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PLATO

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
H. N. FOWLER

AND AN INTRODUCTION BY
W. R. M. LAMB

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EUTHYPHRO APOLOGY CRITO
PHAEDO PHAEDRUS

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MCMXIII
PREFACE

The Greek text in this volume is based upon that of Schanz, and all variations from his readings are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In some cases deviations from the reading of the manuscripts have been noted, even when adopted by Schanz. In the introductions to the separate dialogues no attempt has been made to discuss the philosophy of Plato or to do anything more than to supply such information as is needed for the intelligent reading of these particular dialogues. For further discussion and information the reader is referred to the General Introduction by Mr. W. R. M. Lamb, of Trinity College, Cambridge.

Harold N. Fowler.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Plato was born in 427 B.C. of Athenian parents who could provide him with the best education of the day, and ample means and leisure throughout his life. He came to manhood in the dismal close of the Peloponnesian War, when Aristophanes was at the height of his success, and Sophocles and Euripides had produced their last plays. As a boy he doubtless heard the lectures of Gorgias, Protagoras, and other sophists, and his early bent seems to have been towards poetry. But his intelligence was too progressive to rest in the agnostic position on which the sophistic culture was based. A century before, Heracleitus had declared knowledge to be impossible, because the objects of sense are continually changing; yet now a certain Cratylus was trying to build a theory of knowledge over the assertion of flux, by developing some hints let fall by its oracular author about the truth contained in names. From this influence Plato passed into contact with Socrates, whose character and gifts have left a singular impress on the thought of mankind. This effect is almost wholly due to Plato's applications and extensions of his master's
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

thought; since, fortunately for us, the pupil not only became a teacher in his turn, but brought his artistic genius into play, and composed the memorials of philosophic talk which we know as the Dialogues. Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines were other disciples of Socrates who drew similar sketches of his teaching: the suggestion came from the "mimes" of the Syracusan Sophron,—realistic studies of conversation between ordinary types of character. As Plato became more engrossed in the Socratic speculations, this artistic impulse was strengthened by the desire of recording each definite stage of thought as a basis for new discussion and advance.

When Plato was twenty years old, Socrates was over sixty, and had long beer notorious in Athens for his peculiar kind of sophistry. In the Phaedo he tells how he tried, in his youth, the current scientific explanations of the universe, and found them full of puzzles. He then met with the theory of Anaxagoras,—that the cause of everything is "mind." This was more promising: but it led nowhere after all, since it failed to rise above the conception of physical energy; this "mind" showed no intelligent aim. Disappointed of an assurance that the universe works for the best, Socrates betook himself to the plan of making definitions of "beautiful," "good," "large" and so on, as qualities observed in the several classes of beautiful, good and large material things, and then employing these propositions, if they appeared to be sound, for the erection of higher x
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

hypotheses. The point is that he made a new science out of a recognised theory of "ideas" or "forms," which had come of reflecting on the quality predicated when we say "this man is good," and which postulates some sure reality behind the fleeting objects of sense. His "hypothetical" method, familiar to mathematicians, attains its full reach and significance in the Republic.

The Pythagoreans who appear in the intimate scene of the Phaedo were accustomed to the theory of ideas, and were a fit audience for the highest reasonings of Socrates on the true nature of life and the soul. For some years before the master's death (399 B.C.) Plato, if not a member of their circle, was often a spell-bound hearer of the "satyr." But ordinary Athenians had other views of Socrates, which varied according to their age and the extent of their acquaintance with him. Aristophanes' burlesque in the Clouds (423 B.C.) had left a common impression not unlike what we have of the King of Laputa. Yet the young men who had any frequent speech with him in his later years, while they felt there was something uncanny about him, found an irresistible attraction in his simple manner, his humorous insight into their ways and thoughts, and his fervent eloquence on the principles of their actions and careers. He kept no school, and took no fees; he distrusted the pretensions of the regular sophists, with whom he was carelessly confounded; moreover, he professed to have no knowledge himself, except so far as to
know that he was ignorant. The earliest Dialogues, such as the Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches and Lysis, show the manner in which he performed his ministry. In rousing men, especially those whose minds were fresh, to the need of knowing themselves, he promoted the authority of the intellect, the law of definite individual knowledge, above all reason of state or tie of party; and it is not surprising that his city, in the effort of recovering her political strength, decided to hush such an inconvenient voice. He must have foreseen his fate, but he continued his work undeterred.

Though he seems, in his usual talk, to have professed no positive doctrine, there were one or two beliefs which he frequently declared. Virtue, he said, is knowledge; for each man’s good is his happiness, and once he knows it clearly, he needs must choose to ensue it. Further, this knowledge is innate in our minds, and we only need to have it awakened and exercised by “dialectic,” or a systematic course of question and answer. He also believed his mission to be divinely ordained, and asserted that his own actions were guided at times by the prohibitions of a “spiritual sign.” He was capable, as we find in the Symposium, of standing in rapt meditation at any moment for some time, and once for as long as twenty-four hours.

It is clear that, if he claimed no comprehensive theory of existence, and although his ethical reliance on knowledge, if he never analysed it, leaves him in
a very crude stage of psychology, his logical and mystical suggestions must have led his favourite pupils a good way towards a new system of metaphysics. These intimates learnt, as they steeped their minds in his, and felt the growth of a unique affection amid the glow of enlightenment, that happiness may be elsewhere than in our dealings with the material world, and that the mind has prerogatives and duties far above the sphere of civic life.

After the death of Socrates in 399, Plato spent some twelve years in study and travel. For the first part of this time he was perhaps at Megara, where Eucleides, his fellow-student and friend, was forming a school of dialectic. Here he may have composed some of the six Dialogues already mentioned as recording Socrates' activity in Athens. Towards and probably beyond the end of this period, in order to present the Socratic method in bolder conflict with sophistic education, he wrote the *Protagoras, Meno, Euthydemus*, and *Gorgias*. These works show a much greater command of dramatic and literary art, and a deeper interest in logic. The last of them may well be later than 387, the year in which, after an all but disastrous attempt to better the mind of Dionysius of Syracuse, he returned to Athens, and, now forty years of age, founded the Academy; where the memory of his master was to be perpetuated by continuing and expanding the Socratic discussions among the elect of the new
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

generation. The rivalry of this private college with the professional school of Isocrates is discernible in the subject and tone of the Gorgias. Plato carried on the direction of the Academy till his death, at eighty-one, in 346; save that half-way through this period (367) he accepted the invitation of his friend Dion to undertake the instruction of the younger Dionysius at Syracuse. The elder tyrant had been annoyed by the Socratic freedom of Plato's talk: now it was a wayward youth who refused the yoke of a systematic training. What that training was like we see in the Republic, where true political wisdom is approached by an arduous ascent through mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Plato returned, with less hopes of obtaining the ideal ruler, to make wonderful conquests in the realm of thought.

The Meno and Gorgias set forth the doctrine that knowledge of right is latent in our minds: dialectic, not the rhetoric of the schools, is the means of eliciting it. The method, as Plato soon perceived, must be long and difficult: but he felt a mystical rapture over its certainty, which led him to picture the immutable "forms" as existing in a world of their own. This feeling, and the conviction whence it springs—that knowledge is somehow possible, had come to the front of his mind when he began to know Socrates. Two brilliant compositions, the Cratylus and Symposium, display the strength of the conviction, and then, the noble fervour of the feeling. In the latter of these works, the highest
powers of imaginative sympathy and eloquence are summoned to unveil the sacred vision of absolute beauty. The *Phaedo* turns the logical theory upon the soul, which is seen to enjoy, when freed from the body, familiar cognition of the eternal types of being. Here Orphic dogma lends its aid to the Socratic search for knowledge, while we behold an inspiring picture of the philosopher in his hour of death.

With increasing confidence in himself as the successor of Socrates, Plato next undertook, in the *Republic*, to show the master meeting his own unsatisfied queries on education and politics. We read now of a "form" of good to which all thought and action aspire, and which, contemplated in itself, will explain not merely why justice is better than injustice, but the meaning and aim of everything. In order that man may be fully understood, we are to view him "writ large" in the organisation of an ideal state. The scheme of description opens out into many subsidiary topics, including three great proposals already known to Greece,—the abolition of private property, the community of women and children, and the civic equality of the sexes. But the central subject is the preparation of the philosopher, through a series of ancillary sciences, for dialectic; so that, once possessed of the supreme truth, he may have light for directing his fellow-men. As in the *Phaedo*, the spell of mythical revelation is brought to enhance the discourse of reason. The
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Phaedrus takes up the subject of rhetoric, to lead us allegorically into the realm of "ideas," and thence to point out a new rhetoric, worthy of the well-trained dialectician. We get also a glimpse of the philosopher's duty of investigating the mutual relations of the "forms" to which his study of particular things has led him.

A closer interest in logical method, appearing through his delight in imaginative construction, is one distinctive mark of this middle stage in Plato's teaching. As he passes to the next two Dialogues, the Theaetetus and Parmenides, he puts off the aesthetic rapture, and considers the ideas as categories of thought which require co-ordination. The discussion of knowledge in the former makes it evident that the Academy was now the meeting-place of vigorous minds, some of which were eager to urge or hear refuted the doctrines they had learnt from other schools of thought; while the arguments are conducted with a critical caution very different from the brilliant and often hasty zeal of Socrates. The Parmenides corrects an actual or possible misconception of the theory of ideas in the domain of logic, showing perhaps how Aristotle, now a youthful disciple of Plato, found fault with the theory as he understood it. The forms are viewed in the light of the necessities of thought: knowledge is to be attained by a careful practice which will raise our minds to the vision of all particulars in their rightly distinguished and connected classes.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Plato is here at work on his own great problem:—If what we know is a single permanent law under which a multitude of things are ranged, what is the link between the one and the many? The Sophist contains some of his ripest thought on this increasingly urgent question: his confident advance beyond Socratic teaching is indicated by the literary form, which hardly disguises the continuous exposition of a lecture. We observe an attention to physical science, the association of soul, motion, and existence, and the comparative study of being and not-being. The Politicus returns to the topic of state-government, and carries on the process of acquiring perfect notions of reality by the classification of things. Perhaps we should see in the absolute "mean" which is posited as the standard of all arts, business, and conduct, a contribution from Aristotle. The Philebus, in dealing with pleasure and knowledge, dwells further on the correct division and classification required if our reason, as it surely must, is to apprehend truth. The method is becoming more thorough and more complex, and Plato's hope of bringing it to completion is more remote. But he is gaining a clearer insight into the problem of unity and plurality.

The magnificent myth of the Timaeus, related by a Pythagorean, describes the structure of the universe, so as to show how the One manifests itself as the Many. We have here the latest reflections of Plato on space, time, soul, and many
physical matters. In the lengthy treatise of the *Laws*, he addresses himself to the final duty of the philosopher as announced in the *Republic*: a long habituation to abstract thought will qualify rather than disqualify him for the practical regulation of public and private affairs. Attention is fixed once more on soul, as the energy of the world and the vehicle of our sovereign reason.

Thus Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the Dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle; whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state. But it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. We may be able to detect in the *Timaeus* a tendency to view numbers as the real principles of things; and we may conjecture a late-found interest in the physical complexion of the world. As a true artist, with a keen sense of the beauty and stir of life, Plato had this interest, in a notable degree, throughout; but in speaking of his enthusiasm for science we must regard him rather as a great inventor of sciences than as what we should now call a scientist. This is giving him a splendid name, which few men
have earned. Some of his inventions may be unrealisable, but it is hard to find one that is certainly futile. There are flaws in his arguments: to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy.

W. R. M. Lamb.

[Note.—Each of the Dialogues is a self-contained whole. The order in which they have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees best in the main with modern views of Plato's mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain.]
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INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

The Euthyphro probably owes its place at the head of the list of dialogues to the fact that it is the first of four dialogues dealing with the trial and death of Socrates. It is probably one of the earliest in date of composition, though that fact is not likely to have affected its position in the series.

Socrates comes to the court of the king archon to attend to some preliminaries of his trial on the charge of impiety and corrupting the youth. Here he meets Euthyphro, who is bringing a charge of manslaughter against his father, on account of the death from exposure of a servant who is himself a murderer. Euthyphro says that he is bringing the charge in the interest of piety, and claims to know more than other men about the nature of piety, proper religious observances, and the will of the gods.¹ It is this claim which leads to the discussion of the nature of piety, or holiness, the chief theme of the dialogue.

The purpose of the dialogue is in part to inculcate correct methods of thinking, more especially the dialectic method. Euthyphro, when requested to give a definition of piety or holiness says (5 b) "I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrongdoer who commits murder or

¹ Of Euthyphro nothing further is known. He may be identical with the Euthyphro who appears in the Cratylus as a philologian addicted to fanciful etymologies.
INTRODUCTION TO THE *EUTHYPHRO*

steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else; and not prosecuting him is unholy." This reply leads at once to the proof that a particular example does not constitute a definition of a general concept. The second definition offered by Euthyphro is emended until it takes the form (9 ε) "What all the gods love is holy, and on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy." The question then arises whether a thing is holy because the gods love it, or the gods love it because it is holy. Cause and effect are discussed. In an attempt to arrive at a third definition, Euthyphro flounders hopelessly, whereupon Socrates shows how terms may be defined by referring a species to a genus. Finally Euthyphro states (12 ε) that "the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness." Hereupon Socrates tries to get him to tell what attention the gods require, what end human service to the gods has in view. In this he does not succeed, and the dialogue ends with this question unanswered.

Instruction in methods of thinking may perhaps seem needless to modern readers; even they, however, may find it interesting, and in Plato's times it was undoubtedly necessary. Such instruction occupies an important place in most of the Platonic dialogues. In the *Euthyphro* the correct method of thinking is illustrated and inculcated in the course of an attempt to define piety or holiness. The two definitions offered by Euthyphro are rejected; the third is left unchallenged, though a further limitation is demanded. It may therefore be regarded as

1 See 11 c note.
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUTHYPHRO

a definition accepted by Plato, but not considered complete until the purpose of our service to the gods is determined. How Plato would determine it may be seen in the Apology (30A), where Socrates says his life has been spent in the endeavour to persuade men to care chiefly for the perfection of their souls. The Euthyphro may perhaps be regarded as a sort of scientific justification of the position taken in the Apology.

Special editions of the Euthyphro are numerous. Among them those of Schanz (1887), Christ (1890), Adam (1890), and Heidel (1902) may be chosen for especial mention. The last named contains an exhaustive bibliography.
ΕΥΘΥΦΡΩΝ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΟΞΙΟΥ, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

TA TOU DIADOBOY PROSWIA

ETOTHFON, ZOKRATHIΣ

A 1. ETOTHFON. Τί νεώτερον, ὁ Σώκρατης, γέγονεν, ὅτι σὺ τὰς ἐν Δυκείῳ καταληψῶν διατρίβας ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; οὐ γάρ ποι καὶ σοὶ γε δίκη τις σοῦ τυχχάνει πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὅσπερ ἐμοί.

ZOKRATHIΣ. Οὗτοι δὴ Ἀθηναῖοι γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, δίκην αὐτὴν καλούσιν, ἄλλα γραφὴν.

ETOTHFON. Τί φής; γραφὴν σὲ τις, ὡς ἔοικε,

B γέγραπται; οὐ γάρ ἐκεῖνο γε καταγγέλσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἐτερον.

ZOKRATHIΣ. Οὐ γὰρ σοῦ.

ETOTHFON. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλος;

ZOKRATHIΣ. Πάνυ γε.

ETOTHFON. Τίς οὕτως;

ZOKRATHIΣ. Οὕτως αὐτὸς πάνυ τι γυγνώσκω, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, τὸν ἁνδρᾶν νέος γάρ τίς μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγνώς ὁνομάζουσι μέντοι αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐγώμαι, Μέλητον. ἔστι δὲ τῶν δήμων Πιθέας, εἰ τινὰ νῦ ἔχεις Πιθέα Μέλητον όλου τεταυνότριχα καὶ τᾶν εὐγένειον, ἐπίγραπτον δὲ.
EUTHYPHRO

[OR ON HOLINESS, A TENTATIVE DIALOGUE]

CHARACTERS

EUTHYPHRO, SOCRATES

EUTHYPHRO. What strange thing has happened, Socrates, that you have left your accustomed haunts in the Lyceum and are now haunting the portico where the king archon sits? For it cannot be that you have an action before the king, as I have.

SOCRATES. Our Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it an action, but an indictment.

EUTHYPHRO. What? Somebody has, it seems, brought an indictment against you; for I don’t accuse you of having brought one against anyone else.

SOCRATES. Certainly not.

EUTHYPHRO. But someone else against you?

SOCRATES. Quite so.

EUTHYPHRO. Who is he?

SOCRATES. I don’t know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to be a young and unknown person. His name, however, is Meletus, I believe. And he is of the deme of Pitthus, if you remember any Pitthian Meletus, with long hair and only a little beard, but with a hooked nose.
ΕΤΩΣΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ ἐννοῶ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα γραφὴν σε γέγραπται;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννη, ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ·
tὸ γάρ νέον ὄντα τοσοῦτον πράγμα ἐγνωκέναι οὐ
φαίλοιν ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὡς φησιν, οἶδε, τίνα
τρόπον οἱ νέοι διαφθείρονται καὶ τίνες οἱ διαφθεί-
ροντες αὐτούς· καὶ κινδυνεύει σοφὸς τις εἶναι· καὶ
τὴν ἐμὴν ἀμαθίαν κατιδῶν ὡς διαφθείροντος τοὺς
ἡλικίωτας αὐτοῦ, ἔρχεται καθηγορήσων μοι ὡς
πρὸς μητέρα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. καὶ φαίνεται μοι
τῶν πολιτικῶν μόνος ἀρχεσθαι ὀρθῶς· ὀρθῶς γάρ
ἔστι τῶν νέων πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως ἔσονται
ὁ τι ἄριστοι, ὡς περ γεωργὸν ἀγαθὸν τῶν νέων
φυτῶν εἰκὸς πρῶτον ἐπιμεληθῆναι, μετὰ δὲ τούτο
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἱσως πρῶ-
3 τον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς
βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὡς φησιν· ἐπείτα μετὰ
tοῦτο δὴλον ὅτι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἐπιμεληθῆς
πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων ἁγαθῶν αἰτίων τῇ πόλει
γενήσεται, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκὸς μεμβῆναι ἐκ τοιαύτης
ἀρχῆς ἀρξαμένῳ.

2. ΕΤΩΣΦΡΩΝ. Βουλοίμην ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ
ὀρρωδῶ, μὴ τούναυτίων γένηται. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ μοι
δοκεῖ ἄφι ἐστίας ἀρχεσθαι κακοργεῖν τὴν πόλιν,
ἐπιχειρῶν ἄδικείν σε. καὶ μοι λέγε, τί καὶ
ποιοῦντά σε φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀτοπα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὡς οὕτω γ’
ἀκούσαι. φησὶ γάρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ
ὡς καίνους ποιοῦντα θεοὺς, τοὺς δ’ ἀρχαίους ὦν
νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἐνεκα, ὡς
φησιν.
ΕΤΩΣΦΡΩΝ. Μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὦτι δὴ σὺ
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. I don't remember him, Socrates. But what sort of an indictment has he brought against you?

SOCRATES. What sort? No mean one, it seems to me; for the fact that, young as he is, he has apprehended so important a matter reflects no small credit upon him. For he says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who those are who corrupt them. He must be a wise man; who, seeing my lack of wisdom and that I am corrupting his fellows, comes to the State, as a boy runs to his mother, to accuse me. And he seems to me to be the only one of the public men who begins in the right way; for the right way is to take care of the young men first, to make them as good as possible, just as a good husbandman will naturally take care of the young plants first and afterwards of the rest. And so Meletus, perhaps, is first clearing away us who corrupt the young plants, as he says; then after this, when he has turned his attention to the older men, he will bring countless most precious blessings upon the State,—at least, that is the natural outcome of the beginning he has made.

EUTHYPHRO. I hope it may be so, Socrates; but I fear the opposite may result. For it seems to me that he begins by injuring the State at its very heart, when he undertakes to harm you. Now tell me, what does he say you do that corrupts the young?

SOCRATES. Absurd things, my friend, at first hearing. For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says.

EUTHYPHRO. I understand, Socrates; it is because
τὸ δαίμόνιον φῆς σαυτῷ ἐκάστοτε γίγνεσθαι. ὡς 
οὐν καινοτομοῦντός σου περὶ τὰ θεία γέγραπται 
ταύτην τὴν γραφὴν, καὶ ὃς διαβαλῶν δὴ ἔρχεται 
eἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, εἰδὼς ὃτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ 
τοιαύτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ ἐμὸν γὰρ τοι,

C  ὅταν τι λέγω ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ περὶ τῶν θείων, 
προλέγων αὐτοῖς τὰ μέλλοντα, καταγελῶσιν ὡς 
μανομένου. καὶ τοιοῦτον ὃ τι οὐκ ἀληθῆς ἐφηκα 
ὅν προείπον, ἀλλ' ὡμοί φθονοῦσιν ἥμιν πᾶσι τοῖς 
τοιούτοις. ἀλλ' οὔδεν αὐτῶν χρῆ φροντίζειν, ἀλλ' 
ὄμοσε ἰέναι.

