cannot make out.”

IV. “Well,” he asked, “can anything be more
CICERO DE FINIBUS

suavius quam nihil dolere?” “Immo sit sane nihil melius,” inquam, “(nondum enim id quaero), num pro-
pterea idem voluptas est quod, ut ita dicam, indolen-
tia?” “Plane idem,” inquit, “et maxima quidem, qua fieri nulla maior potest.” “Quid dubitas igitur,”
inquam, “summo bono a te ita constituto ut id totum in non dolendo sit, id tenere unum, id tueri, id
defendere? Quid enim necessce est, tamquam
meretricem in matronarum coetum, sic voluptatem in virtutum concilium adducere? Invidiosum nomen est, infame, suspectum. Itaque hoc frequentor dici solet a vobis, non intellegere nos quam dicat Epicurus
voluptatem. Quod quidem mihi si quando dictum est (est autem dictum non parum saepe), etsi satis
clemens sum in disputando, tamen interdum soleo subirasci. Egone non intellego, quid sit ἡδονή
Graece, Latine ‘voluptas’? utram tandem linguam nescio? Deinde qui fit, ut ego nesciam, sciant omnes quicumque Epicurei esse voluerint? Quod vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse
eum qui futurus sit philosophus scire litteras. Itaque ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt1 Cincinnatum illum ut dictator esset, sic vos de pagis omnibus colligitis bonos illos quidem viros sed certe non per-

1adduxerunt: some inf. MSS. abduxerunt.

90
BOOK II. iv

pleasant than freedom from pain?’” “Still,” I replied, “granting there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” “Absolutely the same,” said he, “indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible.” “If then,” said I, “according to your account the Chief Good consists entirely in feeling no pain, why do you not keep to this without wavering? Why do you not firmly maintain this conception of the Good and no other? What need is there to introduce so abandoned a character as Mistress Pleasure into the company of those respectable ladies the Virtues? Her very name is suspect, and lies under a cloud of disrepute—so much so that you Epicureans are fond of telling us that we do not understand what Epicurus means by pleasure. I am a reasonably good-tempered disputant, but for my own part when I hear this assertion (and I have encountered it fairly often), I am sometimes inclined to be a little irritated. Do I not understand the meaning of the Greek word ἡδονή, the Latin voluptas? Pray which of these two languages is it that I am not acquainted with? Moreover how comes it that I do not know what the word means, while all and sundry who have elected to be Epicureans do? As for that, your sect argues very plausibly that there is no need for the aspirant to philosophy to be a scholar at all. And you are as good as your word. Our ancestors brought old Cincinnatus from the plough to be dictator. You ran-sack the country villages for your assemblage of doubtless respectable but certainly not very learned
CICERO DE FINIBUS

13 eruditos. Ergo illi intellegunt quid Epicurus dicat, ego non intellego? Ut scias me intellegere, primum idem esse\(^1\) dico 'voluptatem,' quod ille ἡδονήν. Et quidem saepe quaerimus verbum Latinum par Graeco et quod idem valeat; hic nihil fuit quod quaereremus. Nullum inveniri verbum potest quod magis idem declarat Latine quod Graece, quam declarat 'voluptas.' Huic verbo omnes qui ubique sunt qui Latine sciunt duas res subiciunt, laetitiam in animo, comotionem suavem iucunditatis in corpore. Nam et ille apud Trabeam 'voluptatem animi nimiam' laetitiam dicit, eandem quam ille Caecilianus quia 'omnibus laetitiis laetum' esse se narrat. Sed hoc interest, quod 'voluptas' dicitur etiam in animo (vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt: 'sublationem animi sine ratione opinantis se magnō bonō frui'), non dicitur 'laetitia' nec 'gaudium' in corpore. In eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem moveat iucunditas. Hanc quoque 'iucunditatem,' si vis, transfer in animum ('iuvere' enim in utroque dicitur ex eoque 'iucundum'), modo intellegas inter illum qui dicit

Tanta laetitia auctus sum ut nihil constet,\(^2\)

\(^1\)esse MdV. brackets, but cp. II 77, III 22, V 18, 20 (Müller).

\(^2\)ut nihil constet: some inf. MSS. ut mihi non constem.

\(a\) Cicero quotes the verse also Tusc. 4. 35 and ad Fam. 2, 9. 2 (where he also refers to the following phrase from Caecilius Statius): it appears to have run 'ego voluptatem animi nimiam summum esse errorem arbitror.'
BOOK II. iv

adherents. Well, if these gentlemen can understand what Epicurus means, cannot I? I will prove to you that I do. In the first place, I mean the same by 'pleasure' as he does by ἰδων. One often has some trouble to discover a Latin word that shall be the precise equivalent of a Greek one; but in this case no search was necessary. No instance can be found of a Latin word that more exactly conveys the same meaning as the corresponding Greek word than does the word voluptas. Every person in the world who knows Latin attaches to this word two ideas—that of gladness of mind, and that of a delightful excitation of agreeable feeling in the body. On the one hand there is the character in Trabea who speaks of 'excessive pleasure of the mind,' a meaning gladness, the same feeling as is intended by the person in Caecilius who describes himself as being 'glad with every sort of gladness.' But there is this difference, that the word 'pleasure' can denote a mental as well as a bodily feeling (the former a vicious emotion, in the opinion of the Stoics, who define it as 'elation of the mind under an irrational conviction that it is enjoying some great good'), whereas 'joy' and 'gladness' are not used of bodily sensation. However pleasure according to the usage of all who speak good Latin consists in the enjoyment of a delightful stimulation of one of the senses. The term 'delight' also you may apply if you like to the mind ('to delight' is said of both mind and body, and from it the adjective 'delightful' is derived), so long as you understand that between the man who says

So full am I of gladness
That I am all confusion,
et eum qui

Nunc demum mihi animus ardet,
quorum alter laetitia gestiat, alter dolore crucietur,
esse illum medium:
Quamquam haec inter nos nuper notitia admodum est,
qui nec laetetur nec angatur; itemque inter eum qui
potiatur corporis expetitis voluptatibus et eum qui
excrucietur summis doloribus esse eum qui utroque
careat.

15 V. "Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an
sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docen-
dus? Et tamen vide ne, si ego non intellegam quid
Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece ut videor luculenter
sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius qui ita loquatur ut non
intellegatur. Quod duobus modis sine represione
fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cogno-
mento qui σκοτεινός perhibetur,' quia 'de natura
nimis obscure memoravit,' aut cum rerum obscuritas,
non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis
est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor,
nec non vult si possit plane et aperte loqui, nec de
re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici,
sed de illustri et facili etiam in vulgus pervagata
loquitur. Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere
quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat; e quo efficitur

a The first quotation is from an unknown comic writer;
the second from Caecilius Statius, who makes a 'heavy
father' say 'Nunc enim demum mihi animus ardet, nunc
meum cor cumulatur ira' (quoted in full by Cicero pro Cael.
37); the third is from Terence, Heautontim., I. 1, cf. I § 3
above: Chremes' mild interest in his new neighbour, the
Self-Tormentor, is rather oddly instanced as an illustration
of the neutral state of emotion intermediate between mental
pleasure and pain.

b The quotation is possibly from Lucilius.

94
and him who says

Now, now my soul with anger burns,

one of whom is transported with gladness and the
other tormented with painful emotion, there is the
intermediate state:

Though our acquaintance is but quite recent, a
where the speaker feels neither gladness nor sor-
row; and that similarly between the enjoyment of
the most desirable bodily pleasures and the endurance
of the most excruciating pains there is the neutral
state devoid of either.

V. "Well, are you satisfied that I have grasped the
meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in
the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing
that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I
believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek,
so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such
unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on
two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in
the case of Heraclitus,

The surname of the Obscure who bore,
So dark his philosophic lore b;

or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of
the subject and not of the style—an instance of
this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion,
has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly
if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject
like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such
as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one
that is generally familiar already. And yet you
Epicureans do not deny that we understand what
pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves
CICERO DE FINIBUS

non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat.

16 Si enim idem dicit quod Hieronymus, qui censet summum bonum esse sine ulla molestia vivere, cur mavult dicere voluptatem quam vacuitatem doloris, ut ille facit, qui quid dicat intellegit? sin autem voluptatem putat adiungendam eam quae sit in motu (sic enim appellat hanc dulcem, 'in motu,' illam nihil dolentis, 'in stabilitate'), quid tendit? cum efficere non possit ut cuiquam qui ipse sibi notus sit, hoc est qui suam naturam sensumque perspexerit, vacuitas doloris et voluptas idem esse videatur. Hoc est vim afferre, Torquate, sensibus, extorquere ex animis cognitiones verborum quibus imbuti sumus. Quis est enim qui non videat haec esse in natura rerum tria? unum cum in voluptate sumus, alterum cum in dolore, tertium hoc in quo nunc equidem sum, credo item vos, nec in dolore nec in voluptate; ut in voluptate sit qui epuletur, in dolore qui torqueatur: tu autem inter haec tantam multitudo nem hominum interiectam non vides nec laetantium

17 nec dolentium?“ "Non prorsus," inquit, "omnesque qui sine dolore sint in voluptate, et ea quidem summa, esse dico." "Ergo in eadem voluptate eum qui

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a A reminiscence of the maxim γνῶθι σέαυτόν, 'know thyself,' inscribed on the temple of Apollo at Delphi.

96
not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. For if he means the same as Hieronymus, who holds that the Chief Good is a life entirely devoid of trouble, why does he insist on using the term pleasure, and not rather 'freedom from pain,' as does Hieronymus, who understands his own meaning? Whereas if his view is that the End must include kinetic pleasure (for so he describes this vivid sort of pleasure, calling it 'kinetic' in contrast with the pleasure of freedom from pain, which is 'static' pleasure), what is he really aiming at? For he cannot possibly convince any person who knows himself\(^a\)—anyone who has studied his own nature and sensations—that freedom from pain is the same thing as pleasure. To identify them, Torquatus, is to do violence to the senses; it is uprooting from our minds the knowledge of the meaning of words imbedded in them. Who is not aware that the world of experience contains these three states of feeling: first, the enjoyment of pleasure; second, the sensation of pain; and third, which is my own condition and doubtless also yours at the present moment, the absence of both pleasure and pain? Pleasure is the feeling of a man eating a good dinner, pain that of one being broken on the rack; but do you really not see that intermediate between those two extremes lies a vast multitude of persons who are feeling neither gratification nor pain?" "I certainly do not," said he; "I maintain that all who are without pain are enjoying pleasure, and what is more the highest form of pleasure." "Then you think that a man who, not being himself thirsty, mixes a drink for

16 Absence of pain is a neutral state between pleasure and pain.

17
CICERO DE FINIBUS

alteri misceat mulsum ipse non sitiens, et eum qui illud sitiens bibat?"

VI. Tum ille: "Finem, inquit, interrogandi, si videtur; quod quidem ego a principio ita me malle dixeram, hoc ipsum providens, dialecticas captiones."

"Rhetorice igitur," inquam, "nos mavis quam dialectice disputare?"

"Quasi vero," inquit, "perpetua oratio rhetorum solum, non etiam philosophorum sit."

"Zenonis est," inquam, "hoc Stoici; omnem vim loquendi, ut iam ante Aristoteles, in duas tributam esse partes, rhetoricam palmae, dialecticam pugni similem esse dicebat, quod latius loquentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. Obsequar igitur voluntati tuae dicamque si potero rhetorice, sed hac rhetorica philosophorum, non nostra illa forensi, quam necesse est, cum populariter loquatur, esse interdum paulo hebetiorem. Sed dum dialecticam, Torquate, contemnit Epicurus, quae una continent omnem et perspiciendi quid in quaque re sit scientiam et iudicandi quale quidque sit et ratione ac via disputandi, ruit in dicendo, ut mihi quidem videtur, nec ea quae docere vult ulla arte distinguat; ut haec ipsa quae modo loquebamur. Summum a vobis bonum voluptas dicitur. Aperiendum est igitur quid sit
another, feels the same pleasure as the thirsty man
who drinks it?"

VI. At this Torquatus exclaimed: "A truce to ques-
tion and answer, if you do not mind. I told you
from the beginning that I preferred continuous
speeches. I foresaw exactly what would happen; I
knew we should come to logic-chopping and quib-
bling." "Then," said I, "would you sooner we
adopted the rhetorical and not the dialectical mode
of debate?" "Why," he cried, "just as if continuous
discourse were proper for orators only, and not for
philosophers as well!" "That is the view of Zeno
the Stoic," I rejoined; "he used to say that the
faculty of speech in general falls into two depart-
ments, as Aristotle had already laid down; and that
Rhetoric was like the palm of the hand, Dialectic
like the closed fist; because rhetoricians employ an
expansive style, and dialecticians one that is more
compressed. So I will defer to your wish, and will
speak if I can in the rhetorical manner, but with the
rhetoric of the philosophers, not with the sort which
we use in the law-courts. The latter being addressed
to the public ear must necessarily sometimes be a little
lacking in subtlety. Epicurus however, Torquatus,
in his contempt for dialectic, which comprises at once
the entire science of discerning the essence of
things, of judging their qualities, and of conducting
a systematic and logical argument,—Epicurus, I say,
makes havoc of his exposition. He entirely fails, in
my opinion at all events, to impart scientific precision
to the doctrines he desires to convey. Take for
example the particular tenet that we have just been
discussing. The Chief Good is pleasure, say you Epi-
cureans. Well then, you must explain what pleasure
CICERO DE FINIBUS

voluptas; aliter enim explicari quod quaeritur
non potest. Quam si explicavisset, non tam haesi-
taret; aut enim eam voluptatem tuetur quam
Aristippus, id est qua sensus dulciter ac iucunde
movetur, quam etiam pecudes si loqui possent apel-
larent volupatem; aut, si magis placeret suo more
loqui quam ut

Omnes Danai atque Mycenenses,
Attica pubes,

reliquique Graeci qui hoc anapaesto citantur, hoc
non dolere solum voluptatis nomine appellaret, illud
Aristippeum contemneret; aut, si utrumque probaret,
Ut probat, coniungeret doloris vacuitatem cum volu-
ptate et duobus ultimis uteretur. Multi enim et
magni philosophi haec ultima bonorum iuncta fece-
runt; ut Aristoteles\(^1\) virtutis usum cum vitae perfe-
ctae prosperitate coniunxit, Callipho adiunxit ad
honestatem voluptatem, Diodorus ad eadem hone-
statem addidit vacuitatem doloris. Idem fecisset
Epicurus, si sententiam hanc, quae nunc Hieronymi
est, coniunxisset cum Aristippe vetere sententia. Illi
enim inter se dissentiunt; propterea singulis finibus
utuntur, et, cum uterque Graece egregie loquatur, nec
Aristippus, qui voluptatem summum bonum dicit, in
voluptate ponit non dolere, neque Hieronymus, qui

\(^1\) ut Aristoteles; inf. MSS. ut Aristoteles qui.

\(^a\) From some tragedy unknown.
BOOK II. vi

is; otherwise it is impossible to make clear the subject under investigation. Had Epicurus cleared up the meaning of pleasure, he would not have fallen into such confusion. Either he would have upheld pleasure in the same sense as Aristippus, that is, an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what even dumb cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure; or, if he preferred to use an idiom of his own, instead of speaking the language of the

Danaans one and all, men of Mycenae, Scions of Athens,^a

and the rest of the Greeks invoked in these anapaests, he might have confined the name of pleasure to this state of freedom from pain, and despised pleasure as Aristippus understands it; or else, if he approved of both sorts of pleasure, as in fact he does, then he ought to combine together pleasure and absence of pain, and profess two ultimate Goods. Many distinguished philosophers have as a matter of fact thus interpreted the ultimate Good as composite. For instance, Aristotle combined the exercise of virtue with well-being lasting throughout a complete lifetime; Callipho united pleasure with moral worth; Diodorus to moral worth added freedom from pain. Epicurus would have followed their example, had he coupled the view we are discussing, which as it is belongs to Hieronymus, with the old doctrine of Aristippus. For there is a real difference of opinion between them, and accordingly each sets up his own separate End; and as both speak unimpeachable Greek, Aristippus, who calls pleasure the Chief Good, does not count absence of pain as pleasure, while Hieronymus, who makes the Chief Good
CICERO DE FINIBUS

summum bonum statuit non dolere, voluptatis nomine umquam utilit in pro illa indolentia, quippe qui ne in expetendis quidem rebus numeret voluptatem.

VII. "Duae sunt enim res quoque, ne tu verba solum putes. Unum est sine dolore esse, alterum cum voluptate; vos ex his tam dissimilibus rebus non modo nomen unum (nam id facilius paterer), sed etiam rem unam ex duabus facere conamus, quod fieri nullo modo potent. Hic, qui utrumque probat, ambo debuit uti, sicut facit re neque tamen dividit verbis. Cum enim eam ipsam voluptatem quam eodem nomine omnes appellamus laudat locis pluris, audet dicere ne suspicari quidem se ulla bonum seiuscum ab illo Aristippeo genere voluptatis; atque ibi hoc dicit ubi omnis eius est oratio de summo bono. In alio vero libro, in quo breviter comprehensis gravissimos sententiis quasi oracula edidisse sapientiae dicitur, scribit his verbis, quae nota tibi profecto, Torquate, sunt (quem enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri κυρίας δόξας, id est quasi maxime ratas, quia gravissimae sint ad beate vivendum breviter enuntiatae sententiae?) animadverte igitur, recte hanc sententiam interpretaret: 'Si ea quae sunt luxuriositas efficientia voluptatum liberarent eos deorum et mortis et doloris metu docearentque qui
BOOK II. vi-vii

absence of pain, never employs the name pleasure to denote this negation of pain, and in fact does not reckon pleasure among things desirable at all.

VII. "For you must not suppose it is merely a verbal distinction: the things themselves are different. To be without pain is one thing, to feel pleasure another; yet you Epicureans try to combine these quite dissimilar feelings—not merely under a single name (for that I could more easily tolerate), but as actually being a single thing, instead of really two; which is absolutely impossible. Epicurus, approving both sorts of pleasure, ought to have recognized both sorts; as he really does in fact, though he does not distinguish them in words. In a number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. This is the language that he holds in the discourse dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. Then there is another treatise containing his most important doctrines in a compendious form, in which we are told he uttered the very oracles of Wisdom. Here he writes the following words, with which you, Torquatus, are of course familiar (for every good Epicurean has got by heart the master's *Kuriai Doxai* or Authoritative Doctrines, since these brief aphorisms or maxims are held to be of sovereign efficacy for happiness). So I will ask you kindly to notice whether I translate this maxim correctly: 'If the things in which sensualists find pleasure could deliver them from the fear of the gods and of death and pain, and could teach them to set bounds to their
CICERO DE FINIBUS

essent fines cupiditatum, nihil haberemus quod reprehenderemus, cum undique compleveruntur voluptatibus nec haberent ulla ex parte aliquid aut dolens aut aegrum, id est autem malum.’’

Hoc loco tenere se Triarius non potuit. “Obsacro,” inquit, “Torquate, haec dicit Epicurus?” (quod mihi quidem visus est, cum sciret, velle tamen confitentem audire Torquatum). At ille non pertimuit saneque fidenter: “Istis quidem ipsis verbis,” inquit; “sed quid sentiat non videtis.” “Si alia sentit,” inquam, “alia loquitur, namquam intellegam quid sentiat; sed plane dicit quod intelligit. Idque si ita dicit, non esse reprendendos luxuriosos si sapientes sint, dicit absurde, similiter et si dicat non reprendendos parricidas si nec cupidi sint nec deos metuant nec mortem nec dolorem. Et tamen quid attinet luxuriosis ullam exceptionem dari aut fingere aliquos qui, cum luxuriose viverent, a summo philosopho non reprenderentur eo nomine dumtaxat, cetera caverent?

Sed tamen nonne reprenderes, Epicure, luxuriosos ob eam ipsam causam quod ita viverent ut persequerentur cuiusquemodi voluptates, cum esset praesertim, ut ais tu, summa voluptas nihil dolere? Atqui reperiemus asotos primum ita non religiosos ut ’edint de patella,’ deinde ita mortem non timentes ut illud in ore habeant ex Hymnide:

\[\text{in footnotes:} \]

1 *haberemus:* inf. MSS. *haereremus*; *quod reprehenderemus* added by Mdv., cf. § 23.

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\[\text{a} \text{Apparently proverbial for shameless gluttony. The *patella* was used for offerings of food made to the household gods.} \]

\[\text{b} \text{A comedy by Caecilius Statius, translated from the Greek of Menander.} \]

104
BOOK II. vii

desires, we should have no reason to blame them, since on every hand they would be abundantly supplied with pleasures, and on no side would be exposed to any pain or grief, which are the sole evil.'"

At this point Triarius could contain himself no longer. "Seriously now, Torquatus," he broke out, "does Epicurus really say that?" (For my own part, I believe that he knew it to be true, but wanted to hear Torquatus admit it.) Torquatus, nothing daunted, answered with complete assurance: "Certainly, those are his very words. But you don't understand his meaning." "Oh," I retorted, "if he means one thing and says another, I never shall understand his meaning. But he does not; he states the case clearly as he understands it. If his meaning is that sensualists are not to be blamed provided they are wise men, he is talking nonsense. He might as well say that parricides are not to be blamed provided they are free from avarice and from fear of the gods, of death and of pain. Even so, what is the point of granting the sensual any saving clause? Why imagine certain fictitious persons who, though living sensually, would not be blamed by the wisest of philosophers, at all events for their sensuality, and who avoided other faults? All the same, Epicurus, would not you blame sensualists for the very reason that their one object in life is the pursuit of pleasure of any and every sort, especially as according to you the highest pleasure is to feel no pain? Yet we shall find profligates in the first place so devoid of religious scruples that they will 'eat the food on the paten,' a and secondly so fearless of death as to be always quoting the lines from the Hymnis b:

105
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Mihi sex menses satis sunt vitae; septimum Orco spondeo.

Iam doloris medicamenta illa Epicurea tamquam de narthecio proment: 'Si gravis, brevis: si longus, levis.' Unum nescio, quomodo possit, si luxuriousus sit, finitas cupiditates habere.

23 VIII. "Quid ergo attinet dicere: 'Nihil haberem quod reprendem, si finitas cupiditates haberent?' Hoc est dicere: 'Non reprendem asotos si non essent asoti.' Isto modo ne improbos quidem si essent boni viri. Hic homo severus luxuriam ipsam per se reprendendum non putat. Et hercule, Torquate, ut verum loquamur, si summum bonum voluptas est, rectissime non putat. Nolim enim mihi fingere asotos, ut soletis, qui in mensam vomant et qui de conviviis auferantur crudique postridie se rursus ingurgitant, qui solem, ut aiunt, nec occidentem umquam viderint nec orientem, qui consumptis patrimoniiis egeant. Nemo nostrum istius generis asotos iucunde putat vivere. Mundos, elegantes, optimis cocis, pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis, vitantes cruditatem, quibus 'vinum defusum e pleno sit, † hirsizon¹ (ut ait Lucilius) cui nihil dum sit vis et sacculus abstulerit,' ad-

¹ hirsizon, hirsyphon or the like, MSS.; and for dum sit some have dempsit, dempserit. No plausible reconstruction has been suggested; but the reference seems to be to the process of straining wine to remove the lees and get rid of vis, harshness of flavour.

¹ Cf. I § 40.

106
BOOK II. vii-viii

Enough for me six months of life, the seventh to Hell I pledge!
Or if they want an antidote to pain, out comes from their medicine-chest the great Epicurean panacea, 'Short if it's strong, light if it's long.' Only one point I can't make out: how can a man at once be a sensualist and keep his desires within bounds?

VIII. 'What then is the point of saying 'I should have no fault to find with them if they kept their desires within bounds'? That is tantamount to saying 'I should not blame the profligate if they were not profligate.' On that principle you would not blame the dishonest either, if they were upright men. Here is a rigid moralist, who thinks that sensuality is not in itself blameworthy! And I profess, Torquatus, on the hypothesis that pleasure is the Chief Good he is perfectly justified in thinking so. I had rather not draw disgusting pictures, as you are so fond of doing, of debauchees who are sick at table, have to be carried home from dinner-parties, and next day gorge themselves again before they have recovered from the effects of the night before; men who, as the saying goes, have never seen either sunset or sunrise; men who run through their inheritance and sink into penury. None of us supposes that profligates of that description live pleasantly. No, but fastidious gourmets, with first-rate chefs and confectioners, fish, birds, game, and all of the very best; careful of their digestion; with

Wine in flask

Decanted from a new-broach'd cask, . . .

as Lucilius has it,

Wine of tang bereft,
All harshness in the strainer left;
CICERO DE FINIBUS

hibentes ludos et quae sequuntur, illa quibus detractis clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum; adsint etiam formosi pueri qui ministrent; respondeat his vestis, argentum, Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium; — hos ergo asotos bene quidem vivere aut beate numquam dixerim. Ex quo efficitur non ut voluptas ne sit voluptas, sed ut voluptas non sit summum bonum. Nec ille qui Diogenem Stoicum adulescens, post autem Panaetium audierat, Laelius eo dictus est sapiens quod non intellegerset quid suavissimum esset (nec enim sequitur ut cui cor sapiat ei non sapiat palatus), sed quia parvi id duceret.

O lapathe, ut iactare nec es satis cognitus qui sis! In quo Laelius clamores σοφός ille solebat Edere, compellans gumias ex ordine nostros.

Praeclare Laelius, et recte σοφός, illudque vere:

‘O Publi, o gurges, Galloni, es homo miser,’ inquit. ‘Cenasti in vita numquam bene, cum omnia in ista Consumis squilla atque acipensere cum decimano.’

Is haec loquitur qui in voluptate nihil ponens negat eum bene cenare qui omnia ponat in voluptate; et

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a This passage of Lucilius is alluded to by Horace Sat. 2. 2. 46, where it appears that Gallonius was an auctioneer, notorious for having introduced acípenser (sturgeon?) to Roman tables.

108
with the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel, the pleasures apart from which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not know what Good is; give them also beautiful boys to wait upon them, with drapery, silver, Corinthian bronzes, and the scene of the feast, the banqueting-room, all in keeping; take profligates of this sort; that these live well or enjoy happiness I will never allow. The conclusion is, not that pleasure is not pleasure but that pleasure is not the Chief Good. The famous Laelius, who had been a pupil of Diogenes the Stoic in his youth and later of Panaetius, was not called 'the Wise' because he was no judge of good eating (for a wise mind is not necessarily incompatible with a nice palate), but because he set little store by it.

Dinner of herbs, how all the earth
Derides thee and ignores thy worth!
Tho' Laelius, our old Roman sage,
Shouted thy praises to the age,
Our gourmands one by one arraigning.

Bravo, Laelius, 'sage' indeed. How true too the lines:

'O bottomless gulf of gluttony,
Publius Gallonius,' cried he,
'You're a poor devil, truth to tell,
Who never in your life dined well,
No, never once, although you pay
A fortune for a fish away,
Lobster or sturgeon Brobdingnagian.'

The speaker is a man who, setting no value on pleasure, declares that he who makes pleasure his all in all cannot dine well. Observe, he does not
CICERO DE FINIBUS

tamen non negat libenter umquam cenasse Gallonium (mentiretur enim), sed bene. Ita graviter et severe voluptatem secernit a bono. Ex quo illud efficitur, qui bene cenent omnes libenter cenare, qui libenter, non continuo bene. Semper Laelius bene.

25 Quid bene? Dicit Lucilius:

\[\text{cocto,}\]

Condito,

sed cedo caput cenae:

\[\text{sermone bono,}\]

quid ex eo?

\[\text{si quaeris, libenter;}\]

veniebat enim ad cenam ut animo quieto satiaret desideria naturae. Recte ergo is negat umquam bene cenasse Gallonium, recte miserum, cum prae-sertim in eo omne studium consumeret. Quem libenter cenasse nemo negat. Cur igitur non bene? Quia quod bene, id recte, frugaliter, honeste; ille porro prave,\(^1\) nequiter, turpiter cenabat; non igitur bene.\(^2\) Nec lapathi, suavitatem acipenseri Galloni Laelius anteponebat, sed suavitatem ipsam neglegebat; quod non faceret si in voluptate sum-mum bonum poneret.

26 IX. Semovenda est igitur voluptas non solum ut recta sequamini sed etiam ut loqui debeat fruga-

\(^1\) porro male prave MSS.; male Mdv. brackets.

\(^2\) bene inserted by Mdv.

110
BOOK II. viii-ix

say Gallonius never dined pleasantly (which would be untrue), but never well. So strict and severe is the distinction he draws between pleasure and good. The conclusion is that though all who dine well dine pleasantly, yet he who dines pleasantly does not necessarily dine well. Laelius always dined well.

What does 'well' mean? Lucilius shall say:

Well-cook'd, well-season'd,

ah, but now the principal dish:

with a deal

Of honest talk,

and the result:

a pleasant meal;

for he came to dinner that with mind at ease he might satisfy the wants of Nature. Laelius is right therefore in denying that Gallonius ever dined well, right in calling him unhappy, and that too although all his thoughts were centred on the pleasures of the table. No one will deny that he dined pleasantly. Then why not 'well'? Because 'well' implies rightly, respectably, worthily; whereas Gallonius dined wrongly, disreputably, basely; therefore he did not dine well. It was not that Laelius thought his 'dinner of herbs' more palatable than Gallonius's sturgeon, but that he disregarded the pleasures of the palate altogether; and this he could not have done, had he made the Chief Good consist in pleasure.

IX. "Consequently you are bound to discard pleasure, not merely if you are to guide your conduct aright, but even if you are to be able consistently to use the language of respectable people. Can we
CICERO DE FINIBUS

liter. Possumusne ergo in vita summum bonum dicere quod ne in cena\(^1\) quidem posse videamur? Quomodo autem philosophus loquitur? 'Tria genera cupiditatum, naturales et necessariae, naturales et non necessariae, nec naturales nec necessariae.' Primum divisit ineleganter; duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria. Hoc est non dividere sed frangere. Qui haec didicerunt quae ille contemnit, sic solent: 'Duo genera cupiditatum, naturales et inanes; naturalium duo, necessariae et non necessariae.' Confecta res esset. Vitiosum est enim in dividendo partem in genere numerare. Sed hoc sane concedamus. Contemnit disserendi elegantiam; confuse loquitur; gerendus est mos, modo recte sentiat. Equidem illud ipsum non nimium probo et tantum patior, philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. An potest cupiditas finiri? Tollenda est atque extrahenda radicitus. Quis est enim in quo sit cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit? Ergo et avarus erit, sed finite, et adulter, verum habebit modum, et luxuriosus, eodem modo. Qualis ista philosophia est quae non interitum afferat pravitatis sed sit contenta mediocrite vitiorum? Quamquam in hac divisione rem ipsam prorsus probo, elegantiam desidero. Appellet haec desideria naturae; cupiditatis nomen servet alio, ut eam cum de avaritia, cum de interm-

\(^1\) quod ne in cena Thos. Bentley; cum id ne in cena Mdv. with MSS.

\(^a\) See note on Bk. I. § 45.
possibly therefore call a thing the Chief Good with regard to living, when we feel we cannot call it so even in regard to dining? But how says our philosopher? 'The desires are of three kinds, natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, neither natural nor necessary.' To begin with, this is a clumsy division; it makes three classes when there are really only two. This is not dividing but hacking in pieces. Thinkers trained in the science which Epicurus despised usually put it thus: 'The desires are of two kinds, natural and imaginary; natural desires again fall into two subdivisions, necessary and not necessary.' That would have rounded it off properly. It is a fault in division to reckon a species as a genus. Still, do not let us stickle about form. Epicurus despises the niceties of dialectic; he affects a careless style; we must humour him in this, provided that his meaning is correct. But for my own part I cannot cordially approve, I merely tolerate, a philosopher who talks of setting bounds to the desires. Is it possible for desire to be kept within bounds? It ought to be destroyed, uprooted altogether. On your principle there is no form of desire whose possessor could not be morally approved. He will be a miser—within limits; an adulterer—in moderation; a sensualist—to the same extent. What sort of a philosophy is this, that instead of dealing wickedness its death-blow, is satisfied with moderating our vices? Albeit I quite approve the substance of this classification; it is the form of it to which I take exception. Let him speak of the first class as 'the needs of nature,' and keep the term 'desire' for another occasion, to be put on trial for its life when he
CICERO DE FINIBUS

perantia, cum de maximis vitiiis loquetur tamquam capitis accuset.

28 "Sed haec quidem liberius ab eo dicitur et saepius. Quod equidem non reprendo; est enim tanti philosophi tamque nobilis audacter sua de creta defendere. Sed tamen ex eo quod eam voluptatem quam omnes gentes hoc nomine appellant videtur amplexari saepe vehementius, in magnis interdum versatur angustiis, ut hominum conscientia remota nihil tam turpe sit quod voluptatis causa non videatur esse facturus. Deinde ubi erubuit (vis enim est permagna naturae), confugit illuc ut neget accedere quidquam posse ad voluptatem nihil dolen tis. At iste non dolendi status non vocatur voluptas. Non laboro, inquit, de nomine.—Quid quod res alia tota est?—Reperiam multos vel innumerables potius non tam curiosos nec tam molestos quam vos estis, quibus quidquid velim facile persuadeam.—Quid ergo dubitamus quin, si non dolere voluptas sit summa, non esse in voluptate dolor sit maximus? cur id non ita fit?—Quia dolori non voluptas contra ria est sed doloris privatio.

29 X. "Hoc vero non videre, maximō argumento esse voluptatem illam, qua sublata neget se intellegere omnino quid sit bonum (eam autem ita persequitur: quae palato percipiatur, quae auribus,—cetera addit,
BOOK II. ix-x

comes to deal with Avarice, Intemperance, and all the major vices.

28 "This classification of the desires is then a subject on which Epicurus is fond of enlarging. Not that I find fault with him for that; we expect so great and famous a philosopher to maintain his dogmas boldly. But he often seems unduly eager to approve of pleasure in the common acceptation of the term, for this occasionally lands him in a very awkward position. It conveys the impression that there is no action so base but that he would be ready to commit it for the sake of pleasure, provided he were guaranteed against detection. Afterwards, put to the blush by this conclusion (for the force of natural instinct after all is overwhelming), he turns for refuge to the assertion that nothing can enhance the pleasure of freedom from pain. 'Oh but,' we urge, 'your static condition of feeling no pain is not what is termed pleasure at all.'—'I don't trouble about the name,' he replies.—'Well, but the thing itself is absolutely different.'—'Oh, I can find hundreds and thousands of people less precise and tiresome than yourselves, who will be glad to accept as true anything I like to teach them.'—'Then why do we not go a step further and argue that, if not to feel pain is the highest pleasure, therefore not to feel pleasure is the greatest pain? Why does not this hold good?'—'Because the opposite of pain is not pleasure but absence of pain.'

29 X. "But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quae si appelles, honos praefandus sit)—hoc igitur, quod solum bonum severus et gravis philosophus novit, idem non videt ne expetendum quidem esse, quod eam voluptatem hoc eodem auctore non desideremus, cum dolore careamus! Quam haec sunt contraria! Hic si definire, si dividere didicisset, si loquendi vim, si denique consuetudinem verborum teneret, numquam in tantas salebras incidisset. Nunc vides quid faciat. Quam nemo umquam voluptatem appellavit, appellat; quae duo sunt, unum facit. Hanc in motu voluptatem (sic enim has suaves et quasi dulces voluptates appellat) interdum ita extenuat ut M'. Curium putes loqui, interdum ita laudat ut quid praeterea sit bonum neget se posse ne suspicari quidem. Quae iam oratio non a philosopho aliquo sed a censore opprimenda est; non est enim vitium in oratione solum sed etiam in moribus. Luxuriam non reprendit, modo sit vacua infinita cupiditate et timore. Hoc loco discipulos quae serere videtur, ut qui asoti esse velint philosophi ante fiunt.

116

A primo, ut opinor, animantium ortu petitur origo summi boni. Simul atque natum animal est, gaudet voluptate et eam appetit ut bonum, aspernatur dolorem ut malum. De malis autem et bonis ab iis animalibus quae nondum depravata sint ait optimo iudicari. Haec et tu ita posuisti et verba...
pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology),—he fails, I say, to see that this, the sole Good with which our strict and serious philosopher is acquainted, is actually not even desirable, inasmuch as on his own showing we feel no need of this sort of pleasure, so long as we are free from pain! How inconsistent this is! If only Epicurus had studied Definition and Division, if he understood the meaning of Predication or even the customary uses of terms, he would never have fallen into such a quandary. As it is, you see what he does. He calls a thing pleasure that no one ever called by that name before; he confounds two things that are distinct. The 'kinetic' sort of pleasure (for so he terms the delightful and so to speak sweet-flavoured pleasures we are considering) at one moment he so disparages that you would think you were listening to Manius Curius, while at another moment he so extols it that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. Now that is language that does not call for a philosopher to answer it,—it ought to be put down by the police. His morality is at fault, and not only his logic. He does not censure profligacy, provided it be free from unbridled desire, and from fear of consequences. Here he seems to be making a bid for disciples: the would-be roué need only turn philosopher.

"For the origin of the Chief Good he goes back, I understand, to the birth of living things. As soon as an animal is born, it delights in pleasure and seeks it as a good, but shuns pain as an evil. Creatures as yet uncorrupted are according to him the best judges of Good and Evil. That is the position both as you ex-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

vestra sunt. Quam multa vitiosa! Summum enim bonum et malum vagiens puer utra voluptate diiudicabit, stante an movente? quoniam, si dis placet, ab Epicuro loqui discimus. Si stante, hoc natura videlicet vult, salvam esse se, quod concedimus; si movente, quod tamen dicitis, nulla turpis voluptas erit quae praetermittenda sit, et simul non proficiscitur animal illud modo natum a summa voluptate, quae est a te posita in non dolendo. Nec tamen argumentum hoc Epicurus a parvis petivit aut etiam a bestiis, quae putat esse specula naturae, ut diceret ab iis duce natura hanc voluptatem expeti nihil dolendi. Neque enim haec move re potest appetitum animi, nec ullam habet ictum quo pellat animum status hic non dolendi (itaque in hoc eodem peccat Hieronymus), at ille pellit qui permulcet sensum voluptate. Itaque Epicurus semper hoc utitur ut probet voluptatem natura expeti, quod ea voluptas quae in motu sit et parvos ad se alliciat et bestias, non illa stabilis in qua tantum inest nihil dolere. Qui igitur convenit ab alia voluptate dicere naturam proficisci, in alia sumnum bonum ponere?

XI. "Bestiarum vero nullum iudicium puto. Quamvis enim depravatae non sint, pravae tamen esse possunt. Ut bacillum alius est inflexum et incurvatum de industria, alius ita natum, sic ferarum natura non
BOOK II. x-xi

pounded it and as it is expressed in the phraseology of your school. What a mass of fallacies! Which kind of pleasure will it be that guides a mewling infant to distinguish between the Chief Good and Evil, 'static' pleasure or 'kinetic'?—since we learn our language, heaven help us! from Epicurus. If the 'static' kind, the natural instinct is clearly towards self-preservation, as we agree; but if the 'kinetic,' and this is what nevertheless you maintain, then no pleasure will be too base to be accepted; and also our new-born animal in this case does not find its earliest motive in the highest form of pleasure, since this on your showing consists in absence of pain.

32 For this latter doctrine, however, Epicurus cannot have gone to children nor yet to animals, which according to him give a true reflection of nature; he could hardly say that natural instinct guides the young to desire the pleasure of freedom from pain. This cannot excite appetition; the 'static' condition of feeling no pain exerts no driving-power, supplies no impulse to the will (so that Hieronymus also is wrong here); it is the positive sensation of pleasure and delight that furnishes a motive. Accordingly Epicurus's standing argument to prove that pleasure is naturally desired is that infants and animals are attracted by the 'kinetic' sort of pleasure, not the 'static' kind which consists merely in freedom from pain. Surely then it is inconsistent to say that natural instinct starts from one sort of pleasure, but that the Chief Good is found in another.

33 XI. "As for the lower animals, I set no value on their verdict. Their instincts may be wrong, although we cannot say they are perverted. One stick has been bent and twisted on purpose, another has grown

119
CICERO DE FINIBUS

est illa quidem depravata mala disciplina, sed natura sua. Nec vero ut voluptatem expetat natura movet infantem, sed tantum ut se ipse diligat, ut integrum se salvumque velit. Omne enim animal, simul est ortum,1 et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligat, duasque quae maximae sunt in primis amplexitatur, animum et corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tum discernere incipit, ut ea quae prima data sint natura appetat asperneturque contraria. In his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est; nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingeni motum, non integritatem corporis, non valentudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt quae paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis. Callipho ad virtutem nihil adiunxit nisi voluptatem; Diodorus vacuitatem doloris. . . .2 His omnibus quos dixi consequentes sunt fines bonorum: Aristippo simplex voluptas; Stoicis consentire naturae, quod esse volunt e virtute, id est honeste vivere, quod ita

1 simul est ortum a conjecture of Mdv., who prints simul [et] ortum est with MSS.
2 Mdv. marks a lacuna. A sentence has been lost indicating the 'primary objects of desire' of the philosophers next mentioned.

a i.e. soundness of the limbs and of the senses.
120
crooked; similarly the nature of wild animals, though not indeed corrupted by bad education, is corrupt of its own nature. Again in the infant the natural instinct is not to seek pleasure; its instinct is merely towards self-regard, self-preservation and protection from injury. Every living creature, from the moment of birth, loves itself and all its members; primarily this self-regard embraces the two main divisions of mind and body, and subsequently the parts of each of these. Both mind and body have certain excellences; of these the young animal grows vaguely conscious, and later begins to discriminate, and to seek for the primary endowments of Nature and shun their opposites. Whether the list of these primary natural objects of desire includes pleasure or not is a much debated question; but to hold that it includes nothing else but pleasure, neither the limbs, nor the senses,\(^a\) nor mental activity, nor bodily integrity nor health, seems to me to be the height of stupidity. And on one's view as to the objects of instinctive desire must depend one's whole theory of Goods and Evils. Polemo, and also before him Aristotle, held that the primary objects were the ones I have just mentioned. Thus arose the doctrine of the Old Academy and of the Peripatetics, maintaining that the End of Goods is to live in accordance with Nature, that is, to enjoy the primary gifts of Nature's bestowal with the accompaniment of virtue. Callipho coupled with virtue pleasure alone; Diodorus freedom from pain. In the case of all the philosophers mentioned, their End of Goods logically follows: with Aristippus it is pleasure pure and simple; with the Stoics, harmony with Nature, which they interpret as meaning virtuous or morally good life, and further explain
CICERO DE FINIBUS

interpretantur, vivere cum intellegentia rerum earum quae natura evenirent, eligentem ea quae essent secundum naturam recientemque contraria. Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri, alter Hieronymi, Carneadi tertius; tres in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione, Polemonis, Calliphontis, Diodori; una simplex, cuius Zeno auctor, posita in decore tota, id est in honestate. (Nam Pyrrho, Aristo, Erillus iam diu abieicti.) Reliqui sibi constiterunt, ut extrema cum initiis convenirent, ut Aristippo voluptas, Hierynumo doloris vacuitas, Carneadi frui principiis naturalibus esset extremum; XII. Epicurus autem cum in prima commendatione voluptatem dixisset, si eam quam Aristippus, idem tenere debuit ultimum bonorum quod ille; sin eam quam Hieronymus, fecisset idem ut voluptatem illam Aristippi in prima commendatione poneret?"¹

"Nam quod ait sensibus ipsis iudicari voluptatem bonum esse, dolorem malum, plus tribuit sensibus quam nobis leges permittunt cum² privaturn litium iudices sumus. Nihil enim possimus iudicare nisi quod est nostri iudici; in quo frustra iudices solent, cum sententiam pronuntiant, addere: 'si quid mei

² cum inserted here by Mdv., after litium by Orelli.

122
this as meaning to live with an understanding of the natural course of events, selecting things that are in accordance with Nature and rejecting the opposite. Thus there are three Ends that do not include moral worth, one that of Aristippus or Epicurus, the second that of Hieronymus, and the third that of Carneades; three that comprise moral goodness together with some additional element, those of Polêmô, Callipho and Diodorus; and one theory that is simple, of which Zeno was the author, and which is based entirely on propriety, that is, on moral worth. (As for Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus, they have long ago been exploded.) All of these but Epicurus were consistent, and made their final Ends agree with their first principles,—Aristippus holding the End to be Pleasure, Hieronymus freedom from pain, Carneades the enjoyment of the primary natural objects. XII. Whereas Epicurus, if in saying that pleasure was the primary object of attraction, he meant pleasure in the sense of Aristippus, ought to have maintained the same ultimate Good as Aristippus; or if he made pleasure in the sense of Hieronymus his Chief Good, should he at the same time have allowed himself to make the former kind of pleasure, that of Aristippus, the primary attraction?

"The fact is that when he says that the verdict of the senses themselves decides pleasure to be good and pain evil, he assigns more authority to the senses than the law allows to us when we sit as judges in private suits. We cannot decide any issue not within our jurisdiction; and there is not really any point in the proviso which judges are fond of adding to their verdicts: 'if it be a matter within my jurisdiction,' for if it were not within their jurisdiction, the verdict..."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

iudici est; si enim non fuit eorum iudici, nihilo magis hoc non addito illud est iudicatum. Quid iudicant sensus? Dulce, amarum, leve, asperum, prope, lange, stare, movere, quadratum, rotundum. 37 Aequam\(^1\) igitur pronuntiabit sententiam ratio, adhibita primum divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia, quae potest appellari rite sapientia, deinde adiunctis virtutibus, quas ratio rerum omnium dominas, tu voluptatum satellites et ministras esse voluisti; quarum adeo omnium ex\(^2\) sententia pronuntiabit primum de voluptate, nihil esse ei loci, non modo ut sola ponatur in summi boni sede quam quaerimus, sed ne illo quidem modo ut ad honestatem applicetur. De vacuitate doloris eadem sententia erit. Reicietur etiam Carneades, nec ulla de summo bono ratio aut voluptatis non dolendive particeps aut honestatis expers probabitur. Ita relinquuet duas, de quibus etiam atque etiam consideret. Aut enim statuet nihil esse bonum nisi honestum, nihil malum nisi turpe, cetera aut omnino nihil habere momenti aut tantum ut nec expetenda nec fugienda sed eligenda modo aut reicienda sint; aut anteponet eam quam cum honestate ornatisimam, tum etiam ipsi initiis naturae et totius perfectione vitae locupletatam videbit. Quod eo liquidius faciet,

\(^1\)aèquam Mdv., quam MSS.
\(^2\)ex supplied by ed.
BOOK II. xii

would be equally invalid were the proviso omitted. What does come under the verdict of the senses? Sweetness, sourness, smoothness, roughness, proximity, distance; whether an object is stationary or moving, square or round. A just decision can therefore only be delivered by Reason, with the aid in the first place of that knowledge of things human and divine, which may rightly claim the title of Wisdom; and secondly with the assistance of the Virtues, which Reason would have to be the mistresses of all things, but you considered as the handmaids and subordinates of the pleasures. After calling all of these into council, she will pronounce first as to Pleasure, that she has no claim, not merely to be enthroned alone in the seat of that Chief Good which we are seeking, but even to be admitted as the associate of Moral Worth. As regards freedom from pain her decision will be the same. For Carneades will be put out of court, and no theory of the Chief Good will be approved that either includes pleasure or absence of pain, or does not include moral worth. Two views will thus be left. After prolonged consideration of these, either her final verdict will be that there is no Good but moral worth and no Evil but moral baseness, all other things being either entirely unimportant or of so little importance that they are not desirable or to be avoided, but only to be selected or rejected; or else she will prefer the theory which she will recognize as including the full beauty of moral worth, enriched by the addition of the primary natural objects and of a life completed to its perfect span. And her judgment will be all the clearer, if she can first of all settle whether the dispute between these rival
CICERO DE FINIBUS

si perspexerit rerum inter eas verborumne sit controversia.

39 XIII. "Huius ego nunc auctoritatem sequens idem faciam. Quantum enim potero, minuam contentiones omnesque sententias simplices eorum in quibus nulla est virtutis adiunctio omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo,—primum Aristippi Cyrenaicorumque omnium, quos non est veritum in ea voluptate quae maxima dulcedine sensum moveret summum bonum ponere, contemnentes istam vacuitatem doloris. Hi non viderunt, ut ad cursum equum, ad arandum bovem, ad indagandum canem, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum, quasi mortalem deum, contraque ut tardam aliquam et languardam pecudem ad pastum et ad procreandi voluptatem hoc divinum animal ortum esse voluerunt, quo nihil mihi videtur absurdius. Atque haec contra Aristippum, qui eam voluptatem non modo summam sed solam etiam ducit, quam omnes unam appellamus voluptatem. Aliter autem vobis placet. Sed ille, ut dixi, vitiose. Nec enim figura corporis nec ratio excellens ingeni humani significat ad unam hanc rem natum hominem ut frueretur voluptatibus. Nec vero audiendus Hieronymus, cui summum bonum est idem quod vos interdum vel potius nimium saepe dicitis, nihil dolere. Non enim, si malum est dolor, carere eo malo satis est ad bene

1 ad supplied by Mdv.
theories is one of fact, or turns on verbal differences only.

XIII. "Guided by the authority of Reason I will now adopt a similar procedure myself. As far as possible I will narrow the issue, and will assume that all those theories of the simple type, that include no admixture of virtue, are to be eliminated from philosophy altogether. First among these comes the system of Aristippus and the Cyrenaic school in general, who did not shrink from finding their Chief Good in pleasure of the sort that excites the highest amount of actively agreeable sensation, and who despised your freedom from pain. They failed to see that just as the horse is designed by nature for running, the ox for ploughing, and the dog for hunting, so man, as Aristotle observes, is born for two purposes, thought and action: he is as it were a mortal God. The Cyrenaics held on the contrary that this godlike animal came into being, like some dull, half-witted sheep, in order to feed and to enjoy the pleasure of procreation,—a view that seems to me the climax of absurdity. So much in answer to Aristippus, who considers pleasure in the only sense in which we all of us employ the term to be not merely the highest but the sole pleasure that exists. Your school holds a different view. However, as I said, Aristippus is wrong. Neither man's bodily conformation nor his surpassing mental faculty of reason indicates that he was born for the sole purpose of enjoying pleasure. Nor yet can we listen to Hieronymus, whose Chief Good is the same as is occasionally, or rather only too frequently, upheld by yourselves, freedom from pain. If pain is an evil, to be without this evil is not enough to constitute the Good Life.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

vivendum. Hoc dixerit potius Ennius:

Nimium boni est cui nihil est mali;
nos beatam vitam non depulsione mali sed adeptione
boni iudicemus, nec eam cessando, sive gaudentem,
ut Aristippus, sive non dolentem, ut hic, sed agendo
aliquid considerandovе quaeramus.

“Quae possunt eadem contra Carneadeum illud
summum bonum dici, quod is non tam ut probaret pro-
tulit, quam ut Stoicis quibuscum bellum gerebat oppo-
neret; id autem eiusmodi est ut additum ad virtutem
auctoritatem videatur habiturum et expleturum cumu-
late vitam beatam, de quo omnis haec quaestio est.
Nam qui ad virtutem adiungunt vel voluptatem, quam
unam virtus minimi facit, vel vacuitatem doloris, quae
etiamsi malo caret tamen non est summum bonum,
accessione utuntur non ita probabili, nec tamen cur id
tam parce tamque restricte faciant intellego. Quasi
everam emendum eis sit quod addant ad virtutem, pri-
mum vilissimas res addunt, deinde singulas potius
quam omnia quae prima natura approbavisset ea cum
honestate coniungerent. Quae quod Aristoni et
Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime
valere et gravissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicerent
interesse, recte iam pridem contra eos desitum est
disputari. Dum enim in una virtute sic omnia esse

\[1\text{quod Mdv.; cum MSS.}\]

\[a\text{From Ennius s tragedy} \text{Hecuba, cf. Euripides, \textit{Hec. 627}}\]

keίνος ὄλυμπατος ὁτι παν ἡμαρ τυχάνει μηδεν κακῶν. 128
BOOK II. xiii

Let Ennius say if he likes that

Enough, and more, of good
Is his who hath no ill;¹

but let us reckon happiness not by the avoidance of evil but by the attainment of good. Let us seek it not in the idle acceptance whether of positive delights, like Aristippus, or of freedom from pain, like Hieronymus, but in a life of action or of study.

The same arguments can be urged against the Chief Good of Carneades, which he advanced less from a desire to prove it true than to use it as a weapon in his battle with the Stoics; though it is such that if added to Virtue it may be thought to be of importance and to be likely to augment the sum total of Happiness, which is the one subject of our inquiry. Whereas those who join with Virtue either pleasure, the one thing she values least, or freedom from pain, which even though it is devoid of evil yet is not the Chief Good, make a less satisfactory combination; nor yet can I understand why they go to work in so cautious and niggardly a fashion. You would think they had to purchase the commodity which is to be added to virtue. To begin with they choose the cheapest things they can find to add, and then they each dole out one only, instead of coupling with moral worth all the things initially approved by Nature. Aristo and Pyrrho thought all these things utterly worthless, and said, for example, that there was absolutely nothing to choose between the most perfect health and the most grievous sickness; and consequently men have long ago quite rightly given up arguing against them. For in insisting upon the unique importance of virtue in such a sense as to

¹ and those denying any value to external goods need not be considered.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

voluerunt ut eam rerum selectione expoliarent, nec ei quidquam aut unde oriretur darent aut ubi niteretur, virtutem ipsam quam amplexabantur sustulerunt. Erillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit, sed nec optimum nec quo vita gubernari possit. Itaque hic ipse iam pridem est reiectus; post enim Chrysippum non sane est disputatum.

XIV. "Restatis igitur vos; nam cum Academicis incerta luctatio est, qui nihil affirmant et quasi desperata cognitione certi id sequi volunt quocumque veri simile videatur. Cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negoti quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est, quodque et ipse et amici eius et multi postea defensores eius sententiae fuerunt, et nescio quomodo, is qui auctoritatem minimam habet, maximam vim, populus cum illis facit. Quos nisi redarguimus, omnis virtus, omne decus, omnis vera laus deserenda est. Ita ceterorum sententiis semotis, relinquitur non mihi cum Torquato sed virtuti cum voluptate certatio. Quam quidem certationem homo et acutus et diligens, Chrysippus, non contemnit, totumque discrimen summi boni in earum comparatione positum putat. Ego autem existimo, si honestum esse aliquid ostendero quod sit ipsum sua vi propter seque expetendum, iacere vestra omnia. Itaque eo quale sit breviter ut tempus postulat constituto, accedam 130
rob it of any power of choice among external things and to deny it any starting-point or basis, they destroyed the very virtue they desired to cherish. Again, Erillus, in basing everything on knowledge, fixed his eyes on one definite Good, but this not the greatest Good, nor one that could serve as the guide of life. Accordingly Erillus himself has long ago been set aside; since Chrysippus no one has even troubled to refute him.

XIV. "Accordingly your school remains; for there is no coming to grips with the Academics, who affirm nothing positively, and despairing of a knowledge of certain truth, make up their minds to take apparent probability as their guide. Epicurus however is a more troublesome opponent, because he is a combination of two different sorts of pleasure, and because besides himself and his friends there have been so many later champions of his theory, which somehow or other enlists the support of that least competent but most powerful adherent, the general public. Unless we refute these adversaries, all virtue, all honour, all true merit must be abandoned. Thus, when all the other systems have been discarded, there remains a duel in which the combatants are, not myself and Torquatus, but Virtue and Pleasure. This contest is by no means ignored by so penetrating and so industrious a writer as Chrysippus, who considers that the rivalry between pleasure and virtue is the cardinal issue in the whole question of the Chief Good. My own view is that, if I can succeed in proving the existence of Moral Worth as a thing essentially and for itself desirable, your entire system at once collapses. Accordingly I will begin by defining, with such brevity as the occasion demands,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ad omnia tua, Torquate, nisi memoria forte defecerit.

45 "Honestum igitur id intellegimus quod tale est ut
detracta omni utilitate sine ullis praemiiis fructibusve
per se ipsum possit iure laudari. Quod quale sit,
non tam definitione, qua sum usus, intellegi potest
(quamquam aliquantum potest) quam communi om-
nium iudicio et optimi cuiusque studiis atque factis,
qui permulta ob eam unam causam faciunt quia
deceet, quia rectum, quia honestum est, etsi nullum
consecuturum emolumentum vident. Homines
enim, etsi aliis multis, tamen hoc uno plurimum
a bestiis differunt quod rationem habent a natura
datam mentemque acrem et vigentem celer-
rimeque multa simul agitantem et, ut ita dicam,
sagacem, quae et causas rerum et consecutiones
videat et similitudines transferat et disiuncta con-
 jungat et cum praesentibus futura copulet om-
nemque complectatur vitae consequentis statum.
Eademque ratio fecit hominem hominem appeten-
tem cumque iis natura et sermone et usu congruen-
tem, ut profectus a caritate domesticorum ac suorum
serpat longius et se implicet primum civium, deinde
omnia mortalium societate atque, ut ad Archytam
scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit sed
patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur.

a Plato, Epistle ix.
the nature of Moral Worth; and then, Torquatus, I will proceed to deal with each of your points, unless my memory should happen to fail me.

"By Moral Worth, then, we understand that which is of such a nature that, though devoid of all utility, it can justly be commended in and for itself, apart from any profit or reward. A formal definition such as I have given may do something to indicate its nature; but this is more clearly explained by the general verdict of mankind at large, and by the aims and actions of all persons of high character. Good men do a great many things from which they anticipate no advantage, solely from the motive of propriety, morality and right. For among the many points of difference between man and the lower animals, the greatest difference is that Nature has bestowed on man the gift of Reason, of an active, vigorous intelligence, able to prosecute several trains of thought with great swiftness at the same time, and having, so to speak, a keen scent to discern the sequence of causes and effects, to draw analogies, combine things separate, connect the future with the present, and survey the entire field of the subsequent course of life. It is Reason moreover that has inspired man with a relish for his kind; she has produced conformity of character, of language and of habit; she has prompted the individual, starting from friendship and from family affection, to expand his interests, forming social ties first with his fellow-citizens and later with all mankind. She reminds him that, as Plato puts it in his letter to Archytas, a man was not born for self alone, but for country and for kindred, claims that leave but a small part of him for himself. Nature
CICERO DE FINIBUS

46 Et quoniam eadem natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri videndi, quod facillime apparat cum vacui curis etiam quid in caelo fiat scire avemus, his initiis inducti omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia, simplicia, constantia, tum vana, falsa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudem, perurium, malitiam, iniuriam. Eadem ratio habet in se quiddam amplum atque magnificum, ad imperandum magis quam ad parentendum accommodatum, omnia humana non tolerabilia solum sed etiam levia ducens, altum quiddam et excelsum, nihil timens, nemini cedens, semper invictum. Atque his tribus generibus honestorum notatis, quartum sequitur et in eadem pulchritudine et aptum ex illis tribus, in quo inest ordo et moderatio. Cuius similitudine perspecta in formarum specie ac dignitate, transitum est ad honestatem dictorum atque factorum. Nam ex his tribus laudibus quas ante dixi, et temeritatem reformidat et non audet cuiquam aut dicto protervo aut facto nocere, vereturque quidquam aut facere aut eloqui quod parum virile videatur.

47 XV. "Habes undique expletam et perfectam, Torquate, formam honestatis, quae tota quattuor his virtutibus quae a te quoque commemoratae sunt continetur. Hanc se tuus Epicurus omnino ignorare dicit quam aut qualem esse velint ii qui honestate summum

134
BOOK II. xiv-xv

has also engendered in mankind the desire of con-
templating truth. This is most clearly manifested
in our hours of leisure; when our minds are at
ease we are eager to acquire knowledge even of
the movements of the heavenly bodies. This
primary instinct leads us on to love all truth as such,
that is, all that is trustworthy, simple and consistent,
and to hate things insincere, false and deceptive,
such as cheating, perjury, malice and injustice.
Further, Reason possesses an intrinsic element of
courage, dignity and grandeur, suited rather to require
obedience than to render it, esteeming all the acci-
dents of human fortunes not merely as endurable
but also as unimportant; a quality of loftiness and
elevation, fearing nothing, submitting to no one,
ever unsubdued. These three kinds of moral good-
ness being noted, there follows a fourth kind,
possessed of equal beauty, and indeed combining in
itself the other three. This is the principle of order
and of restraint. From recognizing something—analogous to this principle in the beauty and dignity
of outward forms, we pass to beauty in the moral
sphere of speech and conduct. Each of the three
excellences mentioned before contributes something
to this fourth one: it dreads rashness; it shrinks
from injuring anyone by wanton word or deed; and
it fears to do or say anything that may appear
unmanly.

XV. "There, Torquatus, is a full, detailed and com-
plete account of Moral Worth, a whole of which these
four virtues, which you also mentioned, constitute the
parts. Yet your Epicurus tells us that he is utterly
at a loss to know what nature or qualities are assigned
to this Morality by those who make it the measure

Morality is not,
as Epicurus says,
a mere conven-
tion.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

bonum metiantur. Si enim ad honestatem omnia referantur neque in ea voluptatem dicant inesse, ait eos voce inani sonare (his enim ipsis verbis utitur), neque intelligere nec videre sub hanc vocem honestatis quae sit subicienda sententia. Ut enim consuetudo loquitur, id solum dicitur honestum quod est popular fama gloriosum. Quod, inquit, quamquam voluptatibus quibusdam est saepe iucundius, tamen expetitur propter voluptatem. Videsne quam sit magna dissenso? Philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id non sit in voluptate, negat se intelligere, nisi forte illud quod multitudinis rumore laudetur. Ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non sit, tum esse non turpe cum id a multitudine laudetur quod sit ipsum per se rectum atque laudabile; tamen non ob eam causam illud dici esse honestum quia laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit ut, vel si ignorantem id homines vel si obmutuissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset specieque laudabile. Itaque idem natura victus, cui obsisti non potest, dicit alio loco id quod a te etiam paulo ante dictum est, non posse iucunde vivi nisi etiam honeste. Quid nunc ‘honeste’ dicit? idemne quod ‘iucunde’? Ergo ita: non posse

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*a Here as elsewhere no translation can convey the double meaning of the word *honestum*, ‘honourable,’ used as an equivalent of τὸ καλὸν, ‘the morally beautiful or good.’*
BOOK II. xv

of the Chief Good. For if Morality be the standard to which all things are referred, while yet they will not allow that pleasure forms any part of it, he declares that they are uttering sounds devoid of sense (those are his actual words), and that he has no notion or perception whatever of any meaning that this term Morality can have attached to it. In common parlance 'moral' (honourable) means merely that which ranks high in popular esteem. And popular esteem, says Epicurus, though often in itself more agreeable than certain forms of pleasure, yet is desired simply as a means to pleasure. Do you realize how vast a difference of opinion this is? Here is a famous philosopher, whose influence has spread not only over Greece and Italy but throughout all barbarian lands as well, protesting that he cannot understand what Moral Worth is, if it does not consist in pleasure; unless indeed it be that which wins the approval and applause of the multitude. For my part I hold that what is popular is often positively base, and that, if ever it is not base, this is only when the multitude happens to applaud something that is right and praiseworthy in and for itself; which even so is not called 'moral' (honourable) because it is widely applauded, but because it is of such a nature that even if men were unaware of its existence, or never spoke of it, it would still be worthy of praise for its own beauty and loveliness. Hence Epicurus is compelled by the irresistible force of instinct to say in another passage what you also said just now, that it is impossible to live pleasantly without also living morally (honourably). What does he mean by 'morally' now? The same as 'pleasantly'? If so, does it amount to saying that it is impossible
CICERO DE FINIBUS

honeste vivi nisi honeste vivatur? An nisi populari fama? Sine ea igitur iucunde negat posse se vivere? Quid turpius quam sapientis vitam ex insipientium sermone pendere? Quid ergo hoc loco intellegit honestum? Certe nihil nisi quod possit ipsum propter se iure laudari. Nam si propter voluptatem, quae est ista laus quae possit e macello peti? Non is vir est ut, cum honestatem eo loco habeat ut sine ea iucunde neget posse vivi, illud honestum quod populare sit sentiat et sine eo neget iucunde vivi posse, aut quidquam aliud honestum intellegat nisi quod sit rectum ipsumque per se, sua vi, sua sponte, sua natura laudabile.

51 XVI. "Itaque, Torquate, cum diceres clamare Epicurum non posse iucunde vivi nisi honeste et sapienter et iuste viveretur, tu ipse mihi gloriari videbare. Tanta vis inerat in verbis propter earum rerum quae significabantur his verbis dignitatem, ut altior fieres, ut interdum insisteres, ut nos intuens quasi testificare rere laudari honestatem et iustitiam aliquando ab Epicuro. Quam te decebat iis verbis uti quibus si philosophi non uterentur, philosophia omnino non egeremus. Iorum enim verborum amore, quae perraro appellantur ab Epicuro, sapientiae, fortitudinis, iustitiae, temperantiae, praestantissimis ingeniiis

\[1 \text{ posse se vivere Mdv. ; posse vivi Orelli; posse vivere MSS.} \]
BOOK II. xv-xvi

to live morally unless you—live morally? Or, unless you make public opinion your standard? He means then that he cannot live pleasantly without the approval of public opinion? But what can be baser than to make the conduct of the Wise Man depend upon the gossip of the foolish? What therefore does he understand by ‘moral’ in this passage? Clearly, nothing but that which can be rightly praised for its own sake. For if it be praised as being a means to pleasure, what is there creditable about this? You can get pleasure at the provision-dealer’s. No,—Epicurus, who esteems Moral Worth so highly as to say that it is impossible to live pleasantly without it, is not the man to identify ‘moral’ (honourable) with ‘popular’ and maintain that it is impossible to live pleasantly without popular esteem; he cannot understand ‘moral’ to mean anything else than that which is right,—that which is in and for itself, independently, intrinsically, and of its own nature praiseworthy.

XVI. “This, Torquatus, accounts for the glow of pride with which, as I noticed, you informed us how loudly Epicurus proclaims the impossibility of living pleasantly without living morally, wisely and justly. Your words derived potency from the grandeur of the things that they denoted; you drew yourself up to your full height, and kept stopping and fixing us with your gaze, and solemnly asseverating that Epicurus does occasionally commend morality and justice. Were those names never mentioned by philosophers we should have no use for philosophy; how well they sounded on your lips! Too seldom does Epicurus speak to us of Wisdom, Courage, Justice, Temperance. Yet it is the love that those great names inspire which
CICERO DE FINIBUS

homines se ad philosophiae studium contulerunt.  
52 Oculorum, inquit Plato, est in nobis sensus acerrimus, quibus sapientiam non cernimus; quam illa ardentes amores excitaret sui, si videretur! Cur tandem? an quod ita callida est ut optime possit architectari voluptates? Cur iustitia laudatur? aut unde est hoc contritum vetustate proverbium: 'quicum in tenebris'\(^2\)? Hoc, dictum in una re, latissime patet, ut omnibus factis re, non teste moveamur. Sunt enim levia et perinffirma quae dicebantur a te, animi conscientia improbos excruciai, tum etiam poenae timore qua aut afficiantur aut semper sint in metu ne afficiantur aliquando. Non oportet timidum aut imbecillo animo fingi non bonum illum virum, qui quidquid fecerit ipse se cruciet omniaque formidet, sed omnia callide referentem ad utilitatem, acutum, versutum, veteratum, facile ut ex cogitet quomodo occulte, sine teste, sine ullo conscio fallat. An tu me de L. Tubulo putas dicere? qui cum praetor quaestionem inter sicarios exercuisset, ita aperte cepit pecunias ob rem iudicandam ut anno proximo P. Scaevola tribunus plebis ferret ad plebeem, vellentne de ea re quae. Quo plebiscito decreta a senatu est consuli quaestio Cn. Caepioni; profectus in exsilium Tubulus statim nec respondere ausus; erat enim res aperta.

\(^1\) si videretur Mdv. om. with A, B, E, but cp. Plato, Phaedr. 250 D. ψις γαρ ἡμῶν ἀυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθητών, ἢ φρόνησις οὐχ ὤραται. δεινῶς γαρ ἀν παρέχετα ἔρωτας, εἰ τι τοιούτων έαυτής ἐναργεῖς εἰδώλων παρέχετο εἰς ἰψιν τὸν. 