D  3. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡ φίλε Εὐθῦφρον, ἀλλὰ τὸ 
μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἵσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθη-

E ναίοις γὰρ τοι, ὃς ἐμὸ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἢν 
τινα δεινὸν οἴνωται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν 
τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἄν καὶ ἄλλος οἴνωται 
ποιεῖν τοιούτους, θυμοῦνται, εἰτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς 
ὑ πέγεις, εἰτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

ΕΤΕΡΦΩΝ. Τούτων οὖν πέρι ὅπως ποτὲ πρὸς 
ἐμὲ ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάνυ ἐπιθυμῶ πειραθῆναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡσώς γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον 
σεαυτῶν παρέχει καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἔθελεν τὴν 
σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν· ἐγὼ δὲ φοβοῦμαι, μὴ ὑπὸ φιλαν-

θρωπίας δοκῶ αὐτοῖς ὃ τι περ ἔχω ἐκκεχυμένως 
παντὶ ἀνδρὶ λέγειν, οὐ μόνον ἄνευ μισθοῦ, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ προστίθεις ἄν ήδεως, ει τὶς μου ἔθελοι ἀκούειν. 
εἰ μὲν οὖν, δ' νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, μέλλοιέν μου κατα-
γελὰν, ὡσπερ σὺ φῆς σαυτοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀν εἰ ἄθηδες 
παίζοντας καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστήριῳ διαγα-

gειν, εἰ δὲ σπουδάσονται, τοῦτ' ἤδη ὅπῃ ἀποβήσε-

E ται ἄδηλον πλην ὑμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. 10
you say the divine monitor keeps coming to you. So he has brought the indictment against you for making innovations in religion, and he is going into court to slander you, knowing that slanders on such subjects are readily accepted by the people. Why, they even laugh at me and say I am crazy when I say anything in the assembly about divine things and foretell the future to them. And yet there is not one of the things I have foretold that is not true; but they are jealous of all such men as you and I are. However, we must not be disturbed, but must come to close quarters with them.

Socrates. My dear Euthyphro, their ridicule is perhaps of no consequence. For the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him, either through jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.

Euthyphro. I don't much desire to test their sentiments toward me in this matter.

Socrates. No, for perhaps they think that you are reserved and unwilling to impart your wisdom. But I fear that because of my love of men they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen to me. Now if, as I was saying just now, they were to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it would not be at all unpleasant to pass the time in the court with jests and laughter; but if they are in earnest, then only soothsayers like you can tell how this will end.
PLATO

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐδὲν ἔσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, πράγμα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνιζέ τὴν δίκην, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὴν ἐμῆν.

4. ἈΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστιν δὲ δὴ σοι, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, τίς ἡ δίκη; φεύγεις αὐτὴν ἢ διώκεις;

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Διώκει.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα;

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Ὅν διώκων αὐ δοκῶ μαίνεσθαι.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; πετόμενον τινα διώκεις;

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Πολλοῦ γε δεὶ πέτεσθαι, ὦ γε τυγχάνει δὲν εὐ μάλα πρεσβύτης.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὗτος;

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Ὅ εμὸς πατήρ.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅ σος, ὃ βέλτιστε;

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστιν δὲ τί τὸ ἐγκλῆμα καὶ τίνος ἡ δίκη;

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Φόνου, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡράκλεις! ἢ ποι, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, ἀγνοεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅτι ποτὲ ὀρθῶς ἔχει. 1 οὐ γὰρ οἴμαι γε τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ Β πράξαι, ἀλλὰ πόρρω ποι Ἑυθυφρός ἐλαύνοντος.

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Πόρρω μὲντοι νὴ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστιν δὲ δὴ τῶν οἰκείων τις ὁ τεθνεώς ὑπὸ τοῦ σοῦ πατρός; ἡ δὴ δὴ, ὅ γαρ ἄν ποὺ γε ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίον ἐπεξεργάσθα φόνου αὐτῷ.

ΕΤΟΣΙΦΡΩΝ. Γελοίον, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὦ τί οἰεὶ τι διαφέρειν, εἴτε ἀλλότριος εἴτε οἰκείος ὁ τεθνεώς,

1 Schanz, following Madvig, marks a lacuna here. For the meaning of the missing word or words he refers to 9 A and 15 D.
EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Well, Socrates, perhaps it won't amount to much, and you will bring your case to a satisfactory ending, as I think I shall mine.

SOCRATES. What is your case, Euthyphro? Are you defending or prosecuting?

EUTHYPHRO. Prosecuting.

SOCRATES. Whom?

EUTHYPHRO. Such a man that they think I am insane because I am prosecuting him.

SOCRATES. Why? Are you prosecuting one who has wings to fly away with?

EUTHYPHRO. No flying for him at his ripe old age.

SOCRATES. Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO. My father.

SOCRATES. Your father, my dear man?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But what is the charge, and what is the suit about?

EUTHYPHRO. Murder, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, most people do not know where the right lies; for I fancy it is not everyone who can rightly do what you are doing, but only one who is already very far advanced in wisdom.

EUTHYPHRO. Very far, indeed, Socrates, by Zeus.

SOCRATES. Is the one who was killed by your father a relative? But of course he was; for you would not bring a charge of murder against him on a stranger's account.

EUTHYPHRO. It is ridiculous, Socrates, that you think it matters whether the man who was killed

1 The Greek word has much the same meaning as the Latin *prosequor*, from which the English 'prosecute' is derived, 'follow,' 'pursue,' and is at the same time the technical term for 'prosecute.'
PLATO

ἀλλ' οὗ τούτο μόνον δεῖν φυλάττειν, εἰτε ἐν δίκη ἐκτείνας εἰτε μῆ, καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν δίκη, ἐὰν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἐπεξεῖναι, ἕαν περ ὁ κτείνας συνέστιος σοι καὶ ὁμοτράπεζος ἦ. ἵσον γὰρ τὸ μάσμα γίγνεται, ἕαν ξυνής τῷ τοιούτῳ ξυνείδως καὶ μῆ ἀφοσιώς σεαυτόν τε καὶ ἐκεῖνον τῇ δίκη ἐπεξίων, ἐπεὶ ὁ γε ἀποθανόν ἐπιλάτης τίς ἦν ἐμός, καὶ ὦς ἐγεωργοῦμεν ἐν τῇ Νάξω, ἐθήτευεν ἐκεῖ παρ' ἕμιν. παροινήσας οὖν καὶ ὀργισθεὶς τῶν αἰκετῶν τινών τῶν ἥμετέρων ἀποσφάττει αὐτῶν· ὁ οὖν πατήρ συνιδήσας τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, καταβαλὼν εἰς τάφρον τινά, πέμπει δεύρῳ ἀνδρὰ πευσόμενον τοῦ ἐξήγητον, ὅ τι χρεία ποιεῖν. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ

D χρόνῳ τοῦ δεδεμένου ἀλησάρει τε καὶ ἰμέλει ὡς ἀνδροφόνου καὶ οὐδὲν ὅν πράγμα, εἰ καὶ ἀποθάνον· ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπαθεῖν. ὑπὸ γὰρ λιμοῦ καὶ ρίγους καὶ τῶν δεσμῶν ἀποθνῄσκει πρὸς τὸν ἀγγέλου παρὰ τοῦ ἐξήγητον ἀφικέσθαι. ταύτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ ο τε πατὴρ καὶ οἱ ἀλλαι οἰκεῖοι, ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνδροφόνου τῷ πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξέρχομαι, οὕτε ἀποκτείναντι, ὡς φασίν ἐκεῖνοι, οὕτε εἰ ο τι μάλιστα ἀπέκτεινεν, ἀνδροφόνου γε ὄντος τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, οὐ δεῖν φροντίζειν ὑπὲρ

E τοῦ τοιούτου· ἀνόσιον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ υἱὸν πατρὶ φόνον ἐπεξείναι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ θείον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ ὤσίου τε πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἀνοσίου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ πρὸς Διός, ὁ Εὐθύφρον, οὕτωσι ἀκριβῶς οἰεὶ ἐπίστασθαι περὶ τῶν θείων,
was a stranger or a relative, and do not see that the only thing to consider is whether the action of the slayer was justified or not, and that if it was justified one ought to let him alone, and if not, one ought to proceed against him, even if he share one's hearth and eat at one's table. For the pollution is the same if you associate knowingly with such a man and do not purify yourself and him by proceeding against him. In this case, the man who was killed was a hired workman of mine, and when we were farming at Naxos, he was working there on our land. Now he got drunk, got angry with one of our house slaves, and butchered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him into a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to ask the religious adviser what he ought to do. In the meantime he paid no attention to the man as he lay there bound, and neglected him, thinking that he was a murderer and it did not matter if he were to die. And that is just what happened to him. For he died of hunger and cold and his bonds before the messenger came back from the adviser. Now my father and the rest of my relatives are angry with me, because for the sake of this murderer I am prosecuting my father for murder. For they say he did not kill him, and if he had killed him never so much, yet since the dead man was a murderer, I ought not to trouble myself about such a fellow, because it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. Which shows how little they know what the divine law is in regard to holiness and unhholiness.

Socrates. But, in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think your knowledge about divine laws and
ὅπη ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ ἀνοσίων, ὡστε τούτων οὕτω πραξκέντων, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, οὐ φοβεῖ δικαζόμενος τῷ πατρί, ὅπως μὴ αὐ σὺ ἀνόσιων πράγμα τυγχάνη πράττων;

εἰτοῦρν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν μου ὁφελος εἶτη, ὥ 5 Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ τῷ ἀν διαφέροι Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ἀκριβῶς εἰδεῖν.

5. σακρατις. Ἄρ’ οὖν μοι, ὡ θαυμάσσει Εὐθύφρων, κράτιστον ἔστι μαθητή σφι γενέσθαι καὶ πρὸ τῆς γραφῆς τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλεῖσθαι αὐτῶν λέγοντα, ὅτι ἔγγυε καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθὲν χρόνῳ τὰ θεῖα περὶ πολλοῦ ἐπιούμην εἰδέναι, καὶ νῦν ἐπειδὴ μὲ ἐκείνους αὐτοσχεδίαζοντα φησι καὶ κανονομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν, μαθητής δὴ γέγονα σῶς και εἰ μὲν, ὥ

B Μέλητε, φαίνω ἂν, Εὐθύφρωνα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅρθως νομίζειν ἐμὲ ἡγεῖν καὶ μὴ δικάζουν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐκεῖνο τῷ διδασκάλῳ λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἡ ἐμοὶ, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι, ἐμὲ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτὸ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντε, ἐκείνου δὲ νοουθετοῦντε τε καὶ κολάζοντε καὶ ἂν μὴ μοι πείθηται μηδ’ ἄφις τῆς δίκης ἢ ἀντ’ ἐμοῦ γράφηται σὲ, αὐτὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, ἃ προκαλοῦμην αὐτὸν.

εἰτοῦρν. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, Ὡ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἂρα με

C ἐπιχειρήσεις γράφεσθαι, εὐροῦμ’ ἂν, ὡς ὁμιληθεῖ, ὅπη σαθρὸς ἔστιν, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος ἐγένετο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἡ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

σακρατις. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι, Ὡ φίλε ἐτάιρε, ταῦτα γυγνώσκων μαθητής ἐπιθυμῶ γενέσθαι σὸς, εἰδῶς.
holiness and unholiness is so exact that, when the facts are as you say, you are not afraid of doing something unholy yourself in prosecuting your father for murder?

EUTHYPHRHO. I should be of no use, Socrates, and Euthyphro would be in no way different from other men, if I did not have exact knowledge about all such things.

SOCRATES. Then the best thing for me, my admirable Euthyphro, is to become your pupil and, before the suit with Meletus comes on, to challenge him and say that I always thought it very important before to know about divine matters and that now, since he says I am doing wrong by acting carelessly and making innovations in matters of religion, I have become your pupil. And “Meletus,” I should say, “if you acknowledge that Euthyphro is wise in such matters, then believe that I also hold correct opinions, and do not bring me to trial; and if you do not acknowledge that, then bring a suit against him, my teacher, rather than against me, and charge him with corrupting the old, namely, his father and me, which he does by teaching me and by correcting and punishing his father.” And if he does not do as I ask and does not release me from the indictment or bring it against you in my stead, I could say in the court the same things I said in my challenge to him, could I not?

EUTHYPHRHO. By Zeus, Socrates, if he should undertake to indict me, I fancy I should find his weak spot, and it would be much more a question about him in court than about me.

SOCRATES. And I, my dear friend, perceiving this, wish to become your pupil; for I know that neither
ότι καὶ ἄλλος ποῦ τὶς καὶ ὁ Μέλητος οὗτος σὲ μὲν οὐδὲ δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὕτως ὃξεως καὶ ῥάδιως κατείδεν, ὡστε ἀσεβείας ἐγράψατο. νῦν οὖν πρὸς Δίως λέγε μοι, ὅ νῦν δὴ σαφῶς εἰδέναι διασχυρίζοντι ποίον τι τὸ ἐυσεβές φής εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀσεβές καὶ

D περὶ φόνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων; ἢ οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐστιν ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ οὐσιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον αὐτοῦ τού μὲν οὐσίου παντὸς ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ δὲ αὐτῷ ὁμοίον καὶ ἔχων μᾶλ γυνὰ ἰδέαν 1 πᾶν, ὅ τι περὶ ἄν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἰναι;

ΕΤΩΤΕΡΩΝ. Πάντως δῆτον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

6. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε δὴ, τί φής εἶναι τὸ οὐσίον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΤΩΤΕΡΩΝ. Λέγω τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν οὐσίον ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τῷ ἀδικοῦντι ἢ περὶ φόνους ἢ περὶ ἱερῶν κλοπᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐξαμαρτάνοντι ἐπεξείναι, εάν τε παθὴρ δὲν τυγχάνῃ Ε ἐάν τε μήτηρ εάν τε ἄλλος ὅστισοιτο, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξείναι ἀνόσιον ἐπεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες, θέασαι, ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρῶ τεκμήριον τού μόνον ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὃ καὶ ἄλλος ἢδη εἶπον, ὅτι ταῦτα ὀρθῶς ἄν εἴη οὕτω γυνόμενα, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦσιν μηδὲ ἄν ὅστισοῦν τυγχάνῃ ὅντ' αὐτὸ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι

6 τυγχάνουσι νομίζοντες τοῦ Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀριστὸν καὶ δικαιότατον, καὶ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦσι τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα δῆσαι, ὅτι τοὺς νυεῖς κατέπινεν οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ, κακεῖνον γε αὐς τὸν αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι' ἐστέρα τοιαῦτα· ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξέρχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ

1 After ιδέαν δ’ read κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσίατητα, which Schanz brackets.

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EUTHYPHRO

this fellow Meletus, nor anyone else, seems to notice you at all, but he has seen through me so sharply and so easily that he has indicted me for impiety. Now in the name of Zeus, tell me what you just now asserted that you knew so well. What do you say is the nature of piety and impiety, both in relation to murder and to other things? Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other hand, is not unholiness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one characteristic quality?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Tell me then, what do you say holiness is, and what unholliness?

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, I say that holiness is doing what I am doing now, prosecuting the wrong-doer who commits murder or steals from the temples or does any such thing, whether he be your father or your mother or anyone else, and not prosecuting him is unholy. And, Socrates, see what a sure proof I offer you,—a proof I have already given to others,—that this is established and right and that we ought not to let him who acts impiously go unpunished, no matter who he may be. Men believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, and they acknowledge that he put his father in bonds because he wickedly devoured his children, and he in turn had mutilated his father for similar reasons; but they are incensed against me because I proceed against my father when he has done wrong, and so they are
αὐτοῖς τὰ ἑνάντια λέγουσι περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρα γε, ὁ Ἐυθύφρος, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, οὗ ἔνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδὰν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγη, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι; δι’ ἄ δὴ, ὃς ἔοικε, φησεί τίς με ἐξαμαρτάνειν. νῦν οὖν εἰ καὶ σοι ταῦτα ἕνσφοικε τῷ εὗ εἰδότι περὶ τῶν τουιτῶν, ἀνάγκη δή, ὃς ἔοικε, καὶ ἥμιν ἔνυχωρεῖν. τι γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, οὗ γε αὐτὸς ὁμολογούμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι; ἅλλα μοι εἰπὲ πρὸς Φιλίου, καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς ἦγεῖ ταῦτα οὕτως γεγονέναι;

ΕΙΣΟΔΟΝ. Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐκ ἔσασιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ πόλεμον ἁρα ἤγει σὺ εἶναι τῷ ὕμνι ἐν τοῖς θεοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἔχθρας γε δεινὰς καὶ μάχας καὶ ἅλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, ὥσα λέγεται τε ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἅγαθῶν γραφέων τὰ τε ἅλλα ἱερὰ ἦμῖν καταπεύκειται, καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις Παναθηναίοις ὁ πέπλος μεστὸς τῶν τοιουτών ποικιλμάτων ἀνάγεται εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν; ταῦτα ἀληθῆ φῶμεν εἶναι, ὁ Ἐυθύφρος;

ΕΙΣΟΔΟΝ. Μὴ μόνον γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. ἅλλ’ ὅπερ ἀρτι εἰπον, καὶ ἅλλα σοι ἐγὼ πολλά, ἑαντερ βούλῃ, περὶ τῶν θεῶν διηγήσομαι, ἀ σὺ ἀκούων εὑ ὅδι ὅτι ἐκπλαγήσει.

7. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι. ἅλλα ταῦτα μὲν μοι εἰς αὕθεις ἐπὶ σχολῆς διηγήσει νυνὶ δέ, ὅπερ ἀρτι σε ἥρομην, πειρὼ σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν.

Οὔ γὰρ με, ὁ ἑταῖρε, τὸ πρῶτον ἰκανῶς ἐδίδαξας ἑρωτήσαντα τὸ ὄσιον, ὁ τι ποτ’ εἴη, ἅλλα μοι
EUTHYPHRO

inconsistent in what they say about the gods and about me.

SOCRATES. Is not this, Euthyphro, the reason why I am being prosecuted, because when people tell such stories about the gods I find it hard to accept them? And therefore, probably, people will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who confess frankly that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, do you really believe these things happened?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, and still more wonderful things than these, Socrates, which most people do not know.

SOCRATES. And so you believe that there was really war between the gods, and fearful enmities and battles and other things of the sort, such as are told of by the poets and represented in varied designs by the great artists in our sacred places and especially on the robe which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaeae? for this is covered with such representations. Shall we agree that these things are true, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Not only these things, Socrates; but, as I said just now, I will, if you like, tell you many other things about the gods, which I am sure will amaze you when you hear them.

SOCRATES. I dare say. But you can tell me those things at your leisure some other time. At present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, you did not give me sufficient information before, when I asked what holiness was, but you told me that this was holy

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eîpes, òti toû toû tûnaxânei õsion òn, ò sî õn
pouieïs, fînou êpetiâw tû pàtrî.

etôfrop. Kai álêthi ge êleugon, ò Sôkrates.

sôkratès. Ísws. õllâ gàr, ô Eúðýphroû, kai õllâ pôllâ fîs einai õsia.

etôfrop. Kai gàr èstîn.

sôkratès. Mèmmnûsai ouî, òti ou toûto sô
diekeleunomèn, èn tî h dûo me dieðâxai tôn pôllôw
õsîw, õllê êkeîno aûto to èîdos, òfî pànta tô
ôsia ôsia èstîn; êphîstha gàr pûn maî idêa tâ
tè ànôsia ànôsia einai kai tô ôsia ôsia: h ou
mîmûneîs;

etôfrop. 'Egôge.

sôkratès. Taûtîn toûnun me aûtîn dieðâxoun
tîn idêan, tîs pôtê èstîn, òna eîs êkeînyn àposthê-
pôn kai chrómenos aûtîn paradêgmatî, ò mên dw
toiûtôn h, òn dw h sî h álloû tîs pràttî, òfî
ôsion eînai, òd' dw mû toiûtôn, mû fîw.

etôfrop. 'Alî eî ouûw bouîlei, ò Sôkrates,
kai ouûw soi phrása.

sôkratès. Òllà mûn bouîlomai ge.

etôfrop. 'Estî toûnun tô mên toûs theoûs prôs-
philèis ôsion, tô òe mû prosthilèis ànôsion.

sôkratès. Pàngkalâw, ô Eúðýphroû, kai òsî
gô êxîtôn àpokrînasaî sei, ouûw mûn àpê-
kînôw. ei mêntoi álthês, tôûto ouûw oîda, õllà
sî dhîlon stî epêkidiâxèis, òsî èstîn álthê h à
lêgèis.

etôfrop. Pànu mên ouû.

8. sôkratès. Êpîr ñh, êpîskephîmêra, tî lê-
gomê. tô mên theofîlèis te kai ó theofîlèis ãn-
ðròpos ôsios, tô òe theomosè kai ó theomosè
EUTHYPHRO

which you are now doing, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, what I said was true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, you say that many other things are holy, do you not?