\(^2\) quicum in tenebris mices inf. MSS. Cp. de Off. 3. 77, cum enim idem alicuius laudant, dignum esse dicunt quicum in tenebris mices (sc. digitis).
has lured the ablest of mankind to devote themselves to philosophical studies. The sense of sight, says Plato, is the keenest sense we possess, yet our eyes cannot behold Wisdom; could we see her, what passionate love would she awaken! And why is this so? Is it because of her supreme ability and cunning in the art of contriving pleasures? Why is Justice commended? What gave rise to the old familiar saying, 'A man with whom you might play odd and even in the dark'? This proverb strictly applies to the particular case of honesty, but it has this general application, that in all our conduct we should be influenced by the character of the action, not by the presence or absence of a witness. How weak and ineffectual are the deterrents you put forward, —the torture of a guilty conscience, and the fear of the punishment that offenders incur, or at all events stand in continual dread of incurring in the end! We must not picture our unprincipled man as a poor-spirited coward, tormenting himself about his past misdeeds, and afraid of everything; but as shrewdly calculating profit in all he does, sharp, dexterous, a practised hand, fertile in devices for cheating in secret, without witness or accomplice.

Don't suppose I am speaking of a Lucius Tubulus, who when he sat as praetor to try charges of murder made so little concealment of taking bribes for his verdict that next year the tribune of the plebs, Publius Scaevola, moved in the plebeian assembly for a special inquiry. The bill passed the plebs, and the senate commissioned the consul Gnaeus Caepio to hold the investigation; but Tubulus promptly left the country, and did not venture to stand his trial, so open was his guilt.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

XVII. "Non igitur de improbo sed de\textsuperscript{1} callido improbo quae-
rimus, qualis Q. Pompeius in foedere Num-
antino insitiiando fuit, nec vero omnia timente sed
primum qui animi conscientiam non curet, quam
scilicet comprimere nihil est negoti. Is enim qui
occultus et tectus dicitur, tantum abest ut se indicet,
perficiet etiam ut dolere alterius improbe facto vi-
deatur; quid est enim alium esse versutum?

"Memini me adesse P. Sextilio Rufo cum is rem ad
amicos ita deferret, se esse heredem Q. Fadio Gallo,
cuius in testamento scriptum esset se ab eo rogatum ut
omnis hereditas ad filiam perveniret. Id Sextilius
factum negabat; poterat autem impune; quis enim
redargueret? Nemo nostrum credebát, eratque veri
similis hunc mentiri, cuius interesser, quam illum,
qui id se rogasse scripsisset quod debuisset rogare.
Addebat etiam se in legem Voconiam iuratum contra
eam facere non audere, nisi aliter amicos videretur.
Aderamus nos quidem adulescentes, sed multi am-
plissimi viri, quorum nemo censuit plus Fadiae dan-
dum quam posset ad eam legem Voconia pervenire.
Tenuit permagnam Sextilius hereditatem unde, si
secutus esset eorum sententiam qui honesta et recta
emolumentis omnibus et commodis anteponerent,
\textsuperscript{1} de inserted by Mdv.

\textsuperscript{a} Presumably a reference to the customary oath to main-
tain the laws, taken on assuming an office of state. The
Voconian law prohibited a woman from being left heir to
an estate. It was evaded by bequeathing the estate to a
friend who had promised to hand it on to the intended
heiress.

\textsuperscript{b} The Voconian law appears to have allowed a bequest
to a woman, provided it did not exceed the amount that
passed to the 'heres' proper. Either such a minor bequest
had been made to Fadia, or this sentence means she was to
get nothing.

142
BOOK II. xvii

XVII “It is not therefore a question of a rascal merely, but of a crafty rascal, like Quintus Pompeius when he disowned the treaty he had made with the Numantines; nor yet of a timid, cowardly knave, but of one who to begin with is deaf to the voice of conscience, which it is assuredly no difficult matter to stifle. The man we call stealthy and secret, so far from betraying his own guilt, will actually make believe to be indignant at the knavery of another; that is what we mean by a cunning old hand.

55 “I remember assisting at a consultation which Publius Sextilius Rufus held with his friends on the following matter. He had been left heir to Quintus Fadius Gallus. Fadius’s will contained a statement that he had requested Sextilius to allow the whole of the estate to pass to his daughter. Sextilius now denied the arrangement, as he could do with impunity, for there was no one to rebut him. Not one of us believed his denial; it was more probable that he should be lying, as his pocket was concerned, than the testator, who had left it in writing that he had made a request which it had been his duty to make. Sextilius actually went on to say that, having sworn to maintain the Voconian law, he would not venture to break it, unless his friends thought he ought to do so. I was only a young man, but many of the company were persons of high consideration; and every one of these advised him not to give Fadia more than she was entitled to get under the Voconian law. Sextilius kept a handsome property, not a penny of which he would have touched had he followed the advice of those who placed honour and right above all considerations of profit and advantage. Do you therefore suppose that he was afterwards

For crafty dishonesty can escape detection; and Epicurus justifies some risk in the pursuit of pleasure.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

nummum nullum¹ attigisset. Num igitur eum postea censes anxio animo aut sollicito fuisse? Nihil minus, contraque illa hereditate dives ob eamque rem laetus. Magni enim aestimabat pecuniam non modo non contra leges sed etiam legibus partam; quae quidem vel cum periculo est quae vobis; est enim effectrix multarum et magnarum voluptatum.

56 "Ut igitur illis qui, recta et honesta quae sunt, ea statuunt per se expetenda, adeunda sunt saepe pericula decoris honestatisque causa, sic vestris, qui omnia voluptate metiuntur, pericula adeunda sunt ut adipscantur magnas voluptates. Si magna res, magna hereditas agetur, cum pecunia voluptates pariantur plurimae, idem erit Epicuro vestro faciendum, si suum finem bonorum sequi volet, quod Scipioni, magna gloria proponita si Hannibalem in Africam retraxisset. Itaque quantum adiit periculum! Ad honestatem enim illum omnem conatum suum referebat, non ad voluptatem. Sic vester sapiens, magno aliquo emolumento commotus, cum causa,² si opus erit, dimicabit. Occultum facinus esse potuerit, gaudebit; deprehensus omnem poenam contemnet. Erit enim instructus ad mortem contemnendam, ad exilium, ad ipsum etiam dolorem. Quem quidem vos cum improbis poenam proponitis impetibilem facitis, cum sapientem semper boni plus habere vultis tolerabilem.

XVIII. "Sed finge non solum callidum eum qui ali-

¹ nummum nullum; some inf. MSS. ne nummum quidem unum.
² cum causa Mdv. marks as corrupt, and conjectures cum amico. Inf. MSS. have animi causa.

144
troubled by remorse? Not a bit of it. On the contrary, the inheritance made him a rich man, and he was thoroughly pleased with himself in consequence. He thought he had scored heavily: he had won a fortune, not only by no illegal means, but actually by the aid of the law. And according to your school it is right to try to get money even at some risk; for money procures many very delightful pleasures.

"Therefore just as those who hold that things right and honourable are desirable for their own sake must often take risks in the cause of honour and morality, so Epicureans, who measure all things by pleasure, may properly take risks in order to obtain considerable pleasures. If a large sum of money or a great inheritance is at stake, inasmuch as money buys a vast number of pleasures, your Epicurus, if he wishes to attain his own End of Goods, will have to act as Scipio did, when he had the chance of winning great renown by enticing Hannibal back to Africa. To do so, he risked enormous dangers. For honour and not pleasure was the aim of that great enterprise. Similarly, your Epicurean Wise Man, when stirred by the prospect of some considerable gain, will fight to the death, if need be, and with good reason. Do circumstances allow his crime to go undetected, so much the better; but if found out, he will make light of every penalty. For he will have been schooled to make light of death, of exile, even of pain itself. The latter indeed you make out to be unendurable when you are enacting penalties for the wicked, but easy to bear when you are maintaining that the Wise Man will always command a preponderance of Good.

XVIII. "But suppose that our evil-doer is not only
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quid improbe faciat, verum etiam praepotentem, ut M. Crassus fuit,—qui tamen solebat uti suo bono,—ut hodie est noster Pompeius, cui recte facienti gratia est habenda; esse enim quam vellet iniquus poterat impune. Quam multa vero iniuste fieri possunt quae nemo possit reprehendere! Si te amicus tuus moriens rogaverit ut hereditatem reddas suae filiae, nec us-quam id scripserit, ut scripsit Fadius, nec cuiquam dixerit, quid facies? Tu quidem reddes; ipse Epicurus fortasse redderet; ut Sex. Pedaecus, Sex. F., is qui hunc nostrum reliquit effigiem et humanitatis et probitatis suae filium, cum doctus, tum omnium vir optimus et iustissimus, cum sciret nemo eum rogatum a C. Plotio, equite Romano splendido, Nursino, ulter ad mulierem venit eique nihil opinanti viri mandatum exposuit hereditatemque reddidit. Sed ego ex te quaero, quoniam idem tu certe fecisses, nonne intellegas eo maiorem vim esse naturae quod ipsi vos, qui omnia ad vestrum commodum et ut ipsi dicitis ad voluptatem referatis, tamen ea faciatis e quibus appareat non voluptatem vos sed officium se-qui, plusque rectam naturam quam rationem pravam valere? Si scieris, inquit Carneades, aspidem occulte latere uspiam et velle aliquem imprudentem super eam assidere cuius mors tibi emolumentum futura sit,
BOOK II. xviii

clever but also supremely powerful, as was Marcus
Crassus,—who however was mostly content to rely
on his private resources; or like our friend Pompeius
at the present time, who deserves our gratitude for his
upright conduct, since he might be as unjust as he
liked with impunity. But how many unrighteous
acts are possible which no one would be in a position
to censure! If a friend of yours requests you on his
death-bed to hand over his estate to his daughter,
without leaving his intention anywhere in writing,
as Fadius did, or speaking of it to anybody, what will
you do? You no doubt will hand over the money;
perhaps Epicurus himself would have done the same;
as did Sextus Peducaeus, son of Sextus, a scholar and
a gentleman of scrupulous honour, who left behind
him a son, our friend of to-day, to recall his father’s
culture and integrity. No one knew that a similar
request had been made to Sextus by a distinguished
Roman knight named Gaius Plotius, of Nursia; but
Sextus of his own accord went to Plotius’s widow, in-
formed her, much to her surprise, of her husband’s
commission, and handed over the property to her.
But the question I want to put to you is this: since
you yourself would undoubtedly have done the same,
do you not see that the force of natural instinct is all
the more firmly established by the fact that even you
Epicureans, who profess to make your own interest
and pleasure your sole standard, nevertheless perform
actions that prove you to be really aiming not at
pleasure but at duty; prove, I say, that the natural
impulse towards right is more powerful than corrupt
reason? Suppose, says Carneades, you should know
that there is a viper lurking somewhere, and that
some one, by whose death you stand to profit, is about
CICERO DE FINIBUS
improve feceris nisi monueris ne assidat. Sed im-
punite tamen; scisse enim te quis coarguere possit?
Sed nimis multa. Perspicuum est enim, nisi aequitas,
fides, iustitia proficiscantur a natura, et si omnia haec
ad utilitatem referantur, virum bonum non posse re-
periri, deque his rebus satis multa in nostris de re
publica libris sunt dicta a Laelio.
60  XIX. "Transfer idem ad modestiam vel temperan-
tiam, quae est moderatio cupiditatum rationi obediens.
Satisne ergo pudori consulat si quis sine teste libidini
pareat? An est aliquid per se ipsum flagitosum,
etiamsi nulla comitetur infamia? Quid? fortis
viri voluptatumne calculis subductis proelium ineunt,
sanguinem pro patria profundunt, an quodam animi
ardore atque impetu concitati? Utrum tandem
censes, Torquate, Imperiosum illum, si nostra verba
audiret, tuamne de se orationem libentius auditurum
fuisset an meam, cum ego dicerem nihil eum fecisse
sua causa omnique rei publicae, tu contra nihil nisi
sua? Si vero id etiam explanare velles, apertiusque
diceres nihil eum fecisse nisi voluptatis causa, quo-
61 modo eum tandem laturum fuisset existimas? Esto;
fecerit, si ita vis, Torquatus propter suas utilitates
(malo enim dicere quam voluptates, in tanto praes-
sertim viro); num etiam eius collega P. Decius,
BOOK II. xviii-xix

to sit down on it unawares; then you will do a wicked deed if you do not warn him not to sit down. But still your wickedness would go unpunished, for who could possibly prove that you knew? However, I labour the point unnecessarily. It is obvious that, if fair-dealing, honesty and justice have not their source in nature, and if all these things are only valuable for their utility, no good man can anywhere be found. The subject is fully discussed by Laelius in my volumes On the State.

XIX. "Apply the same test to Temperance or Moderation, which means the control of the appetites in obedience to the reason. Suppose a man yields to vicious impulses in secret,—is that no offence against purity? Or is it not true that an act can be sinful in itself, even though no disgrace attends it? And again, does a brave soldier go into battle and shed his blood for his country upon a nice calculation of the balance of pleasures, or in hot blood and under the stimulus of impulse? Come, Torquatus, if the great Imperiosus were listening to our debate, which of our two speeches about himself would he have heard with greater satisfaction, yours or mine? Me declaring that no deed of his was done for selfish ends, but all from motives of patriotism, or you maintaining that he acted solely for self? And suppose you had wanted to make your meaning clearer, and had said more explicitly that all his actions were prompted by desire for pleasure, pray how do you imagine he would have taken it? But grant your view; assume if you like that Torquatus acted for his own advantage (I would sooner put it in that way than say 'for his own pleasure,' especially in the case of so great a man). Yet what about his colleague Publius
princeps in ea familia consulatus, cum se devoverat
et equo admissó in medium aciem Latinorum irruebat,
aliquid de voluptatibus suis cogitabat? ubi ut eam
caperet aut quando? cum scieret confestim esse mori-
endum, eaunque mortem ardentiore studio peteret
quam Epicurus voluptatem petendam putat. Quod
quidem eius factum nisi esset iure laudatum, non
esset imitatus quarto consulatu suo filius, neque porro
ex eo natus cum Pyrrho bellum gerens consul cecidisse
set in proelio seque e continentis genere tertiam
victimam rei publicae praebuisse. Contineo me ab
exemplis. Graecis hoc modicum est, Leonidas,
Epaminondas, tres aliqui aut quattuor: ego si nostros
colligere coepero, perficiam illud quidem ut se vir-
tuti tradat constringendam voluptas, sed dies me
deficiet, et, ut A. Varius, qui est habitus iudex durior,
dicere consessori solebat, cum datis testibus alii
tamen citarentur: 'Aut hoc testium satis est aut
nescio quid satis sit,' sic a me satis datum est te-
stium. Quid enim? te ipsum, dignissimum maior-
bus tuis, voluptasne induxit ut adolescensulus eripe-
res P. Sullae consulatum? Quem cum ad patrem-
tuum rettulisses, fortissimum virum, qualis ille vel
consul vel civis cum semper, tum post consulatum
fuit! Quo quidem auctore nos ipsi ea gessimus ut
omnibus potius quam ipsis nobis consulerimus.

"At quam pulchre dicere videbare, cum ex altera

\[a\] A reference to the suppression of the Catalinarian con-
spiracy and Cicero's subsequent exile.

150
Decius, the first of his family to be consul? When Decius vowed himself to death, and setting spurs to his horse was charging into the thickest of the Latin ranks, surely he had no thought of personal pleasure? Pleasure where to be enjoyed or when? For he knew he must die in a moment, aye and he courted death with more passionate ardour than Epicurus would have us seek pleasure. Had not his exploit earned renown, it would not have been imitated by his son in his fourth consulship; nor would the latter's son again, commanding as consul in the war with Pyrrhus, have also fallen in battle, third in succession of his line to give himself a victim for the state. I refrain from further instances. The Greeks have but a modest list,—Leonidas, Epaminondas, some three or four; but were I to begin to cite the heroes of our race, I should doubtless succeed in making Pleasure yield herself prisoner to Virtue, but—daylight would fail before I had done. Aulus Varius, noted for his severity as a judge, used to say to his colleague on the bench, when after witnesses had been produced still further witnesses were called: 'Either we have evidence enough already, or I do not know what evidence can be enough.' Well, I have cited witnesses enough. Why, you yourself, in every way a worthy scion of your stock,—was pleasure the inducement that led you, a mere youth, to wrest the consulship from Publius Sulla? You won that office for your gallant father; and what a consul he was! What a patriot, all his life long and more especially after his consulship! It was with his support that I carried through an affair, which was for all men's interest rather than my own.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

parte ponebas cumulatum aliquem plurimis et maximis voluptatibus nullo nec praesenti nec futuro dolore, ex altera autem cruciatibus maximis toto corpore nulla nec adiuncta nec sperata voluptate, et quaerebas quis aut hoc miserior aut superiore illo beatior; deinde concludebas summum malum esse dolorem, summum bonum voluptatem!

XX. "L. Thorius Balbus fuit, Lanuvinus, quem meminisse tu non potes; is ita vivebat ut nulla tam exquisita posset inveniri voluptas qua non abundaret. Erat et cupidus voluptatum et eius generis intelligens et copiosus; ita non supersticiosus ut illa plurima in sua patria sacrificia et fana contemneret; ita non timidus ad mortem ut in acie sit ob rem publicam interfectus. Cupiditates non Epicuri divisione finiebat sed sua satietate. Habebat tamen rationem valetudinis; utebatur iis exercitationibus ut ad cenam et sitiens et esuriens veniret, eo cibo qui et suavissimus esset et idem facillimus ad concoquentum, vino et ad voluptatem et ne noceret. Cetera illa adhibebat, quibus demptis negat se Epicurus intelligere quid sit bonum. Aberat omnis dolor; qui si adesset, nec molliter ferret et tamen medicis plus quam philosophis uteretur. Color egregius, integra valetudo, summa gratia; vita denique conferta
BOOK II. xix-xx

when you pictured on the one hand a person loaded with an abundance of the most delightful pleasures and free from all pain whether present or in prospect, and on the other one racked throughout his frame by the most excruciating pains, unqualified by any pleasure or hope of pleasure; then proceeded to ask who could be more wretched than the latter or more happy than the former; and finally drew the conclusion that pain was the Chief Evil and pleasure the Chief Good.

XX. "Well, there was a certain Lucius Thorius of Lanuvium, whom you cannot remember; he lived on the principle of enjoying in the fullest measure all the most exquisite pleasures that could possibly be found. His appetite for pleasures was only equalled by his taste and ingenuity in devising them. He was so devoid of superstition as to scoff at all the sacrifices and shrines for which his native place is famous; and so free from fear of death that he died in battle for his country. Epicurus's classification of the desires meant nothing to him; he knew no limit but satiety. At the same time he was careful of his health: took sufficient exercise to come hungry and thirsty to table; ate what was at once most appetizing and most digestible; drank enough wine for pleasure and not too much for health. Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what Good is. Pain he never experienced at all; had it come to him, he would have borne it with fortitude, yet would have called in a doctor sooner than a philosopher. He had excellent health and a sound constitution. He was extremely popular. In short, his life was replete with pleasure of every
CICERO DE FINIBUS

65 voluptatum omnium varietate. Hunc vos beatum,—ratio quidem vestra sic cogit; at ego quem huic antpeonam non audeo dicere; dicet pro me ipsa virtus, nec dubitatit isti vestro beato M. Regulum antpeonere, quem quidem, cum sua voluntate, nulla vi coactus praeter fidem quam dederat hosti, ex patria Carthaginem revertisset, tum ipsum, cum vigiliiis et fame cruciaretur, clamat virtus beatiorum: fuisse quam potantem in rosa Thorium. Bella magna gesserat, bis consul fuerat, triumpharat, nec tamen sua illa superiora tam magna neque tam praecelar ducebat quam illum ultimum casum quem propter fidem constantiamque susceperat; qui nobis miseraabilis videtur audientibus, illi perpetenti erat voluptarius. Non enim hilaritate nec lascivia nec risu aut ioco, comite levitatis, 1 saepe etiam tristes firmate et constantia sunt beati. Stuprata per vim Lucretia a regis filio testata cives se ipsa interemt. Hic dolor populi Romani duce et auctore Bruto causa civitati libertatis fuit, ob eiusque mulieris memoriam primo anno et vir et pater eius consul est factus. Tenuis L. Verginius unusque de multis sexagesimo anno post libertatem receptam virginem filiam sua manu occidit potius quam ea Ap. Claudi libidini, qui tum erat cum 2 summo imperio, dederetur.

1 Before saepe inf. MSS. insert sed.
2 cum inserted by I. Müller.

154
BOOK II. xx

65 variety. Your school pronounces him a happy man, at least your theory requires you to do so. But I place above him—I do not venture to say whom: Virtue herself shall speak for me, and she will not hesitate to rank Marcus Regulus higher than this typically happy man, as you would call him. Regulus, of his own free will and under no compulsion except that of a promise given to an enemy, returned from his native land to Carthage; yet Virtue proclaims that when he had done so he was happier while tormented with sleeplessness and hunger than Thorius carousing on his couch of roses. Regulus had fought great wars, had twice been consul, had celebrated a triumph; yet all his earlier exploits he counted less great and glorious than that final disaster, which he chose to undergo for the sake of honour and of loyalty: a pitiable end, as it seems to us who hear of it, but full of pleasure for him who endured it. Gaiety and merriment, laughter and jesting, those comrades of frivolity, are not the only signs of happiness; often in sadness those are happy whose wills are strong and true. Lucretia outraged by the royal prince called on her fellow-citizens to witness her wrong and died by her own hand. The indignation that this aroused in the Roman People, under the leadership and guidance of Brutus, won freedom for the state; and in gratitude to Lucretia's memory both her husband and her father were made consuls for the first year of the republic. Sixty years after our liberties had been won, Lucius Verginius, a poor man of humble station, killed his maiden daughter with his own hand rather than surrender her to the lust of Appius Claudius, who then held the highest power in the state.
CICERQ DE FINIBUS

67 XXI. "Aut haec tibi, Torquate, sunt vituperanda aut patrocinium voluptatis repudiandum. Quod autem patrocinium aut quae ista causa est voluptatis quae nec testes ullos e claris viris nec laudatores poterit adhibere? Ut enim nos ex annalium monumentis testes excitamus eos quorum omnis vita consumpta est in laboribus gloriiosis, qui voluptatis nomen audire non possent, sic in vestris disputationibus historia muta est. Numquam audivi in Epicuri schola Lycurgum, Solonem, Miltiadem, Themistoclem, Epaminondam nominari, qui in ore sunt ceterorum philosophorum omnium. Nunc vero, quoniam haec nos etiam tractare coepimus, suppedebit nobis Atticus noster e thesauris suis quos et quantos viros! Nonne melius est de his aliquid quam tantis voluminibus de Themista loqui? Sint ista Graecorum; quamquam ab iis philosophiam et omnes ingenuas disciplinas habemus; sed tamen est aliquid quod nobis non liceat, liceat illis. Pugnant Stoici cum Peripateticis. Alteri negant quidquam esse bonum nisi quod honestum sit, alteri plurimum se et longe longeque plurimum tribuere honestati, sed tamen et in corpore et extra esse quaedam bona. Et certamen honestum et disputatio splendidá! Omnis est enim de virtutis dignitate contentio. At cum tuis cum disseras, multa sunt audienda etiam de obscenis voluptatibus, de quibus ab Epicuro sæpissime dicitur. Non potes ergo ista tueri, Torquate, mihi crede, si te ipse et

a Atticus wrote historical and biographical miscellanies.

156
BOOK II. xxi

67. XXI. "Either, Torquatus, you must reprobate these actions, or you must give up your championship of Pleasure. But what defence can Pleasure offer, what case can you make out for her, when she will be able to produce no famous men as her witnesses or supporters? On our side we cite in evidence from our records and our annals men who spent their whole lives in glorious toils, men who would not have borne to hear pleasure so much as named; but in your discourses history is dumb. In the school of Epicurus I never heard one mention of Lycurgus, Solon, Miltiades, Themistocles, Epaminondas, who are always on the lips of the other philosophers. And now that we Romans too have begun to treat of these themes, what a marvellous roll of great men will our friend Atticus supply to us from his store-houses of learning? Would it not be better to talk of these than to devote those bulky volumes to Themista? Let us leave that sort of thing to the Greeks. True we owe to them philosophy and all the liberal sciences; yet there are topics not permitted to us, that are allowable for them. Battle rages between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. One school declares that nothing is good but Moral Worth, the other that, while it assigns the greatest, and by far the greatest, value to Morality, yet still some bodily and external things are good. Here is an honourable quarrel, fought out in high debate! For the whole dispute turns on the true worth of virtue. But when one argues with your friends, one has to listen to a great deal about even the grosser forms of pleasure! Epicurus is always harping upon them! Believe me then, Torquatus, if you will but look within, and study your own thoughts and inclinations, you cannot con-

68

69

It paints the Virtues as the handmaids of Pleasure.
tuas cogitationes et studia perspexeris; pudebit te, inquam, illius tabulae quam Cleanthes sane com-mode verbis depingere solebat. Iubebat eos qui audiebant secum ipsos cogitare pictam in tabula voluptatem pulcherrimo vestitu et ornatu regali in solio sedentem; praesto esse virtutes ut ancillulas, quae nihil aliud agerent, nullum suum officium duce-rent nisi ut voluptati ministrarent, et eam tantum ad aurem admonerent (si modo id pictura intellegi pos-set) ut caveret ne quid faceret imprudens quod offen-deret animos hominum, aut quidquam e quo oriretur aliquid dolor. 'Nos quidem virtutes sic natae sumus ut tibi serviremus; aliud negoti nihil habemus.'

XXII. "At negat Epicurus (hoc enim vestrum lumen est) quemquam qui honeste non vivat iucunde posse vivere. Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget; illud quaero, quid ei qui in voluptate sum- mum bonum ponat consentaneum sit dicere. Quid affers cur Thorius, cur Chius Postumius, cur omnium horum magister, Orata, non iucundissime vi-xerit? Ipse negat, ut ante dixi, luxuriosorum vitam reprendendam nisi plane fatui sint, id est nisi aut cupiant aut metuant. Quarum ambarum rerum cum medicinam pollicetur, luxuriae licentiam pollicetur. His enim rebus detractis negat se reperire in asoto- rum vita quod reprendat. Non igitur potestis volu- ptate omnia dirigentes aut tueri aut retinere virtutem. Nam nec vir bonus ac iustus haberi debet qui ne

1 Inf. MSS. have Postumius cur Chius. Mdv. marks a corruption, suspecting that three persons were enu- merated before cur omnium horum: perhaps cur Hirrius (an epicure mentioned by Varro and Pliny the Elder), cur Postumius.
BOOK II. xxi-xxii

tinue to defend the doctrines you profess. You will be put to the blush, I say, by the picture that Cleanthes used to draw so cleverly in his lectures. He would tell his audience to imagine a painting representing Pleasure, decked as a queen, and gorgeously apparelled, seated on a throne; at her side should stand the Virtues as her handmaids, who should make it their sole object and duty to minister to Pleasure, merely whispering in her ear the warning (provided this could be conveyed by the painter's art) to beware of unwittingly doing aught to offend public opinion, or anything from which pain might result. 'As for us Virtues, we were born to be your slaves; that is our one and only business.'

XXII. "But, you will tell me, your great luminary Epicurus denies that anyone who does not live morally can live pleasantly. As if I cared what Epicurus says or denies! What I ask is, what is it consistent for a man to say who places the Chief Good in pleasure? What reason can you give for thinking that Thorius, or Postumius of Chios, or the master of them all, Orata, did not live extremely pleasant lives? Epicurus himself says that the life of sensualists is blameless, if they are not utter fools—for that is what his proviso, 'if they are free from fear and from desire,' amounts to. And, as he offers an antidote for both desire and fear, he virtually offers free indulgence for sensuality. Eliminate those passions, he says, and he cannot find anything to blame in a life of profligacy. Consequently you Epicureans, by taking pleasure as the sole guide, make it impossible for yourselves either to uphold or to retain virtue. For a man is not to be thought good and just who refrains from doing wrong to
CICERO DE FINIBUS

malum habeat abstinet se ab iniuria; nosti, credo, illud:

Nemo pius est qui pietatem—;
cave putes quidquam esse verius. Nec enim dum metuit iustus est, et certe si metuere destiterit non erit; non metuet autem sive celare poterit sive opibus magnis quidquid fecerit obtinere, certeque malet existimari vir bonus ut non sit, quam esse ut non putetur. Ita, quod certissimum est, pro vera certaque iustitia simulationem nobis iustitiae traditis praecipitisque quodam modo ut nostram stabilem conscientiam contemnamus, aliorum errantem opinionem aucupemur. Quae dici eadem de ceteris virtutibus possunt, quorum omnia fundamenta vos in voluptate tamquam in aqua ponitis. Quid enim? fortemne possimus dicere eundem illum Torquatum? — delector enim, quamquam te non possum, ut ais, corrumpere, delector, inquam, et familia vestra et nomine; et hercule mihi vir optimus nostrique amantissimus, A. Torquatus, versatur ante oculos, cuius quantum studium et quam insigne fuerit erga me temporibus illis quae nota sunt omnibus, scire necesse est utrumque vestrum; quae mihi ipsi, quì volo et esse et haberì gratus, grata non essent nisi eum perspicerem mea causa mihi amicum fuisse, non sua; nisi hoc dicis, sua, quod interest omnium recte facere. Si id dicis, vicimus; id enim volumus, id

1 quod certissimum est Mdv. suspects as an inept interpolation.

a An unknown quotation. Mdv. suggests that the sentence ended with metu colit or the like.
b Cp. § 62 above.

160
BOOK II. xxii

avoid incurring harm; no doubt you know the line:

None is good, whose love of goodness —;

believe me, nothing can be truer. As long as his motive is fear, he is not just, and assuredly as soon as he ceases to fear, he will not be just; and he will not feel fear, if he can conceal his wrong-doing, or is sufficiently powerful to brazen it out; and he will assuredly prefer the reputation without the reality of goodness to the reality without the reputation. So your school undoubtedly preaches the pretence of justice instead of the real and genuine thing. Its lesson amounts to this—we are to despise the trustworthy voice of our own conscience, and to run after the fallible imaginations of other men. The same applies in the case of the other virtues. Basing them entirely on pleasure you are laying their foundations in water. Why, take the great Torquatus again: can he really be called brave?—for I delight, albeit my flattery, as you put it, is powerless to bribe you, I delight, I say, in your name and lineage; and indeed I have personal recollections of that distinguished man, Aulus Torquatus, who was an affectionate friend of my own, and whose signal loyalty and devotion to me in circumstances that are within universal knowledge must be familiar to you both; yet for my part, anxious as I am to feel and show a proper gratitude, I would not have thanked him for his friendship had I not known that it was disinterested; unless you choose to say that it was for his own interest in the sense that it is to every man's interest to act rightly. If you do say so, we have won our case; for our one principle, our one
CICERO DE FINIBUS

73 contendimus, ut offici fructus sit ipsum officium. Hoc ille tuus non vult, omnibusque ex rebus voluptatem quasi mercedem exigit. Sed ad illum redeo; si voluptatis causa cum Gallo apud Anienem depugnavit provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et cognomen induit ullam aliam ob causam nisi quod ei talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto. Iam si pudor, si modestia, si pudicitia, si uno verbo temperantia poenae aut infamiae metu coercetbuntur, non sanctitate sua se tuebuntur, quod adulterium, quod stuprum, quae libido non se proripiet ac proiciet aut occultatione proposita aut impunitate aut licentia?

74 "Quid? illud, Torquate, quale tandem videtur,—te isto nomine ingenio gloria, quae facis, quae cogitas, quae contendis quo referas, cuius rei causa perficere quae conaris velis, quid optimum denique in vita iudices, non audere in conventu dicere? Quid enim mereri velis, iam cum magistratum inieris et in contentionem ascenderes (est enim tibi edicendum quae sis observaturus in iure dicendo, et fortasse etiam, si tibi erit visum, aliquid de maioribus tuis et de te ipso dices more maiorum),—quid merearis igitur ut dicas te in eo magistratu omnia voluptatis causa facturum esse tese nihil fecisse in vita nisi voluptatis causa?—

162
BOOK II. xxii

73 contenton is, that duty is its own reward. This your great master does not allow; he expects everything to pay—to yield its quota of pleasure. But I return to old Torquatus. If it was to win pleasure that he accepted the Gallic warrior’s challenge to single combat on the banks of the Anio, and if he despoiled him and assumed his necklet and the corresponding surname for any other reason than that he thought such deeds became a man, I do not consider him brave. Again, if modesty, self-control, chastity, if in a word Temperance is to depend for its sanction on the fear of punishment or of disgrace, and not to maintain itself by its own intrinsic sacredness, what form of adultery, vice or lust will not break loose and run riot when it is assured of concealment, impunity or indulgence.

74 “Or what, pray, are we to think of the situation if you, Torquatus, bearing the name you do, and gifted and distinguished as you are, dare not profess before a public audience the real object of all your actions, aims and endeavours, the motive that inspires you to accomplish your undertakings, what it is in short that you consider the greatest good in life? In return for what payment or consideration, when not long hence you have attained to public office and come forward to address a meeting (for you will have to announce the rules that you propose to observe in administering justice, and very likely also, if you think good, you will follow the time-honoured custom of making some reference to your ancestors and to yourself)—for what consideration then would you consent to declare that you intend in office to guide your conduct solely by pleasure, and that pleasure has been your aim in every action of your life?—‘Do you

m2 163
CICERO DE FINIBUS

'An me,' inquis, 'tam amentem putas ut apud imperitos isto modo loquar?'—At tu eadem ista dic in iudicio aut, si coronam times, dic in senatu. Numquam facies. Cur, nisi quod turpis oratio est? Mene ergo et Triarium dignos existimas apud quos turpiter loquare?

75 XXIII. "Verum esto: verbum ipsum voluptatis non habet dignitatem, nec nos fortasse intellegimus; hoc enim identidem dicitis, non intellegere nos quam dicatis voluptatem. Rem videlicet difficilem et obscuram! Individua cum dicitis et intermundia, quae nec sunt nulla nec possunt esse, intellegimus; voluptas, quae passeribus nota est omnibus, a nobis intellegi non potest? Quid si efficio ut fateare me non modo quid sit voluptas scire (est enim iucundus motus in sensu), sed etiam quid eam tu velis esse? Tum enim eam ipsam vis quam modo ego dixi, et nomen imponis in motu ut sit et faciat aliquam varietatem, tum aliam quandam summam voluptatem cui addi nihil possit; eam tum adesse cum dolor omnis absit; eam stabilem appellas. Sit sane ista voluptas. Die in quovis conventu te omnia facere ne doleas. Si ne hoc quidem satis ample, satis honeste dici putas, dic te omnia et in isto magistratu et in omnī vita utilitatis tuae causa facturum, nihil nisi quod 164
BOOK II. xxii-xxiii

take me for such an imbecile,' you exclaim, 'as to talk in that fashion before ignorant people?'—Well, make the same profession in a law-court, or if you are afraid of the public there, say it in the senate. You will never do it. Why not, unless because such language is disgraceful? Then what a compliment to Torquatus and myself, to use it in our presence!

75  XXIII. "But let us grant your position. The actual word 'pleasure' has an undignified sound; and perhaps we do not understand its significance: you are always repeating that we do not understand what you mean by pleasure. As though it were a difficult or recondite notion! We understand you when you talk of 'indivisible atoms' and 'cosmic interspaces,' things that don't exist and never can exist; then is our intelligence incapable of grasping the meaning of pleasure, a feeling known to every sparrow? What if I force you to admit that I do know not only what pleasure really is (it is an agreeable activity of the sense), but also what you mean by it? For at one moment you mean by it the feeling that I have just defined, and this you entitle 'kinetic' pleasure, as producing a definite change of feeling, but at another moment you say it is quite a different feeling, which is the acme and climax of pleasure, but yet consists merely in the complete absence of pain; this you call 'static' pleasure. Well, grant that pleasure is the latter sort of feeling. Profess in any public assembly that the motive of all your actions is the desire to avoid pain. If you feel that this too does not sound sufficiently dignified and respectable, say that you intend both in your present office and all your life long to act solely for the sake of your own advantage,—to do nothing but what will pay, nothing
CICERO DE FINIBUS

expeditat, nihil denique nisi tua causa; quem clamorem contionis aut quam spem consulatus eius qui tibi paratissimus est futuram putas? Eamne rationem igitur sequere\textsuperscript{1} qua tecum ipse et cum tuis utare, profiteri et in medium proferre non audeas? At vero illa quae Peripatetici, quae Stoici dicunt, semper tibi in ore sunt in iudiciis, in senatu. Officium, aequitatem, dignitatem, fidem, recta, honesta, digna imperio, digna populo Romano, omnia pericula pro re publica, mori pro patria,—haec cum loqueris, nos barones stupemus, tu videlicet tecum ipse rides.

Nam inter ista tam magnifica verba tamque praeeclara non habet ullum voluptas locum, non modo illa quam in motu esse dicitis, quam omnes urbani, rustici, omnes, inquam, qui Latine loquuntur, voluptatem vocant, sed ne haec quidem stabilis, quam praeter vos nemo appellat voluptatem. XXIV. Vide igitur ne non debeat verbis nostris uti, sententiis tuis. Quod si vultum tibi, si incessum fingers quo gravior vide-rere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas, et ea dicas quae non sentias? aut etiam, ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur? Vide, queso, rectumne sit. Mihi quidem eae verae videntur opiniones quae honestae, quae laudabiles, quae gloriosae, quae in senatu, quae apud populum, \textsuperscript{1}sequere A; most MSS. sequare.

166
BOOK II. xxiii-xxiv

in short that is not for your own interest; imagine the uproar among the audience! What would become of your chances of the consulship, which as it is seems to be a certainty for you in the near future? Will you then adopt a rule of life which you can appeal to in private and among friends but which you dare not openly profess or parade in public? Ah, but it is the vocabulary of the Peripatetics and the Stoics that is always on your lips, in the law-courts and the senate. Duty, Fair-dealing, Moral Worth, Fidelity, Uprightness, Honour, the Dignity of office, the Dignity of the Roman People, Risk all for the state, Die for your Country,—when you talk in this style, we simpletons stand gaping in admiration, and you no doubt laugh in your sleeve. For in that glorious array of high-sounding words, pleasure finds no place, not only what your school calls ‘kinetic’ pleasure, which is what every one, polished or rustic, every one, I say, who can speak Latin, means by pleasure, but not even this ‘static’ pleasure, which no one but you Epicureans would call pleasure at all. XXIV. Well then, are you sure you have any right to employ our words with meanings of your own? If you assumed an unnatural expression or demeanour, in order to look more important, that would be insincere. Are you then to affect an artificial language, and say what you do not think? Or are you to change your opinions like your clothes, and have one set for indoor wear and another when you walk abroad? Outside, all show and pretence, but your genuine self concealed within? Reflect, I beg of you, is this honest? In my view those opinions are true which are honourable, praiseworthy and noble—which can be openly avowed in the senate and
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quae in omni coetu concilioque profitenda sint, ne id non pudeat sentire quod pudeat dicere.

78 "Amicitiae vero locus ubi esse potest aut quis amicus esse cuiquam quem non ipsum amet propter ipsum? Quid autem est amare, e quo nomen ductum amicitiae est, nisi velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis etiamsi ad se ex iis nihil redundet\(^1\)? Prodest, inquit, mihi eo esse animo. Immo videri fortasse. Esse enim, nisi eris, non potes\(^2\); qui autem esse poteris nisi te amor ipse ceperit? quod non subducta utilitatis ratione effici solet, sed ipsum a se oritur et sua sponte nascitur. 'At enim sequor utilitatem.' Manebit ergo amicitia tam diu quam diu sequetur utilitas, et, si utilitas constituet amicitiam, tollet eadem. Sed quid ages tandem si utilitas ab amicitia, ut fit saepe, defecerit? Relinquesne? quae ista amicitia est? Retinebis? qui convenit? quid enim de amicitia statueris utilitatis causa expectenda vides. 'Ne in odium veniam si amicum destitero tueri.' Primum cur ista res digna odio est nisi quod est turpis? Quod si ne quo incommodo afficiare non relinques amicum, tamen, ne sine fructu alligatus sis, ut moriatur optabis. Quid si non modo utilitatem tibi nullam afferet, sed iacturae

\(^1\) *reundet* Mdv.; MSS. *redeunt et, redeat et, redeat quid.*
\(^2\) For the suspicious words *esse enim, nisi eris, non potes*, which make the following sentence tautological, Graser conjectures *esse enim, nisi videris, non prodest.* "'It pays me (you say) to be a disinterested friend.' No, to seem so perhaps: it doesn't pay to be so without seeming so. But how can you be so unless, etc. . . .”
BOOK II. xxiv

the popular assembly, and in every company and gathering, so that one need not be ashamed to say what one is not ashamed to think.

78 Again, how will friendship be possible? How can one man be another man’s friend, if he does not love him in and for himself? What is the meaning of ‘to love’—from which our word for friendship is derived—except to wish some one to receive the greatest possible benefits even though one gleans no advantage therefrom oneself? ‘It pays me,’ you say, ‘to be a disinterested friend.’ No, perhaps it pays you to seem so. Be so you cannot, unless you really are; but how can you be a disinterested friend unless you feel genuine affection? Yet affection does not commonly result from any calculation of expediency. It is a spontaneous growth; it springs up of itself: ‘But,’ you will say, ‘I am guided by expediency.’ Then your friendship will last just so long as it is attended by expediency. If expediency creates the feeling it will also destroy it. But what, pray, will you do, if, as often happens, expediency parts company with friendship? Will you throw your friend over? What sort of friendship is that? Will you keep him? How does that square with your principles? You remember your pronouncement that friendship is desirable for the sake of expediency. ‘I might become unpopular if I left a friend in the lurch.’ Well, in the first place, why is such conduct unpopular, unless because it is base? And if you refrain from deserting a friend because to do so will have inconvenient consequences, still you will long for his death to release you from an unprofitable tie. What if he not only brings you no advantage, but causes you to suffer loss of pro-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

rei familiaris erunt faciundae, labores suscipiendi, adeundum vitae periculum? ne tum quidem te respicies et cogitabis sibi quemque natum esse et suis voluptatibus? Vadem te ad-mortem tyranno dabis pro amico, ut Pythagoreus ille Siculo fecit tyranno, au! Pylades cum sis, dices te esse Oresten ut moriare pro amico, aut si esses Orestes, Pyladem refelleres, te indicares, et si id non probares, quo minus ambo una necaremni non deprecarere1?

80 XXV. “Faceres tu quidem, Torquate, haec omnia; nihil enim arbitror magna laude dignum esse quod te praetermissurum credam aut mortis aut doloris metu. Non quaeritur autem quid naturae tuae consentaneum sit, sed quid disciplinae. Ratio ista quam defendis, praecepta quae didicisti, quae probas, funditus evertunt amicitiam, quamvis eam Epicurus, ut facit, in caelum efferat laudibus. ‘At coluit ipse amicitias.’ Quis, quae, illum negat et bonum virum et comem et humanum fuisset? De ingenio eius in his disputationibus, non de moribus quaeritur. Sit ista in Graecorum levitate perversitas, qui male dictis insectantur eos a quibus de veritate dissentiant. Sed quamvis comis in amicis tuendis fuerit, tamen, si haec vera sunt (nihil enim affirmo), non satis acutus fuit. ‘At multis se probavit.’ Et quidem iure fortasse; sed tamen non gravissimum est testimonium multitudinis. In omni enim arte vel

1 deprecarere edd.; prece rare Mdv. with the MSS.

a Phintias, pleading for his friend Damon before Dionysius, ‘tyrant’ of Syracuse; Dionysius pardoned them both and begged to become a third in such a friendship. Cf. Off. 3. 45.
b Cf. V. 63. Cicero refers to a scene in the Duloreses of Pacuvius, where Thoas King of the Tauri wished to kill whichever of the two captives brought before him was Orestes.

170
BOOK II. xxiv-xxv

perty, to undergo toil and trouble, to risk your life? Will you not even then take interest into account, and reflect that each man is born for himself and for his own pleasure? Will you go bail with your life to a tyrant on behalf of a friend, as the famous Pythagorean did to the Sicilian despot? or being Pylades will you say you are Orestes, so as to die in your friend's stead? or supposing you were Orestes, would you say Pylades was lying and reveal your identity, and if they would not believe you, would you entreat that you both might die together?

XXV. "Yes, Torquatus, you personally would do all these things; for I do not believe there is any high or noble action which fear of pain or death could induce you to forgo. But the question is not what conduct is consistent with your character, but what is consistent with your tenets. The system you uphold, the principles you have studied and accept, undermine the very foundations of friendship, however much Epicurus may, as he does, praise friendship up to the skies. 'But,' you tell me, 'Epicurus himself had many friends.' Who pray denies that Epicurus was a good man, and a kind and humane man? In these discussions it is his intellect and not his character that is in question. Let us leave to the frivolous Greeks the wrong-headed habit of attacking and abusing the persons whose views of truth they do not share. Epicurus may have been a kind and faithful friend; but if what I say is true (for I do not dogmatize), he was not a very acute thinker. 'But he won many disciples.' Yes, and perhaps he deserved to do so; but still the witness of the crowd does not carry much weight; for as in every art or study or science of any kind, so in right conduct itself,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

studio vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optimum quidque rarissimum est. Ac mihi quidem, quod et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei et fuerunt et hodie sunt et in amicitiiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes, hoc videtur maior vis honestatis et minor voluptatis. Ita enim vivunt quidam ut eorum vita refellatur oratio. Atque ut ceteri dicere existimantur melius quam facere, sic hi mihi videntur facere melius quam dicere.

82 XXVI. "Sed haec nihil sane ad rem; illa videamus quae a te de amicitia dicta sunt. E quibus unum mihi videbar ab ipso Epicuro dictum cognoscere, amicitiam a voluptate non posse divelli ob eamque rem colendum esse quod, cum sine ea tuto et sine metu vivi non posset, ne iucunde quidem posset. Satis est ad hoc responsum. Attulisti aliud humanius horum recentiorum, numquam dictum ab ipso illo, quod sciam, primo utilitatis causa amicum expeti, cum autem usus accessisset, tum ipsum amari per se, etiam omissa spe voluptatis. Hoc etsi multis modis reprendi potest, tamen accipio quod dant; mihi enim satis est, ipsis non satis. Nam aliquando posse re"cte fieri dicunt, nulla exspectata nec quaesita voluptate.

83 Posuisti etiam dicere alios foedus quoddam inter se

1 cum inserted by Mdv.
supreme excellence is extremely rare. And to my mind the fact that Epicurus himself was a good man and that many Epicureans both have been and today are loyal to their friends, consistent and high-principled throughout their lives, ruling their conduct by duty and not by pleasure,—all this does but enforce the value of moral goodness and diminish that of pleasure. The fact is that some persons' lives and behaviour refute the principles they profess. Most men's words are thought to be better than their deeds; these people's deeds on the contrary seem to me better than their words.

XXVI. "But this I admit is a digression. Let us return to what you said about friendship. In one of your remarks I seemed to recognize a saying of Epicurus himself,—that friendship cannot be divorced from pleasure, and that it deserves to be cultivated for the reason that without it we cannot live secure and free from alarm, and therefore cannot live agreeably. Enough has been said in answer to this already. You quoted another and a more humane dictum of the more modern Epicureans, which so far as I know was never uttered by the master himself. This was to the effect that, although at the outset we desire a man's friendship for utilitarian reasons, yet when intimacy has grown up we love our friend for his own sake, even if all prospect of pleasure be left out of sight. It is possible to take exception to this position on several grounds; still I welcome their concession, as it is sufficient for my case and not sufficient for theirs. For it amounts to saying that moral action is occasionally possible,—action prompted by no anticipation or desire of pleasure.

You further alleged that other thinkers speak of
CICERO DE FINIBUS

facere sapientes ut, quemadmodum sint in se ipsos animati, eodem modo sint erga amicos; id et fieri posse et saepe esse factum et ad voluptates perciendas maxime pertinere. Hoc foedus facere si potuerunt, faciant etiam illud, ut aequitatem, modestiam, virtutes omnes per se ipsas gratis diligant. An vero si fructibus et emolumentis et utilitatis amicitias colemus, si nulla caritas erit quae faciat amicitiam ipsam sua sponte, vi sua, ex se et propter se expetendum, dubium est quin fundos et insulas amicis anteponamus? Licet hic rursus ea comme-mores quae optimis verbis ab Epicuro de laude amicitiae dicta sunt. Non quaero quid dicat, sed quid convenienter possit rationi et sententiae suae dicere. 'Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita.' Num igitur utiliorem tibi hunc Triarium putas esse posse quam si tua sint Puteolis granaria? Collige omnia quae soletis: 'Praesidium amicorum.' Satis est tibi in te, satis in legibus, satis in mediocrebus amicitias praesidi; iam contemni non poteris; odium autem et invidiam facile vitabis: ad eas enim res ab Epicuro praeepta dantur. Et tamen tantis vectigalibus ad liberalitatem utens, etiam sine hac Pyladea amicitia multorum te benevolentia praecelare tuebere et munies. At quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia? Tecum optime, deinde etiam cum mediocri amico. Sed fac ista esse

174
wise men as making a sort of mutual compact to entertain the same sentiments towards their friends as they feel towards themselves; this (you said) was possible, and in fact had often occurred; and it was highly conducive to the attainment of pleasure. If men have succeeded in making this compact, let them make a further compact to love fair-dealing, self-control, and all the virtues, for their own sakes and without reward. If on the other hand we are to cultivate friendships for their results, for profit and utility; if there is to be no affection to render friendship in and for itself, intrinsically and spontaneously, desirable; can we doubt that we shall value land and house-property more than friends? It is no good your once again repeating Epicurus’s admirable remarks in praise of friendship. I am not asking what Epicurus actually says, but what he can say consistently while holding the theory he professes. ‘Friendship is originally sought after from motives of utility.’ Well, but surely you don’t reckon Triarius here a more valuable asset than the granaries at Puteoli would be if they belonged to you? Cite all the stock Epicurean maxims. ‘Friends are a protection.’ You can protect yourself; the laws will protect you; ordinary friendships offer protection enough; soon you will be too powerful to be despised; moreover you will easily avoid hatred and envy,—Epicurus gives rules for doing so! And even otherwise, with so large an income to give away, you can dispense with the romantic sort of friendship that we have in mind; you will have plenty of well-wishers to defend you quite effectively. But a confidant, to share your ‘grave thoughts or gay’ as the saying is, all your secrets and private affairs? Your
CICERO DE FINIBUS

non importuna; quid ad utilitatem tantae pecuniae? Vides igitur, si amicitiam sua caritate metiare, nihil esse praestantius, sin emolumento, summas familiaritates praeidorum fructuosorum mercede superari. Me igitur ipsum ames oportet, non mea, si veri amici futuri sumus.

XXVII. "Sed in rebus apertissimis nimium longi sumus. Perfecto enim et concluso neque virtutibus neque amicitiiis usquam locum esse si ad voluptatem omnia referantur, nihil praeterea est magno opere dicendum. Ac tamen, ne cui loco non videatur esse responsum, pauc a etiam nunc dicam ad reli-

quam orationem tuam. Quoniam igitur omnis sum-

ma philosophiae ad beate vivendum refertur, idque unum expetentes homines se ad hoc studium contulerunt, beate autem vivere alii in alio, vos in voluptate ponitis, item contra miseriam omnem in dolore, id primum videamus, beate vivere vestrum quale sit. Atque hoc dabitis, ut opinor, si modo sit aliquid esse beatum, id oportere totum poni in pote-

state sapientis. Nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Quis enim confidit semper sibi illud stabile et firmum permansurum quod fragile et caducum sit? Qui autem diffidit perpetuitati bonorum suorum, timeat necesse est ne aliquando 176
best confidant is yourself; you may also confide in a friend of the average type. But granting that friendship has the conveniences you mention, what are they compared with the advantages of such vast wealth? You see then that although if you measure friendship by the test of its own charm it is unsurpassed in value, by the standard of profit the most affectionate intimacy is outweighed by the rents of a valuable estate. So you must love me myself, not my possessions, if we are to be genuine friends.

XXVII. "But we dwell too long upon the obvious. For when it has been conclusively proved that if pleasure is the sole standard there is no room left either for virtue or friendship, there is no great need to say anything further. Still I do not want you to think I have failed to answer any of your points, so I will now say a few words more in reply to the remainder of your discourse. The end and aim of every system of philosophy is the attainment of happiness; and desire for happiness is the sole motive that has led men to engage in this study. But different thinkers make happiness consist in different things. According to your school it consists in pleasure, and conversely misery consists solely in pain. Let us then begin by examining what sort of thing happiness as you conceive it is. You will grant, I suppose, that if there is such a thing as happiness, it is bound to be attainable in its entirety by the Wise Man. For if happiness once won can be lost, a happy life is impossible. Since who can feel confident of permanently and securely retaining a possession that is perishable and precarious? yet one who is not sure of the permanence of his Goods, must inevitably fear that a time may come when he
amissis illis sit miser. Beatus autem esse in maxime rerum timore nemo potest. Nemo igitur esse beatus potest. Neque enim in aliqua parte sed in perpetuitate temporis vita beata dici solet, nec appellatur omnino vita nisi confecta atque absoluta, nec potest quisquam alias beatus esse, alias miser; qui enim existimabit posse se miserum esse, beatus non erit. Nam cum suscepta semel est beata vita, tam permanet quam ipsa illa effectrix beatae vitae sapientia, neque exspectat ultimum tempus aetatis, quod Croeso scribit Herodotus praecipuum a Solone. "At enim, queladmodum tute dicebas, negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliudum afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis quam si illa sit semper. Haec dicuntur inconstantissime. Cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modo. Qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis: negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum diem; qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam putabit, qui sibi is conveniet si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? Igitur ne dolorem quidem. An dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? Quid est igitur cur ita semper deum Epicurus beatum appellat et aeternum? Dempta enim aeternitate nihilomin beator Iuppiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim sum-

1 diei Med.; duci MSS.
may lose them and so be miserable. But no one can be happy who fears utter ruin. Therefore no one can be happy at all. For we usually speak of a life as a happy one not in reference to a part of it, but to the whole of a lifetime; indeed ‘a life’ means a finished and complete life; nor is it possible to be at one time happy and at another miserable, since he who thinks that he may be miserable, will not be happy. For when happiness has once been achieved, it is as permanent as Wisdom itself, which is the efficient cause of happiness; it does not wait for the end of our mortal term, as Croesus in Herodotus’s history was warned by Solon to do.

"It may be rejoined that Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, denies that long duration can add anything to happiness; he says that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting. In saying this he is grossly inconsistent. He places the Chief Good in pleasure, and yet he says that no greater pleasure would result from a lifetime of endless duration than from a limited and moderate period. If a person finds the sole Good in Virtue, it is open to him to say that the happy life is consummated by the consummation of Virtue; for his position is that the Chief Good is not increased by lapse of time. But if one thinks that happiness is produced by pleasure, how can he consistently deny that pleasure is increased by duration? If it is not, pain is not either. Or if pain is worse the longer it lasts, is not pleasure rendered more desirable by continuance? Epicurus always speaks of the Deity as happy and everlasting; but on what ground? Take away his everlasting life, and Jove is no happier than Epicurus; each of
CICERO DE FINIBUS

mo bono fruitur, id est voluptate. ‘At enim hic etiam dolore!’ At eum nihili facit; ait enim se, si uratur, ‘Quam hoc suave!’ dicturum. Qua igitur re a deo vincitur si aeternitate non vincitur? In qua quid est boni praeter summam voluptatem et eam sempiternam? Quid ergo attinet gloriose loqui nisi constanter loquare? In voluptate corporis (addam, si vis, animi, dum ea ipsa, ut vultis, sit e corpore) situm est vivere beate. Quid? istam voluptatem perpetuam quis potest praestare sapienti? Nam quibus rebus efficiuntur voluptates, eae non sunt in potestate sapientis. Non enim in ipsa sapientia positum est beatum esse, sed in iis rebus quas sapientia comparat ad voluptatem. Totum autem id externum est, et quod externum, id in casu est. Ita fit beatae vitae domina fortuna, quam Epicurus ait exiguam intervenire sapienti.

XXVIII. ‘‘Age,’ inquies, ‘ista parva sunt. Sapientem locupletat ipsa natura, cuius divitias Epicurus parabiles esse docuit.’—Haec bene dicuntur, nec ego repugno; sed inter sese ipsa pugnant. Negat enim tenuissimo victu, id est contemptissimis escis et potionibus, minorem voluptatem percipi quam rebus exquisitissimis ad epulandum. Huic ego, si negaret quidquam interesse ad beate vivendum quali utteretur victu, concederem; laudarem etiam; verum

a I.e. in the brazen bull of Phalaris, cf. V. 80, 85.

180
them enjoys the Chief Good, that is to say, pleasure. 'Ah but,' you say, 'Epicurus is liable to pain as well.' Yes, but he thinks nothing of pain; for he tells us that if he were being burnt to death he would exclaim, 'How delightful this is!' Wherein then is he inferior to God, except that God lives for ever? But what good has everlasting life to offer beside supreme and never-ending pleasure? What then is the use of your high-flown language, if it be not consistent? Physical pleasure (and I will add if you like mental pleasure, so long as this, as you hold, is understood to have its source in the body) constitutes happiness. Well, who can guarantee this pleasure for the Wise Man in perpetuity? For the things that produce pleasure are not in the Wise Man's control; since happiness does not consist in wisdom itself, but in the means to pleasure which wisdom can procure. But all the apparatus of pleasure is external, and what is external must depend on chance. Consequently happiness becomes the slave of fortune; yet Epicurus says that fortune interferes with the Wise Man but little!

XXVIII. "'Come,' you will say, 'these are trivial objections. The Wise Man is endowed with Nature's own riches, and these, as Epicurus has shown, are easy of attainment.' This is excellently said, and I do not combat it; but Epicurus's own statements are at war with each other. He tells us that the simplest fare, that is, the meanest sorts of food and drink, afford no less pleasure than a banquet of the rarest delicacies. For my part, if he said that it made no difference to happiness what sort of food he ate, I should agree, and what is more I should applaud; for he would be telling the truth. I
CICERO DE FINIBUS

enim diceret, idque Socratem, qui voluptatem nullo loco numerat, audio dicientem, cibi condimentum esse famem, potionis sitim. Sed qui ad voluptatem omnia referens vivit ut Gallonius, loquitur ut Frugi ille Piso, non audio, nec eum quod sentiat dicere existimo. Naturae divitias dixit parabiles esse quod parvo esset natura contenta. Certe, nisi volup
tatem tanti aestimaretis. Non minor, inquit, volu
ptas percititur ex vilissimis rebus quam ex pretiosis
simis. Hoc est non modo cor non habere sed ne
palatum quidem. Qui enim voluptatem ipsam con
temnunt, iis licet dicere se acipenserem maenae non
anteponere; cui vero in voluptate summum bonum
est, huic omnia sensu, non ratione sunt iudicanda,
eaque dicenda optima quae sunt suavissima. Verum
esto; consequatur summas voluptates non modo parvo,
sed per me nihilo, si potest; sit voluptas non minor
in nasturcio illo quo vesci Persas esse solitos scribit
Xenophon, quam in Syracusanis mensis quae a Platone
graviter vituperantur; sit, inquam, tam facilis quam
vultis comparatio voluptatis; quid de dolore dicemus?
cuius tanta tormenta sunt ut in iis beata vita, si
modo dolor summum malum est, esse non possit.
Ipse enim Metrodorus, paene alter Epicurus, beatum
esse describit his fere verbis: cum corpus bene con
stitutum sit et sit exploratum ita futurum. An id
exploratum cuiquam potest esse, quomodo se hoc
habiturum sit corpus non dico ad annum, sed ad
vesperum? Dolor igitur, id est summum malum,

\[a\] Xen. Cyropaed. 1. 2. 8.
\[b\] Pl. Ep. 7. 326 B, also Rep. 404 D.

182
BOOK II. xxviii

will listen to Socrates, who holds pleasure of no account, when he says that the best sauce for food is hunger and the best flavouring for drink thirst. But I will not listen to one who makes pleasure the sole standard, when while living like Gallonius he talks like Piso the Thrifty; I refuse to believe in his sincerity. He said that natural wealth is easily won, because nature is satisfied with little. Undoubtedly,—if only you Epicureans did not value pleasure so highly. As much pleasure, he says, is derived from the cheapest things as from the most costly. Dear me, his palate must be as dull as his wits. Persons who despise pleasure in itself are at liberty to say that they value a sturgeon no higher than a sprat; but a man whose chief good consists in pleasure is bound to judge everything by sensation, not by reason, and to call those things the best which are the pleasantest. However, let us grant his point: let him get the highest pleasures cheap, or for all I care for nothing, if he can; allow that there is as much pleasure to be found in the cress salad which according to Xenophon\(^a\) formed the staple diet of the Persians, as in the Syracusan banquets which Plato\(^b\) takes to task so severely; grant, I say, that pleasure is as easy to get as your school makes out;—but what are we to say of pain? Pain can inflict such tortures as to render happiness absolutely impossible, that is, if it be true that pain is the Chief Evil. Metrodorus himself, who was almost a second Epicurus, describes happiness (I give almost his actual words) as 'sound health, and an assurance of its continuance.' Can anyone have an assurance of what his health will be, I don't say a year hence, but this evening? It follows that we can never be
CICERO DE FINIBUS


XXIX. "Quod autem magnum dolorem brevem, longinquum levem esse dicitis, id non intellego quale sit. Video enim et magnos et eosdem bene longinquos dolores; quorum alia toleratio est verior, quia uti vos non potestis qui honestatem ipsam per se non amatis. Fortitudinis quaedam praeccepta sunt ac paene leges, quae effeminari virum vetant in dolore. Quamobrem turpe putandum est, non dico
free from the apprehension of pain, which is the Chief Evil, even when it is absent, for at any moment it may be upon us. How then can life be happy when haunted by fear of the greatest Evil? 'Ah but,' he rejoins, 'Epicurus teaches a method for disregarding pain.' To begin with, the mere idea of disregarding that which is the greatest of evils is absurd. But what is this method, pray? 'The severest pain,' says he, 'is brief.' First of all, what do you mean by brief? and secondly, what do you mean by the severest pain? Why, cannot the most intense pain last for several days? You may find it last for months! Unless indeed you mean a seizure that instantaneously kills you. But no one is afraid of such a pain as that. I want you rather to alleviate such agony as I have seen afflicting my excellent and amiable friend, Gnaeus Octavius, son of Marcus; and that not once only or for a short time, but repeatedly and for very long periods. Great heavens, what torments he used to suffer! All his joints felt as if on fire. And yet one did not think of him as miserable, because such pain was not the greatest evil,—only as afflicted. Miserable he would have been if he had lived a life of profligacy and vice surrounded by every pleasure.

"As for your maxim that severe pain is short and prolonged pain light, I cannot make out what it may mean. For I see pains that are at once severe and considerably prolonged; and the truer way to endure them is that other method, which you who do not love moral worth for its own sake are not able to employ. Courage has its precepts and its rules, rules of constraining force, that forbid a man to show womanish weakness in pain. Hence it must
CICERO DE FINIBUS
dolare (nam id quidem est interdum ncessse), sed
'saxum illud Lemnium' clamore Philocteteo 'fune-
stare;'
Quod eiulatv, questu, gemitu, fremitibus
Resonando mutum flebiles voces refert.
Huic Epicurus praecentet, si potest, cui
E 1 viperino morsu venae viscerum
Veneno imbutae taetros cruciatus cient!
Sic Epicurus: 'Philocteta, si gravis dolor, brevis.' 2 At
iam decimum annum in spelunca iacet. 'Si longus,
levis; dat enim intervalla et relaxat.' Primum non
saepe, deinde quae est ista relaxatio, cum et praeter-
iti doloris memoria recens est et futuri atque im-
pendentis torquet timor? Moriatur, inquit. Fortasse
id optimum, sed ubi illud: 'Plus semper voluptatis?'
Si enim ita est, vide ne facinus facias cum mori
suadeas. Potius ergo illa dicantur, turpe esse, viri
non esse debilitari dolore, frangi, succumbere. Nam
ista vestra: 'Si gravis, brevis; si longus, levis' dictata
sunt. Virtutis, magnitudinis animi, patientiae, for-
titudinis fomentis dolor mitigari solet.

XXX. "Audi, ne longe abeam, moriens quid dicat
Epicurus, ut intellegas facta eius cum dictis discre-
pare: 'Epicurus Hermarcho S. Cum ageremus,' inquit,

\(^1\) E inserted by Baiter.
\(^2\) Si (or sit) gravis dolor, brevis inf. MSS.; si brevis dolor,
levis A, B, E.—Mdv. 'Philocteta, st! Brevis dolor.' But cp.
22 and 95.

\(^a\) Quoted probably from the Philoctetes of Attius.

186
BOOK II. xxix-xxx

be considered a disgrace, I do not say to feel pain (that is sometimes inevitable), but that 'rock of Lemnos to outrage' with the cries of a Philoctetes,

Till the dumb stones utter a voice of weeping, Echoing his wails and plaints, his sighs and groanings.

Let Epicurus soothe with his spells, if he can, the man whose

Veins and vitals, from the viper's fang Envenom'd, throb with pangs of anguish dire.

Thus Epicurus: 'Philoctetes! If pain is severe, it is short.' Oh, but he has been languishing in his cave these ten years past. 'If it is long, it is light: for it grants intervals of respite.' In the first place, these are few and far between; and secondly, what is the good of a respite embittered by recent pain still fresh in memory, and tormented by fear of pain impending in the future? Let him die, says Epicurus. Perhaps that were the best course, but what becomes of the maxim about 'a constant preponderance of pleasure'? If that be true, are you not guilty of a crime in advising him to end his life? Well then, let us rather tell him that it is base and unmanly to be enfeebled, crushed and overpowered by pain. As for the formula of your sect, 'Short if it's strong, light if it's long,' it is a tag for copybooks. Virtue, magnanimity, endurance, courage, —it is these that have balm to assuage pain.

XXX. "But I must not digress too far. Let me repeat the dying words of Epicurus, to prove to you the discrepancy between his practice and his principles: 'Epicurus to Hermarchus, greeting. I write
CICERO DE FINIBUS

‘vitae beatum et eundem supremum diem, scribamus haec. Tanti aderant vesicae et torrminum morbi ut nihil ad eorum magnitudinem posset accedere.’ Miserum hominem! Si dolor summum malum est, dici aliter non potest. Sed audiamus ipsum. ‘Compensabatur,’ inquit, ‘tamen cum his omnibus animi laetitia quam capiebam memoria rationum inventorumque nostrorum. Sed tu, ut dignum est tua erga me et philosophiam voluntate ab audacescentulo suscepta, fac ut Metrodori tueare liberos.’ Non ego iam Epaminondae, non Leonidae mortem huius morti antepono; quorum alter cum vicisset Lacedaemonios apud Mantineam atque ipse gravi vulnere examinari se videret, ut primum dispexit, quaeuivit salvusne esset clipeus. Cum salvum esse fluentes sui respondissent, rogavit essentne fusi hostes. Cum id quoque ut cupiebat audivisset, evelli iussit eam quam erat transfixus hastam. Ita multo sanguine profuso in laetitia et victoria est mortuus. Leonidas autem, rex Lacedaemoniorum se in Thermopylis trecentosque eos quos eduxerat Sparta, cum esset proposita aut fuga turpis aut gloriae mors, opposuit hostibus. Praeclarae mortes sunt imperatoriae; philosophi autem in suis lectulis plerumque moriuntur. Refert tamen quomodo. Beatus sibi videtur esse moriens. Magna laus.¹ ‘Compensabatur,’ inquit, ‘cum summis doloribus laetitia.’ Audio equidem philosophi vocem, Epicure; sed quid tibi dicendum sit oblitus es. Primum enim, si vera sunt ea quorum recorda-

¹MSS. Refert tamen quod sibi videtur esse morienti magna laus, with variants quo modo, videbatur and moriens. Mdv. restores as above, inserting beatus.
BOOK II. xxx

these words,' he says, 'on the happiest, and the last, day of my life. I am suffering from diseases of the bladder and intestines, which are of the utmost possible severity.' Unhappy creature! If pain is the Chief Evil, that is the only thing to be said. But let us hear his own words. 'Yet all my sufferings,' he continues, 'are counterbalanced by the joy which I derive from remembering my theories and discoveries. I charge you, by the devotion which from your youth up you have displayed towards myself and towards philosophy, to protect the children of Metrodorus.' When I read this I rank the death-scene of Epicurus on a level with those of Epaminondas and of Leonidas. Epaminondas had defeated the Lacedemonians at Mantinea, and perceived himself to be mortally wounded. As soon as he regained consciousness he inquired if his shield were safe. His weeping followers told him that it was. He asked, were the enemy routed. Satisfied on this point also, he bade them pluck out the spear that pierced his side. A rush of blood followed, and so in the hour of joy and victory he died. Leonidas, king of the Lacedemonians, had to choose between dishonourable flight and a glorious death; with the three hundred warriors that he had brought from Sparta he confronted the foe at Thermopylae. It is glorious to fall when leading an army; but philosophers mostly die in their beds. Still the manner of their death makes a difference. Epicurus counts himself happy in his last moments. All honour to him. 'My joy,' he writes, 'counterbalances the severest pain.' There, Epicurus, it is true, I hear the voice of a philosopher; but you forget what you logically ought to say. In the first place, if the thing
CICERO DE FINIBUS

tione te gaudere dicis, hoc est si vera sunt tua scripta et inventa, gaudere non potes; nihil enim iam habes quod ad corpus referas; est autem a te semper dictum nec gaudere quemquam nisi propter corpus nec dolere. Praeteritis, inquit, gaudeo. Quibusnam praeteritis? si ad corpus pertinentibus, rationes tuas te video compensare cum istis doloribus, non memoriam corpore perceptarum voluptatum; sin autem ad animum, falsum est quod negas animi llum esse gaudium quod non referatur ad corpus. Cur deinde Metrodori liberos commendas? quid in isto egregio tuo officio et tanta fide (sic enim existimo) ad corpus refers?