EUTHYPHRO. Why, so they are.

SOCRATES. Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy acts are holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by one aspect. Or don’t you remember?

EUTHYPHRO. I remember.

SOCRATES. Tell me then what this aspect is, that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a model and, if anything you or anyone else does agrees with it, may say that the act is holy, and if not, that it is unholy.

EUTHYPHRO. If you wish me to explain in that way, I will do so.

SOCRATES. I do wish it.

EUTHYPHRO. Well then, what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.

SOCRATES. Excellent, Euthyphro; now you have answered as I asked you to answer. However, whether it is true, I am not yet sure; but you will, of course, show that what you say is true.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Come then, let us examine our words. The thing and the person that are dear to the gods are holy, and the thing and the person that are hateful to the gods are unholy; and the two are not the same, but the holy and the unholy are the
PLATO

ἀνοσιός· οὐ ταυτὸν δ’ ἐστὶν, ἄλλα τὸ ἐναντιώ-
tatov to ὁσιον τῷ ἀνοσίῳ· οὐχ οὕτως;

ἐτσθφων. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.

ζωκράθης· Καὶ εὖ γε φαίνεται εἰρήσθαι;

Β ἐτσθφων. Δοκῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες.1

ζωκράθης. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁτι στασιάζουσιν οἱ
θεοί, ὦ Ἐυθύφρον, καὶ διαφέρονται ἀλλήλους καὶ
ἐχθρὰ ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἄλληλους, καὶ τοῦτο
εἰρηται;

ἐτσθφων. Εἰρῆται γὰρ.

ζωκράθης. Ἐχθράν δὲ καὶ ὀργὰς, δὲ ἄριστε, ἡ
περὶ τίνων διαφορὰ ποιεῖ; ὡδὲ δὲ σκοπῶμεν. ἀρ
ἀν εἰ διαφεροὶμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ,
ὅποτερα πλεῖον, ἡ περὶ τούτων διαφορὰ ἐχθροὺς
ἀν ἡμᾶς ποιοὶ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἄλληλους, ἥ ἐπὶ
λογίσμον ἑλθόντες περὶ γε τῶν τοιοῦτων ταχύ ἀν

ζωκράθης. Πάνω γε.

ζωκράθης. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ
ἐλάττωνος εἰ διαφεροὶμεθα, ἐπὶ τὸ μέτρον ἐλ-
θόντες ταχύ παυσαίμεθα ἀν τῆς διαφορᾶς;

ἐτσθφων. Ἑστι ταῦτα.

ζωκράθης. Καὶ ἐπὶ γε τὸ ἰστάναι ἑλθόντες,
ὡς ἐγὼ φησί, περὶ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου
diakrithemenv ἀν;

ἐτσθφων. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ζωκράθης. Περὶ τίνος δὲ δὴ διενεχθέντες καὶ
ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν ὁυ δυνάμενοι ἄφικεσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε
ἀν ἄλληλοις εἴμεν καὶ ὀργίζοιμεθα; ἵσως οὐ πρὸ-

D χειρόν σοὶ ἐστίν. ἄλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ

1 The manuscripts read Δοκῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες. εἰρῆται γὰρ. Schanz brackets this and the preceding line. I follow
EUTHYPHRO

exact opposites of each other. Is not this what we have said?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, just this.

SOCRATES. And it seems to be correct?

EUTHYPHRO. I think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, have we said this also, that the gods, Euthyphro, quarrel and disagree with each other, and that there is enmity between them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, we have said that.

SOCRATES. But what things is the disagreement about, which causes enmity and anger? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to disagree about number, for instance, which of two numbers were the greater, would the disagreement about these matters make us enemies and make us angry with each other, or should we not quickly settle it by resorting to arithmetic?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course we should.

SOCRATES. Then, too, if we were to disagree about the relative size of things, we should quickly put an end to the disagreement by measuring?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And we should, I suppose, come to terms about relative weights by weighing?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. But about what would a disagreement be, which we could not settle and which would cause us to be enemies and be angry with each other? Perhaps you cannot give an answer offhand; but let Hermann in omitting ἐπηθαν γὰρ, which may have been once a marginal note or may have been copied by mistake from the next words of Euthyphro.

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PLATO

τάδε ἦστι τὸ τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ τὸ ἄδικου καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ. ἀρα οὐ ταύτα ἦστιν, ὅπως διευθέτησε καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἰκανὴν κρίσιν αὐτῶν ἔλθειν ἑχθροὶ ἀλλήλους γεγονόμεθα, ὅταν γεγονόμεθα, καὶ ἔγω καὶ σύ καὶ οἱ άλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

ἐτετύφρων. 'Αλλ' ἦστιν αὐτὴ ἡ διαφορὰ, ὥς Σώκρατες, καὶ περὶ τούτων.

ζωκράτης. Τί δε; οἱ θεοὶ, ὥς Εὐθύφρων, οὐκ εἶπερ· τί διαφέρονται, διὰ ταύτα διαφέροντ' ἂν;

ἐτετύφρων. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Εζωκράτης. Καὶ τῶν θεῶν ἄρα, ὥς γέννατε Εὐθύφρων, ἄλλοι ἄλλα δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα ἢ γονίωνται κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ ἐστασίαιζον ἀλλήλους, εἰ μὴ περὶ τούτων διεφέροντο· ἢ γὰρ;

ἐτετύφρων. 'Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ζωκράτης. Οὐκοῦν ἂπερ καλὰ γονίωνται ἐκαστοί καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ταύτα καὶ φιλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων μισοῦσιν;

ἐτετύφρων. Πάνω γε.

ζωκράτης. Ταύτα δὲ γε, ὥς σὺ φῆς, οἱ μὲν δίκαια γονίωνται, οἱ δὲ ἄδικα· περὶ ἂ καὶ 8 ἀμφισβητοῦντες στασιάζουσί τε καὶ πολεμοῦσιν ἀλλήλους. ἀρα οὐξ οὖτω;

ἐτετύφρων. Οὔτω.

ζωκράτης. Ταύτ' ἄρα, ὥς ἐοικεν, μισεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν καὶ φιλεῖται, καὶ θεομοσιῇ τε καὶ θεοφιλῇ ταύτ' ἂν εἰθ.

ἐτετύφρων. 'Εοικεν.

1 καὶ ἄδικα inserted by Hirchig, followed by Schanz.
EUTHYPHRO

me suggest it. Is it not about right and wrong, and noble and disgraceful, and good and bad? Are not these the questions about which you and I and other people become enemies, when we do become enemies, because we differ about them and cannot reach any satisfactory agreement?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, Socrates, these are the questions about which we should become enemies.

SOCRATES. And how about the gods, Euthyphro? If they disagree, would they not disagree about these questions?

EUTHYPHRO. Necessarily.

SOCRATES. Then, my noble Euthyphro, according to what you say, some of the gods too think some things are right or wrong and noble or disgraceful, and good or bad, and others disagree; for they would not quarrel with each other if they did not disagree about these matters. Is that the case?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

SOCRATES. Then the gods in each group love the things which they consider good and right and hate the opposites of these things?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But you say that the same things are considered right by some of them and wrong by others; and it is because they disagree about these things that they quarrel and wage war with each other. Is not this what you said?

EUTHYPHRO. It is.

SOCRATES. Then, as it seems, the same things are hated and loved by the gods, and the same things would be dear and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ὅσια ἄρα καὶ ἀνόσια τὰ αὐτὰ ἄν εἴη, ὥς Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτο τῷ λόγῳ.

ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Κινδυνεύει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὃ ἡρόμην ἀπεκρίνω, ὥς θαυμάσιε. οὐ γὰρ τούτο γε ἠρώτων, ὃ τυγχάνει ταύτων ὃν ὅσιόν τε καὶ ἀνόσιον· ὃ δὲ ἂς θεοφιλής ἦ, καὶ θεομισίας ἐστὶν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ὡστε, ὅ

B Εὐθύφρον, ὅ σὺ νῦν ποιεῖς τὸν πατέρα κολάξων, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν, εἰ τούτῳ δρῶν τῷ μὲν Δεὶ προσφιλές ποιεῖς, τῷ δὲ Κρόνῳ καὶ τῷ Οὐρανῷ ἐχθρόν, καὶ τῷ μὲν Ἑράστῳ ὕλον, τῇ δὲ Ἡρα ἐχθρόνος καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν θεῶν ἔτερος ἔτερῳ διαφέρεται περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐκείνος κατὰ τὰ αὐτά.

ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι, ὥς Σώκратες, περὶ γε τούτου τῶν θεῶν οὐδένα ἔτερον ἔτερῳ διαφέρεσθαι, ὡς ὅ ὅ δεί δίκην διδόναι ἐκεῖνον, ὅς ὅν ἂδίκως τινὰ ἀποκτεῖνη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὶ δὲ; ἀνθρώπων, ὥς Εὐθύφρον, ήδη τινὸς ἡκουσας ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς τῶν ἂδίκως ἀποκτείναντα ἡ ἄλλο ἂδίκως ποιοῦντα ὁτιοῦν οὐ δεί δίκην διδόναι;

ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παῦνται ταῦτα ἀμφισβητοῦντες καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. ἂδικοῦντες γὰρ πάμπολλα, πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι φεύγοντες τῇ δίκῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ καὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν, ὥς Εὐθύφρον, ἂδικεῖν, καὶ ὁμολογοῦντες ὁμος οὐ δεῖν φασι σφαζ αὐτοὶ διδόναι δίκην;

ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς τούτῳ γε.

1 Schanz reads φ for δ.
EUTHYPHRO

Socrates. And then the same things would be both holy and unholy, Euthyphro, according to this statement.

Euthyphro. I suppose so.

Socrates. Then you did not answer my question, my friend. For I did not ask you what is at once holy and unholy; but, judging from your reply, what is dear to the gods is also hateful to the gods. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if, in punishing your father as you are doing, you were performing an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagree with any other about it.

Euthyphro. But I think, Socrates, that none of the gods disagrees with any other about this, or holds that he who kills anyone wrongfully ought not to pay the penalty.

Socrates. Well, Euthyphro, to return to men, did you ever hear anybody arguing that he who had killed anyone wrongfully, or had done anything else whatever wrongfully, ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro. Why, they are always arguing these points, especially in the law courts. For they do very many wrong things; and then there is nothing they will not do or say, in defending themselves, to avoid the penalty.

Socrates. Yes, but do they acknowledge, Euthyphro, that they have done wrong and, although they acknowledge it, nevertheless say that they ought not to pay the penalty?

Euthyphro. Oh, no, they don't do that.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἂρα πάν γε ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι. τούτο γάρ, οἶμαι, οὐ τολμῶσι λέγειν οὐδὲν ἂμφισβητεῖν, ὡς οὐχὶ, εἴπερ ἁδικοῦσί· γε, δοτέον δίκην ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οὐ φασιν ἁδικεῖν. ἦ γάρ;

ΕΤΕΡΦΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἂρα ἐκεῖνο γε ἂμφισβητοῦσιν, ὡς οὐ τὸν ἁδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἵσος ἂμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἔστιν ὁ ἁδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν καὶ πότε.

ΕΤΕΡΦΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ¹

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰ γε ταῦτα καὶ οἱ θεοὶ πεπόνθασιν, εἴπερ στασιμῶσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἁδίκων, ὡς ο σὸς λόγος, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασὶν ἄλληλους ἁδικεῖν, οἱ δὲ οὐ φασὶν; Επεὶ ἐκεῖνο γε δήπου, ὁ θαυμάσιε, οὐδὲς οὐτε θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων τολμᾶ λέγειν, ὡς οὐ τῷ γε ἁδικοῦντε δοτέον δίκην.

ΕΤΕΡΦΩΝ. Ναὶ, τοῦτο μὲν ἁλθής λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ κεφάλαιον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἐκαστὸν γε οἶμαι, ὃ Εὐθύφρον, τῶν πραγμάτων ἂμφισβητοῦσιν οἱ ἂμφισβητοῦντες, καὶ ἁνθρώποι καὶ θεοὶ, εἴπερ ἂμφισβητοῦσι θεοὶ. πράξεως τινος πέρι διαφερόμενοι οἱ μὲν δικαίως φασίν αὐτὴν πεπράχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἁδίκως ἀρ' οὖχ οὔτω;

ΕΤΕΡΦΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡθι νῦν, ὁ φίλε Εὐθύφρον.

9 δίδαξον καὶ ἐμέ, ἵνα σοφώτερος γένωμαι, τί σοι τεκμήριόν ἔστιν, ὡς πάντες θεοὶ ἠγούνται ἐκεῖνον ἁδίκως τεθνάναι, ὃς ἂν θητεύων ἀνδρο-

¹ οὐκ ἂρα . . . 'Αληθῆ λέγεις bracketed by Schanz following Schenkl.

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EUTHYPHRO

SOCRATES. Then there is something they do not do and say. For they do not, I fancy, dare to say and argue that, if they have really done wrong, they ought not to pay the penalty; but, I think, they say they have not done wrong; do they not?

EUTHYPHRO. You are right.

SOCRATES. Then they do not argue this point, that the wrongdoer must not pay the penalty; but perhaps they argue about this, who is a wrongdoer, and what he did, and when.

EUTHYPHRO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Then is not the same thing true of the gods, if they quarrel about right and wrong, as you say, and some say others have done wrong, and some say they have not? For surely, my friend, no one, either of gods or men, has the face to say that he who does wrong ought not to pay the penalty.

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, you are right about this, Socrates, in the main.

SOCRATES. But I think, Euthyphro, those who dispute, both men and gods, if the gods do dispute, dispute about each separate act. When they differ with one another about any act, some say it was right and others that it was wrong. Is it not so?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Come now, my dear Euthyphro, inform me, that I may be made wiser, what proof you have that all the gods think that the man lost his life wrongfully, who, when he was a servant, committed
PLATO

φόνος γενόμενος, ξυνδεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου τοῦ ἀποθανόντος, φθάσῃ τελευτήσας διὰ τὰ δεσμά, πρὶν τὸν ξυνδήσαντα παρὰ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ πυθόσθαι, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιοῦτο τῇ ὀρθῶς ἔχει ἐπεξείναι καὶ ἐπισκύπτεσθαι φόνου τὸν νῦν τῷ πατρὶ ἢ τί, περὶ τούτων πειρῶ τί μοι σαφὲς ἐνδείκασθαι, ὡς τοῦ πάντος μᾶλλον πάντες θεοὶ ἡγοῦνται ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τάς την πράξεως καὶ μοι ἰκανός ἐνδείξῃς, ἐγκωμίας σε ἐπὶ σοφία οὐδέποτε παύσομαι.

ἐτείφρον. 'Ἀλλ' ἵσως οὐκ ὄλγον ἔργον ἔστιν, ὥς Σώκρατες ἐπεὶ πάνυ γε σαφῶς ἔχομι ἃν ἐπείδειξαι σοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω δὲ σοὶ δοκῶ τῶν δικαστῶν δυσμαθέστερος εἶναι ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνος γε ἐνδείξῃς δῆλον ὅτι, ὥς ἀδικά τέ ἔστων καὶ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα μισοῦσιν.

ἐτείφρον. Πάνυ γε σαφῶς, ὅς Σώκρατες, εάν περ ἀκούσθη γέ μου λέγοντος.

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλ' ἀκούσθη, εάν περ εὖ δοκῆς λέγειν. τόδε δέ σοι ἐνενόησα ἀμα λέγοντος, καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν σκοτῶν εἶ ὃ τι μᾶλλον μὲ Εὐθύφρων διδάξειν. ὡς οἱ θεοὶ ἀπαντεῖς τὸν τοιοῦτον θάνατον ἡγοῦνται ἄδικον εἶναι, τί μᾶλλον ἐγὼ μεμάθηκα παρ' Εὐθύφρωνος, τί ποτ' ἔστων τὸ ὅσιον τε καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον; θεομασίας μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, ὡς ἐοικεῖν, εἴη ἂν ἄλλα γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ ἐφανὴ ἀρτι ὁρισμένα τὸ ὅσιον καὶ μὴ τὸ γὰρ θεομασίας ὅν καὶ θεομασίας ἐφανή: ὡστε τούτῳ ἀφίημι σε, ὅς Εὐθύφρων εἰ βοῦλει, πάντες αὐτὸ ὅγεισθον θεοὶ ἄδικον καὶ πάντες μισοῦντων. ἀλλ' ἀρα τούτῳ νῦν ἐπανορθώμεθα ἐν τῷ λόγῳ,
EUTHYPHRO

a murder, was bound by the master of the man he killed, and died as a result of his bonds before the master who had bound him found out from the advisers what he ought to do with him, and that it is right on account of such a man for a son to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Come, try to show me clearly about this, that the gods surely believe that this conduct is right; and if you show it to my satisfaction, I will glorify your wisdom as long as I live.

EUTHYPHRO. But perhaps this is no small task, Socrates; though I could show you quite clearly.

SOCRATES. I understand; it is because you think I am slower to understand than the judges; since it is plain that you will show them that such acts are wrong and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO. Quite clearly, Socrates; that is, if they listen to me.

SOCRATES. They will listen, if they find that you are a good speaker. But this occurred to me while you were talking, and I said to myself: "If Euthyphro should prove to me no matter how clearly that all the gods think such a death is wrongful, what have I learned from Euthyphro about the question, what is holiness and what is unholiness? For this act would, as it seems, be hateful to the gods; but we saw just now that holiness and its opposite are not defined in this way; for we saw that what is hateful to the gods is also dear to them; and so I let you off any discussion of this point, Euthyphro. If you like, all the gods may think it wrong and may hate it. But shall we now emend our definition and
PLATO

ως δὲ μὲν ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ μισᾶσθαι, ἀνόσιον ἐστὶν, 10
δὲ ἄν φιλῶσθαι, ὑσίον· δὲ δὲ ἄν οἱ μὲν φιλῶσθαι,
oi ὃ ὑσᾶσθαι, οὐδέτερα ή ἀμφότερα; ἀρ' οὖτω
βούλει ἡμῖν ὥρισθαι νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὑσίου καὶ τοῦ
ἀνόσιου;

εὐστρπ. Τί γὰρ καλύπει, ὁ Σωκράτης;
σωκρατις. Οὐδὲν ἐμὲ γε, ὁ Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ
οὐ δὴ τὸ σὸν σκόπει; εἰ τούτῳ ὑποθέμενος οὔτω
ρᾶστα μὲ διδάξεις ὑπέσχοι.

Εὐστρπ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼνοι φαίνη ἂν τούτῳ εἶναι
τὸ ὑσίου, δὲ ἄν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσθαι, καὶ τὸ
ἐναντίον, δὲ ἄν πάντες θεοὶ μισᾶσθαι, ἀνόσιον.

σωκρατις. Ὀυκοῦν ἐπισκοπῶμεν αὐ τούτῳ, ὁ
Εὐθύφρων, εἰ καλῶς λέγεται, ἡ ἐώμεν καὶ οὕτω
ἡμῶν τε αὐτῶν ἀποδεχόμεθα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐὰν
μόνον φη τὸς τι ἐχεῖν οὕτω, ἔναντι οὕτω,
ἡ σκεπτέον, τί λέγει ὁ λέγων;

εὐστρπ. Σκεπτέον: οἶμαι μεντοῦ ἐγώνοι τοῦτο
νυνι καλῶς λέγεσθαι.

12. σωκρατις. Τάχ', ὧγαθε, βέλτιον εἰσό-
μεθα, ἐννόησον γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο. ἀρα τὸ ὑσίον,
ὅτι ὑσίον ἐστὶ, φιλεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ὅτι
φιλεῖται, ὑσίον ἐστὶ;

εὐστρπ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης.

σωκρατις. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι σαφέστερον
φράσαι. λέγομεν τὶ φερόμενον καὶ φέρον καὶ
ἀγόμενον καὶ ἁγόμενον καὶ ἀρόμενον καὶ ὀρῶν.
καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐτερα ἀλλήλων
ἐστι καὶ ἦ ἐτερα;

εὐστρπ. Ἐγώγε μοι δοκῶ μανθάνειν.

34
EUTHYPHRO

say that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they all love is holy, and what some love and others hate is neither or both? Do you wish this now to be our definition of holiness and unholliness?

EUTHYPHRO. What is to hinder, Socrates?
SOCRATES. Nothing, so far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, but consider your own position, whether by adopting this definition you will most easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO. Well, I should say that what all the gods love is holy and, on the other hand, what they all hate is unholy.

SOCRATES. Then shall we examine this again, Euthyphro, to see if it is correct, or shall we let it go and accept our own statement, and those of others, agreeing that it is so, if anyone merely says that it is? Or ought we to inquire into the correctness of the statement?

EUTHYPHRO. We ought to inquire. However, I think this is now correct.

SOCRATES. We shall soon know more about this, my friend. Just consider this question:—Is that which is holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then I will try to speak more clearly. We speak of being carried and of carrying, of being led and of leading, of being seen and of seeing; and you understand—do you not?—that in all such expressions the two parts differ one from the other in meaning, and how they differ.