XXXI. "Huc et illuc, Torquate, vos versetis licet; nihil in hac praeclara epistula scriptum ab Epicuro congruens et conveniens decetis eius reperietis. Ita redarguitur ipse a sese, convincunturque scripta eius probitate ipsius ac moribus. Nam ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu conservatio indicat in natam esse homini probitatem gratuitam, non invita tam voluptatibus nec praemiorum mercedibus evocatam. Quod enim testimonium maius quae quis, quae honesta et recta sint, ipsa esse optabilia per sese, cum videamus tanta officia morientis? Sed ut epistolam laudandam arbitror eam quam modo totidem fere verbis interpretatus sum, quamquam ea cum summa eius philosophia nullo modo congruebat, sic

1 MSS. om. the preposition; MdV. suggests in, but writes ex with most edd.
2 convincunturque MdV. after Davis; vincunturque, ven euntque MSS.
in the recollection of which you profess to find pleasure, I mean your writings and your theories, are true, you cannot really be feeling pleasure. All feelings referable to the body are over for you; yet you have always maintained that no one feels either pleasure or pain except on account of the body. He says ‘I take pleasure in my past feelings.’ What past feelings? If you mean bodily feelings, I notice that it is not the memory of bodily delights, but your philosophical theories, that counterbalance for you your present pains; if mental feelings, your doctrine that there is no delight of the mind not ultimately referable to the body is an error. And secondly, why do you provide for the children of Metrodorus? What standard of bodily pleasure are you following in this signal act (for so I esteem it) of loyalty and duty?

XXXI. "Yes, Torquatus, you people may turn and twist as you like, but you will not find a line in this famous letter of Epicurus that is not inconsistent and incompatible with his teachings. Hence he is his own refutation; his writings are disproved by the uprightness of his character. That provision for the care of the children, that loyalty to friendship and affection, that observance of these solemn duties with his latest breath, prove that there was innate in the man a disinterested uprightness, not evoked by pleasure nor elicited by prizes and rewards. Seeing so strong a sense of duty in a dying man, what clearer evidence do we want that morality and rectitude are desirable for their own sakes? But while I think that the letter I have just translated almost word for word is most admirable, although entirely inconsistent with the general tenor of his philosophy, yet

Inconsistency of his provision for the posthumous celebration of his birthday.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

eiusdem testamentum non solum a philosophi gravitate sed etiam ab ipsius sententia iudico discrepare. Scripsit enim et multis saepe verbis et breviter aper- teque in eo libro quem modo nominavi, 'mortem nihil ad nos pertinere; quod enim dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu; quod autem sine sensu sit, id nihil ad nos pertinere omnino.' Hoc ipsum elegantius poni meliusque potuit. Nam quod ita positum est, 'quod dissolutum sit, id esse sine sensu,' id eiusmodi est ut non satis plane dicat quid sit dissolutum. Sed tamen intellego quid velit. Quaero autem quid sit quod, cum dissolutione, id est morte sensus omnis ex- stinguatur, et cum reliqui nihil sit omnino quod per- tineat ad nos, tam accurate tamque diligentem caveat et sanciat 'ut Amynomachus et Timocrates, heredes sui, de Hermarchi sententia dent quod satis sit ad diem agendum natalem suum quotannis mense Game- lione, itemque omnibus mensibus vicesimo die lunae dent ad eorum epulas qui una secum philosophati sint, ut et sui et Metrodori memoria colatur.' Haec ego non possum dicere nonesse hominis quamvis et belli et humani, sapientis vero nullo modo, physici prae- sertim, quem se ille esse vult, putare ullum esse curusquam diem natalem. Quid? idemne potest esse dies saepius qui semel fuit? Certe non potest. An eiusmodemodi? Ne id quidem, nisi multa annorum intercesserint milia, ut omnium siderum eodem unde
BOOK II. xxxi

I consider his will to be quite out of harmony not only with the dignity of a philosopher but also with his own pronouncement. For he repeatedly argued at length, and also stated briefly and plainly in the book I have just mentioned, that 'death does not affect us at all; for a thing that has experienced dissolution must be devoid of sensation; and that which is devoid of sensation cannot affect us in any degree whatsoever.' The maxim such as it is might have been better and more neatly put. For the phrase, 'what has experienced dissolution must be devoid of sensation,' does not make clear what it is that has experienced dissolution. However in spite of this I understand the meaning intended. What I want to know is this: if all sensation is annihilated by dissolution, that is, by death, and if nothing whatever that can affect us remains, why is it that he makes such precise and careful provision and stipulation 'that his heirs, Amynochus and Timocrates, shall after consultation with Hermarchus assign a sufficient sum to celebrate his birthday every year in the month of Gamelion, and also on the twentieth day of every month shall assign a sum for a banquet to his fellow-students in philosophy, in order to keep alive the memory of himself and of Metrodorus'?

That these are the words of as amiable and kindly a man as you like, I cannot deny; but what business has a philosopher, and especially a natural philosopher, which Epicurus claims to be, to think that any day can be anybody's birthday? Why, can the identical day that has once occurred recur again and again? Assuredly it is impossible. Or can a similar day recur? This too is impossible, except after an interval of many thousands of years, when all the
CICERO DE FINIBUS

profecta sint fiat ad unum tempus reversio. Nullus est igitur eiusquam dies natalis. 'At habetur.' Et ego id scilicet nesciebam! Sed ut sit, etiamne post mortem coletur? idque testamento cavebit is qui nobis quasi oraculum ediderit nihil post mortem ad nos pertinere? Haec non erant eius qui innumera-biles mundos infinitasque regiones, quorum nulla esset ora, nulla extremitas, 'mente peragravisset.' Num quid tale Democritus? (Ut alios omittam, hunc 103 appello quem ille unum secutus est.) Quod si dies notandus fuit, eumne potius quo natus, an eum quo sapiens factus est? 'Non potuit,' inquies, 'fieri sapiens nisi natus esset.' Isto modo ne si avia quidem eius nata non esset. Res tota, Torquate, non doctorum hominum, velle post mortem epulis celebrari memoriam sui nominis. Quos quidem dies quemadmodum agatis et in quantam hominum faceto-rum urbanitatem incurratis, non dico; nihil opus est litibus; tantum dico magis fuisse vestrum agere Epicuri diem natalem quam illius testamento cavere ut ageretur.

104 XXXII. "Sed ut ad propositum revertamur (de dolore enim cum diceremus, ad istam epistulam de-lati sumus), nunc totum illud concludi sic licet: Qui in

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a This conception is found in Plato, *Timaeus* 39, and was accepted by ancient astronomers, who calculated the period of the Great Year or Perfect Year, as it was called, at 12,954 solar years.

b Lucretius I. 74 omne immensum peragravit mente animoque.
BOOK II. xxxi-xxxii

heavenly bodies simultaneously achieve their return to the point from which they started. It follows that there is no such thing as anybody's birthday. 'All the same, people do keep birthdays.' Much obliged, I am sure, for the information! But even granting birthdays, is a person's birthday to be observed when he is dead? And to provide for this by will—is this appropriate for a man who told us in oracular tones that nothing can affect us after death? Such a provision ill became one whose 'intellect had roamed' over unnumbered worlds and realms of infinite space, unbounded and unending. Did Democritus do anything of the kind? (To omit others, I cite the case of the philosopher who was Epicurus's only master.) And if a special day was to be kept, did he do well to take the day on which he was born, and not rather that on which he became a Wise Man? You will object that he could not have become a Wise Man if he had not first of all been born. You might equally well say, if his grandmother had not been born either. The entire notion of wishing one's name and memory to be celebrated by a banquet after one's death is alien to a man of learning. I won't refer to your mode of keeping these anniversaries, or to the ridicule you bring upon yourselves from persons with a sense of humour. We do not want to quarrel. I only remark that it was more your business to keep Epicurus's birthday than his business to provide by will for its celebration.

XXXII. "But to return to our subject (for we were discussing the question of pain, when we digressed to the letter of Epicurus). The whole matter may now be put in the following syllogism: A man un-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

summo malo est, is tum cum in eo est non est beatus; sapiens autem semper beatus est et est aliquando in dolore; non est igitur summum malum dolor. Iam illud quale tandem est, bona praeterita non effluere sapienti, mala meminisse non oportere? Primum in nostrane est potestate quid meminerimus? Themis- stocles quidem, cum ei Simonides an quis alius artem memoriae polliceretur, 'Oblivionis,' inquit, 'mallem; nam memini etiam quae nolo, oblivisci non possum quae volo.' Magno hic ingenio; sed res se tamen sic habet ut nimis imperiosi philosophi sit vetare meminisse. Vide ne ista sint Manliana vestra aut maiora etiam, si imperes quod facere non possim. Quid si etiam iucunda memoria est praeteritorum malorum? ut proverbia nonnulla veriora sint quam vestra dogmata. Vulgo enim dicitur: 'Iucundi acti labores'; nec male Euripides (concludam, si potero, Latine; Graecum enim hunc versum nostis omnes):

Suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria.

Sed ad bona praeterita redeamus. Quae si a vobis talia dicerentur qualibus C. Marius uti poterat, ut expulsus, egens, in palude demersus tropaeorum recordatione levaret dolorem suum, audirem et plane probarem. Nec enim absolvi beata vita sapientis

\[a\] See § 60.

\[b\] From the lost Andromeda: ἀλλ' ἤδο τοι σωθέντα μεμνησθαι πόνων: quoted by Plutarch, etc.

196
dergoing the supreme Evil is not for the time being happy; but the Wise Man is always happy, and sometimes undergoes pain; therefore pain is not the supreme Evil. And again, what is the sense of the maxim that the Wise Man will not let past blessings fade from memory, and that it is a duty to forget past misfortunes? To begin with, have we the power to choose what we shall remember? Themistocles at all events, when Simonides or some one offered to teach him the art of memory, replied that he would prefer the art of forgetting; 'for I remember,' said he, 'even things I do not wish to remember, but I cannot forget things I wish to forget.' Epicurus was a very able man; but still the fact of the matter is that a philosopher who forbids us to remember lays too heavy a charge upon us. Why, you are as great a martinet as your ancestor Manlius, or greater, if you order me to do what is beyond my power. What if the memory of past evils be actually pleasant? proving certain proverbs truer than the tenets of your school. There is a popular saying to the effect that 'Toil is pleasant when 'tis over'; and Euripides well writes (I will attempt a verse translation; the Greek line is known to you all):

Sweet is the memory of sorrows past.

But let us return to the question of past blessings. If your school meant by these the sort of successes that Gaius Marius could fall back on, enabling him when a penniless exile up to his chin in a swamp to lighten his sufferings by recollecting his former victories, I would listen to you, and would unreservedly assent. Indeed it would be impossible for the
neque ad exitum perduci poterit, si prima quaeque
bene ab eo consulta atque facta ipsius oblivione ob-
ruentur. Sed vobis voluptatum perceptorum recor-
datam vitam beatam facit, et quidem corpore percep-
tarum; nam si quae sunt aliae, falsum est omnes
animi voluptates esse e corporis societate. Corporis
autem voluptas si etiam praeterita delectat, non
intellego cur Aristoteles Sardanapalli epigramma
tanto opere derideat, in quo ille rex Syriae glorietur
se omnes secum abstulisse libidinum voluptates. Quod
enim ne vivus quidem, inquit, diutius sentire poterat
quam dum fruebatur, quomodo id mortuo potuit per-
manere? Fluit igitur voluptas corporis et prima
quaeque avolat, saepiusque relinquit causam paeni-
tendi quam recordandi. Itaque beatior Africanus
cum patria illo modo loquens:

Desine, Roma, tuos hostes—
reliquaque praecelare:

Nam tibi moenimenta mei peperere labores.
Laboribus hic praeteritis gaudet, tu iubes voluptati-
bus; et hic se ad ea revocat e quibus nihil umquam
rettulerit ad corpus, tu totus haeres in corpore.

XXXIII. "Illud autem ipsum qui obtineri potest,
quod dicitis omnes animi et voluptates et dolores ad
corporis voluptates ac dolores pertinere? Nihilne
te delectat umquam (video quicum loquar), te igitur,

\[a\] In a work now lost. The lines referred to run \( \text{k} \text{e} \text{w' } \text{e} \text{h} \text{o}
\text{d} \text{o} \text{a' } \text{e} \text{f} \text{a} \text{g} \text{o} \text{n} \text{a} \text{i} \text{e} \text{f} \text{o} \text{b} \text{r} \text{i} \text{a} \text{a} \text{k} \text{i} \text{a} \text{i} \text{a} \text{n} \text{e} \text{r} \text{o} \text{t} \text{i} \text{t} \text{e} \text{r} \text{e} \text{t} \text{a' } \text{e} \text{p} \text{a} \text{d} \text{o} \text{n} \text{a' } \text{t} \text{a} \text{b} \text{e} \text{t} \text{c} \text{o} \text{l} \text{a}
\text{k} \text{i} \text{a} \text{d} \text{e} \text{b} \text{i} \text{a} \text{m} \text{a} \text{p} \text{a} \text{n} \text{a} \text{l} \text{e} \text{l} \text{e} \text{n} \text{t} \text{e} \text{n} \text{a} \text{i} \text{a} \text{.} \text{ (a} \text{p.} \text{ Athen.} \text{ 336a.)}

\[b\] Apparently from the Annals of Ennius.

198
happiness of the Wise Man to attain its final and ultimate perfection, if all his previous wise designs and achievements were to be erased from his memory. But with you it is the recollection of pleasures enjoyed that gives happiness; and those must be bodily pleasures,—for if it be any others, it ceases to be true that mental pleasures all arise from the connection of the mind with the body. Yet if bodily pleasure even when past can give delight, I do not see why Aristotle* should be so contemptuous of the epitaph of Sardanapalus. The famous Syrian monarch boasts that he has taken with him all the sensual pleasures that he has enjoyed. How, asks Aristotle, could a dead man continue to experience a feeling which even while alive he could only be conscious of so long as he was actually enjoying it? So that bodily pleasures are transient; each in turn evaporates, leaving cause for regrets more often than for recollection. Accordingly Africanus must be counted happier than Sardanapalus, when he addresses his country with the words:

Cease, Rome, thy foes—

and the glorious conclusion:

My toils have won thee battlements secure.\(^b\)

His past toils are what he delights in, whereas you bid us dwell upon our past pleasures; he recalls experiences that never had any connection with bodily enjoyment, but you never rise above the body.

XXXIII. "Again how can you possibly defend the dictum of your school, that all mental pleasures and pains alike are based on pleasures and pains of the body? Do you, Torquatus (for I bethink me who it is I am addressing)—do you personally never experi-

199
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Torquate, ipsum per se nihil delectat? Omitto dignitatem, honestatem, speciem ipsam virtutum, de quibus ante dictum est; haec leviora ponam: poema, orationem cum aut scribis aut legis, cum omnium factorum, cum regionum conquiris historiam, signum, tabula, locus amoenus, ludi, venatio; villa Luculli (nam si tuam dicerem, latebram haberes; ad corpus diceres pertinere)—sed ea quae dixi ad corpusne referis? an est aliquid quod te sua sponte delectet? Aut pertinacissimus fueris si perstiteris ad corpus ea quae dixi referre, aut deserueris totam Epicuri volupatem si negaveris.

"Quod vero a te disputatum est maiores esse voluptates et dolores animi quam corporis, quia trium temporum particeps animus sit, corpore autem praesentia solum sentiantur, qui id probari potest ut is qui propter me aliquid gaudeat plus quam ego ipse gaudeat? [Animo voluptas oritur propter voluptatem corporis, et maior est animi voluptas quam corporis; ita fit ut gratulator laetior sit quam is cui gratulatur.] Sed dum efficere vultis beatum sapientem cum maximas animo voluptates percipiat omnibusque partibus maiores quam corpore, quid occurrat non videtis. Animi enim dolores quoque percipiat omnibus partibus maiores quam corporis. Ita miser sit aliquando necesse est is quem vos beatum semper vultis esse;

1 qui id probari B; quid id prob. E; quid probari, qui prob. other MSS.
2 Animo—gratulatur rejected by edd. as a note clumsily explaining the simile in the form of which the preceding reductio ad absurdum is expressed—body: mind :: happy person: sympathizing friend.
BOOK II. xxxiii

delight in some thing for its own sake? I pass over moral worth and goodness, and the intrinsic beauty of the virtues, of which we spoke before. I will suggest less serious matters, reading or writing a poem or a speech, the study of history or geography, statues, pictures, beautiful scenery; sport, hunting, Lucullus's country house (I won't mention your own, for that would give you a loophole of escape; you would say it is a source of bodily enjoyment); but take the things I have mentioned,—do you connect them with bodily sensation? Is there nothing which of itself affords you delight? Persist in tracing back the pleasures I have instanced to the body—and you show yourself impervious to argument; recant—and you abandon Epicurus's conception of pleasure altogether.

"As for your contention that mental pleasures and pains are greater than bodily, because the mind apprehends all three periods of time, whereas the body perceives only present sensations, surely it is absurd to say that a man who rejoices in sympathy with my pleasure feels more joy than I feel myself. [Pleasure of the mind arises out of sympathy with that of the body, and pleasure of the mind is greater than that of the body; thus it comes about that one who offers congratulations feels more delight than the person congratulated.] But when you try to prove the Wise Man happy on the ground that he enjoys the greatest mental pleasures, and that these are infinitely greater than bodily pleasures, you do not see the difficulty that meets you. For it follows that the mental pains which he experiences will also be infinitely greater than the bodily ones. Hence he whom you maintain to be always happy would

201
CICERO DE FINIBUS

nec vero id dum omnia ad voluptatem doloremque referetis efficietis umquam. Quare aliud aliquod, Torquate, hominis summum bonum reperiendum est; voluptatem bestiis concedamus, quibus vos de
summo bono testibus uti soletis. Quid si etiam bestiae multa faciunt, duce sua quaeque natura, partim indulgenter vel cum labore, ut in gignendo, in educando, perfacile ut\(^1\) appareat aliud quiddam iis
propositum, non voluptatem? partim cursu et perg ranione laetantur; congregatone aliae coetum quo
dam modo civitatis imitantur; videmus in quodam
volucrium genere nonnulla indicia pietatis, cognitionem, memoriam; in multis etiam desideria vide-
mus; ergo in bestiis erunt secreta a voluptate
humanarum quaedam simulacra virtutum, in ipsis
hominibus virtus nisi voluptatis causa nulla erit? Et
homin, qui ceteris animantibus plurimum praestat,
praecipui a natura nihil datum esse dicemus?

XXXIV. "Nos vero, si quidem in voluptate sunt
omnia, longe multumque superamur a bestiis, quibus
ipsa terra fundit ex sese pastus varios atque abun-
dantes nihil laborantibus; nobis autem aut vix aut
ne vix quidem suppetunt multo labore quaerentibus.
Nec tamenullo modo summum pecudis bonum et
hominis idem mihi videri potest. Quid enim tanto
opus est instrumento in optimis artibus comparandis,
quid tanto concursu honestissimorum studiorum, tanto

\(^1\) ut supplied by Müller.
BOOK II. xxxiii-xxxiv

inevitably be sometimes miserable; nor in fact will you ever prove him to be invariably happy, as long as you make pleasure and pain the sole standard.

109 Therefore we are bound, Torquatus, to find some other Chief Good for man. Let us leave pleasure to the lower animals, to whose evidence on this question of the Chief Good your school is fond of appealing. But what if even animals are prompted by their several natures to do many actions conclusively proving that they have some other End in view than pleasure? Some of them show kindness even at the cost of trouble, as for instance in giving birth to and rearing their offspring; some delight in running and roaming about; others are gregarious, and create something resembling a social polity; in a certain class of birds we see some traces of affection for human beings, recognition, recollection; and in many we even notice regret for a lost friend. If animals therefore possess some semblance of the human virtues unconnected with pleasure, are men themselves to display no virtue except as a means to pleasure? And shall we say that man, who so far surpasses all other living creatures, has been gifted by nature with no exceptional endowment?

111 XXXIV. "As a matter of fact if pleasure be all in all, the lower animals are far and away superior to ourselves. The Earth herself without labour of theirs lavishes on them food from her stores in great variety and abundance; whereas we with the most laborious efforts can scarcely if at all supply our needs. Yet I cannot think that the Chief Good can possibly be the same for a brute beast and for a man. What is the use of all our vast machinery of culture, of the great company of liberal studies, of the
CICERO DE FINIBUS

virtutum comitatu, si ea nullam ad aliam rem nisi ad
voluptatem conquiruntur? Ut, si Xerxes, cum tantis
classibus tantisque equestribus et pedestribus copiis,
Hellesponto iuncto, Athone perfosso, mari ambula-
visset, terra\(^1\) navigavisset, si, cum tanto impetu in
Graeciam venisset; causam quis ex eo quae reret tan-
tarum copiarum tantique belli, mel se auferre ex
Hymetto voluisse diceret, certe sine causa vide-
retur tanta conatus, sic nos sapientem, plurimis et
gravissimis artibus atque virtutibus instructum et
ornatum, non, ut illum, maria pedibus peragran tem,
classibus montes, sed omne caelum totamque cum
universo mari terram mente complexum, voluptatem
petere si dicemus, mellis causa dicemus tanta moli-
tum.

113 "Ad altiora quaedam et magnificentiora, mihi
crede, Torquate, nati sumus; nec id ex animi solum
partibus, in quibus inest memoria rerum innumerab-
ilium, in te quidem infinta, inest coniectura conse-
quentium non multum a divinatione differens, inest
moderator cupiditatis pudor, inest ad humanam
societatem\(^2\) iustitiae fida custodia, inest in perpetuendis
laboribus adeundisque periculis firma et stabilis
doloris mortisque contemptio;—ergo haec in animis;
tu autem etiam membra ipsa sensusque considera, qui
tibi, ut reliquae corporis partes, non comites solum vir-

\(^1\) mari . terra Baiter; Mdv. approves, but prints maria
. terram with MSS.

\(^2\) societatem tuendam one inf. MS.

204
goodly fellowship of the virtues, if all these things are sought after solely for the sake of pleasure? Suppose when Xerxes led forth his huge fleets and armies of horse and foot, bridged the Hellespont, cut through Athos, marched over sea and sailed over land—suppose on his reaching Greece with his great armada some one asked him the reason for all this enormous apparatus of warfare, and he were to reply that he had wanted to procure some honey from Hymettus! surely he would be thought to have had no adequate motive for so vast an undertaking. So with our Wise Man, equipped and adorned with all the noblest accomplishments and virtues, not like Xerxes traversing the seas on foot and the mountains on shipboard, but mentally embracing sky and earth and sea in their entirety—to say that this man's aim is pleasure is to say that all his high endeavour is for the sake of a little honey.

"No, Torquatus, believe me, we are born for loftier and more splendid purposes. Nor is this evidenced by the mental faculties alone, including as they do a memory for countless facts, in your case indeed a memory of unlimited range; a power of forecasting the future little short of divination; the sense of modesty to curb the appetites; love of justice, the faithful guardian of human society; contempt of pain and death, remaining firm and steadfast when toil is to be endured and danger undergone. These are our mental endowments. But I would also have you consider our bodily frame, and our organs of sensation, which latter like the other parts of the body you for your part will esteem not as the comrades merely but actually as the servants of
CICERO DE FINIBUS

114 tutum sed ministri etiam videbuntur. Quod si in ipso corpore multa voluptati praeponenda sunt, ut vires, valetudo, velocitas, pulchritudo, quid tandem in animis censes? in quibus doctissimi illi veteres inesse quiddam caeleste et divinum putaverunt. Quod si esset in voluptate summum bonum, ut dicitis, optabile esset in maxima voluptate nullo intervallo interiecto dies noctesque versari, cum omnes sensus dulcedine omni quasi perfusi moverentur. Quis est autem dignus nomine hominis qui unum diem totum velit esse in genere isto voluptatis? Cyrenaici quidem non recusant; vestri haec vere-

115 cundius, illi fortasse constantius. Sed lustremus animo nou has maximas artes quibus qui carebant inertes a maioribus nominabuntur, sed quaeo num existimes, non dico Homerum, Archilochum, Pindarum, sed Phidian, Polyclitum, Zeuxim ad voluptatem artes suas direxisse. Ergo opifex plus sibi proponet ad formarum quam civis excellens ad factorum pulchritudinem? Quae autem est alia causa erroris tanti, tam longe lateque diffusi, nisi quod is qui voluptatem summum bonum esse decernit non cum ea parte animi in qua inest ratio atque consilium, sed cum cupiditate, id est cum animi levissima parte deliberat? Quaero enim de te, si sunt di, ut vos etiam putatis, qui possint esse beati cum voluptates corpore percipere non possint, aut si sine eo genere voluptatis beati sunt, cur similem animi usum in sapiente esse nolitis.

206
BOOK II. xxxiv

114 the virtues. But if even the body has many attributes of higher value than pleasure, such as strength, health, beauty, speed of foot, what pray think you of the mind? The wisest sages of antiquity believed that the mind contains an element of the celestial and divine. Whereas if the Chief Good consisted in pleasure as your school avers, the ideal of happiness would be to pass days and nights in the enjoyment of the keenest pleasure, without a moment's intermission, every sense drenched and stimulated with every sort of delight. But who that is worthy to be called a human being would choose to pass a single entire day in pleasure of that description? The Cyrenaics, it is true, do not repudiate it; on this point your friends are more decent, but the Cyrenaics perhaps more consistent. But let us pass in review not these 'arts' of first importance, a lack of which with our ancestors gave a man the name of 'inert' or good-for-nothing, but I ask you whether you believe that, I do not say Homer, Archilochus or Pindar, but Phidias, Polyclitus and Zeuxis regarded the purpose of their art as pleasure. Then shall a craftsman have a higher ideal of external than a distinguished citizen of moral beauty? But what else is the cause of an error so profound and so very widely diffused, than the fact that he who decides that pleasure is the Chief Good judges the question not with the rational and deliberative part of his mind, but with its lowest part, the faculty of desire? For I ask you, if gods exist, as your school too believes, how can they be happy, seeing that they cannot enjoy bodily pleasures? or, if they are happy without that kind of pleasure, why do you deny that the Wise Man is capable of a like purely mental activity?
CICERO DE FINIBUS

XXXV. "Lege laudationes, Torquate, non eorum qui sunt ab Homero laudati, non Cyri, non Agesilai, non Aristidi aut Themistocli, non Philippi aut Alexandri; lege nostrorum hominum, lege vestrae familiae; neminem videbis ita laudatum ut artifex callidus comparandarum voluptatum diceretur. Non elogia monumentorum id significant, velut hoc ad portam: HUNC UNUM PLURIMAE CONSENTIUNT GENTES POPULI PRIMA-

MARII FUISSE VIRUM. Idne consensisse de Calatino plurimas gentes arbitramur, primarum populi fuisse quod praestantissimus fuisse in conficiendis voluptatibus? Ergo in iis adulescentibus bonam spem esse dicemus et magnam indolem quos suis commodis inservituros et quidquid ipsis expedit facturos arbitrabimur? Nonne videmus quanta perturbatio rerum omnium consequatur, quanta confusio? Tollitur beneficium, tollitur gratia, quae sunt vincla concordiae. Nec enim cum tua causa cui commodes beneficium illud habendum est, sed feneratio, nec gratia deberi videtur ei qui sua causa commodaverit. Maximas vero virtutes iacere omnes necesse est voluptate dominante; sunt etiam turpitudines plurimae quae, nisi honestas natura plurimum valeat, cur non cadant in sapientem non est facile defendere. Ac ne plura complectar (sunt enim innumerable), bene laudata virtus voluptatis aditus inter-

208
BOOK II. xxxv

116 XXXV. "Read the panegyrics, Torquatus, not of the heroes praised by Homer, not of Cyrus or Agesilaus, Aristides or Themistocles, Philip or Alexander; but read those delivered upon our own great men, read those of your own family. You will not find anyone extolled for his skill and cunning in procuring pleasures. This is not the purport of laudatory epitaphs, like that one near the city gate:

**HERE LYETH ONE WHOM ALL MANKIND AGREE**
**ROME'S FIRST AND GREATEST CITIZEN TO BE.**

117 Do we suppose that all mankind agreed that Calatinus was Rome's greatest citizen because of his surpassing eminence in the acquisition of pleasures? Then are we to say that a youth is a young man of great promise and high character, when we judge him likely to study his own interests and to do whatever will be for his personal advantage? Do we not see what a universal upheaval and confusion would result from such a principle? It does away with generosity and with gratitude, the bonds of mutual harmony. If you lend a man money for your own advantage, this cannot be considered an act of generosity—it is usury; no gratitude is owing to a man who lends money for gain. In fact if pleasure usurps the sovereignty, all the cardinal virtues must inevitably be dethroned; and indeed there are a number of morally base actions which can with difficulty be proved inconsistent with the character of the Wise Man, unless it be a law of nature that moral goodness should be supreme. Not to bring forward further arguments (for they are countless in number) any honest panegyric of Virtue must needs keep Pleasure at arm's length.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

cludat necesse est. Quod iam a me exspectare noli; tute introspice in mentem tuam ipse eamque omni cogitatione pertractans percontare ipse te, perpetuisne malis voluptatibus perfruens in ea quam saepe usurpabas tranquillitate degere omnem aetatem sine dolore, assumpto etiam illo quod vos quidem adiungere soletis sed fieri non potest, sine doloris metu, an, cum de omnibus gentibus optime mere- rere, cum opem indigentibus salutemque ferres, vel Herculis perpeti aerumnas. Sic enim maiores nostri labores non fugiendos tristissimo tamen verbo aerumnas etiam in deo nominaverunt. Elicerem ex te cogeremque ut responderes, nisi vererer ne Herculem ipsum ea quae pro salute gentium summo labore gessisset voluptatis causa gessisse diceres.”


1 elicereBaiter, Mdv.; MSS. eligere, exigere.

210
BOOK II. xxxv

Do not expect me further to argue the point; look within, study your own consciousness. Then after full and careful introspection, ask yourself the question, would you prefer to pass your whole life in that state of calm which you spoke of so often, amidst the enjoyment of unceasing pleasures, free from all pain, and even (an addition which your school is fond of postulating but which is really impossible) free from all fear of pain, or to be a benefactor of the entire human race, and to bring succour and safety to the distressed, even at the cost of enduring the agonies of a Hercules? Agonies—that was indeed the sad and gloomy name which our ancestors bestowed, even in the case of a god, upon labours which yet were not to be evaded. I would press my question and drag an answer from you, were I not afraid lest you should say that Hercules himself in the toils and labours that he wrought for the preservation of mankind was acting for the sake of pleasure!"

Here I concluded. "I am at no loss for authorities," said Torquatus, "to whom to refer your arguments. I might be able to do some execution myself, but I prefer to find better equipped champions." "No doubt you allude to our excellent and learned friends Siro and Philodemus." "You are right," he replied. "Pray appeal to them," said I; "but it would be fairer to let Triarius pronounce some verdict on our dispute." "I formally object to him as prejudiced," he rejoined with a smile, "at all events on this issue. You have shown us some mercy, but Triarius lays about him like a true Stoic." "Oh," interposed Triarius, "I'll fight more boldly still next time, for I shall have the arguments I have just
CICERO DE FINIBUS

in promptu quae modo audivi; nec ante aggrediar quam te ab istis quos dicis instructum videro." Quae cum essent dicta, finem fecimus et ambulandi et disputandi.
BOOK II. xxxv

heard ready to my hand, though I won’t attack you
till I see you have been armed by the instructors
whom you mention.” And with these words we
brought our promenade and our discussion to an end
together.
M. TULLII CICERONIS
DE
FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM
LIBER TERTIUS

1 I. Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se lo-quatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, conces-suram arbitror, convictam superiore libro, dignitati. Etenim sit impudens si virtuti diutius repugnet aut si honestis iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. Quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius illecebrisque impediatur disputandi

2 severitas. Quaerendum est enim ubi sit illud sum-mum bonum quod reperire volumus, quoniam et voluptas ab eo remota est et eadem fere contra eos dici possunt qui vacuitatem doloris finem bonorum esse voluerunt; nec vero ullum probetur oportet\(^1\) summum bonum quod virtute careat, qua nihil possit\(^2\) esse praestantius.

Itaque quamquam in eo sermone qui cum Torquato est habitus non remissi fuimus, tamen haec acrior est cum Stoicis parata contentio. Quae enim de voluptate dicuntur, ea nec acutissime nec abscondite disseruntur; neque enim qui de-

\(^1\) oportet Müller; ut A, B, E; other MSS. omit; Mdv. \([ut]\).
\(^2\) possit B and inf. MSS.; posset A, E; potest Mdv.

216
DE FINIBUS

BOOK III

1  I. MY DEAR BRUTUS.—Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. The question before us is, where is that Chief Good, which is the object of our inquiry, to be found? Pleasure we have eliminated; the doctrine that the End of Goods consists in freedom from pain is open to almost identical objections; and in fact no Chief Good can be accepted that is without the element of Virtue, the most excellent thing that can exist.

Hence although in our debate with Torquatus we did not spare our strength, nevertheless a keener struggle now awaits us with the Stoics. For pleasure is a topic that does not lend itself to very subtle or profound discussion; its champions are little skilled in

217
CICERO DE FINIBUS

fendunt eam versuti in disserendo sunt nec qui contra dicunt causam difficilem repellunt. Ipse etiam dicit Epicurus ne argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attinet doceri. Quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. Nec enim in Torquati sermone quidquam implicatum aut tortuosum fuit, nostra, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disse-rendi genus, idque cum Graecis, tum magis nobis quibus etiam verba parienda sunt imponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. Quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur, cogitans in omni arte cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit multam novitatem nominum esse cum constituaturs earum rerum vocabula quae in quaque arte versentur.

4 Itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis quae ipsi Graeciae nota non sint,\(^1\) geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam, more quodam loquuntur suo; ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forensest atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis.

II. Atque ut omittam has artes elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices quidem tueri sua artifícia possent nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. Quin etiam\(^1\)agri cultura\(^1\) quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas res in quibus versatur.

\(^1\)sint Mdv.; sunt MSS.
BOOK III. i-ii

dialectic, and their adversaries have no difficult case to refute. In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology.

II. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has

219
nominibus notavit novis. Quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est; ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. 5 Quamquam ex omnibus philosophis Stoici plurima novaverunt, Zenoque eorum princeps non tam rerum inventor fuit quam verborum novorum. Quod si in ea lingua quam plerique uberiorem putant concessum est ut doctissimi homines de rebus non pervagatis inusitatis verbis utterentur, quanto id nobis magis est concedendum qui ea nunc primum audemus attingere? Et quoniam saepe diximus, et quidem cum aliqua querela non Graecorum modo, sed eorum etiam qui se Graecos magis quam nostros haberi volunt, nos non modo non vinci a Graecis verborum copia sed esse in ea etiam superiores, elaborandum est ut hoc non in nostris solum artibus sed etiam in illorum ipsorum assequamur. Quamquam ea verba quibus instituto veterum utimur pro Latinis, ut ipsa philosophia, ut rhetorica, dialectica, grammatica, geometria, musica, quamquam Latine ea dici pote- rant, tamen quoniam usu percepta sunt nostra duca- mus. Atque haec quidem de rerum nominibus. 6 De ipsis rebus autem saepenúmero, Brute, vereor ne reprehendar, cum haec ad te scribam, qui cum in philosophia, tum in optimo genere philosophiae tantum processeris. Quod si facerem quasi te eru-

a Cp. 1, 8 ff.

b viz. Ethics.
yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot be discussed in language taken at random from the street. Still of all the philosophers the Stoics have been the greatest innovators in this respect, and Zeno their founder was rather an inventor of new terms than a discoverer of new ideas. But if men so learned, using a language generally supposed to be more copious than our own, were allowed in handling recondite subjects to employ unfamiliar terms, how much more right have we to claim this licence who are venturing now to approach these topics for the first time? Moreover we have often declared, and this under some protest not from Greeks only but also from persons who would rather be considered Greeks than Romans, that in fullness of vocabulary we are not merely not surpassed by the Greeks but are actually their superiors. We are therefore bound to do our utmost to make good this claim not in our native arts only but also in those that belong to the Greeks themselves. However, words which the practice of past generations permits us to employ as Latin, e.g. the term ‘philosophy’ itself, or ‘rhetoric,’ ‘logic,’ ‘grammar,’ ‘geometry,’ ‘music’ we may consider as being our own; the ideas might it is true have been translated into Latin, but the Greek terms have been naturalized by use. So much for terminology.

As regards my subject, I often fear, Brutus, that I shall meet with censure for writing upon this topic to you, who are yourself so great an adept in philosophy, and in the highest branch of philosophy. Did I assume the attitude of an instructor, such censure would be
CICERO DE FINIBUS
diens, iure reprehenderer. Sed ab eo plurimum
absum neque ut ea cognoscas quae tibi notissima
sunt ad te mitto; sed quia facillime in nomine tuo
acquiesco et quia te habeo aequissimum eorum studio-
rum quae mihi communia tecum sunt existimatorem
et iudicem. Attendes igitur ut soles diligenter,
eamque controversiam diiudicabis quae mihi fuit
cum avunculo tuo, divino ac singulari viro.

7 Nam in Tusculano cum essem vellemque e bibli-
theca pueri Luculli quibusdam libris uti, veni in eius
villam ut eos ipse ut solebam depromerem. Quo cum
venissem, M. Catonem quem ibi esse nescieram vidi in
bibliotheca sedentem, multis circumfusum Stoicorum
libris. Erat enim ut scis in eo aviditas legendi, nec
satiari poterat; quippe qui ne reprisionem quidem
vulgi inanem reformidans in ipsa curia soleret legere
saepe dum senatus cogeretur, nihil operae rei publicae
detrahens; quo magis tum in summo otio maximaque
copia quasi helluari libris, si hoc verbo in tam clara

8 re utendum est, videbatur. Quod cum accidisset,
ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, surrexit sta-
tim. Deinde prima illa quae in congressu solemus:
"Quid tu," inquit, "huc? a villa enim credo;" et:
"Si ibi te esse scissem, ad te ipse venissem."
"Heri," inquam, "ludis commissis ex urbe prefectus

222
BOOK III. ii

deserved. But nothing could be farther from me. I dedicate my work to you, not to teach you what you know extremely well already, but because your name gives me a very comforting sense of support, and because I find in you a most impartial judge and critic of the studies which I share with yourself. You will therefore grant me, as always, your closest attention, and act as umpire of the debate which I held with that remarkable man of genius, your uncle.

7 I was down at my place at Tusculum, and wanted to consult some books from the library of the young Lucullus; so I went to his country-house, as I was in the habit of doing, to help myself to the volumes I needed. On my arrival, seated in the library I found Marcus Cato; I had not known he was there. He was surrounded by piles of books on Stoicism; for he possessed, as you are aware, a voracious appetite for reading, and could never have enough of it; indeed it was often his practice actually to brave the idle censure of the mob by reading in the senate-house itself, while waiting for the senate to assemble,—he did not steal any attention from public business. So it may well be believed that when I found him taking a complete holiday, with a vast supply of books at command, he had the air of indulging in a literary debauch, if the term may be applied to so honourable an occupation. Upon this chance encounter, each of us being equally surprised to see the other, he at once rose, and we began to exchange the usual greetings. "What brings you here?" cried he; "You are from your country-seat, I suppose. Had I known you were there," he continued, "I should have anticipated you with a visit." "Yes," I answered, "the games began yesterday, so I came
veni ad vesperum. Causa autem fuit hoc veniendi ut quosdam hinc libros promerem. Et quidem, Cato, hanc totam copiam iam Lucullo nostro notam esse oportebit; nam his libris eum malo quam reliquo ornatu villae detectari. Est enim mihi magnae curae (quamquam hoc quidem proprium tuum munus est) ut ita erudiatur ut et patri et Caepioni nostro et tibi tam propinquo respondeat. Laboro autem non sine causa; nam et avi eius memoria moveor (nec enim ignoras quanti fecerim Caepionem, qui, ut opinio mea fert, in principibus iam esset si viveret) et Lucullus mihi versatur ante oculos, vir cum omnibus excellens, tum mecum et amicitia et omni voluntate sententiaque coniunctus.” “Praeclare,” inquit, “facis cum et eorum memoriam tenes quorum uterque tibi testamento liberos suos commendavit, et puerum diligis. Quod autem meum munus dicis non equidem recuso, sed te adiungo socium. Addo etiam illud, multa iam mihi dare signa puerum et pudoris et ingenii; sed aetatem vides.” “Video equidem,” inquam; “sed tamen iam insci debet iis artibus quas si dum est tener combiberit, ad maiora veniet paratior.” “Sic; et quidem diligentius saepiusque ista loquemur inter nos agemusque communiter. Sed residamus,” inquit, “si placet.” Itaque fecimus.

1 Halm conj. L. Lucullus.
2 Baiter conj. omnibus virtutibus.

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a The young Lucullus’s grandfather, Q. Servilius Caepio, was quaestor 100 B.C. and died 90 B.C. when Cicero was 16. But the following words seem to refer to a Caepio who, had he not died prematurely, would be in the prime of life when Cicero writes. This must mean the Caepio of the preceding sentence, Lucullus’s uncle, who may well have left Cicero as the guardian of his son, as is stated below. We may assume that avi is a slip, either of Cicero’s or of a copyist’s, for avunculi (Schütz).  

224
out of town, and arrived late in the afternoon. My reason for coming on here was to get some books from the library. By the way, Cato, it will soon be time for our friend Lucullus to make acquaintance with this fine collection; for I hope he will take more pleasure in his library than in all the other appointments of his country-house. I am extremely anxious (though of course the responsibility belongs especially to you) that he should have the kind of education that will turn him out after the same pattern as his father and our dear Caepio, and also yourself, to whom he is so closely related. And I have every motive for my interest in him. I cherish the memory of his grandfather* (and you are aware how highly I esteemed Caepio, who in my belief would to-day be in the front rank, were he still alive). And also Lucullus is always present to my mind; he was a man of surpassing eminence, united to me in sentiment and opinion as well as by friendship.” “I commend you,” rejoined Cato, “for your loyalty to the memory of men who both bequeathed their children to your care, as well as for your affectionate interest in the lad. My own responsibility, as you call it, I by no means disown, but I enlist you to share it with me. Moreover I may say that the youth already seems to me to show many signs both of modesty and talent; but you know how young he is.” “I do,” said I, “but all the same it is time for him to be dipping into studies which, if allowed to soak in at this impressionable age, will render him better equipped when he comes to the business of life.” “True, and we will discuss this matter again several times more fully and take common action. But let us be seated,” he said, “if agreeable to you.” So we sat down.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

III. Tum ille: "Tu autem cum ipse tantum librorum habeas, quos hic tandem requiris?" "Commentarios quosdam," inquam, "Aristotelios, quos hic sciebam esse, veni ut auferrem, quos legerem dum essem otiosus; quod quidem nobis non saepe contingit." "Quam vellem," inquit, "te ad Stoicos inclinavisses! Erat enim, si cuiusquam, certe tuum nihil praeter virtutem in bonis ducere." "Vide ne magis, inquam, tuum fuerit, cum re idem tibi quod mihi videretur, non nova te rebus nomina imponere. Ratio enim nostra consentit, pugnat oratio." "Minime vero," inquit ille, "consentit. Quidquid enim praeter id quod honestum sit expetendum esse dixeris in bonisque numeraveris, et honestum ipsum; quasi virtutis lumen, exstinxeris et virtutem penitus everteris." "Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice," inquam; "sed videsne verborum gloriam tibi cum Pyrrhone et cum Aristone, qui omnia exaequant, esse communem? de quibus cupio scire quid sentias." "Egone quaeris," inquit, "quid sentiam? quos bonos viros, fortes, iustos, moderatos autaudivimus in re publica fuisse aut ipsi vidimus, qui sineulla doctrina, naturam ipsam securti, multa laudabilia fecerunt, eos melius a natura institutos fuisse quam institui potuisissent a philosophia, si ullahiam probavissent praeteream quae nihil aliud in bonis haberet nisi honestum, nihil nisi turpe in malis; ceterae philosophorum disci-
III. Cato then resumed: "But what pray are the books that you must come here for, when you have so large a library of your own?"

"I have come to fetch some commentaries on Aristotle," I replied, "which I knew were here. I wanted to read them during my holiday; I do not often get any leisure."

"How I wish," said he, "that you had thrown in your lot with the Stoics! You of all men might have been expected to reckon virtue as the only good."

"Perhaps you might rather have been expected," I answered, "to refrain from adopting a new terminology, when in substance you think as I do. Our principles agree; it is our language that is at variance."

"Indeed," he rejoined, "they do not agree in the least. Once pronounce anything to be desirable, once reckon anything as a good, other than Moral Worth, and you have extinguished the very light of virtue, Moral Worth itself, and overthrown virtue entirely."

"That all sounds very fine, Cato," I replied, "but are you aware that you share your lofty pretensions with Pyrrho and with Aristo, who make all things equal in value? I should like to know what your opinion is of them."

"My opinion?" he said. "You ask what my opinion is? That those good, brave, just and temperate men, of whom we have heard as having lived in our state, or whom we have ourselves seen, who under the guidance of Nature herself, without the aid of any learning, did many glorious deeds,—that these men were better educated by nature than they could possibly have been by philosophy had they accepted any other system of philosophy than the one that counts Moral Worth the only good and Moral Baseness the only evil. All other philosophical systems—in vary-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

plinae, omnino alia magis alia, sed tamen omnes quae rem ullam virtutis experem aut in bonis aut in malis numerent, eas non modo nihil adiuvare arbitror neque afferre\(^1\) quo meliores simus, sed ipsam depravare naturam. Nam nisi hoc obtineatur, id solum bonum esse quod honestum sit, nullo modo probari possit beatam vim virtute effici; quod si ita sit, cur opera philosophiae sit danda, nescio. Si enim sapiens aliquid miser esse possit, ne ego istam gloriosam memorabilemque virtutem non magno aestimandam putem.”

12 “Quae adhuc, Cato, a te dicta sunt, eadem,” inquam, “dicere posses si sequerere Pyrrhonem aut Aristonem. Nec enim ignoras iis istud honestum non summum modo sed etiam ut tu vis solum bonum videri; quod si ita est, sequitur id ipsum quod te velle video, omnes semper beatos esse sapientes. Hosne igitur laudas et hanc eorum,” inquam, “sentientiam sequi nos censes oportere?” “Minime vero istorum quidem,” inquit; “cum enim virtutis hoc proprium sit, earum rerum quae secundum naturam sint habere delectum, qui omnia sic exaequaverunt ut in utramque partem ita paria redderent uti nulla selectione uterentur, hi virtutem ipsam sustulerunt.”

13 “Istud quidem,” inquam, optime dicis; sed quaero, nonne tibi faciendum idem sit nihil dicenti bonum quod non rectum honestumque sit, reliquarum rerum discrimen omne tollenti.” “Si quidem,” inquit, tollerem; sed relinquuo.” “Quonam modo?” in-

\(^1\) afferre edd.; affirmare MSS., and Mdv. with mark of corruption.

228
BOOK III. iii-iv

ing degrees no doubt, but still all,—which reckon anything of which virtue is not an element either as a good or an evil, do not merely, as I hold, give us no assistance or support towards becoming better men, but are actually corrupting to the character. Either this point must be firmly maintained, that Moral Worth is the sole good, or it is absolutely impossible to prove that virtue constitutes happiness. And in that case I do not see why we should trouble to study philosophy. For if a Wise Man could be miserable, I should not set much value on your vaunted and belauded virtue.”

12 IV. “What you have said so far, Cato,” I answered, “might equally well be said by a follower of Pyrrho or of Aristo. They, as you are aware, think as you do, that this Moral Worth you speak of is not merely the chief but the only Good; and from this of necessity follows the proposition that I notice you maintain, namely, that the Wise are always happy. Do you then,” I asked, “commend these philosophers, and think that we ought to adopt this view of theirs?”

“I certainly would not have you adopt their view,” he said; “for it is of the essence of virtue to exercise choice among the things in accordance with nature; so that philosophers who make all things absolutely equal, rendering them indistinguishable either as better or worse, and leaving no room for selection

13 among them, have abolished virtue itself.” “Excellently put,” I rejoined; “but pray are not you committed to the same position, if you say that only what is right and moral is good, and abolish all distinction between everything else?” “Quite so,” said he, “if I did abolish all distinction, but I do not.” “How so?” I said. “If only virtue, only that

229
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quam. "Si una virtus, unum istud quod honestum appellas, rectum, laudabile, decorum (erit enim notius quale sit pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus), id igitur, inquam, si solum est bonum, quid habebis praeterea quod sequare? aut, si nihil malum nisi quod turpe, inhonestum, indecorum, pravum, flagitiosum, foedum (ut hoc quoque pluribus nominibus insigne faciamus), quid praeterea dices esse fugiendum?" "Non ignoranti tibi," inquit, "quid sim dicturus, sed aliquid, ut ego suspicor, ex mea brevi responsione arripere cupienti non respondebo ad singula; explicabo potius, quoniam otiosi sumus, nisi alienum putas, totam Zenonis Stoicorumque sententiam." "Minime id quidem," inquam, "alienum, multumque ad ea quae quae quierimus explicatio tua ista profecerit." "Experiamur igitur," inquit; "etsi habet haec Stoicorum ratio difficilior quiddam et obscurius. Nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa quondam rerum nomina novarum ...¹ non videbantur, quae nunc consuetudo diuturna trivit; quid censes in Latino fore?" "Facillimum id quidem est," inquam. "Si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset insitatem, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen imponere, cur non liceat Catoni? Nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesserit erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum quod idem declarat magis usitatum; equidem soleo etiam, quod uno Graeci, si alter non possum, idem pluribus

¹ Mdv. marks lacuna, and conjectures novarum nova erant ferenda non videbantur.
one thing which you call moral, right, praiseworthy, becoming (for its nature will be better understood if it is denoted by a number of synonyms), if then, I say, this is the sole good, what other object of pursuit will you have beside it? or, if there be nothing bad but what is base, dishonourable, disgraceful, evil, sinful, foul (to make this clear also by using a variety of terms), what else will you pronounce worthy to be avoided?" "You know quite well," he retorted, "what I am going to say; but I suspect you want to catch up something in my answer if I put it shortly. So I won't answer you point by point. Instead of that, as we are at leisure, I will expound, unless you think it out of place, the whole system of Zeno and the Stoics." "Out of place?" I cried. "By no means. Your exposition will be of great assistance towards solving the questions we are asking." "Then let us make the attempt," said he, "albeit there is a considerable element of difficulty and obscurity in this Stoic system. For at one time even the terms employed in Greek for its novel conceptions seemed unendurable, when they were novel, though now daily use has made them familiar; what then do you think will be the case in Latin?" "Do not feel the least difficulty on that score," said I. "If when Zeno invented some novel idea he was permitted to denote it by an equally unheard-of word, why should not Cato be permitted to do so too? Though all the same it need not be a hard and fast rule that every word shall be represented by its exact counterpart, when there is a more familiar word conveying the same meaning. That is the way of a clumsy translator. Indeed my own practice is to use several words to give what is ex-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

verbis exponere. Et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus occurrerit Latinum, ne hoc 'ephippiis' et 'acrato-phoris' potius quam 'proëgmenis' et 'aproproëgmenis' concedatur. Quamquam haec quidem 'praepo-
16 sita' recte et 'reiecta' dicere licebit." "Bene facis," inquit, "quod me adiuvas; et istis quidem quae modo dixisti utar potius Latinis; in ceteris subvenies si me haerentem videbis." "Sedulo," inquam "fa-
ciam. Sed fortuna fortes; quare conare, quaeo. Quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius?"

V. "Placet his," inquit, "quorum ratio mihi probatur, simul atque natum sit animal (hinc enim est ordiendum), ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum vi-
deantur asserre. Id ita esse sic probant, quod ante quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret nisi statum suum diligereint, interitum tимерent. Fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligereint. Ex quo intellegi
pressed in Greek by one, if I cannot convey the sense otherwise. And at the same time I hold that we may fairly claim the licence to employ a Greek word when no Latin word is readily forthcoming. Why should this licence be granted to *ephippia* (saddles) and *acratophora* (jars for neat wine) more than to *proëgmena* and *aproproëgmena*? These latter however it is true may be correctly translated 'preferred' and 'rejected.'” “Thanks for your assistance,” he said. “I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties.” “I'll do my best,” I replied. “But fortune favours the bold; so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?”

V. He began: “It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary
CICERO DE FINIBUS

17 debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. In principiis autem naturalibus plerisque Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam; quibus ego vehementer assentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur quae praeae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. Satis esse autem argumenti videotur quamobrem illa quae prima sunt ascita natura diligamus, quod est nemo quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnes partes corporis quam eodem usu immunitas aut detortas habere.

“Rerum autem cognitiones (quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, καταλήψεις appellamus licet), eas igitur ipsas propter se asciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. Id autem in parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. Artes etiam ipsas propter se assumendas putamus, cum quia sit in iis aliquid dignum assumptione, tum quod constant ex cognitionibus et contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via. A falsa autem assensione magis nos alienatos esse quam a ceteris rebus quae sint contra naturam, arbitrantur.

“(Iam membrorum, id est, partium corporis alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata, ut manus, crura, pedes, ut ea quae sunt intus in corpore, quorum utilitas quanta sit a medicis etiam

\[a\] This parenthesis has no relevance to the context.

234
BOOK III. v

17 impulse to action. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable.

"Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, *katalēpseis*), — these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. The sciences also, we consider, are things to be chosen for their own sake, partly because there is in them something worthy of choice, partly because they consist of acts of cognition and contain an element of fact established by methodical reasoning. The mental assent to what is false, as the Stoics believe, is more repugnant to us than all the other things that are contrary to nature.

"(Again, of the members or parts of the body, some appear to have been bestowed on us by nature for the sake of their use, for example the hands, legs, feet, and the internal organs, as to the degree of whose utility even physicians are not agreed;
CICERO DE FINIBUS

disputatur, alia autem nullam ob utilitatem quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumae versicolores columbis, viris mammae atque barba.)

19 Haec dicuntur fortasseieiunius; sunt enim quasi prima elementa naturae, quibus ubertas orationis adhiberi vix potest; nec equidem eam cogito consектari; verum tamen cum de rebus grandioribus dicas, ipsae res verba rapiunt; ita fit cum gravior, tum etiam splendidior oratio." "Est ut dicis," inquam; "sed tamen omne quod de re bona dilucide dicitur, mihi praecelare dici videtur. Istiusmodi autem res dicere ornate velle puerile est, plane autem et perspicue expedire posse docti et intellegentis viri."

20 "Progrediamur igitur, quoniam," inquit, "ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. Sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt (sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus) id quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi àçìav vocant, contraque inaestimabile quod sit superiori contrarium. Initiis igitur ita constitutis ut ea quae secundum naturam sunt ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda,
BOOK III. v-vi

while others serve no useful purpose, but appear to be intended for ornament: for instance the peacock's tail, the plumage of the dove with its shifting colours, and the breasts and beard of the male human being.) All this is perhaps somewhat baldly expressed; for it deals with what may be called the primary elements of nature, to which any embellishment of style can scarcely be applied, nor am I for my part concerned to attempt it. On the other hand, when one is treating of more majestic topics the style instinctively rises with the subject, and the brilliance of the language increases with the dignity of the theme.” “True,” I rejoined; “but to my mind, any clear statement of an important topic possesses excellence of style. It would be childish to desire an ornate style in subjects of the kind with which you are dealing. A man of sense and education will be content to be able to express his meaning plainly and clearly.”

VI. “To proceed then,” he continued, “for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value—arist—such things are ‘valuable’ and ‘to be taken,’ and their contraries ‘valueless’ and ‘to be rejected.’

Such things are ‘valuable’ and ‘to be taken,’ and their contraries ‘valueless’ and ‘to be rejected.’

237
primum est officium (id enim appello καθέκον) ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat quae secundum naturam sint pellatque contraria; qua inventa selectione et item reiectione, sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi quid sit quod vere bonum possit dici. Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam; simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant ἐννοια illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit quam omnia illa quae prima dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum; quod cum positum sit in eo quod ὅμολογία Stoici, nos appellamus convenientiam, si placet, — cum igitur in eo sit id bonum quo omnia referenda sunt, honeste facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et

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\textsuperscript{a} The Latin is here inadequate; what is meant is apparently that the adult deliberately selects the natural Goods which as a child he pursued instinctively, and that the selection is now an officium. If however cum officio is the mark of selectio at this later stage, Cicero is inaccurate above when he applies officium to the instinct of self-preservation and the instinctive choice of natural Goods. On the other hand it is not clear why these should not be included under kathêkon 'appropriate action' or officium as defined at § 58, 'an act of which a probable account or reason can be given.'
rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek \textit{kathèkon}) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action';\(^a\) then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has attained to understanding, or rather to conscious intelligence—in Stoic phraseology \textit{ennoia}—and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that should govern conduct, he then esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that in this order resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term \textit{homologia} and we with your approval may call 'conformity'\(^b\)—inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its

\(^{a}\) Later we choose them deliberately, as in harmony with nature; and this is Morality—the right aim, not the attainment—which is the Chief and only Good.

\(^{b}\) 'To live conformably,' \textit{homologoumenos i̱ṉ̱}, was Zeno's formula for the End; it was interpreted as meaning 'to live on one harmonious plan.' Cleanthes added, \textit{i̱ṉ̱ φίλος}, 'to live in conformity with nature.'
CICERO DE FINIBUS

dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quae sunt prima naturae propter se nihil est expetendum. 

22 Cum vero illa quae officia esse dixi profisciscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri ut adipsica-mur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliazionibus honesta actio; consequens est enim et post oritur, ut dixi. Est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendum magis hort-tatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet ut duo sint ultima bonorum. Ut enim si cui propositum sit collineare hastam aliquo aut sagittam, sicut ¹ nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia quae possit ut collineet: huic in eiusmodi similitudine omnia sint facienda ut collineet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat quo propositum assequatur, sit ² hoc quasi ulti-mum quae nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum.

VII. "Cum autem omnia officia a principis naturae profisciscantur, ab iisdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. Sed quemadmodum saepe fit ut is qui commendatus sit alicui pluriis eum faciat cui commendatus quam illum a quo sit, sic minime mirum

¹ sicut MSS.; sic Mdv., bracketing sic illi—collineet: the sentence so emended may be rendered "For suppose a man were to set himself to take true aim at a mark with a spear or an arrow, this purpose would correspond to the Ultimate Good as we define it. The archer in this illustration would have to do all he could to aim straight, and yet it is this doing all he could to attain his purpose that would constitute his Ultimate End, as we call it, answering to the Chief Good, as defined by us, in the conduct of life; the actual hitting of the mark would be, in our phrase, 'to be chosen,' not 'to be desired.'" ² sit edd.; sic MSS.

240
own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. But since those actions which I have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.'

VII. "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like
CICERO DE FINIBUS

est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri quam illa sint a quibus ad hanc venerimus. Atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae ὅμη Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. Ut enim histrioni actioni, saltatori motus non quivis sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certa genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius quam modo dixi et saltationi, ut in ipsa insit, non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. Et tamen est etiam alia cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimili tude, propter quae in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant κατορθώματα, omnes numeros virtutis continent. Sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. Inscite autem medicinae et gubernationis ultimum cum ultimo sapientiae comparatur. Sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem

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a Effectio is here taken as equivalent to the Aristotelian praxis, as in § 45; but it might be construed as having the sense of 'effectus' in Tusc. 2, 3, viz. ergon in its wider sense, the product of an art, covering both praxis, the actual exercise of the art, which is the product of a 'practic' art, and ergon in the narrower sense, 'effectus' in § 32, the extraneous product of a 'poëtic' or constructive art.
manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first introduced to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hōrmē, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living: and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these same arts. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology kathorthōmata, contain all the categories of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. It is erroneous, however, to place the End of medicine or of navigation exactly on a par with the End of Wisdom. For Wisdom includes also magnanimity.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

complectitur et iustitiam et ut omnia quae homini accidant infra se esse iudicet, quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit. Tenere autem virtutes eas ipsas quarum modo feci mentionem nemo poterit nisi statuerit nihil esse quod intersit aut differat aliud ab alio praeter honesta et turpia.

26 "Videamus nunc quam sint praecellae illa his quae iam posui consequentia. Cum enim hoc sit extremum (sentis enim, credo, me iam diu quod τέλος Graeci dicunt id dicere tum extremum, tum ultimum, tum summum; licebit etiam finem pro extremo aut ultimo dicere)—cum igitur hoc sit extremum, congruenter naturae convenienterque vivere, necessario sequitur omnes sapientes semper feliciter, absoleute, fortunate vivere, nulla re impediri, nulla prohiberi, nulla egere. Quod autem continet non magis eam disciplinam de qua loquor quam vitam fortunasque nostras, id est ut quod honestum sit id solum bonum iudicemus, potest id quidem fuse et copiose et omnibus electissimis verbis gravissimisque sententiiis rhetorice et augeri et ornari; sed consequentia me Stoicorum brevia et acuta delectant.

27 VIII. "Concluduntur igitur eorum argumenta sic: Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est; quod autem laudabile est, omne est honestum; bonum igitur quod est, honestum est. Satisne hoc conclusum videtur? Certe; quod enim efficiebatur ex iis duobus quae erant sumpta, in eo vides esse conclu-

1 rhetorice some inf. MSS. and some edd. omit.
and justice and a sense of superiority to all the accidents of man's estate, but this is not the case with the other arts. Again, even the very virtues I have just mentioned cannot be attained by anyone unless he has realized that all things are indifferent and indistinguishable except moral worth and base-ness.

"We may now observe how strikingly the principles I have established support the following corollaries. Inasmuch as the final aim—(and you have observed, no doubt, that I have all along been translating the Greek term telos either by 'final' or 'ultimate aim,' or 'chief Good,' and for 'final or ultimate aim' we may also substitute 'End')—inasmuch then as the final aim is to live in agreement and harmony with nature, it necessarily follows that all wise men at all times enjoy a happy, perfect and fortunate life, free from all hindrance, interference or want. The essential principle not merely of the system of philosophy I am discussing but also of our life and fortunes is, that we should believe Moral Worth to be the only good. This principle might be amplified and elaborated in the rhetorical manner, with great length and fullness and with all the resources of choice diction and impressive argument; but for my own part I like the terse and pointed syllogisms of the Stoics.

VIII. "They put their arguments in the following syllogistic form: Whatever is good is praiseworthy: but whatever is praiseworthy is morally honourable: therefore that which is good is morally honourable. Do you think this is a valid deduction? Undoubtedly it is so: you can see that the conclusion rests on an inference logically drawn from the two
CICERO DE FINIBUS

sum. Duorum autem e quibus effecta conclusio est contra superius dici solet non omne bonum esse laudabile; nam quod laudabile sit honestum esse conceditur. Illud autem perabsurdum, bonum esse aliquid quod non expetendum sit, aut expetendum quod non placens, aut si id, non etiam diligendum; ergo et probandum; ita etiam laudabile; id autem honestum. Ita fit ut quod bonum sit id etiam honestum sit.

28 "Deinde quaero quis aut de misera vita possit gloriari aut de non beata. De sola igitur beata. Ex quo efficitur gloriacione, ut ita dicam, dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit nisi honestae vitae iure contingere. Ita fit ut honesta vita beata vita sit. Et quoniam is cui contingit ut iure laudetur habet insigne quiddam ad decus et ad gloriam, ut ob ea quae tanta sint beatus dici iure possit, idem de vita talis viri rectissime dicetur. Ita si beata vita honestate cernitur, quod honestum est id bonum solum habendum est.

29 "Quid vero? negarine ullo\textsuperscript{1} modo possit numquam\textsuperscript{2} quemquam stabilii et firmo et magno animo, quem fortem virum dicimus, effici posse, nisi constitutionem sit non esse malum dolorem? Ut enim qui mortem in malis ponit non potest eam non timere, sic nemoulla in re potest id quod malum esse decreverit non curare idque contemnere. Quo posito et omnium assensu approbato, illud assumitur, eum qui

\textsuperscript{1}negarine ullo Davis, Mdv.; negari nullo MSS.
\textsuperscript{2}numquam inserted by Mdv.

246
BOOK III. viii

premises. The usual line of reply is to deny the major premise, and say that not everything good is praiseworthy; for there is no denying that what is praiseworthy is morally honourable. But it would be paradoxical to maintain that there is something good which is not desirable; or desirable that is not pleasing; or if pleasing, not also esteemed; and therefore approved as well; and so also praiseworthy. But the praiseworthy is the morally honourable. Hence it follows that what is good is also morally honourable.

28 "Next I ask, who can be proud of a life that is miserable or not happy? It follows that one can only be proud of one's lot when it is a happy one. This proves that the happy life is a thing that deserves, so to speak, that one should be proud of it; and this cannot rightly be said of any life but one morally honourable. Therefore the moral life is the happy life. And the man who deserves and wins praise has exceptional cause for pride and self-satisfaction; but these things count for so much that he can justly be pronounced happy; therefore the life of such a man can with full correctness be described as happy also. Thus if Moral Worth is the criterion of happiness, Moral Worth must be deemed the only Good.

29 "Once more; could it be denied that it is impossible for there ever to exist a man of steadfast, firm and lofty mind, such a one as we call a brave man, unless it be established that pain is not an evil? For just as it is impossible for one who counts death as an evil not to fear death, so in no case can a man disregard and despise a thing that he decides to be evil. This being laid down as generally admitted, we take as our minor premise that the brave and
CICERO DE FINIBUS

magno sit animo atque forti omnia quae cadere in hominem possint despiciere ac pro nihilò putare. Quae cum ita sint, effectum est nihil esse malum quod turpe non sit. Atque iste vir altus et excellens, magno animo, vere fortis, infra se omnia humana ducens, is, inquam, quem efficere volumus, quem quaerimus, certe et confidere sibi debet ac suae vitae et actae et consequenti et bene de sese iudicare, statuens nihil posse mali incidere sapienti. Ex quo intellegitur idem illud, solum bonum esse quod honestum sit, idque esse beate vivere, honeste, id est cum virtute vivere.

30 IX. "Nec vero ignoro, varias philosophorum fuisset sententias, eorum dico qui summum bonum, quod ultimum appello, in animo ponerent. Quae quamquam vitiose quidam securi sunt, tamen non modo iis tribus qui virtutem a summo bono segregaverunt, cum aut voluptatem aut vacuitatem doloris aut prima naturae in summis bonis ponerent, sed etiam alteris tribus qui mancam fore putaverunt sine aliqua accessione virtutem ob eamque rem trium earum rerum quas supra dixi singuli singulas addiderunt, his tamen omnibus eos antepono, cuicui modi sunt, qui summum bonum in animo atque in virtute posuerunt. Sed sunt tamen perabsurdi et ii qui cum scientia vivere ultimum bonorum, et qui nullam rerum differentiam esse dixerunt atque ita sapientem beatum fore, nihil aliud alii momento ullo anteponentem, et qui,¹

¹ et qui inserted by Mdv.

a For these various schools see V 20–23.