EUTHYPHRO. I think I understand.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φιλούμενον τί ἐστὶν καὶ
tούτων ἔτερον τὸ φιλοῦν;

ΕΤΕΘΥΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δέλει δή μοι, πότερον τὸ φερόμενον,
διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον ἐστὶν, ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι;

ΕΤΕΘΥΡΩΝ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτο.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τὸ ἀγόμενον δὴ, διότι ἄγεται,
καὶ τὸ ὀρῶμενον, διότι ὀρᾶται;

ΕΤΕΘΥΡΩΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα διότι ὀρῶμενον γέ ἐστιν,
διὰ τούτο ὀρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον διότι ὀρᾶται,
διὰ τούτο ὀρῶμενον· οὐδὲ διότι ἁγόμενον ἐστὶν,
διὰ τούτο ἄγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἄγεται, διὰ τούτο
ἀγόμενον· οὐδὲ διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ
dιότι φέρεται, φερόμενον. ἀρα κατὰ δηλοῦν, δὲ

Εὐθύφρων, δ’ Βούλομαι λέγειν; Βούλομαι δὲ τόδε,
ὅτι, εἰ τί γίγνεται ἢ τι πάσχει, οὐχ ὅτι γιγνόμενον
ἔστιν, γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι γίγνεται, γιγνόμενον
ἔστιν· οὐδ’ ὅτι πάσχον ἔστιν, πάσχει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι
πάσχει, πάσχον ἔστιν· ὦ ὃς ἁγιωθωρεῖς οὖτω;

ΕΤΕΘΥΡΩΝ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλούμενον ἢ γιγνό-
μενόν τί ἐστιν ἢ πάσχον τι υπὸ του;

ΕΤΕΘΥΡΩΝ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ τούτῳ ἀρα οὕτως ἔχει, ὡσπερ
τὰ πρῶτα· οὐχ ὅτι φιλούμενον ἐστιν, φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ δὴ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ’ ὅτι φιλεῖται, φιλούμενον;

ΕΤΕΘΥΡΩΝ. Ἀνάγκη.
EUTHYPHRO

Socrates. Then, too, we conceive of a thing being loved and of a thing loving, and the two are different?

Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates. Now tell me, is a thing which is carried a carried thing because one carries it, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro. No, for that reason.

Socrates. And a thing which is led is led because one leads it, and a thing which is seen is so because one sees it?

Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates. Then one does not see it because it is a seen thing, but, on the contrary, it is a seen thing because one sees it; and one does not lead it because it is a led thing, but it is a led thing because one leads it; and one does not carry it because it is a carried thing, but it is a carried thing because one carries it. Is it clear, Euthyphro, what I am trying to say? I am trying to say this, that if anything becomes or undergoes, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes, and it does not undergo because it is a thing which undergoes, but because it undergoes it is a thing which undergoes; or do you not agree to this?

Euthyphro. I agree.

Socrates. Is not that which is beloved a thing which is either becoming or undergoing something?

Euthyphro. Certainly.

Socrates. And is this case like the former ones: those who love it do not love it because it is a beloved thing, but it is a beloved thing because they love it?

Euthyphro. Obviously.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὴ οὖν λέγομεν περὶ τοῦ ὅσιον,
D ὁ Εὐθύφρος; ἄλλο τι φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν πάντων,
ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος;
ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναὶ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι ὅσιὸν ἔστιν, ἢ
dι' ἄλλο τι;
ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Οὐκ, ἄλλα διὰ τοῦτο.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Διότι ἄρα ὅσιὸν ἔστιν, φιλεῖται,
ἄλλ' οὖχ ὅτι φιλεῖται, διὰ τοῦτο ὅσιὸν ἔστιν;
ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐσικευ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ διότι γε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ
θεῶν, φιλομενὸν ἔστι καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ θεοφιλές. 1
ΕΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ θεοφιλὲς ὅσιὸν ἔστιν, ὁ
Εὐθύφρος, οὐδὲ τὸ ὅσιὸν θεοφιλὲς, ὡς σὺ λέγεις,
ἄλλ' ἔτερον τοῦτο τούτου.
ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δὴ, ὁ Σώκρατες;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅτι ὁμολογοῦμεν τὸ μὲν ὅσιὸν διὰ
tοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι, ὅτι ὅσιὸν ἔστιν, ἄλλ' οὐ διότι
φιλεῖται, ὅσιὸν εἶναι: ἡ γὰρ;
ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναὶ.
13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ γε θεοφιλὲς ὅτι φιλεῖται
ὑπὸ θεῶν, αὐτῷ τούτῳ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι θεοφιλὲς
εἶναι, ἄλλ' οὖχ ὅτι θεοφιλὲς, διὰ τοῦτο φιλεῖσθαι.
ΕΤΟΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' εἰ γε ταῦταν ἴν, ὁ φίλο
Εὐθύφρων, τὸ θεοφιλὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιὸν, εἰ μὲν διὰ τὸ
ὁσιὸν εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο τὸ ὅσιὸν, καὶ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλὲς
εἶναι ἐφιλεῖτο ἀν τὸ θεοφιλὲς, εἰ δὲ διὰ τὸ φιλεῖ-
σθαι ὑπὸ θεῶν τὸ θεοφιλὲς θεοφιλὲς ἴν, καὶ τὸ
1 τὸ θεοφιλὲς added by Schanz following Bast.
EUTHYPHRO

Socrates. Now what do you say about that which is holy, Euthyphro? It is loved by all the gods, is it not, according to what you said?

Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. For this reason, because it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euthyphro. No, for this reason.

Socrates. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

Euthyphro. I think so.

Socrates. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them and beloved by them because they love it.

Euthyphro. Of course.

Socrates. Then that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy are not identical, but differ one from the other.

Euthyphro. How so, Socrates?

Socrates. Because we are agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy and that it is not holy because it is loved; are we not?

Euthyphro. Yes.

Socrates. But we are agreed that what is dear to the gods is dear to them because they love it, that is, by reason of this love, not that they love it because it is dear.

Euthyphro. Very true.

Socrates. But if that which is dear to the gods and that which is holy were identical, my dear Euthyphro, then if the holy were loved because it is holy, that which is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear, and if that which is dear to the gods is dear because it is loved, then that which is holy would be holy because
PLATO

όσιον ἂν διὰ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι οὗτον ἦν νῦν ὁτὲ ὅρας, ὅτι ἐναντίως ἔχετον, ὡς παντάπασιν ἔτερω ὄντε ἀλλήλων. τὸ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι φιλεῖται, ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν οἷον φιλεῖσθαι, διὰ τούτο φιλεῖται. καὶ κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Ἐυθύφρον, ἐρωτῶμενος τὸ ὁσιον, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, τὴν μὲν οὖσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὗ βούλεσθαι. δηλῶσαι, πάθος δὲ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὅ τι πέπονθε τούτῳ τὸ

Β ὁσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὃ τι δὲ ὅν, οὐραίοις εἴπες. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, μή με ἀποκρύψῃ, ἀλλὰ πάλιν εἴπε ἢρχης, τί ποτὲ ὅν τὸ ὁσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν εἴτε ἄτιθη πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τούτου διωσόμεθα· ἀλλ' εἴπη προθύμως, τί ἐστὶν τὸ τε ὁσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον;

ΕΤΘΡΩΝ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω ἔγγυς, ὅπως σοι εἴπω τὸ νοῦ. περιέρχεται γὰρ πως ἡμῖν ἥκι ὅ ἂν προθύμωμεθα, καὶ οὖκ ἠθέλει μένειν ὅπως ἂν ἰδρυσόμεθα αὐτό.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦ ἧμετέρου προγόνου, ὦ Ἐυθύ-

C φρον, ἐοικέν εἶναι Δαίδαλον τὰ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγόμενα. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτὰ ἔγω ἔλεγον καὶ ἐπιθέμην, ἢσος ἄν μὲ ἐπέσκωπτες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἐμοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκείνου εὐγγένειαν τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα ἀποδι-

δράσκειν καὶ οὖκ ἠθέλει μένειν ὅπως ἂν τις αὐτὰ θῇ· νῦν δὲ—σαλ γὰρ αἱ ὑποθέσεις εἰσὶν· ἀλλου δὴ 

τινος δεὶ σκῶμματος. οὐ γὰρ ἠθέλουσι σοι μένειν, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ σοι δοκεῖ.

ΕΤΘΡΩΝ. Ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ σχεδόν τι τοῦ αὐτοῦ
EUTHYPHRO

it is loved; but now you see that the opposite
is the case, showing that the two are entirely
different from each other. For the one becomes
lovable from the fact that it is loved, whereas
the other is loved because it is in itself lovable.
And, Euthyphro, it seems that when you were
asked what holiness is you were unwilling to
make plain its essence, but you mentioned some-
thing that has happened to this holiness, namely,
that it is loved by the gods. But you did not
tell as yet what it really is. So, if you please,
do not hide it from me, but begin over again
and tell me what holiness is, no matter whether
it is loved by the gods or anything else happens
to it; for we shall not quarrel about that. But
tell me frankly, What is holiness, and what is
unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO. But, Socrates, I do not know how to
say what I mean. For whatever statement we
advance, somehow or other it moves about and won’t
stay where we put it.

SOCRATES. Your statements, Euthyphro, are like
works of my \(^1\) ancestor Daedalus, and if I were the
one who made or advanced them, you might laugh
at me and say that on account of my relationship to
him my works in words run away and won’t stay
where they are put. But now—well, the statements
are yours; so some other jest is demanded; for they
won’t stay fixed, as you yourself see.

EUTHYPHRO. I think the jest does very well as it

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\(^1\) Socrates was the son of a sculptor and was himself
educated to be a sculptor. This is doubtless the reason for
his reference to Daedalus as an ancestor. Daedalus was a
half mythical personage whose statues were said to have been
so lifelike that they moved their eyes and walked about.
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σκόμματος, ὡς Σώκρατες, δεῖσθαι τὰ λεγόμενα.

D τὸ γὰρ περιεῖναι τούτοις ¹ τοῦτο καὶ μὴ μένειν ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἐγώ εἰμι ὃ ἐντιθέεις, ἀλλὰ σὺ μοι
δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ γε ἐνεκα ἐμενὲν ἄν
ταῦτα οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύω ἄρα, ὃ ἐταὶρέ, ἐκείνου
tοῦ ἀνδρὸς δεινότερος γεγονέναι τὴν τέχνην το-
σούτῳ, ὅσῳ ὁ μὲν τὰ αὐτοῦ μόνα ἐποίει οὐ
μένωντα, ἐγώ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμαντοῦ, ὃς ἔοικε, καὶ
Ε τὰ ἀλλότρια. καὶ δῆτα τοῦτο μιᾷ τῆς τέχνης
ἐστὶ κοινώτατον, ὅτι ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφὸς. ἔβου-
λόμην γὰρ ἂν μοι τοὺς λόγους μένειν καὶ ἀκινήτως
ιδρύσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τῇ Δαίδαλου σοφίᾳ
tὰ Ταυτάλων χρήματα γενέσθαι. καὶ τούτων
μὲν ἄδην ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτὸς
σοι ἑμπροθυμῆσομαι, ² ὅπως ἂν με διδάξῃς περὶ
τοῦ ὅσιον. καὶ μὴ προαποκάμης. ἢδε γὰρ, εἰ
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον σοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι πάν τὸ
ὅσιον.

ΕΤΕΘΡΩΝ. Ἐμοι γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ πάν τὸ δίκαιον ὅσιον,
12 ἢ τὸ μὲν ὅσιον πάν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον οὖ πάν
ὅσιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ τι καὶ
ἄλλο;

ΕΤΕΘΡΩΝ. Οὐχ ἔσομαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῖς
λεγομένοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν νεώτερός γε μοι εἰ οὐκ
ἐλάττων ἢ ὅσῳ σοφώτερος ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, τρυφᾶς
ὕπο πλούτου τῆς σοφίας. ἀλλ', ὃ μακάριε,
EUTHYPHRO

is; for I am not the one who makes these statements move about and not stay in the same place, but you are the Daedalus; for they would have stayed, so far as I am concerned.

SOCRATES. Apparently then, my friend, I am a more clever artist than Daedalus, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, as it seems, give motion to the works of others as well as to my own. And the most exquisite thing about my art is that I am clever against my will; for I would rather have my words stay fixed and stable than possess the wisdom of Daedalus and the wealth of Tantalus besides. But enough of this. Since you seem to be indolent, I will aid you myself, so that you may instruct me about holiness. And do not give it up beforehand. Just see whether you do not think that everything that is holy is right.

EUTHYPHRO. I do.

SOCRATES. But is everything that is right also holy? Or is all which is holy right, and not all which is right holy, but part of it holy and part something else?

EUTHYPHRO. I can't follow you, Socrates.

SOCRATES. And yet you are as much younger than I as you are wiser; but, as I said, you are indolent on account of your wealth of wisdom. But exert
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ξύντευνε σαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ χαλεπῶν κατα-
νόησαι ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ δὴ τὸ ἑναντίον ἢ ὁ
ποιητὴς ἑποίησεν ὃ ποιήσας·

Ζήνα δὲ τὸν θ’ ἔρξαντα, καὶ δὲ τάδε πάντ' ἐφύτευσεν,
Β οὐκ ἔθελεις εἰπεῖν· ὦν γὰρ δέος, ἐνθά καὶ αἰδῶς.
ἐγὼ οὖν τοῦτο διαφέρομαι τῷ ποιητῇ. εἶπος σοι
ὄπη;

ΕΤΩΣΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι, ἦνα δέος, ἐνθά
καὶ αἰδῶς. πολλοὶ γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι καὶ νόσους
καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα πολλά τοιαῦτα δεδιότες
dedénav µέν, αἰδεῦσθαι δὲ µηδὲν ταῦτα ἀµα
ὀν καὶ σοι δοκεῖ;

ΕΤΩΣΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἦνα γε αἰδῶς, ἐνθά καὶ δέος εἶναι· ἔπει ἐστὶν ὡστὶς αἰδούμενος τι πρᾶγμα καὶ
Ｃ αἰσχυνόμενος οὐ πεφόβηται τε καὶ δέδοικεν ἀµα
dóxan pownikías;

ΕΤΩΣΡΩΝ. Δέδοικε µὲν οὖν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἄρ’ ὀρθῶς ἔχει λέγειν ἦνα γὰρ
dέος, ἐνθά καὶ αἰδῶς· ἀλλ’ ἦνα µὲν αἰδῶς, ἐνθά καὶ
déos, οὐ µέντοι ἦνα γε δέος, πανταχοῦ αἰδῶς. ἐπὶ
πλέον γάρ, οἶμαι, δέος αἰδοῦς· µόριον γὰρ αἰδῶς
déous, ὥσπερ ἄριθμον περιττόν, ὡστε οὐχ ἦνα περ
ἄριθμός, ἐνθά καὶ περιττόν, ἦνα δὲ περίττων, ἐνθά
καὶ ἄριθμός. ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐν οὐν γε;

ΕΤΩΣΡΩΝ. Πάνυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον τούτων καὶ ἔκει λέγων
ἡρώτων, ἀρὰ ἦνα δίκαιον, ἐνθά καὶ δεισιον, ἢ ἦνα
Ｄ µὲν ἄρ’ ἦνα, ἐνθά καὶ δίκαιον, ἦνα δὲ δίκαιον, οὐ
EUTHYPHRO

yourself, my friend; for it is not hard to understand what I mean. What I mean is the opposite of what the poet 1 said, who wrote: "Zeus the creator, him who made all things, thou wilt not name; for where fear is, there also is reverence." Now I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you how?

EUTHYPHRO. By all means.

SOCRATES. It does not seem to me true that where fear is, there also is reverence; for many who fear diseases and poverty and other such things seem to me to fear, but not to reverence at all these things which they fear. Don't you think so, too?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But I think that where reverence is, there also is fear; for does not everyone who has a feeling of reverence and shame about any act also dread and fear the reputation for wickedness?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, he does fear.

SOCRATES. Then it is not correct to say "where fear is, there also is reverence." On the contrary, where reverence is, there also is fear; but reverence is not everywhere where fear is, since, as I think, fear is more comprehensive than reverence; for reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, so that it is not true that where number is, there also is the odd, but that where the odd is, there also is number. Perhaps you follow me now?

EUTHYPHRO. Perfectly.

SOCRATES. It was something of this sort that I meant before, when I asked whether where the right is, there also is holiness, or where holiness is,

1 Stasinus, author of the "Cypria" (Fragm. 20, ed. Kinkel).

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πανταχοῦ ὁσιοῦ. µόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὁσιοῦ. οὕτω φώµεν ἢ ἄλλως σοι δοκεῖ;

εὐστήρων. Όυκ, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω. φαίνει γὰρ µοι ὁρθῶς λέγειν.

14. Ἕκκρατῆς. Ὁρὰ δὴ τὸ µετὰ τούτο. εἰ γὰρ µέρος τοῦ ὁσιοῦ τοῦ δικαίου, δεῖ δὴ ἡµᾶς, ὡς ξοικεῖν, ἔξευρεῖν τὸ ποίον µέρος ἂν εἶη τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὁσιοῦ. εἰ µὲν οὖν σὺ µὲ ήρωτας τι τῶν νῦν δὴ, οἶον ποίον µέρος ἐστὶν ἀριθµοῦ τὸ ἀρτιον καὶ τὸς ὁν τυγχάνει οὗτος ὁ ἀριθµός, εἶπον ἂν, ὅτι ὅς ἂν µὴ σκαληνοῦ ἦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσοςκελὴς ἦ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

εὐστήρων. Ἑµούγε. Ἐπερῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐµὲ οὕτω διδάξαι, τὸ ποίον µέρος τοῦ δικαίου ὁσιοῦ ἐστὶν, ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωµεν µηκέθ' ἡµᾶς ἄδικεῖν µηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ίκανῶς ἡδὴ παρὰ σοῦ µεµαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβή καὶ ὁσια καὶ τὰ µή.

εὐστήρων. Τούτῳ τούνν έµούγε δοκεί, ὡς Ἕκκρατες, τὸ µέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβές τε καὶ ὁσιοῦ, τὸ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν θεραπεῖαν τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου µέρος.

15. Ἕκκρατῆς. Καὶ καλῶς γέ µοι, ὦ Εὐθύ-13 φρον, φαίνει λέγειν. ἄλλα σµικρὸν τινὸς ἐτὶ ἐνδεχὴς εἶµ. τὴν γὰρ θεραπεῖαν οὕτω ξυνήµι ἡµινα ὁµομάζεις. οὐ γὰρ ποὺ λέγεις γε, οἶαι περ καὶ οἱ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεραπεῖαι εἴσιν, τοιαῦτην καὶ περὶ θεῶς. λέγοµεν γὰρ ποϑ—οἶον φαµέν, ἰπποὺς οὐ πᾶς ἐπίστηται θεραπεύειν, ἄλλα ὁ ἰππικός ἥ γὰρ;
EUTHYPHRO

there also is the right; but holiness is not every-where where the right is, for holiness is a part of the right. Do we agree to this, or do you dissent?

EUTHYPHRO. No, I agree; for I think the state-
ment is correct.

Socrates. Now observe the next point. If holiness is a part of the right, we must, apparently, find out what part of the right holiness is. Now if you asked me about one of the things I just mentioned, as, for example, what part of number the even was, and what kind of a number it was I should say, "that which is not indivisible by two, but divisible by two"; or don't you agree?

EUTHYPHRO. I agree.

Socrates. Now try in your turn to teach me what part of the right holiness is, that I may tell Meletus not to wrong me any more or bring suits against me for impiety, since I have now been duly instructed by you about what is, and what is not, pious and holy.

EUTHYPHRO. This then is my opinion, Socrates, that the part of the right which has to do with attention to the gods constitutes piety and holiness, and that the remaining part of the right is that which has to do with the service of men.

Socrates. I think you are correct, Euthyphro; but there is one little point about which I still want information, for I do not yet understand what you mean by "attention." I don't suppose you mean the same kind of attention to the gods which is paid to other things. We say, for example, that not everyone knows how to attend to horses, but only he who is skilled in horsemanship, do we not?
ΠΛΑΤΩΝ

ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Πάννυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Η γάρ ποι ἑπική ἱππὼν θερα-
πεία.
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Ναι.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔδε γε κύνας πᾶς ἐπίσταται θερα-
πεύειν, ἀλλὰ ὁ κυνηγητικός.
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Οὔτω.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Η γάρ ποι κυνηγητικὴ κυνῶν
θεραπεία.

B ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Ναι.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Η δὲ βοηλατικὴ βοών.
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Πάννυ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Η δὲ δὴ ὀσιότητι τε καὶ εὐσέβειᾳ
θεών, ὥς Εὐθύφρον; οὔτω λέγεις;
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. 'Εγώ γε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν θεραπεία γε πᾶσα ταύτῶν
diapyrratetai; οἶον τοιοῦτο: ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ τινὶ ἔστι
καὶ ὡφελεία τοῦ θεραπευομένου, ὥσπερ ὅρας δὴ,
ὅτι οἱ ἵπποι ὑπὸ τῆς ἑπικής θεραπευόμενοι
ὡφελοῦνται καὶ βελτίων γίγνονται ἡ οὐ νο-
κούσι σοι;
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. 'Εμοῦγε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ οἱ κύνες γε ποι ὑπὸ τῆς κυνη-
γητικῆς, καὶ οἱ βόες ὑπὸ τῆς βοηλατικῆς, καὶ
tάλα πάντα ὡσαύτως: ἢ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ οἷς τοῦ
θεραπευομένου τῆς θεραπείαν εἶναι;
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἐγώγε.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλ' ἐπ' ὡφελείᾳ;
ΕΤΟΣΦΡΩΝ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Η οὖν καὶ ἡ ὀσιότης θεραπεία οὐσα
θεών ὡφελεία τε ἐστι θεών καὶ βελτίων τοὺς θεοὺς

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EUTHYPHRO

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And not everyone knows how to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

EUTHYPHRO. That is so.

SOCRATES. Then the huntsman's art is the art of attending to dogs?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the oxherd's art is that of attending to oxen?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And holiness and piety is the art of attending to the gods? Is that what you mean, Euthyphro?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Now does attention always aim to accomplish the same end? I mean something like this: It aims at some good or benefit to the one to whom it is given, as you see that horses, when attended to by the horseman's art are benefited and made better; or don't you think so?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I do.

SOCRATES. And dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art and oxen by the oxherd's and everything else in the same way? Or do you think care and attention are ever meant for the injury of that which is cared for?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, I do not.

SOCRATES. But for its benefit?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, since it is the art of attending to the gods, is a benefit to the gods, and
PLATO

ποιεῖ; καὶ σὺ τούτο ἐνεγκρήσας ἂν, ὡς ἐπειδὰν τι ὁσιον ποιῆσ, βελτίω τινὰ τῶν θεῶν ἀπεργάζεις;

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Μὰ Δέι ὦ πάνω ἐγώγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύμρην, οἷμαι σὲ τούτο λέγειν πολλοῦ καὶ δέω. ἀλλα τούτου δή ἐνεκα καὶ ἀνηρόμην, τίνα ποτὲ λέγοις τὴν θεραπείαν τῶν θεῶν, οὐχ ἥγούμενός σε τοιαύτην λέγειν.

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ὅρθως γε, ὦ Σώκρατες ὡς γὰρ τοιαύτην λέγω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰςεν ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ θεῶν θεραπεία εἰή ἄν ἡ ὀσιότης;

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἡσυγερ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἰ δούλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανθάνω ὑπηρετική τις ἄν, ὡς ἐσικερ, εἰς θεοῖς.

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Πάνω μὲν ὦ πάνω.

16. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἵατροῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργον ἀπεργάσιαν τυγχάνει ὁὐσα ὑπηρετικὴ; οὐκ εἰς ὑγιείας ὀλεῖ;

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ἐγώγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; ἢ ναυπηγοῖς ὑπηρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργον ἀπεργάσιαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἔστιν;

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Δῆλον δτί, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πλοῖου.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ὡς οἰκοδομοῖς γε που εἰς οἰκίας;

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπτε δή, ὦ ἀριστε; ἢ δὲ θεοῖς ὑπη-

ρετικὴ εἰς τίνος ἔργον ἀπεργάσιαν ὑπηρετικὴ ἄν 

εἰς; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι σὺ οἰσθα, ἑπειδὴ πρέπει τά γε θεία 

κάλλιστα γε φής εἰδέναι ἀνθρώπων.

ΕΤΘΥΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ ἀλήθη γε λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπτε δὴ πρὸς Διός, τι ποτέ ἔστιν

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EUTHYPHRO

makes them better? And you would agree that when you do a holy or pious act you are making one of the gods better?

EUTHYPHRO. No, by Zeus, not I.

SOCRATES. Nor do I, Euthyphro, think that is what you meant. Far from it. But I asked what you meant by "attention to the gods" just because I did not think you meant anything like that.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates; that is not what I mean.

SOCRATES. Well, what kind of attention to the gods is holiness?

EUTHYPHRO. The kind, Socrates, that servants pay to their masters.

SOCRATES. I understand. It is, you mean, a kind of service to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly.

SOCRATES. Now can you tell me what result the art that serves the physician serves to produce? Is it not health?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Well then; what is it which the art that serves shipbuilders serves to produce?

EUTHYPHRO. Evidently, Socrates, a ship.

SOCRATES. And that which serves housebuilders serves to build a house?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then tell me, my friend; what would the art which serves the gods serve to accomplish? For it is evident that you know, since you say you know more than any other man about matters which have to do with the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. And what I say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, in the name of Zeus, tell me,
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ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον ἔργον, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται ἕμεν ὑπηρέταις χρῶμενοι;

ἐτετεύρων. Πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ὃ Σώκρατες.

14 σωκράτης. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ σтратηγοὶ, ὃ φίλε· ἀλλ' ὁμοὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ράδιως ἂν εἰποίη, ὦτι νίκην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀπεργάζονται· ὡς οὖ;  

ἐτετεύρων. Πῶς ὅ' οὖ; 

σωκράτης. Πολλὰ δὲ γ', ὁμαί, καὶ καλὰ καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ· ἀλλ' ὁμοὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἐστὶν τῆς ἀπεργασίας ἡ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφή.  

ἐτετεύρων. Πάνυ γε. 

σωκράτης. Τί δὲ δή; τῶν πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν, ὃ οἱ θεοὶ ἀπεργάζονται, τί τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐστὶ τῆς ἐργασίας;  

ἐτετεύρων. Καὶ ὅλην σοι πρότερον εἴποι, ὃ 

Β Σώκρατες, ὅτι πλείονος ἔργου ἐστίν ἄκριβῶς πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἔχει μαθεῖν· τόδε μέντοι σοι ἀπλῶς λέγω, ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν κεχαρισμένα τις ἐπίστηται τοῦς θεοὺς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενοι τε καὶ θύσιν, ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ὑσία, καὶ σφύξει τὰ τοιαύτα τοὺς τε ἰδίους οὐκούς καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων· τὰ δ' ἐναντία τῶν κεχαρισμένων ἁσθῆ, ἀ δὴ καὶ ἀνατρέπει ἀπάντα καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν.

17. σωκράτης. Ἡ πολὺ μοι διὰ βραχύτερων, ὃ 

Εὐθύφρον, εἰ ἐβούλου, εἰπὲς ἂν τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ἦρωτον. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὖ πρόθυμος με εἰ διδάξαι· 

C δήλος εἰ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν ἑπείδη ἐπ' αὐτῶ ἡσθα, ἀπετράπου· ὃ εἰ ἀπεκρίνω, ἰκανῶς ἂν ἤδη παρὰ 

σοῦ τὴν ὁσίότητα ἐμμαθήκη. νῦν δὲ—ἀνάγκη 

γὰρ τὸν ἔρωτα τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὅπῃ ἂν 

ἐκεῖνος ὑπάγῃ· τί δὴ αὐ λέγεις τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι καὶ 

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what is that glorious result which the gods accomplish by using us as servants?

EUTHYPHRO. They accomplish many fine results, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, and so do generals, my friend; but nevertheless, you could easily tell the chief of them, namely, that they bring about victory in war. Is that not the case?

EUTHYPHRO. Of course.

SOCRATES. And farmers also, I think, accomplish many fine results; but still the chief result of their work is food from the land?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. But how about the many fine results the gods accomplish? What is the chief result of their work?

EUTHYPHRO. I told you a while ago, Socrates, that it is a long task to learn accurately all about these things. However, I say simply that when one knows how to say and do what is gratifying to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is holiness, and such things bring salvation to individual families and to states; and the opposite of what is gratifying to the gods is impious, and that overturns and destroys everything.

SOCRATES. You might, if you wished, Euthyphro have answered much more briefly the chief part of my question. But it is plain that you do not care to instruct me. For now, when you were close upon it you turned aside; and if you had answered it, I should already have obtained from you all the instruction I need about holiness. But, as things are, the questioner must follow the one questioned wherever he leads. What do you say the holy, or
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ην ὀσίότητα; οὐχὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ τοῦ θύειν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι;

ἘΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Ἕγωγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ θύειν δωρεῖσθαι ἐστὶ τοῖς

Δ. θεοῖς, τὸ δὲ εὐχεσθαι αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς;

ΕΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπιστήμη ἄρα αἰτήσεως καὶ δόσεως

θεοῖς ὀσίότης ἂν εἴη ἔκ τουτοῦ τοῦ λόγου.

ΕΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Πάνω καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔσκυψας ὦ

εἶπον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπιθυμητὴς γάρ εἰμι, ὦ φίλε, τῆς

σῆς σοφίας καὶ προσέχω τὸν νοῦν αὐτῆς, ὥστε οὐ

χαμαλ πεσεῖται ὁ τι ἄν εἴπης. ἀλλὰ μοι λέξον, τίς

αὔτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς

αὐτοὺς καὶ διδόναι ἐκεῖνοι;

ΕΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Ἕγωγε.

18. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ ὀρθῶς αἰτεῖν ἂν

εἴη, ὅν δεόμεθα παρ' ἐκεῖνων, ταῦτα αὐτοὺς αἰτεῖν;

ΕΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ τί;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ αὖ τὸ διδόναι ὀρθῶς, ἂν ἐκεῖνοι

Ε τυγχάνον σοι δεόμεθα παρ' ἦμων, ταῦτα ἐκεῖνοι

αὐτὸ δωρείσθαι; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ τεχνικὸν ἦ ἂν

εἰθὶ δωροφεῖν διδόντα τῷ ταῦτα ὑν οὐδὲν δεῖται.

ΕΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Ἀληθὴ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμπορικὴ ἀρὰ τις ἄν εἴη, ὅ Εὐθύ-

φρον, τέχνῃ ἡ ὀσιότης θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις παρ' ἀλλήλων.

ΕΤΘΕΦΡΩΝ. Ἐμπορικὴ, εἰ σὺτως ἦδιον σοι ὀνο-

μάζεωι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἦδιον ἔμοι, εἰ μὴ τυγ-

χανεί ἄληθὲς ὅν. φράσον δὲ μοι, τίς ἡ ὀφέλεια

τοῖς θεοῖς τυγχάνει υστα ἀπὸ τῶν δώρων ὅν παρ' 54
EUTHYPHRO

holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. And sacrificing is making gifts to the gods and praying is asking from them?

EUTHYPHRO. Exactly, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness, according to this definition, would be a science of giving and asking.

EUTHYPHRO. You understand perfectly what I said, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Yes, my friend, for I am eager for your wisdom, and give my mind to it, so that nothing you say shall fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service of the gods? Do you say that it consists in asking from them and giving to them?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Would not the right way of asking be to ask of them what we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO. What else?

SOCRATES. And the right way of giving, to present them with what they need from us? For it would not be scientific giving to give anyone what he does not need.

EUTHYPHRO. You are right, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then holiness would be an art of barter between gods and men?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, of barter, if you like to call it so.

SOCRATES. I don't like to call it so, if it is not true. But tell me, what advantage accrues to the gods from
PLATO

ημῶν λαμβάνονσιν; ἀ μὲν γὰρ διδάσκι, παντὶ
δήλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ὡς τι ἂν μὴ
ἐκεῖνοι δώσιν· ἃ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν λαμβάνονσιν, τί
ὡφελοῦνται; ἡ τοσοῦτον αὐτῶν πλεονεκτοῦμεν
κατὰ τὴν ἐμπορίαν, ὡστε πάντα τάγαθὰ παρ’
Αὐτῶν λαμβάνομεν, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παρ’ ἡμῶν οὐδέν;

ἔτειφρων. Ἀλλ’ οἶει, ὡς Σωκράτες, τοὺς θεοὺς
ὡφελεῖσθαί ἀπὸ τοῦτων, ἀ παρ’ ἡμῶν λαμβάνον-
σιν;

ζωκράτης. Ἀλλὰ τί δήποτ’ ἂν εἰη ταῦτα, ὡς
Εὐθύφρον, τὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῖς θεοῖς;

ἔτειφρων. Τί δ’ οἶει ἄλλο ἡ τυμή τε καλ γέρα
καὶ, ὅπερ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, χάρις;

Β ζωκράτης. Κεχαρισμένον ἄρα ἐστὶν, ὡς Εὐθύ-
φρον, τὸ ὀσιον, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ ὡφελιμον οὐδὲ φίλον
τοῖς θεοῖς;

ἔτειφρων. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε πάντων γε μάλιστα
φίλον.

ζωκράτης. Τοῦτο ἄρ’ ἐστὶν αὐ, ως ἑοικε, τὸ
ὀσιον, τὸ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον.

ἔτειφρων. Μάλιστα γε.

19. ζωκράτης. Θαυμάσει οὐν ταῦτα λέγων, εάν

σοι οἱ λόγοι φαίνονται μὴ μένοντες ἀλλὰ βαδίζοντες,

καὶ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσει τὸν Δαίδαλον βαδίζοντας αὐτοὺς

ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς ὅν πολὺ γε τεχνικῶτερος τοῦ Δαι-

δάλου καὶ κύκλῳ περιόντα ποιῶν; ἢ οὐκ αἰ-

σθάνει, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς
tαὐτὸν ἤκει; μέμυθαι γὰρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἐμ-

προσθεν τὸ τε ὀσιον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλές οὐ ταὐτὸν

ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, ἀλλ’ ἔτερα ἀλλήλων· ἢ οὐ μέμυθαι;

ἔτειφρων. Ἐγώγε.

ζωκράτης. Νῦν οὖν οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι τὸ τοῖς
EUTHYPHRO

the gifts they get from us? For everybody knows what they give, since we have nothing good which they do not give. But what advantage do they derive from what they get from us? Or have we so much the better of them in our bartering that we get all good things from them and they nothing from us?

EUTHYPHRO. Why you don't suppose, Socrates, that the gods gain any advantage from what they get from us, do you?

SOCRATES. Well then, what would those gifts of ours to the gods be?

EUTHYPHRO. What else than honour and praise, and, as I said before, gratitude?

SOCRATES. Then, Euthyphro, holiness is grateful to the gods, but not advantageous or precious to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. I think it is precious, above all things.

SOCRATES. Then again, it seems, holiness is that which is precious to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then will you be surprised, since you say this, if your words do not remain fixed but walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk, when you are yourself much more skilful than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Or do you not see that our definition has come round to the point from which it started? For you remember, I suppose, that a while ago we found that holiness and what is dear to the gods were not the same, but different from each other; or do you not remember?

EUTHYPHRO. Yes, I remember.

SOCRATES. Then don't you see that now you say
PLATO

θεοῖς φίλον φής ὅσιον εἶναι; τοῦτο δ' ἄλλο τι ή θεοφιλέσ γίγνεται ἢ οὖ; ετήσιον. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἄρτι οὗ καλῶς ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἢ ἐὰν τότε καλῶς, νῦν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τιθέμεθα. ετήσιον. 'Εσικεν.

20. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐξ ἄρχης ἀρὰ ἡμῖν πάλιν σκεπτέον, τί ἐστι τὸ ὅσιον; ὡς ἐγώ, πρὶν ἂν μάθω, ἐκών εἶναι οὐκ ἀποδειλιάσω. ἀλλὰ μὴ μὲ ἀτιμάσῃς, ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προσέχων τὸν νῦν ὃ τι μάλιστα νῦν εἴπε τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οἴσθα γὰρ, ἐπερ τις ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων, καὶ οὐκ ἀφετέοι εἰ, ὡσπερ ὁ Πρωτεύς, πρὶν ἂν εἴπης. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦδησθα σαφῶς τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόσιον, οὐκ ἐστίν ὅπως ἂν ποτε ἐπεχείρησας ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς θητὸς ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάσθεν φόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἂν ἔδεισας παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσως, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἰχθύντης. νῦν δὲ εὐ οἶδα ὅτι σαφῶς οἶει εἴδειναι τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ μὴ εἰπὲ οὖν, ὃ βέλτιστε Ἐυθύφρον, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ ό τι αὐτὸ ἤγει.

ετήσιον. Εἰς αὕτης τοῖνυν, ὁ Σώκρατες· νῦν γὰρ σπεύδω ποι, καὶ μοι ὄρα ἀπιέναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅλα ποιεῖς, ὃ ἐταίρε! ἀπ' ἐλπίδος με καταβαλῶν μεγάλης ἀπέρχει, ἂν εἴχων, ὡς παρὰ σοῦ μαθῶν τά τε ὅσια καὶ μή καὶ τῆς πρὸς Μέλητον γραφῆς ἀπαλλάξαι μι, ἐνδειξάμενος ἐκεῖνῳ ὅτι σοφὸς ἡδὴ παρ' Ἐυθύφρονος τὰ θεία γέγονα καὶ ὅτι οὐκέτι ὑπ' ἀγνολας αὐτοσχεδιάξω οὔδε καινοτομώ περὶ αὐτά, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βιον ἄμεινον βιωσόμην.

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EUTHYPHRO

that what is precious to the gods is holy? And is not this what is dear to the gods?

EUTHYPHRO. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then either our agreement a while ago was wrong, or if that was right, we are wrong now.

EUTHYPHRO. So it seems.

SOCRATES. Then we must begin again at the beginning and ask what holiness is. Since I shall not willingly give up until I learn. And do not scorn me, but by all means apply your mind now to the utmost and tell me the truth; for you know, if any one does, and like Proteus, you must be held until you speak. For if you had not clear knowledge of holiness and unholiness, you would surely not have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for murder for the sake of a servant. You would have been afraid to risk the anger of the gods, in case your conduct should be wrong, and would have been ashamed in the sight of men. But now I am sure you think you know what is holy and what is not. So tell me, most excellent Euthyphro, and do not conceal your thought.

EUTHYPHRO. Some other time, Socrates. Now I am in a hurry and it is time for me to go.

SOCRATES. Oh my friend, what are you doing? You go away and leave me cast down from the high hope I had that I should learn from you what is holy, and what is not, and should get rid of Meletus's indictment by showing him that I have been made wise by Euthyphro about divine matters and am no longer through ignorance acting carelessly and making innovations in respect to them, and that I shall live a better life henceforth.
THE APOLOGY
INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

In the spring of 399 B.C., when Socrates was seventy years old, he was accused of impiety and of corrupting the youth. The chief accuser was Meletus, who was seconded by Anytus and Lyco. In the Euthyphro Meletus is spoken of as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is said to have been incensed by Socrates' criticism of the poets. Nothing further is known of him, though he may be identical with the Meletus mentioned in the Frogs (1302) of Aristophanes as a poet of Skolia. The statement of Diodorus Siculus (XIV, 37), that the Athenians, overcome by repentance for their injustice to Socrates, put Meletus and Anytus to death, deserves no credence. Anytus, who is one of the characters in the Meno, was a man of substance, who had served as general of the Athenian armies and had recently been active in expelling the Thirty Tyrants. He was a bitter enemy of all the sophists, and, according to the author of the Apology attributed to Xenophon, he had been irritated by Socrates' criticism of his conduct in employing his son in his tannery, when the young man was fitted for higher things. Lyco was charged by the comic poet Eupolis with being of foreign descent, and the comic poet Cratinus refers to his poverty and effeminacy, though Aristophanes (Wasps, 1301) mentions him among
INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGY

aristocrats. He seems to have been a person of no great importance.

Cases involving religion came under the jurisdiction of the King Archon, to whom Meletus submitted his indictment of Socrates (see the beginning of the Euthyphro), and such cases, like others, were tried before the heliastic court, which consisted altogether of six thousand citizens chosen by lot, six hundred from each of the ten tribes. The court did not however, usually sit as a whole, but was divided, so that cases were tried before smaller bodies, consisting generally of five hundred jurymen or judges, though sometimes the number was less, as four hundred or two hundred, and sometimes more, as one thousand. One additional judge was added to these even numbers to avoid a tie. Socrates was tried before a court of 501 (Apology, 36 ά). If the accuser did not receive a fifth part of the votes cast in a case of this kind, he was subject to a fine of 1000 drachmae (about £35 or $175). No penalty was prescribed by law for the offence with which Socrates was charged. After Socrates was found guilty the penalty still remained to be determined. The rule was that the accused, after conviction, should propose a counter penalty, the court being obliged to choose one of the two penalties proposed (Apology, 36 β–38 β); no compromise was permitted.

The question has frequently been asked, whether the Apology is substantially the speech made by Socrates before the court or a product of Plato's imagination. In all probability it is essentially the speech delivered by Socrates, though it may well be that the actual speech was less finished and less charming than that which Plato has reported. The
INTRODUCTION TO THE *APOLOGY*

legal procedure is strictly followed, and the manner of speech is that which was, as we know from Plato and also from Xenophon, usual with Socrates. There is nothing inconsistent with what we know of Socrates, and no peculiarly Platonic doctrine is suggested. The purpose of the dialogue, or rather, of the speech, for it is hardly a dialogue, is to present Socrates in a true and favourable light to posterity, and that end could hardly be gained by publishing a fiction as the speech which many Athenians must have remembered at the time of publication, which was, in all probability, not long after the trial.