248
BOOK III. viii-ix

high-minded man despises and holds of no account all the accidents to which mankind is liable. The conclusion follows that nothing is evil that is not base. Also, your lofty, distinguished, magnanimous and truly brave man, who thinks all human vicissitudes beneath him, I mean, the character we desire to produce, our ideal man, must unquestionably have faith in himself and in his own career both past and future, and think well of himself, holding that no ill can befall the wise man. Here then is another proof of the same position, that Moral Worth alone is good, and that to live honourably, that is virtuously, is to live happily.

30 IX. "I am well aware, it is true, that varieties of opinion have existed among philosophers, I mean among those of them who have placed the Chief Good, the ultimate aim as I call it, in the mind. In following out these various views some of them fell into errors; but nevertheless I rank all those, of whatever type, who have placed the Chief Good in the mind and in virtue, not merely above the three philosophers who dissociated the Chief Good from virtue altogether and identified it either with pleasure or freedom from pain or the primary impulses of nature, but also above the other three, who held that virtue would be incomplete without some enhancement, and therefore added to it one or other respectively of the three things I have just enumerated. But still those thinkers are quite beside the mark who pronounced the ultimate Good to be a life devoted to knowledge; and those who declared that all things are indifferent, and that the Wise Man will secure happiness by not preferring any one thing in the least degree to any other; and those again who said,
CICERO DE FINIBUS
ut quidam Academici constituisse dicuntur, extremum bonorum et summum munus esse sapientis obsistere visis assensusque suos firme sustinere. His singulis copiose responderi solet. Sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent; quid autem apertius quam, si selectio nulla sit ab iis rebus quae contra naturam sint earum rerum quae sint secundum naturam, tollatur\(^1\) omnis ea quae quae reratur laudeturque prudentia? Circumscriptis igitur iis sententiis quas posui, et iis si quae similes earum sunt, relinquitur ut summum bonum sit vivere scientiam adhibentem earum rerum quae natura eveniant, seligentem quae secundum naturam et quae contra naturam sint reicientem, id est convenienter congruenterque naturae vivere.

32 "Sed in ceteris artibus cum dicitur artificiose, posterum quodam modo et consequens putandum est, quod illi ἐπιγεννηματικὸν appellant; cum autem in quo sapiente dicimus,\(^2\) id a primo rectissime dicitur. Quidquid enim a sapiente proficiscitur, id continuo debet expletum esse omnibus suis partibus; in eo enim positum est id quod dicimus esse expetendum. Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu. Verum ut haec non

\(^1\) tollatur: Mdv. adds a mark of corruption
\(^2\) dicimus A omits.

250
as some members of the Academy are said to have maintained, that the final Good and supreme duty of the Wise Man is to resist appearances and resolutely withhold his assent to the reality of sense-impressions. It is customary to take these doctrines severally and reply to them at length. But there is really no need to labour what is self-evident; and what could be more obvious than that, if we can exercise no choice as between things consonant with and things contrary to nature, no scope is left at all for the much-prized and belauded virtue of Prudence? Eliminating therefore the views just enumerated and any others that resemble them, we are left with the conclusion that the Chief Good consists in applying to the conduct of life a knowledge of the working of natural causes, choosing what is in accordance with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it; in other words, the Chief Good is to live in agreement and in harmony with nature.

"But in the other arts when we speak of an 'artistic' performance, this quality must be considered as in a sense subsequent to and a result of the action; it is what the Stoics term *epigennēmatikon* (in the nature of an after-growth). Whereas in conduct, when we speak of an act as 'wise,' the term is applied with full correctness from the first inception of the act. For every action that the Wise Man initiates must necessarily be complete forthwith in all its parts; since the thing desirable, as we term it, consists in his activity. As it is a sin to betray one's country, to use violence to one's parents, to rob a temple, where the offence lies in the result of the act, so the passions of fear, grief and lust are sins, even when no extraneous result ensues. The
CICERO DE FINIBUS

in posteris et in consequentibus, sed in primis continuo peccata sunt, sic ea quae profisciscuntur a virtute, susceptione prima, non perfectione, recta sunt iudicanda.

33 X. "Bonum autem quod in hoc sermone totiens usurpatum est id etiam definitione explicatur. Sed eorum definitiones paulum oppido inter se differunt, et tamen eodem spectant. Ego assentior Diogeni qui bonum definierit id quod esset natura absolutum. Id autem sequens illud etiam quod prodesset (ωφέλημα enim sic appellemus) motum aut statum esse dixit e natura absoluto. Cumque rerum notiones in animis sint si aut usu aliquid cognitum sit aut coniunctione aut similitudine aut collatione rationis, hoc quarto quod extremum posui boni notitia facta est. Cum enim ab iis rebus quae sunt secundum naturam ascendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notionem boni pervenit. Hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando, sed propria vi sua et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi aestimandum, sed ea aestimatio genere valet, non magnitudine. Nam cum aestimatio, quae δεξa dicitur, neque in bonis numerata sit nec rursus in malis,quantumcumque eo addideris, in suo 252
BOOK III. ix-x

latter are sins not in their subsequent effects, but immediately upon their inception; similarly, actions springing from virtue are to be judged right from their first inception, and not in their successful completion.

33 X. “Again, the term ‘Good,’ which has been employed so frequently in this discourse, is also explained by definition. The Stoic definitions do indeed differ from one another in a very minute degree, but they all point in the same direction. Personally I agree with Diogenes in defining the Good as that which is by nature perfect. In consonance with this he pronounced the ‘beneficial’ (for so let us render the Greek ὧπθελέμα) to be a motion or state in accordance with that which is by nature perfect. Now notions of things are produced in the mind when something has become known either by experience or by combination of ideas or by likeness or by analogy. The fourth and last method in this list is the one that has given us the conception of the Good. The mind ascends by analogy from the things in accordance with nature till finally it arrives at the notion of Good. At the same time Goodness is absolute, and is not a question of degree; the Good is recognized and pronounced to be good from its own inherent properties and not by comparison with other things. Just as honey, though extremely sweet, is yet perceived to be sweet by its own peculiar kind of flavour and not by being compared with something else, so this Good which we are discussing is superlatively valuable, yet the value in its case depends on kind and not on quantity. Value, in Greek αἰτία, is not counted as a Good nor yet as an Evil; so that however much you increase it in amount, it will still remain the same.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

genere manebit. Alia est igitur propria aestimatio virtutis, quae genere, non crescendo valet.

35 "Nec vero perturbationes animorum, quae vitam insipientium miseram acerbamque reddunt (quas Graeci πάθη appellant, poteram ego verbum ipsum interpretans morbos appellare, sed non conveniret\(^1\) ad omnia; quis enim misericordiam aut ipsam iracundiam morbum solet dicere? at illi dicunt πάθος; sit igitur perturbatio, quae nomine ipso vitiosa declarari videtur; nec eae perturbationes vi aliqua naturali moventur\(^2\); omnesque eae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures, aegritudo, formido, libido, quamque Stoici communi nomine corporis et animi θυμός appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam:) perturbationes autem nulla naturae vi commoventur, omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac judicia levitatis; itaque his sapiens semper vacabit.

36 XI. "Omne autem quod honestum sit id esse propter se expetendum, commune nobis est cum multorum aliorum philosophorum sententiis. Praeter enim tres disciplinas quae virtutem a summo bono excludunt, ceteris omnibus philosophis haec est tuenda sententia, maxime tamen his qui\(^3\) nihil aliud in honorum numero nisi honestum esse voluerunt. Sed haec quidem est perfacilis et expedita defensio. Quis est enim aut quis umquam fuit aut avaritia tam ardentis aut tam effrenatis cupiditatibus,

\(^1\) conveniret edd.; conveniet MSS.

\(^2\) nec—moventur Mdv. brackets.

\(^3\) his qui Mdv.; his Stoicis qui MSS.
BOOK III. x-xi

in kind. The value of Virtue is therefore peculiar and distinct; it depends on kind and not on degree.

"Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is pathos, and I might have rendered this literally and styled them 'diseases,' but the word 'disease' would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then accept the term 'emotion,' the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous subdivisions, namely sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, hēdonē 'pleasure,' but which I prefer to style 'delight,' meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exultation), these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influence of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them.

XI. "The view that all Moral Worth is intrinsically desirable is one that we hold in common with many other systems of philosophy. Excepting three schools that shut out Virtue from the Chief Good altogether, all the remaining philosophers are committed to this opinion, and most of all the Stoics, with whom we are now concerned, and who hold that nothing else but Moral Worth is to be counted as a good at all. But this position is one that is extremely simple and easy to defend. For who is there, or who ever was there, of avarice so consuming and appetites so unbridled, that, even though willing to
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ut eandem illam rem quam adipisci scelere quovis velit non multis partibus malit ad sese etiam omni impunitate proposita sine facinore quam illo modo pervenire?

37 "Quam vero utilitatem aut quem fructum petentes scire cupimus illa quae occultā nobis sunt, quomodo moveantur quibusque de causis ea quae versantur in caelo? Quis autem tam agrestibus institutis vivit aut quis contra studia naturae tam vehementer obduruit ut a rebus cognitione dignis abhorreat easque sine voluptate aut utilitate aliqua non requirit et pro nihilo putet? aut quis est qui maiorum aut Africanorum aut eius quem tu in ore semper habes, proavi mei ceterorumque virorum fortium atque omni virtute praestantium facta, dicta, consilia cognoscens nulla animo afficiatur voluptate? Quis autem honesta in familia institutus et educatus ingenuae non ipsa turpitudine etiamsi eum laesura non sit offenditur? quis animo aequo videt eum quem impure ac flagitiose putet vivere? quis non odit sordidos, vanos, leves, futiles? Quid autem dixi poterit, si turpitudinem non ipsam per se fugiendum esse statuemus, quo minus homines tenebras et solitudinem nacti nullo dedecore se abstineant, nisi eos per se foeditate sua turpitudo ipsa deterret? Innumerable dici possunt in hanc sententiam; sed non necesse est. Nihil est enim de quo minus dubitari possit quam et honesta expetenda per se et eodem modo turpia per se esse fugienda. Constituto autem

1ea quae versantur Mdv. conj., but prints ea versentur with MSS. (which also have versantur).
2maiorum aut Weidner conj.; Maximorum aut, Mdv.; maiorum, ut.

256
commit any crime to achieve his end, and even though absolutely secure of impunity, yet would not a hundred times rather attain the same object by innocent than by guilty means?

37 "Again, what desire for profit or advantage underlies our curiosity to learn the secrets of nature, the mode and the causes of the movements of the heavenly bodies? Who lives in such a boorish state, or who has become so rigidly insensible to natural impulses, as to feel a repugnance for these lofty studies and eschew them as valueless apart from any pleasure or profit they may bring? Or who is there who feels no sense of pleasure when he hears of the wise words and brave deeds of our forefathers,—of the Africani, or my great-grandfather whose name is always on your lips, and the other heroes of valour and of virtue? On the other hand, what man of good breeding, brought up in an honourable family, is not shocked by moral baseness as such, even when it is not calculated to do him personally any harm? who can view without disgust a person whom he believes to be dissolute and an evil liver? who does not hate the mean, the empty, the frivolous, the worthless? Moreover, if we decide that baseness is not a thing to be avoided for its own sake, what arguments can be urged against men's indulging in every sort of unseemliness in privacy and under cover of darkness, unless they are deterred by the essential and intrinsic ugliness of what is base? Endless reasons could be given in support of this view, but they are not necessary. For nothing is less open to doubt than that what is morally good is to be desired for its own sake, and similarly what is morally bad is to be avoided for its own sake. Again,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

illo de quo ante diximus, quod honestum esset id esse solum bonum, intellegi necesse est pluris id quod honestum sit aestimandum esse quam illa media quae ex eo comparentur. Stultitiam autem et timiditatem et iniustitiam et intemperantium cum dicimus esse fugienda propter eas res quae ex ipsis eveniant, non ita dicimus ut cum illo quod positum est, solum id esse malum quod turpe sit, haec pugnare videatur oratio, propterea quod ea non ad corporis incommo-
dum referuntur sed ad turpes actiones quae oriuntur e vitis (quas enim κακίας Graeci appellant, vitia malo quam malitias nominare).

40 XII. "Ne tu," inquam, "Cato, verbis illustribus et id quod vis declarantibus! Itaque mihi videris Latine docere philosophiam et ei quasi civitatem dare; quae quidem adhuc peregrinari Romae vide-
batur nec offerre sese nostris sermonibus, et ista maxime propter limatam quandam et rerum et verborum tenuitatem. (Scio enim esse quosdam qui quavis lingua philosophari possint; nullis enim part-
tionibus, nullis definitionibus utuntur, ipsique dicunt ea se modo probare quibus natura tacita assentiatur; itaque in rebus minime obscuris non multus est apud eos disserendi labor.) Quare attendo te studiose et quaecumque rebus iis de quibus hic sermo est no-
mina imponis memoriae mando; mihi enim erit iisdem istis fortasse iam utendum. Virtutibus igitur rectissime mihi videris et ad consuetudinem nostrae orationis vitia posuisse contraria. Quod enim vitu-

\[a\] vitium means normally a defect or imperfection rather than a moral failing or vice.

258
BOOK III. xi-xii

the principle already discussed, that Moral Worth is the sole Good, involves the corollary that it is of more value than those neutral things which it procures. On the other hand when we say that folly, cowardice, injustice and intemperance are to be avoided because of the consequences they entail, this dictum must not be so construed as to appear inconsistent with the principle already laid down, that moral baseness alone is evil; for the reason that the statement does not refer to bodily harm but to the base actions to which these vices give rise (the term 'vice' I prefer to 'badness' as a translation of the Greek *kakia*)."

40 XII. "Indeed, Cato," said I, "your language is lucidity itself; it conveys your meaning exactly. In fact I feel you are teaching philosophy to speak Latin, and naturalizing her as a Roman citizen. Hitherto she has seemed a foreigner at Rome, and not able to fall in with our ways of speaking; and this is especially so with your Stoic system because of its precision and subtlety alike of thought and language. (There are some philosophers, I know, who could express their ideas in any language; for they ignore Division and Definition altogether, and themselves profess that they seek to commend only those principles which receive the tacit assent of nature. Hence, their ideas being so far from recondite, exposition is with them no laborious matter.) So I am following you attentively, and am committing to memory all the terms you use to denote the conceptions we are discussing. For very likely I shall soon have to employ the same terms myself. Well, I think you are quite correct in calling the opposite of the virtues 'vices.' This is in conformity with the usage of our language. The word 'vice'
CICERO DE FINIBUS

perabile est per se ipsum, id eo ipso vitium nomina-
tum puto, vel etiam a vitio dictum vituperari. Sin
κακίαν malitiam dixisses, ad aliud nos unum certum
vitium consuetudo Latina traduceret; nunc omni
virtuti vitium contrario nomine opponitur."

41 Tum ille: "His igitur ita positis," inquit, "sequi-
tur magna contentio, quam tractatam a Peripateticis
mollius (est enim eorum consuetudo dicendi non
satis acuta propter Ignorationem dialecticae) Carneae-
des tuus egregia quadam exercitacione in dialecticis
summaque eloquentia rem in summum discrimen
adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit in
omni hac quaestione quae de bonis et malis appelletur
non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis contro-
versiam sed nominum. Mihi autem nihil tam perspi-
cuum videtur quam has sententias eorum philoso-
phorum re inter se magis quam verbis dissidere;
maiorum multo inter Stoicos et Peripateticos rerum
esse ait discrepaniam quam verborum, quippe cum
Peripatetici omnia quae ipsi bona appellant pertinere
dicant ad beate vivendum, nostri non ex omni quod
aestimatione aliqua dignum sit compleleri vitam beatam
putent.

42 XIII. "An vero certius quidquam potest esse
quam illorum ratione qui dolorem in malis ponunt
non posse sapientem beatum esse cum eculeo to-
queatur? Eorum autem qui dolorem in malis non
BOOK III. xii-xiii

denotes, I believe, that which is in its own nature 'vituperable'; or else 'vituperable' is derived from 'vice.' Whereas if you had rendered kakiā by 'badness' ('malice'), Latin usage would point us to another meaning, that of a single particular vice. As it is, we make 'vice' the opposite term to 'virtue' in general."

41 “Well, then,” resumed Cato, “these principles established there follows a great dispute, which on the side of the Peripatetics was carried on with no great pertinacity (in fact their ignorance of logic renders their habitual style of discourse somewhat deficient in cogency); but your leader Carneades with his exceptional proficiency in logic and his consummate eloquence brought the controversy to a head. Carneades never ceased to contend that on the whole so-called ‘problem of good and evil,’ there was no disagreement as to facts between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, but only as to terms. For my part, however, nothing seems to me more manifest than that there is more of a real than a verbal difference of opinion between those philosophers on these points. I maintain that there is a far greater discrepancy between the Stoics and the Peripatetics as to facts than as to words. The Peripatetics say that all the things which under their system are called goods contribute to happiness; whereas our school does not believe that total happiness comprises everything that deserves to have a certain amount of value attached to it.

42 XIII. “Again, can anything be more certain than that on the theory of the school that counts pain as an evil, the Wise Man cannot be happy when he is being tortured on the rack? Whereas the system for under the latters' view (1) the Sapiens is not always happy.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

habent ratio certe cogit ut in omnibus tormentis conservetur beata vita sapienti. Etenim si dolores eosdem tolerabilius patiuntur qui excipiunt eos pro patria quam qui leviore de causa, opinio facit, non natura, vim doloris aut maiorem aut minorem. Ne illud quidem est consentaneum, ut si cum tria genera bonorum sint, quae sententia est Peripateticiorum, eo beatior quisque sit, quo sit corporis aut externis bonis plenior, ut hoc idem approbandum sit nobis, ut qui plura habeat ea quae in corpore magni aemintur sit beatior. Illi enim corporis commodis complevi vitam beatam putant, nostri nihil minus. Nam cum ita placeat, ne eorum quidem bonorum quae nos bona vere appellemus frequentia beatiorum vitam fieri aut magis expetendum aut pluris aemintandum, certe minus ad beatam vitam pertinet multitudo corporis commodorum. Etenim si et sapere expetendum sit et valere, coniunctum utrumque magis expetendum sit quam sapere solum, neque tamen si utrumque sit aemintionum dignum, pluris sit coniunctum quam sapere ipsum separatim. Nam qui valetudinem aemintionum aliqua dignam iudicamus neque eam tamen in bonis ponimus, idem censemus nullam esse tantam aemintionem ut ea virtutis anteponatur; quod idem Peripatetici non tenent, quibus dicendum est quae et honesta actio sit et sine dolore eam magis esse expetendum quam si esset eadem actio cum dolore. Nobis aliter videtur; recte secusne, postea; sed potestne rerum maior esse dissenso?

1 separatim MSS.; separatum Mdv.

262
BOOK III. xiii

that considers pain no evil clearly proves that the Wise Man retains his happiness amidst the worst torments. The mere fact that men endure the same pain more easily when they voluntarily undergo it for the sake of their country than when they suffer it for some lesser cause, shows that the intensity of the pain depends on the state of mind of the sufferer, not on its own intrinsic nature. Further, on the Peripatetic theory that there are three kinds of goods, the more abundantly supplied a man is with bodily or external goods, the happier he is; but it does not follow that we Stoics can accept the same position, and say that the more a man has of those bodily things that are highly valued the happier he is. For the Peripatetics hold that the sum of happiness includes bodily advantages, but we deny this altogether. We hold that the multiplication even of those goods that in our view are truly so called does not render life happier or more desirable or of higher value; even less therefore is happiness affected by the accumulation of bodily advantages. Clearly if wisdom and health be both desirable, a combination of the two would be more desirable than wisdom alone; but it is not the case that if both be deserving of value, wisdom plus wealth is worth more than wisdom by itself separately. We deem health to be deserving of a certain value, but we do not reckon it a good; at the same time we rate no value so highly as to place it above virtue. This is not the view of the Peripatetics, who are bound to say that an action which is both morally good and not attended by pain is more desirable than the same action if accompanied by pain. We think otherwise—whether rightly or wrongly, I will consider later; but how could there be a wider or more real difference of opinion?
CICERO DE FINIBUS

XIV. "Ut enim obscuratur et offunditur luce solis lumen lucernae, et ut interit in\textsuperscript{1} magnitudine maris Aegaei stilla mellis et ut in divitiis Croesi terunci accessio et gradus unus in ea via quae est hinc in Indiam, sic, cum sit is bonorum finis quem Stoici dicunt, omnis ista rerum corporearum aestimatio splendore virtutis et magnitudine obscuretur et obruatur atque intereat necesse est. Et quemadmodum opportunitas (sic enim appellemus \textit{εὐκαρπίαν}) non fit maior productione temporis (habent enim suum modum quae opportuna dicuntur), sic recta effectio (\textit{κατόρθωσιν} enim ita appello, quoniam rectum factum \textit{κατόρθωμα}), recta igitur effectio, item convenientia, denique ipsum bonum, quod in eo positum est ut naturae consentiat, crescendi accessionem nullam habet. Ut enim opportunitas illa, sic haec de quibus dixi, non sunt temporis productione maiora. Ob eamque causam Stoicis non videtur optabilior nec magis expetenda beata vita si sit longa quam si brevis; utunturque simili: Ut, si cothurni laus illa esset, ad pedem apte convenire, neque multi cothurni paucis anteponenterur nec maiores minoribus, sic, quorum omne bonum convenientia atque opportunitate finitur, ea\textsuperscript{2} nec plura paucioribus nec longinquiora brevioribus anteponentur.\textsuperscript{3} Nec vero satis acute dicunt: Si bona valetudo pluris aestimanda sit longa quam brevis, sapientiae quoque usus longissimus quisque sit plurimi. Non intellegunt valetudinis

\textsuperscript{1} in inserted by Halm, Mdv.
\textsuperscript{2} ea inserted by Müller (\textit{finitur e nec A}).
\textsuperscript{3} anteponentur MSS.; anteponent Mdv.
XIV. "The light of a lamp is eclipsed and overpowered by the rays of the sun; a drop of honey is lost in the vastness of the Aegean sea; an additional sixpence is nothing amid the wealth of Croesus, or a single step in the journey from here to India. Similarly if the Stoic definition of the End of Goods be accepted, it follows that all the value you set on bodily advantages must be absolutely eclipsed and annihilated by the brilliance and the majesty of virtue. And just as opportuneness (for so let us translate *eukairia*) is not increased by prolongation of time (since things we call opportune have attained their proper measure), so right conduct (for thus I translate *katorthosis*, since *katorthoma* is a single right action), right conduct, I say, and also propriety, and lastly Good itself, which consists in harmony with nature, are not capable of increase or addition. For these things that I speak of, like opportuneness before mentioned, are not made greater by prolongation. And on this ground the Stoics do not deem happiness to be any more attractive or desirable if it be lasting than if it be brief; and they use this illustration: Just as, supposing the merit of a shoe were to fit the foot, many shoes would not be superior to few shoes nor bigger shoes to smaller ones, so, in the case of things the good of which consists solely and entirely in propriety and opportuneness, a larger number of these things will not be rated higher than a smaller number nor those lasting longer to those of shorter duration. Nor is there much point in the argument that, if good health is more valuable when lasting than when brief, therefore the exercise of wisdom also is worth most when it continues longest. This ignores the fact that, whereas the value of
CICERO DE FINIBUS

aestimationem spatio iudicari, virtutis opportunitate; ut videantur qui illud dicant iidem hoc esse dicturi, bonam mortem et bonum partum meliorem longum esse quam brevem. Non vident alia brevitate pluris aessimari, alia diuturnitate. Itaque consentaneum est his quae dicta sunt ratione illorum qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse, iisdem placere esse alium alio etiam sapientiorem, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tūm essent in profundo, nec catulus ille qui iam appropinquat ut videat plus cernit quam is qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil processit.

XV. "Haec mirabilia videri intellego; sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum quidem est veritate dubitandum. Sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant.

49 Divitias autem Diogenes censeit non eam modo vim

a i.e. They may be exercised on a larger or smaller scale.
health is estimated by duration, that of virtue is measured by opportuneness; so that those who use the argument in question might equally be expected to say that an easy death or an easy child-birth would be better if protracted than if speedy. They fail to see that some things are rendered more valuable by brevity as others by prolongation. So it is consistent with the principles already stated that those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, are on their own theory also bound to hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open to us to say, who do not think that the End of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all.

XV. "I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that both of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. Wealth again, in the opinion of Wealth
CICERO DE FINIBUS

habere ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad vale-
tudinem bonam, sed etiam uti ea continuant: non
idem facere eas in virtute neque in ceteris artibus,
ad quas esse dux pecunia potest, continere autem
non potest; itaque si voluptas aut si bona valetudo
sit in bonis, divitis quoque in bonis esse ponendas :
at si sapientia bonum sit, non sequi ut etiam divitias
bonum esse dicamus. Neque ab ulla re quae non sit
in bonis id quod sit in bonis contineri potest; ob
eamque causam, quia cognitiones comprensionesque
rerum, e quibus efficiuntur artes, apparitiam mo-
vent, cum divitiae non sint in bonis, nulla ars divitiis
contineri potest. Quod si de artibus concedamus,
virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod
haec plurimae commentionis et exercitacionis indi-
geat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus
stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae
complectatur nec haec eadem in artibus esse videa-

mus.

"Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si
non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita,
ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut
opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas quae ad vitam
degendam pertinent nihil omnino interesset neque
ullum dilectum adhiberi oportet. Itaque cum
esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum quod
esset honestum et id malum solum quod turpe, tum
inter illa quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve

\[\text{268}\]

\[\text{a It is to be remembered that 'artes,' }\text{ technai, included}
\text{professions, trades and handicrafts as well as sciences and}
\text{the fine arts, and it is of the simpler crafts that phi-
\text{losophers, following Socrates, were mostly thinking when}
\text{they compared and contrasted the other 'artes' with the}
\text{'ars vivendi.'}\]
BOOK III. xv

Diogenes, though so important for pleasure and health as to be not merely conducive but actually essential to them, yet has not the same effect in relation to virtue, nor yet in the case of the other arts; for money may be a guide to these but cannot form an essential factor in them; therefore although if pleasure or if good health be a good, wealth also must be counted a good, yet if wisdom is a Good, it does not follow that we must also pronounce wealth to be a good. Nor can anything which is not a good be essential to a thing that is a good; and hence, because acts of cognition and of comprehension, which form the raw material of the arts, excite desire, since wealth is not a good, wealth cannot be essential to any art. But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts.

"Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was..."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

vivendum aliquid tamen quod differret esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. Quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae quamobrem quibusdam anteponenterur, ut in valetudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, alia autem non esse eiusmodi; itemque eorum quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae quamobrem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. Hinc est illud exortum quod Zeno προηγµένων, contraque quod ἀποπροηγµένον nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi faciendi Zenonis exponere.

52 XVI. "Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim προηγµένον), sed eos qui in aliquo honore sunt quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea quae primo ordine sunt, sed ea, quae secundum locum obtinent, προηγµένα, id est, producta nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus (id erit verbum e verbo) vel promota et remota vel ut dudum diximus praeposita vel praecip-

1rerum : rerum in usu conj. O. Hein.
2verbi om. A.
3primo ordine conj. Mdv.; primorie loco MSS.; primario loco with mark of corruption, Mdv.
270
nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. Again among things valuable —e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like—they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are deserving of no value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proēgmena and the opposite, apoproēgmena—for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coin-

52 XVI. "In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as 'promoted' to honour (for that is the meaning of proēgmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal pre-eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proēgmenon, that is, 'promoted,' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or 'advanced' and 'degraded,' or the term we have been using all along, 'preferred' or 'superior,' and
pua, et illa reiecta. Re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus. Quoniam autem omne quod est bonum primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc quod praepositum vel praecipuum nominamus; idque ita definimus, quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocris; quod enim illi ἀδιάφορον dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit ut indifferens dicerem. Neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra; nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni quod satis aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse praeposita. Recte igitur haec facta distinctio est; atque etiam ab iis quo facilius res perspicci possit hoc simile ponitur: Ut enim, inquirunt, si hoc singamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum ut rectus assistat, qui ita talus erit iactus ut cadat rectus praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui aliter contra, neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum quem dixi finem pertinebit, sic ea quae sunt praeposita referuntur illa quidem ad finem sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent.

“Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello quae τελικά dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere quod uno non poter-

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*Tali*, real or artificial, were used as dice; they had four long sides and two pointed ends; of the sides two were broad and two narrow. The *talius* was said to be *rectus* when lying on a narrow side, and *pronus* when on a broad side. Thus *cadere rectus*, to alight upright when thrown, would be the first stage towards *assistere rectus*, to remain standing upright.

272
BOOK III. xvi

for the opposite ‘rejected.’ If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of 53 words. But since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value—since it has occurred to me that I may use the word ‘indifferent’ to represent their term *adiaphoron*. For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of intermediate things should contain some things that were either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and this being so, that this class should include some things which possessed moderate value, and, granting this, that some things of this class should be ‘preferred.’

54 There were good grounds therefore for making this distinction; and furthermore, to elucidate the matter still more clearly they put forward the following illustration: Just as, supposing we were to assume that our end and aim is to throw a knuckle-bone *a* in such a way that it may *stand* upright, a bone that is thrown so as to *fall* upright will be in some measure ‘preferred’ or advanced in relation to the proposed end, and one that falls otherwise the reverse, and yet that ‘advance’ on the part of the knuckle-bone will not be a constituent part of the end indicated, so those things which are ‘preferred’ are means it is true to the End but are in no sense constituents of its essential nature.

55 “Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are ‘constituents’ of the final End (for so I represent the term *telika*, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do T...
CICERO DE FINIBUS

mus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci ποιητικά, alia utrumque. De pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam volunt esse. Nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo\(^1\) pertinenti genere quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones attest et efficit, id\(^2\) efficiens dici potest.

56 XVII. "Haec quae praeposita dicimus partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim utrumque: per se, ut quidam habitus oris et vultus, ut status, ut motus, in quibus sunt et praeponenda quaedam et reicienda; alia ob eam rem praeposita dicitur quod ex se aliquid efficiunt, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem, ut integri sensus, ut bona valetudo. De bona autem fama (quam enim appellant εὐδοξίαν aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriám), Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta utilitatem ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebat, quibus ego vehementer assentior. Qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc quam dixi bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositaet sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum; dicuntque, ut

\(^1\) est in illo Mdv.; est illo A, B, E; est cum illo inf. MSS.
\(^2\) id Mdv. brackets.

274
so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are 'productive' of the End, the Greek poietika; and thirdly those which are both. The sole instance of a good of the 'constituent' class is moral action; the sole instance of a 'productive' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive.

56 XVII. "These things which we call 'preferred' are in some cases preferred for their own sake, in others because they produce a certain result, and in others for both reasons; for their own sake, as a certain cast of features and of countenance, or a certain pose or movement, things which may be in themselves either preferable or to be rejected; others will be called preferred because they produce a certain result, for example, money; others again for both reasons, like sound senses and good health.

57 About good fame (that term being a better translation in this context than 'glory' of the Stoic expression eudoxia) Chrysippus and Diogenes used to aver that, apart from any practical value it may possess, it is not worth stretching out a finger for; and I strongly agree with them. On the other hand their successors, finding themselves unable to resist the attacks of Carneades, declared that good fame, as I have called it, was preferred and desirable for its own sake, and that a man of good breeding and liberal education would desire to have the good opinion of his parents and relatives, and of good men in general, and that for its own sake and not
CICERO DE FINIBUS

liberis consultum velimus etiam si postumi futuri sint propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem etiam detracto usu consulendum.

58 "Sed cum quod honestum sit id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. Est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita ut eius ratio redde possit; ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio redde possit; est autem officium quod ita factum est ut eius facti probabilis ratio redde possit; ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam esse quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. Quoniamque in iis rebus quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiiis, est tamen quiddam quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. Est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum; quod autem ratione actum est id officium appellamus; est igitur officium eius generis quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in contrariis.

59 XVIII. "Atque perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. Iudicat igitur cum agit officium illud esse. Quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus
BOOK III. xvii-xviii

for any practical advantage; and they argue that just as we study the welfare of our children, even of such as may be born after we are dead, for their own sake, so a man ought to study his reputation even after death, for itself, even apart from any advantage.

58 "But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of an act reasonably performed; now an appropriate act is an act so performed that a reasonable account can be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite.

59 XVIII. "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore
CICERO DE FINIBUS

officium. Quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit etiam inchoatum; ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito 'iuste,' fit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. Quoniamque non dubium est quin in iis quae media dicamus sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quidquid ita fit aut dicitur omne officio continetur. Ex quo intellegitur quoniam se ipsi omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum quae secundum naturam sint reiecturumque contraria. Ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis; ex quo efficitur versari in iis quae media dicamus. Sed cum ab his omnia profisciscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum et vita et in vita mansionem. In quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est e vita excedere. E quo appareat et sapientis esse aliquando officium.
BOOK III. xviii

appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. This is also proved by the following syllogistic argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification ‘on principle’ makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that the class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man’s circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also
excedere e vita cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita cum sit miser. Nam bonum illud et malum quod saepe iam dictum est postea consequitur; prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia sapientiae. Itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis rebus quas supra dixi metienda. Nam neque...\(^1\) virtute retinetur in vita, nec iis qui sine virtute sunt mors est oppetenda. Et saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita cum sit beatissimus, si id opportune facere possit. Sic enim censent, opportunitatis esse beate vivere quod est convenienter naturae vivere.\(^2\) Itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam si usus sit sapiens ut relinquit. Quamobrem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum qui iidem miseri sint officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte earum rerum quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. Et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est, nec diuturnitas magis ei vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint esse in vita manendum.

62 XIX. "Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur;\(^3\)

\(^1\) Mdv. conj. neque is qui virtute utitur retinetur or the like.
\(^2\) Quod—vivere after facere possit above MSS., Mdv. after Baiter suggests the transposition.

280
of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predominance of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life.

XIX. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents..."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. Quod primum intelligi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant, procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. Neque vero haec inter se congruere possent ut natura et procreari vellet et diligere procreatos non curaret. Atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. Quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore abhorrire, sic apparat a natura ipsa ut eos quos genuerimus amemus impelli. Ex hoc nascitur ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum quod homo sit non alienum videri. Ut enim in membris alia sunt tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiu vant, ut crura, ut manus, sic immanes quaedam bestiae sibi solum natae sunt, at illa quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque qui enat e concha, qui quod eam custodit pinoteris vocatur, in eandemque cum se recepit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut cave ret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam

1 ut inserted by edd.

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a A reminiscence of Terence, who humorously puts this Stoic tag into the mouth of Chremes as an excuse for his neighbourly curiosity: Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto, Heaut. 25, Cp. I 3, II 14.

b A mussel in whose ‘beard’ a small crab is often found entangled. The notion of their partnership is found in Aristotle; Chrysippus introduced it as an illustration in Ethics.
an affection for their children; and parental affection is the germ of that social community of the human race to which we afterwards attain. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the sea-pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the sea-pen, which swims out of the sea-pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard—these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do
CICERO DE FINIBUS

causa quaedam faciunt. Muto haec\(^1\) coniunctius homines.\(^2\) Itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, civitates.

64 "Mundum autem censent regi numine deorum eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unumquemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. Ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis offici non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. Nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. Ex quo fit ut laudandus is sit qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. Quoniamque illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium desflagratio consequatur (quod vulgari quodam versus Graeco pronuntiari solet), certe verum est etiam iis qui aliquo futuri sint esse propter ipsos consulendum.

65 XX. "Ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. Quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregacionemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse

\(^1\)Muto haec A, B, E; Muto magis haec inf. MSS.  
\(^2\)coniunctius homines Mdv.; coniunctio est hominis MSS.

\(\acute{e}m\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\upsilon\theta\omicron\omicron\upsilon\omicron\ \gamma\alpha\iota\alpha\upsilon\mu\omicron\chi\omicron\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\lambda\:\) said to have been quoted by Tiberius and Nero.

284
BOOK III. xix-xx

certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states.

"Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and law-abiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line*) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake.

XX. "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature

285
natos. Impellimur autem natura ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. Itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus verum etiam ad doecendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitalulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepinus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. Minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles neglectique simus, postulare ut dis immortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur prius quam didicimus cuius ea utilitatis causa habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. Quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus.

"Sed quomodo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. Praeclare enim Chrysippus cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria; quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile

\[1\text{ sed Mdv.};\text{ et MSS.}\]
BOOK III. xx

inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are by nature united and allied in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence.

"But just as they hold that man is united with man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice. And the nature of man, he said, is such, that as it were a code of law subsists between the individual and the human race, so that he who up-

287
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ius intercederet, qui id conservaret eum iustum, qui migraret iniustum fore. Sed quemadmodum, theatra-
trum cum commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum locum quem quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius quo minus suum quidque cuiusque sit. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse vi-
deamus, consentaneum est huic naturae ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. Ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui eius-
modi forte casus inciderit ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo.

XXI. "Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et
detrimenta (quae φελήματα et βλάματα appellant) communia esse voluerunt, quorum altera prosum,
nocent altera; neque solum ea communia verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. Incommoda autem et
commoda (ita enim χρηστήματα et δυσχρηστήμαta appello) communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt.
Illa enim quae prosum aut quae nocent aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est; commoda
autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt quae prae-
posita et reiecta dicimus; ea possunt paria non esse.
Sed emolumenta\(^1\) communia esse dicuntur, recte

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\(^1\) After *emolumenta* Lambinus inserts *et detrimenta*.

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\(^a\) The Cynics cast off the ties of country and family, and proclaimed themselves *Kosmou Politai*, citizens of the Universe and members of the universal brotherhood of man.

288
BOOK III. xx-xxi

holds this code will be just and he who departs from it, unjust. But just as though the theatre is a public place it is yet correct to say that the particular seat a man has taken belongs to him, so in the state or in the universe, though these are common to all, no principle of justice militates against the possession of private property. Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic Sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally.

XXI. “To safeguard the universal alliance, solidarity and affection that subsist between all mankind, the Stoics held that both ‘benefits’ and ‘injuries’ (in their terminology, ὀφελήματα and βλαμμάτα) are common, the former doing good and the latter harm; and they pronounced them to be not only ‘common’ but also ‘equal.’ ‘Disadvantages’ and ‘advantages’ (for so I render εὐχρήστημα and δυσχρήστημα) they held to be ‘common’ but not ‘equal.’ For things ‘beneficial’ and ‘injurious’ are goods and evils respectively, and these must needs be equal; but ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’ belong to the class we speak of as ‘preferred’ and ‘rejected,’ and these may differ in degree. But whereas ‘benefits’ and ‘injuries’ are...
autem facta et peccata non habentur communia.  

"Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent quia sit ex eo genere quae prosunt. Quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aequa caram esse sapienti ratione amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrhere quid de alium quo quod sibi assumat. Minime vero probatur huic disciplinae de qua loquor aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates asciscì aut probari. Eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. Etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia esse omnino poterunt nisi ipsae per se expetuntur.  

Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura; alienumque esse a sapiente non modo injuriam cui facere verum etiam nocere. Nec vero rectum est cum amicum aut bene meritis consociare at coniungere injuriam; gravissimeque et verissime defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et quidquid aequum iustumque esset id etiam honestum, vicissimque quidquid esset honestum id iustum etiam atque aequum fore.

expetuntur: inf. MSS. expetantur.

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a Moral and immoral acts (a) viewed for their results for good and ill affect all mankind, (b) viewed in themselves concern the agent only; while in both aspects they do not admit of degree, but are either good or bad, right or wrong absolutely. Whereas things indifferent (i.e. everything but moral good and evil) are more or less advantageous or the reverse, both to the person immediately concerned and to the world at large.
BOOK III. xxi

pronounced to be 'common,' righteous and sinful acts are not considered 'common.'

They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugnant to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair.

\[b\] The sense seems here to require \textit{utile}, 'useful,' rather than \textit{honestum}; unless \textit{honestum} is intended to mean 'held in popular esteem,' and so profitable.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

72. "Ad easque virtutes de quibus disputatum est dia-
lecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam easque ambas
virtutum nomine appellant, alteram quod habeat
rationem ne cui falsa assentiamur neve unquam
captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque quae de bonis
et malis didicerimus ut tenere tuerique possimus;
nam sine hac arte quemvis arbitrantur a vero abduci
fallique posse. Recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus
temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea quae tollit
haec virtus nominata est.

73. XXII. "Physicae quoque non sine causa tributus
idem est honos, propterea quod qui convenienter
naturae victurus sit ei profiscendum est ab omni
mundo atque ab eius procuratione. Nec vero potest
quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni
cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et
utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa.
Quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent
'tempori parere' et 'sequi deum' et 'se noscere,' et
'nihil nimis,' haec sine physicis quam vim habeant
(et habent maximam) videre nemo potest. Atque
etiam ad iustitiam colendum, ad tuendas amicitias
et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una
cognitio potest tradere; nec vero pietas adversus
deos nec quanta iis gratia debeatur sine explicatione
naturae intelligi potest.

74. "Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum quam
BOOK III. xxi-xxii

"To the virtues we have discussed they also add Dialectic and Natural Philosophy. Both of these they entitle by the name of virtue; the former because it conveys a method that guards us from giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability, and enables us to retain and to defend the truths that we have learned about good and evil; for without the art of Dialectic they hold that any man may be seduced from truth into error. If therefore rashness and ignorance are in all matters fraught with mischief, the art which removes them is correctly entitled a virtue.

XXII. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to ‘obey occasion,’ ‘follow God,’ ‘know thyself,’ and ‘moderation in all things.’ Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature’s secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them."

However I begin to perceive that I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the

5. Conclusion: Perfection of the Stoic system.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

proposita ratio postularet. Verum admirabilis compositio disciplinæ incredibilisque me rerum traxit ordo; quem per deos immortales nonne miraris? Quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagentatum inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur ut si ullum litteram moveris labent omnia? Nec tamen quidquam est quod moveri possit.

75 "Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit quod honestum esset id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat quae irriteri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi (is enim est dictator) quam Sulla qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus qui nisi eguisset numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. Recte eius omnia dicentur qui scit uti solus omnibus; recte etiam pulcher appellabitur (animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis) recte solus liber, nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec

* The old title of the dictators at Rome. Cicero plays on the meaning of magister, 'teacher.'
BOOK III. xxii

plan that I set before me. The fact is that I have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter.

75 "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better claim to be called rich than Crassus, who had he needed nothing would never have been induced to cross the Euphrates for any military reason. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the beauty of the soul is fairer than that of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as sub-

Praise of the Wise Man.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

obediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiam 
corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici 
nulla possint. Nec exspectat 1 ullum tempus aetatis, 
ut tum denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit cum ex-
tremum vitae diem morte confecerit; quod ille unus 
e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit, 
nam si beatus umquam fuisset, beatam vitam usque 
ad illum a Cyro exstructum rogum pertulisset. Quod 
si ita est ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes 
boni beati sint, quid philosophia magis colendum aut 
quid est virtute divinius?"

1 expectat ed.: expectet MSS., edd. (‘transit ad poten-
tialem orationis formam’ Mdv.).
BOOK III. xxii
ject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. Nor does he wait for any period of time that the decision whether he has been happy or not may be finally pronounced only when he has rounded off his life's last day in death,—the famous warning so unwisely given to Croesus by old Solon, one of the seven Wise Men; for had Croesus ever been happy, he would have carried his happiness uninterrupted to the pyre raised for him by Cyrus. If then it be true that all the good and none but the good are happy, what possession is more precious than philosophy, what more divine than virtue?"
CICERO DE FINIBUS

BOOK IV
M. TULLI CICERONIS
DE
FINIBUS BONORUM ET MALORUM
LIBER QUARTUS

1 I. Quae cum dixisset, finem ille. Ego autem:
"Ne tu, inquam, Cato, ista exposuisti, ut tam multa,
memoriter, ut tam obscura, dilucide. Itaque aut
omittamus contra omnino velle aliquid aut spatium
sumamus ad cogitandum; tam enim diligenter,
etiamsi minus vere (nam nondum id quidem audeo
dicere), sed tamen\(^1\) accurate non modo fundatam
verum etiam exstructam disciplinam non est facile
perdiscere." Tum ille: "Ain tandem?" inquit;
"cum ego te hac nova lege videam eodem die accu-
satori respondere et tribus horis perorare, in hac me
causa tempus dilaturum putas? quae tamen a te
agetur non melior quam illae sunt quas interdum
obtines. Quare istam quoque aggredere, tractatum
praesertim et ab aliis et a te ipso saepe, ut tibi
2 deesse non possit oratio." Tum ego: "Non meher-
cule," inquam, "soleo temere contra Stoicos, non quo
illis admodum assentiar, sed pudore impedior; ita
multa dicunt, quae vix intellegam." "Obscura,"
inquit, "quaedam esse confiteor; nec tamen ab illis
ita dicuntur de industria, sed inest in rebus ipsis
\(^1\) sed tamen: Lambinus conjectures \textit{sed tamen tam}, Davis
\textit{sed tam}. Perhaps \textit{audeo dicere}, \textit{sed tamen} non modo; and
bracket \textit{accurate} as interpolated.

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\(^a\) Passed by Pompey, 52 B.C., to limit the concluding
speeches in lawsuits to two hours for the prosecution and
three for the defence, both to be delivered on the same day.

300
I. With these words he concluded. "A most faithful and lucid exposition, Cato," said I, "considering the wide range of your subject and its obscurity. Clearly I must either give up all idea or replying, or must take time to think it over; it is no easy task to get a thorough grasp of a system so elaborate, even if erroneous (for on that point I do not yet venture to speak), but at all events so highly finished both in its first principles and in their working out."

"You don't say so!" replied Cato. "Do you suppose I am going to allow our suit to be adjourned, when I see you under this new law* replying for the defence on the same day as your opponent concludes for the prosecution, and keeping your speech within a three hours' limit? Though you will find your present case as shaky as any of those which you now and then succeed in pulling off. So tackle this one like the rest, particularly as the subject is familiar; others have handled it before, and so have you repeatedly, so that you can hardly be gravelled for lack of matter."

"I protest," I exclaimed, "I am not by way of challenging the Stoics lightly; not that I agree with them entirely, but modesty restrains me: there is so much in their doctrines that I can hardly understand." "I admit," he said, "that some parts are obscure, but the Stoics do not affect an obscure style on purpose; the obscurity is inherent in the subjects themselves." "How is it,
CICERO DE FINIBUS


II. “Existimo igitur,” inquam, “Cato, veteres illos Platonis auditores, Speusippum, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, deinde eorum Polemonem, Theophrastum, satis et copiose et eleganter habuisse constitu- tam disciplinam, ut non esset causa Zenoni cum Polemonem audisset cur et ab eo ipso et a superiori- bus dissiparet; quorum fuit haec institutio, in qua animadvertas velim quid mutandum putes, nec exspectes dum ad omnia dicam quae a te dicta sunt; universa enim illorum ratione cum tota vestra con- 4 fligendum puto. Qui cum viderent ita nos esse natos ut et communiter ad eas virtutes apti essemus

1 occurrerit or some similar word has been lost.

302
BOOK IV. i-ii

then," I replied, "that when the same subjects are discussed by the Peripatetics, every word is intelligible?" "The same subjects?" he cried. "Have I not said enough to show that the disagreement between the Stoics and the Peripatetics is not a matter of words, but concerns the entire substance of their whole system?" "O well, Cato," I rejoined, "if you can prove that, you are welcome to claim me as a whole-hearted convert." "I did think," said he, "that I had said enough. So let us take this question first, if you like; or if you prefer another topic, we will take this later on." "Nay," said I, "as to that matter I shall use my own discretion, unless this is an unfair stipulation, and deal with each subject as it comes up." "Have it your way," he replied: "my plan would have been more suitable, but it is fair to let a man choose for himself."

3 II. "My view then, Cato," I proceeded, "is this, that those old disciples of Plato, Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and afterwards their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, had developed a body of doctrine that left nothing to be desired either in fullness or finish, so that Zeno on becoming the pupil of Polemo had no reason for differing either from his master himself or from his master's predecessors. The outline of their theory was as follows—but I should be glad if you would call attention to any point you may desire to correct without waiting for me to deal with the whole of your discourse; for I think I shall have to place their entire system in conflict with the whole of yours. Well, these philosophers observed (1) that we are so constituted as to have a natural aptitude for the recognized and

803
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quae notae illustresque sunt, iustitiam dico, temperantiam, ceteras generis eiusdem (quae omnes similis artium reliquarum materia tantum ad meliorem partem et tractatione differunt), easque ipsas virtutes viderent nos magnificentius appetere et ardentius; habere etiam insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae, natosque esse ad congregationem hominum et ad societatem communitemque generis humani, eaque in maximis ingeniis maxime elucere, totam philosophiam tres in partes diviserunt, quam partitionem a Zenone esse retentam videmus.

5 Quorum cum una sit qua mores conformari putantur, differo eam partem, quae quasi stirps est huius quaestionis; qui sit enim finis bonorum, mox; hoc loco tantum dico a veteribus Peripateticis Academicisque, qui re consentientes vocabulis differebant, eum locum quem civilem recte appellaturi videmur (Graeci πολιτικοί) graviter et copiose esse tractatum.

III. "Quam multa illi de re publica scripserunt, quam multa de legibus! quam multa non solum praecepta in artibus sed etiam exempla in orationibus bene dicendi reliquerunt! Primum enim ipsa illa quae subtiliter disserenda erant polite apteque dixerunt, tum definientes, tum partientes, ut vestri etiam; sed vos squalidius; illorum vides quam niteat

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This sentence might appear to imply that the three departments of philosophy were (1) Ethics, (2) Physics and Logic, (3) Politics; but in the following chapters Cicero adopts the normal division, (1) Logic, c. IV, (2) Physics, c. V, (3) Ethics, cc. VI foll., with its two subordinate branches of Politics and Rhetoric which are dismissed parenthetically in c. III.

304
BOOK IV. ii-iii

standard virtues in general, I mean Justice, Temperance and the others of that class (all of which resemble the rest of the arts and differ only by excelling them in the material with which they work and in their treatment of it); they observed moreover that we pursue these virtues with a more lofty enthusiasm than we do the arts; and (2) that we possess an implanted or rather an innate appetite for knowledge, and (3) that we are naturally disposed towards social life with our fellow men and towards fellowship and community with the human race; and that these instincts are displayed most clearly in the most highly endowed natures. Accordingly they divided philosophy into three departments, a division that was retained, as we notice, by Zeno. One of these departments is the science that is held to give rules for the formation of moral character; this part, which is the foundation of our present discussion, I defer. For I shall consider later the question, what is the End of Goods. For the present I only say that the topic of what I think may fitly be entitled Civic Science (the adjective in Greek is politikos) was handled with authority and fullness by the early Peripatetics and Academics, who agreed in substance though they differed in terminology.

III. "What a vast amount they have written on politics and on jurisprudence! how many precepts of oratory they have left us in their treatises, and how many examples in their discourses! In the first place, even the topics that required close reasoning they handled in a neat and polished manner, employing now definition, now division; as indeed your school does also, but your style is rather out-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

6 oratio. Deinde ea quae requirebant orationem ornatam et gravem, quam magnifice sunt dicta ab illis, quam splendide! de iustitia, de temperantia, de fortitudine, de amicitia, de aetate degenda, de philosophia, de capessenda re publica, hominum nec spinas vellentium, ut Stoici, nec ossa nudantium, sed eorum qui grandia ornate vellent, enucleate minora dicere. Itaque quae sunt eorum consolationes, quae cohortationes, quae etiam monita et consilia scripta ad summos viros! Erat enim apud eos, ut est rerum ipsarum natura, sic dicendi exercitatio duplex. Nam quidquid quaeritur, id habet aut generis ipsius sine personis temporibusque aut iis adiunctis facti aut iuris aut nominis controversiam. Ergo in utroque exercebantur; eaque disciplina effecit tantum illorum utroque in genere dicendi copiam. Totum genus hoc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt aut non potuerunt tueri aut noluerunt, certe reliquerunt. Quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic ut si quis obmutescere concupierit nihil aliud legere debeat. Itaque vides quomodo loquantur: nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata. At quanta conantur!—mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum. Vides quantam rem agat ut Circeis qui habitet totum hunc mundum suum municipium esse existimet. Incendit

1 nec Müller; non Mdv.; de MSS.
2 tueri inserted by Cobet, Mdv. omits.

\( ^{a} \text{Cp. III, 64.} \)
BOOK IV. iii

6 at-elnows, while theirs is noticeably elegant. Then, in themes demanding ornate and dignified treatment, how imposing, how brilliant is their diction! On Justice, Temperance, Courage, Friendship, on the conduct of life, the pursuit of wisdom, the career of the statesman,—no hair-splitting like that of the Stoics, no bare skeleton of argument, but the loftier passages studiously ornate, and the minor topics studiously plain and clear. As a result, think of their consolations, their exhortations, even their warnings and counsels, addressed to men of the highest eminence! In fact, their rhetorical exercises were twofold, like the nature of the subjects themselves. For every question for debate can be argued either on the general issue, ignoring the persons or circumstances involved, or, these also being taken into consideration, on a point of fact or of law or of nomenclature. They therefore practised themselves in both kinds; and this training produced their remarkable fluency in each class of discussion. This whole field Zeno and his successors were either unable or unwilling to cover; at all events they left it untouched. Cleanthes it is true wrote a treatise on rhetoric, and Chrysippus wrote one too, but what are they like? why, they furnish a complete manual for anyone whose ambition is to hold his tongue; you can judge then of their style, coining new words, discarding those approved by use. 'But, you will say, 'think how vast are the themes that they essay! for example, that this entire universe is our own town.' a You see the magnitude of a Stoic's task, to convince an inhabitant of Circeii that the whole vast world is his own borough! 'If so, he must rouse his audience to enthusiasm.'

x2 307
CICERO DE FINIBUS

igitur eos qui audiunt. Quid? ille incendat? Restinguet citius si ardentem acceperit. Ista ipsa quae tu breviter, regem, dictatorem, divitem solum esse sapientem, a te quidem apte ac rotunde; quippe; habes enim a rhetoribus; illorum vero ista ipsa quam exsilia de virtutis vi! quam tantam volun esse ut beatum per se efficere possit. Pungunt enim, quasi aculeis, interrogatio unculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo et idem abeunt qui venerant; res enim fortasse verae, certe graves, non ita tractantur ut debent, sed aliquanto minutiis.

IV. “Sequitur disserendi ratio cognitioque naturae; nam de summo bono mox, ut dixi, videbimus et ad id explicandum disputationem omnem conferemus. In his igitur partibus duabus nihil erat quod Zeno commutare gestiret; res enim se praecclare habebat, et quidem in utraque parte. Quid enim ab antiquis ex eo genere quod ad disserendum valet praetermissum est? qui et definierunt plurima et definiendi artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiunctum, ut res in partes dividatur, id et fit ab illis et quemadmodum fieri oporteat traditur; item de contrariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum venerunt. Iam argumenti ratione conclusi caput esse faciunt ea quae perspicua dicunt; deinde ordinem sequuntur; tum quid verum sit in singulis extrema

308
BOOK IV. iii-iv

What? a Stoic rouse enthusiasm? He is much more likely to extinguish any enthusiasm the student may have had to begin with. Even those brief maxims that you propounded, that the Wise Man alone is king, dictator, millionaire,—neatly rounded off no doubt as you put them; of course, for you learnt them from professors of rhetoric;—but how bald are those very maxims, on the lips of the Stoics, when they talk about the potency of virtue,—virtue which they rate so highly that it can of itself, they say, confer happiness! Their meagre little syllogisms are mere pin-pricks; even if they convince the intellect, they cannot convert the heart, and the hearer goes away no better than he came. What they say is possibly true, and certainly important; but the way in which they say it is wrong; it is far too niggling.

8 IV. "Next come Logic and Natural Science; for the problem of Ethics, as I said, we shall notice later, concentrating the whole force of the discussion upon its solution. In these two departments then, there was nothing that Zeno need have desired to alter; since all was in a most satisfactory state, and that in both departments. For in the subject of Logic, what had the ancients left undetected? They defined a multitude of terms, and left treatises on Definition; of the kindred art of the Division of a thing into its parts they give practical examples, and lay down rules for the process; and the same with the Law of Contradictories, from which they arrived at genera and species. Then, in Deductive reasoning, they start with what they term self-evident propositions; from these the argument proceeds by rule; and finally the conclusion gives the inference

309
CICERO DE FINIBUS

9 conclusio est. Quanta autem ab illis varietas argumentorum ratione concludentium eorumque cum captiosis interrogationibus dissimilitudo! Quid quod pluribus locis quasi denuntiant ut neque sensuum fidem sine ratione nec rationis sine sensibus exquiramus atque ut eorum alterum ab altero ne\(^1\) separemus? Quid? ea quae dialectici nunc tradunt et docent, nonne ab illis instituta sunt?\(^2\) De quibus etsi a Chrysippo maxime est elaboratum, tamen a Zenone minus multo quam ab antiquis; ab hoc autem quaedam non melius quam veteres, quaedam omnino relict. Cumque duae sint artes quibus perfecte ratio et oratio compleatur, una inveniendi, altera disserendi, hanc posteriorem et Stoici et Peripateticici, priorem autem illi egregie tradiderunt, hi omnino ne attigerunt quidem. Nam e quibus locis quasi thesauris argumenta depromerentur, vestri ne suspicati quidem sunt, superiores autem artificio et tradiderunt. Quae quidem ars\(^3\) efficit ne necesse sit iisdem de rebus semper quasi dictata decantare neque a commentariolis suis discedere. Nam qui sciet ubi quidque positum sit quaque eo veniat, is, etiamsi quid obturum erit, poterit eruere semperque esse in disputando suus. Quod etsi ingeniis magnis praediti quidam dicendi copiam sine ratione consequuntur, ars

\(^1\) ne supplied by Lambinus, Mdv.

\(^2\) After instituta sunt all but one inferior MS. add inventa sunt: Mdv. brackets.

\(^3\) ars Mdv.: om. A, other MSS. res.

\(^a\) Cp. I, 39.

\(^b\) 'Inventio,' Topikê, arranged stock arguments in 'loqui,' topos, pigeon-holes as it were of the memory: Cp. V, 2.
valid in the particular case. Again, how many different forms of Deduction they distinguish, and how widely these differ from sophistical syllogisms! Think how earnestly they reiterate the warning, that we must not expect to find truth in sensation unaided by reason, nor in reason without sensation, and that we are not to divorce the one from the other! Was it not they who first laid down the rules that form the stock-in-trade of professors of logic to-day? Logic, no doubt, was very fully worked out by Chrysippus, but much less was done in it by Zeno than by the older schools; and in some parts of the subject his work was no improvement on that of his predecessors, while other parts he neglected altogether.

Of the two sciences which between them cover the whole field of reasoning and of oratory, one the Science of Topics and the other that of Logic, the latter has been handled by both Stoics and Peripatetics, but the former, though excellently taught by the Peripatetics, has not been touched by the Stoics at all. Of Topics, the store-chambers in which arguments are arranged ready for use, your school had not the faintest notion, whereas their predecessors propounded a regular technique and method. This science of Topics saves one from always having to drone out the same stock arguments on the same subjects without ever departing from one’s notes. For a man who knows under what general heading each argument comes, and how to lay his hand on it, will always be able to unearth any particular argument however far out of sight it lies, and will never lose his self-possession in debate. The fact is that although some men of genius attain to eloquence without a system, nevertheless science
tamen est dux certior quam natura. Aliud est enim poetarum more verba fundere, aliud ea quae dicas ratione et arte distinguere.

11 V. "Similia dici possunt de explicatione naturae, qua et hi\(^1\) utuntur et vestri, neque vero ob duas modo causas, quomodo Epicuro videtur, ut pellatur mortis et religionis metus; sed etiam modestiam quandam cognitio rerum caelestium affert iis qui videant quanta sit etiam apud deos moderatio, quantus ordo, et magnitudinem animi deorum opera et facta cernentibus, iustitiam etiam, cum cognitum habeas quod sit summi rectoris ac domini numen, quod consilium, quae voluntas; cuius ad naturam apta ratio vera illa et summa lex a philosophis dicitur.

12 Inest in eadem explicatione naturae insatiabilis quae-dam e cognoscendis rebus voluptas, in qua una, confectis rebus necessariis, vacui negotiis honestae ac liberaliter possimus vivere. Ergo in hac ratione tota de maximis fere rebus Stoici illos seuti sunt, ut et deos esse et quattuor ex rebus omnia constare dice-rent. Cum autem quaereretur res admodum difficilis num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse ex qua ratio et intellegentia oriretur, in quo etiam de animis cuius generis essent quaereretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem; nonnulla deinde aliter, sed ea paucar; de maxima autem re eodem modo, divina mente atque

\(^1\) qua et hi Mdv.; que hic, qua hic MSS.

\(^a\) Aristotle spoke of a fifth sort of matter, 'body moving in a circle, aetherial, unchanged,' which was the origin of the heavenly bodies; but he nowhere states that mind is composed of this, but on the contrary always regards mind as incorporeal.
is a safer guide than nature. A poetic out-pouring of language is one thing, the systematic and scientific marshalling of one's matter is another.

V. "Much the same may be said about Natural Philosophy, which is pursued both by the Peripatetics and by your school, and that not merely for the two objects, recognized by Epicurus, of banishing superstition and the fear of death. Besides these benefits, the study of the heavenly phenomena bestows a power of self-control that arises from the perception of the consummate restraint and order that obtain even among the gods; also loftiness of mind is inspired by contemplating the creations and actions of the gods, and justice by realizing the will, design and purpose of the Supreme Lord and Ruler to whose nature we are told by philosophers that the True Reason and Supreme Law are conformed. The study of Natural Philosophy also affords the inexhaustible pleasure of acquiring knowledge, the sole pursuit which can afford an honourable and elevated occupation for the hours of leisure left when business has been finished. Now in the whole of this branch of philosophy, on most of the important points the Stoics followed the Peripatetics, maintaining the existence of the gods and the creation of the world out of the four elements. Then, coming to the very difficult question, whether we are to believe in the existence of a fifth substance, as the source of reason and intellect, and bound up with this the further question of the nature of the soul, Zeno declared this substance to be fire; next, as to some details, but only a few, he diverged from his predecessors, but on the main question he agreed that the universe as a whole and its chief parts are
CICERO DE FINIBUS

natura mundum universum atque eius maximas partes administrari. Materiam vero rerum et copiam apud 13 hos exilem, apud illos uberrimam reperiemus. Quam multa ab iis conquisita et collecta sunt de omnium animantium genere, ortu, membris, aetatibus! quam multa de rebus iis quae gignuntur e terra! quam multae quamque de variis rebus et causae cur quidque fiat et demonstrationes quemadmodum quidque fiat! qua ex omni copia plurima et certissima argumenta sumuntur ad cuiusque rei naturam explicandam. Ergo adhuc, quantum equidem intellego, causa non videtur fuisse mutandi nominis; non enim, si omnia non sequebatur, idcirco non erat ortus illinc. Equidem etiam Epicurum, in physicis quidem, Democriteum puto. Pauca mutat, vel plura sane; at cum de plurimis eadem dicit, tum certe de maximis. Quod idem cum vestri faciant, non satis magnum tribuunt inventoribus gratiam.

14 VI. "Sed haec hactenus. Nunc videamus, quaeso, de summo bono, quod continet philosophiam, quid tandem attulerit quamobrem ab inventoribus tamquam a parentibus dissentiret. Hoc igitur loco, quamquam a te, Cato, diligenter est explicatum finis hic bonorum et qui a Stoicis et quemadmodum dicetur, tamen ego quoque exponam, ut perspiciamus si potuerimus quidnam a Zenone novi sit allatum.

*i.e. for Zeno’s school to be called Stoic and not Peripatetic.*

314
BOOK IV. v.-vi

governed by a divine mind and substance. In point of fullness, however, and fertility of treatment we shall find the Stoics meagre, whereas the Peripatetics are copious in the extreme. What stores of facts they discovered and collected about the classification, reproduction, morphology and biology of animals of every kind! and again about plants! How copious and wide in range their explanations of the causes and demonstrations of the mode of different natural phenomena! and all these stores supply them with numerous and conclusive arguments to explain the nature of each particular thing. So far then, as far as I at least can understand the case, there appears to have been no reason for the change of name; that Zeno was not prepared to follow the Peripatetics in every detail did not alter the fact that he had sprung from them. For my own part I consider Epicurus also, at all events in natural philosophy, simply a pupil of Democritus. He makes a few modifications, or indeed a good many; but on most points, and unquestionably the most important, he merely echoes his master. Your leaders do the same, yet neglect to acknowledge their full debt to the original discoverers.

VI. "But leaving this let us now, if you please, turn to Ethics. On the subject of the Chief Good, which is the keystone of philosophy, what precise contribution did Zeno make to justify his quarrelling with his parents, the originators of the doctrine? Under this head you, Cato, gave a careful exposition of the Stoics' conception of this 'End of Goods,' and of the meaning they attached to the term; still I also will restate it, to enable us to perceive, if we can, what element of novelty was introduced by Zeno.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Cum enim superiores, e quibus planissime Polemo, secundum naturam vivere summum bonum esse dixissent, his verbis tria significari Stoici dicunt, unum eiusmodi, vivere adhibentem scientiam earum rerum quae natura evenirent; hunc ipsum Zenonis aitut esse finem, declarantem illud quod a te dictum est, convenienter naturae vivere. Alterum significari idem ut si diceretur officia media omnia aut pleraque servantem vivere. Hoc sic expositum dissimile est superiori; illud enim rectum est (quod κατόρθωμα dicebas) contingitque sapienti soli; hoc autem inchoati cuiusdam offici est, non perfecti, quod cadere in nonnullos insipientes potest. Tertium autem, omnibus aut maximis rebus iis quae secundum naturam sint fruentem vivere. Hoc non est positum in nostra actione; completur enim et ex eo genere vitae quod virtute fruitur\(^1\) et ex iis rebus quae sunt secundum naturam neque sunt in nostra potestate. Sed hoc summum bonum quod tertia significacione intellegitur, eaque vita quae ex summo bono degit, quia coniuncta ei virtus est, in sapien tem solum cadit, isque finis bonorum, ut ab ipsis Stoicis scriptum videmus, a Xenocrate atque ab Aristotele constitutus est. Itaque ab iis constitutio illa prima naturae a qua tu quoque ordiebare his prope verbis exponitur.

\(^1\) fruitur: inferior MSS. have finitur.

\(^a\) Cp. III, 59.

316
BOOK IV. vi

Preceding thinkers, and among them most explicitly Polemo, had explained the Chief Good as being 'to live in accordance with nature.' This formula receives from the Stoics three interpretations. The first runs thus, 'to live in the light of a knowledge of the natural sequence of causation.' This conception of the End they declare to be identical with Zeno's, being an explanation of your phrase 'to live in agreement with nature.' Their second interpretation is that it means the same as 'to live in the performance of all, or most, of one's intermediate duties.' The Chief Good as thus expounded is not the same as that of the preceding interpretation. That is 'right action' (kathorhôma was your term), and can be achieved only by the Wise Man, but this belongs to duty merely inchoate, so to speak, and not perfect, which may sometimes be attained by the foolish. Again, the third interpretation of the formula is 'to live in the enjoyment of all, or of the greatest, of those things which are in accordance with nature.' This does not depend solely on our own conduct, for it involves two factors, first a mode of life enjoying virtue, secondly a supply of the things which are in accordance with nature but which are not within our control. But the Chief Good as understood in the third and last interpretation, and life passed on the basis of the Chief Good, being inseparably coupled with virtue, lie within the reach of the Wise Man alone; and this is the account of the End of Goods, as we read in the writings of the Stoics themselves, which was given by Xenocrates and Aristotle. They therefore describe the primary constitution of nature, which was your starting point also, more or less in the following terms.

317
CICERO DE FINIBUS

16 VII. "Omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui, ut et salva sit et in genere conservetur suo. Ad hanc rem aiunt artes quoque requisitas quae naturam adiuverant, in quibus ea numeretur in primis quae est vivendi ars, ut tueatur quod a natura datum sit, quod desit acquirat; iidemque divisertur naturam hominis in animum et corpus; cumque eorum utrumque per se expetendum esse dixissent, virtutes quoque utriusque eorum per se expetendas esse dicebant; et\textsuperscript{1} cum animum infinita quadam laude anteponerent corpori, virtutes quoque animi bonis corporis anteponebant. Sed cum sapientiam totius hominis custodem et procurationem esse vellent, quae esset naturae comes et adiutrix, hoc sapientiae munus esse dicebant ut cum\textsuperscript{2} eum tueretur qui constaret ex animo et corpore, in utroque iuvaret eum ac conteret. Atque ita re simpliciter primo collocata, reliqua subtius sequentes corporis bona facilem quandam rationem habere censebant, de animi bonis accuratius exquirebant, in primisque reperiebant esse in iis iustitiae semina, primique ex omnibus philosophis natura tributum esse docuerunt ut ii qui procreati essent a procreatoribus amarentur, et, id quod temporum ordine antiquius est, ut coniugia virorum et uxorum natura coniuncta esse dicerent, qua ex stirpe orirentur amicitiae cognitionum. Atque ab his initiis profecti omnium virtutum et originem et

\textit{et Lambinus; Mdv. om. with MSS.}
\textit{\textsuperscript{2}cum inserted by Mdv.}
BOOK IV. vii

16 VII. "Every natural organism aims at being its own preserver, so as to secure its safety and also its preservation true to its specific type. With this object, they declare, man called in the aid of the arts also to assist nature; and chief among the arts is counted the art of living, which aims at guarding the gifts that nature has bestowed and at obtaining those that are lacking. They further divided the nature of man into soul and body. Each of these parts they pronounced to be desirable for its own sake, and consequently they said that the virtues also of each were desirable for their own sakes; at the same time they extolled the soul as infinitely surpassing the body in glory, and accordingly placed the virtues also of the mind above the goods of the body. But they held that wisdom is the guardian and protectress of the whole man, as being the comrade and helper of nature, and so they said that the function of wisdom, as protecting a being that consisted of a mind and a body, was to assist and preserve him in respect of both. After thus laying the first broad foundations of the theory, they went on to work it out in greater detail. The goods of the body, they held, required no particular explanation, but the goods of the soul they investigated with more elaboration, finding in the first place that in them lay the germs of Justice; and they were the first of any philosophers to teach that the love of parents for their offspring is a provision of nature; and that nature, so they pointed out, has ordained the union of men and women in marriage, which is prior in order of time, and is the root of all the family affections. Starting from these first principles they traced out the origin and growth of all..."
progressionem persecuti sunt. Ex quo magnitudo quoque animi existebat qua facile posset repugnari obsistisque fortunae, quod maximae res essent in potestate sapientis; varietates autem iniuriasque fortunae facile veterum philosophorum praecipitis in-stituta vita superabat. Principiis autem a natura datis amplitudines quaedam bonorum excitabantur, partim profectae a contemplatione rerum occultarum, quod erat insitus menti cognitionis amor, e quo etiam rationis explicandae disserendique cupiditas consequatur; quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque convictum hominum ac societatem animadvertensque in omnibus rebus quas ageret aut diceret ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac decore, his initii et ut ante dixi seminibus a natura datis, temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absulata est.

19 VIII. "Habes," inquam, "Cato, formam eorum de quibus loquor philosophorum. Qua exposita scire cupio quae causa sit cur Zeno ab hac antiqua constitutione desciverit, quidnam horum ab eo non sit probatum: quodne omnem naturam conservatricem sui dixerint, an quod omne animal ipsum sibi commendatum ut se salvum in suo genere incolumique vellet, an quod, cum omnium artium finis is esset quem natura maxime quaereret, idem statui debere de totius arte vitae, an quod, cum ex animo

1 et inserted by Mdv.
2 se salvum Lambinus, Mdv.; se et salvum MSS.
3 quod inserted by Mdv.

320
the virtues. From the same source was developed loftiness of mind, which could render us proof against the assaults of fortune, because the things that matter were under the control of the Wise Man; whereas to the vicissitudes and blows of fortune a life directed by the precepts of the old philosophers could easily rise superior. Again, upon the foundations given by nature was erected a spacious structure of excellences, partly based on the contemplation of the secrets of nature, since the mind possessed an innate love of knowledge, whence also resulted the passion for argument and for discussion; and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of modesty and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care—in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection.

VIII. "There, Cato," I said, "is an outline of the philosophers of whom I am speaking. Having put it before you, I should be glad to learn what reason Zeno had for seceding from this old-established system. Which precisely of these doctrines did he think unsatisfactory: the doctrine that every organism instinctively seeks its own preservation? or that every animal has an affection for itself, prompting it to desire its own continuance safe and unimpaired in its specific type? or that, since the End of every art is some special natural requirement, the same must be affirmed as regards the art of life as a whole? or that, as we consist of soul and body, these and also

Therefore Zeno invented nothing but a new terminology,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

costaremus et corpore, et haec ipsa et eorum virtutes per se esse sumendas. An vero displicuit ea quae tributa est animi virtutibus tanta praestantia? an quae de prudentia, de cognitione rerum, de coniunctione generis humani, quaeque ab iisdem de temperantia, de modestia, de magnitudine animi, de omni honestate dicuntur? Fatebuntur Stoici haec omnia dicta esse praecclare neque eam causam Zenoni desciscendi fuisse. Alia quaedam dicent, credo, magna antiquorum esse peccata quae ille veri investigandi cupidus nullo modo ferre potuerit. Quid enim perversius, quid intolerabilius, quid stultius quam bonam valetudinem, quam dolorum omnium vacuitatem, quam integritatem oculorum reliquorumque sensuum ponere in bonis potius quam dicerent nihil omnino inter eas res iisque contrarias interesse? ea enim omnia quae illi bona dicerent praeposita esse, non bona; itemque illa quae in corpore excel- lerent stulte antiquos dixisse per se esse expetenda; sumenda potius quam expetenda; ea denique omni vita quae in virtute una consisterei, illam vitam quae etiam ceteris rebus quae essent secundum naturam abundaret, magis expetendum non esse sed magis sumendam; cumque ipsa virtus efficiat ita beatam vitam ut beatior esse non possit, tamen quaedam deesse sapientibus tum cum sint beatissimi; itaque eos id agere ut a se dolores, morbos, debilitates repellant.

322
the virtues of these are desirable for their own sakes? Or again, did he take exception to the ascription of such pre-eminence to the virtues of the soul? or with what they say about prudence and knowledge, about the sense of human fellowship, or about temperance, self-control, magnanimity, and moral virtue in general? No, the Stoics will admit that all of these doctrines are admirable, and that Zeno's reason for secession did not lie here. As I understand, they will accuse the ancients of certain grave errors in other matters, which that ardent seeker after truth found himself quite unable to tolerate. What, he asked, could have been more insufferably foolish and perverse than to take good health, freedom from all pain, or soundness of eye-sight and of the other senses, and class them as goods, instead of saying that there was nothing whatever to choose between these things and their opposites? According to him, all these things which the ancients called good, were not good, but 'preferred'; and so also with bodily excellences, it was foolish of the ancients to call them 'desirable for their own sakes'; they were not 'desirable' but 'worth adopting'; and in short, speaking generally, a life bountifully supplied with all the other things in accordance with nature, in addition to virtue, was not 'more desirable,' but only 'more worth adopting' than a life of virtue and virtue alone; and although virtue of itself can render life as happy as it is possible for it to be, yet there are some things that Wise Men lack at the very moment of supreme happiness; and accordingly they do their best to protect themselves from pain, disease and infirmity.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

21 IX. "O magnam vim ingeni causamque iustam cur nova exsisteret disciplina! Perge porro: sequuntur enim ea quae tu scientissime complexus es, omnium insipientiam, iniustitiam, alia vitia similia esse, omniaque peccata esse paria, eisque qui natura doctrinaque longe ad virtutem processissent, nisi eam plane consecuti essent, summe esse miseris, neque inter eorum vitam et improbissimorum quidquam omnino interesse, ut Plato, tantus ille vir, si sapiens non fuerit, nihil melius quam quivis improbissimus nec beatius vixerit. Haec videlicet est correctio philosophiae veteris et emendatio, quae omnino aditum nullum habere potest in urbem, in forum, in curiam. Quis enim ferre posset ita loquentem eum qui se auctorem vitae graviter et sapienter agendae profesiterut, nomina rerum commutantem, cumque idem sentiret quod omnes, quibus rebus eandem vim tribueret alia nomina imponentem, verba modo mutantem, de opinionibus nihil detrahentem? Patronusne causae in epilogio pro reo dicens negaret esse malum exsilium, publicationem bonorum? haec reicienda esse, non fugienda? nec misericordem iudicem esse oportere? In contione autem si loqueretur, si Hannibal ad portas venisset murumque iaculo traecisset, negaret esse in malis capi, venire, interfici, patriam amittere? An senatus, cum trium-

1 nomina rerum commutantem bracketed by Mdv. and earlier Edd.

324
IX. "What acuteness of intellect! What a satisfactory reason for the creation of a new philosophy! But proceed further; for we now come to the doctrine, of which you gave such a masterly summary, that all men's folly, injustice and other vices are alike and all sins are equal; and that those who by nature and training have made considerable progress towards virtue, unless they have actually attained to it, are utterly miserable, and there is nothing whatever to choose between their existence and that of the wickedest of mankind, so that the great and famous Plato, supposing he was not a Wise Man, lived a no better and no happier life than any unprincipled scoundrel. And this, if you please, is your revised and corrected version of the old philosophy, a version that could not possibly be produced in civic life, in the law-courts, in the senate! For who could tolerate such a way of speaking in one who claimed to be an authority on wise and moral conduct? Who would allow him to alter the names of things, and while really holding the same opinions as everybody else, to impose different names on things to which he attaches the same meanings as other people, just altering the terms while leaving the ideas themselves untouched?

Could an advocate wind up his defence of a client by declaring that exile and confiscation of property are not evils? that they are 'to be rejected,' but not 'to be shunned'? that it is not a judge's duty to show mercy? Or supposing him to be addressing a meeting of the people; Hannibal is at the gates and has flung a javelin over the city walls; could he say that captivity, enslavement, death, loss of country are no evils? Could the senate, decreeing
CICERO DE FINIBUS

phum Africano decerneret, 'quod eius virtute,' aut 'felicitate' posset dicere, si neque virtus in ullo nisi in sapiente nec felicitas vere dici potest? Quae est igitur ista philosophia quae communi more in foro loquitur, in libellis suo? praesertim cum quod illi suis verbis significant in eo nihil novetur, caedem res maneant alio modo. Quid enim interest, divitias, opes, valetudinem bona dicas anne praeposita, cum ille qui ista bona dicit nihilo plus iis tribuat quam tu qui eadem illa praeposita nominas? Itaque homo in primis ingenuus et gravis, dignus illa familiaritate Scipionis et Laeli, Panaetius, cum ad Q. Tuberonem de dolore patiendo scriberet, quod esse caput debebat si probari posset, nusquam posuit non esse malum dolorem, sed quid esset et quale, quantumque in eo esset alieni, deinde quae ratio esset perferendi; cuius quidem, quoniam Stoicus fuit, sententia condemnata mihi videtur esse inanitas ista verborum.

24 X. "Sed ut propius ad ea, Cato, accedam quae a te dicta sunt, pressius agamus eaque quae modo dixisti cum iis conferamus quae tuis antepono. Quae sunt igitur communia vobis cum antiquis, iis sic utamur quasi concessis; quae in controversiam ve-

1 in om. most MSS.
2 significant Kayser; significant MSS., Mdv.
3 After novetur MSS. add de ipsis rebus nihil mutetur.
a triumph to Africanus, use the formula, 'whereas by reason of his valour,' or 'good fortune,' if no one but the Wise Man can truly be said to possess either valour or good fortune? What sort of a philosophy then is this, which speaks the ordinary language in public, but in its treatises employs an idiom of its own? and that though the doctrines which the Stoics express in their own peculiar terms contain no actual novelty; the ideas remain the same, though clothed in another dress. Why, what difference does it make whether you call wealth, power, health 'goods,' or 'things preferred,' when he who calls them goods assigns no more value to them than you who style exactly the same things 'preferred'? This is why so eminent and high-minded an authority as Panaetius, a worthy member of the famous circle of Scipio and Laelius, in his epistle to Quintus Tubero on the endurance of pain, has nowhere made what ought to have been his most effective point, if it could be shown to be true, namely that pain is not an evil; instead he defines its nature and properties, estimates the degree of its divergence from nature, and lastly prescribes the method by which it is to be endured. So that by his vote, seeing that he was a Stoic, your terminological fatuities seem to me to stand condemned.

X. "But I want to come to closer quarters, Cato, with the actual system as you stated it; so let us press the matter home, and compare the doctrines you have just enunciated with those which I think superior to yours. Let us then take for granted the tenets that you hold in common with the ancients, but discuss, if you are willing, those about which

327
CICERO DE FINIBUS

niunt, de iis si placet disseramus.” “Mihi vero,” inquit, “placet agi subtilius et ut ipse dixisti pres-sius. Quae enim ahuc protulisti, popularia sunt; ego autem a te elegantiora desidero.” “A mene tu?” inquam; “sed tamen enitar, et si minus multa 25 mihi occurrent non fugiam ista popularia. Sed positum sit primum nosmet ipsos commendatos esse nobis primamque ex natura hanc habere appationem ut conservemus nosmet ipsos. Hoc convenit; sequitur illud ut animadvertamus qui simus ipsi, ut nos quales oportet esse servemus. Sumus igitur homines; ex animo constamus et corpore, quae sunt cuiusdam modi, nosque oportet, ut prima appetitio naturalis postulat, haec diligere constituereque ex his finem illum summi boni atque ultimi; quem si prima vera sunt ita constituit necesse est, earum rerum quae sint secundum naturam quam plurima et quam maxima 26 adipisci. Hunc igitur finem illi tenuerunt, quodquæ ego pluribus verbis, ills brevius, secundum naturam vivere, hoc iis honorum videbatur extremum.

XI. “Age nunc isti doceant, vel tu potius (quis enim ista melius?), quonam modo ab iisdem princi-piis profecti efficiatis ut honeste vivere (id est enim 328
BOOK IV. x-xi

there is dispute." "Oh," said he, "I am quite willing for the debate to go deeper; to be pressed home, as you phrase it. The arguments you have so far put forward are of the popular order; but I look to you to give me something more out of the common." "What, do you look to me?" said I. "But all the same I will do my best, and if I am short of matter, I shall not shrink from the arguments you are pleased to call popular. But let it be granted to begin with, that we have an affection for ourselves, and that the earliest impulse bestowed upon us by nature is a desire for self-preservation. On this we are agreed; and the implication is that we must study what we ourselves are, in order to keep our- selves true to our proper character. We are then human beings, consisting of soul and body, and these of a certain kind. These we are bound to esteem, as our earliest natural instinct demands, and out of these we must construct our End, our Chief and Ultimate Good. And, if our premises are correct, this End must be pronounced to consist in the attainment of the largest number of the most im- portant of the things in accordance with nature. This then was the conception of the End that they up- held; the supreme Good they believed to be the thing which I have described at some length, but which they more briefly expressed by the formula 'life ac- cording to nature.'

XI. "Now then let us call upon your leaders, or better upon yourself (for who is more qualified to speak for your school?) to explain this: how in the world do you contrive, starting from the same first principles, to reach the conclusion that the Chief Good is morality of life?—for that is equivalent to

Both start from self-preservation, and the self includes body as well as mind.

But the Stoics' chief Good would not satisfy even a disembodied mind.
vel e virtute vel naturae congruenter vivere) summum bonum sit, et quonam modo aut quo loco corpus subito deserueritis omniaque ea quae secundum naturam cum sint absint a nostra potestate, ipsum denique officium. Quaero igitur quomodo hae tantae commendationes a natura profectae subito a sapientia relictae sint. Quod si non hominis summum bonum quae reremus sed cuiusdam animantis, is autem esset nihil nisi animus (liceat enim fingere aliquid eiusmodi quo verum facilius reperiamus), tamen illi animo non esset hic vester finis. Desideraret enim valetudinem, vacuitatem doloris, appeteret etiam conservationem sui earumque rerum custodiam, finemque sibi constitueret secundum naturam vivere, quod est ut dixi habere ea quae secundum naturam sint vel omnia vel plurima et maxima. Cuiuscumque enim modi animal constitueris, necesse est, etiam si sine corpore sit ut fingimus, tamen esse in animo quaedam similia eorum quae sunt in corpore, ut nullo modo nisi ut exposui constitui possit finis bonorum. Chrysippus autem exponens differentias animantium ait alias earum corpore excellere, alias autem animo, nonnullas valere utraque re; deinde disputat quod cuiusque generis animantium statui deceat extremum. Cum autem hominem in eo genere posuisset ut ei tribueret animi excellentiam,
BOOK IV. xi

your 'life in agreement with virtue' or 'life in harmony with nature.' By what means or at what point did you suddenly discard the body, and all those things which are in accordance with nature but out of our control, and lastly duty itself? My question then is, how comes it that so many things that Nature strongly recommends have been suddenly abandoned by Wisdom? Even if we were not seeking the Chief Good of man but of some living creature that consisted solely of a mind (let us allow ourselves to imagine such a creature, in order to facilitate our discovery of the truth), even so that mind would not accept this End of yours. For such a being would ask for health and freedom from pain, and would also desire its own preservation, and security for the goods just specified; and it would set up as its End to live according to nature, which means, as I said, to possess either all or most and the most important of the things which are in accordance with nature. In fact you may construct a living creature of any sort you like, but even if it be devoid of a body like our imaginary being, nevertheless its mind will be bound to possess certain attributes analogous to those of the body, and consequently it will be impossible to set up for it an End of Goods on any other lines than those which I have laid down. Chrysippus, on the other hand, in his survey of the different species of living things states that in some the body is the principal part, in others the mind, while there are some that are equally endowed in respect of either; and then he proceeds to discuss what constitutes the ultimate good proper to each species. Man he has placed under that species in which the mind is principal; and yet he so defines
CICERO DE FINIBUS

sumnum bonum id constituit, non ut excellere animus sed ut nihil esse praeter animum videretur. XII. Uno autem modo in virtute sola sumnum bonum recte poneretur, si quod esset animal quod totum ex mente constaret, id ipsum tamen sic ut ea mens nihil haberet in se quod esset secundum natu
29 ram, ut valetudo est. Sed id ne cogitari quidem potest quale sit ut non repugnet ipsum sibi.

"Sin dicunt\(^1\) obscurari quaedam nec apparere quia valde parva sint, nos quoque concedimus; quod dicit Epicurus etiam de voluptate, quae minimae sint voluptates, eas obscurari saepe et obrui; sed non sunt in eo genere tantae commoditates corporis tamque productae temporibus tamque multae. Ita
30 que in quibus propter eorum exiguitatem obscuratio consequitur, saepe accidit ut nihil interesse nostra fateamur sint illa necne sint (ut in sole, quod a te dicebatur, lucernam adhibere nihil interest aut teruncium adiere Croesi pecuniae); quibus autem in rebus tanta obscuratio non fit, fieri tamen potest ut id ipsum quod interest non sit magnum (ut ei qui iucunde vixerit annos decem si aeque vita iucunda menstrua addatur, quia momentum aliquod habeat ad iucundum accessio,\(^2\) bonum sit; si autem id non concedatur, non continuo vita beata tollitur). Bona autem corporis huic sunt quod posterius posui similia. Habent enim accessionem dignam in qua elaboretur: ut mihi in hoc Stoici iocari videantur

\(^1\) dicunt Mdv.; dicit MSS. (in next line E has dicunt for dicit.
\(^2\) ad iucundum accessio edd. with inf. MSS., but ?— Other MSS. have ad iucundum or iucundam accessionem.
man's End as to make it appear, not that he is principally mind, but that he consists of nothing else. XII. But the only case in which it would be correct to place the Chief Good in virtue alone is if there existed a creature consisting solely of pure intellect, with the further proviso that this intellect were devoid of any attribute that is in accordance with nature, such as health. But it is impossible even to imagine a self-consistent picture of what such a creature would be like.

"If on the contrary they urge that certain things are so extremely small that they are eclipsed and lost sight of altogether, we too admit this; Epicurus also says the same of pleasure, that the smallest pleasures are often eclipsed and disappear. But things so important, permanent and numerous as the bodily advantages in question are not in this category. On the one hand therefore, with things so small as to be eclipsed from view, we are often bound to admit that it makes no difference to us whether we have them or not (just as, to take your illustration, it makes no difference if you light a lamp in the sunshine, or add sixpence to the wealth of Croesus); while on the other hand, with things which are not so completely eclipsed, it may nevertheless be the case that the precise difference they make is not very great (thus, if a man who has lived ten years enjoyably were given an additional month of equally enjoyable life, the addition to his enjoyment, being of some value, would be a good thing, but yet the refusal of the addition does not forthwith annihilate his happiness). Now bodily goods resemble rather the latter sort of things. For they contribute something worth taking trouble to obtain; so that I feel

Bodily and external goods are not all eclipsed by mental goods and if they were, they still would be included among 'things according to nature,'
interdum cum ita dicant, si ad illam vitam quae cum virtute degatur ampulla aut strigilis accedat, summpturum sapientem eam vitam potius quo haec adiecta sint nec beatiorem tamen ob eam causam fore. Hoc simile tandem est? non risu potius quam oratione eiciendum? Ampulla enim sit necne sit, quis non iure optimo irrideatur si laboret? At vero pravitate membrandum et cruciato dolorum si quis quem levet, magnam ineat gratiam; nec si ille sapiens ad tortoris eculeum a tyranno ire cogatur similem habeat vultum et si ampullam perdisset, sed ut magnum et difficile certamen iniens, cum sibi cum capitali adversario, dolore, depugnandum videret, excitaret omnes rationes fortitudinis ac patientiae quam praesidio iniret difficile illud ut dixi magnumque proelium. Deinde non quaerimus quid obscuretur aut intereat quia sit admodum parvum, sed quid tale sit ut expleat summam. Una voluptas e multis obscuratur in illa vita voluptaria; sed tamen ea, quamvis parva sit, pars est eius vitae quae posita est in voluptate. Nummus in Croesi divitiis obscuratur, pars est tamen divitiorum. Quare obscurentur etiam haec quae secundum naturam esse dicimus in vita beata, sint modo partes vitae beatae.

XIII. "Atqui si, ut convenire debet inter nos, est quaedam appetitio naturalis ea quae secundum naturam sunt appetens, eorum omnium est aliqua

1 pravitate Bentley, Mdv.; gravitate MSS.
the Stoics must sometimes be joking on this point, when they say that if to the life of virtue be added an oil-flask or a flesh-brush, the Wise Man will choose the life so augmented, by preference, but yet will not on that account be any happier. Pray does this illustration really hold good? is it not rather to be dismissed with a laugh than seriously refuted? Who does not richly deserve to be laughed at if he troubles about having or not having an oil-flask? But rid a man of bodily deformity or agonies of pain, and you earn his deepest gratitude; and if the Wise Man is ordered by a tyrant to go to the rack, he would not wear the same look as if he had lost his oil-flask. He would feel that he had a severe and searching ordeal before him; and seeing that he was about to encounter the supreme antagonist, pain, he would summon up all his principles of courage and endurance to fortify him against that severe and searching struggle aforesaid.—Again, the question is not whether such and such a good is so trifling as to be eclipsed or lost altogether, but whether it is of such a sort as to contribute to the sum total. In the life of pleasure of which we spoke, one pleasure is lost to sight among the many; but all the same, small as it is, it is a part of the life that is based upon pleasure. A halfpenny is lost to sight amidst the riches of Croesus; still it forms part of those riches. Hence the circumstances according to nature, as we call them, may be unnoticed in a life of happiness, only you must allow that they are parts of that happiness.

"Yet if, as you and we are bound to agree, there does exist a certain natural instinct to desire the things in accordance with nature, the right procedure is to add together all these things in one definite...

335
CICERO DE FINIBUS

summa facienda. Quo constituto tum licebit otiose ista quae rerere, de magnitudine rerum, de excellentia quanta in quoque sit ad beate vivendum, de istis ipsis obscurationibus quae propter exiguitatem vix aut ne vix quidem appareant. Quid de quo nulla dissensio est? Nemo enim est qui aliter dixerit quin omnium naturarum simile esset id ad quod omnia referrentur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum. Omnis enim est natura diligens sui. Quae est enim quae se umquam desperat aut partem aliquam sui aut eius partis habitum aut vim aut ullius earum rerum quae secundum naturam sunt aut motum aut statum? Quae autem natura suae primae institutionis oblita est? Nulla profecto est quin suam vim retineat a primo ad extremum. Quomodo igitur evenit ut hominis natura sola esset quae hominem relinququeret, quae oblivisceretur corporis, quae summum bonum non in toto homine sed in parte hominis poneret? Quomodo autem, quod ipsi etiam fatentur constatque inter omnes, conservabitur ut simile sit omnium naturarum illud ultimum de quo quaeritur? Tum enim esset simile si in ceteris quoque naturis id cuique esset ultimum quod in quaque excelleret. Tale enim visum est ultimum Stoicorum. Quid dubitas igitur mutare principia naturae? Quod enim dicis, omne animal, simul atque sit ortum, applicatum esse ad se diligendum esseque in se conservando occupatum, quin potius ita dicis, omne

1 est supplied by Mdv.

2 Quod conj. Müller; MSS. and edd. Quid—occupatum?
BOOK IV. xiii

This point established, it will then be open to us to investigate at our leisure your questions about the importance of the separate items, and the value of their respective contributions to happiness, and about that eclipse, as you call it, of the things so small as to be almost or quite imperceptible. Then what of a point on which no disagreement exists? I mean this: no one will dispute that the supreme and final End, the thing ultimately desirable, is analogous for all natural species alike. For love of self is inherent in every species; since what species exists that ever deserts itself or any part of itself, or any habit or faculty of any such part, or any of the things in accordance with nature, either in motion or at rest? What species ever forgot its own original constitution? Assuredly there is not one that does not retain its own proper faculty from start to finish. How then came it about that, of all the existing species, mankind alone should abandon man's nature, forget the body, and find its Chief Good not in the whole man but in a part of man? How moreover is the axiom to be retained, admitted as it is even by the Stoics and accepted universally, that the End which is the subject of our inquiry is analogous for all species? For the analogy to hold, every other species also would have to find its End in that part of the organism which in that particular species is the highest part; since that, as we have seen, is how the Stoics conceive the End of man.

Why then do you hesitate to alter your conception of the primary instincts to correspond? Instead of saying that every animal from the moment of its birth is devoted to love of itself and engrossed in preserving itself, why do you not rather say that...
CICERO DE FINIBUS

animal applicatum esse ad id quod in eo sit optimum et in eius unius occupatum esse custodia, reliquasque naturas nihil aliud agere nisi ut id conservent quod in quaque optimum sit? Quomodo autem optimum, si bonum praeterea nullum est? Sin autem reliqua appetenda sunt, cur, quod est ultimum rerum appetendarum, id non aut ex omnium earum aut ex plurimarum et maximarum appetitione concluditur? Ut Phidias potest a primo instituere signum idque perfacere, potest ab alio inchoatum accipere et absolvere, huic similis est sapientia; non enim ipsa genuit hominem sed accepit a natura inchoatum; hanc ergo intuens debet institutum illud quasi signum absolvere. Qualem igerit hominem natura inchoavit? et quod est munus, quod opus sapientiae? quid est quod ab ea absolvi et perfici debeat? Si nihil [in eo quod perficiendum est] praeter motum ingenii quendam, id est, rationem, necesse est huic ultimum esse ex virtute agere; rationis enim perfectio est virtus; si nihil nisi corpus, summa erunt illa, valetudo, vacuitas doloris, pulchritudo, cetera. XIV. Nunc de hominis summo bono quaeatur; quid igerit dubitamus in tota eius natura quaerere quid sit effectum? Cum enim constet inter omnes omne officium munusque sapientiae in hominis cultu esse occupatum, alii (ne me existimes contra Stoicos solum dicere) eas sen-

1 in eo quod perficiendum est bracketed by ed., cp. § 27 f.; Mdv. in quo (i.e. in aliquo animali) perficiendum est.
BOOK IV. xiii-xiv

every animal is devoted to the best part of itself and engrossed in protecting that alone, and that every other species is solely engaged in preserving the part that is respectively best in each? But in what sense is one part the best, if nothing beside it is good at all? While if on the contrary other things also are desirable, why does not the supremely desirable thing consist in the attainment of all, or of the greatest possible number and the most important, of these things? A Pheidias can start to make a statue from the beginning and carry it to completion, or he can take one rough-hewn by some one else and finish that. The latter case typifies the work of Wisdom. She did not create man herself, but took him over in the rough from Nature; her business is to finish the statue that Nature began, keeping her eyes on Nature meanwhile. What sort of thing then is man as rough-hewn by Nature? and what is the function and the task of Wisdom? what is it that needs to be consummated by her finishing touch? If it is a creature consisting solely of a certain operation of the intellect, that is, reason, its highest good must be activity in accordance with virtue, since virtue is reason's consummation. If it is nothing but a body, the chief things will be health, freedom from pain, beauty and the rest. XIV. But as a matter of fact the creature whose Chief Good we are seeking is man. Surely then our course is to inquire what Nature's handiwork has been in man—the whole man. All are agreed that the duty and function of Wisdom is entirely centred in the work of perfecting man; but then some thinkers (for you must not imagine that I am tilting at the Stoics only) produce theories which place the Chief
tentias afferunt ut summum bonum in eo genere ponant quod sit extra nostram potestatem, tamquam de inanimo aliquo loquantur, alii contra, quasi corpus nullum sit hominis, ita praeter animum nihil curant, cum praesertim ipse quoque animus non inane nescio quid sit (neque enim id possum intelligere) sed in quodam genere corporis, ut ne is quidem virtute una contentus sit sed appetat vacui-tatem doloris. Quamobrem utrique idem faciunt ut si laevam partem neglegerent, dexteram tuerentur, aut ipsius animi, ut fecit Erillus, cognitionem ample-xarentur, actionem relinquerent. Eorum enim omnium, multa praetermittentium dum elegant aliquid quod sequantur, quasi curta sententia; at vero illa perfecta atque plena eorum qui, cum de hominis summo bono quaererent, nullam in eo neque animi neque corporis partem vacuam tutam reliquerunt.

Vos autem, Cato, quia virtus, ut omnes fatemur, altissimum locum in homine et maxime excellentem tenet et quod eos qui sapientes sunt absolutos et perfectos putamus, aciem animorum nostrorum virtutis splendore praestringitis. In omni enim animante est summum aliquid atque optimum, ut in equis, in canibus, quibus tamen et dolore vacare opus est et valere; sic igitur in homine perfectio ista in eo potissimum quod est optimum, id est, in virtute laudatur. Itaque mihi non satis videmini considerare quod iter sit naturae quaeque progressio. Non enim, quod facit in frugibus, ut, cum ad spicam perduxerit ab herba, relinquit et pro nihilo habeat herbam, idem facit in homine cum eum ad rationis

1 de inanimo aliquo Mdv.; in annali quo E; in animali quo B; de inanimali quo inf. MSS.
BOOK IV. xiv

Good in the class of things entirely outside our control, as though they were discussing some creature devoid of a mind; while others on the contrary ignore everything but mind, just as if man had no body; and that though even the mind is not an empty, impalpable something (a conception to me unintelligible), but in some sort corporeal, and therefore even the mind is not satisfied with virtue alone, but desires freedom from pain. In fact, with each school alike it is just as if they should ignore the left side of their bodies and protect the right, or, in the mind, like Erillus, recognize cognition but leave the practical faculty out of account. They pick and choose, pass over a great deal and fasten on a single aspect; so that all their systems are one-sided. The full and perfect philosophy was that which, investigating the Chief Good of man, left no part either of his mind or body uncared-for. Whereas your friends, Cato, on the strength of the fact, which we all admit, that virtue is man’s highest and supreme excellence and that the Wise Man is the perfect and consummate type of humanity, try to dazzle our mental vision with virtue’s radiance. Every animal, for instance the horse, or the dog, has some supreme good quality, yet at the same time they require to have health and freedom from pain; similarly therefore in man that consummation you speak of attains its chief glory in what is his chief excellence, namely virtue. This being so, I feel you do not take sufficient pains to study Nature’s method of procedure. With the growing corn, no doubt, her way is to guide its development from blade to ear, and then discard the blade as of no value; but she does not do the same with man, when she has developed in him the
CICERO DE FINIBUS

habitum perduxit.\(^1\) Semper enim ita assumit aliquid ut ea quae prima dederit non deserat. Itaque sensibus rationem adiunxit et ratione effecta sensus non reliquit. Ut si cultura vitium, cuius hoc munus est ut efficiat ut vitis cum omnibus partibus suis quam optime se habeat,—sed sic intellegamus (licet enim, ut vos quoque soletis, fingere aliquid docendi causa): si igitur illa cultura vitium in vite insit ipsa, cetera, credo, velit quae ad colendam vitem attinebunt sicut antea, se autem omnibus vitis partibus praeferat statuatque nihil esse melius in vite quam se; similiter sensus, cum accessit ad Naturam, tuetur illam quidem sed etiam se tuetur; cum autem assumpta est ratio, tanto in dominatu locatur ut omnia illa prima naturae huius tutelae subiciantur.

Itaque non discedit ab eorum curatone quibus praeposita vitam omnem debet gubernare; ut mirari satis istorum\(^2\) inconstantiam non possim. Naturalem enim appetitionem, quam vocant \(\delta\rho\mu\nu\), itemque officium, ipsam etiam virtutem volunt esse earum rerum quae secundum Naturam sunt. Cum autem ad summum bonum volunt pervenire, transiliunt omnia et duo nobis opera pro uno relinquunt, ut alia sumamus, alia expetamus, potius quam uno fine utrumque concluderent.

XV. "At enim [nam]\(^3\) dicitis virtutem non posse

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\(^1\) *perduxit* Mdv. (cp. V, 41 *caepimus*), *perduxerit* MSS.
\(^2\) *istorum* Mdv.; *eorum* MSS.
\(^3\) *nam* of best MSS. Mdv. brackets: other MSS. *veram, natura*, and *iam dicetis.*
faculty of reason. For she continually superadds fresh faculties without abandoning her previous gifts. Thus she added to sensation reason, and after creating reason did not discard sensation. Suppose the art of viticulture, whose function is to bring the vine with all its parts into the most thriving condition—at least let us assume it to be so (for we may invent an imaginary case, as you are fond of doing, for purposes of illustration); suppose then the art of viticulture were a faculty residing in the vine itself, this faculty would desire, doubtless, as before, every condition requisite for the health of the vine, but would rank itself above all the other parts of the vine, and would consider itself the noblest element in the vine's organism. Similarly when an animal organism has acquired the faculty of sensation, this faculty protects the organism, it is true, but also protects itself; but when reason has been superadded, this is placed in such a position of dominance that all the primary gifts of nature are placed under its protection. Accordingly Reason never abandons its task of safeguarding the earlier elements; its business is by controlling these to steer the whole course of life; so that I cannot sufficiently marvel at the inconsistency of your teachers. Natural desire, which they term hormē, and also duty, and even virtue itself they reckon among things according to Nature. Yet when they want to arrive at the Supreme Good, they leap over all of these, and leave us two operations instead of one; some things we are to 'adopt,' others to 'desire'; instead of including both operations under a single End.

"But you protest that if other things than
CICERO DE FINIBUS

constitui, si ea quae extra virtutem sint ad beate vivendum pertineant. Quod totum contra est; introduci enim virtus nullo modo potest, nisi omnia quae leget quaeque reciet unam referentur ad summam. Nam si omnino nos\(^1\) neglegemus, in Aristonea vitia incidemus et peccata obliviscemurque quae virtuti ipsi principia dederimus; si ea non neglegemus neque tamen ad finem summi boni referemus, non multum ab Erilli levitate aberimus;\(^2\) duarum enim vitarum nobis erunt instituta capienda. Facit enim ille duo seiiuncta ultima bonorum, quae ut essent vera coniungi debuerunt; nunc ita separantur ut diiuncta sint, quo nihil potest esse perversius.

41 Itaque contra est ac dicitis; nam constitui virtus nullo modo potest nisi ea quae sunt prima naturae ut ad summam pertinentia tenebit. Quaesita enim virtus est non quae relinquaret naturam sed quae tueretur; at illa ut vobis placet partem quandam tuetur, reliquam deserit. Atque ipsa hominis institutio si loqueretur hoc dicret, primos suos quasi coemptus appetendi fuisse ut se conservaret in ea natura in qua ortus esset. Nondum autem explana-tum satis erat quid maxime natura vellet. Explanetur igitur. Quid ergo? aliud\(^3\) intellegeetur nisi uti ne quae pars naturae neglegatur? In qua si nihil est praefer

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\(^1\) nos: edd. conj. ea. Mdv. marks as corrupt, and conj. omnino omnia praeter animos neglegemus. Perhaps omnino nostra corpora neglegemus.

\(^2\) aberimus Cobet (‘admodum probabiliter’ Mdv.): aberrabimus Mdv., MSS.

\(^3\) Quid ergo? aliud ed. Quid ergo aliud Mdv. etc.

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\(^a\) i.e. our own nature.

344
victory go to make up happiness, virtue cannot be established. As a matter of fact it is entirely the other way about: it is impossible to find a place for virtue, unless all the things that she chooses and rejects are reckoned towards one sum-total of good. For if we entirely ignore ourselves, we shall fall into the mistakes and errors of Aristo, forgetting the things that we assigned as the origins of virtue herself; if while not ignoring these things, we yet do not reckon them in the End or Chief Good, we shall be well on the road towards the extravagances of Erillus, since we shall have to adopt two different rules of life at once. Erillus sets up two separate ultimate Goods, which, supposing his view were true, he ought to have united in one; but as it is he makes them so separate as to be mutually exclusive alternatives, which is surely the extreme of perversity. Hence the truth is just the opposite of what you say; virtue is an absolute impossibility, unless it holds to the objects of the primary instincts as going to make up the sum of good. For we started to look for a virtue that should protect, not abandon, nature; whereas virtue as you conceive it protects a particular part of our nature but leaves the remainder in the lurch. Man's constitution itself, if it could speak, would declare that its earliest tentative movements of desire were aimed at preserving itself in the natural character with which it was born into the world. But at that stage the principal intention of nature had not yet been fully revealed. Well, suppose it revealed. What then? will it be construed otherwise than as forbidding that any part of man's nature should be ignored? If man consists solely of a reasoning faculty, let it be granted...
rationem, sit in una virtute finis bonorum; sin est etiam corpus, ista explanatio naturae nempe hoc effecerit ut ea quae ante explanationem tenebamus relinquamus. Ergo id est convenienter naturae vivere, a natura discedere. Ut quidam philosophi, cum a sensibus profecti maiora quaedam et diviniora vidissent, sensus reliquerunt, sic isti, cum ex appetitio rener virtutis pulchritudinem aspexissent, omnia quae praeter virtutem ipsam viderant abiecerunt, oblii naturam omnem appetendarum rerum ita late patere ut a principiis permanaret ad fines, neque intellegunt se rerum illarum pulchrarum atque admirabilium fundamentum subducere.

XVI. "Itaque mihi videntur omnes quidem illi errasse qui finem 'bonorum esse dixerunt honeste vivere, sed alius alio magis; Pyrrho scilicet maxime, qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat; deinde Aristo, qui nihil relinquere non est ausus, introduxit autem, quibus commotus sapiens appeteret aliquid, 'quodcumque in mentem incideret' et 'quodcumque tamquam occurreret.' Is hoc melior quam Pyrrho quod aliquod genus appetendi dedit, deterior quam ceteri quod penitus a natura recessit. Stoici autem quod finem bonorum in una virtute ponunt, similes sunt illorum; quod autem principium offici quaeunt, melius quam

1 quodcumque edd., cf. § 47; quod cuique MSS.
2 quod aliquod B, E; quod vel aliquod inf. MSS.; quod vel al. Mdv.
that the End of Goods is contained in virtue alone; but if he has a body as well, the revelation of our nature, on your showing, will actually have resulted in our relinquishing the things to which we held before that revelation took place. At this rate 'to live in harmony with nature' means to depart from nature. There have been philosophers who, after rising from sensation to the recognition of nobler and more spiritual faculties, thereupon threw the senses on one side. Similarly your friends, starting from the instinctive desires, came to behold virtue in all her beauty, and forthwith flung aside all they had ever seen besides virtue herself, forgetting that the whole instinct of appetite is so wide in its range that it spreads from the primary objects of desire right up to the ultimate Ends, and not realizing that they are undermining the very foundations of the graces which they so much admire.

43 XVI. "In my view, therefore, while all who have defined the End of Goods as the life of moral conduct are in error, some are more wrong than others. The most mistaken no doubt is Pyrrho, because his conception of virtue leaves nothing as an object of desire whatever. Next in error comes Aristo, who did not venture to go so far as Pyrrho, but who introduced as the Wise Man's motives of desire 'whatever chanced to enter his mind' and 'whatever struck him.' Aristo was better than Pyrrho in so far as he allowed desire of some sort, but worse than the rest because he departed so utterly from nature. Now the Stoics in placing the End of Goods in virtue alone resemble the philosophers already mentioned; but in trying to find a foundation for virtuous action they are an improvement
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Pyrrho; quod ea non 'occurrentia' fingunt, vincunt Aristonem; quod autem ea quae ad naturam accommodata et per se assumenda esse dicunt non adiungunt ad finem bonorum, desciscunt a natura et quodam modo sunt non dissimiles Aristonis. Ille enim 'occurrentia' nescio quae comminiscebatur; hi autem ponunt illi quidem prima naturae, sed ea seiuungunt a finibus et summa bonorum; quae cum praeponunt ut sit aliqua rerum selectio, naturam videntur sequi; cum autem negant ea quidquam ad beatam vitam pertinent, rursus naturam relinquent.

44 "Atque adhuc ea dixi, causa cur Zenoni non fuisset, quomobrem a superiorum auctoritate discederet; nunc reliqua videamus, nisi aut ad haec, Cato, dicere alienus vis aut nos iam longiores sumus." "Neutrum vero," inquit ille; "nam et a te perfici istam dispositionem volo nec tua mihi oratio longa videri potest." "Optime," inquam; "quid enim mihi potest esse optatus quam cum Catone, omnium virtutum auctore, de virtutibus disputare? Sed primum illud vide, gravissimam illam vestram sententiam, quae familiam ducit, honestum quod sit id esse solum bonum honesteque vivere bonorum finem, communem fore vobis cum omnibus qui in una virtute constituunt finem bonorum; quodque dicitis informari non posse virtutem si quidquam nisi quod

1 ea dixi, causa cur Zenoni non fuisset (cum for cur E) MSS., Müller; Mdv. marks as corrupt, and suggests eam dixi causam (i.e. eam causam ego, sic disputavi, ut ostendem), Zenoni non fuisse quomobrem —. Mdv. formerly conjectured ea dixi, causam Zenoni non fuisse.
BOOK IV. xvi

upon Pyrrho, and in not finding this in imaginary 'things that strike the mind' they do better than Aristo; though in speaking of certain things as 'suitable to nature' and 'to be adopted for their own sakes,' and then refusing to include them in the End of Goods, they desert nature and approximate in some degree to Aristo. For Aristo invented his vague 'things that strike the mind'; while the Stoics, though recognizing, it is true, the primary objects of nature, yet allow no connection between these and their Ends or sum of Goods. In making the primary objects 'preferred,' so as to admit a certain principle of choice among things, they seem to be following nature, but in refusing to allow them to have anything to do with happiness, they again abandon nature.

44 "So far what I have said was to show why Zeno had no grounds for seceding from the earlier authorities. Now let us turn our attention to the rest of my points, unless, Cato, you desire to say anything in reply to this, or unless we have gone on too long already." "Neither is the case," he answered, "since I am eager for you to finish your argument, and no discourse of yours could seem to me long." "Thank you very much," I rejoined; "for what could I desire better than to discuss the subject of virtue with that pattern of all the virtues 45 Cato? But first I would have you observe that the most important of all your doctrines, the head of the array, namely that Moral Worth alone is good and that the moral life is the End of Goods, will be shared with you by all those who make the End of Goods consist of virtue alone; and your view that it is impossible to frame a conception of Virtue if
CICERO DE FINIBUS

honestum sit numeretur, idem dicetur ab illis quos modo nominavi. Mihi autem aequisius videbatur Zenonem cum Polemone disceptantem, a quo quae essent principia naturae acceperat, a communibus initiis progradientem videre ubi primum insisteret et unde causa controversiae nasceretur, non, stantem cum iis qui ne dicerent quidem sua summa bona esse a natura profecta, uti iisdem argumentis quibus illi uterentur iisdemque sententiis.

46 XVII. "Minime vero illud probo quod, cum dociustis ut vobis videmini solum bonum esse quod honestum sit, tum rursum dicitis initia proponi necesse esse apta et accommodata naturae quorum ex selectione virtus possit existere. Non enim in selectione virtus ponenda erat, ut id ipsum quod erat bonorum ultimum aliud aliquid acquireret. Nam omnia quae sumenda quaeque legenda aut optanda sunt inesse debent in summa bonorum, ut is qui eam adeptus sit nihil praeterea desideret. Videsne ut quibus summa est in voluptate perspicuum sit quid iis faciendum sit aut non faciendum? ut nemo dubitet eorum omnia officia quo spectare, quid sequi, quid fugere debeant? Sit hoc ultimum bonorum quod nunc a me defenditur; apparet statim quae sint officia, quae actiones. Vobis autem, quibus nihil

350
BOOK IV. xvi-xvii

anything beside Moral Worth be counted in it, will also be maintained by the philosophers whom I just now mentioned. To my mind it would have been fairer for Zeno in his dispute with Polemo, whose teaching as to the primary impulses of nature he had adopted, to have started from the fundamental tenets which they held in common, and to have marked the point where he first called a halt and where occasion for divergence arose; not to take his stand with thinkers who did not even profess to hold that the Chief Good, as they severally conceived it, was based on natural instinct, and employ the same arguments and the same doctrines as they did.

XVII. “Another point to which I take great exception is that, when you have proved, as you think, that Moral Worth alone is good, you then turn round and say that of course there must be advantages adapted to our nature set before us as a starting point, in exercising choice among which advantages virtue may be able to come into existence. Now it was a mistake to make virtue consist in an act of choice, for this implies that the very thing that is the ultimate Good itself seeks to get something else. Surely the sum of Goods must include everything worth adopting, choosing or desiring, so that he who has attained it may not want anything more. In the case of those whose Chief Good consists in pleasure, notice how clear it is what things they are to do or not to do; no one can be in doubt as to the proper scope of all their duties, what these must aim at and what avoid. Or grant the ultimate Good that I am now upholding, and it becomes clear at once what one’s duties are and what actions are prescribed. But you, who have no
CICERO DE FINIBUS

est aliud propositum nisi rectum atque honestum, unde offici, unde agendi principium nascatur non reperietis. 47 Hoc igitur quaerentes\(^1\) omnes, et ii qui quodcumque in mentem veniat aut quodcumque occurrat se sequi dicunt\(^2\) et vos, ad naturam revertemini.\(^8\) Quibus natura iure responderit non esse verum aliunde finem beate vivendi, a se principia rei gerendae peti; esse enim unam rationem qua et principia rerum agendarum et ultima bonorum continenterur, atque ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis nihil differente aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas praeter virtutes et vitia inter quas quidquam omnino interesseret, sic errare Zenonem qui nulla in re nisi in virtute aut vitio\(^4\) propensionem ne minimi quidem momenti ad summum bonum adipiscendum esse diceret et, cum ad beatam vitam nullum momentum cetera haberent, ad petitionem tamen\(^5\) rerum esse in iis momenta diceret; quasi vero haec appetitio non ad summi boni aectionem pertinere! Quid autem minus consentaneum est quam quod aiunt cognito summo bono reverti se ad naturam ut ex ea petant agendi principium, id est offici? Non enim actionis aut officii ratio impellit ad ea quae secundum naturam sunt appetenda, sed ab iis et appetitio et actio com movetur.

XVIII. "Nunc venio ad illa tua brevia, quae consectaria esse dicebas, et primum illud, quo nihil

\(^{1}\) quaerentes Görenz, Mdv.; quaeritis MSS.
\(^{2}\) dicunt ed.; dicent MSS., Mdv.
\(^{3}\) revertemini Mdv. with inf. MSS.; reuertimini B, E.
\(^{4}\) aut vitio some edd. bracket.
\(^{5}\) cetera haberent . . . tamen Mdv. with Davis and Bremi; Ea res haberet . . . autem MSS.
BOOK IV. xvii-xviii

other standard in view but abstract right and morality, will not be able to find a source and starting point for duty and for conduct. In the search for this you will all of you have to return to nature,—both those who say that they follow whatever comes into their mind or whatever occurs to them, and you yourselves. Both will be met by Nature's very just reply that it is unfair that the standard of Happiness should be sought elsewhere while the springs of conduct are derived from herself; that there is a single principle which must cover both the springs of action and the ultimate Goods; and that just as Aristo's doctrine has been quite discredited, that everything is absolutely indifferent and there is nothing whatever to choose between any things at all excepting virtues and vices, so Zeno was mistaken in saying that nothing else but virtue or vice affected even in the smallest degree the attainment of the Chief Good, and that although other things had no effect whatever upon happiness, they yet had some influence upon our desires; just as though desire, if you please, bore no relation whatever to the attainment of the Chief Good! But what can be more inconsistent than the procedure they profess, to ascertain the Chief Good first, and then to return to Nature, and demand from her the primary motive of conduct or of duty? Considerations of conduct or duty do not supply the impulse to desire the things that are in accordance with nature; it is these things which excite desire and give motives for conduct.

XVIII. "I now come to those concise proofs of yours which you said were so conclusive. I will start with one as concise as anything could be: 

The Stoic syllogisms (iii, 26 ff) are based on false premises, or else are logically invalid:
CICERO DE FINIBUS

potest brevius: 'Bonum omne laudabile; laudabile autem omne honestum; bonum igitur omne honestum.' O plumbeum pugionem! Quis enim tibi primum illud concesserit? (quo quidem concesso, nihil opus est secundo; si enim omne bonum laudabile est, omne honestum est); quis igitur tibi istud dabit praeter Pyrrhonem, Aristonem eorumve similis? quos tu non probas. Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit, quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. Et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant; quid censes eos esse facturos, qui omnino virtutem a bonorum fine segregaverunt, Epicurum, Hieronymum, illos etiam, si qui Carneadeum finem tueri volunt? Iam aut Callipho aut Diodorus quomodo poterunt tibi istud concedere, qui ad honestatem aliud adiungunt, quod ex eodem genere non sit? Placet igitur tibi, Cato, cum res sumpseris non concessas, ex illis efficer, quod velis? Iam ille sorites est, quo nihil putatis esse vitiosius, 'quod bonum sit, id esse optabile; quod optabile, id expetendum; quod expetendum, id laudabile'; dein reliqui gradus, sed ego in hoc resisto; eodem enim modo tibi nemo dabit, quod expetendum sit, id esse laudabile. Illud vero minime consectorium, sed in primis hebes, illorum

\footnote{est inserted by Baites, Mdv.}

\footnote{a Cp. note on II, 48.}
BOOK IV. xviii

'Everything good is praiseworthy; but everything praiseworthy is honourable (moral); therefore everything good is honourable (moral).' What a dagger of lead! Why, who will grant you your major premise? (and if this be granted there is no need of the minor; for if everything good is praiseworthy, then everything good is honourable).

49 Who, I say, will grant you this, except Pyrrho, Aristo and their fellows, whose doctrines you reject? Aristotle, Xenocrates and the whole of their following will not allow it; because they call health, strength, riches, fame and many other things good, but do not call them praiseworthy. And these, though holding that the End of Goods is not limited to virtue alone, yet rate virtue higher than all other things; but what do you suppose will be the attitude of those who entirely dissociated virtue from the End of Goods, Epicurus, Hieronymus, and also of any supporters of the End of Carneades?

50 Or how will Callipho or Diodorus be able to grant your premise, who combine with Moral Worth another factor belonging to an entirely different category? Are you then content, Cato, to take disputed premises for granted, and draw from these the conclusion you want? And again, the following proof is a sorites, which according to you is a most fallacious form of reasoning: 'what is good is to be wished; what is to be wished is desirable; what is desirable is praiseworthy'; and so on through the remaining steps, but I call a halt at this one, for, just as before, no one will grant you that what is desirable is praiseworthy. And once again, here is an argument which so far from being conclusive is stupid to a degree, though, of course, the Stoic leaders and not
CICERO DE FINIBUS

scilicet, non tuum, 'gloriatione dignam esse beatam vitam, quod non possit sine honestate contingere, ut iure quisquam glorietur.' Dabit hoc Zenoni Polemo; etiam magister eius et tota illa gens et reliqui qui virtutem omnibus rebus multo anteponentes adiungunt ei tamen aliquid summo in bono finiendo; si enim virtus digna est gloriatione, ut est, tantumque praestat reliquis rebus ut dici vix possit, et beatus esse poterit virtute una praeditus carens ceteris, nec tamen illud tibi concedet, praeter virtutem nihil in bonis esse ducendum. Illi autem quibus summum bonum sine virtute est, non dabunt fortasse vitam beatam habere in quo possit iure gloriari; etsi illi quidem etiam voluptates faciunt interdum gloriosas.

52 XIX. "Vides igitur te aut ea sumere quae non concedantur aut ea quae etiam concessa te nihil iuvent. Equidem in omnibus istis conclusionibus hoc putarem philosophia nobisque dignum, et maxime cum summum bonum quaereremus, vitam nostram, consilia, voluntates, non verba corrigi. Quis enim potest istis quae te ut ais delectant brevibus et acutis auditis de sententia decedere? Nam cum exspectant et avent audire cur dolor malum non sit, dicunt illi asperum esse dolere, molestum, odiosum, contra naturam, difficile toleratu, sed quia nulla sit in dolore nec fraus nec improbitas nec malitia nec

1 ut—glorietur Manutius rejects as interpolated.

* Viz. that only what is moral is a thing to be proud of.

356
BOOK IV. xviii-xix

yourself are responsible for that: 'Happiness is a thing to be proud of, whereas it cannot be the case that anyone should have good reason to be proud without Moral Worth.' The minor premise a Polemo will concede to Zeno, and so will his master and the whole of their clan, as well as all the other philosophers that while ranking virtue far above all else yet couple some other thing with it in defining the Chief Good; since if virtue is a thing to be proud of, as it is, and if it is almost inexpressibly superior to everything else, Polemo will be able to be happy if endowed solely with virtue, and destitute of all besides, and yet he will not grant you that nothing except virtue is to be reckoned as a good. Those on the other hand whose Supreme Good dispenses with virtue, will perhaps decline to grant that happiness contains any just ground for pride; although they, it is true, sometimes make out even pleasures to be things to be proud of.

51

52

XIX. "So you see that you are either making assumptions which cannot be granted or ones which even if granted do you no good. For my own part, as regards all these Stoic syllogisms, I should have thought that to be worthy of philosophy and of ourselves, particularly when the subject of our inquiry is the Supreme Good, the argument ought to amend our lives, purposes and wills, not just correct our terminology. Would those concise epigrams which you say give you so much pleasure make any man alter his opinions? Here are people all agog to learn why pain is no evil; and the Stoics tell them that though pain is irksome, annoying, hateful, unnatural and hard to bear, it is not an evil, because it involves no dishonesty, wickedness or malice, no
CICERO DE FINIBUS

culpa nec turpitudo non esse illud malum. Haec qui audierit, ut ridere non curet, discendet tamen nihilo firmior ad dolorem ferendum quam venerat. 53 Tu autem negas fortem esse quemquam posse qui dolorem malum putet. Cur fortior sit si illud quod tute concedis asperum et vix ferendum putabit? Ex rebus enim timiditas, non ex vocabulis nascitur. Et ais, si una littera commota sit, fore tota ut labet disciplina. Utrum igitur tibi litteram videor an totas paginas commovere? Ut enim sit apud illos, id quod est a te laudatum, ordo rerum conservatus et omnia inter se apta et connexa (sic enim aiebas), tamen persequi non debemus si a falsis principiis profecta congruunt ipsa sibi et a proposito non aber-

rant. In prima igitur constitutione Zeno tuus a natura recessit, cumque summum bonum posuisset in ingeni praestantia quam virtutem vocamus, nec quidquam aliud esse bonum dixisset nisi quod esset honestum, nec virtutem posse constare si in ceteris rebus esset quidquam quod aliud alio melius esset aut peius, his propositis tenuit prorsus consequentia. Recte dicis; negare non possum; sed ita falsa sunt ea quae consequuntur, ut illa e quibus haec nata 55 sunt vera esse non possint. Docent enim nos, ut scis, dialectici, si ea quae rem aliquam sequantur, falsa sint, falsam illam ipsam esse quam sequantur. Ita fit illa conclusio non solum vera sed ita perspicua ut dialectici ne rationem quidem reddi putent oportere: Si illud, hoc; non autem hoc; igitur ne illud quidem. Sic consequentibus vestris sublatis prima

358
moral blame or baseness. He who hears this may or may not want to laugh, but he will not go away any stronger to endure pain than he came. You however say that no one can be brave who thinks pain an evil. Why should he be braver for thinking it what you yourself admit it to be, irksome and almost intolerable? Timidity springs from facts, not from words. And you aver that if a single letter be altered, the whole system will totter. Well then, do you think I alter a letter or whole pages? Even allowing that the Stoics deserve the praise you gave them for the methodical arrangement and perfect logical connection (as you described it) of their system, still we are not bound to accept a chain of reasoning because it is self-consistent and keeps to the line laid down, if it starts from false premises.

Now your master Zeno deserted nature in framing his first principles; he placed the supreme Good in that intellectual excellence which we term virtue, and declared that nothing but Moral Worth is good, and that virtue cannot be established if among the rest of things any one thing is better than any other; and he adhered to the logical conclusions from these premises. Quite true, I can't deny it. But the conclusions are so false that the premises from which they sprang cannot be true. For the logicians teach us, as you are aware, that if the consequences that follow from a proposition be false, the proposition from which those consequences follow must itself be false. On this is based the following syllogism, which is not merely true, but so self-evident that the logicians assume it as axiomatic: If A is B, C is D; but C is not D; therefore A is not B. Thus, if your conclusions are upset, your
CICERO DE FINIBUS
tolluntur. Quae sequuntur igitur? Omnes qui non sint sapientes aeque miseris esse; sapientes omnes summe beatos; recte facta omnia aequalia, omnia peccata paria;—quae cum magnifice primo dici viderentur, considerata minus probabantur. Sensus enim cuiusque et natura rerum atque ipsa veritas clamabat quodam modo non posse adduci ut inter eas res quas Zeno exaequaret nihil interesset.

56 XX. "Postea tuus ille Poenulus (scis enim Citi eos clientes tuos e Phoenica profectos), homo igitur acutus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura, verba versare coepit; et primum rebus iis quas nos bonas dicimus concessit ut haberentur aestimabiles et ad naturam accommodatae, faterique coepit sapienti, hoc est, summe beato commodius tamen esse si ea quoque habeat quae bona non audet appellare, naturae accommodata esse concedit; negatque Platonem, si sapiens non sit, eadem esse in causa qua tyrannum Dionysium: huic mori optimum esse propter desperationem sapientiae, illi propter spem vivere; peccata autem partim esse tolerabilia, partim nullo modo, propterua quod alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros offici praeterirent; iam insipientes alios ita esse ut nullo modo ad sapientiam possent pervenire, alios qui possent, si id egissent, sapientiam consequi. Hic loquebatur aliter atque omnes, sentiebat idem quod ceteri. Nec vero

aestimabiles Hein, Müller; aptae, habiles MSS.; Mdv. br. habiles.

*Zeno came from Citium in Cyprus, said to have been the seat of a Phoenician colony; and the Phoenicians were proverbially crafty. Cato superintended the reduction of Cyprus to a Roman province, and Cicero in his Letters speaks of the island as under Cato’s protection.
BOOK IV. xix-xx

premises are upset also. What then are your conclusions? That those who are not wise are all equally wretched; that the wise are all supremely happy; that all right actions are equal, all sins on a par;—these dicta may have had an imposing sound at a first hearing, but upon examination they began to seem less convincing. For common sense, the facts of nature, truth herself seemed to cry aloud that nothing should persuade them that there was actually no difference between the things which Zeno made out to be equal.

56 XX. "Subsequently your little Phoenician (for you are aware that your clients of Citium originally came from Phoenicia\textsuperscript{a}), with the cunning of his race, on failing to make good his case in defiance of Nature's protest, set about juggling with words. First he allowed the things that we in our school call goods to be considered 'valuable' and 'suited to nature,' and he began to admit that though a man were wise, that is supremely happy, it would yet be an advantage to him if he also possessed the things which he is not bold enough to call goods, but allows to be 'suited to nature.' He maintains that Plato, even if he be not wise, is not in the same case as the tyrant Dionysius: Dionysius must despair of wisdom, and his best fate would be to die; but Plato has hopes of it, and had better live. Again, he allows that some sins are endurable, while others are unpardonable, because some sins transgress more and others fewer points of duty; moreover some fools are so foolish as to be utterly incapable of attaining wisdom, but others might conceivably by great effort attain to wisdom. In all this though his language was peculiar, his meaning was the same as

361
CICERO DE FINIBUS

minoris aestimanda ducet ea quae ipse bona negaret esse quam illi qui ea bona esse dicebant. Quid igitur voluit sibi qui illa mutaverit? Saltem aliquid de pondere detraxisset et paulo minoris aestimavisset ea quam Peripatetici, ut sentire quoque aliud, non solum dicere videretur. Quid? de ipsa beata vita, ad quam omnia referuntur, quae dicitis? Negatis eam esse quae expleta sit iis rebus omnibus quas natura desideret, totamque eam in una virtute ponitis. Cumque omnis controversia aut de re soleat aut de nomine esse, utraque earum nascitur si aut res ignoratur aut erratur in nomine. Quorum si neutrum est, opera danda est ut verbis utamur quam usitatissimis et quam maxime aptis, id est rem declarantibus. Num igitur dubium est quin, si in re ipsa nihil peccatur a superioribus, verbis illi commodius utantur? Videamus igitur sententias eorum; tum ad verba redeamus.

XXI. "Dicunt appetitionem animi moveri cum aliquid ei secundum naturam esse videatur; omniaque quae secundum naturam sint aestimatione aliqua digna, eaque pro eo quantum in quoque sit ponderis esse aestimanda; quaeque secundum naturam sint, partim nihil habere in sese eius appetitionis de qua saepe iam diximus, quae nec honesta nec
that of everybody else. In fact he set no lower value on the things he himself denied to be good than did those who said they were good. What then did he want by altering their names? He ought at least to have diminished their importance and to have set a slightly lower value on them than the Peripatetics, so as to make the difference appear to be one of meaning and not merely of language. Again, what do you and your school say about happiness itself, the ultimate end and aim of all things? You will not have it to be the sum of all nature's requirements, but make it consist of virtue alone. Now all disputes usually turn either on facts or on names; ignorance of fact or error as to terms will cause one or the other form of dispute respectively. If neither source of difference is present, we must be careful to employ the terms most generally accepted and those most suitable, that is, those that best describe the fact. Can we doubt that, if the older philosophers are not mistaken on the point of fact, their terminology is the more convenient one? Let us then consider their opinions and return to the question of terminology later.

XXI. "Their statements are that appetite is excited in the mind when something appears to it to be in accordance with nature; and that all things that are in accordance with nature are worth some value, and are to be valued in proportion to the importance that they severally possess; and that of those things which are in accordance with nature, some excite of themselves none of that appetite of which we have often spoken already, and these are to be called neither honourable nor praiseworthy,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

laudabilia dicantur, partim quae voluptatem habeant in omni animante, sed in homine rationem etiam; ex ea quae sint apta, ea honesta, ea pulchra, ea laudabilia, illa autem superiora naturalia nominantur, quae coniuncta cum honestis vitam beatam perficiunt et absolvunt. Omnium autem eorum commodorum quibus non illi plus tribuunt qui illa bona esse dicunt quam Zeno qui negat, longe praestantissimum esse quod honestum esset atque laudabile: sed si duo honesta proposita sint, alterum cum valetudine, alterum cum morbo, non esse dubium ad utrum eorum natura nos ipsa deductura sit; sed tamen tantam vim esse honestatis tantumque eam rebus omnibus praestare et excellere ut nullis nec suppliciiis nec praemii demoveri possit ex eo quod rectum esse decreverit; omniaque quae dura, difficilia, adversa videantur, ea virtutibus iis quibus a natura essemus ornati obteri posse; non facile illa quidem, nec contemnenda esse (quid enim esset in virtute tantum?), sed ut hoc iudicaremus, non esse in his partem maximam positam beate aut secus vivendi.

Ad summam ea quae Zeno aetimanda et sumenda et apta naturae esse dixit, eadem illi bona appellant;

1 non facile illa quidem (sc. obteri posse) nec contemnenda esse conj. Mdv., who prints with a mark of corruption the MSS. non faciles illas quidem nec contemnendas (quid etc.).

a This confused passage is conjecturally remedied by W. M. L. Hutchinson, de Fin. p. 235, who for in sese suggests in stirpe (cp. V, 10 stirpium naturas), and for voluptatem, voluntatem (cp. Tusc. IV, 12). Lastly the clause quae nec honesta nec laudabilia dicantur logically should come immediately after quaeque secundum naturam sint, though Cicero may have carelessly misplaced it. The
while some are those which are objects of pleasure in every living creature, but in man are objects of the reason also; a those which are suitable in accordance with reason are called honourable, beautiful, praiseworthy; but the former class are called natural, the class which coupled with things morally worthy render happiness perfect and complete. They further hold that of all those advantages, which they who call them goods rate no more highly than does Zeno who says they are not goods, by far the most excellent is Moral Worth and what is praiseworthy; but if one is offered the choice between Moral Worth plus health and Moral Worth plus disease, there is no doubt to which of the two Nature herself will guide us; though at the same time Moral Worth is so potent, and so overwhelmingly superior to all other things, that no penalties or rewards can induce it to swerve from what it has decided to be right; and all apparent hardships, difficulties and obstacles can be trodden under foot by the virtues with which nature has adorned us; not that these hardships are easily overcome or to be made light of (else where were the merit of virtue?), but so as to lead us to the verdict that these things are not the main factor in our happiness or the reverse. In fine, the ancients entitle the same things 'good' that Zeno pronounced 'valuable,' 'to be adopted,' and 'suited to nature';

sentence will then run: 'Things in accordance with nature, which the Stoics pronounce neither moral nor praiseworthy, (1) in plants excite none of the appettition of which we have often spoken, but (2) in animals excite volition, and particularly (3) in man excite the reason also (i.e. are the objects of rational choice).’
CICERO DE FINIBUS

vitam autem beatam illi eam quae constaret ex iis rebus quas dixi, aut plurimis aut gravissimis, Zeno autem quod suam, quod propriam\textsuperscript{1} speciem habeat cur appetendum sit, id solum bonum appellat, beatam autem vitam eam solam quae cum virtute degatur.

XXII. "Si de re disceptari oportet, nulla mihi tecum, Cato, potest esse dissensio; nihil est enim de quo aliter tu sentias atque ego, modo commutatis verbis ipsas res conferamus. Nec hoc ille non vidit sed verborum magnificentia est et gloria delectatus; qui si ea quae dicit ita sentiret ut verba significant, quid inter eum et vel Pyrrhonem vel Aristonem interesset? Sin autem eos non probabat, quid attinuit cum iis quibuscum re concinebat verbis discrepare?

61 Quid si reviviscant Platonis illi et deinceps qui eorum auditores fuerunt et tecum ita loquantur? 'Nos cum te, M. Cato, studiosissimum philosophiae, iustissimum virum, optimum iudicem, religiosissimum testem, audiremus, admirati sumus quid esset cur nobis Stoicos anteferres, qui de rebus bonis et malis sentirent ea quae ab hoc Polemone Zeno cognoverat, nominibus uterentur iis quae prima specie admiratiodinem, re explicata risum moverent. Tu autem, si tibi illa probabantur, cur non propriis verbis illa tenebas? sin te auctoritas commovebat, nobisne omnibus et Platoni ipsi nescio quem illum anteponebas? praesertim cum in re publica princeps esse

\textsuperscript{1} quod propriam br. Baiter; Mdv. conj. quendam propriam.

366
BOOK IV. xxi-xxii

and they call a life happy which comprises either the largest number or the most important of the things aforesaid: Zeno on the contrary calls nothing good but that which has a peculiar charm and attractiveness of its own, and no life happy but the life of virtue.