In form the *Apology*, if we disregard the two short addresses after the conviction and the condemnation, follows the rules in vogue for public speeches. A brief introduction is followed by the narrative and argument, after which the speech closes with a brief appeal to the judges and to God (36 ν). It conforms to Plato’s own rule (*Phaedrus* 264 c), that every discourse should, like a living being, have its middle parts and its members, all in proper agreement with each other and with the whole, which is, after all, the rule of common sense, followed for the most part even by those teachers of rhetoric whose elaborate subdivisions and high-sounding nomenclature Plato ridicules in the *Phaedrus* (266 ε—267 ν). The two shorter addresses after the case had been decided against Socrates cannot be expected to stand as independent and complete speeches; they are, and must be, treated as supplementary and subordinate to the speech delivered before the first adverse vote. Yet they are symmetrically arranged and their topics are skilfully presented. A peroration would hardly be appropriate before the last of
INTRODUCTION TO THE APOLOGE

these and the last itself needs no formal introduction; it serves as a fitting conclusion for the entire discourse. As such it is a brilliant example of oratorical composition.

The high moral character and genuine religious faith of Socrates are made abundantly clear throughout this whole discourse. It would seem almost incredible that the Athenian court voted for his condemnation, if we did not know the fact. His condemnation is to be explained by the general hostility to the sophists. Socrates was, to be sure, not a sophist, though Aristophanes in the Clouds selects him as the representative of that profession to be ridiculed. He did not teach for pay and did not promise any definite result from his instruction. He did not investigate natural phenomena or claim to ensure the political or financial success of his hearers; his aim was to show the way to righteousness, to the perfection of the individual soul. This seems harmless enough, but Socrates endeavoured to lead men to righteousness by making them think, and thinking, especially on matters of religion, is not welcomed by the slothful or the conservative. The mere fact that he was a leader of thought caused Socrates to be confounded with the sophists who were also leaders of thought, and were, chiefly, perhaps, for that reason, regarded with suspicion and hostility. Moreover, Socrates claimed to possess a daimonion, or spiritual monitor, which guided his actions. He did not, so far as we know, attribute a distinct personality to this inner voice, but his belief in it caused him to be accused of introducing "new spiritual beings" or divinities and of disbelieving in the gods of the state, although he was apparently punctilious in religious observances.
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His method had also, without doubt, aroused many personal antagonisms (*Apology* 21 c–23 λ). Probably Meletus and the judges who voted for the condemnation of Socrates believed that they were acting in the interest of religion and piety, though their verdict has not been approved by later generations.

Editions of the *Apology* are very numerous. One of the best is that of Cron (*Apology* and *Crito*), upon which the excellent edition of Dyer is based (revised, 1908, by Seymour). Another good edition is that of J. Adam.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ

St. I
p. 17

[ἡεικός]

Α 1. "Ό τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖος, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὃλγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθεῖς γε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὃν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο, ἐν ὃ ἔλεγον ὡς χρή ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἔξαπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινοῦ ὅντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἔξαπατηθῆσον ἐργά, ἐπειδὰν μὴ ὀπωσδεὶν παύνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀνασχινιτώτατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινῶν καλοῦσιν οὕτω λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγοντι, ὁμολογοῦντι ἄν ἐγώγει οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ρήτορ. οὕτως γὰρ οὖν, ὡστερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἢ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὸς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ' ἐμοῦ ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὁμού τοῦτοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεσπημένους γε λόγους, ὡστερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμαςί τε καὶ ὠνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλὰ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἑπταυχοῦσιν ὠνόμασιν· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἄμειν, καὶ μηδεὶς οὕτω προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· 68
THE DEFENCE OF SOCRATES
AT HIS TRIAL

[ETHICAL]

How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told—when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, because I was a clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator—not after their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches, finely tricked out with words and phrases, as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything else.
PLATO

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν δὴπο τρεποὶ, ὡς ἄνδρες, τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὅσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινεν. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τούτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρέμαϊ ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούντε μου ἀπολογουμένου, δι’ ὅσπερ έξωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλῶν ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως. νῦν ἔγω πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονός εἴδομέκοιτα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν έξεσθα ἡχῶ τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὅσπερ οὖν ἂν, εἰ τῷ οὐτὶ έξεσθα ἐπίγγαρον ἄν, εἰσεγγύσις καὶ τῶν τρόπων ἐλεγον, ἐν ὅσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν τούτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δικαιοῦσι· ἂν γέ μοι δοκῇ, τῶν μὲν τρόπων τῆς λέξεως ἐὰν· ἵσως μὲν γὰρ καίρων, ἵσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη· αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τῶν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δικαία λέγω ἡ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ ἄρετῆ, ρήτορος δὲ τάλαθθι λέγειν.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δικαίος εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ υπέρτα καὶ τοὺς υπέρτερους. ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροῦσι γεγονασι πρὸς υμῶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἠδη ἔτη καὶ οὔθεν ἀλήθες λέγοντες, οὕς ἔγω μᾶλλον φοβούμαι ἡ τούς ἀμφὶ Ανυτοῦ, καίτερ δύτας καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς· ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὡς ἄνδρες, οὐ υμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παῖδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειδῶν τε

1 Schanz brackets ψευδῆ, following Hirschig.
THE APOLOGY

For surely it would not be fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market place at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, not to be surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have come before the court, although I am seventy years old; I am therefore an utter foreigner to the manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner in which I had been brought up, so now I make this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech—for perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better—and observe and pay attention merely to this, whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak the truth.

First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. For many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many years already, and saying nothing true; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these also are dangerous; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since they got
καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ ὁδεῖν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστι τις
Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστής
καὶ τα ὑπὸ γῆς ἀπαντά ἀνεξητηκός καὶ τὸν ἤττω
λόγον κρείττω ποιών. οὗτοι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,

C οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάζοντες, οἱ δεινοὶ
eἰσὶν μου κατηγοροῦμεν. οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται
tοὺς ταύτα ξηροῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτα
eἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ κατηγοροῦμενοι πολλοὶ καὶ πολλοὶ χρόνον
ἡδη κατηγορηκότες, έτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἠλικίᾳ
λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἧ ἀν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε,
παῖδες ὑμεῖς, ἐνοῦ δ' ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶν
ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογούμενον οὐδενός. δὲ
δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὄνοματα οἶν

D τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμο-
διστοὺς τυγχάνει ὁν̆ οὔσι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολή
χρώμευοι οὔμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισ-
μένοι ἄλλους πείδοντες, οὗτοι πάντων ἀπορώτατοί
eἰσιν οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἶνον τ' ἐστιν αὐτῶν
ἐνταῦθοι οὐδὲ ἐλέγχαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκῃ
ἀτεχνῶς ὅσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε
καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε
οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὅσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διπτοὺς μοι τοὺς

E κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἐτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι
κατηγορήσαντας, ἐτέρους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι, οὓς ἐγὼ
λέγω, καὶ οἰχῆτε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνους πρὸτὸν μὲ
ἀπολογησάσθαι καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνων πρότερον
ηκούσατε κατηγοροῦντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἦ

1 After ἐμοῦ the MSS. read μᾶλλον “more” or “rather.” Schanz reads μᾶ τόν,—“by—,” Hermann brackets μᾶλλον
and also οὐδὲν ἀληθές, Wohlrab omits μᾶλλον.
THE APOLOGY

hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, "There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger." These, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth, most of you in childhood), and the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody appeared in defence. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this, that it is not even possible to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander—and some also persuaded others because they had been themselves persuaded—all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question when nobody answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes of my accusers—one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you heard them making their charges first and with
PLATO

tάνυδε τῶν ύστερον. εἰεν· ἀπολογητέου δή, ὁ
19 ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέου ύμῶν ἐξελε-
θαι τὴν διαβολήν, ἦν ύμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ
ἐσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. Βουλοίμην
μὲν οὖν ἀν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἄμεινον
καὶ ύμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιήσαι ἀπο-
λογούμενον οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπῶς εἰναι, καὶ οὐ
πάνυ με λαυθάνει οὐδὲν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν
ἄτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ
ἀπολογητέον.

3. Ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία
ἐστίν, ἐξ ἡς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἡ δὴ καὶ
Β πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν
ταύτην. εἰεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διεβαλλόν οἱ δια-
βάλλοντες; ὁσπερ οὖν κατηγόρον τὴν ἀντω-
μοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνώσαι αὐτῶν. Σωκράτης ἄδικεί
καὶ περιεργαζόμεθα, ξητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ
οἰδών καὶ τοῦ ἥπτω λόγον κριττὸν ποιῶν καὶ
Ο ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς
ἐστιν· ταύτα γὰρ ἔωράτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀρι-
στοφάνους κωμῳδία, Σωκράτης τινὰ ἔκει περι-
φερομένον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην
πολλὴν φλαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, δὲν εγὼ οὐδὲν
οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίνο. καὶ οὐχ ὡς
ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις
περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων σοφὸς ἐστιν. μὴ πως ἔγω ὑπὸ
Μέλητοι τοσαύτας δίκας φύγοιμι! ἀλλὰ γὰρ
ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὁ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

D μάρτυρας δέ αὐτοὺς ύμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρ-
έχομαι, καὶ ἂξιώ ύμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ

1 Schanz brackets μὴ τοις . . . φύγοιμι.

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much greater force than those who made them later. Well, then, I must make a defence; men of Athens, and must try in so short a time to remove from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as is pleasing to God, the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.

Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the false prejudice against me has arisen, in which Meletus trusted when he brought this suit against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: "Socrates is a criminal and a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument stronger and teaching others these same things." Something of that sort it is. For you yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes' comedy, a Socrates being carried about there, proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great a charge as that!),—but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. And I offer as witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another
PLATO

φράζειν, ὃσιν ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοί δὲ ύμῶν οἱ τοιούτοι εἰσίν· φράζετε ὁυν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώποτε ἦ μικρὸν ἦ μέγα ἥκουσέ τις ύμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου· καὶ ἐκ τούτων γνώσεσθε, ὅτι τοιαῦτ' ἐστίν καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἄ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

4. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὑτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν,1 οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τινὸς ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύεω ἐπιχειρῶ ἐν ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές· ἐπει τινός καὶ τούτο γ' μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἷος τ' εἰς παιδεύεων ἀνθρώπους ὡςπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Δεοντύος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰστιαῖος ὁ Ἡλείος. τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστος, ὁ ἀνδρες, οἷος τ' ἐστίν2 ἰδὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς ἐξεστὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν πολιτῶν προϊκα ξυνείναι 3 ἄν βούλωνται, τούτους πείδουσιν τὰς ἐκείνων ἐξουσίας ἀπολύσοντας σφίσαις ξυνείναι χρήματα δεδόντας καὶ χάριν προσεδέναι. ἐπει καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστὶ Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφός, δύν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμαν ἐπιθυμοῦντα· ἐτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ δ' τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταίς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου· τούτων οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστόν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νιε—'Ω Καλλία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σου τῷ νιε πῶλῳ ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἀν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστάσεθν λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, δ' ἐμελλέαυτῷ καλῶ

B τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν· ἦν δ' ἀν οὕτως ἦ τῶν ἰππικῶν τις ἦ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω εστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖς ἐν ψ' ἐχεῖς ἐπιστάσει λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης

1 Schanz brackets ἐστίν. 2 Schanz brackets οἷος τ' ἐστίν.
and to tell, all those of you who ever heard me con-
versing—and there are many such among you—now
tell, if anyone ever heard me talking much or little
about such matters. And from this you will perceive
that such are also the other things that the multitude
say about me.

But in fact none of these things are true, and if
you have heard from anyone that I undertake to
teach people and that I make money by it, that is not
true either. Although this also seems to me to be a
fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as
Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and
Hippias of Elis are. For each of these men, gen-
tlemen, is able to go into any one of the cities and
persuade the young men, who can associate for
nothing with whomsoever they wish among their
own fellow citizens, to give up the association with
those men and to associate with them and pay them
money and be grateful besides.

And there is also another wise man here, a
Parian, who I learned was in town; for I happened
to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than
all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; so I asked
him—for he has two sons—"Callias," said I, "if
your two sons had happened to be two colts or two
calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an
overseer who would make them excellent in the kind
of excellence proper to them; and he would be a
horse-trainer or a husbandman; but now, since they
are two human beings, whom have you in mind to
get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind

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ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν; οἷμαι γὰρ σὲ ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νεών κτήσιν. ἐστιν τις, ἐφὴν ἐγώ, ἢ οὐ; Πάννυ γε, ἢ ἢ οὐ. Τίς, ἢ νῦ ἦν ἡ ἐγώ, καὶ ποιδάοις, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὐηνος, ἐφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών. καὶ ἔγὼ τὸν Εὐηνον ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ὦς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμελέως διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλωμένη τε καὶ ἡθυγόμην ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταύτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπισταμαι, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι.

5. Ἱππολάβοι ἄν οὖν τις υμῶν ἴσως· 'Ἀλλ', ὡς Σώκρατες, τό σον τί ἐστι πράγμα; πόθεν αἰ διαβολάι σοι αὐταί γεγονασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήποι σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἐπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἐπραττεῖς ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί·¹ λέγει οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, ἢν μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δικαία λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κάγω υμῶν πειράσσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστιν τοῦτο δ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τὸ τε ὅννομα καὶ τὴν διαβολῆν. ἀκούστε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισῶν υμῶν παίζειν, εὐ μέντοι ὅστε, πᾶσαν υμῶν τὴν ἀληθείαν ἐρω. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, δ' οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ διὰ σοφίας τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὅννομα ἐσχήκα. τολμῶ δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἢπερ ἐστίν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὦντι γὰρ κινδυνεῦω ταύτην εἶναι σοφὸς· οὔτοι δὲ τάχ' ἄν, οὐς ἀρτι ἐλεγον, μεῖξω τινὰ ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων σοφίαν σοφοῖ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἐξω, τὶ λέγω. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγὼ γε αὐτὴν ἐπισταμαι, ἀλλ' ὡστὶς φησὶν.

¹ Schanz brackets ei μή τι . . . πολλοί.
of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?" "Certainly," said he. "Who," said I, "and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?" "Evenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae." And I called Evenus blessed, if he really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.

Now perhaps someone might rejoin: "But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something other than most people; so tell us what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case." The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom. For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, of whom I was just speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don't know what to say; for I do not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to
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ψεύδεται τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολή τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ μοι, ὃς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσῃτε, μηδὲ ἂν δόξῳ τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον, διὰ ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίγοι. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὴ τις ἐστὶν σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαίρετον γὰρ ἵστε ποι.

21 οὕτως ἐμὸς τε ἑταῖρος ἢν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρος τε καὶ ἕνεφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθ' ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἵστε δὴ, οἷος ἦν Χαίρετο, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφ' ὃ τι ὁμήρεσεν. καὶ δὴ ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι. καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυ-βεῖτε, ὃς ἄνδρες· ἣρετο γὰρ δὴ, εἰ τις ἐμὸν εἰς σοφῶτερος. ἀνείλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία· μηδένα σοφώ-τερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἄδελφός ὑμῖν αὐτὸν ὀφτοῖ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τε-τελεύτηκεν.

B 6. Σκέψασθε δὲ, ὅτι ἐνεκα ταύτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν, ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταύτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτωσί· τὶ ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τὶ ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἄνυστον ἔμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὅν· τὶ οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκον ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ ψευδεταῖ γε' οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἦπόρουν, τὶ ποτὲ λέγει. ἔπειτα μόνις πάνω ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔτραπόμην·

'Ηλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι,

C ὡς ἐνταύθα, εἰ περποῦν, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τὸ χρησμῷ, ὅτι ὀφτοῖ ἐμὸν

1 Schanz brackets ἑταῖρος τε καὶ.
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arouse prejudice against me. And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For of my wisdom—if it is wisdom at all—and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. And you know the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went to Delphi and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia replied that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since Chaerephon is dead.

But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: "What in the world does the god mean, and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little. What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that is not possible for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows.

I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, thinking that there, if anywhere, I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the
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σοφότερός ἐστι, σὺ δ' ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπᾶν οὖν τούτον—οὐναίτι γὰρ οὐδὲν δεομαί λέγειν, ἢν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, πρὸς δὲ ἐγώ σκοπῶν τοιούτων τι ἐπαθον, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι,—καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξέει μοι οὖν τὸ ἄνηρ δοκεῖν μὲν εῖναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἰναι δ’ οὐν κἀπείται ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οἰοίτο μὲν εἰναι σοφός, εἰθ’ δ’ οὐ. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτοῦ δ’ οὖν ἀπίων ἄμοιζομην, ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφότερός εἰμι. κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδεν κἀκαλὸν κἀκαθόν εἰδέναι. ἀλλ’ οὕτως μὲν οἰεταὶ τι εἰδέναι οὖκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δὲ, ὧσπερ οὖν οὕκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι ἔοικα γρῶν τούτω γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτω σοφότερος εἰναι, ὅτι ἡ μή οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπ’ ἄλλον γὰρ τῶν ἕκεινον δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἰναι, καὶ μοι ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐδοξεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκεῖνο καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

7. Μετὰ ταῦτα οὖν ἡδὴ ἐφέξεις ἡ, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυπούμενος καὶ δεδίως ὁτι ἀπηχθάνομην, ὡμώς δέ ἀναγκαίου ἐδοκει εἰναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται. ἢτέον οὖν σκοποῦτι τῶν χρησμῶν, τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἀπαντάς τούς τι δοκούντας εἰδέναι καὶ νῆ τῶν κύνα, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι. δει γὰρ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τάληθε λέγειν ἂ μῶν ἐγὼ ἐπιθαῦν τι τοιούτων οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δειν τοῦ πλείστου

1 Schanz brackets καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ.
2 Schanz brackets καὶ.

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oracle "This man is wiser than I, but you said I was wisest." So examining this man—for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the public men with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens—and conversing with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought he was wise, but was not. As a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought to myself, "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do not think I do either. I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either." From him I went to another of those who were reputed to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I became hateful both to him and to many others.

After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god's business of the highest importance. So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know anything. And by the Dog, men of Athens—for I must speak the truth to you—this, I do declare, was my experience: those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the most deficient,
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ἐνδεεὶς εἶναι ξητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φανλότεροι ἐπεικεστεροὶ εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεὶ δὴ ὡμίν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδειξάω ὡσπερ πόνους τίμασ, ποιοῦντος, ἵνα 1 μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἡ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τε τῶν θραγμονων καὶ τοὺς τῶν διθυράμβων B καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἑνταῦθα ἐπὶ αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἁμαθεστερον ἐκεῖνων ὑμῖν. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἂ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματευθῆναι αὐτοῖς, διηρύων ἄν αὐτοὺς, τί λέγοιεν, ἵν' ἠμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρ' αὐτῶν. αἱσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἄνδρες, τάληθ' ὅμως δὲ ῥήτευον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅλογον αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖ οἱ παρὸντες ἀν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὅν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιή−κεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῦν ἢ ποιοῦν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινι καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὡστερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοί. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἵσαμι δὲ ὑδε ὅν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτον τί μοι ἔφανησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες. καὶ ἀμα ἤθομην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τὰλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἄνθρωπων, ἡ οὐκ ἤσαν. ἀπῆκ αὐτῷ οὐν καὶ ἑντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ 2 οἰόμενος περιγεγογονέαι φέρει καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

C

8. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἡ.

D

ἐμαυτῶ γὰρ ξυνήδη οὐδέν ἐπισταμένω, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δὲ γ' ἢδη ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλα

1 Schanz, following Stephanus, inserts μη after ἵνα.
2 Schanz inserts αὐτῶν after τῷ αὐτῷ.
as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak, in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the public men I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this, that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. And at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excelled the public men.

Finally then I went to the hand-workers. For I was conscious that I knew practically nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine
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καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἔφευσθην, ἀλλ’ ἦπισταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἦπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ’, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξαὶ ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅτερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ.1 διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἔκαστος ἥξιον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφῶτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκεῖνη τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν· ὥστε ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτάν

Ε ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, πότερα δεξαίμην ἄν οὐτὸ ὅσπερ ἐχὼ ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὃν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ ἐκείνοι ἔχονσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ, ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὅσπερ ἐχὼ ἔχειν.

9. Ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὁ ἄνδρες 23 Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἱ καὶ χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὅστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνομα δὲ τούτῳ λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἰονται γὰρ με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρώντες ταύτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἢ ἄν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω· τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὁ ἄνδρες, τῷ οὖν ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησµῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός· καὶ φαίνεται τούτῳ οὔ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτην, προσπεχρῆσθαι

Β δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἔμε παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὅσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι, τοῦ οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὁ ἀνθρωποί, σοφώτατος ἔστιν, ὅστις ὅσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξιός ἐστι τῇ ἅλθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταύτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιών ἦτοι

1 Schanz brackets καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί.
things. And in this I was not deceived; they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practising his art well, each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.

Now from this investigation, men of Athens, many enmities have arisen against me, and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise and by his oracle means this: "Human wisdom is of little or no value." And it appears that he does not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, and makes me an example, as if he were to say: "This one of you, O human beings, is wisest, who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in truth of no account in respect to wisdom."

Therefore I am still even now going about and
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καὶ ἔρευνω κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἁστῶν καὶ ἕνων ἄν τινα οἷωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνυδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὕτε τί τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὕτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλὰ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

10. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἔστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιώτατων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξεταζόμενοι. κάτειτα, οἶμαι, εὐρύσκουσι πολλήν ἀφθονίαν οἰκομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὅ λίγα ἡ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμὸν ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Ἀφράτης τῆς ἐστὶ μιαρῶτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τούς νέους καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις ἄνεμος ἐρωτᾷ τις τοῦτον καὶ τὸ διάδακτον, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἄγνωσίαν, ὃν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν θεοφονοῦντων πρόχειρα ταύτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ήττον λόγον κρείττων ποιεῖν τὰ γὰρ ἄληθῆ, οὗμαι, οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν.

1 ἢτε οὖν, οἶμαι, φιλότιμοί δυντες καὶ σφοδροί καὶ πολλοί, καὶ ξυντεταγμένοι καὶ πιθανὸς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὑπ’ ὅτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ τούτων καὶ

1 Schanz reads ἄμφιγγος, “they are in doubt.”
2 Schanz reads ξυντεταγμένος, “earnestly.”
searching and investigating at the god's behest anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, or of my own, but am in vast poverty on account of my service to the god.

And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined, and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and, then, I fancy, they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."

And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth" and "not to believe in the gods" and "to make the weaker argument the stronger." For they would not, I fancy, care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with vehement slanders.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτός καὶ Δύκων, Μέλητός μὲν ύπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἀνυτός δὲ ύπὲρ τῶν δημουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολι-
24 τικῶν. Δύκων δὲ ύπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων ὅστε, ὅσπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομι ἂν, εἰ οἶος τ' εἶνιν ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἔξελέσθαι ἐν ὁὔτως ὁλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὔτω πολλῇ γεγονοῦντα, ταύτ' ἐστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τάλληθι, καὶ ὑμᾶς ὁὔτε μέγα ὁὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυφόμενος ἐγὼ λέγω ὁὔτ' ὑποστειλάμενος, καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτῶις ἀπεχθάνομαι ὦ καὶ τεκμήριον, ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αὕτα ταύτα ἐστιν, καὶ εἀν τε νῦν

B εάν τε αὕτες ἕτησθητε ταύτα, οὔτως εὐρήσετε.

11. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅτι οἱ πρῶτοι μοι κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἱκανη ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὡς φησί, καὶ τοὺς ὕστερους μετὰ ταύτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὕτης γὰρ δὴ, ὡσπερ ἔτερων τούτων οὕτως κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὡδὲ: Σωκράτης φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐτερα

C δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἐκαστῶν ἐξετάσωμεν. φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν μὲ διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δὲ γε, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδὴ χαριευτέται, ὁμοίως εἰς ἀγώνα καθιστάς ἀνθρώποις, περὶ πραγ-

μάτων προσποούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι,

1 Schanz follows Cobet in bracketing καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.
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From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men, and Lycon on account of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. And whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.

Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers, let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings.

Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, pretending to be zealous and concerned about things
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δεν τούτω πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὡς δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι.

12. Καὶ μοι δεύρο, ὁ Μέλητε, εἰπὲ· ἀλλο τὴν περὶ πολλού ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὃς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται; Ἔγωγε· Ἡθι δὴ νυν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τῖς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὧτι οἴσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἕξευρόν, ὡς φῆς, ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις τουτούς· καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἤθι εἰπὲ καὶ μὴν ὑσσον αὐτοῖς, τοὺς ἔστων. ὡς ὁ Μέλητε· ὃτι συγὰς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπέν; καὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἀἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανόν τεκμήριον οὐ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὃτι σοὶ οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ' εἰπέ, ὃ γαθέ, τῖς αὐτοὺς ἁμείνους ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ' οὗ τούτω ἐρωτῶ, ὁ βέλτιστο, ἀλλὰ τῖς ἀνθρωπος, ὡς πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τούτῳ οἴδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὗτοι ὁ Σώκρατες, οὶ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Μέλητε· οἴδε τοὺς νέους παῦδεύειν οιοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἄπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὗ; Ἄπαντες. Ἐν γε νὴ τὴν Ἡραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλῆν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὡφελοῦντων. τί δὲ δὴ; οἴδε ἢ ἀκροταί βελτίους ποιούσιν ἢ οὗ; Καὶ οὕτωι. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βουλευταί.

Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μὴ ὡς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησία, ὃ ἐκκλησιασταί; διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κακεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἄπαντες; Κάκεινοι. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔουσον, Ἀθηναίοι καλοὺς κάγαθος ποιούσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; Πάνω σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλῆν γ'

1 Cobet's suggestion of eis toutou for toutois is adopted by Schanz.
2 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing oi ἐκκλησιασταί.
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for which he never cared at all. And that this is so I will try to make plain to you also.

Come here, Meletus, tell me: don't you consider it of great importance that the youth be as good as possible? "I do." Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better? For it is evident that you know, since you care about it. For you have found the one who corruptions them, as you say, and you bring me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell, my good man, who makes them better? "The laws." But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just this very thing, the laws. "These men, Socrates, the judges." What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they make them better? "Certainly." All, or some of them and others not? "All." Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this? Do these listeners make them better, or not? "These also." And how about the senators? "The senators also." But, Meletus, those in the assembly, the assembly-men, don't corrupt the youth, do they? or do they also all make them better? "They also." All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you mean? "Very decidedly, that is


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ἐμοὶ κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἀπόκριναὶ ἢ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὐτώ σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν

βελτίων ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποί εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τούναντιον τοῦτον πῶς

εἰς μέν τις ὁ βελτίων οἶδα τὰ ὁποῖαν ἡ πάνω ὁλίγοι, οἰ ἵπποι; οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάντερ ἔξυνθοι καὶ

χρῶνται ἵππους, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάν-

των ξών; ἕπαινος δὴ τοῦ, εἰν τε σὺ καὶ Ἄνωτος

οὐ φῆτε ἐὰν τε φῆτε πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν τις εὐδαιμονία εἰη περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς
diaphθείρει, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὄφελοῦσιν. ἅλλα γὰρ,

ὁ Μέλητε, ἰκανός ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ὅτι οὐδεπώ-

ποτε ἐφρύντισα τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῆς ἀποφαίνεις

τὴν σαυτοῦ ἄμελειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκεν

περὶ ὃν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.

13. Ἐτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὁ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε,

πότερον ἐστιν οἰκεῖν ἀμείνου ἐν πολίταις χριστοῖς

ἡ πονηρὸς; δ' τὰν, ἀπόκριναι οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦ

χαλεποῦν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακῶν τι

ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δ'

ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι; Πάνω γε. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις

βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνώντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον

ἡ ὀφελεῖσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὁ ἄγαθε καὶ γὰρ ὁ

νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθ' ὅστις βούλεται

βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δὴ θα. Φέρε δὴ, πότερον ἐμὲ

εἰσάγεις δεύτερο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους

καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;

Ἐκόντα ἐγώγε. Τί δήτα, ὁ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ

ἐμοὶ σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικὸς ἄν,

ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν

τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον ἐαυτῶν,

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what I mean.” You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me; does it seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures them some one person? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and use horses, injure them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other animals? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree; for it would be a great state of blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But, Meletus, you show clearly enough that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale me into court.

But besides, tell us, for heaven’s sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad? My friend, answer; for I am not asking anything hard. Do not the bad do some evil to those who are with them at any time and the good some good? “Certainly.” Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited? Answer, my good man; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured? “Of course not.” Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making them worse voluntarily or involuntarily? “Voluntarily I say.” What then, Meletus? Are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have recognized that the evil always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some
oī dē ἄγαθοι ἄγαθον· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκο, ὡστε καὶ τούτ' ἄγνω, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ἔννοιων, κινδυνεύωσο κακόν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τούτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακόν ἐκὼν ποιώ, ὡς φης σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι ὑπὲρθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλον ἀνθρώ-

26 πων οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἀκῶν, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεύδεις. εἰ δὲ ἀκῶν διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἀκούσιων 1 ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεύρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ ἵδια λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν δῆλον γάρ οτί, εάν μᾶθω, παύσομαι ο γε ἀκόν ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ ἔννογενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἥθελσας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμοι ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλ' οὐ μαθή-

σεως.

14. Ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τούτῳ μὲν δήλον ἢ ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τού-

B τῶν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πῶςποτέ ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγει ἧμιν, πῶς με φης διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, ἢν ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκοιν μη νομίζειν οὖς ἡ πόλις νομίζῃ, ἐτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια καίνα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖνυν, ὦ

C Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ, εἰπὲ ἐτί σαφείστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν τοῦτοις. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν, ποτέροι λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἰναι τινὰς θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὔτε ταύτῃ ἄδικᾳ, οὐ μὲντοι

1 Schanz brackets καὶ ἀκούσιων.
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good; whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say? I don't believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world does! but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is clear that if I am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here, where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.

But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as I said, that Meletus never cared much or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that it is by teaching this that I corrupt them? "Very decidedly that is what I say." Then, Meletus, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly both to me and to these gentlemen. For I am unable to understand whether you say that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom the
οὐσιπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ ἑτέρους, καὶ τούτ’ ἐστιν ὦ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους· ἥ παντάπασι με φής οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταύτα διδάσκειν. Ταύτα λέγω, ὡς το παράταν οὐ νομίζεις θεοὺς. Ωθαυμάσσει Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταύτα λέγεις;

D οὖδὲ ἦλιον οὖδὲ σελήνην ἂρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἅλλοι ἀνθρωποί; Μᾶ Δε, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταῖ, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἦλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν. Ἄναξαγόρου ἵπτει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε, καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τόνδε καὶ οἱ αὐτούς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὰ Ἄναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαξομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νεόι ταύτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ὡς ἔξεστιν

E ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ, δραχμῆς ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένους Σωκράτους καταγελάν, εὰν προσποιήται ἔαυτον εἶναι, ἄλλος τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα. ἄλλ’, ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὕτως σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζεις θεοῦ εἶναι; Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδ’ ὅπωστείον. Ἀπιστός γ’ εἰ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταύτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖσ, σαυτῷ. ἐμὸ γὰρ δοκεῖσ ὄντος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνω εἶναι ὑβριστής καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὑβρεί τινι καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ νόητη γράψασθαι. ἐοικεν

27 γὰρ ὥσπερ αἰνιγμα ξυντιθέντι διαπεραμένει, ἀρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριευτικομένου καὶ ἐναντὶ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ὡς ἐξαπατήσω αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὕτως γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ εἴποι: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης

1 Schanz brackets Ἄναξαγόρου. 2 Schanz brackets δοκῶ.
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state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people. “That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all.” You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do? “No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth.” Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian are full of such utterances? “And forsooth the youth learn these doctrines from me, which they can buy sometimes (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven’s sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god? “No, by Zeus, you don’t, not in the least.” You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man appears to me, men of Athens, to be very violent and unrestrained, and actually to have brought this indictment in a spirit of violence and unrestraint and rashness. For he seems, as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: “Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?” For he appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say, “Socrates is a wrongdoer, because he does
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θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τούτο ἐστὶ παίζοντος.

15. Εὐνεπισκέψασθε δὴ, ὥ ἄνδρες, ἦ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν. σὺ δὲ ἥμιν ἀπόκριναι, ὥς Ἔστιν ὅστις ἄνθρώπων, ὥς Ἔστιν, ἄνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἄνθρώπως δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρίνεσθο, ὥ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτο. ἔσθ' ὅστις ἰπποὺς μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικα δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὧ ἄριστον ἄνδρῷν εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοποῦσι. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι: ἔσθ' ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὡς οὖν ὡς ὅτι μόνος ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τοῦτον ἀναγκαζόμενον. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φής μὲ καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' οὖν καὶ ταῦτα εἰτὲ παλαιά: ἀλλ' οὖν δαίμονια γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διώκομεν ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζεων μὲ ἐστὶν. οὖχ οὖτως ἐχεις; ἐχει δὴ τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὔκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας οὔχι ἦτοι

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θεοὺς γε ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν παῖδας; φής ἦ οὐ; Πάνυ γε. Οὔκοιν εἰπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φής, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτ' ἄν εἰη ὃ ἐγὼ φημὶ σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὔχ ἡγούμενον φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς οὐ ἡγεῖσθαι

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not believe in gods, but does believe in gods." And yet this is the conduct of a jester.

Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus, answer; and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.

Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer at least the next question. Is there anyone who believes spiritual things exist, but does not believe in spirits? "There is not." Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentlemen. Then you say that I believe in spiritual beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in spiritual beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indictment. But if I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits; is it not so? It is; for I assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think the spirits are gods or children of gods? Yes, or no? "Certainly." Then if I believe in spirits, as you say, if spirits are a kind of gods, that would be the puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do believe in gods again, since I
πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἥγοιμαι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδες εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ἄν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἄνθρωπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἥγοιτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μὴ; ὡμοίως γὰρ ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη,

Ε ὡσπερ δὴ εἰ τις ἴππων μὲν παῖδας ἥγοιτο καὶ ἄνω, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἴππους δὲ καὶ ὅνους μὴ ἥγοιτο εἶναι. ἀλλ', ὡ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἐστιν ὅπως σὺν' ὅχλ νόθον ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφήν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορών ὅτι ἐγκαλεῖσθαι ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τῶν πείθοις ἄν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἄνθρωπον, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν καὶ δαίμονα καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μῆτε δαίμονας μῆτε θεοὺς μὴτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

16. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς μὲν ἦγος οὐκ ἄδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελητοῦ γραφήν, οὐ πολλὴς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἴκανα καὶ ταύτα· ὅ δέ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλὴ μοι ἀπέκθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εἰ ἦσυ τοῖς ἀληθέσιν, καὶ τούτ' ἐστιν ὃ ἐμε αἰρήσει, εἰσαντερ αἰρή, οὐ Μελητοῦ ὀνείρες Ἀντοῦ, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ὅ δὲ πολλοῦς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἤρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεως ὁυδὲν δὲ δεινὸν, μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. Ἰσως δ' ἂν ὁυν εἶποι τις· εἰτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτήδευμα, εἴς ὃ Κινδυνεύεις νυν ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἄν δίκαιον λόγον

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1 Schanz brackets ταύτα, which the MSS. give after σο.  
2 After ὡς the MSS., and Schanz, read οὐ. It was omitted by Stephanus.  
3 Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets τοῦ αὐτοῦ.  
4 Schanz, following Prammer, brackets μῆτε ἥρωας.
believe in spirits; but if, on the other hand, spirits are a kind of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be, what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods? It would be just as absurd as if one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of; but there is no way for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to believe in spiritual and divine existences and again for the same person not to believe in spirits or gods or heroes.

Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrong-doer according to Meletus's indictment, seems to me not to need much of a defence, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus, but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has condemned many other good men, and I think will do so; and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say: "Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger of being put to death as a result?" But I should make to him a
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ἀντείπομεν, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οἶει δεῖν κινδύνου ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζήν ἡ
tεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ,
tότερα δίκαια ἡ ἅδικα πράττει, καὶ ἄνδρος ἀγαθὸν ἔργα ἡ κακοῦ. φαύλοι γὰρ ἄν τῷ γε σὺ

C λόγῳ εἶν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν ο ineff τάλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦς, ὅς
τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ
ἀισχρόν τι υπομεῖναι, ὅστε ἐπειδὴ εἴπεν ἡ μήτηρ

Αὐτῷ προθυμομένῳ Ἐκτὸρα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς

οὔσα, οὔτωσι πως, ὅσ ὑγό ὁμιαί ὣν παῖ, εἰ τιμωρή

σεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταῖρῳ τῶν φόνον καὶ Ἐκτὸρα ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀυτός ἀποθανεῖ, αὐτίκα γάρ τοι,

φήσι, μεθ' Ἐκτὸρα πότιμος ἑτοίμου· ὃ δὲ ταύτα

ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὄμωρ-

ησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δεῖσας τοῦ ζήν κακὸς ὅν καὶ

τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμώρειν, αὐτίκα, φήσι, τεθναίην

δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἄδικοντι, ἵνα μὴ ἑνθάδε μὲν

καταγέλαστος παρὰ ἔψυξι κορωνίσθην ἄχθος ἀροῦ-

ρης. μὴ αὐτῶν οἴει φροντίσας θανάτον καὶ κιν-

δύνου; οὕτω γάρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ

ἄληθείᾳ οὐ ἄν τις ἐκαίνυ τάξη ἡγησάμενος

βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡ ὑπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα
dei, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπο-

λογίζομενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ
tοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

17. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἄν εἶδον εἰργασμένος, ὦ

Ε ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔτατ-

του, οὐς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτδαία

καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὐ
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just reply: "You do not speak well, Sir, if you think
a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to
consider danger of life or death, and not rather
regard this only, when he does things, whether the
things he does are right or wrong and the acts of a
good or a bad man. For according to your argument
all the demigods would be bad who died at Troy,
including the son of Thetis, who so despised danger,
in comparison with enduring any disgrace, that when
his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he
was eager to slay Hector, something like this, I
believe, 'My son, if you avenge the death of your
friend Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall
die; "for straightway,"' she says, "after Hector,
is death appointed unto thee"';\(^1\) he, when he heard
this, made light of death and danger, and feared
much more to live as a coward and not to avenge his
friends, and 'Straightway,' said he, 'may I die,\(^2\) after
doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not
stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships, a burden
of the earth.'\(^3\) Do you think he considered death
and danger?"

For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever
a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be
there, or is stationed by his commander, there he
must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks,
considering neither death nor any other thing more
than disgrace.

So I should have done a terrible thing, if, when
the commanders whom you chose to command me
stationed me, both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and
at Delium, I remained where they stationed me,

\(^1\) Homer, \textit{Iliad}, xviii, 96. \(^2\) Homer, \textit{Iliad}, xviii, 98.
\(^3\) Homer, \textit{Iliad}, xviii, 104.