XXII. "If, Cato, the discussion is to turn on facts, disagreement between me and yourself is out of the question: since your views and mine are the same in every particular, if only we compare the actual substance after making the necessary changes in terms. Zeno was not unaware of this, but he was beguiled by the pomp and circumstance of language; had he really thought what he says, in the actual sense of the words he uses, what difference would there be between him and either Pyrrho or Aristo? If on the other hand he rejected Pyrrho and Aristo, what was the point of quarrelling about words with those with whom he agreed in substance? What if the pupils of Plato were to come to life again, and their pupils again in succession, and were to address you in this fashion? 'As we listened, Marcus Cato, to so devoted a student of philosophy, so just a man, so upright a judge, so scrupulous a witness as yourself, we marvelled what reason could induce you to reject us for the Stoics, whose views on good and evil were the views that Zeno learnt from Polemo here, but who expressed those views in terms at first sight startling and upon examination ridiculous. If you accepted those views on their merits, why did you not hold them under their own terminology? or if you were swayed by authority, could you prefer that nobody to all of us, even to Plato himself? especially when you aspired to play a leading part in
velles ad eamque tuendam cum summa tua dignitate maxime a nobis ornari atque instrui posses. A nobis enim ista quaesita, a nobis descripta, notata, praecpta sunt, omniumque rerum publicarum actionis genera, status, mutationes, leges etiam et instituta ac mores civitatum perscripsimus. Eloquentiae vero, quae et principibus maximo ornamimento est et quae audimus valere plurimum, quantum tibi ex monumentis nostris addidisses! Ea cum dixissent, quid tandem talibus viris responderes?" "Rogarem te," inquit, "ut diceres pro me tu idem qui illis orationem dictavisses, vel potius paulum loci mihi ut iis respondere dare, nisi et te audire nunc mallem et istis tamen alio tempore responsum esse, tum scilicet cum tibi."

XXIII. "Atque si verum respondere velles, Cato, haec erant dicenda, non eos tibi non probatos, tantis ingeniis homines tantaque auctoritate, sed te animadvertisse quas res illi propter antiquitatem parum vidissent, eas a Stoicis esse perspectas, eisdemque de rebus hos cum acutius disseruisse, tum sensisse gravius et fortius, quippe qui primum valetudinem bonam expetendam negent esse, eligendum dicant, nec quia bonum sit valere sed quia sit nonnihilo aestimandum (neque tamen pluris illis videtur, qui illud non dubitunt bonum dicere;) hoc vero te ferre non potuisse, quod antiqui illi quasi barbati (ut nos de nostris

\[A\] inserted by Lambinus, Mdv.

\[a\] The early Romans wore beards, whereas for several generations before Cicero it had been usual to shave.
the state, and we were the very persons to arm and equip you to protect the state with all the weight of your high character. Why, it is we who invented political philosophy; its classifications, its nomenclature, its practical rules are our creation; on all the various forms of government, their stability, their revolutions, the laws, institutions and customs of states, we have written exhaustively. Oratory again is the proudest distinction of the statesman, and in it you, we are told, are pre-eminent; but how vastly you might have enriched your eloquence from the records of our genius.' What answer, pray, could you give to these words from such men as those?" "I would beg of you," replied Cato, "to be my spokesman also, as you have been their prompter in this harangue; or rather I would ask you to grant me a moment's space in which to answer them, if it were not that for the present I prefer to listen to you, and also intend to reply to your champions at another time, I mean when I reply to yourself."

XXIII. "Well, Cato, if you wanted to answer truly, this is what you would have to say: that with all respect for the high authority of men so gifted, you had observed that the Stoics had discovered truths which they in those early days had naturally failed to see; the Stoics had discussed the same subjects with more insight and had arrived at bolder and more profound conclusions; first, they said that good health is not desirable but is worthy of selection, and that not because to be well is a good, but because it has some positive value (not that any greater value is attached to it by the older school who do not hesitate to call it a good); well then, you couldn't stand those bearded* old fogies (as we call our own

The Stoics' claim to superior accuracy examined.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

solemus dicere) crediderint, eius qui honeste viveret, si idem etiam bene valeret, bene audiret, copiosus esset, optabiliorem fore vitam melioremque et magis expetendam quam illius qui, aequo vir bonus, multis modis esset, ut Enni Alcmaeo,

‘circumventus morbo, exilio atque inopia.’

63 Illi igitur antiqui non tam acute optabiliorem illam vitam putant, praestantiorem, beatiorem; Stoici autem tantummodo praeponendam in seligendo, non quo beatior ea vita sit, sed quod ad naturam accommodatior; et qui sapientes non sint, omnes aequo miserors esse. Stoici hoc videlicet viderunt, illos autem id fugerat superiores, homines sceleribus et parricidiis inquinatos nihilo miseriorem esse quam eos qui, cum caste et integre viverent, nondum perfe-

ctam illam sapientiam essent consecuti. Atque hoc loco similitudines eas quibus illi uti solent dissimillimas proferebas. Quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velit, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam aquam iam appro-

pinquent sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progressi in virtute quominus miserrimus sit antequam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat. Et quoniam catuli qui iam dispecturi sunt caeci aequo et ii qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aequo caecum animo ac Phalarim fuisse.

65 XXIV. “Ista similia non sunt, Cato, in quibus

1 After superiores MSS. add qui arbitrabantur; edd. omit.

870
BOOK IV. xxiii-xxiv

Roman ancestors) believing that a man who lived morally, if he also had health, wealth and reputation, had a preferable, better, more desirable life than he who, though equally good, was, like Alcmaeon in Ennius,

In divers ways beset
With sickness, banishment and poverty.

63 Those men of old then, with their duller wits, think that the former life is more desirable, more excellent, more happy; the Stoics on the other hand consider it merely to be preferred for choice, not because it is a happier life but because it is more adapted to nature. The Stoics we must suppose discerned a truth that had escaped their predecessors, namely that men defiled by crimes and murders are no more miserable than those who though pious and upright in their lives have not yet attained ideal and perfect wisdom. It was at this point that you brought forward those extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing. For who cannot see that if there are several people plunged in deep water and trying to get out, those already approaching the surface, though nearer to breathing, will be no more able actually to breathe than those at the bottom? You infer that improvement and progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. Again, since puppies on the point of opening their eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of wisdom, was just as blind mentally as Phalaris!

64 Their analogies to prove all fools equally miserable are fallacious.

65 XXIV. "Really, Cato, there is no analogy between
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quamvis multum processeris, tamen illud in eadem causa est a quo abesse velis, donec evaseris. Nec enim ille respirat antequam emersit, et catuli æque caeci priusquam dispexerunt ac si ita futuri semper essent. Illa sunt similia: hebes acies est cuipiam oculorum, corpore alius languescit¹; hi curatione adhibita levantur in dies; valet alter plus cotidie, alter videt; his similes sunt omnes qui virtuti student; levantur viis, levantur erroribus. Nisi forte censes Ti. Gracchum patrem non² beatiorem fuisse quam filium, cum alter stabilire rem publicam studuerit, alter evertere. Nec tamen ille erat sapiens; quis enim hoc? aut quando? aut ubi? aut unde? sed quia studebat laudi et dignitati, multum in virtute processerat. Confer³ avum tuum Drusum cum C. Graccho, eius fere aequali. Quae hic rei publicae vulnera imponebat, eadem ille sanabat. Si nihil est quod tam miseris faciat quam impietas et scelus, ut iam omnes insipientes sint miseri, quod profecto sunt, non est tamen æque miser qui patriae consulit et is qui illum extinctam cupit. Levatio igitur vitiorum magna fit in⁴ iis qui habent ad virtutem progressione aliquantum. Vestri autem progressionem ad virtutem fieri aiunt, levationem vitiorum fieri negant. At quo utantur homines acuti argumento ad probandum operaet pretium est considerare.

¹languescit inf. MSS.; nescit B E; senescit Mdv.
²non inserted by edd.
³Confer[am] Müller; Conferam B E; Conferam autem inf. MSS.; Conferam [autem] . . . aequali? Mdv.
⁴in E, om. B and other MSS.

372
BOOK IV. xxiv

progress in virtue and cases such as you describe, in which however far one advances, the situation one wishes to escape from still remains the same until one has actually emerged from it. The man does not breathe until he has risen to the surface; the puppies are as blind before they have opened their eyes as if they were going to be blind always. Good analogies would be these: one man's eyesight is dim, another's general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day; every day the one is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced. Surely you would not maintain that the elder Tiberius Gracchus was not happier than his son, when the one devoted himself to the service of the state and the other to its destruction. But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how? Still he aspired to fame and honour, and therefore had advanced to a high point in virtue.

56 Compare your grandfather Drusus with Gaius Gracchus, who was nearly his contemporary. The former strove to heal the wounds which the latter inflicted on the state. If there is nothing that makes men so miserable as impiety and crime, granted that all who are foolish are miserable, as of course they are, nevertheless a man who serves his country is not so miserable as one who longs for its ruin. Therefore those who achieve definite progress towards virtue undergo a great diminution of their vices.

57 Your teachers, however, while allowing progress towards virtue, deny diminution of vice. But it is worth while to examine the argument on which these clever people rely for the proof. Their line is this: In
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Quarum, inquit, artium summae crescere possunt, earum etiam contrariorum summa poterit augeri; ad virtutis autem summam accedere nihil potest; ne vitia quidem igitur crescere poterunt, quae sunt virtutum contraria. Utrum igitur tandem perspicuisne dubia aperiuntur an dubii perspicua tolluntur? Atqui hoc perspicuum est, vitia alia aliis esse maiora; illud dubium, ad id quod summum bonum dicitis ecquae-nam fieri possit accessio. Vos autem, cum perspicuis dubia debeat is illustrare, dubii perspicua conamini tollere. Itaque eadem ratione qua sum paulo arsite usus haerebitis. Si enim propterea vitia alia aliis maiora non sunt quia ne ad finem quidem bonorum eum quem vos facitis quidquam potest accedere, quoniam perspicuum est vitia non esse omnium paria, finis bonorum vobis mutandus est. Teneamus enim illud necesse est, cum consequens aliquod falsum sit, illud cuius id consequens sit non posse esse verum.

XXV. "Quae est igitur causa istarum angustiarum? Gloriosa ostentatio in constituendo summo bono. Cum enim quod honestum sit id solum bonum esse confirmatur, tollitur cura valetudinis, diligentia rei familiaris, administratio rei publicae, ordo gerendorum negotiorum, officia vitae; ipsum denique illud honestum, in quo uno vultis esse omnia, deserendum est; quae diligentissime contra Aristonem dicuntur a Chrysippo. Ex ea difficultate illae ‘fallaciloquae,’ ut ait Attius, ‘malitiae,’ natae sunt. Quod enim

1 alia aliis Lambinus, Mdv.; alia in aliis MSS.
2 Itaque eadem Mdv.; Itaque rursus eadem Baiter; atque usus eadem B E.
BOOK IV. xxiv-xxv

the case of arts or sciences which admit of advancement, the opposite of those arts and sciences will also admit of advance; but virtue is absolute and incapable of increase; therefore the vices also, being the opposite of the virtues, are incapable of gradation. Pray tell me then, does a certainty explain an uncertainty, or does an uncertainty disprove a certainty? Now, that some vices are worse than others is certain; but whether the Chief Good, as you Stoics conceive it, can be subject to increase is not certain. Yet instead of employing the certain to throw light on the uncertain, you endeavour to make the uncertain disprove the certain. Therefore you can be checkmated by the same argument as I employed just now. If the proof that one vice cannot be worse than another depends on the fact that the End of Goods, as you conceive it, is itself incapable of increase, then you must alter your End of Goods, since it is certain that the vices of all men are not equal. For we are bound to hold that if a conclusion is false, the premise on which it depends cannot be true.

XXV. "Now what has landed you in this impasse? Simply your pride and vainglory in constructing your Chief Good. To maintain that the only Good is Moral Worth is to do away with the care of one's health, the management of one's estate, participation in politics, the conduct of affairs, the duties of life; nay, to abandon that Moral Worth itself, which according to you is the be-all and the end-all of existence; objections that were urged most earnestly against Aristo by Chrysippus. This is the difficulty that gave birth to those 'base conceits deceitful-tongued,' as Attius has it. Wisdom had no
CICERO DE FINIBUS

sapientia pedem ubi poneret non habebat sublatis officiis omnibus, officia autem tollebantur delectu omni et discrimine remoto, quae esse non¹ poterant rebus omnibus sic exaequatus ut inter eas nihil interesset, ex his angustiis ista evaserunt deteriora quam Aristonis. Illa tamen simplicia; vestra versuta. Roges enim Aristonem, bonane ei videantur haec, vacuitas doloris, divitiae, valetudo; neget. Quid? quae contraria sunt his malane? Nihilo magis. Zenonem roges; respondeat totidem verbis. Admirantes quaeramus ab utroque quonam modo vitam agere possimus si nihil interesse nostra pate-mus, valeamus aegrine simus, vacemus an cruciorem dolore, frigus, famem propulsare possimus necne possimus. Vives, inquit Aristo, magnifice atque praeclare; quod erit cumque visum aeges; numquam angere, numquam cupies, numquam timebis. Quid Zeno? Portenta haec esse dicit neque ea rationeullo modo possee vivi; se dicere² inter honestum et turpe nimium quantum, nescio quid immensum, inter ceteras res nihil omnino interesse. Idem adhuc; audi reliqua et risum contine si potes. Media illa, inquit, inter quae nihil interest, tamen eiusmodi sunt ut eorum alia eligenda sint, alia reciencia, alia omnino neglegenda, hoc est ut eorum alia velis, alia nolis, alia non cures.—'At modo dixeras nihil in istis

¹ non inserted by edd.  
²se dicere Mdv.; sed dicere B, E; sed differre other MSS.  
876
BOOK IV. xxv

ground to stand on when desires were abolished; desires were abolished when all choice and distinction was done away with; distinction was impossible when all things were made absolutely equal and indifferent; and these perplexities resulted in your paradoxes, which are worse than those of Aristo. His were at all events frank and open, whereas yours are disingenuous. Ask Aristo whether he deems freedom from pain, riches, health to be goods, and he will answer No. Well, are their opposites bad? No, likewise. Ask Zeno, and his answer would be identically the same. In our surprise we should inquire of each, how can we possibly conduct our lives if we think it makes no difference to us whether we are well or ill, free from pain or in torments of agony, safe against cold and hunger or exposed to them. O, says Aristo, you will get on splendidly, capital; you will do exactly what seems good to you; you will never know sorrow, desire or fear.

What is Zeno’s answer? This doctrine is a philosophical monstrosity, he tells us, it renders life entirely impossible; his view is that while between the moral and the base a vast, enormous gulf is fixed, between all other things there is no difference whatever. So far this is the same as Aristo; but hear what follows, and restrain your laughter if you can. These intermediate things, says Zeno, which have no difference between them, are still of such a nature that some of them are to be selected and others rejected, while others again are to be entirely ignored; that is, they are such that some you wish to have, others you wish not to have, and about others you do not care.—‘But you told us just now that there was no difference among them.’—‘And I say
CICERO DE FINIBUS

esse quod interesset.'—'Et nunc idem dico,' inquiet, 'sed ad virtutes et ad vitia nihil interesse.'

72 XXVI. "Quis istud, quaesum, nesciebat? Verum audiamus.—'Ista,' inquit, 'quae dixisti, valere, locupletem esse, non dolere, bona non dico sed dicam Graece προηγμένα, Latine autem producta (sed praeposita aut praecipua malo; sit\(^1\) tolerabilius et mollius); illa autem, morbum, egestatem, dolorem, non appello mala sed si libet reiectanea. Itaque illa non dico me expetere sed legere, nec optare sed sumere, contraria autem non fugere sed quasi secernere.' Quid ait Aristoteles reliquique Platonis alumni? Se omnia quae secundum naturam sint bona appellare, quae autem contra mala. Videsne igitur Zenonem tuum cum Aristone verbis consistere,\(^2\) re dissidere; cum Aristotele et illis re consentire, verbis discrepare? Cur igitur cum de re conveniat non malumus usitate loqui? Aut doceat paratiorem me ad contemnendam pecuniam fore si illam in rebus praepositis quam si in bonis duxero, fortioremque in patiendo dolore si eum asperum et difficilem perpessu et\(^3\) contra naturam esse quam si malum dixero. Facete M. Piso familiaris noster et alia multa et hoc loco\(^4\) Stoicos irridebat. 'Quid enim?' aiebat; 'bonum negas esse divitias, praepositi- tum esse dicis; quid adivas? avaritiamne minuis?

\(^1\) sit B, Mdv.; \(\textit{sit}\) E; \(\textit{sic}\) other MSS.
\(^2\) \textit{consistere}: inf. MS. \textit{consentire}; Cobet, Müller \textit{concinere}.
\(^3\) \textit{perpessu et inf. MSS.}; Mdv.; \textit{perpessi} B, E; \textit{perpessu si} Görenz, Müller.
\(^4\) \textit{loco} Mdv. with inf. MSS.; \textit{modo} B, E, Müller.
BOOK IV. xxv-xxvi

the same now,' he will reply, 'but I mean no difference in respect of virtue and vice.'

XXVI. 'Who, pray, did not know that? However, let us hear what he has to say.—'The things you mentioned,' he continues, 'health, affluence, freedom from pain, I do not call goods, but I will call them in Greek proëgmena, that is in your language 'brought forward' (though I will rather use 'preferred' or 'pre-eminent,' as these sound smoother and more acceptable) and on the other hand disease, poverty and pain I do not style evils, but, if you please, 'things rejected.' Accordingly I do not speak of 'desiring' but 'selecting' these things, not of 'wishing' but 'adopting' them, and not of 'avoiding' their opposites but so to speak 'discarding' them.' What say Aristotle and the other pupils of Plato? That they call all things in accordance with nature good and all things contrary to nature bad. Do you see therefore that between your master Zeno and Aristotle there is a verbal harmony but a real difference; whereas between him and Aristotle and the rest there is a real agreement and a verbal disagreement? Why, then, as we are agreed as to the fact, do we not prefer to employ the usual terminology? Or else let him prove that I shall be readier to despise money if I believe it to be a 'thing preferred' than if I believe it to be a good, and braver to endure pain if I say it is irksome and hard to bear and contrary to nature, than if I call it an evil. Our friend Marcus Piso was often witty, but never more so than when he ridiculed the Stoics on this score. 'What?' he said, 'You tell us wealth is not good but you say it is 'preferred'; how does that help matters? do you

379
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Quomodo? Si verbum sequimur, primum longius verbum praepositum quam bonum.'—'Nihil ad rem!'
—'Ne sit sane; at certe gravius. Nam bonum ex quo appellatum sit, nescio; praepositum ex eo credo, quod praeponatur aliis: id mihi magnum videtur.'
Itaque dicebat plus tribui divitiis a Zenone qui eas in praepositionibus poneret quam ab Aristotele qui bonum esse divitiias fateretur sed neque magnum bonum et praec rectis honestisque contemnendum ac despiciendum nec magno opere expetendum; omninoque de istis omnibus verbis a Zenone mutatis ita disputabant, et quae bona negarentur esse ab eo et quae mala, illa laetioribus nominibus appellari ab eo quam a nobis, haec tristioribus. Piso igitur hoc modo, vir optimus tuique, ut scis, amantissimus; nos paucis ad haec additis finem faciamus aliquando; longum est enim ad omnia respondere quae a te dicta sunt.

74 XXVII. "Nam ex eisdem verborum praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem ut omnia quae ubique sint sapientis esse dicatis. Solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem; stultos\(^1\) omnia contraria, quos etiam insanos esse vultis. Haec \(\pi\alpha\rho\alpha\deltao\varsigma\) illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. Quid autem habent admirationis cum prope accesseris? Conferam tecum quam cuique

\(^1\) stultos inserted by Mdv.
BOOK IV. xxvi-xxvii

diminish avarice? In what way? If it is a question of words, to begin with "preferred" is a longer word than "good."'—'That is no matter.'—'Granted, by all means; but it is certainly more impressive. For I do not know the derivation of "good," whereas "preferred" I suppose means "placed before" other things; this implies to my mind something very important.' Accordingly he would maintain that Zeno gives more importance to wealth, by classing it as 'preferred,' than did Aristotle, who admitted wealth to be a good, yet not a great good, but one to be thought lightly of and despised in comparison with uprightness and Moral Worth, and not to be greatly desired; and on Zeno's innovations in terminology generally he would declare that the names he actually gave to the things which he denied to be good or evil were pleasanter and gloomier respectively than the names by which we call them. So said Piso, an excellent man and, as you know, a devoted friend to yourself. For my part, let me add a few words more and then finally conclude. For it would be a long task to reply to all your arguments.

74 XXVII. "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, too, you say, is beautiful, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these *paradoxa*, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you

Their paradoxes turn out to be truisms, and their favourite analogies will not hold water.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. Non ego tecum iam ita iocabor ut iisdem his de rebus cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. Apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt; aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria.—Quonam modo?—Quia nec honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius.—Perge porro, nam de isto magna dissensio est; illa argumenta propria videamus cur omnia sint paria peccata.\footnote{Sint paria peccata B, E, Mdv.; peccata sint paria inf. MSS.}—Ut, inquit, fidibus pluribus, si nulla earum ita contenta nervis sit ut concentum servare possit, omnes aeque incontentae sint, sic peccata, quia discrepant, aeque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.—Hic ambiguo ludimur. Aeque enim contingit omnibus fidibus ut incontentae sint; illud non continuo ut aeque incontentae. Collatio igitur ista te nihil iuvat; nec enim, omnes avaritias si aeque avaritas esse dixerimus, sequetur ut etiam aequas esse dicamus. Ecce aliud simile dissimile: ut enim, inquit, gubernator aeque peccat si palearum navem evertit et si auri, item aeque peccat qui parentem et qui servum injuria verberat.—Hoc non videre, cuius generis onus navis vehat, id ad gubernatoris artem nihil pertinere! itaque aurum paleamne portet, ad bene aut ad male gubernandum nihil interesse; at quid inter parentem et servulum

\footnote{See the remarkable passage in Cicero’s \textit{Pro Murena}, 60-66.}
BOOK IV. xxvii

attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. Transgressions are equal.—How so, pray?—Because nothing can be better than good or baser than base.—Explain further, for there is much disagreement on this point; let us have your special arguments to prove how all transgressions are equal, —Suppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal.—Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune. So your comparison does not help you; for it does not follow that because we pronounce every case of avarice equally to be avarice, we must therefore pronounce them all to be equal. Here is another of these false analogies: A skipper, says my adversary, commits an equal transgression if he loses his ship with a cargo of straw and if he does so when laden with gold; similarly a man is an equal transgressor if he beats his parent or his slave without due cause.—Fancy not seeing that the nature of the cargo has nothing to do with the skill of the navigator! so that whether he carries gold or straw makes no difference as regards good or bad seamanship; whereas the distinction between a parent and a mere slave
CICERO DE FINIBUS

intersit intellegi et potest et debet. Ergo in gubernando nihil, in officio plurimum interest quo in genere peccetur. Et si in ipsa gubernatione neglegentia est navis eversa, maius est peccatum in auro quam in palea. Omnibus enim artibus volumus attributam esse eam quae communis appellatur prudentia, quam omnes qui cuique\(^1\) artificio praesunt debent habere. Ita ne hoc quidem modo paria\(^2\) peccata sunt.

77 XXVIII. "Urguent tamen et nihil remittunt, Quoniam, inquiant, omne peccatum imbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, nescesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis æque magna esse vitia et eadem imbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse qua illum cuius is condemnatus est rogatione P. Scaevolam; et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas in quibus peccatur intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo quae peccentur in his rebus aut maiora sint aut minora! Itaque (iam enim concludatur oratio) hoc uno vitio maxime mihi premi videntur tui Stoici, quod se posse putant duas contrarias sententias obtinere. Quid enim est tam repugnans quam eundem dicere quod honestum sit solum id bonum esse, qui dicat appositionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a natura profectam? Ita cum ea volunt retinere quae superiori sententiae

\(^1\) qui cuique MSS., Müller; cuicumque Mdv.
\(^2\) ne hoc quidem modo paria Lambinus, Müller; ne hoc modo paria quidem MSS., Mdv.
BOOK IV. xxvii-xxviii

is one that cannot and ought not to be overlooked. Hence the nature of the object upon which the offence is committed, which in navigation makes no difference, in conduct makes all the difference. Indeed in the case of navigation too, if the loss of the ship is due to negligence, the offence is greater with a cargo of gold than with one of straw. For the virtue known generally as prudence is an attribute as we hold of all the arts, and every master craftsman in any branch of art ought to possess it. Hence this proof also of the equality of transgression breaks down.

XXVIII. "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! And therefore (since my discourse must now conclude) this is the one chief defect under which your friends the Stoics seem to me to labour,—they think they can maintain two contrary opinions at once. How can you have a greater inconsistency than for the same person to say both that Moral Worth is the sole good and that we have a natural instinct to seek the things conducive to life? Thus in their desire to retain ideas consonant
CICERO DE FINIBUS

conveniunt, in Aristonem incidunt; cum id fugiunt, re eadem defendunt quae Peripatetici, verba tenent mordicus. Quae rursus dum sibi evelli ex ordine\textsuperscript{1} nolunt,\textsuperscript{2} horridiores evadunt, asperiores, duriores et oratione et moribus. Quam illorum tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit, fuitque in altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior, semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. Quos quidem tibi studiose et diligent
er tractandos magno opere censeo. Sed quoniam et advesperascit et mihi ad villam revertendum est, nunc quidem hactenus; verum hoc idem faciamus saepe.” “Nos vero,” inquit ille; “nam quid possumus facere melius? Et hanc quidem primam exigam a te operam, ut audias me quae a te dicta sunt refellentem. Sed memento te quae nos sentiamus omnia probare, nisi quod verbis aliter utamur, mihi autem vestrorum nihil probari.” “Scrupulum, inquam, abeunti; sed videbimus.” Quae cum essent dicta, discessimus.

\textsuperscript{1}ordine MSS., Mdv. (explaining ‘ex ordine disciplinae’); ore Manutius; perhaps oratione.

\textsuperscript{2}nolunt inf. MSS.; volunt B, E.
with the former doctrine they are landed in the position of Aristo; and when they try to escape from this they adopt what is in reality the position of the Peripatetics, though still clinging tooth and nail to their own terminology. Unwilling again to take the next step and weed out this terminology, they end by being rougher and more uncouth than ever, full of asperities of style and even of manners.

Panaetius strove hard to avoid this uncouth and repellant development of Stoicism, censuring alike the harshness of its doctrines and the crabbedness of its logic. In doctrine he was mellower, and in style more lucid. Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and Dicearchus were constantly on his lips, as his writings show; and these authors I strongly advise you to take up for your most careful study. But evening is closing in, and I must be getting home. So enough for the present; but I hope we may often renew this conversation.” “Indeed we will,” he replied; “what better occupation could we have? and the first favour I shall ask of you is to listen to my refutation of what you have said. But bear in memory that whereas you really accept all of our opinions save for the difference of terminology, I on the contrary do not accept any of the tenets of your school.” “A parting shot indeed!” said I; “but we shall see.” And with these words I took my leave.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

BOOK V
M. TULLI CICERONIS
DE FINIBUS BONO
RUM ET MALORUM
LIBER QUINTUS

1 I. Cum audissem Antiochum, Brute, ut solebam, cum M. Pisonem in eo gymnasio quod Ptolemaeum vocatur, unaque nobiscum Q. frater et T. Pomponius Luciusque Cicero, frater noster cognitio
ne patrueelis, amore germanus, constituimus inter nos ut ambula-
tionem postmeridianam conscieremus in Academia, maxime quod is locus ab omni turba id temporis vacuus esset. Itaque ad tempus ad Pisonem omnes. Inde vario sermone sex illa a Dipylon stadia confec-
mus. Cum autem venissemus in Academiae non sine causa nobilitat
a spatia, solitudo erat ea quam volue-
2 ramus. Tum Piso: "Naturane nobis hoc," inquit, "datum dicam an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus in quibus memoria dignos viros accepier-
mus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur quam si quando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scri-
ptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepier-
mus primum hic disputare solitum; cuius etiam illi propinqui hortuli non memoriam solum mihi afferunt sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo;

1 solebam Mdv.; solebat MSS.

390
I. **My Dear Brutus,—** Once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out conversed on various subjects while we covered the three-quarters of a mile from the Dipylon Gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so deservedly famous, we had them entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. Thereupon Piso remarked: “Whether it is a natural instinct or a mere illusion, I can’t say; but one’s emotions are more strongly aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed his garden close at hand yonder not only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates’ pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the
CICERO DE FINIBUS

cuius illa ipsa sessio fuit quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram (Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae minor mihi esse videtur posteaquam est maiorem) solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare; tantavis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex iis memoriae ducta sit disciplina."

3 Tum Quintus: "Est plane, Piso, ut dicis," inquit. "Nam me ipsum hoc modo venientem convertebat ad sese Coloneus ille locus, cuius incolae Sophocles ob oculos versabatur, quem scis quam admirer quamque eo delecter. Me quidem ad altiorem memoriam Oedipodis hoc venientis et illo mollissimo carmine quaenam essent haec ipsa loca requiritis species quaedam commovit, inaniter scilicet, sed commovit tamen."

Tum Pomponius: "At ego, quem vos ut deditum Epicuro insectari soletis, sum multum equidem cum Phaedro, quem unice diligo, ut scitis, in Epicuri hortis, quos modo praeteribamus, sed veteris proverbi admonitu 'vivorum memini'; nec tamen Epicuri licet oblivisci, si cupiam, cuius imaginem non modo in tabulis nostri familiares sed etiam in poculis et in anulis habent."

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a The senate-house, ascribed by tradition to King Tullus Hostilius, was enlarged by Sulla a year or two before the date of the dialogue.
b Presumably L. Piso Frugi, the 'Man of Worth,' cp. II, 90.
c Greek Mnemonics or memoria technica, said to have been invented by the poet Simonides, cp. II, 104, seems to have been based on visual memory; it arranged the subjects to be remembered in τόνω, loci. The art was associated with Inventio as a branch of Rhetoric, cp. IV, 10.
very seat we see over there. For my own part even the sight of our senate-house at home (I mean the Curia Hostilia, not the present new building, which seems to me to be smaller since its enlargement) used to call up to me thoughts of Scipio, Cato, Lælius, and chief of all, my grandfather; such powers of suggestion do places possess. No wonder the scientific training of the memory is based upon locality."

"Perfectly true, Piso," rejoined Quintus. "I myself on the way here just now noticed yonder village of Colonus, and it brought to my imagination Sophocles who resided there, and who is as you know my great admiration and delight. Indeed my memory took me further back; for I had a vision of Oedipus, advancing towards this very spot and asking in those most tender verses, 'What place is this?' —a mere fancy no doubt, yet still it affected me strongly."

"For my part," said Pomponius, "you are fond of attacking me as a follower of Epicurus, and I do spend much of my time with Phaedrus, who as you know is my dearest friend, in Epicurus's Gardens which we passed just now; but I obey the old saw: I 'think of those that are alive.' Still I could not forget Epicurus, even if I wanted; the members of our body not only have pictures of him, but even have his likeness on their drinking-cups and rings."

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d Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus, 1 f.:

τέκνοι τυφλοὶ γέρωντες, Ἀντιγώνη, τίνας
χώρους ἀφίγμεθ' ἢ τινῶν ἀνδρῶν πόλιν;

e Bequeathed by Epicurus as a sort of college to his successors.

f 'Vivorum meminerimus' occurs in Petronius 43 and 75, of shaking off vain regrets.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

II. Hic ego: "Pomponius quidem," inquam, "noster iocari videtur, et fortasse suo iure; ita enim se Athenis collocavit ut sit paene unus ex Atticis, ut id etiam cognomen videatur habiturus; ego autem tibi, Piso, assentior, usu hoc venire ut acrius ali-quanto et attentius de claris viris locorum admonitu cogitemus. Scis enim me quodam tempore Metapontum 'venisse tecum neque ad hospitem ante devertisse quam Pythagorae ipsum illum locum ubi vitam ediderat sedemque viderim. Hoc autem tempore, etsi multa in omni parte Athenarum sunt in ipsis locis indicae summorum virorum, tamen ego ulla moveor exhedra; modo enim fuit Carneades; quem videre videor (est enim nota imago), a sedeque ipsa tanta ingeni magnitudine orbata desiderari illam vo-cem puto."

5 Tum Piso: "Quoniam igitur aliquid omnes, quid Lucius noster?" inquit; "an eum locum libenter invisit ubi Demosthenes et Aeschines inter se decertare soliti sunt? Suo enim quisque\(^1\) studio maxime ducitur."

Et ille, cum erubuisset, "Noli," inquit, "ex me quaeerere, qui in Phalericum etiam descendereim, quo in loco ad fluctum aiunt declamare solitum Demo-sthenem ut fremitum assuesceret voce vincere. Modo etiam paulum ad dexteram de via declinavi ut ad Pericli sepulcrum accederem. Quamquam id qui-

\(^1\) quisque Mdv. with inf. MSS.; unus quisque B, E.

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\(^a\) This prophecy after the event shows that Cicero's friend and correspondent derived the name by which he is best known from his long residence at Athens.

\(^b\) Carneades died 129 B.C., fifty years before the supposed date of this dialogue.

394
II. "As for our friend Pomponius," I interposed, "I believe he is joking; and no doubt he is a licensed wit, for he has so taken root in Athens that he is almost an Athenian; in fact I expect he will get the surname of Atticus." But I, Piso, agree with you; it is a common experience that places do strongly stimulate the imagination and vivify our ideas of famous men. You remember how I once came with you to Metapontum, and would not go to the house where we were to stay until I had seen the abode of Pythagoras and the very place where he breathed his last. All over Athens, I know, there are many reminders of eminent men in the actual places where they lived; but at the present moment it is that hall over there which appeals to me; for not long ago it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I see him now (for his portrait is well known), and I can imagine that the very place where he used to sit misses the sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of that mighty intellect."

"Well, then," said Piso, "as we all have some association that appeals to us, what is it that interests our young friend Lucius? Does he enjoy visiting the spot where Demosthenes and Aeschines used to fight their battles? For we are all mainly influenced by our own particular study."

"Pray don't ask me," answered Lucius with a blush; "I have actually made a pilgrimage down to the Bay of Phalerum, where they say Demosthenes used to practise declaiming on the beach, to learn to pitch his voice so as to overcome an uproar. Also only just now I turned off the road a little way on the right, to visit the tomb of Pericles. Though in fact there
CICERO DE FINIBUS

dem infinitum est in hac urbe; quacumque enim ingredimur, in aliqua historia vestigium ponimus."


7 III. Tum Piso: "Etsi hoc," inquit, "fortasse non poterit sic abire cum hic adsit" (me autem dicebat), "tamen audebo te ab hac Academia nova ad illam veterem vocare, in qua, ut dicere Antiochum audiebas, non ii soli numerantur qui Academicici vocantur, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor ceterique, sed etiam Peripatetici veteres, quorum princeps Aristoteles, quem excepto Platone haud scio an recte 396."
is no end to it in this city; wherever you go you tread historic ground.”

Well, Cicero,” said Piso, “these enthusiasms befit a young man of parts, if they lead him to copy the example of the great. If they only stimulate antiquarian curiosity, they are mere dilettantism. But we all of us exhort you—and I hope it is a case of spurring a willing steed—to resolve to imitate your heroes as well as to know about them.” “He is practising your precepts already, Piso,” said I, “as you are aware; but all the same thank you for encouraging him.” “Well,” said Piso, with his usual amiability, “let us all join forces to promote the lad’s improvement; and especially let us try to make him spare some of his interest for philosophy, either so as to follow the example of yourself for whom he has such an affection, or in order to be better equipped for the very study to which he is devoted. But, Lucius,” he asked, “do you need our urging, or have you a natural leaning of your own towards philosophy? You are keeping Antiochus’s lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive listener.” “I try to be,” replied Lucius with a timid or rather a modest air; “but have you heard any lectures on Carneades lately? He attracts me immensely; but Antiochus calls me in the other direction; and there is no other lecturer to go to.”

III. “Perhaps,” said Piso, “it will not be altogether easy, while our friend here” (meaning me) “is by, still I will venture to urge you to leave the present New Academy for the Old, which includes, as you heard Antiochus declare, not only those who bear the name of Academics, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crantor and the rest, but also the early Peripatetics, headed by their chief, Aristotle, who,
CICERO DE FINIBUS
dixerim principem philosophorum. Ad eos igitur converte te, quaeso. Ex eorum enim scriptis et institutis cum omnis doctrina liberalis, omnis historia, omnis sermo elegans sumi potest, tum varietas est tanta artium ut nemo sine eo instrumento ad ullam rem illustriorem satis ornatus possit accedere. Ab his oratores, ab his imperatores ac rerum publicarum principes extiterunt. Ut ad minora veniam, mathematici, poetæ, musici, medici denique ex hac tamquam omnium artificum officina profecti sunt."

Atque ego: "Scis me," inquam, "istud idem sentire, Piso, sed a te opportune facta mentio est; studet enim meus audire Cicero quaenam sit istius veteris quam commemoratas Academiae de finibus bonorum Peripateticorumque sententia. Censemus autem facillime te id explanare posse, quod et Staseam Neapolitanum multos annos habueris apud te et complures iam menses Athenis haec ipsa te ex Antiocho videamus exquirere." Et ille ridens: "Age, age," inquit, "(satis enim scite me nostri sermonis principium esse voluisti), exponamus adulescenti si quae forte possimus. Dat enim id nobis solitudo, quod si qui deus diceret, numquam putarem, me in Academia tamquam philosophum disputatum. Sed ne, dum huic obsequor, vobis molestus sim." "Mihi," inquam, "qui te id ipsum rogavi?" Tum, Quintus et Pomponius cum idem se velle dixissent, Piso exorsus est; cuius oratio attende quaeso, Brute,

1 artificum B, E, Müller; artium with inf. MSS. Mdv.

398
BOOK V. iii

if Plato be excepted, I almost think deserves to be called the prince of philosophers. Do you then join them, I beg of you. From their writings and teachings can be learnt the whole of liberal culture, of history and of style; moreover they include such a variety of sciences, that without the equipment that they give no one can be adequately prepared to embark on any of the higher careers. They have produced orators, generals and statesmen. To come to the less distinguished professions, this factory of experts in all the sciences has turned out mathematicians, poets, musicians and physicians." "You know that I agree with you about that, Piso," I replied; "but you have raised the point most opportunely; for my cousin Cicero is eager to hear the doctrine of the Old Academy of which you speak, and of the Peripatetics, on the subject of the Ends of Goods. We feel sure you can expound it with the greatest ease, for you have had Staseas from Naples in your household for many years, and also we know you have been studying this very subject under Antiochus for several months at Athens." "Here goes, then," replied Piso, smiling, "(for you have craftily arranged so that our discussion shall start with me), let me see what I can do to give the lad a lecture. If an oracle had foretold that I should find myself discoursing in the Academy like a philosopher, I should not have believed it, but here I am, thanks to the place being so deserted. Only don't let me bore the rest of you while I am obliging our young friend." "What, bore me?" said I. "Why, it is I who asked you to speak." Thereupon Quintus and Pomponius having declared that they wished it too, Piso began, And I will ask you, Brutus, kindly to consider
CICERO DE FINIBUS

satisne videatur Antiochi complexa esse sententiam, quam tibi qui fratrem eius Aristum frequenter audieris maxime probatam existimo.

IV. Sic est igitur locutus. "Quantus ornatus in Peripateticorum disciplina sit, satis est a me, ut brevissime potuit, paulo ante dictum. Sed est forma eius disciplinae, sicut fere ceterarum, tripex: una pars est naturae, disserendi altera, vivendi tertia. Natura sic ab iis investigata est ut nulla pars caelo, mari, terra (ut poetice loquar) praetermissa sit. Quin etiam, cum de rerum initiis omnique mundo locuti essent, ut multa non modo probabili argumentatione sed etiam necessaria mathematicorum ratione concluderent, maximam materiam ex rebus per se investigatis ad rerum occultarum cognitionem attulerunt. Persecutus est Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras, Theophrastus autem stirpium naturas omniumque fere rerum quae e terra gignerentur causas atque rationes; qua ex cognitione facilius facta est investigatio rerum occultissimarum. Disserendiique ab iisdem non dialectice solum sed etiam oratorie praecipita sunt tradita; ab Aristotelisque princeipe de singulis rebus in utramque partem dicendi exercitatio est instituta, ut non contra omnia semper, sicut Arcesilas, diceret, et tamen ut in omnibus rebus quidquid ex utraque parte dici posset expromeret. Cum autem tertia pars bene vivendi praecipta quaereret, ea quoque est ab iisdem non 400
BOOK V. iii-iv

whether you think his discourse a satisfactory summary of the doctrine of Antiochus, which I believe to be the system which you most approve, as you have often attended the lectures of his brother Aristus.

IV. Accordingly Piso spoke as follows: "About the educational value of the Peripatetic system I have said enough, in the briefest possible way, a few moments ago. Its arrangement, like that of most other systems, is threefold: one part deals with nature, the second with discourse, and the third with conduct. Natural Philosophy the Peripatetics have investigated so thoroughly that no region in sky or sea or land (to speak poetically) has been passed over. Nay more, in treating of the origin of creation and the constitution of the universe they have established much of their doctrine not merely by probable arguments but by conclusive mathematical demonstration, applying a quantity of material derived from facts that they have themselves investigated to the discovery of other facts beyond the reach of observation. Aristotle gave a complete account of the birth, nutrition and structure of all living creatures, Theophrastus of the natural history of plants and the causes and constitution of vegetable organisms in general; and the knowledge thus attained facilitated the investigation of the most obscure questions. In Logic their teachings include the rules of rhetoric as well as of dialectic; and Aristotle their founder set on foot the practice of arguing pro and contra upon every topic, not like Arcesilas, always controverting every proposition, but setting out all the possible arguments on either side in every subject. The third division of philosophy investigates the rules of human well-being;
solum ad privatae vitae rationem, sed etiam ad rerum publicarum rectionem relata. Omnium fere civitatum non Graeciae solum, sed etiam barbariae ab Aristotele mores, instituta, disciplinas, a Theophrasto leges etiam cognovimus. Cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse\(^1\) conveniret, pluribus praeterea conscripsisset qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus, quae essent in re publica rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum quibus esset moderandum ut cuumque res postularet. Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime illis quidem placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum vitae erat simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima. Atque his de rebus et splendidia est eorum et illustris oratio.

12 V. "De summo autem bono quia duo genera librorum sunt, unum populariter scriptum quod \(\varepsilon \omega \tau \epsilon \rho i \kappa \omicron \nu\) appellabant, alterum limatius quod in commentariis reliquern, non semper idem dicere videntur; nec in summa tamen ipsa aut varietas est ulla, apud hos quidem quos nominavi, aut inter ipsos dissensio. Sed cum beata vita quaeatur idque sit unum quod philosophia spectare et sequi debeat, sitne ea tota sita in potestate sapientis an possit aut laborfactari aut eripi rebus adversis, in eo nonnumquam variari inter eos et dubitari videtur. Quod maxime efficit Theo-

\(^1\) esse inserted by edd.

\*Not only the extant treatises on Ethics but the whole of the extant works of Aristotle, except the recently-discovered *Athenian Constitution*, belong to this latter class.
BOOK V. iv-v

this too was treated by the Peripatetics, so as to comprise not only the principles of individual conduct but also of the government of states. From Aristotle we learn the customs, institutions and regulations, and from Theophrastus the laws also, of nearly all the states not only of Greece but of the barbarians as well. Both described the proper qualifications of a sovereign, both moreover wrote lengthy treatises on the best form of constitution; Theophrastus treated more fully the subject of political vicissitudes and movements which have to be controlled as the occasion demands. Among the alternative ideals of conduct they gave the highest place to the life of retirement, devoted to contemplation and to study. This was pronounced to be most worthy of the Wise Man, as most nearly resembling the life of the gods. These topics they handle in a style as brilliant as it is illuminating.

12. "Their books on the subject of the Chief Good fall into two classes, one popular in style, and this class they used to call their exoteric works; the other more carefully wrought. The latter treatises they left in the form of note-books. This distinction occasionally gives them an appearance of inconsistency; but as a matter of fact in the main bulk of their doctrine there is no divergence, at all events among the philosophers I have mentioned, and no disagreement between them. But on the chief object of inquiry, namely Happiness, and the one question which philosophy has to consider and to investigate, whether this lies entirely within the control of the Wise Man, or whether it can be impaired or destroyed by adversity, here there does appear sometimes to exist among them some divergence and uncertainty. This effect is chiefly produced by Theophrastus’s
phrasti de beata vita liber, in quo multum admodum fortunae datur; quod si ita se habeat, non possit beatam vitam praestare sapientia. Haec mihi videtur delicatior, ut ita dicam, molliorque ratio quam virtutis vis gravitasque postulat. Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, ejus accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristotelis, sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. Theophrastum tamen adhibeamus ad pleraque, dum modo plus in virtute teneamus quam ille tenuit firmitatis et roboris. Simus igitur contenti his. Namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem, mea sententia, quam reliquarum philosophi disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. Primum Theophrasti, Strato, physicum se voluit; in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque, et perpaucu de moribus. Huius, Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior. Concinnus deinde et elegans huius, Aristo, sed ea quae desideratur a magno philosopho gravitas in eo non fuit; scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.

"Praetereo multos, in his doctum hominem et suavem, Hieronymum, quem iam cur Peripateticum appellem nescio; summum enim bonum exposuit vacuitatem doloris; qui autem de summo bono dis-

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*Aristotle's principal work on Ethics is entitled* The Nichomachean Ethics*, to distinguish it from two other treatises ascribed to him, the Eudemian Ethics* and the Magna Moralia*. The title may imply that the book was dedicated to, or possibly that it was edited by, Nichomachus; but hardly, *pace* Cicero, that it was written by him, since he died in battle while still a youth. It seems certain that Cicero had never read, or had forgotten, the book, for he entirely ignores its distinctive doctrines. *Cp. IV 12 n.*
BOOK V. v

book On Happiness, in which a very considerable amount of importance is assigned to fortune; for if this be correct, wisdom alone could not guarantee happiness. This theory seems to me to be, if I may so call it, too enervating and unmanly to be adequate to the force and dignity of virtue. Hence we had better keep to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus; the latter's elaborate volumes on Ethics are ascribed, it is true, to Aristotle, but I do not see why the son should not have been capable of emulating the father. Still, we may use Theophrastus on most points, so long as we maintain a larger element of strength and solidity in virtue than he did. Let us then limit ourselves to these authorities. Their successors are indeed in my opinion superior to the philosophers of any other school, but are so unworthy of their ancestry that one might imagine them to have been their own fathers. To begin with, Theophrastus's pupil Strato set up to be a natural philosopher; but great as he is in this department, he is nevertheless for the most part an innovator; and on ethics he has hardly anything. His successor Lyco has a copious style, but his matter is somewhat barren. Lyco's pupil Aristo is polished and graceful, but has not the authority that we expect to find in a great thinker; he wrote much, it is true, and he wrote well, but his style is somewhat lacking in weight.

14 I pass over a number of writers, including the learned and entertaining Hieronymus. Indeed I know no reason for calling the latter a Peripatetic at all; for he defined the Chief Good as freedom from pain: and to hold a different view of the Chief Good is to hold a different system of philo-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

sentit, de tota philosophiae ratione dissentit. Critolaus imitari voluit antiquos; et quidem est gravitate proximus et redundat oratio; ac tamen ne is quidem in patriis institutis manet. Diodorus, eius auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris. Hic quoque suus est, de summoque bono dissentiens dici vere Peripateticus non potest. Antiquorum autem sententiam Antiochus noster mihi videtur persequi diligentissime, quam eandem Aristotelisuisse et Polemonis docet.

15 VI. "Facit igitur Lucius noster prudenter qui audire de summo bono potissimum velit; hoc enim constituto in philosophia constituta sunt omnia. Nam ceteris in rebus sive praetermissum sive igno-ratum est quidpiam, non plus incommodi est quam quanti quaeque earum rerum est in quibus nege-ctum est aliquid; summum autem bonum si ignore-tur, vivendi rationem ignorari necesse est; ex quo tantus error consequitur ut quem in portum se recipiant scire non possint. Cognitis autem rerum finibus, cum intellegitur quid sit et bonorum extre-mum et malorum, inventa vitae via est conforma-
tioque omnium officiorum, inventum igitur, quo quidque referatur; ex quo, id quod omnes expe-tunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest.

"Quod quoniam in quo sit magna dissensione est, Carneadis nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster

1 ne added by edd.
2 inventum igitur Müller; cum igitur B, E; est igitur inf. MSS.; cum exiguitur (i.e. examinatur) Mdv.

406
BOOK V. v-vi

Sophy altogether. Critolaus professed to imitate the ancients; and he does in fact come nearest to them in weight, while his style is copious to a degree; all the same, even he is not true to his ancestral principles. Diodorus, his pupil, couples with Moral Worth freedom from pain. He too stands by himself; differing about the Chief Good he cannot correctly be called a Peripatetic. Our master Antiochus seems to me to adhere most scrupulously to the doctrine of the ancients, which according to his teaching was common to Aristotle and to Polemo.

15 VI. “Our young friend Lucius is therefore well advised in desiring most of all to hear about the Chief Good; for when you have settled that point in a system of philosophy, you have settled everything. On any other topic, some degree of incompleteness or uncertainty causes no more mischief than is proportionate to the importance of the particular topic on which the neglect has occurred; but uncertainty as to the Chief Good necessarily involves uncertainty as to the principles of conduct, and this must carry men so far out of their course that they cannot know what harbour to steer for. On the other hand when we have ascertained the Ends of things, knowing the ultimate Good and ultimate Evil, we have discovered a map of life, a chart of all the duties; and therefore have discovered a standard to which each action may be referred; and from this we can discover and construct that rule of happiness which all desire.

“Now there is great difference of opinion as to what constitutes the ultimate End. Let us therefore adopt the classification of Carneades, which our
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Antiochus libenter uti solet. Ille igitur vidit non modo quot fuissent adhuc philosophorum de summo bono sed quot omnino esse possent sententiae. Negabat igitur ullam esse artem quae ipsa a se proficisceretur; etenim semper illud extra est quod arte comprehenditur. Nihil opus est exemplis hoc facere longius; est enim perspicuum nullam artem ipsam in se versari, sed esse aliud artem ipsam, aliud quod propositum sit arti; quoniam igitur, ut medicina valetudinis, navigationis gubernatio, sic vivendi ars est prudentia, necesse est eam quoque ab aliqua re esse constitutam et profectam. Constituit autem fere inter omnes, id, in quo prudentia versaretur et quod assequi vellet, aptum et accommodatum naturae esse oportere et tale ut ipsum se invitaret et alliceret appetitum animi, quem ὑπηγέρκυ Γραικοι vocant. Quid autem sit quod ita moveat itaque a natura in primo ortu appetatur, non constat, deque eo est inter philosophos, cum summum bonum exquiritur, omnis dissensio. Totius enim quaestionis eius quae habetur de finibus bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur in his quid sit extremum, quid ultimum, fons reperiendus est in quo sint prima invita menta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur.

VII. "Voluptatis alii primum appetitum putant et primam depulsionem doloris; vacuitatem doloris alii

408
teacher Antiochus is very fond of employing. Carneades passed in review all the opinions as to the Chief Good, not only that actually had been held by philosophers hitherto, but that it was possible to hold. He then pointed out that no science or art can start wholly from itself; it must always have some subject-matter which is outside itself. There is no need to enlarge upon or illustrate this point; for it is evident that no art is occupied with itself: the art is distinct from the subject with which it deals; since therefore, as medicine is the art of health and navigation the art of sailing the ship, so Prudence or Practical Wisdom is the art of conduct, it follows that Prudence also must take its being and origin from something. Now practically all have agreed that the subject with which Prudence is occupied and the end which it desires to attain is bound to be something intimately adapted to our nature; it must be capable of directly arousing and awakening an impulse of desire, what in Greek is called hroné. But what it is that at the first moment of our existence excites in our nature this impulse of desire, —as to this there is no agreement. It is at this point that all the difference of opinion among students of the ethical problem arises. Of the whole inquiry into the Ends of Goods and Evils and the question which among them is ultimate and final, the fountain-head is to be found in the earliest instincts of nature; discover these and you have the source of the stream, the starting-point of the debate as to the Chief Good and Evil.

18 VII. "One school holds that our earliest desire is for pleasure and our earliest repulsion is from pain; another thinks that freedom from pain is the earliest
CICERO DE FINIBUS

censent primum ascitam et primum declinatum do-
lorem; ab iis ali quae prima secundum naturam
nominant pro ficiscuntur, in quibus numerant inco-
mitatem conservationemque omnium partium, vale-
tudinem, sensus integros, doloris vacuitatem, vires,
pulchritudinem, cetera generis eiusdem, quorum si-
milia sunt prima in animis, quasi virtutum igniculi
et semina. Ex his tribus cum unum aliquid sit quo
primum natura moveatur vel ad appetendum vel ad
repellendum nec quidquam omnino praeter haec
tria possit esse, necesse est omnino officium aut
fugiendi aut sequendi ad eorum aliquid referri, ut
illa prudentia quam artem vitae esse diximus in
earum trium rerum aliqua versetur a qua totius vitae
ducat exordium.

19 "Ex eo autem quod statuerit esse quo primum
natura moveatur, existet recti etiam ratio atque
honesti, quae cum aliquo uno ex tribus illis congru-
ere possit, ut aut id honestum sit, facere omnia\(^1\)
voluptatis causa etiamsi eam non consequere, aut
non dolendi etiamsi id assequi nequeas, aut eorum
quae secundum naturam sunt adipiscendi etiamsi
nihil consequere. Ita fit ut quanta differentia est in
principiis naturalibus, tanta sit in finibus bonorum
malorumque dissimilitudo.—Alii rursum iisdem a
principiis omne officium referent aut ad voluptatem.

\(^1\) After omnia MSS. add aut, Mdv. brackets.
BOOK V. vii

thing welcomed, and pain the earliest thing avoided; others again start from what they term the primary objects in accordance with nature, among which they reckon the soundness and safety of all the parts of the body, health, perfect senses, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and the like, analogous to which are the primary intellectual excellences which are the sparks and seeds of the virtues. Now it must be one or other of these three sets of things which first excites our nature to feel desire or repulsion; nor can it be anything whatsoever beside these three things. It follows therefore that every right act of avoidance or of pursuit is aimed at one of these objects, and that consequently one of these three must form the subject-matter of Prudence, which we spoke of as the art of life; from one of the three Prudence derives the initial motive of the whole of conduct.

19 "Now, from whichever Prudence decides to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory of right and of Moral Worth which may correspond with one or other of the three objects aforesaid. Thus Morality will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at absence of pain, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them. Hence there is a divergence between the different conceptions as to the Ends of Goods and Evils, precisely equivalent to the difference of opinion as to the primary natural objects.—Others again starting from the same primary objects will make the sole standard of right action the actual attainment of plea-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

aut ad non dolendum aut ad prima illa secundum naturam obtinenda.

20 "Expositis iam igitur sex de summo bono sententiae, trium proximarum hi principes: voluptatis Aristippus, non dolendi Hieronymus, fruendi rebus iis quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus Carneades non ille quidem auctor sed defensor disserendi causa fuit. Superiores tres erant quae esse possent; quarum est una sola defensa eaque vehementer. Nam voluptatis causa facere omnia cum, etiamsi nihil consequamur, tamen ipsum illud consilium ita faciendi per se expetendum et honestum et solum bonum sit, nemo dixit. Ne vitationem quidem doloris ipsam per se quisquam in rebus expetendis putavit nisi etiam evitare posset. At vero facere omnia ut adipiscamur quae secundum naturam sunt etiamsi ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum et solum bonum Stoici dicunt.

21 VIII. "Sex igitur hae sunt simplices de summa bonorum malorumque sententiae, duae sine patrono, quattuor defensae. Iunctae autem et duplices expositiones summi boni tres omnino fuerunt, nec vero plures, si penitus rerum naturam videas, esse potuerunt. Nam aut voluptas adiungi potest ad honestatem, ut Callipponti Dinomachoque placuit, aut doloris vacuitas, ut Diodoro, aut prima naturae, ut antiquis, quos easdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominamus.

\[\text{This is obviously incorrect; for formal completeness, Carneades ought to have made six composite Ends, by combining Morality with the pursuit of each of the three primary objects of desire as well as with their attainment; but no doubt at this point he felt the unreality of his scheme and drew back, since Morality, according to Aristippus, Epicurus and the Stoics was the pursuit of pleasure, freedom from pain, and the natural goods respectively.}\]
BOOK V. vii-viii

sure, freedom from pain, or the primary things in accordance with nature, respectively.

20 "Thus we have now set forth six views as to the Chief Good. The leading upholders of the latter three are: of pleasure, Aristippus; of freedom from pain, Hieronymus; of the enjoyment of what we have called the primary things in accordance with nature, Carneades,—that is, he did not originate this view but he upheld it for polemical purposes. The three former were possible views, but only one of them has been actually maintained, though that with great vigour. No one has asserted pleasure to be the sole aim of action in the sense that the mere intention of attaining pleasure, although unsuccessful, is in itself desirable and moral and the only good. Nor yet has anyone held that the effort to avoid pain is in itself a thing desirable, without one's being able actually to avoid it. On the other hand, that morality consists in using every endeavour to obtain the things in accordance with nature, and that this endeavour even though unsuccessful is itself the sole thing desirable and the sole good, is actually maintained by the Stoics.

21 VIII. "These then are the six simple views about the End of Goods and Evils; two of them without a champion, and four actually upheld. Of composite or dualistic definitions of the Supreme Good there have been three in all; nor were more than three possible, if you examine the nature of the case closely.\(^a\) There is the combination of Morality with pleasure, adopted by Callipho and Dinomachus; with freedom from pain, by Diodorus; or with the primary objects of nature, the view of the ancients, as we entitle both the Academics and the Peripatetics.

\(^a\) Or the End may consist in the combination of one of these three things with Virtue.
“Sed quoniam non possunt omnia simul dici, haec in praesentia nota esse debebunt, voluptatem semo-vendam esse, quando ad maiora quaedam, ut iam apparebit, nati sumus. De vacuitate doloris eadem fere dici solent quae de voluptate.\(^1\) Nec vero alia sunt quaerenda contra Carneadiam illam sententiam; quocumque enim modo summum bonum sic exponitur ut id vacet honestate, nec officia nec virtutes in ea ratione nec amicitiae constare possunt. Coniunctio autem cum honestate vel voluptatis vel non dolendi id ipsum honestum quod amplecti vult id efficit turpe. Ad eas enim res referre quae agas, quarum una si quis malo careat in summo eum bono dicat esse, altera versetur in levissima parte naturae, obscurantis est omnem splendorem honestatis, ne dicam inquinantis. Restant Stoici, qui, cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt. “Hos contra singulos dici est melius; sed nunc quod agimus; de illis cum volemus.

“Democriti autem securitas, quae est animi tranquillitas,\(^2\) quam appellavit\(^3\) eἰθυμίαν, eo separanda fuit ab hac disputatione, quia ista animi tranquillitas ea est ipsa beata vita; quareimus autem non quae sit sed unde sit. Iam explosae eictaeque sententiae Pyrrhonis, Aristonis, Erilli, quod in hunc orbem

\(^1\)After voluptate, MSS. add: Quoniam igitur et de voluptate cum Torquato et de honestate, in qua una omne bonum poneretur, cum Catone est disputatum, primum, quae contra voluptatem dicta sunt, eadem fere cadunt contra vacuitatem doloris. Edd. reject this reference to the two earlier dialogues as an interpolation, since they are supposed to take place at a later date than the present one. 

\(^2\)tranquillitas Müller; tranquillitas tanquam B E; [tanquam] tranq. Mdv.

\(^3\)appellavit inf. MSS., Müller; appellant B, E, Mdv.
BOOK V. viii

"But it is impossible to set forth the whole of our position at once; so for the present we need only notice that pleasure must be discarded, on the ground that, as will be shown later, we are intended by nature for greater things. Freedom from pain is open to practically the same objections as pleasure. Nor need we look for other arguments to refute the opinion of Carneades; for any conceivable account of the Chief Good which does not include the factor of Moral Worth gives a system under which there is no room either for duty, virtue or friendship. Moreover the combination with Moral Worth either of pleasure or of freedom from pain debases the very morality that it aims at supporting. For to uphold two standards of conduct jointly, one of which declares freedom from evil to be the Supreme Good, while the other is a thing concerned with the most frivolous part of our nature, is to dim, if not to defile, all the radiance of Moral Worth. There remain the Stoics, who took over their whole system from the Peripatetics and the Academics, adopting the same ideas under other names.

"The best way to deal with these different schools would be to refute each separately; but for the present we must keep to the business in hand; we will discuss these other schools at our leisure.

"The calmness or tranquillity of mind which is the Chief Good of Democritus, euthumia as he calls it, has had to be excluded from this discussion, because this mental tranquillity is in itself the happiness in question; and we are inquiring not what happiness is, but what produces it. Again, the discredited and abandoned theories of Pyrrho, Aristo and Erillus cannot be brought within the circle we have drawn,
quam circumsciripsum incidere non possunt, adhibendae omnino non fuerunt. Nam cum omnis haec quaestio de finibus et quasi de extremis honorum et malorum ab eo profisciatur quod diximus naturae esse aptum et accommodatum, quodque ipsum per se primum appetatur, hoc totum et ii tollunt qui in rebus iis in quibus nihil aut honestum aut turpe sit negant esse ullam causam cur aliud alii anteponatur nec inter eas res quidquam omnino putant interesse, et Erillus, si ita sensit, nihil esse bonum praeter scientiam, omnem consili capiendi causam inventionemque offici sustulit.

"Sic exclusis sententiis reliquorum, cum praeter ea nulla esse possit, haec antiquorum valeat necessae est. Igitur¹ instituto veterum, quo etiam Stoici utuntur, hinc capiamus exordium.

24 IX. "Omne animal se ipsum diligent, ac simul est ortum² id agit ut se conservet, quod hic ei primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus a natura datur, se ut conservet atque ita sit affectum ut optime secundum naturam affectum esse possit. Hanc initio institutionem confusam habet et incertam, ut tantummodo se tueatur qualemque sit; sed nec quid sit nec quid possit nec quid ipsius natura sit intellegit. Cum autem processit paulum et quatenus quidque³ se attingat ad seque pertineat perspicere coepit, tum sensim incipit progradi seseque agnosceri et intelle-

¹ Igitur: inf. MSS. ergo.
² est ortum conj. Müller, cp. II, 33; et or ut ortum est MSS.; [et] ortum est Mdv.
³ quidquid Baiter, Müller; quidquid MSS., Mdv.
BOOK V. viii-ix

and so we have not been concerned to consider them at all. For the whole of this inquiry into the Ends or, so to speak, the limits of Goods and Evils must begin from that which we have spoken of as adapted and suited to nature and which is the earliest object of desire for its own sake; now this is entirely done away with by those who maintain that, in the sphere of things which contain no element of Moral Worth or baseness, there is no reason why any one thing should be preferred to any other, and who consider these things to be absolutely indifferent; and Erillus also, if he actually held that there is nothing good but knowledge, destroyed every motive of rational action and every clue to right conduct.

"Thus we have eliminated the views of all the other philosophers; and no other view is possible; therefore this doctrine of the Ancients must hold good. Let us then follow the practice of the old philosophers, adopted also by the Stoics, and make this our starting-point.

IX. "Every living creature loves itself, and from the moment of birth strives to secure its own preservation; because the earliest impulse bestowed on it by nature for its life-long protection is the instinct for self-preservation and for the maintenance of itself in the best condition possible to it in accordance with its nature. At the outset this tendency is vague and uncertain, so that it merely aims at protecting itself whatever its character may be; it does not understand itself nor its own capacities and nature. When, however, it has grown a little older, and has begun to notice the measure in which different things affect and concern itself, it now gradually commences to make progress. Self-consciousness
CICERO DE FINIBUS

gere quam ob causam habeat eum quem diximus
animi appetitum, coeptatque et ea quae naturae sentit
apta appetere et propulsare contraria. Ergo omni
animali illud quod appetit positum est in eo quod
naturae est accommodatum. Ita finis bonorum
existit, secundum naturam vivere sic affectum ut
optime affici possit ad naturamque accommodatissime.

25 Quoniam autem sua cuiusque animantis natura est,
necesse est finem quoque omnium hunc esse ut natura
expleatur (nihil enim prohibit quaedam esse et inter
se animalibus reliquis et cum bestiis homini commu-
nia, quoniam omnium est natura communis), sed
extrema illa et summa quae quaerimus inter anima-
lium genera distincta et dispertita sint et sua cuique
propria et ad id apta quod cuiusque natura desideret.

26 Quare cum dicimus omnibus animalibus extremum
esse secundum naturam vivere, non ita accipiendum
est quasi dicamus unum esse omnium extremum;
sed ut omnium artium recte dici potest commune
esse ut in aliqua scientia versentur, scientiam autem
suam cuiusque artis esse, sic commune animalium
omnium secundum naturam vivere, sed naturas esse
diversas, ut aliud equo sit e natura, aliud bovi, aliud
homiini, et tamen in omnibus summa communis, et qui-
dem non solum in animalibus sed etiam in rebus

418
BOOK V. ix
dawns, and the creature begins to understand the reason why it possesses the instinctive appetition aforesaid, and to try to obtain the things which it perceives to be adapted to its nature and to repel their opposites. Every living creature therefore finds its object of appetition in the thing suited to its nature. Thus arises the End of Goods, namely to live in accordance with nature and in that condition which is the best and most suited to nature that is possible. At the same time every animal has its own nature; and consequently, while for all alike the End consists in the satisfaction of that nature (for there is no reason why certain things should not be common to all the lower animals, and also to the lower animals and man, since all have a common nature), yet the ultimate and supreme objects that we are investigating must be differentiated and distributed among the different kinds of animals, each kind having its own peculiar to itself and adapted to the requirements of its individual nature. Hence when we say that the End of all living creatures is to live in accordance with nature, this must not be construed as meaning that all have one and the same End; but just as it is correct to say that all the arts and sciences have the common characteristic of occupying themselves with some branch of knowledge, while each art has its own particular branch of knowledge belonging to it, so all animals have the common End of living according to nature, but their natures are diverse, so that one thing is in accordance with nature for the horse, another for the ox, and another for man, and yet in all the Supreme End is common, and that not only in animals but also in all those things upon which

EE2

419
CICERO DE FINIBUS

omnibus iis quas natura alit, auget, tuetur; in quibus videmus ea quae gignuntur e terra multa quodam modo efficere ipsa sibi per se quae ad vivendum crescendumque valeant, ut suo\(^1\) genere perveniant ad extremum; ut iam liceat una comprehensione omnia complecti non dubitantemque dicere omnem naturam esse servatricem sui idque habere propositum quasi finem et extremum, se ut custodiat quam in optimo sui generis statu; ut necesse sit omnium rerum quae natura vigeat similem esse finem, non eundem. Ex quo intellegi debet homini id esse in bonis ultimum, secundum naturam vivere, quod ita interpretemur, vivere ex hominis natura undique perfecta et nihil 27 requirente. Haec igitur nobis explicantur sunt; sed si enodatus, vos ignoscetis. Huius enim aetati nunc\(^2\) haec primum fortasse audientis servire debeat. “Ita prorsus,” inquam; “etsi ea quidem quae adhuc dixisti quamvis ad aetatem recte isto modo dicentur.”

X. “Exposita igitur,” inquit, “terminatione rerum expetendarum, cur ista se res ita habeat ut dixi deinceps demonstrandum est. Quamobrem ordo-mur ab eo quod primum posui, quod idem reapce primum est, ut intellegamus omne animal se ipsum diligere. Quod quamquam dubitationem non habet (est enim infixum in ipsa natura comprehenditurque\(^3\) suis cuiusque sensibus, sic ut contra si quis dicere

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\(^1\) ut suo Mdv.; et suo MSS.; Müller conj. ut in suo.
\(^2\) aetati nunc . . audientis (conj. Mdv.) Müller; aetati et huic nunc . . audienti MSS., Mdv.
\(^3\) comprehenditurque edd.; comprehenditur MSS.

420
nature bestows nourishment, increase and protection. Among these things we notice that plants can, in a sense, perform on their own behalf a number of actions conducive to their life and growth, so that they may attain their End after their kind. So that finally we may embrace all animate existence in one broad generalization, and say without hesitation, that all nature is self-preserving, and has before it the end and aim of maintaining itself in the best possible condition after its kind; and that consequently all things endowed by nature with life have a similar, but not an identical, End. This leads to the inference, that the ultimate Good of man is life in accordance with nature, which we may interpret as meaning life in accordance with human nature developed to its full perfection and supplied with all its needs. This, then, is the theory that we have to expound; but if it requires a good deal of explanation, you will receive it with forbearance. For this is perhaps the first time that Lucius has heard the subject debated, and we must make allowance for his youth." "Very true," said I; "albeit the style of your discourse so far has been suited to hearers of any age."

X. "Well then," he resumed, "having explained what the principle is which determines what things are desirable, I have next to show why the matter is as I have stated. Let us therefore begin from the position which I laid down first and which is also first in the order of reality: let us understand that every living creature loves itself. The fact that this is so admits of no doubt, for indeed it is a fundamental fact of nature, and one that everybody can grasp for himself by the evidence of his senses, so much so that did anyone choose to deny it, he would not get a hearing;
velit non audiatur), tamen ne quid praetermittamus
rationes quoque cur hoc ita sit afferendas puto. Etsi
qui potest intellegi aut cogitari esse aliquod animal
quod se oderit? Res enim concurrent contrariae. Nam
cum appetitus ille animi aliquid ad se trahere coeperit
consulto quod sibi obsit, quia sit sibi inimicus, cum
id sua causa faciet, et oderit se et simul diliget, quod
fieri non potest. Necesseque est si quis ipse sibi
inimicus est eum quae bona sunt mala putare, bona
contra quae mala, et quae appetenda fugere et quae
fugienda appetere; quae sine dubio vitae est eversio.
Neque enim, si nonnulli reperiuntur qui aut laqueos
aut alia exitia quaerant, aut 1 ille apud Terentium,
qui 'decrevit tantisper se minus iniuriae suo nato
facere (ut ait ipse) dum fiat miser,' inimicus ipse sibi
putandus est. Sed alii dolore moventur, alii cupidit-tate; iracundia etiam multi efferuntur et, cum in
mala scientes irruunt, tumi se optime sibi consulere
arbitrantur. Itaque dicunt nec dubitant:
'Mihi sic est usus; tibi ut opus est facto, face.'
Qui ipsi sibi 2 bellum indixissent, cruciari dies, noctes
torqueri vellent, nec vero sese ipsi accusarent ob eam
causam quod se male suis rebus consuluisse dicerent;
eorum enim est haec querela qui sibi cari sunt sese-
que diligunt. Quare, quotiescumque dicetur male

2 Qui ipsi sibi MSS., edd.; qui ipsi si E; qui sibi ipsi
inf. MS.  Perhaps Qui si ipsi sibi ed.

a Terence Heautontimorumenos (The Self-tortmentor) 147.
b From the same play, l. 80.

422
nevertheless, so that no step may be omitted, I suppose I ought also to give reasons to show why it is so. Yet how can you form any intelligible conception of an animal that should hate itself? The thing is a contradiction in terms. For the creature being its own enemy, the instinctive appetition we spoke of will deliberately set about drawing to itself something harmful to itself; yet it will be doing this for its own sake; therefore the animal will both hate and love itself at the same time, which is impossible. Also, if a man is his own enemy, it follows that he will think good evil and evil good; that he will avoid things that are desirable and seek things that ought to be avoided; but this undeniably would mean to turn the whole of life upside down. A few people may be found who attempt to end their lives with a halter or by other means; but these, or the character of Terence who (in his own words) 'resolved that if he made himself to suffer, he so made less the wrong he did his son,' are not to be put down as haters of themselves. The motive with some is grief, with others passion; many are rendered insane by anger, and plunge into ruin with their eyes open, fancying all the time that what they do is for their own best interests. Hence they say, and say in all sincerity:

'It is my way; do you do as it suits you.'

Men who had really declared war against themselves would court days of torment and nights of anguish, nor would they reproach themselves for having done so and say that they had been misguided and imprudent: such lamentations show that they love and care for themselves. It follows that whenever
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quis de se mereri sibique inimicus esse atque hostis, vitam denique fugere, intellegatur aliquam subesse eiusmodi causam ut ex eo ipso intellegi possit sibi quemque esse carum. Nec vero id satis est, neminem esse qui ipse se oderit, sed illud quoque intelligendum est, neminem esse qui quomodo se habeat nihil sua censeat interesse. Tolletur enim appetitus animi si, ut in iis rebus inter quas nihil interest neutram in partem propensiores sumus, item in nobismet ipsis quemadmodum affecti simus nihil nostra arbitrabimur interesse.

XI. "Atque etiam illud si qui dicere velit, perabsurdum sit, ita diligi a sese quemque ut ea vis diligendi ad aliam rem quamiam referatur, non ad eum ipsum qui sese diligat. Hoc cum in amicitias, cum in officiis, cum in virtutibus dicitur, quomodocumque dicitur, intellegi tamen quid dicatur potest; in nobismet ipsis autem ne\(^1\) intellegi quidem ut\(^1\) propter aliam quamiam rem, verbi gratia propter voluptatem, nos amemus; propter nos enim illam, non propter eam nosmet ipsos diligimus. Quamquam quid est quod magis perspicuum sit quam\(^1\) non modo carum sibi quemque, verum etiam vehementer carum esse? quis est enim aut quotus quisque cui mors cum appropinquet non

'refugiat timido sanguen atque exalbescat metu'?
Etsi hoc quidem est in vitio, dissolutionem naturae

\(^1\) ne, ut, quam inserted by edd.

\(^a\) From the same passage of Ennius's *Alcmaeon* as is quoted at IV, 62.
it is said of a man that he has ruined himself and is his own worst enemy, and that he is tired of life, you may be sure that there is really an explanation which would justify the inference, even from such a case as this, that every man loves himself. Nor is it enough to say that nobody exists who hates himself; we must also realize that nobody exists who thinks it makes no difference to him what his own condition is. For it will be destructive of the very faculty of desire if we come to think of our own circumstances as a matter of indifference to us, and feel in our own case the absolute neutrality which is our attitude towards the things that are really indifferent.

XI. "It would also be utterly absurd if anyone desired to maintain that, though the fact of self-love is admitted, this instinct of affection is really directed towards some other object and not towards the person himself who feels it. When this is said of friendship, of right action or of virtue, whether correct or not, it has some intelligible meaning; but in the case of ourselves it is utterly meaningless to say that we love ourselves for the sake of something else, for example, for the sake of pleasure. Clearly we do not love ourselves for the sake of pleasure, but pleasure for the sake of ourselves. Yet what fact is more self-evident than that every man not merely loves himself, but loves himself very much indeed? For who is there, what percentage of mankind, whose

' Blood does not ebb with horror, and face turn pale with fear,'a

at the approach of death? No doubt it is a fault to
tam valde perhorrescere (quod item\(^1\) est reprehendendum in dolore); sed quia fere sic afficiuntur omnes, satis argumenti est ab interitu naturam apprehendere; idque quo magis quidam ita faciunt ut iure etiam reprehendantur, hoc magis intellegendum est haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisset nisi quaedam essent modica natura. Nec vero dico eorum metum mortis qui, quia privari se vitae bonis arbitrentur aut quia quasdam post mortem formidines extimescant aut si\(^2\) metuant ne cum dolore moriantur, idcirco mortem fugiant; in parvis enim saepe qui nihil eorum cogitant, si quando iis ludentes minamur praeceipitatuos alicunde, extimescunt. Quin etiam ‘ferae,’ inquit Pacuvius, ‘quibus abest ad praecavendum intellegendi astutia,’ injecto terrore mortis ‘horrescunt.’ Quis autem de ipso sapiente aliter existimat quin, etiam cum decreverit esse moriendum, tamen discessu a suis atque ipsa relinquenda luce moveatur? Maxime autem in hoc quidem genere vis est perspicua naturae, cum et mendicitatem multi perpetiantur ut vivant, et angantur appropinquatione mortis confecti homines senectute, et ea perferant quae Philoctetam videmus in fabulis; qui cum cruciaretur non ferendis doloribus, propagabat tamen vitam aecupio; ‘configebat tardus celeres, stans volantes,’ ut apud Attium est,

\(^1\) item: Mdv. conj. idem.
\(^2\) si: Müller conj. quia.
BOOK V. xi

recoil so violently from the dissolution of our being (and the same timidity in regard to pain is blameworthy); but the fact that practically everybody has this feeling is conclusive proof that nature shrinks from destruction; and the more some people act thus—as indeed they do to a blameworthy degree—the more it is to be inferred that this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural. I am not referring to the fear of death felt by those who shun death because they believe it means the loss of the good things of life, or because they are afraid of certain horrors after death, or if they dread lest death may be painful: for very often young children, who do not think of any of these things, are terribly frightened if in fun we threaten to let them fall from a height. Even 'wild creatures,' says Pacuvius,

'Lacking discourse of reason
To look before,'

when seized with fear of death, 'bristle with horror.' Who does not suppose that the Wise Man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be affected at parting from his friends and quitting the very light of day? The strength of natural impulse, in this manifestation of it, is extremely obvious, since many men endure to beg their bread in order—that they may live, and men broken with age suffer anguish at the approach of death, and endure torments like those of Philoctetes in the play; who though racked with intolerable pains, nevertheless prolonged his life by fowling;

'Slow he pierced the swift with arrows, standing shot them on the wing,'
CICERO DE FINIBUS

pennarumque contextu corpori tegumenta faciebat.

33 De hominum genere aut omnino de animalium lo-
quor, cum arborum et stirpium eadem paene natura
sit? Sive enim, ut doctissimis viris visum est, maior
alia qua causa atque divinior hanc vim ingenuit, sive
hoc ita fit fortuito, videmus ea quae terra gignit
corticibus et radicibus valida servari, quod contingit
animalibus sensuum distributione et quadam com-
pactione membrorum. Qua quidem de re quamquam
assentior iis qui haec omnia regi natura putant, quae si
natura neglegat, ipsa esse non possit,\(^1\) tamen concedo
ut qui de hoc dissentiant existiment quod velint ae vel
hoc intellegant, si quando naturam hominis dicam, ho-
minem dicere me; nihil enim hoc differt. Nam prius
a se poterit quisque discedere quam appetitum earum
rerum quae sibi conducant amittere. Iure igitur
gravissimi philosophi initium summi boni a natura
petiverunt et illum appetitum rerum ad naturam
accommodatarum ingeneratum putaverunt omnibus,
quia continetur\(^2\) ea commendatione naturae qua se
ipsi diligunt.

34 XII. "Deinceps videndum est, quoniam satis
apertum est sibi quemque natura esse carum, quae
sit hominis natura. Id est enim de quo quaerimus.
Atqui perspicuum est hominem e corpore animoque
constare, cum primae sint animi partes, secundae

\(^1\) possit B, E, Mdv. ; possint inf. MSS.
\(^2\) quia continetur suggested by Mdv., who prints quia
continetur; qui continetur MSS.; qui continetur Schö-
mann.
as Attius has it, and wove their plumage together to make himself garments. But do I speak of the human race or of animals generally, when the nature of trees and plants is almost the same? For whether it be, as very learned men have thought, that this capacity has been engendered in them by some higher and diviner power, or whether it is the result of chance, we see that the vegetable species secure by means of their bark and roots that support and protection which animals derive from the distribution of the sensory organs and from the well-knit framework of the limbs. On this matter I agree, it is true, with those who hold that all these things are regulated by nature, because if nature were to neglect them her own existence would be impossible; yet I allow those who think otherwise on this point to hold what view they please: whenever I mention 'the nature of man,' let them, if they like, understand me to mean 'man,' as it makes no difference. For the individual can no more lose the instinct to seek the things that are good for him than he can divest himself of his own personality. The wisest authorities have therefore been right in finding the basis of the Chief Good in nature, and in holding that this instinctive desire for things suited to our nature is innate in all men, because it is founded on that natural attraction which makes them love themselves.

XII. "Having made it sufficiently clear that every one by nature loves himself, we must next examine what is the nature of man. For it is human nature that is the object of our investigation. Now it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, although the parts of the mind hold the first place
CICERO DE FINIBUS

corporis. Deinde id quoque videmus, et ita figuratum corpus ut excellat aliis, animumque ita constitutum ut et sensibus instructus sit et habeat praestantium mentis cui tota hominis natura pareat, in qua sit mirabilis quaedam vis rationis et cognitionis et scientiae virtutumque omnium. Nam quae corporis sunt ea nec auctoritatem cum animi partibus comparandam et cognitionem habent faciliorem. Itaque ab his ordiamur.

35 "Corporis igitur nostri partes totaque figura et forma et statura quam apta ad naturam sit apparat, neque est dubium quin frons, oculi, aures et reliquae partes quales propriae sint hominis intellegatur; sed certe opus est ea valere et vigere et naturales motus ususque habere, ut nec absit quid eorum nec aegrum debilitatumve sit. Id enim natura desiderat. Est autem etiam actio quaedam corporis quae motus et status naturae congruentes tenet; in quibus si peccetur distorte et depravatione quadam ae motu statuve deformi, ut si aut manibus ingrediatur quis aut non ante sed retro, fugere plane se ipse et hominem exuens ex homine naturam odisse videatur. Quamobrem etiam sessiones quaedam et flexi facti-que motus, quales protervorum hominum aut mollium esse solent, contra naturam sunt, ut etiamsi animi

430
BOOK V. xii

and those of the body the second. Next we further observe both that man's body is of a structure surpassing that of other animals, and that his mind is so constituted as not only to be equipped with senses but also to possess the predominant factor of intellect, which commands the obedience of the whole of man's nature, being endowed with the marvellous faculties of reason, of cognition, of knowledge and of all the virtues. For the attributes of the body are not comparable in importance with the parts of the mind; and moreover they are easier to understand. We will therefore begin with them.

"It is manifest how well the parts of our body, and its entire figure, form and stature are adapted to our nature; and that special conformation of the brow, eyes, ears and other parts which is appropriate to man, can be recognized without hesitation by the understanding; but of course it is necessary that these organs should be healthy and vigorous and possessed of their natural motions and uses; no part must be lacking and none must be diseased or enfeebled. This is a requirement of nature. Again, our body also possesses a faculty of action which keeps its motions and postures in harmony with nature; and any error in these, due to distortion or deformity or abnormality of movement or posture,—for example, if a man were to walk on his hands, or backwards instead of forwards,—would make a man appear alienated from himself, as if he had stripped off his proper humanity and hated his own nature. Hence certain attitudes in sitting, and slouching, languishing movements, such as are affected by the wanton and the effeminate, are contrary to nature, and though really arising from a
CICERO DE FINIBUS

vitio id eveniat tamen in corpore mutari hominis
natura videatur. Itaque e contrario moderati aequa-
bilesque habitus, affectiones ususque corporis apti
esse ad naturam videntur.

"Iam vero animus non esse solum sed etiam cuius-
dam modi debet esse, ut et omnes partes suas habeat
incolumes et de virtutibus nulla desit. Atque in
sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus, ut ne quid impediat
quo minus suo sensus quisque munere fungatur in
iis rebus celeriter expediteque percipiendis quae
subiectae sunt sensibus. XIII. Animi autem et eius
animi partis quae princeps est quaeque mens nomi-
natur plures sunt virtutes, sed duo prima genera,
unum earum quae ingenerantur suapte natura ap-
pellanturque non voluntariae, alterum¹ earum quae
in voluntate positae magis proprio nomine appellari
solent, quarum est excellens in animorum laude pra-
stantia. Prioris generis est docilitas, memoria; quae
fere omnia appellantur uno ingeni nomine, easque
virtutes qui habent ingeniosi vocantur. Alterum
autem genus est magnarum verarumque virtutum
quas appellamus voluntarias, ut prudentiam, tem-
perantiam, fortitudinem, iustitiam et reliquas generis
eiusdem.

"Et summatis quidem haec erant de corpore ani-
moque dicenda, quibus quasi informatum est quid
hominis natura postulet; ex quo perspicuum est,
quoniam ipsi a nobis diligamur omniaque et in animo

¹ alterum inf. MSS., Mdv.; alterum autem E.
432
defect of mind, suggest to the eye a bodily perversion of man's nature. And so, on the contrary, a controlled and well-regulated bearing, condition and movement of the body have the appearance of being in harmony with nature.

"Turning now to the mind, this must not only exist, but also be of a certain character; it must have all its parts intact and lack none of the virtues. The senses also possess their several virtues or excellences, consisting in the unimpeded performance of their several functions of swiftly and readily perceiving the objects presented to them. XIII. The mind, on the other hand, and that dominant part of the mind which is called the intellect, possess many excellences or virtues, but these are of two main classes; one class consists of those excellences which are the result of our natural endowments and which are called non-volitional; and the other of those which, depending on our volition, are usually styled 'virtues' in the more special sense; and the latter are the pre-eminent glory and distinction of the mind. To the former class belong receptiveness and memory; and practically all the excellences of this class are included under one name of 'talent,' and their possessors are spoken of as 'talented.' The other class consists of the lofty virtues properly so called, which we speak of as dependent on volition, for instance, Prudence, Temperance, Courage, Justice, and the others of the same kind.

"Such is the account, a brief one, it is true, that it was necessary to give of the body and the mind. It has indicated in outline what the requirements of man's nature are; and it has clearly shown that, since we love ourselves, and desire all our

FF

433
CICERO DE FINIBUS

et in corpore perfecta velimus esse, ea nobis ipsa
cara esse propter se et in iis esse ad bene vivendum
momenta maxima. Nam cui proposita sit conservatio
sui, necesse est huic partes quoque sui caras esse,
carioresque quo perfectiores sint et magis in suo
genere laudabiles. Ea enim vita expetitur quae sit
animi corporisque expleta virtutibus, in eoque sum-
mum bonum poni necesse est, quando quidem id tale
esse debet ut rerum expetendarum sit extremum.
Quo cognito dubitari non potest quin, cum ipsi
homines sibi sint per se et sua sponte cari, partes
quoque et corporis et animi et earum rerum quae
sunt in utriusque motu et statu sua caritate colantur
et per se ipsae appetuntur. Quibus expositis facilis
est coniectura ea maxime esse expetenda ex nostris
quae plurimum habent dignitatis, ut optimae cuius-
que partis quae\(^1\) per se expetatur virtus sit expetenda
maxime. Ita fiet ut animi virtus corporis virtuti
anteponatur animique virtutes non voluntarias vin-
cant virtutes voluntariae, quae quidem proprie vir-
tutes appellantur multumque excellunt, propterea
quod ex ratione gignuntur qua nihil est in homine
divinius. Etenim omnium rerum quas et creat na-
tura et tuetur, quae aut sine animo sunt aut non\(^2\)
multo secur, earum summum bonum in corpore est;
ut non inscite illud dictum videatur in sue, animum
illi pecudi datum pro sale, ne putisceret. XIV. Sunt

\(^1\) Perhaps quae maxime per se ed,

\(^2\) non inserted by edd.
attributes both of mind and body to be perfect, our mind and body are themselves dear to us for their own sakes, and are of the highest importance for our general well-being. For he who aims at the preservation of himself, must necessarily feel an affection for the parts of himself also, and the more so, the more perfect and admirable in their own kind they are. For the life we desire is one fully equipped with the virtues of mind and body; and such a life must constitute the Chief Good, inasmuch as it must necessarily be such as to be the limit of things desirable. This truth realized, it cannot be doubted that, as men feel an affection towards themselves for their own sakes and of their own accord, the parts also of the body and mind, and of those faculties which are displayed in each while in motion or at rest, are esteemed for their own attractiveness and desired for their own sake. From these explanations, it may readily be inferred that the most desirable of our attributes are those possessed of the highest intrinsic worth; so that the most desirable excellences are the excellences of the noblest parts of us, which are desirable for their own sake. The result will be that excellence of mind will be rated higher than excellence of body, and the volitional virtues of the mind will surpass the non-volitional; the former, indeed, are the 'virtues' specially so called, and are far superior, in that they spring from reason, the most divine element in man. For the inanimate or nearly inanimate creatures that are under nature's charge, all of them have their supreme good in the body; hence it has been cleverly said, as I think, about the pig, that a mind has been bestowed upon this animal to serve as salt and keep it from going bad.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

autem bestiae quaedam in quibus inest aliquid simile virtutis, ut in leonibus, ut in canibus, ut\textsuperscript{1} in equis, in quibus non corporum solum ut in suibus sed etiam animorum aliqua ex parte motus quosdam videmus. In homine autem summa omnis animi est et in animo rationis, ex qua virtus est, quae rationis absolutio definitur, quam etiam atque etiam explicandam putant.

39 "Eorum etiam rerum quas terra dignit educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium; itaque et vivere vitem et mori dicimus, arboremque et novellam et vetulam et vigere et senescere; ex quo non est alienum ut animantibus sic illis et apta quaedam ad naturam putare et aliena, earumque augendarum et alendarum quandam cultricem esse, quae sit scientia atque ars agricolarum, quae circumcidat, amputet, erigat, extollat, adminiculet, ut quo natura ferat eo possint ire; ut ipsae vites si loqui possint ita se tractandas tuendasque esse fateantur. Et nunc quidem quod eam tuetur, ut de viti potissimum loquar, est id extrinsecus; in ipsa enim parum magna vis inest ut quam optime se habere possit si nulla cultura adhibeat. At vero si ad vitem sensus accesserit, ut appetitum quendam habeat et per se ipsa moveatur, quid facturam putas? An ea quae per vinitorem antea consequebatur per se ipsa cura-

\textsuperscript{1}ut inserted by edd.

\textsuperscript{a} This definition of moral virtue and the doctrine above of its superiority to intellectual excellence (the exact opposite of Aristotle's view) are Stoic tenets foisted on the Peripatetics by Antiochus.
BOOK V. xiv

XIV. But there are some animals which possess something resembling virtue, for example, lions, dogs and horses; in these we observe not only bodily movements as in pigs, but in some degree a sort of mental activity also. In man, however, the Supreme End appertains entirely to the mind, and to the rational part of the mind, which is the source of virtue; and virtue is defined as the perfection of reason, a doctrine which the Peripatetics think cannot be expounded too often.

"Plants also have a development and progress to maturity that is not unlike that of animals; hence we speak of a vine as living and dying, or of a tree as young or old, in the prime of life or decrepit; consequently it is appropriate to suppose that with them as with animals certain things are suited and certain other things foreign to their nature; and that their growth and nurture is tended by a foster-mother, the science and art of husbandry, which trims and prunes, straightens, raises and props, enabling them to follow the course that nature prescribes, till the vines themselves, could they speak, would acknowledge this to be their proper mode of treatment and of tendance. In reality, of course, the power that tends the vine, to take that particular instance, is something outside of it; for the vine does not possess force enough in itself to be able to attain its highest possible development without the aid of cultivation. But suppose the vine to receive the gift of sensation, bestowing on it some degree of appetite and power of movement; then what do you think it will do? Will it not endeavour to provide for itself the benefits which it previously obtained by the aid of the vine-dresser? But do
CICERO DE FINIBUS

bit? Sed videsne accessuram ei curam ut sensus quoque suos eorumque omnem appetitum et si qua sint adiuncta ei membra tueatur? Sic ad illa quae semper habuit iunet ea quae postea accesserint, nec eundem finem habebit quem cultor eius habebat, sed volet secundum eam naturam quae postea ei adiuncta erit vivere. Ita similis erit ei finis boni atque antea fuerat, neque idem tamen; non enim iam stirpis bonum quaeret sed animalis. Quid si non sensus modo ei datus sit verum etiam animus hominis? non necesse est et illa pristina manere ut tuenda sint et haec multo esse cariora quae accesserint, animique optimam quamque partem carissimam, in eaque expletione naturae summi boni finem consistere, cum longe multumque praestet mens atque ratio? Sic exstitit extremum omnium appetendorum atque ductum a prima commendatione naturae multis gradibus ascendit ut ad summum perveniret, quod cumulatur ex integritate corporis et ex mentis ratione perfecta.

41 XV. "Cum igitur ea sit quam exposui forma naturae, si ut initio dixi simul atque ortus esset se quisque cognosceret iudicareque posset quae vis et totius esset naturae et partium singularum, continuo videret quid esset hoc quod quaerimus, omnium rerum quas expetimus summum et ultimum, nec ulla in re peccare posset. Nunc vero a primo quidem mirabiliter occulta natura est nec perspici nec

1 accesserint MSS., edd.; Mdv. suggests accesserunt.
2 erit Müller; sit MSS.; est Mdv.
3 sic extitit Mdv.; sic et, sicque, sitque MSS.

438
you mark how it will further be concerned to protect its sensory faculties also and all their appetitive instincts, and any additional organs it may have developed? Thus with the properties that it always possessed it will combine those subsequently added to it, and it will not have the same End as the husbandman who tended it had, but will desire to live in accordance with that nature which it has subsequently acquired. And so its End or Good will be similar to, but not the same as, what it was before; it will no longer seek the Good of a plant, but that of an animal. Suppose again that it have bestowed upon it not merely sensation but also a human mind. Will it not result that while its former properties remain objects of its care, these added properties will be far more dear to it, and that the best part of the mind will be the dearest of all? Will it not find its End or Chief Good in this crowning development of its nature, inasmuch as intellect and reason are far and away the highest faculties that exist? Thus there has emerged the final term of the series of objects of desire; thus guided by the primary attraction of nature it has risen by many stages till it has reached the summit, the consummation of perfect bodily integrity combined with the full development of the mental faculty of reason.

XV. “The plan of our nature being then that which I have explained, if, as I said at the outset, every man as soon as he is born could know himself and could appreciate the powers of his nature as a whole and of its several parts, he would at once perceive what is this thing that we seek, the highest and last of the objects of our desires, and he would be incapable of error in anything. But as it is, our nature
CICERO DE FINIBUS

cognosci potest; progredientibus autem aetatibus sensim tardeve potius quasi nosmet ipsos cognoscimus. Itaque prima illa commendatio quae a natura nostri facta est nobis incerta et obscura est, primusque appetitus ille animi tantum agit ut salvi atque integri esse possimus; cum autem dispicerere coepimus,¹ et sentire quid simus et quid ab² animantibus ceteris differamus, tum ea sequi incipimus ad quae nati sumus. Quam similitudinem videmus in bestiis, quae primo in quo loco natae sunt ex eo se non commovent; deinde suo quaeque appetitu movetur; serpere anguiculos, nare anaticulas, evolare merulas, cornibus uti videmus boves, nepas aculeis, suam denique cuique naturam esse ad vivendum ducem. Quae similitudo in genere etiam humano appet. Parvi enim primo ortu sic iacent, tamquam omnino sine animo sint; cum autem paulum firmitatis accessit,³ et animo utuntur et sensibus, conitunturque sese ut erigant, et manibus utuntur, et eos agnoscent a quibus educantur; deinde aequalibus deletantur libenterque se cum iis congregant dantque se ad ludendum fabellarumque auditione ducuntur, deque eo quod ipsis superat aliis gratificari volunt, animadvertuntque ea quae domi fiunt curiosius, incipiantque commentari aliquid et discere, et eorum quos vident volunt non ignorare nomina, quibusque rebus cum aequalibus decertant si vicerunt efferunt se laetitia, victi debilitantur animosque demittunt;

¹ coepimus Mdv. with some MSS. (cp. 42 accessit), coeperimus B, E.
² ab added by edd.
³ accessit Mdv. with B and E, inf. MSS. accesserit.

440
at the beginning is curiously hidden from us, and we cannot fully realize or understand it; yet as we grow older we gradually or I should say tardily come, as it were, to know ourselves. Accordingly, the earliest feeling of attraction which nature has created in us towards ourselves is vague and obscure, and the earliest instinct of appetition only strives to secure our safety and freedom from injury. When, however, discernment dawns and we begin to perceive what we are and how we differ from the rest of living creatures, we then commence to pursue the objects for which we are intended by nature. Some resemblance to this process we observe in the lower animals. At first they do not move from the place where they were born. Then they begin to move, under the influence of their several instincts of appetition; we see little snakes gliding, ducklings swimming, blackbirds flying, oxen using their horns, scorpions their stings; each in fact has its own nature as its guide to life. A similar process is clearly seen in the human race. Infants just born lie as if absolutely inanimate; when they have acquired some small degree of strength, they exercise their mind and their senses; they strive to stand erect, they use their hands, they recognize their nurses; then they take pleasure in the society of other children, and enjoy meeting them, they take part in games and love to hear stories; they desire to bestow of their own abundance in bounty to others; they take a keen interest in what goes on in the household; they begin to reflect and to learn, and want to know the names of the people they see; in competition with their companions they are elated by victory, discouraged and disheartened by
CICERO DE FINIBUS

43 quorum sine causa fieri nihil putandum est. Est enim natura sic generata vis hominis ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris quorum in se habent semina sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis virtutis quasi germen\(^1\) efficitur. Nam cum ita nati factique simus ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contine-remus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas quas dixi in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. Nam ut saepe iam dixi in infirma aetate imbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem naturae vim, sed ita ut progradi possit longius, per se sit tantum\(^2\) inchoata.

44 XVI. "Intrandum igitur est in rerum naturam et penitus quid ea postulet pervidendum; aliter enim nosmet ipsos nosse non possumus. Quod praeceptum quia maius erat quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco assignatun est deo. Iubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo noscere nosmet ipsos; cognitio autem haec est una nostri ut vim corporis animique norimus sequamurque eam vitam quae rebus iis\(^3\) perfratur.

\(^1\) germen Gronovius, Mdv.; carmen MSS.
\(^2\) tantum Mdv.; tamen MSS.
\(^3\) rebus iis Müller (cp. § 46 and IV, 28, utraque re); rebus hiis B, E; rebus ipsis inf. MSS.; [rebus] iis Mdv.

442
defeat. For every stage of this development there must be supposed to be a reason. It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for those are primary elements of our nature, which seeds sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of activity, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence we see the reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher’s torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature’s goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity and intellectual weakness the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition.

XVI. “We must therefore penetrate into the nature of things, and come to understand thoroughly its requirements; otherwise we cannot know ourselves. That precept was too high for man’s discernment, and was therefore ascribed to a god. It is therefore the Pythian Apollo who bids us ‘know ourselves’; but the sole road to self-knowledge is to know the powers of body and of mind, and to follow the path of life that gives us their full realization.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

"Quoniam autem is animi appetitus a principio fuit, ut ea quae dixi quam perfectissima natura haberemus, confitendum est, cum id adepti simus quod appetitum sit, in eo quasi in ultimo consistere naturam atque id esse summum bonum; quod certe universum sua sponte ipsum expeti et propter se necesse est, quoniam ante demonstratum est etiam singulas eius partes esse per se expectandas.

45 "In enumerandis autem corporis commodis si quis praetermissam a nobis voluptatem putabit, in aliud tempus ea quaestio differatur. Utrum enim sit voluptas in iis rebus quas primas secundum naturam esse diximus necne sit, ad id quod agimus nihil interest. Si enim, ut mihi quidem videtur, non explet bona naturae voluptas, iure praetermissa est; sin autem est in ea quod quidam volunt, nihil impedsit hanc nostram comprehensionem summii boni; quae enim constituta sunt prima naturae, ad ea si voluptas accessorit, unum aliquod accessorit commodum corporis neque eam constitutionem summii boni quae est proposita mutaverit.

46 XVII. "Et adhuc quidem ita nobis progressa ratio est ut 'ea duceretur omnis a prima commendatione naturae. Nunc autem aliud iam argumentandi sequamur genus, ut non solum quia nos diligamus sed quia cuiusque partis naturae et in corpore et in animo sua quaeque vis sit, idcirco in his rebus summo\footnote{his rebus seems to refer to cuiusque partis naturae, cp. § 44 note, and § 56 ! et corpore et animo moveri.}
BOOK V. xvi-xvii

"Now inasmuch as our original instinct of desire was for the possession of the parts aforesaid in their fullest natural perfection, it must be allowed that, when we have attained the object of our desire, our nature takes its stand in this as its final End, and this constitutes our Chief Good; and that this End as a whole must be desired intrinsically and in and for itself, follows of necessity from the fact that the several parts of it also have already been proved to be desirable for themselves.

45 "If however anyone thinks that our enumeration of bodily advantages is incomplete owing to the omission of pleasure, let us postpone this question to another time. For whether pleasure is or is not one of the objects we have called the primary things in accordance with nature makes no difference for our present inquiry. If, as I hold, pleasure adds nothing to the sum-total of nature's goods, it has rightly been omitted. If on the contrary pleasure does possess the property that some assign to it, this fact does not impair the general outline we have just given of the Chief Good; since if to the primary objects of nature as we have explained them, pleasure be added, this only adds one more to the list of bodily advantages, and does not alter the interpretation of the Chief Good which has been propounded.

46 XVII. "So far as our argument has proceeded hitherto, it has been based entirely upon the primary attractions of nature. But from this point on let us adopt a different line of reasoning, namely to show that, in addition to the argument from self-love, the fact that each part of our nature, both mental and bodily, possesses its own peculiar energy goes to prove that the activity of our several parts is pre-eminently 

445
CICERO DE FINIBUS

nostra sponte moveamur. Atque ut a corpore ordiar, videsne ut si quae in membris prava aut debilitata aut imminuta sint occultent homines? ut etiam contendant et elaborent, si efficere possint, ut aut non appareat corporis vitium aut quam minimum appareat, multisque etiam dolores curationis causa perferant ut, si ipse usus membrorum non modo non maius verum etiam minor futurus sit, eorum tamen species ad naturam revertatur? Etenim cum omnes natura toto se expetendos putent, nec id ob aliud rem sed propter ipsos, necesse est eius etiam partes propter se expetit quod universum propter se expetatur. Quid? in motu et in statu corporis nihil inest quod animadvertendum esse ipsa natura iudicet? quemadmodum quis ambulet, sedeat, qui ductus oris, qui vultus in quoque sit? nihil est in his rebus quod dignum libero aut indignum esse ducamus? Nonne odio multos dignos putamus qui quodam motu aut statu videntur naturae legem et modum contempsisse? Et quoniam haec deducuntur de corpore, quid est cur non recte pulchritudo etiam ipsa propter se expetenda ducatur? Nam si pravitatem imminutionemque corporis propter se fugiendam putamus, cur non etiam, ac forte magis, propter se formae dignitatem sequamur? Et si turpitudinem fugimus in statu et motu corporis, quid est cur pulchritudinem non sequamur? Atque etiam valitudinem, vires, vacuitatem doloris non propter utilitatem solum sed etiam ipsas propter se ex-
BOOK V. xvii

spontaneous. To start with the body, do you notice how men try to hide a deformed or infirm or maimed limb? They actually take great pains and trouble to conceal, if they possibly can, their bodily defect, or at all events to let it be seen as little as possible; they even undergo painful courses of treatment in order to restore the natural appearance of their limbs, even though the actual use of them will not only not be improved but will even be diminished. In fact, since every man instinctively thinks that he himself in his entirety is a thing to be desired, and this not for the sake of anything else but for his own sake, it follows that when a thing is desired as a whole for its own sake, the parts also of that thing are desired for their own sakes. Again, is there nothing in the movements and postures of the body which Nature herself judges to be of importance? A man's mode of walking and sitting, his particular cast of features and expression? is there nothing in these things that we consider worthy or unworthy of a free man? Do we not often think people deserving of dislike, who by some movement or posture appear to have violated a law or principle of nature? And since people try to get rid of these defects of bearing, why should not even beauty have a good claim to be considered as desirable for its own sake? For if we think imperfection or mutilation of the body things to be avoided for their own sake, why should we not with equal or perhaps still greater reason pursue dignity of form for its own sake? And if we avoid ugliness in bodily movement and posture, why should we not pursue beauty? Health also, and strength and freedom from pain we shall desire not merely for their utility
CICERO DE FINIBUS

petemus. Quoniam enim natura suis omnibus expleri partibus vult, hunc statum corporis per se ipsum expetit qui est maxime e natura, quae tota perturbatur si aut aegrum corpus est aut dolet aut caret viribus.

48 XVIII. "Videamus animi partes, quorum est conspectus illustrior; quae quo sunt excelsiores, eo dant clariora indicia naturae. Tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur. Videamusne ut pueri ne verberibus quidem a contemplandis rebus perquirendisque deterreantur? ut pulsi recurrant? ut aliquid scire se gaudeant? ut id aliis narrare gestiant? ut pompa, ludis atque eiusmodi spectaculis teneantur ob eamque rem vel famem et sitim perferant? Quid vero? qui ingenuis studiis atque artibus delectantur, nonne videmus eos nec valetudinis nec rei familiaris habere rationem omniaque perpeti ipsa cognitione et scientia captos et cum maximis curis et laboribus compensare eam quam ex discendo capiant voluptatem? Mihi quidem Homerus huiusmodi quiddam vidisse videtur in iis quae de Sirenum cantibus finxerit.¹ Neque enim vocum suavitate videntur aut novitate quadam et varietate cantandi revocare eos solitae qui prae-tervehebantur, sed quia multa se scire profitebantur, ut homines ad earum saxa discendi cupiditate ad-

¹ finxerit inf. MSS.; others finxit (perhaps rightly Mdv.); finxerint B, E.

448
BOOK V. xvii-xviii

but also for their own sakes. For since our nature aims at the full development of all its parts, she desires for its own sake that state of body which is most in accordance with himself; because she is thrown into utter disorder if the body is diseased or in pain or weak.

8 XVIII. "Let us consider the parts of the mind, which are of nobler aspect. The loftier these are, the more unmistakable indications of nature do they afford. So great is our innate love of learning and of knowledge, that no one can doubt that man's nature is strongly attracted to these things even without the lure of any profit. Do we notice how children cannot be deterred even by punishment from studying and inquiring into the world around them? Drive them away, and back they come. They delight in knowing things; they are eager to impart their knowledge to others; pageants, games and shows of that sort hold them spell-bound, and they will even endure hunger and thirst so as to be able to see them. Again, take persons who delight in the liberal arts and studies; do we not see them careless of health or business, patiently enduring any inconvenience when under the spell of learning and of science, and repaid for endless toil and trouble by the pleasure they derive from acquiring knowledge? For my part I believe Homer had something of this sort in view in his imaginary account of the songs of the Sirens. Apparently it was not the sweetness of their voices or the novelty and diversity of their songs, but their professions of knowledge that used to attract the passing voyagers; it was the passion for learning that kept men rooted to the Sirens'
haerescerent. Ita enim invitam Ulixem (nam verti, ut quaedam Homeri, sic istum ipsum locum):

O decus Argolicum, quin puppim flectis, Ulixes, Auribus ut nostros possis agnoscere cantus?
Nam nemo haec umquam est transvectus caerulea
cursu,
Quin prius astiterit vocum dulcedine captus,
Post, variis avido satiatus pectore musis,
Doctior ad patrias lapsus pervenerit oras.
Nos grave certamen belli clademque tenemus,
Graecia quam Troiae divino numine vexit,
Omniaque et latis rerum vestigia terris.

Vidit Homerus probari fabulam non posse si canti
unculis tantus irretitus vir teneretur; scientiam
pollicientur, quam non erat mirum sapientiae cupid
patria esse\(^1\) cariorem. [Atque omnia quidem scire
cuiuscumquemodi sint cupere curiosorum], duci vero
maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem sci
entiae summorum virorum est putandum.

50  XIX. “Quem enim ardorem studi censetis fuisset in
Archimede, qui dum in pulvere quaedam describit
attentius, ne patriam quidem captam esse senserit!
quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus
in musicis! quo studio Aristophanem putamus aeta
tem in litteris duxisse! Quid de Pythagora, quid
de Platone aut de Democrito loquar? a quibus
propter discendi cupiditatem videmus ultimas terras
esse peragratas. Quae qui non vident, nihil um
quam magnum ac\(^2\) cognitione dignum amaverunt.

\(^1\) esse most MSS. omit.
\(^2\) magnum ac Bremius, Mdv.; magna MSS.

*Odyssey*, 12, 184 ff.
rocky shores. This is their invitation to Ulysses (for I have translated this among other passages of Homer):

Ulysses, pride of Argos, turn thy bark
And listen to our music. Never yet
Did voyager sail these waters blue, but stayed
His course, enchanted by our voices sweet,
And having filled his soul with harmony,
Went on his homeward way a wiser man.
We know the direful strife and clash of war
That Greece by Heaven's mandate bore to Troy,
And whatsoever on the wide earth befalls.a

Homer was aware that his story would not sound plausible if the magic that held his hero immeshed was the charm of mere melody! It is knowledge that the Sirens offer, and it was no marvel if a lover of wisdom held this dearer than his home. An itch for miscellaneous omniscience no doubt stamps a man as a mere dilettante; but it must be deemed the mark of a superior mind to be led on by the contemplation of high matters to a passionate love of knowledge.

XIX. "What an ardour for study, think you, possessed Archimeedes, who was so absorbed in a diagram he was drawing in the dust that he was unaware even of the capture of his native city! What genius do we see expended by Aristoxenus on the theory of music! Imagine the zeal of a lifetime that Aristophanes devoted to literature! Why should I speak of Pythagoras, or of Plato, or Democritus? For they, we are told, in their passion for learning travelled through the remotest parts of the earth! Those who are blind to these facts have never been enamoured of some high and worthy study. And
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Atque hoc loco qui propter animi voluptates coli dicunt ea studia quae dixi, non intellegunt idcirco esse ea propter se expetenda quod nulla utilitate obiecta delectentur animi atque ipsa scientia etiamsi incommodatura sit gaudeant. Sed quid attinet de rebus tam apertis plura requirere? Ipsi enim quaeramus a nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium quae naturae obscuritate occultantur cognitiones quemadmodum nos moveant, et quid historia delectet quam solemus persequi usque ad extremum, praetermissa repetimus, inchoata persequimur. Nec vero sum nescius esse utilitatem in historia, non modo voluptatem. Quid cum fictas fabulas e quibus utilitas nulla elici potest cum voluptate legimus? Quid cum volumus nomina eorum qui quid gesserint nota nobis esse, parentes, patriam, multa praeterea minime necessaria? Quid quod homines insima fortuna, nulla spe rerum gerendarum, opifices denique delectantur historia? maximeque eos videre possumus res gestas audire et legere velle qui a spe gerendi absunt confecti senectute. Quocirca intellegi neesse est in ipsis rebus quae discuntur et cognoscuntur invitaumenta inesse quibus ad discendum cognoscendumque moveamur. Ac veteres quidem philosophi in beato- rum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, 452
BOOK V. xix

those who in this connexion allege that the studies I have mentioned are pursued for the sake of mental pleasure fail to see that they are proved to be desirable for their own sake by the very fact that the mind feels delight in them when no bait of advantage is held out, and finds enjoyment in the mere possession of knowledge even though it is likely to be a positive disadvantage to its possessor.

But what is the point of inquiring further into matters so obvious? (Let us ask ourselves the question, what feelings are produced in us by the motions of the stars and by contemplating the heavenly bodies and studying all the obscure and secret realms of nature; what pleasure we derive from books on history, which we are so fond of perusing to the very last page, turning back to parts we have omitted, and pushing on to the end when we have once begun. Not that I am unaware that history is useful as well as entertaining. But what of our reading fiction, from which no utility can be extracted? What of our eagerness to learn the names of people who have done something notable, their parentage, birthplace, and many quite unimportant details beside? What of the delight that is taken in history by men of the humblest station, who have no expectation of participating in public life, even mere artisans? Also we may notice that the persons most eager to hear and read of public affairs are those who are debarred by the infirmities of age from any prospect of taking part in them. Hence we are forced to infer that the objects of study and knowledge contain in themselves the allurements that entice us to study and to learning. The old philosophers picture what the life of the Wise will be in the Islands of the Blest, and

458
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae
cultum aut paratum requirentes, nihil aliud acturos
putant nisi ut omne tempus inquiringo ac discendo
in naturae cognitione consumant. Nos autem non
solum beatae vitae istam esse oblectationem videmus
sed etiam levamentum miseriarum; itaque multi
cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum,
multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum
54 doctrinae studiis levarunt. Princeps huius civitatis
Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esset iniuria,
ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit.
Qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te horta-
mur excerret Theophrastique esset auditor, multa
praecrara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum
ali quem suum quo erat orbatus; sed animi cultus
ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus. Equi-
dem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis
capto, saepe audiebam cum se lucis magis quam utili-
tatis desiderio moveri dicaret. Somnum denique
nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quan-
dam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus
datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit om-
nem; itaque si aut requietem natura non quae reret
aut eam posset alia quadam ratione consequi, facile
pateremur, qui etiam nunc agendi aliquid discendii-
que causa prope contra naturam vigilias suscipere
soleamus.

55 Sunt autem etiam clariora vel plane perspicua
minimeque dubitanda indicia naturae, maxime scilicet
454
imagine them released from all anxiety, needing none of the necessary equipment or accessories of life, and with nothing else to do but to spend their whole time upon study and research in the science of nature. We on the other hand see in such studies not only the amusement of a life of happiness, but also the alleviation of misfortune; hence the numbers of men who when they had fallen into the power of enemies or tyrants, or when they were in prison or in exile, have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning. Demetrius of Phalerum, the ruler of this city, when unjustly banished from his country, repaired to the court of King Ptolemy at Alexandria. Being eminent in the very system of philosophy which we are recommending to you, and a pupil of Theophrastus, he employed the leisure afforded by his disaster in composing a number of excellent treatises, not for any practical use in his own case, for from this he was debarred; but he found a sort of food for his intellectual tastes in thus cultivating his mind. I myself frequently heard the blind ex-praetor and scholar Gnaeus Ausidius declare that he felt the actual loss of light more than the inconvenience of blindness. Take lastly the gift of sleep: did it not bring us repose for our bodies and an antidote to labour, we should think it a violation of nature, for it robs us of sensation and entirely suspends our activity; so that if our nature did not require repose or could obtain it in some other manner, we should be quite content, inasmuch as even as it is we frequently deny ourselves slumber, almost to the point of doing violence to nature, in the interests of business or of study.

“Even more striking, and in fact absolutely obvious and convincing natural indications are not
CICERO DE FINIBUS

in homine sed in omni animali, ut appetat animus agere semper aliquid neque ulla condicione quietem sempiternam possit pati. Facile est hoc cernere in primis puerorum aetatulis. Quamquam enim vereor ne nimius in hoc genere videar, tamen omnes veteres philosophi, maxime nostri, ad incunabula accedunt, quod in pueritia facillime se arbitrentur naturae voluntatem posse cognoscere. Videmus igitur ut conquiescere ne infantes quidem possint; cum vero paulum processerunt, lusionibus vel laboriosis dele- ctantur, ut ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint. Eaque cupiditas agendi aliquid adulescit una cum aetatibus. Itaque ne si iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat mortis instar putemus.

56 Quin etiam inertissimos homines, nescio qua singulari nequitia praeditos, videmus tamen et corpore et animo moveri semper et, cum re nulla impediantur necessaria, aut alveolum poscere aut quaerere quempiam ludum aut sermonem aliquem require, cumque non habeant ingenuas ex doctrina oblectiones, circulos aliquos et sessiunculas consectari. Ne bestiae quidem quas delectionis causa concludimus, cum copiosius alantur quam si essent liberae, facile patiuntur sese contineri, motusque solutos et vagos a natura sibi tributos requirunt. Itaque ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita si gerendis negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus.

1 quod... arbitrentur inf. MSS., Müller; others quod... arbitrantur; qui... arbitrentur B, E, Mdv.
2 Ne inf. MSS., Mdv.; quin ne B, quin te E.
wanting, more particularly no doubt in man, but also in every living creature, of the presence of a positive craving for constant activity. Perpetual re-
pose is unendurable on any terms. This is a fact that may be readily detected in children of the tenderest age, if I may risk being thought to lay un-
due stress on a field of observation sanctioned by the older thinkers, all of whom, and my own school more than others, go to the nursery, because they believe that Nature reveals her plan to them most clearly in childhood. Even infants, we notice, are incapable of keeping still. Children of a somewhat more advanced age delight in games involving considerable exertion, from which not even fear of punishment can restrain them. And this passion for activity grows as they grow older. The prospect of the most delightful dreams would not reconcile us to falling asleep for ever: Endymion's fate we should consider an exact image of death. Observe the least energetic among men: even in a notorious idler both mind and body are constantly in motion; set him free from unavoid-
able occupations, and he calls for a dice-board, goes off to some sport, or looks for somebody to chat with, seeking at the club or at some trivial social gathering a substitute for higher and more intellectual amusements. Even the wild animals that we keep in cages for our entertainment find their captivity irksome, although they are better fed than if they were at large; they miss their natural birthright of free and untrammelled movement. Hence the abler and more accomplished a man is, the less he would care to be alive at all if debarred from taking part in affairs, although allowed to consume an unlimited supply of pleasures. Men of ability either choose
CICERO DE FINIBUS

Nam aut privatim aliquid gerere malunt, aut qui altiore animo sunt capessunt rem publicam honoribus imperiisque adipiscendis, aut totos se ad studia doctrinae conferunt; qua in vita tantum abest ut voluptates consequuntur, etiam curas, sollicitudines, vigilias perferunt, optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est, ingenii et mentis acie fruuntur, nec voluptatem requirentes nec fugientes laborem; nec vero intermittunt aut admirationem eorum rerum quae sunt ab antiquis repertae aut investigationem novarum; quo studio cum satiari non possint, 1 om- nium ceterarum rerum oblii nihil abiectum, nihil humile cogitam; tantaque est vis talibus in studiis, ut eos etiam qui sibi alios proposuerint fines bonorum, quos utilitate aut voluptate dirigunt, tamen in rebus quaerendis explicandisque naturis aetates conterere videamus.

58 XXI. "Ergo hoc quidem apparét, nos ad agendum esse natos. Actionum autem genera plura, ut obscœrentur etiam maioribus minora, maxima autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et ipsis quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque rerum caelestium et earum quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta ratio, reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum

1 possint Ernesti, Müller; possunt MSS., Mdv.

a A reference to the Epicureans' interest in natural science, illustrated by Lucretius.

458
BOOK V. xx-xxi

a life of private activity, or, if of loftier ambition, aspire to a public career of political or military office, or else they devote themselves entirely to study and learning; and the devotees of learning are so far from making pleasure their aim, that they actually endure care, anxiety and loss of sleep, and in the exercise of the noblest part of man’s nature, the divine element within us (for so we must consider the keen edge of the intellect and the reason), they ask for no pleasure and avoid no toil; they are ceaselessly occupied in marvelling at the discoveries of the ancients or in pursuing new researches of their own; insatiable in their appetite for study, they forget all else besides, and harbour not one base or mean thought. So potent is the spell of these pursuits, that even those who profess to follow other Ends of Goods, defined by utility or pleasure, may yet be seen to spend their whole lives in investigating and unfolding the processes of nature.

XXI. "It is therefore at all events manifest that we are designed by nature for activity. Activities are of various kinds, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first (according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied) the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of Prudence, Temperance, Bravery and Justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consonant therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of Morality; towards the knowledge and practice of which, when
CICERO DE FINIBUS

et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeerunte deducimur. Omnium enim rerum principia parva sunt, sed suis progressionibus usa augmentur; nec sine causa; in primo enim ortu inest teneritas ac mollitia quaedam, ut nec res videre optimas nec agere possint. Virtutis enim beataeque vitae, quae duo maxime expetenda sunt, serius lumen apparat, molto etiam serius, ut plane qualia sint intellegantur. Praeclare enim Plato: ‘Beatum cui etiam in senectute contigerit ut sapientiam verasque opiniones assequi possit!’ Quare quoniam de primis naturae commodis satis dictum est, nunc de maioribus consequentibusque videamus. Natura igitur corpus quidem hominis sic et genuit et formavit ut alia in primo ortu perficeret, alia progrediente aetate finge-ret, neque sane multum adiumentis externis et adventiciis uteretur; animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfeicit ut corpus; sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendis idoneis ut nihil aut non multum adiumento ullo ad suam confirmationem indigerent; quod autem in homine praestantissimum atque optimum est, id deseruit. Etsi dedit talem mentem quae omnem virtutem accipere posset, ingenuitque sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum et quasi instituit docere, et induxit in ea quae inerant tamquam elementa virtutis. Sed virtutem ipsam inchoavit; nihil amplius. Itaque nostrum est (quod nostrum dico, artis est) ad ea principia quae accep-

1 indigerent Bremi; indigeret Mdv. with MSS.

a Plato, Laws 653a.
we have grown to maturity, we are led onward by nature's own guidance. All things are small in their first beginnings, but they grow larger as they pass through their regular stages of progress. And there is a reason for this, namely that at the moment of birth we possess a certain weakness and softness which prevent our seeing and doing what is best. The radiance of virtue and of happiness, the two things most to be desired, dawns upon us later, and far later still comes a full understanding of their nature. 'Happy the man,' Plato well says, 'who even in old age has the good fortune to be able to achieve wisdom and true opinions.'

Therefore since enough has been said about the primary goods of nature, let us now consider the more important things that follow later. In generating and developing the human body, Nature's procedure was to make some parts perfect at birth, and to fashion other parts as it grew up, without making much use of external and artificial aids. The mind on the other hand she endowed with its remaining faculties in the same perfection as the body, equipping it with senses already adapted to their function of perception and requiring little or no assistance of any kind to complete their development; but the highest and noblest part of man's nature she neglected. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction embryonic notions of the loftiest ideas, laying the foundation of its education, and introducing it to the elements of virtue, if I may so call them, which it already possessed. But of virtue itself she merely gave the germ and no more. Therefore it rests with us (and when I say with us, I mean with our
CICERO DE FINIBUS

mus consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id quod volumus effectum; quod quidem pluris est haud paulo magisque ipsum propter se expetendum quam aut sensus aut corporis ea quae diximus, quibus tantum praestat mentis excellens perfectio ut vix cogitari possit quid intersit. Itaque omnis honos, omnis admiratio, omne studium ad virtutem et ad eas actiones quae virtutis consentaneae sunt refertur, eaque omnia quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur uno nomine honesta dicuntur.

"Quorum omnium quae sint notitiae quaeque significantur rerum¹ vocabulis quaeque cuiusque vis et natura sit mox videbimus; XXII. hoc autem loco tantum explicemus, haec honesta quae dico, praeterquam quod nosmet ipsos diligamus, praeterea suapte natura per se esse expetenda. Indicant pueri, in quibus ut in speculis natura cernitur. Quanta studia decertantium sunt! quanta ipsa certamina! ut illi efferuntur laetitia cum vicerunt! ut pudet victos! ut se accusari nolunt! quam cupiunt laudari! quos illi labores non² perferunt ut aequalium principes sint! quae memoria est in iis bene merentium, quae referendae gratiae cupiditas! Atque ea in optima quaque indole maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta quae intellegimus a natura tamquam adumbrantur.

Sed haec in pueris; expressa vero in iis aetatibus quae iam confirmatae sunt. Quis est tam dissimilis

¹significantur rerum inf. MSS., Mdv.; significant rerum B, E; Mdv. conj. significant eorum; Davis quibusque significantur [rerum].
²non bracketed by Mdv.

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science), in addition to the elementary principles bestowed upon us, to seek out their logical developments, until our full purpose is realized. For this is much more valuable and more intrinsically desirable than either the senses or the endowments of the body above alluded to; since those are surpassed in an almost inconceivable degree by the matchless perfection of the intellect. Therefore all honour, all admiration, all enthusiasm is directed towards virtue and towards the actions in harmony with virtue, and all such properties and processes of the mind are entitled by the single name of Moral Worth.

"The connotation of all these conceptions and the signification of the terms that denote them, and their several values and natures we shall study shortly; for the present let us merely explain that this Morality to which I allude is an object of our desire, not only because of our love of self, but also intrinsically and for its own sake. A hint of this is given by children, in whom nature is discerned as in a mirror. How hotly they pursue their rivalries! how fierce their contests and competitions! what exultation they feel when they win, and what shame when they are beaten! How they dislike blame! how they covet praise! what toils do they not undergo to stand first among their companions! how good their memory is for those who have shown them kindness, and how eager they are to repay it! And these traits are most apparent in the noblest characters, in which the moral excellences, as we understand them, are already roughly outlined by nature. But this belongs to childhood; the picture is filled in at the age when the character is fully formed. Who is
CICERO DE FINIBUS

hominis qui non moveatur et offensione turpitudinis et comprobatione honestatis? quis est qui non oderit libidinosam, protervam adolescendiam? quis contra in illa aetate pudorem, constantiam, etiamsi sua nihil intersit, non tamen diligat? quis Pullum Numitorium Fregellanum proditorem, quamquam rei publicae nostre profuit, non odit? quis huius\(^{1}\) urbis conservatorem Codrum, quis Erechthei filias non maxime laudat? cui Tubuli nomen odio non est? quis Aristodem non mortuum diligat? An obliviscimus quanto opere in audiendo in\(^{2}\) legendoque moveamur cum pie, cum amice, cum magno animo aliquid factum cognoscimus? Quid loquor de nobis qui ad laudem et ad de cus nati, suscepti, instituti sumus? qui clamores vulgi atque imperatorum excitantur in theatris, cum illa dicuntur:

Ego sum Orestes,

contraque ab altero:

Immo enimvero ego sum, inquam, Orestes!

Cum autem etiam exitus ab utroque datur conturbato errantique regi:

Ambo ergo una necarier precamur,

quotiens hoc agitur, ecquandone nisi admirationibus maximis? Nemo est igitur quin hanc affectionem animi probet atque laudet qua non modo utilitas nulla quae ritur sed contra utilitatem etiam conservatatur fides. Talibus exemplis non fictae solum fabulae verum etiam historiae refertae sunt, et quidem

\(^{1}\)huius\ inserted by Müller, suggested by Mdv.

\(^{2}\)in Mdv. brackets.

\(^{a}\) Cf. II, 79, note.
BOOK V. xxii

so unlike a human being as to feel no repulsion at baseness and no approval for goodness? Who is there that does not hate a youth spent in debauchery and wantonness? Who on the contrary would not esteem modesty and orderliness in the young, even though he has no personal concern in them? Who does not hate the traitor Pullus Numitorius of Fregellae, although he did a service to our country? Who does not praise and extol Codrus, the preserver of this city, or honour the daughters of Erechtheus? or loathe the very name of Tubulus? or love the memory of Aristides? Do we forget the strong emotion that we feel when we hear or read of some deed of piety, of friendship or of magnanimity? But I need not speak of ourselves, whose birth, breeding and education point us towards glory and towards honour; think of the uneducated multitude,—what a tempest of applause rings through the theatre at the words:

I am Orestes,

and at the rejoinder:

No, no, 'tis I, I say, I am Orestes.

And then when each offers a solution to the king in his confusion and perplexity:

Then prithee slay us both; we'll die together:
as often as this scene is acted, does it ever fail to arouse the greatest enthusiasm? This proves that all men without exception approve and applaud the disposition that not only seeks no advantage for itself, but is loyal and true even to its own disadvantage.

These high examples crowd the pages not only of romance but also of history, and especially the history

HH

465
maxime nostrae. Nos enim ad sacra Idaea accipiendae optimum virum delegimus; nos tutores regibus misimur; nostri imperatores pro salute patriae sua capita voverunt; nostri consules regem inimicissimum moenibus iam appropinquantem monuerunt a veneno ut caveret; nostra in re publica et quae per vim oblatum stuprum voluntaria morte lueret inventa est et qui filiam interficeret ne stupraretur; quae quidem omnia et innumerabilia praeterea quis est quin intellegat et eos qui fecerint dignitatis splendore ductos immemores fuisse utilitatum suarum nosque cum ea laudemus nulla alia re nisi honestate duci?

XXIII. "Quibus rebus breviter expositis (nec enim sum copiam quam potui, quia dubitatio in re nulla erat, persecutus), sed his rebus concluditur profecto et virtutes omnes et honestum illud quod ex iis oritur et in illis haeret per se esse expetendum.

65 In omni autem honesto de quo loquimur nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat quam coniuncto inter homines hominum et quasi quaedam societas et communicatio utilitatum et ipsa caritas generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, quod a procreatori bus nati diliguntur et tota domus coniugio et stirpe coniungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognitionibus primum, tum affinitatibus, deinde amicitiiis, post vicini-

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a Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, chosen, in obedience to an oracle, as man of blameless life, to receive the image of Cybele, which was brought from Phrygia to Rome 204 B.C.
b M. Aemilius Lepidus administered Egypt, on the death of King Ptolemy Epiphanes, 181 B.C., as guardian of his sons.
c The Decii, cp. II, 61.
d C. Fabricius and Q. Aemilius Papius, 278 B.C., warned Pyrrhus that his physician had offered to poison him.
e Lucretia, cp. II, 66.
f Virginius, ibid.
BOOK V. xxii-xxiii

of our own country. It was we who chose our most virtuous citizen\textsuperscript{a} to receive the sacred emblems from Ida; we who sent guardians to royal princes;\textsuperscript{b} our generals\textsuperscript{c} sacrificed their lives to save their country; our consuls\textsuperscript{d} warned the king who was their bitterest foe, when close to the walls of Rome, to be on his guard against poison; in our commonwealth was found the lady\textsuperscript{e} who expiated her outraged honour by a self-sought death, and the father\textsuperscript{f} who killed his daughter to save her from shame. Who is there who cannot see that all these deeds and countless others besides were done by men who were inspired by the splendour of moral greatness to forget all thought of interest, and are praised by us from no other consideration but that of Moral Worth?

XXIII. “The considerations thus briefly set out (for I have not aimed at such a full account as I might have given, since the matter admitted of no uncertainty), these considerations then lead to the undoubted conclusion that all the virtues, and the Moral Worth which springs from them and inheres in them, are intrinsically desirable. But in the whole moral sphere of which we are speaking there is nothing more glorious nor of wider range than the solidarity of mankind, that species of alliance and partnership of interests and that actual affection which exists between man and man, which, coming into existence immediately upon our birth, owing to the fact that children are loved by their parents and the family as a whole, is bound together by the ties of marriage and parenthood, gradually spreads its influence beyond the home, first by blood relationships, then by connections through marriage, later by friendships, afterwards by the bonds of neighbourhood,

\textsuperscript{a} \textsuperscript{b} \textsuperscript{c} \textsuperscript{d} \textsuperscript{e} \textsuperscript{f}
CICERO DE FINIBUS

tatibus, tum civibus et iis qui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanae; quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens atque hanc quam dico societatem coniunctionis humanae munificae et aequae tuens iustitia dicitur, cui sunt adiunctae pietas, bonitas, liberalitas, benignitas, comitas, quaeque sunt generis eiusdem. Atque haec ita iustitiae propria sunt ut sint virtutum reliquarum communia. Nam cum sic hominis natura generata sit ut habeat quiddam ingenitum quasi civile atque populare, quod Graeci πολιτικόν vocant, quidquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam exposui caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit, vicissimque iustitia, ut ipsa fundet se usu in ceteras virtutes, sic illas expetet. Servari enim iustitia nisi a forti viro, nisi a sapiente non potest. Qualis est igitur omnis haec quam dico conspiratio consensusque virtutum, tale est illud ipsum honestum; quando quidem honestum aut ipsa virtus est aut res gesta virtute; quibus rebus vita consentiens virtutibusque respondens recta et honesta et constans et naturae congruens existimari potest.

"Atque haec coniunctio confusioque virtutum tamen a philosophis ratione quadam distinguitur. Nam cum ita copulatae connexaeque sint ut omnes omnium participes sint nec alia ab alia possit separari, tamen proprium suum cuiusque munus est,
then to fellow-citizens and political allies and friends, and lastly by embracing the whole of the human race. This sentiment, assigning each his own and maintaining with generosity and equity that human solidarity and alliance of which I speak, is termed Justice; connected with it are dutiful affection, kindness, liberality, good-will, courtesy and the other graces of the same kind. And while these belong peculiarly to Justice, they are also factors shared by the remaining virtues. For human nature is so constituted at birth as to possess an innate element of civic and national feeling, termed in Greek politikon; consequently all the actions of every virtue will be in harmony with the human affection and solidarity I have described, and Justice in turn will diffuse its agency through the other virtues, and so will aim at the promotion of these. For only a brave and a wise man can preserve Justice. Therefore the qualities of this general union and combination of the virtues of which I am speaking belong also to the Moral Worth aforesaid; inasmuch as Moral Worth is either virtue itself or virtuous action; and life in harmony with these and in accordance with the virtues can be deemed right, moral, consistent, and in agreement with nature.

"At the same time this complex of interwoven virtues can yet be theoretically resolved into its separate parts by philosophers. For although the virtues are so closely united that each participates in every other and none can be separated from any other, yet on the other hand each has its own special function. Thus Courage is displayed in toils and dangers, Temperance in forgoing pleasures, Prudence in the choice of goods and evils, Justice in
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ut fortitudo in laboribus periculisque cernatur, temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus, prudentia in delectu bonorum et malorum, iustitia in suo cuique tribuendo. Quando igitur inest in omni virtute cura quaedam quasi foras spectans aliosque appetens atque complectens, existit illud, ut amici, ut fratres, ut propinqui, ut affines, ut cives, ut omnes denique (quoniam unam societatem hominum esse volumus) propter se expetendi sint. Atqui eorum nihil est eius generis ut sit in fine atque extremo bonorum.

68 Ita fit ut duo genera propter se expetendorum reperiantur, unum quod est in iis in quibus completur illud extremum, quae sunt aut animi aut corporis; haec autem quae sunt extrinsecus, id est quae neque in animo insunt neque in corpore, ut amici, ut parentes, ut liberi, ut propinqui, ut ipsa patria, sunt illa quidem sua sponte cara, sed eodem in genere quo illa non sunt. Nec vero umquam summum bonum assequi quisquam posset si omnia illa, quae sunt extra quamquam expetenda, summo bono continerentur.

69 XXIV. "Quomodo igitur, inquies, verum esse poterit omnia referri ad summum bonum, si amici-tiae, si propinquitates, si reliqua externa summum bono non continentur? Hac videlicet ratione, quod ea quae externa sunt iis tuemur officiis quae oriuntur a suo cuiusque genere virtutis. Nam et amici cultus et parentis ei qui officio fungitur in eo ipso prodest quod ita fungi officio in recte factis est, quae sunt orta a\textsuperscript{1} virtutibus. Quae quidem sapientes sequuntur utentes tamquam\textsuperscript{2} duce natura; non perfecti autem

\textsuperscript{1} a inserted by Lambinus, Mdv.

\textsuperscript{2} utentes tamquam Mdv. brackets; utentes sequuntur tamquam MSS.; Mdv. conj. videntes sequuntur duce natura eam viam.
BOOK V. xxiii-xxiv

giving each his due. As then each virtue contains an element not merely self-regarding, which embraces other men and makes them its end, there results a state of feeling in which friends, brothers, kinsmen, connections, fellow-citizens, and finally all human beings (since our belief is that all mankind are united in one society) are things desirable for their own sakes. Yet none of these relations is such as to form part of the End and Ultimate Good. Hence it results that we find two classes of things desirable for their own sakes; one class consists of those things which constitute the Ultimate Good aforesaid, namely goods of mind or body; the latter set, which are external goods, that is, goods that belong neither to the mind nor to the body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives and one’s country itself, while intrinsically precious to us, yet are not included in the same class as the former. Indeed, no one could ever attain the Chief Good, if all those goods, which though desirable are external to us, formed part of the Chief Good.

XXIV. “How then, you will object, can it be true that all things are means to the Chief Good, if friendships and relationships and the other external goods are not part of the Chief Good? The answer is that it is in this way: we maintain these external goods by those acts of duty which spring from the particular class of virtue connected with each. For example, dutiful conduct towards friends and parents benefits the doer from the very fact that such performance of duty is a right action, and right actions take their rise from virtues. And whereas the Wise, under nature’s guidance, make right action their aim, on the other hand men not perfect and yet although to do our duty to others is a part of virtue.

Love of honour a lower form of virtue.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

homines et tamen ingeniis excellentibus praediti excitantur saepe gloria, quae habet speciem honestatis et similitudinem. Quod si ipsam honestatem undique perfectam atque absolutam, rem unam praeclarissimam omnium maximeque laudandam, penitus viderent, quonam gaudio completerunt, cum tanto opere eius adumbrata opinione laetentur? Quem enim deditum voluptatibus, quem cupiditatum incendiis inflammatum in iis potiendis quae acerrime concupivisset tanta laetitia perfundi arbitramur quanta aut superiorem Africanum Hannibalem victo aut posteriorem Carthaginem eversa? Quem Tiberina descensio festo illo die tanto gaudio affectit quanto L. Paulum, cum regem Persem captum adduceret, eodem flumine invectio? Age nunc, Luci noster, extruere animo altitudinem excellentiamque virtutum; iam non dubitatis quin earum compotes homines magno animo erectoque viventes semper sint beati; qui omnes motus fortunae mutationesque rerum et temporum leves et imbécillos fore intellegant si in virtutis certamen venerint. Illa enim quae sunt a nobis bona corporis numerata complent ea quidem beatissimam vitam, sed ita ut sine illis possit beata vita existere. Ita enim parvae et exiguae sunt istae accessiones bonorum ut, quemadmodum stellae in radiis solis, sic istae in virtutum splendore ne cernantur quidem. Atque hoc ut vere dicitur, parva esse ad beate vivendum momenta ista corporis commodorum, sic nimirum violentum est nulla esse dicere; qui enim sic disputant, obli mihi

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\*The festival of Fors Fortuna, June 24, described by Ovid *Fasti*, 6, 774.\*  

472
BOOK V. xxiv

endowed with noble characters often respond to the stimulus of honour, which has some show and semblance of Moral Worth. But if they could fully discern Moral Worth itself in its absolute perfection and completeness, the one thing of all others most splendid and most glorious, how enraptured would they be, if they take such a delight in the mere shadow and reputation of it? What devotee of pleasure, though consumed by most glowing passions, can be supposed to feel such transports of rapture in winning the objects of his keenest desires, as were felt by the elder Africanus upon the defeat of Hannibal, or by the younger at the overthrow of Carthage? Who ever experienced so much delight from the voyage down the Tiber on the day of the festival as Lucius Paulus felt when he sailed up the river leading King Perses captive in his train?

Come now, my dear Lucius, build in your imagination the lofty and towering structure of the virtues; then you will feel no doubt that those who achieve them, guiding themselves by magnanimity and uprightness, are always happy; realizing as they do that all the vicissitudes of fortune, the ebb and flow of time and of circumstance, will be trifling and feeble if brought into conflict with virtue. The things we reckon as bodily goods do, it is true, form a factor in supreme happiness, but yet happiness is possible without them. For those supplementary goods are so small and slight that in the full radiance of the virtues they are as invisible as the stars in sunlight. Yet true though it is that these bodily advantages are of but slight importance for happiness, to say that they are of no importance is too sweeping; those who maintain this appear to me to

478
CICERO DE FINIBUS

diventur quae ipsi fecerint\(^1\) principia naturae. Tribuendum est igitur his aliquid, dum modo quantum tribuendum sit intellegas. Est enim\(^2\) philosophi non tam gloria qua vera quaerentis nec pro nihilo putare ea quae secundum naturam illi ipsi gloriosi esse fateantur,\(^3\) et videre tantam vim virtutis tan-
tamque ut ita dicam auctoritatem honestatis esse\(^4\) ut reliqua non illa quidem nulla sed ita parva sint ut nulla esse videantur. Haec est nec omnia spennentis praeter virtutem et virtutem ipsam suis laudibus amplificantis oratio; denique haec est undique com-
pleta et perfecta explicatio summi boni.

"Hinc ceteri particulas arripere conati suam quisque videri voluit asserre sententiam. XXV.

73 Saepe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia; hoc uno captus Erillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam alienam per se expetendum. Multa dicta sunt ab antiquis de contemnendis ac despi-
iciendis rebus humanis; hoc unum Aristo tenuit: praeter vitia atque virtutes negavit rem esse ullam aut fugiendum aut expetendum. Positum est a nostris in iis esse rebus quae secundum naturam essent non dolere; hoc Hieronymus summum bonum esse dixit. At vero Callipho et post eum Diodorus, cum alter voluptatem adamasset, alter vacuitatem

\(^1\) fecerint Lambinus, Mdv.; egerint MSS.; icerint Gifan-

\(^2\) enim Davis, Mdv.; tamen MSS.

\(^3\) fateantur (conj. Mdv.) Müller; fatentur E, Mdv.; fate-
bantur B and inf. MSS.

\(^4\) esse inserted by Mdv.

\(474\)
BOOK V. xxiv-xxv

have forgotten those first principles of nature which they have themselves established. Some weight then must be given to bodily goods provided one understands what is the proper amount of weight. The genuine philosopher, who aims at truth and not ostentation, while refusing on the one hand to deny all value to the things which even those high-sounding teachers themselves admit to be in accordance with nature, will on the other hand realize that virtue is so potent, Moral Worth invested so to speak with such authority, that all those other goods, though not worthless, are so small as to appear worthless. This is the language that a man will hold who while not despising all else but virtue yet extols virtue herself with her own proper praises; in short, this is the full, finished and complete account of the Chief Good.

"From this system all the other schools have endeavoured to appropriate fragments, which each has hoped may pass for original. XXV. Aristotle and Theophrastus often and admirably praised knowledge for its own sake; Erillus, captivated by this single tenet, maintained that knowledge was the Chief Good and that nothing else was desirable as an end in itself. The ancients enlarged on the duty of rising proudly superior to human fortunes; Aristo singled out this one point, and declared that nothing but vice or virtue was either to be avoided or desired. Our school included freedom from pain among the things in accordance with nature; Hieronymus made it out to be the Supreme Good. On the other hand Callipho and later Diodorus, the one having fallen in love with pleasure, and the other with freedom from pain, could neither of them dispense

475
doloris, neuter honestate carere potuit, quae est a nostris laudata maxime. Quin etiam ipsi voluptarii deverticula quae sunt et virtutes habent in ore toto dies voluptatemque dumtaxat primo expeti dicunt, deinde consuetudine quasi alteram quandam naturam effic, quae impuls multa faciant nullam quaerentes voluptatem. Stoici restant. Ei quidem non unam aliquam aut alteram rem a nobis, sed totam ad se nostram philosophiam transtulerunt. Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententiis nostri pro suis uterentur nomina tamquam rerum notas mutaverunt. Ita relinquitur sola haec disciplina digna studiosis ingenuarum artium, digna eruditis, digna claris viris, digna principibus, digna regibus.”

Quae cum dixisset paulumque instittisset, “Quid est?” inquit; “satisne vobis videor pro meo iure in vestris auribus commentatus?” Et ego: “Tu vero,” inquam, “Piso, ut saepe alias, sic hodie ita nosse ista visus es ut, si tui nobis potestas saepius fieret, non multum Graecis supplicandum putarem. Quod quidem eo probavi magis quia memini Stasiam Neapolitanum, doctorem illum tuum, nobilem sane Peripateticum, aliquanto ista secus dicere solutum, assentientem iis qui multum in fortuna secunda aut adversa, multum in bonis aut malis corporis pone- rent.” “Est ut dices,” inquit; “sed haec ab Antiocho, familiari nostro, dicuntur multo melius et fortius

1 quae sunt... Lambinus, Müller; quae-sa... dicunt Lambinus, Müller; qua- 2 faciant T. Bentley, Müller; faciunt MSS., Mdv. 3 rem inserted by T. Bentley, Mdv.
with Moral Worth, which by our school was extolled above all else. Even the votaries of pleasure take refuge in evasions: the name of virtue is on their lips all the time, and they declare that pleasure is only at first the object of desire, and that later habit produces a sort of second nature, which supplies a motive for many actions not aiming at pleasure at all. There remain the Stoics. The Stoics have conveyed from us not some one or other item, but our entire system of philosophy. It is a regular practice of thieves to alter the marks upon stolen goods; and the Stoics, in order to pass off our opinions as their own, have changed the names, which are the marks of things. Our system therefore is left as the sole philosophy worthy of the student of the liberal arts, of men of learning, of men of eminence, rank, and power.”

After these words he paused, and then added: “How now? Do you judge me to have used my opportunity well? Does the sketch I have given satisfy my audience?” “Why, Piso,” I replied, “you have shown such a knowledge of your theory, on this, as on many other occasions, that I do not think we should have to rely much upon the aid of the Greeks, if we had more frequent opportunities of hearing you. And I was all the more ready to be convinced by you because I remember that your great teacher, Staseas of Naples, a Peripatetic of unquestionable repute, used to give a somewhat different account of your system, agreeing with those who attached great importance to good and bad fortune, and to bodily goods and evils.” “That is true,” said he; “but our friend Antiochus is a far better and far more uncompromising exponent of the
quam a Stasea dicebantur. Quamquam ego non quaero quid tibi a me probatum sit, sed huic Ciceroni nostro, quem discipulum cupio a te abducere.”


1 ei MSS., edd.; ea two inf. MSS.; perhaps potest quae probabilia sibi videantur ea ed.

a A reference to the scepticism of the New Academy of Arcesilas and Carneades; their doctrines, that certainty was unattainable and that reasonable probability was a sufficient guide for life, are avowed by Cicero in the following sentences.

478.
system than Staseas used to be. Though I don't want to know how far I succeeded in convincing you, but how far I convinced our friend Cicero here; I want to kidnap your pupil from you."

XXVI. To this Lucius replied: "Oh, I am quite convinced by what you have said, and I think my brother is so too." "How now?" said Piso to me, "Has the young man your consent? or would you rather he should study a system which, when he is perfect in it, will end in his knowing nothing?" "Oh, I leave him his liberty," said I; "but don't you remember that it is quite open to me to approve the doctrines you have stated? Since who can refrain from approving statements that appear to him probable?" "But," said he, "can anyone approve that of which he has not full perception, comprehension and knowledge?" "There is no great need to quarrel about that, Piso," I rejoined. "The only thing that makes me deny the possibility of perception is the Stoics' definition of that term; they maintain that nothing can be perceived except a true presentation having such a character as no false presentation can possess. Here then I have a quarrel with the Stoics, but certainly none with the Peripatetics. However let us drop this question, for it involves a very long and somewhat contentious debate. It is the doctrine that the Wise Man is always and invariably happy that I would challenge as too hurriedly touched upon by you. Your discourse somehow skimmed past this point. But unless this doctrine is proved, I am afraid that the truth will lie with Theophrastus, who held that misfortune, sorrow and bodily anguish were incom..."
CICERO DE FINIBUS

putavit, vereor ne vera sint. Nam illud vehementer repugnat, eundem beatum esse et multis malis oppressum. Haec quomodo convenient non sane intellego." "Utrum igitur tibi," inquit, "non placet virtutisne esse tantam vim ut ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta sit, an, si id probas, fieri ita posse negas ut ii qui virtutis compotes sint etiam quibusdam malis affecti beati sint?" "Ego vero volo in virtute vim esse quam maximam; sed quanta sit alias, nunc tantum possitne esse tanta, si quidquam extra virtem habeatur in bonis." "Atqui," inquit, "si Stoicis concedis ut virtus sola si assit vitam efficat beatam, concedis etiam Peripateticis. Quae enim mala illi non audent appellare, aspera autem et incommoda et reecienda et aliena naturae esse concedunt, ea nos mala dicimus sed exigua et paene minima. Quare si potest esse beatus is qui est in asperis reeciendisque rebus, potest is quoque esse qui est in parvis malis." Et ego: "Piso, inquam, si est quisquam qui acute in causis videre soleat quae res agatur, is es profecto tu. Quare attende, quae. Nam adhuc, meo fortasse vitio, quid ego quaeam non perspicis." "Istic sum," inquit, "exspectoque quid ad id quod quaerebam respondeas."

79 XXVII. "Respondebo me non quaerere," inquam, "hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat." "Quo," inquit, "modo?" "Quia cum a Zenone," 480
patible with happiness. For that a man can be at once happy and overwhelmed with evils is violently repugnant to common sense. How happiness and misfortune can go together I entirely fail to understand." "Which position then do you question?" he replied; "that virtue is so potent that she need not look outside herself for happiness? or, if you accept this, do you deny that the virtuous can be happy even when afflicted by certain evils?" "Oh, I would rate the potency of virtue as high as possible; but let us defer the question of her exact degree of greatness; the only point is now, could she be so great as she is, if anything outside virtue be classed as a good?" "Yet," said he, "if you concede to the Stoics that the presence of virtue alone can produce happiness, you concede this also to the Peripatetics. What the Stoics have not the courage to call evils, but admit to be irksome, detrimental, 'to be rejected,' and not in accordance with nature, we say are evils, though small and almost negligible evils. Hence if a man can be happy when surrounded by circumstances that are irksome and to be rejected, he can also be happy when surrounded by trifling evils." "Piso," I rejoined, "you, if anyone, are a sharp enough lawyer to see at a glance the real point at issue in a dispute. Therefore I beg your close attention. For so far, though perhaps I am to blame, you do not grasp the point of my question." "I am all attention," he replied," and await your reply to my inquiry."

XXVII. "My reply will be," said I, "that I am not at the present asking what result virtue can produce, but what is a consistent and what a self-contradictory account of it." "How do you mean?" said he. "Why," I said, "first Zeno enunciates the lofty and
CICERO DE FINIBUS

inquam, "hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: 'Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est,' 'Quare?' inquit; respondet: 'Quia nisi quod honestum est nullum est aliud bonum.' Non quaero iam verumne sit; illud dico, ea quae dicat praeclare inter se cohaerere. Dixerit hoc idem Epicurus, semper beatum esse sapientem; quod quidem solet ebullire nonnumquam; quem quidem cum summis doloribus conficiatur, ait dicturum: 'Quam suave est! quam nihil curo!' Non pugnem cum homine, cur tantum aberret\(^1\) in natura boni; illud urgueam, non intelligere eum quid sibi dicendum sit cum dolorem summum malum esse dixerit. Eadem nunc mea adversum te oratio est. Dicis eadem omnia et bona et mala quae quidem\(^2\) dicunt ii qui numquam philosophum pictum ut dicitur viderunt, valetudinem, vires, staturam, formam, integritatem unguiculorum omnium bona,\(^3\) deformitatem, morbum, debilitatem mala. Iam illa externa parce tu quidem; sed haec cum corporis bona sint, eorum conscientia certe in bonis numerabis, amicos, liberos, propinquis, divitias, honores, opes. Contra hoc attende me nihil dicere; illud dicere,\(^4\) si ista mala sunt in quae potest incidere sapiens, sapientem esse non satis esse ad beate vivendum." "Immo vero," inquit, "ad beatissimem vivendum parum est, ad beate satis." "Animadverti," inquam, "te isto modo paulo ante ponere, et scio ab Antioche nostro dici sic solere; sed quid

\(^1\)aberret Müller; habeat MSS.; abeat ("tam longe a nobis discedat") Mdv.
\(^2\)quidem Mdv. brackets.
\(^3\)bona inserted by Lambinus, Mdv.
\(^4\)illud dicere inserted by Mdv.
BOOK V. xxvii

oracular utterance, 'Virtue need not look outside herself for happiness'; 'Why?' says some one. 'Because,' he answers, 'nothing else is good but what is morally good.' I am not now asking whether this is true; what I say is that Zeno's statements are admirably logical and consistent. Suppose Epicurus to say the same thing, that the Wise Man is always happy,—for he is fond of ranting like this now and then, and indeed tells us that when the Wise Man is suffering torments of pain, he will say 'How pleasant this is! how little I mind!'—Well, I should not join issue with the man as to why he goes so far astray about the nature of the Good; what I should insist is that he does not understand what is the necessary corollary of his own avowal that pain is the supreme evil. I take the same line now against you. As to what is good and what is evil, your account agrees entirely with that of those who have never set eyes on a philosopher, even in a picture, as the saying is: you call health, strength, height, beauty, soundness of every part from top to toe, goods, and ugliness, disease and weakness evils. As for external goods, you were, it is true, cautious; but since these bodily excellences are goods, you will doubtless reckon as goods the things productive of them, namely friends, children, relations, riches, rank and power. Mark that against this I say nothing; what I say is, if misfortunes which a Wise Man may encounter are as you say evils, to be wise is not enough for happiness.' "Say rather," said he, "not enough for supreme happiness, but it is enough for happiness." "I noticed," I replied, "you made that distinction a little time ago, and I am aware that our master Antiochus is fond of saying the same; but what can be more un-

Piso: Yes, though not the greatest happiness.

Cicero: How can there be degrees of happiness?
CICERO DE FINIBUS

minus probandum quam esse aliquem beatum nec satis beatum? Quod autem satis est, eo quidquid accessit\(^1\) nimum est; et nemo nimum beatus est; igitur\(^2\) nemo beato beator. "Ergo," inquit, "tibi Q. Metellus, qui tres filios consules vidit, et quibus unum etiam et censorem et triumphantem, quartum autem praetorem, eosque salvos reliquit et tres filias nuptas, cum ipse consul, censor, augur fuisset et triumphasset, ut sapiens fuerit, nonne beator quam, ut item sapiens fuerit, qui in potestate hostium vigilii et inedia necatus est, Regulus?"


\(^1\)accessit Müller (cf. IV, 37 perduxit); accesserit MSS, Mdv.
\(^2\)igitur Müller; et MSS., Mdv. who marks as corrupt
BOOK V. xxvii-xxviii

satisfactory than to say that a man is happy but not happy enough? Any addition to what is enough makes too much; now no one has too much happiness; therefore no one can be happier than happy."

"Then in your view," he said, "was not Quintus Metellus, who saw three sons consuls, and one of these made censor and celebrating a triumph as well, and a fourth praetor, and who left his four sons alive and well and three daughters married, having himself been consul, censor and augur and having had a triumph,—supposing him to have been a Wise Man, was he not happier than Regulus, who died a captive in the hands of the enemy, from starvation and want of sleep, allowing him also to have been a Wise Man?"

XXVIII. "Why," said I, "do you ask that question of me? Ask the Stoics." "What answer then," he said, "do you think they would give?" "That Metellus is no happier than Regulus." "Well then," said he, "let us start from that." "Still," said I, "we are wandering from our subject. For I am not inquiring what is true, but what each school ought consistently to say. I only wish they said that there were degrees of happiness! then you would see a collapse! For since the Good consists solely in virtue and in actual Moral Worth, and neither virtue nor Moral Worth, as they hold, admits of increase, and since that alone is good which necessarily makes its possessor happy, when that which alone constitutes happiness does not allow of increase, how can anyone possibly be happier than anyone else? Do you see how logical this is? And in fact (for I must admit what I really think) their system is a marvellously consistent whole.

Cicero: But it is inconsistent to say that the Wise Man is always happy, unless with the Stoics you deny pain to be an evil.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

media utrisque, omnia omnibus; quid sequatur, quid repugnet, vident. Ut in geometria, prima si dederis, danda sunt omnia. Concede nihil esse bonum nisi quod honestum sit; concedendum est in virtute positam esse\(^1\) vitam beatam. Vide rursus retro. Dato hoc, dandum est illud. Quod vestri non item. 84 ‘Tria genera bonorum’: proclivi currit oratio. Venit ad extremum; haeret in salebra; cupit enim dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. Honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam. ‘Audeo dicere,’ inquit. Non potes, nisi retexueris illa. Paupertas si malum est, mendicus esse beatus nemo potest quamvis sit sapiens. At Zeno eum non beatum modo sed etiam divitem dicere ausus est. Dolere malum est; in crucem qui agitur beatus esse non potest. Bonum liberi; misera orbitas; bonum patria; miserum exsilium; bonum valetudo; miser morbus; bonum integritas corporis; misera debilitas; bonum incolmum acies; misera caecitas. Quae si potest singula consolando levare, universa quomodo sustinebit? Sit enim idem caecus, debilis, morbo gravissimo affectus, exsul, orbis, egens, torqueatur eculeo; quem hunc appellas, Zeno? ‘Beatum,’ inquit. Etiam beatissimum? ‘Quippe,’ inquiet, ‘cum tam\(^2\) docu-

\(^1\) esse inserted by Mdv.
\(^2\) cum tam inf. MSS., edd.; cum B, E; cum . . non magis habere Baiter.

486
BOOK V. xxviii

The conclusions agree with the first principles, the middle steps with both, in fact every part with every other. They understand what inference follows from and what contradicts a given premise. It is like geometry: grant the premises and you must grant everything. Admit that there is no good but Moral Worth, and you are bound to admit that happiness consists in virtue. Or again conversely: given the latter, you must grant the former. Your school are not so logical. 'Three classes of goods': your exposition runs smoothly on. It comes to its conclusion, and now it sticks at a rough place; for it wants to assert that the Wise Man can lack no requisite of happiness. That is the moral style, the style of Socrates, and of Plato too. 'I dare assert it,' cries the Academic. You cannot, unless you recast the earlier part of the argument. If poverty is an evil, no beggar can be happy, be he as wise as you like. But Zeno dared to say that a wise beggar was not only happy but also wealthy. Pain is an evil: then a man sentenced to crucifixion cannot be happy. Children are a good: then childlessness is miserable; one's country is a good: then exile is miserable; health is a good: then the sick man is miserable; soundness of body is a good: then infirmity is miserable; good eyesight is a good: then blindness is miserable. Perhaps the philosopher's consolations can alleviate each of these misfortunes singly; but how will he enable us to endure them all at once? Suppose a man to be at once blind, infirm, afflicted by dire disease, in exile, childless, destitute and tortured on the rack; what is your name, Zeno, for him? 'A happy man,' says Zeno. A supremely happy man as well? 'To be sure,' he will reply,
CICERO DE FINIBUS

erim gradus istam rem non habere quam virtutem, 85 in qua sit ipsum etiam beatum. 'Tibi hoc incredibile quod beatissimum; quid? tuum credibile? Si enim ad populum me vocas, eum qui ita sit affectus beatum esse numquam probabis; si ad prudentes, alterum fortasse dubitabunt, sitne tantum in virtute ut ea praediti vel in Phalaridis tauro beati sint; alterum non dubitabunt, quin et Stoici convenientia sibi dicant et vos repugnantia. 'Theophrasti igitur,' inquit, 'tibi liber ille placet de beata vita?' Tamen aberramus a proposito, et ne longius, prorsus, inquam, 86 Piso, si ista mala sunt, placet.' "Nonne igitur," inquit, "tibi videntur mala?" "Id quaeris," inquam, "in quo utrum respondero verses te huc atque illuc necesse est." "Quo tandem modo?" inquit. "Quia si mala sunt, is qui erit in iis beatus non erit; si mala non sunt, iacet omnis ratio Peripateticorum." Et ille ridens: "Video," inquit, "quid agas; ne discipulum abducam times." "Tu vero," inquam, "ducas licet si sequetur; erit enim mecum si tecum erit."

XXIX. "Audi igitur," inquit, "Luci; tecum enim mihi instituenda oratio est. Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi 488
BOOK V. xxviii-xxix

'because I have proved that happiness no more admits of degrees than does virtue, in which happiness itself consists.' To you the statement that he is supremely happy is incredible; but what of your own view? is it credible? Call me before a jury of ordinary people, and you will never persuade them that the man so afflicted is happy; refer the case to the learned, and it is possible that on one of the two counts they will be doubtful about their verdict, whether virtue has such efficacy that the virtuous will be happy even in the bull of Phalaris: but on the other, they will find without hesitation that the Stoic doctrine is consistent and yours self-contradictory. 'Ah,' says the Academic, 'then you agree with Theophrastus in his great work On Happiness?' However, we are wandering from the subject; and to cut the matter short, Piso," I said, "I do fully agree with Theophrastus, if misfortunes, as you say, are evils." "Then don't you think they are evils?" he said. "To that question," said I, "whichever reply I make, you will be bound to shift and shuffle." "How so exactly?" he asked. "Because," I replied, "if they are evils, the man who suffers from them will not be happy; and on the other hand if they are not evils, down top- ples the whole Peripatetic system." "I see what you are at," cried he smiling; "you are afraid of my robbing you of a pupil." "Oh," said I, "you are welcome to convert him if he wants to be converted; for if he is in your fold, he will be in mine."

XXIX. "Listen then, Lucius," said Piso, "for I must address myself to you. The whole importance of philosophy lies, as Theophrastus says, in the attainment of happiness; since an ardent desire for hap-
CICERO DE FINIBUS


88 Sed haec etsi praeclare, nondum tamen perpolita; paucia enim, neque ea ipsa enucleate, ab hoc de virtute quidem dicta. Post enim haec in hac urbe primum a Socrate quaeri coepta, deinde in hunc locum delata sunt, nec dubitatum quin in virtute quaerere nolumus Müller; quaereremus.
less possesses us all. On this your brother and I are agreed. Hence what we have to consider is this, can the system of the philosophers give us happiness? It certainly professes to do so. Were it not so, why did Plato travel through Egypt to learn arithmetic and astronomy from barbarian priests? Why did he later visit Archytas at Tarentum, or the other Pythagoreans, Echecrates, Timaeus and Arion, at Locri, intending to append to his picture of Socrates an account of the Pythagorean system and to extend his studies into those branches which Socrates repudiated? Why did Pythagoras himself scour Egypt and visit the Persian magi? why did he travel on foot through those vast barbarian lands and sail across those many seas? Why did Democritus do the same? It is related of the latter (whether truly or falsely we are not concerned to inquire) that he deprived himself of eyesight; and it is certain that in order that his mind should be distracted as little as possible from reflection, he neglected his paternal estate and left his land uncultivated, engrossed in the search for what else but happiness? Even if he supposed happiness to consist in knowledge, still he designed that his study of natural philosophy should procure him peace of mind; since that is his conception of the Chief Good, which he entitles euthumia, or often athambia, that is freedom from alarm. But what he said on the subject, however excellent, nevertheless lacks the finishing touches; for indeed about virtue he said very little, and that not clearly expressed. For it was later that these inquiries began to be pursued at Athens by Socrates, first in the city, and afterwards the study was transferred to the place where we now are; and
CICERO DE FINIBUS

omnis ut bene sic etiam beate vivendi spes ponere-tur. Quae cum Zeno didicisset a nostris, ut in actionibus praescribi solet, de eadem re fecit1 aliomo-do. Hoc tu nunc in illo probas. Scilicet vocabulis rerum mutatis inconstantiae crimine illae effugit, nos effugere non possimus! Ille Metelli vitam negat beatiorem quam Reguli, praeponendam tamen; nec magis expetemandam, sed magis sumendam; et, si optio esset, eligendam Metelli, Reguli reiciendam; ego, quam ille praeponendam et magis eligendam, beati-orem hanc appello, nec ullo minimo2 momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici. Quid interest, nisi quod ego res notas notis verbis appello, illi nomina nova quaerunt quibus idem dicant? Ita quemadmodum in senatu semper est aliquis qui interpretem postulet, sic isti nobis cum interprete audiendi sunt. Bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est, quod contra, malum; nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis. Quid ergo? aliter homines, aliter philosophos loqui putas oportere? Quanti quidque sit, aliter docti et indocti; sed cum constiterit inter doctos quanti res quaeque sit,—si homines essent, usitate loquerentur;—dum res ma-neant, verba fissing arbitratu suo.

1 FECIT edd. bracket.
2 minimo inf. MSS., Mdv.; omnino B, E.

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This preamble seems to have guarded the plaintiff against being non-suited on a plea of chose jugée, in case that having failed in his suit he chose to bring it in again under a different formula.

b.i.e. when an audience was given to Greek-speaking envoys.
no one doubted that all hope alike of right conduct and of happiness lay in virtue. Zeno having learnt this doctrine from our school proceeded to deal with 'the same matter in another manner,' as the common preamble a to an indictment has it. You now approve of this procedure on his part. He, no doubt, can change the names of things and be acquitted of inconsistency, but we cannot! He denies that the life of Metellus was happier than that of Regulus, yet calls it 'preferable'; not more desirable, but 'more worthy of adoption'; and given the choice, that of Metellus is 'to be selected' and that of Regulus 'rejected.' Whereas the life he called 'preferable' and 'more worthy to be selected' I term happier, though I do not assign any the minutest fraction more value to that life than do the Stoics. What is the difference except that I apply familiar terms to familiar things, whereas they invent new names to express the same meaning? Thus just as in the senate there is always some one who demands an interpreter, b so we must use an interpreter when we give audience to your school. I call whatever is in accordance with nature good and what is contrary to nature bad; nor am I alone in this: you, Chrysippus, do so too in business and in private life, but you leave off doing so in the lecture-room. What then? do you think philosophers should speak a different language from ordinary human beings? The learned and the unlearned may differ as to the values of things; but when the learned are agreed what each thing's value is,—if they were human beings, they would adopt the recognized form of expression; but so long as the actual things remain, let them coin new words at their pleasure.

498
CICERO DE FINIBUS

90 XXX. "Sed venio ad inconstantiae crimen, ne sæpius dicas me aberrare; quam tu ponis in verbis, ego positam in re putabam. Si satis erit hoc perceptum, in quo adiuvores Stoicos optimos habemus, tantam vim esse virtutis ut omnia si ex altera parte ponantur ne appareant quidem, cum omnia quae illi commoda certe dicunt esse et sumenda et eligenda et præposita (quae ita definiunt ut satis magno aestimanda sint), haec igitur cum ego tot nominibus a Stoicis appellata, partim novis et commenticiis ut ista 'producta' et 'reducta,' partim idem significantibus (quid enim interest, expetas an eligas? mihi quidem etiam lautius videtur quod eligitur et ad quod deflectus adhibetur), sed, cum ego ista omnia bona dixero, tantum refert quam magna dicam; cum expetenda, quam valde. Sin autem nec expetenda ego magis quam tu eligenda, nec illa pluris aestimanda ego qui bona, quam tu qui producta appellas, omnia ista necesse est obscurari nec apparere et in virtutis tamquam in solis radios incurrere. At enim qua in vita est aliquid mali, ea beata esse non potest Ne seges quidem igitur spicies uberibus et crebris si avenam uspiam videris, nec mercatura quaestuosa si
BOOK V. xxx

XXX. "But I come to the charge of inconsistency, or you will say I digress too often. You make inconsistency a matter of words, but I imagined it to be a question of fact. Only let it be clearly grasped, and in this we have the Stoics as our strongest supporters, that such is the power of virtue that all other things, if ranged on the opposite side to it, are absolutely imperceptible in comparison; then, as for all the things which they admit to be advantageous and 'to be adopted' and 'selected' and 'preferred' (terms which they define so as to mean possessed of considerable value), when I style these things, which receive so many names from the Stoics, some new and original, like your words 'promoted' and 'degraded,' some identical in meaning (for what difference is there between 'desiring' a thing and 'selecting' it? to my ear there is a more sumptuous sound about a thing that is selected, and to which choice is applied), —however when I call all these things good, the only thing that matters is, how good do I mean; when I call them desirable, the only question is, how desirable? But if on the other hand I do not think them more 'to be desired' than you 'to be selected,' and if I who call them good do not deem them more valuable than you who call them 'promoted,' all these external things will necessarily be eclipsed and rendered imperceptible by the side of virtue; to encounter its radiance is like meeting the rays of the sun. But you will say that a life which contains some evil cannot be happy. At that rate a crop of corn is not a heavy and abundant crop if you can spy a single stalk of wild oat anywhere among it; a business is not profitable if among

we assign no higher value to externals by calling them 'goods.'

If you say that happiness cannot include any evil, we reply that a thing is judged by its predominant quality:
CICERO DE FINIBUS

in maximis lucris paulum aliquid damni contraxerit. An hoc usquequaque, aliter in vita? et non ex maxima parte de tota iudicabis? an dubium est quin virtus ita maximam partem obtineat in rebus humanis ut reliquas obruat? Audebo igitur cetera quae secundum naturam sint bona appellare nec fraudare suo vetere nomine potius quam aliquod novum exquirere; virtutis autem amplitudinem quasi in altera librae lance ponere. Terram, mihi crede, ea lanx et maria deprimet. Semper enim ex eo quod maximas partes continet latissimeque funditur tota res appellatur. Dicimus aliquem hilare vivere; ergo si semel tristior effectus est hilara vita amissa est?

At hoc in eo M. Crasso, quem semel ait in vita risisse Lucilius, non contigit, ut ea re minus ἀγέλαστος, ut ait idem, vocaretur. Polycratem Samium felicem appellabant. Nihil acciderat ei quod nollet nisi quod anulum quo delectabatur in mari abiecerat. Ergo infelix una molestia, felix rursus cum is ipse anulus in praecordiis piscis inventus est? Ille vero si insipiens (quod certe, quoniam tyrannus), numquam beatus; si sapiens, ne tum quidem miser cum ab Oroete praetore Darei in crucem actus est. 'At multis malis affectus.' Quis negat? sed ea mala virtutis magnum magnum obruebantur.

\[ potius quam aliquod \] Lambinus, Müller; quam aliquid (aliquam B, E) potius MSS., Mdv. with mark of corruption, suggesting \[ requi aliquid potius. \]

\[ ^{a} \text{i.e. 'unsmiling.'} \]
\[ ^{b} \text{The story is told by Herodotus, 3.40 foll.} \]
\[ ^{c} \text{i.e. on the supposition that he was a Wise Man.} \]

496
enormous profits it suffers a single loss. Does one principle hold good in everything else, but another in conduct? Will you not judge of the whole by the largest part? Is there any doubt that virtue occupies so large a part in human affairs that it eclipses every other factor? Well then, I shall make bold to call the other things in accordance with nature 'goods,' and not cheat them of their old name, rather than excogitate some new one; but I shall place the massive bulk of virtue in the opposite scale of the balance. Believe me, that scale will weigh down the earth and the seas. It is a universal rule that any whole takes its name from its most predominant and preponderant part. We say that a man is a cheerful fellow; but if he is once in rather low spirits, has he therefore lost his title to cheerfulness for ever? Well, the rule was not applied to Marcus Crassus, who according to Lucilius laughed but once in his life; that one exception did not prevent his being called *agelastos,* as Lucilius has it. Polycrates of Samos was called 'the fortunate.' Not a single untoward circumstance had ever befallen him, except that he had thrown his favourite ring overboard at sea. Did that single annoyance then make him unfortunate? and did he become fortunate again when the very same ring was found in a fish's belly? But Polycrates, if he was foolish (which he certainly was, since he was a tyrant), was never happy; if wise, he was not miserable even when crucified by Oroetes, the satrap of Darius. 'But,' you say, 'many evils befell him!' Who denies it? but those evils were eclipsed by the magnitude of his virtue.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

93 XXXI. "An ne hoc quidem Peripateticis concedis, ut dicant omnium bonorum virorum, id est sapientium, omnibus virtutibus ornatorum, vitam omnibus partibus plus habere semper boni quam mali? Quis hoc dicit? Stoici scilicet. Minime; sed isti ipsi qui voluptate et dolore omnia metiuntur, nonne clamant sapienti plus semper adesse quod velit quam quod nolit? Cum tantum igitur in virtute ponant ii qui fatentur se virtuosis causa, nisi ea voluptatem faceret, ne manum quidem versurosuisse, quid facere nos oportet qui quamvis minimam praeestantiam animi omnibus bonis corporis anteire dicamus ut ea ne in conspectu quidem relinquantur? Quis est enim qui hoc cadere in sapientem dicere audeat, ut si fieri possit virtutem in perpetuum abiciat ut dolore omni liberetur? Quis nostrum dixerit (quos non pudet ea quae Stoici aspera dicunt mala dicere), melius esse turpiter aliquid facere cum voluptate quam honeste cum dolore? Nobis Heracleotes ille Dionysius flagitiose descivisse videtur a Stoicis propter oculorum dolorem. Quasi vero hoc didicisset a Zenone, non dolere cum doleret! Illud audierat nec tamen didicerat, malum illud non esse quia turpe non esset, et esse\(^2\) ferendum viro. Hic si Peripateticus fuisset, permansisset, credo, in sententia, qui dolorem malum dicunt esse, de asperitate autem eius fortiter ferenda praecipuiunt eadem, quae Stoici. 

\(^1\) faceret Mikkelsen, Müller; accerit inf. MSS., Mdv. with mark of corruption; \(^2\) esse Manutius, Mdv., esset MSS.
BOOK V. xxxi

XXXI. "Or do you even refuse to let the Peripatetics say that every part of the life of all good, that is of all wise men, men whom every virtue decks, always comprises more good than evil? Who does say this? The Stoics, you suppose? Not at all; but the very people who measure all things by pleasure and pain, do not they cry aloud that the Wise Man always has more of what he likes than of what he dislikes? When therefore so much importance is assigned to virtue by those who confess that they would not raise a hand for the sake of virtue if it did not produce pleasure, what are we to do, who say that the smallest amount you like to mention of mental excellence surpasses all the goods of the body, and renders them completely imperceptible? For who is there who would venture to say that it would become the Wise Man to discard virtue for ever (were this possible) for the sake of securing absolute freedom from pain? Who of our school (which is not ashamed to call evils what the Stoics term 'annoyances') was ever known to say that it is better to commit a pleasant sin than to do the painful right? In our view Dionysius of Heraclea was wrong to secede from the Stoics because of a malady of the eyes. As though Zeno had ever taught him that to feel pain was not painful! What he had heard, though he had not learnt the lesson, was that pain was not an evil, because not morally bad, and that it was manly to endure it. Had Dionysius been a Peripatetic, I believe he would never have changed his opinions; the Peripatetics say that pain is an evil, but on the duty of bearing the annoyance it causes with fortitude their teaching is the same as that of the Stoics. And indeed your friend

Even the Epicureans hold that the Wise Man always enjoys a balance of what he desires.

In not denying pain to be evil, Peripateticism is more fortifying than Stoicism.
CICERO DE FINIBUS

quidem Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit; erat enim Polemonis; is cum arderet podagrae doloribus visitassetque hominem Charmides Epicureus¹ perfamiliaris et tristis exiret, 'Mane, quaeso,' inquit, 'Charmide noster; nihil illinc hoc pervenit.' Ostendit pedes et pectus. Ac tamen hic mallet non dolere.

95  XXXII. "Haec igitur est nostra ratio, quae tibi videtur inconstans, cum propter virtutis caelestem quandam et divinam tantamque praestantiam, ut, ubi virtus sit resque magnae et summe laudabiles virtute gestae, ibi esse miseria et aerumna non possit, tamen labor possit, possit molestia, non dubitem dicere omnes sapientes semper esse beatos, sed tamen fieri posse ut sit alius alio beatior." "Atqui iste locus est, Piso, tibi etiam atque etiam confirmandus," inquam; "quem si tenueris, non modo meum Cicero-

96 nem sed etiam me ipsum abducas licebit." Tum Quintus: "Mihi quidem," inquit, "satis hoc confirmatum videtur, laetorque eam² philosophiam, cuix ante supellectilem pluris aestimabam quam possessiones reliquarum (ita mihi dives videbatur ut ab ea petere possem quidquid in studiis nostris concupissem), hanc igitur laetor etiam acutiorem repertam quam ceteras, quod quidam ei deesse dicebant." "Non quam nostram quidem," inquit Pomponius iocans; "sed mehercule pergrata mihi fuit³ oratio tua. Quae enim dici Latine posse non arbitrabar,

¹ Epicureus Mdv.; Epicurus B, E; Epicuri inf. MSS.
² laetorque eam Davis, Mdv.; laetor quidem MSS.
³ fuit inserted by Mdv.

500
BOOK V. xxxi-xxxii

Arcesilas, though he was rather too dogmatic in debate, was still one of us; for he was a pupil of Polemo. When Polemo was racked with the torments of gout he was visited by an intimate friend, the Epicurean Charmides. The latter was departing in distress. 'Stay, I beg of you, friend Charmides,' cried Polemo; 'no pain from here has got to there' (pointing to his feet and his breast). Yet Polemo would have preferred not to feel pain.

XXXII. "This then is our system which you think inconsistent. I on the other hand, seeing the celestial and divine excellence of virtue, excellence so great that where virtue and the mighty and most glorious deeds that she inspires are found, there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can, do not hesitate to declare that every Wise Man is always happy, but yet that it is possible for one to be happier than another." "Well, Piso," said I, "that is a position which you will find needs a great deal of defending; and if you can hold to it, you are welcome to convert not only my cousin Cicero, but also myself." "For my part," remarked Quintus, "I think the position has been satisfactorily defended, and I am delighted that the philosophy whose household gear I previously thought more precious than the landed estates of the other schools (I deemed her so rich that I might go to her for all that I coveted in our studies), I rejoice, I say, that this philosophy has been found to be actually subtler than the rest,—a quality in which she was said by some to be deficient." "Not subtler than ours at all events," said Pomponius playfully; "but I protest I was most delighted by your discourse. You have expressed ideas that I thought it impos-
CICERO DE FINIBUS

ea dicta sunt a te, nec minus plane, quam dicuntur a Graecis, verbis aptis.¹ Sed tempus est, si videtur; et recta quidem ad me." Quod cum ille dixisset et satis disputatum videretur, in oppidum ad Pomponium perreximus omnes.

¹verbis aptis Müller brackets with Baiter.
sible to express in Latin, and you have expressed them as lucidly as do the Greeks, and in apt language. But our time is up, if you please; let us make straight for my quarters." At these words, as it was felt there had been enough discussion, we all proceeded to the town to Pomponius's house.
INDEX

Achademy (the Platonic School of philosophy), pp. xxxii; ii, 2; v, 1
Achademy, the Old (i.e. before Arcessilas’s headship), ii, 58; iv, 5; v, 7
Achademy, the New (i.e. from Arcessilas onwards), ii, 43; v, 7, 76n
Adairkon, iii, 53
Aeschinus (Athenian orator), v, 5
Aetnianus (writer of Roman historical tragedies, b.c. 150 B.C.), i, 7
Africanus; see Scipio
Agelastos, v, 92
Agesilas (King of Sparta 398-360 B.C., panegyrized in Xenophon’s Agesilas), ii, 116
Albucius, Titus, i, 8
Alexander the Great (King of Macedon, 336-323 B.C.), ii, 118
Animals created for man, iii, 67; pleasure and pain not sole motives of, ii, 109; in captivity, v, 56
Antiochus (restorer of the “Old” Academy, d. 68 B.C.), p. xxiv; v, 1, 6ff, 14, 75, 81
Antipater (head of Stoic School c. 44 B.C.), i, 6
Apeltes, i, 21
Apologygenem, p. xxi; iii, 15, 51
Appetitio, prima, appetitus pr.; see . Prima naturae
Arcessilas (founder of Second or New Academy; c. 315-240 B.C.), p. xxxii; ii, 2; v, 87
Archochus (Greek lyric poet, c. 720-676 B.C.), iii, 115
Archimedes (of Syracuse, most famous of ancient mathematicians, b. 287 B.C.), v, 50
Archytas (of Tarentum, philosopher and mathematician, fl. 400 B.C.), i, 45; v, 87
Arion (Pythagorean philosopher), v, 87
Aristides (Athenian general and statesman, called “The Just,” d. c. 470 B.C.), i, 116
Aristippus (hedonistic philosopher of Cyrene, b. c. 428 B.C.), p. xvi; i, 22; ii, 18ff, 34/, 59, 41; v, 20
Aristo (of Ceos, head of Peripatetic School, c. 224 B.C.), iii, 50; iv, 40, 43, 47, 49, 60, 68; v, 13
Aristo (of Chios, a heterodox Stoic, fl. c. 260 B.C.), ii, 35, 43; iii, 11; iv, 40; v, 23, 73
Aristophanes (of Byzantium, scholar, b. c. 260 B.C., head of Alexandrian library, editor of Homer, Plato, etc.), v, 50
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), p. vii; i, 6, 7; ii, 17, 19, 34, 40, 106; iii, 10; iv, 3; v, 7, 11/, 73; style, i, 14. See Peripatetics
Aristothenus (of Tarentum, pupil of Aristotle, philosopher and musician, fl. 320 B.C.), v, 50
Aristus (philosopher of “Old” Academy, brother of Antiochus), v, 8
Atkambria, v, 87
Athens, philosophical and literary associations of, v, 2ff
Athos, Mount (promontory of Macedonia; traces of Xerxes’ canal still visible), ii, 112
Atilius (Roman dramatist c. 200 B.C.), i, 5
Atoms, i, 17ff
Atticus, Titus Pomponius (friend and correspondent of Cicero), i, 16; ii, 67; v, 1, 3, 96; origin of surname, v, 4
Attius, (Roman tragic poet, b. 170 B.C.), ii, 94; iv, 68; v, 32
Auctius, Gnaeus (Roman statesman and historian, praetor 103 B.C.), v, 54
Axta; see Value

Barbati, iv, 62
Blammatia, iii, 69
Brutus, Lucius Junius (consul 509 B.C.), ii, 66
Brutus, Marcus Junius (the tyrannicide), i, 1; iii, 1; v, 1, 8
Brutus, Marcus Junius (jurisconsult, father of the preceding), i, 12
Caecilius Status (Roman writer of comedies c. 200 B.C.), i, 4; ii, 13; 14, 22
Caepio, Gnaeus (consul), ii, 54
Caepio (half-brother of Cato), iii, 8
Calatinus, A. Atilius (cos. 258 and 254 B.C. during first Punic War; buried 505
INDEX

outside the Porta Capena at Rome), ii, 117
Callipho (probably a disciple of Epicurus), ii, 19, 34; iv, 50; v, 21, 73
Canonic, p. xiv; i, 22, 63
Carneades (head of the Academy, visited Rome 156 b.c.), p. xxiii; ii, 35, 38, 42, 59; iii, 41; iv, 49; v, 4, 6, 20. Carneades' classification of ethical theories, v, 16ff
Catalinarian conspiracy, the, ii, 62, 72
Cato, M. (95-46 b.c.), spokesman of Stoicism in Bks. iii and iv.
Cato, M. Porcius, the Censor (284-179 b.c.), v, 2
Caution, i, 18, 19
Ceramicus (suburb of Athens), i, 30
Charmides, v, 94
Children show natural impulses, i, 30; ii, 53; iii, 16; iv, 42, 48, 55, 61
Chremes (the title-part of Terence's Self-Tormentor), i, 5; v, 22ff
Chrysippus (third head and "second founder" of the Stoic School, 280-207 b.c.), i, 6, 59; ii, 43; iv, 7, 9, 68
 Cicero, Lucius (cousin of Marcus), v, 1, 57
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, adherent of "New" Academy, v, 76; pp. viii/ff
Cicero, Quintus (bro. of Marcus), v, 1
Circei (a town of Latium), iv, 7
Citium, iv, 56
Claudius, Appius (consul and decemvir 451 b.c.), ii, 66
Cleanthes (second head of Stoic School), iv, 7
Codrus (last of the legendary Kings of Athens, fell disguised as a common soldier in battle against the Heraclidae because of an oracle that the side whose leader was killed should win), v, 62
Cognition, modes of, iii, 83
Colonus, v, 3
Commendatio, prima (see prima naturae), ii, 85
Conciliationes, primeae naturae (see prima naturae), iii, 22
Conscience, i, 51
Consectaria, iii, 26; iv, 49
Corinthian bronzes, ii, 23
"Cosmopolitanism," Stoic, iii, 64, 69; iv, 7
Courage, i, 49

Crantor (Academic philosopher, 300 b.c.), v, 7
Crassus, Marcus, called agetatos, v, 92
Crassus, Marcus (son of the former, surnamed Dives), ii, 67
Crassus, Marcus (son of Dives; the triudivir, fell in Parthia 53 b.c.), iii, 75
Criterion of truth, p. xvii; i, 30, 63; v, 76
Critolaus (successor of Aristo as head of Peripatetic School; envoy to Rome 155 b.c.), v, 14
Croesus (King of Lydia), iii, 75
Cumanum, i, 14
Curia Hostilia, v, 2
Curius, Manius Dentatus (thrice consul, conqueror of Pyrrhus 274 b.c.), ii, 30
Cynics and Stoics compared, p. xxii
Cyrenaics (the School of Aristippus, i, 25, 39; ii, 59, 114
Cyprus, King of Persia, iii, 76
Cyprus (the Younger, fell in battle against his brother Artaxerxes. King of Persia, 400 b.c.; the hero of Xenophon's Anabasis and Cyropaedia), ii, 116

Damon, ii, 79n
Darius (King of Persia 521-485 b.c.) v, 92
Decli, the, ii, 60; v, 64n
Declinatio atomorum, i, 19/
Definition, ii, 47
Demetrius of Phalerum (ruler of Athens under Cassander, banished on liberation of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, 307 b.c.), v, 54
Democritus (Greek philosopher; founder, with his master Leucippus, of atomism; c. 460-361 b.c.), i, 17f; ii, 102; iv, 13; v, 50, 87
Democritus, Ethicus of, v, 23
Demosthenes (the Athenian orator, d. 322 b.c.), v, 5
Desires, i, 49/
Desires classified, i, 45; ii, 26/
Dialectic (see also Logic), ii, 17/
Dicaearchus (pupil of Aristotle), iv, 79
Dimonmachus (a philosopher associated here and Tusc. v, 30, with Callipho, v, 21

506
INDEX

Diodorus (head of Peripatetic School, d. c. 120 B.C.), ii, 19, 34/; iv, 50; v, 14, 21, 73
Diogenes (head of Stoic School: visited Rome 156 B.C.), i, 6; ii, 24
Dionysius of Heraclea (a disciple of Zeno who became a Cyrenaic), v, 94
Dionysius, (tyrant of Syracuse, visited by Plato), ii, 79n; iv, 56
Dipylon (city-gate of Athens to N.W.), v, 1
Division, i, 22; ii, 26/
Drusus, M. Livius (tribune 122 B.C., opponent of Gaius Gracchus), iv, 66
Duty, Stoic doctrine of, iii, 16
Dusischristemata, iii, 69

Echecrates (Pythagorean philosopher), v, 57
Eeffectio, iii, 24, 45
Effectus, iii, 32
Egyptian science, v, 87
Eidola, i, 21
End, the definition of, i, 42; ii, 5
Endymion (in the Greek myth, a youth eternally asleep, beloved by the Moon), v, 55
Ennius (Roman tragic and epic poet), 239-169 B.C.), i, 4, 17; ii, 41, 106; iv, 62; v, 31
Epaminondas (Theban general and statesman, d. 362 B.C.), ii, 62, 67, 97
Epicurean School, i, 65; ii, 12, 101; v, 3
Epicureanism, attacked, i, 13-26; divergences of doctrine, i, 31, 66ff; ii, 82; ethics expounded, p. xvi; i, 29; ethics refuted, ii; logic, p. xiv; i, 22, 63; ii, 26, 30; physics, p. xv; i, 17ff, 63; iv, 13; motives for studying, iv, 9, 13
Epicurus (342-279 B.C.), i and ii, passim; v, 80; birthday kept by his school, ii, 101; claimed title of Sapiens, ii, 7; debt to Democritus, i, 18ff; friendships, i, 65; ii, 80, 96; maxims, ii, 50; quoted, i, 57, 63, 65; ii, 84, 96, 100; unlearned, i, 20, 26, 71/; portraits of, v, 3; will, ii, 96ff
Epi phenomenonon, iii, 32
Erechtheus (legendary King of Athens, who in obedience to an oracle sacrificed his youngest daughter to secure victory in a war, and the rest of whose daughters killed themselves), v, 62
Erillus (of Carthage, a heterodox Stoic, disciple of Zeno), ii, 35, 43; iv, 36, 40; v, 23, 75
Ethics, the Peripatetic, v, 11ff
Ethics, the Nicomachean, v, 12
Euchrestemata, iii, 69
Eukairia, iii, 45
Euripides (Attic tragedian, 480-406 B.C.), i, 4, 5; ii, 105
Euthymia, v, 23, 87
Expetenda, iv, 19

Fabricius, Gaius, v, 64n
Finitus, de, meaning of title, p. vii; date of composition, p. x; sources of, p. xiii; text of, p. xxv; MSS of, p. xxvi
Fortu Fortuna (goddess of fortune), v, 70n
Fortune does not touch the Wise, i, 63
Friendship, i, 65ff; ii, 78ff; iii, 70

Gallonius, Publius, ii, 24, 90
Gallus, Quintus Fadius, ii, 55
Glorio, iii, 28
Gods, Stoic view of, iii, 66f
Good, the Chief, views as to, classified, iii, 30f
Good defined, ii, 5; iii, 33
Goods, external, iii, 41ff; iv, 29ff, 58f
Gorgias (the Sophist, came to Athens 427 B.C.), ii, 2
Gracchus, (1) Tiberius, tribune 187 B.C., twice consul; (2) Tiberius, tribune, 133; and (3) Gaius, tribune, 123, agrarian reformers, sons of (1), iv, 65f

Hannibal (Carthaginian invader of Italy 218 B.C.), iv, 22
Happiness, Epicurean rule of, i, 57ff; Stoic and Peripatetic views of, iii, 41ff
Hellespont (the Dardanelles, bridged with boats by Xerxes), ii, 112
Heroclitus (philosopher of Ephesus, fl. 510 B.C.), ii, 15

507
INDEX

Hercules, ii, 118
Hermarchus (succeeded Epicurus as head of school), ii, 96, 101
Hieronymus (heterodox pupil of Aristotle), ii, 8, 16; 19, 32, 35, 41; iv, 49; v, 14, 20, 73
Hirrius, ii, 60n
History, charm of, v, 51f
Homer, i, 7; ii, 115, 116; v, 49
Homologia, iii, 21
Honestum, i, 61; ii, 37f, 45, 48 (see note)
Honesty the best policy, i, 52
Hormê, see Prima naturae
Hortensius Hortalus, Q. (Cicero's rival as an orator, 114-50 B.C.), ii, 1
Hortensius (Cicero's, an Introduction to Philosophy, extant only in fragments), i, 2
Hymettus, mountain in Attica famous for its honey), ii, 112.
Hymnars, ii, 22

Imagines, i, 21
Inane, i, 17, 21
Indifferent things, iii, 50ff
Initia naturae; see Prima naturae
Instinct of new-born animals (see Prima naturae), i, 90; ii, 31, 33f
Institutio, iv, 82
Intention, Morality depends on, iii, 32
Interrogatiuncula, i, 39; iv, 7
Inventio, iv, 10

Justice, i, 50; v, 65f
Kakia, iii, 40
Katalêpsis, p. xviii; iii, 17
Kathkôn, p. xxii; iii, 20
Kalorhômata; see Recta
Kalorhôsis, iii, 45
"Know thyself," ii, 16; v, 44
Knowledge, love of, instinctive, v, 48
Kuriâi dosai, ii, 20

Laelius, C. (Roman statesman, friend of Scipio Africanus Minor, cons. 140 B.C.), ii, 24, 59; iv, 23
Lanuvium (city of Latium), ii, 63
Laudabile, ii, 27; iv, 49
Leonidas (Spartan King, r. 480 B.C.), ii, 62, 97
Lepidus, Marcus Aemilius, v, 64n
Licinius (perhaps Porcius Licinius, a critic a little senior to Cicero), i, 5
Locri (Greek colony in S. Italy), v, 87
Logic, Epicurean, i, 22, 63; ii, 26, 30;
Stoic, i, 63; iii, 72; iv, 8; Peripatetic, v, 10
Lucilius (founder of Roman satura), 148-108 B.C.), i, 7, 9; ii, 15, 23, 24f
Lucretia (wife of Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus), ii, 66; v, 64n
Lucretius (Roman poet 95-55 B.C.), ii, 102
Lucullus (Roman millionaire, conqueror of Mithridates), iii, 9
Lucullus (son of the above and nephew and ward of Cato, fell at Philippi on the Republican side 42 B.C.), iii, 7f
Lyco (fourth head of Peripatetic School), v, 13
Lycurgus (founder of the Spartan constitution), ii, 67

Magi, the Persian, v, 87
Magister populi, iii, 75
Manilius, Manilius (cos. 149 B.C., jurist), i, 12
Manilius; see Torquatus
Mantinea, battle of (362 B.C.), ii, 96
Marius, Gaius (157-87 B.C., conqueror of Jugurtha, and of the German and Celtic invaders; in the civil wars proscribed by Sulla and arrested in the marshes of the Liris), ii, 105
Media, iii, 58f; and see Indifferent things
Memory, control of, i, 57; ii, 104f
Memory, training of, v, 2
Menander (writer of Attic comedy) 342-291 B.C.), i, 4, 7
Metapontum (an old Greek city in the South of Italy), v, 4
Metellus, Quintus Macedonicus (con-sul 143 B.C.), v, 82
Metrodorus (pupil of Epicurus), i, 25;
ii, 7, 92, 96, 101
Miltiades (Athenian general, defeated Persians at Marathon 490 B.C.), ii, 67
Mnesarchus (head of Stoic School, teacher of Antiochus), i, 6
Moral Worth, Morality; see Honestum
Murena, T. (cos. 63, defended by Cicero on charge of bribery), iv, 74
INDEX

Natural Philosophy; see Physics
Naturalia; see Prima naturae
Nature, Life in accordance with, pp. xx, xxi; iv, 14ff
Nicomachus, v, 12
Numantia (in Spain, chief town of Celtiberians), ii, 54

Octavius, Gnaeus, ii, 93
Oedipus, v, 3
Ophiop, p, xxii; iii, 20ff, 58ff
Omololgia, iii, 21
Ophelema, iii, 33, 69
Orata (= aurata, a fish; nickname of C. Sergius, a gourmet), ii, 70
Orestes (friend of Pythides in Greek legends), ii, 65; ii, 79; v, 63
Orphée; see Prima naturae
Oroetes, v, 92

Pacuvius (Roman tragic poet, 220-130 B.C.), i, 49; ii, 79; v, 51, 63
Pain; see Pleasure and pain
Pain, absence of, the greatest pleasure, i, 37ff, 56; ii, 8ff
Pain, absence of = "Static" pleasure, ii, 9, 16
Pain, short if strong, light if long, i, 40; ii, 22
Panaceus (head of Stoic School), 180-111 B.C.), i, 6; ii, 24; iv, 23, 79
Papus, Quintus Aemilius, v, 64ff
Paradox, iv, 74.
Passions, not natural, iii, 35
Pathos; iii, 35
Paulus; see Perses
Pediaeas, Sextus (proprator in Sicily 75 B.C. when Cicero was quaestor), ii, 58
Perception, Stoic doctrine of, v, 76
Pericles (Athenian stateman, d. 429 B.C.), v, 5
Peripatetics (the School of Aristotle), ii, 94; iii, 41; iv, 5; v, 7; system reviewed, v, 9ff; divergences on Ethics, v, 12; decline of, v, 13; included in the Old Academy, v, 7
Peripatetics and Academic Ethics identified, v, 14; 21; expounded, v, 24ff; misrepresented, v, 28n
Perses (last King of Macedonia, conquered by L. Aemilius Paulus 168 B.C.), v, 71
Persians' frugal diet, ii, 92
Persius, i, 7
Phaedrus (Epictesian philosopher, teacher of Cicero), i, 16; v, 3
Phalaris (cruel tyrant of Acragas, 550 B.C.), iv, 64; v, 85
Phalerum (a harbour of Athens), v, 5
Phaedras (Greek sculptor 490-432 B.C.), ii, 115; iv, 34
Philanthropia, iii, 63
Philip (King of Macedon 359-336 B.C.), ii, 110
Philomela, pp. viii, xxiii
Philoctetes (Greek hero bitten by snake on voyage to Troy and marooned on isle of Lemnos; the hero of tragedies by Sophocles and Attius), i, 94; v, 32
Philodemus (Epictesian philosopher, taught at Rome in Cicero's day), ii, 119
Philosophy, its three parts, iv, 4
Phintias, ii, 79n
Physics, Epicurean, i, 17ff, 63; iv, 3; Peripatetic, iv, 13; v, 9ff; Stoic, iii, 73; iv, 11
Pindar (Greek lyric poet, b.c. 523 B.C.), ii, 115
Piso Frugi (cos. 133 B.C., opponent of Gaius Gracchus and author of first law against extortion in the provinces), ii, 90; v, 2
Piso Marcus (consul 61 B.C., spokesman of system of Antiocinus in Bk. V), iv, 73; v, passim.
Plato (Athenian philosopher, 428-347 B.C.), ii, 2, 15, 45, 52, 92, 102n; iv, 21, 56, 79; v, 2, 7, 50, 58, 84, 87
Pleasure defined, ii, 6, 8; absence of pain the greatest, i, 37ff, 56; ii, 8ff; Epicurean, calculation of, i, 32ff; mental and bodily, i, 55; ii, 18, 107ff; mental, Stoic view of, iii, 33; perceived directly, i, 30; ii, 36; primary instinct for, i, 30; sensual, a fundamental good, ii, 29, 64, 68; "static" and "kinetic" confused by Epicurus, ii, 9, 16; Peripatetic and Academic, view of, v, 45
Pleasure and pain not sole motives, i, 23ff; ii, 109ff; the ultimate good and evil, i, 29ff, 40ff; ii, 7
Pleasure and virtue, i, 57ff
Plotinus, Gaius, ii, 58
Poetika, iii, 55

509
INDEX

Polemo (head of the Academy 315-273 b.c.), ii, 34, 35; iv, 3, 45, 51, 61; v, 2, 7, 14, 94
Politics, Stoic, iii, 66; iv, 7, 9
Politics, Peripatetic, iv, 56; v, 11
Polyaenus (geometrician, friend of Epicurus), i, 19
Polyceitus (Greek sculptor, fl. 459-412 b.c.), ii, 115
Polycrates (tyrant of Samos, d. 522 b.c.), v, 92
Pompeius, Quintus (cons. 141 b.c.), ii, 46
Pompeius (Gnaeus Magnus, the triumvir), ii, 57
Pomponius; see Atticus
Posidonius (Stoic philosopher, pupil of Panaetius and friend of Cicero), i, 6
Postumius, ii, 60
"Preferred" things, iii, 51ff; iv, 19
Prima naturae, iii, 21, 30; τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν, the earliest objects which nature prompts a new-born animal to seek, or the instincts to seek such objects (the two senses not always distinguished) also rendered by naturalia, iii, 61; prima natura, ii, 34; prima secundam naturam, v, 18, 19, 43; prima natura data, ii, 34; initia naturae, ii, 38; iii, 22; prima naturae conciliaiones, iii, 22 (cf. in prima commendatio naturae, ii, 35, 40); principia naturae, iii, 22, 23; prima or principia a natura data, ii, 34; iv, 18; principia naturalia, ii, 35; iii, 17; prima ex natura appetitio, iv, 25; naturalis appetitio, iv, 30; quam vacant ὑπονόμη, iii, 23; v, 17; primus appetitus, v, 24; re quae pri-mae appetuntur, iii, 17; prima ascita naturae, iii, 17; prima naturae commoda, v, 58; prima invitamenta naturae, v, 17
Principia naturae, naturalia = prima naturae, which see; in a broader sense = prima constitutio naturae, v, 72
Proeumen, p. xxi; iii, 15, 51f; iv, 72
Probability, v, 76
Progress, Stoic doctrine of, iv, 67
Ptolemaic, v, 1
Ptolemy (the first, surnamed Soter, King of Egypt 325-285 b.c.), v, 54
Pullus Numitorius, Quintus (Volscian general, betrayed Fregellae to the Romans 328 b.c.), v, 62
Pylades, ii, 79
Pyrrho (of Elis, founder of Sceptic School), p. xiii; ii, 35, 49; iii, 11, 12; iv, 49, 49, 61; v, 23
Pyrrhus (King of Epirus, 318-273 b.c.), ii, 61; v, 64n
Pythagoras (an early Greek philosopher), v, 4, 50, 87

Recta, recta fæcta, κατωρθόματα, p. xxii; iii, 24, 45, 50
Regulus, Marcus (invaded Africa in first Punic War, 256 B.C.), ii, 65; v, 82, 88
"Reflected" things, iii, 51ff
Republica, de (Cicero's treatise, extant in fragments), ii, 59
Rhetoric compared with Dialectic, ii, 17
Rhetoric, Peripatetic, iv, 5; v, 10
Rufus, Publius Sextilius, ii, 55
Rutilius, i, 7

Sapiens; see Wise Man
Sardanapalus, ii, 106
Scaevola Mucius, i, 8
Scaevola, Publius (jurist, pontifex maximus b.c. 131), i, 12; ii, 54; iv, 76
Scepticism, v, 76; in the Academy, iii, 32
Scipio, Publius Cornelius Nasica, v, 64n
Scipio (Publius Cornelius Africanus Major, the conqueror of Hannibal, 202 B.C.), ii, 56, 106; iv, 22; v, 70
Scipio (Publius Africanus Minor, conqueror of Carthage, 146 B.C.), i, 7; iv, 23; v, 70
Scipiones, iii, 37
Self-love, primary instinct, iii, 26
Self-preservation the universal primary impulse, v, 24
Senses, sole and infallible source of knowledge, i, 30, 64; pronounce pleasure good, i, 30; ii, 36
Simonides (Greek lyric poet, inventor of mnemonics, b. 556 B.C.), ii, 104; v, 2n
Sirens, the, v, 49
Siro (Epicurean philosopher, taught at Rome, c. 60 B.C.), ii, 119

510
INDEX

Socrates (Athenian philosopher 469-399 B.C.), ii, 1/90; v, 84, 87, 88

Solon (Athenian reformer, c. 595 B.C.), ii, 67; iii, 76

Sophists (Greek professors of higher education in 5th and 4th cent. B.C.), ii, 1/1

Sophocles, i, 5; v, 3

Socrates (Gr. σώρος, a heap: a train of argument consisting of a series of syllogisms, each proving a premise of the next, but with the intermediate conclusions not expressed), iv, 60

Steuippus (successor of Plato as head of the Academy), iv, 3; v, 2, 7

Stasea (Peripatetic philosopher of Naples, resided with Piso), v, 8, 75

Stoicism, Ethics iii, 16/5; Logic, p. xviii; i, 68; iii, 72; p. xx; iv, 8/5; Physics, p. xix; iv, 11; Politics, iv, 7; terminology novel, iii, 3ff; v, 22; and Peripateticism, real difference between asserted, iii, 41ff; denied, iv, 3ff; v, 22, 74; its Chief Good defined, v, 20; inconsistency of, iv, 68, 78

Strato (third head of Peripatetic School) v, 13

Suicide, i, 49; iii, 60/

Sulla (Roman dictator, d. 78 B.C.), iii, 75

Sumenda, iv, 19

Syracusan luxury, ii, 92

Tali, iii, 54

Tarentum (Greek colony in S. Italy), v, 87

Tarquinius (Superbus, the last king of Rome, banished 510 B.C.), iii, 75

Tēidka, iii, 55

Telos, p. vii; i, 42; iii, 26

Temperance, i, 47

Terence (P. Terentius Afer, Roman writer of comedy, c. 190-159 B.C.), ii, 3, 4; ii, 14; v, 29/

Thea (wife of Leontes of Lampsis, and like her husband, a pupil of Epicurus, one of whose ethical discourses was in the form of a laudation of her), ii, 67

Themistocles (Athenian general, defeated Persians at Salamis 480 B.C.), ii, 67, 104/4; 116

Theophrastus (successor of Aristotle as head of Peripatetic School), i, 6, 14; iv, 3, 79; v, 11/, 54, 73, 77, 85

Thermopylae, battle of (490 B.C.), ii, 97

Theseus (King of Athens and friend of Peirithous in Greek legends), i, 65

Thorus, Lucius, ii, 63/, 70

Title of de Finibus, p. vii

Timaeus (Pythagorean philosopher), v, 87

Topics; see Inventio

Torquatus, Titus Manlius Imperiosus (won surname of Torquatus 361 B.C.), i, 23, 34/; ii, 60, 72/, 105

Torquatus, T. Manlius (consul 65 B.C.), i, 24, 34/5

Torquatus, Aulus (friend of Cicero, in exile as a Pompeian), ii, 72

Torquatus, Lucius Manlius (praetor 49 B.C., see ii, 74; fell fighting on Pompeian side in Africa); spokesman for Epicureanism, i, 18-end; ii

Trabea (Roman comic dramatist, fl. 130 B.C.), ii, 13

Triarius, Galus (Pompeian, fell in battle), interlocutor, i, 18-end; ii

Tubero, Q. (praetor 123 B.C.), iv, 23

Tubulus, Lucius (praetor 142 B.C.), ii, 54; iv, 77; v, 62

Tusculum, Cicero's villa at, iii, 7

Ulysses, v, 49

Vacuum, i, 17, 21

Value, Stoic doctrine of, ii, 20, 34

Verginius, Lucius, ii, 66; v, 64n

Veserus, battle of the (near Mt. Vesuvius, 340 B.C., final conquest of the Latins), i, 23

Virtue based on pleasure, i, 42ff

Virtue and Reason, v, 36

Virtues, "voluntary" and "involuntary," v, 36

Voconian law, ii, 55

Wisdom, absolute, iii, 48

Wisdom brings peace of mind, i, 43/

Wise Man alone happy, i, 61/; ii, 86/

always happy, i, 62; iii, 42; iv, 31;

v, 77ff; displays love of life, v, 32;

Epicurus a, ii, 7; iv, 3; limits his
desires, i, 44, 58/; the Stoic, iii, 75/;

iv, 7, 21/

Wise Men, the Seven, ii, 7; iii, 73, 76

511
INDEX

Xenocrates (third head of the Academy), iv, 3, 49, 79; v, 2, 7
Xenophon, ii, 92; and see Agesilaus
and Cyrus
Xerxes (King of Persia, invaded
Greece 480 B.C.), ii, 112

Zeno (founder of Stoic School, c.
b.c.), ii, 17, 35; iii, 15ff; iv, 3,
13, 19, 44; his birthplace, iv, 56
Zeno (Epicurean philosopher,
temporary of Cicero), i, 16
Zeuxis (Greek painter, b. c. 450:
ii, 115

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