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ΕΚΕΪΝΟΙ ΕΤΑΤΤΟΥΝ ΕΜΕΝΟΝ ὈΣΠΕΡ ΚΑΙ ἈΛΛΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ἘΚΙΝΔΥΝΕΥΟΝ ἈΠΟΘΑΝΕΙΝ, ΤΟΥ ΔΕ ΘΕΟΥ ΤΑΤΤΟΝΤΟΣ, ὩΣ ἜΓΩ ΦΗΘΗΝ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ὙΠΕΛΑΒΟΝ, ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΥΝΤΑ ΜΕ ΔΕΙΝ ΞΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΕΤΑΞΟΥΝΤΑ ἘΜΑΥΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ἈΛΛΟΥΣ, ἘΝΤΑΥΘΑ ΔΕ ΦΟΒΗΘΕΙΣ Ἡ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ Ἡ ἈΛΛΟ ὅΤΙΟΥΝ ΠΡᾆΓΜΑ ΛΙΠΟΙΜΙ ΤΗΝ ΤΑΞΙΝ. ΔΕΙΝΟΝ ΤΑΝ ΕΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ὩΣ ἈΛΗΘΩΣ ΤΟΤ' ἈΝ ΜΕ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣ ΕΙΣΑΓΟΙ ΤΙΣ ΕΙΣ ΔΙΚΑ- ΣΤΗΡΙΟΝ, ὌΤΙ ΟΥ ΝΟΜΙΣΩ ΘΕΟΥΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ἈΠΕΙΘΩΝ ΤΗ ΜΑΝΤΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΙΔΗΣ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΪΜΕΝΟΣ ΣΟΦΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟὐΚ ὩΝ. ΤΟ ΓΑΡ ΤΟΙ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΔΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ, Ὡ ἈΝΔΡΕΣ, ΟΥΔΕΝ ἈΛΛΟ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ἡ ΔΟΚΕΙΝ ΣΟΦΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΗ ὌΝΤΑΙ: ΔΟΚΕΙΝ ΓΑΡ ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ἀ ΟŨΚ ΟΙΔΕΝ. ΟΙΔΕ ΜΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΟΙΔΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΟΥΔ' ΕΙ ΤΥΧΧΑΝΕΙ ΤΟ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ ὙΝ ΤΩΝ ἈΓΑΘΩΝ, ΔΕΔΙΑΣΙ Δ' ὩΣ ΕΙ ΕΙΔΟΤΕΣ ὩΤΙ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ ΤΩΝ Β ΚΑΚΩΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ. ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΩΣ ΟΥΚ ἈΜΑΘΙΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΤΗ Η ᾿ΕΠΟΝΕΙΔΙΟΣ, Η ΤΟΥ ΟΙΔΙΘΑΙ ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ Α ΟΥΚ ΟΙΔΕΝ; ΕΓΩ Δ', Η ἈΝΔΡΕΣ, ΤΟΥΤΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΝΤΑΥΘΑ ἩΣΩΣ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΙ ΔΗ ΤΗ ΣΟΦΩΤΕΡΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΦΑΙΝΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΤΟΥΤΟΙ ΑΝ, ὩΤΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΙΔΩΣ ΙΚΑΝΩΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ἜΝ "ΑΙΔΟΝ ΟΥΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΟΙΟΜΑΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ." ΤΟ ΔΕ ἈΔΙΚΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ἈΠΕΙΘΕΙΝ Τ῍ ΒΕΛ- ΤΙΟΝΙ, ΚΑΙ ΘΕΦ' ΚΑΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟ ΨΩΤΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΙΣΧΡΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΟΙΔΑ. ΠΡΟ ΟΥΝ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΚΩΝ, ΩΝ ΟΙΔΑ ΩΤΙ ΚΑΚΑ ΕΣΤΙΝ, Α ΜΗ ΟΙΔΑ ΕΙ ἈΓΑΘΑ ΟΝΤΑ ΤΥΧΧΑΝΕΙ ΟΥΔΕΤΟΤΕ ΦΟΒΗΘΟΜΑΙ ΟΥΔΕ ΦΕΙΞΟΜΑΙ, ὩΣΤΕ ΟΥΔ' ΕΙ ΜΕ ΝΥΝ ΥΜΕΙΣ ἈΦΙΣΤΕ ΆΝΤΥΡΟ ἈΠΙΣΤΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ, ΨΕ ἘΦΗ Ἡ ΤΗΝ ἈΡΧΗΝ ΟΥ ΔΕΙΝ ΕΜΕ ΔΕΥΡΟ ΕΙΣΕΙΔΘΕΙΝ Ἡ, ἘΠΕΙΔΗ ΕΙΣΗΘΘΟΝ, ΟΙΧ ΟΙΟΝ Τ' ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΟ ΜΗ ἈΠΟΚΤΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΕ, ΛΕΓΟΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΥΜΑΣ ΩΣ, ΕΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΝΧΟΙΜΗΝ, ἩΔΗ ἌΝ ΥΜΑΝ ΟΙ ΥΙΕΙΣ ΕΠΙΤΡΗΣΕΟΝΤΕΣ ΑΣ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ΠΑΝΤΑΠΑΣΙ ΔΙΑΦΘΑΡΗΣΟΝΤΑΙ,—ΕΙ ΜΟΙ ΠΡΟΣ

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like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining myself and others, then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else whatsoever. It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows whether death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the greatest of evils. And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other men in this way, and if I were to say that I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or bad rather than those which I know are bad. And therefore, even if you acquit me now and are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all, or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if I were acquitted your sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach—if you should say

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ταῦτα εἶποντε· ὦ Σώκρατε· νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτως οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἔπει τούτω μέντοι,
ἐφ' ὡτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ξητήσει διατρίβειν
μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἕαν δὲ ἀλῆς ἐτι τούτῳ πράττων,
D ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὀπερ εἶπον, ἔπει τούτων
ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγώ ὑμᾶς, ἀνδρεῖς
Ἄθηναιοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ· πείσομαι δὲ
μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἡ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐωσπερ ἄν ἐμπνεύω καὶ
οἷς τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν
παρακελεύσαμένοις τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἂν ἂεί
ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἴσπερ εἰσέβα, ὅτι, ὦ
ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖοι ὦν, πό λεως τῆς μεγίστης
καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρη-
μάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος, ὡς οὖν σοι
E ἔσται ὡς πλείστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως
dὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη
ἔσται, οὖν ἐπιμελεῖι οὔδε φροντίζεις; καὶ εάν τις
ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητῇ καὶ φή ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὖν εὕθες
ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτόν
καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ
κεκτήσαι ἄρετὴν, φάναι δέ, ὀνειδῶ, ὦτι τὰ
30 πλείστου ἕξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ
φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ
πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὅτι ἂν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ
καὶ ἀστῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὧσφι μου ἐγχυ-
ντέρῳ ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὐ
ιστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴσμαι οὐδὲν πω ὑμῖν μείξων ἀγαθῶν
γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.
οὔδὲν γὰρ ἀλλὸ πράττων ἐγώ περιέρχομαι ἢ
πείθων υμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους
μὴτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων
B πρῶτερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς.
THE APOLOGY

to me in reply to this: "Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are caught doing so again you shall die"; if you should let me go on this condition which I have mentioned, I should say to you, "Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my accustomed way: "Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth and the perfection of your soul?" And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning the things that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch as you are more nearly related to me. For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell
PLATO

όπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετῆ γίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς
χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄγαθὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαντὰ καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτα
λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταύτ' ἄν εἴη βλαβερά·
eἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησὶν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταύτα, οὔδὲν
λέγει. πρὸς ταύτα, φαίην ἂν, ὥ 'Ἀθηναίοι, ἡ
πείθεσθε Ἀνύτω ἢ μή, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε,
ὡς ἐμοῦ οὖν ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὔδ' εἰ μέλλω
C πολλάκις τεθνάναι. 18. Μή θορυβεῖτε, ἀνδρεὶς 'Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλ'
ἐμμείνατε μοι οἷς ἐδείχθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖτε ἐφ'
οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούειν καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι,
ὁνήσεσθε ἀκούσετε. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν
ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἰσως βοήσεσθε: ἀλλὰ
μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ
ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὅντα, οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ
ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἀνυτος·
D οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνατο· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμιτὸν εἶναι
ἀμέλειναι ἄνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀπο-
κτείνετε μέντ' ἂν ἰσως ἢ ἐξελάσειν ἢ ἀτιμώσειν
ἀλλὰ ταύτα οὕτως μὲν ἰσως οίς ἐται καὶ ἄλλος τὸς
ποὺ μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
mᾶλλον ποιεῖν ὁ οὕτως νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως
ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτείνυναι. νῦν οὖν, ὥ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθη-
ναίοι, πολλοὶ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείσθαι,
ὡς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρ-
τητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψή-
E φισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥαδίως
ἄλλου τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιό-
ΓΙΩ
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you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not, knowing that I shall not change my conduct even if I am to die many times over.

Do not make a disturbence, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out; but do not do so by any means. For know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus could injure me; that would be impossible, for I believe it is not God's will that a better man be injured by a worse. He might, however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much greater injury by doing what he is doing now—killing a man unjustly. And so, men of Athens, I am now making my defence not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours, that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the God gave you. For if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd
τερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει, ὥσπερ ἔπειτω μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὕπὸ μύωπος τινος: οἶον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτον τινα, δὲ ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὅνειδίζων ἕνα ἑκαστὸν οὐδὲν παιόμαι τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥαδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μοι· ὑμεῖς δ' ἵσως τἀξι' ἂν αὐχωμενοὶ, ὥσπερ οἱ νυσταξόντες ἐγερόμενοι, κρουσάντες ἂν με, πειθόμενοι. Ἀνύτω, ῥαδίως ἂν ἅποκτείνατε, εἰτα τὸν λουπὸν βίον καθευδοντες διατελοῦτε ἂν, εἰ μῆ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτεμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὧν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδοσθαὶ, ενθένδε ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔστει τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμελήκειναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσοῦτα ἂν ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ἱμέτερον πράττειν ἁεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόνται ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πείθοντα ἐπιμελείσθαι ἄρετῆς. καὶ ει μὲν τι ὑπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυνος καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκκελεύμην, εἶχεν ² ἂν τινα λόγου νῦν δὲ ὅρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοῖ, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τάλα πάντα ἀναψυχύντως οὕτω κατηγοῦντες τοῦτο γε οὐχ οὐδ' ἐγένετο ἀπιαναισχυντῆσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὥς ἐγώ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἡτησα. ἰκανὸν

1 The MSS. give ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, "by the god," after πόλει. Schanz, following Hirschig, brackets it.

² Schanz, with some inferior MS. authority, reads εἶχεν for εἶχον of the best MSS.
THE APOLOGY

figure, attaches himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account of his age and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some such capacity, and I go about arousing, and urging and reproaching each one of you, constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry, like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless God, in his care for you, should send someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue; now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves up to such a pitch of shamelessness as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or asked pay of anyone. For I think
γάρ, οἴμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἄληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

19. Ἰσως ἄν οὖν δόξειν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἴδια μὲν ταύτα ξυμβουλεύω περιών καὶ πολυπραγμονώ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον ξυμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἰτίον ἔστιν ὃ ύμεις ἔμοι πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὃτι μοι θείον τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, 1 δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικω-μῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτ’ ἐστιν ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμενον φωνὴ τις γνησιώτερη, ἢ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτῳ δὲ ἐν μέλλων πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐποτε· τούτ’ ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γάρ ἰστε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ ἐπεχειρήσατο πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολόληκα καὶ οὔτ’ ἂν ύμᾶς ὀφελήκῃ οὔδεν οὔτ’ ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθη· οὔ γὰρ ἐστιν δότις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ύμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλῆθει οὔδεν θυμήσις ἐναντιοῦμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι,

32 ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίοιν ἔστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχοῦμεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὅλιγον χρόνον σωθή-σεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

20. Μεγάλα δ’ ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὃ ύμεις τιμάτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δὴ μου τὰ ἐμοὶ ξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνι υπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀμ’ ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην.

1 The MSS. read φωνή, “voice,” after γίγνεται. Schanz, following others, omits it.
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I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my poverty.

Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, is that something divine and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death long ago and should have done no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man.

I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more,—actions. And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to any one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going to tell
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ἐρῷ δὲ ύμῶν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικαικά, ἀληθῇ δὲ.

Β ἔγῳ γάρ, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε ήρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δὲ· καὶ ἐτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή πρυτανεύονσα, ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἄνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβούλευσθε άθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως ὡς ἐν τῷ ύστερον χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐδοξεῖ. τότε ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡμαντώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους· καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελεύοντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου φύμη μᾶλλον με δεῖν διακαν ευνεῦν ἡ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμον ἡ θάνατον. καὶ ταύτα μὲν ἐν ἐτί δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὅλων τραχεία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὐτοὶ ἐπεμψάμενοι με πέμπτον αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν θόλου προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμίνος Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἦν ἀποθάνου· οὔτα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοὶ πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλήσαι αὐτῶν τότε μέντοι

C

D ἐγὼ οὖ λόγῳ ἀλλ' ἔρημον αὕτη ἐναδεικτάμην, ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτον μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικίτερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὔτε ὅτι τούτῳ τε μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδ' ἀνόσιον ἔργα-ζεσθαι, τούτον δὲ τῷ πάν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἄρχη οὐκ ἐξέλησιν οὕτως ἱσχυρὰ οὕσα, ὡστε ἄδικον τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτοι χριστοὺς εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἡγαγον Δέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀχομῆν ἀπώλον οἰκαδε. καὶ ἔσως ἀν διὰ ταύτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἄρχη

1 Schanz, following Hermann, brackets καὶ ἐναντία ἐγγε-φισάμην, "and I voted against it," which the MSS. give after
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you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. I, men of Athens, never held any other office in the state, but I was a senator; and it happened that my tribe held the presidency when you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the slain after the naval battle; this was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the only one of the prytanes who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I thought I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. [That was when the democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established, the Thirty sent for me with four others to come to the rotunda and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to implicate as many in their crimes as they could. Then I, however, showed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been νόμους. Xenophon, Mem. iv. 4. 2, states that Socrates, as presiding officer, refused to put the question to vote.

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Ε διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ύμιν ἐσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

21. Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν με οἴσθητε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι, εἰ ἐπράττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἄξιως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὥσπερ χρή, τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιεύμην; πολλοὶ γε δεί, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος ἄνθρωπων οὐδεὶς. ἄλλ' ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα, τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ιδία ὁ αὐτὸς οὕτως, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐνυγχωρήσας οὐδεὶς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλα ὤντε τούτων οὐδεὶς, οὐδ' οἱ διαβάλλοντες ἐμὲ φασὶν ἐμοὺς μαθητάς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἐγενόμην· εἰ δὲ τὰς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεὶς ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐφθόνισα, οὐδεὶς χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὖν, ἄλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίως καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἔρωτᾶν, καὶ εάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἄκοψαι δὲν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχομι, ὅτι μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δὲ τὰς φησίν παρ' ἐμοῦ πώποτε τί μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκούσαι ιδία ὃ τι μή καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εἰ ἢστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.

22. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ δὴ ποτὲ μετ' ἐμοῦ χαίρουσιν τινὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκοάτε, ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι; πάσαν ύμιν τὴν ἄλληθειαν ἐγὼ εἴπων ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοῖς οἰκομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὕτω δ' οὖν· ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἄθαντες. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ, ὅς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέτακται
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put down. Of these facts you can have many witnesses.

Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. But you will find that through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always been the same as now, and have never yielded to any one wrongly, whether it were any other person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never any one's teacher. If any one, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I have never objected, nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I say. And whether any of them turns out well or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying.

But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? You have heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth; it is because they like to listen when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe, I
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υπὸ Ἰτοῦ θεοῦ πραττεῖν καὶ ἐκ μαντεῖων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὥσπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ οὕτων προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστίν καὶ εὐθεία. εἰ γὰρ ὅτι ἐγὼ τῶν νέων τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρὴν δὴν, εἰτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἐγρωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὐσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πάποτε τι ξυνεβούλευσα, νυν αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμὸν κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἄδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὅπερ ἐμὸν τι κακὸν ἐπετύμθησαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι. 1 πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοὶ, οὐς ἐγὼ ὅρῳ, πρὸ τοῦ μὲν Κρίτων ἐπιτοσί, ἐμὸς ἠλειώτης καὶ δημώτης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἐπείτα Δυσανίας ὁ Σφῆττως, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἐπὶ Ἀντιφών ὁ Κηφισιαῖος οὐτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ· ἀλλοι τοῖς ὑπὸ, ὅποι ἐδεῖ δὴν ἐκείνοις γε αὐτοῦ κατάδειθεῖ—καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἴνα Θεάγης ἄδελφος. ὅδε δὲ Ἄδειμαντος ὁ Ἀριστωνος, ὁ ἄδελφος οὗτοι Πλάτων, καὶ Ἀιαντόδωρος, ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὃδε ἄδελφος. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ύμιν εἰπεῖν, ὅπως ἕχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ

1 After μεμνῆσθαι the best MSS. give καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι, “and punish.” Schanz follows Bekker and some MSS. in omitting these words.
have been commanded to do this by the God through oracles and dreams and in every way in which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do anything whatsoever. This, Athenians, is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men and have corrupted others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognise that I ever gave them any bad advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or if they did not wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives—fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk—ought now to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see; first Crito here, who is of my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present; then there is Lysanias the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, who is here; and also Antiphon of Cephasus, father of Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of Theozotides and brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus is dead, so he could not stop him by entreaties), and Paralus, son of Demodocus; Theages was his brother; and Adimantus, son of Aristo, whose brother is Plato here; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present. And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have produced as a witness in his speech; but if he forgot it then, let
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δὲ τὸτε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τούναυτίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακᾷ ἐργαζόμενῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὡς φασί Μέθ-

Β λητος καὶ Ἀνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρ-

méνοι τάξιν ἄν λόγου ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες. οἳ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, προσβύτεροι ἢδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τοῦτο προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸν ὀρθὸν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι εὐνύσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

23. Εἶνεν δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἀ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομι ἀν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἱσως τοιαύτα. τάχα δ’ ἂν τις ὡμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν Α

ἀναμισθείς εαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττων τοῦτον τὸν ἀγώνον ἀγώνα ἀγωνιζόμενον ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἰκέτευσε τοὺς δικαιατάς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρυῶν, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἢν δ’ τι μάλιστα ἐλεηθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολ-

λούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταύτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἄν δόξαμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχ’ οὖν τις ταύτα ἐνυόσασι αὐθάδεστερον ἄν πρὸς μὲ σχοίη, καὶ ὄργυσθεις αὐτοῖς τούτους θείον ἄν μετ’ ὁργῆς τὴν ψήφου. εἰ δ’ τις τῶν ὡμῶν οὐτως ἄναυτο

D ἔχει,—οὐκ ἀξίω μὲν γὰρ ἔγω γε· εἰ δ’ οὖν, ἐπιεικὴ ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοὶ, ὦ ἀριστε, εἴσον μὲν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδ’ ἔγω ἀπὸ ὅρους ὡδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσι καὶ νεῖσι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-

ναίου, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία.
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him do so now; I yield the floor to him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. Now those who are themselves corrupted might have some motive in aiding me; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am speaking the truth?

Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defence. Perhaps some one among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, if he, even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives; whereas I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps some one with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote in anger. Now if any one of you is so disposed—I do not believe there is such a person—but if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives, for I am, as Homer has it, "not born of an oak or a rock,"¹ but of human parents, so that I have relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still

¹ Homer, Odyssey, xix. 163.
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άλλο διμος ουδένα αυτών δεύρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ ὦν οὐδὲν
tούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ Ἀθηναίοι,
Ε οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν 
θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἀλλός λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὖ
μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν ἐναὶ ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ 
tηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τούτο τούτομα ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἰτ' οὖν 
ψεύδος. ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένου γέ ἔστι
τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.
εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφία εἴτε 
ἀνδρεῖα εἴτε ἀλλή ἦτωσον ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται,
αἰσχρὸν ἃν εἰτ' οὖνστερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακα 
tινας, ὅταν κρίνονται, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἰναι,
θραύσμα δὲ ἐργαζόμενους, ὃς δεινὸν τι οἰδώμενος 
πέσοσθαι, εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀστέρ ἀθανάτων 
ἐσομένων, ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνῃτε οἳ ἐμοὶ 
dοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνῃ τῇ πόλει περιαπτεῖν, ὡστ' ἂν 
tινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὑπὸ 
εἰς διαφέροντες

B. Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὐδ' αὐτὸλ ἐαυτῶν ἐν τε ταῖς 
ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, 
οὕτω γυναίκων οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ 
ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, οὔτε ἡμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τούς 
dοκοῦτας καὶ ὅποιον τι εἶναι, οὔτ', ἂν ἡμεῖς 
ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδει-

κυνοῖθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφίζεις τοῦ τὰ 
ἐλεεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰςάγοντος καὶ καταγέ-

λαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν 
ἀγνοτος.

24. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δι-

C καὶ οὐ 

δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ 

δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.

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children; but nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. Whether I fear death or not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most men. If then those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they are a disgrace to the state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, men whom they themselves honour with offices, and other marks of esteem, are no better than women. Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputation at all ought not to commit, and if we commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more ready to condemn a man who puts before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous than one who keeps quiet.

But apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, I think it is not right to implore the judge or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform
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οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστὴς, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζοντος τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνον ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμομοιοί εὐρείας οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσεως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὕτως χρὴ οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἐθίζως ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὕτως ἡμᾶς ἐθίζουσί· οὐδέπερ γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτε με, ὦ ἄνδρες ἴχναιοι, τοιάντες διὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, ὅ μήτε ἡγούμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὅσια,

D ἄλλως τε μέντοι νῷ Δία καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοῦτον. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθομεν ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμεθα ὁμομοιοτάτας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκομεν μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀνεχθῶς ἀπολογοῦμενος κατηγοροῦν ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ, ὦς θεοὺς οἱ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν νομίζω τε γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες ἴχναιοι, ὥς οὔδες τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

Ε 25. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες ἴχναιοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψυχίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ ξυμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἄνελπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονός τούτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρω τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα αἰρεῖμον. οὐ γὰρ φόμην ἔγγει καὶ παρ' ὅλίγων ἐσεσθαί, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ νῦν δέ, ὡς οὐκετε, εἰ τριάκοντα μόνοι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφεύγη ἃν. Μελήτου μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τούτῳ γε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη 1

1 Schanz brackets τὸ γεγονός.
THE APOLOGY

and convince him. For the judge is not here to grant favours in matters of justice, but to give judgment; and his oath binds him not to do favours according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you in a way which I consider neither honourable, nor right nor pious, especially when impiety is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence of the gods and in making my defence should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is far from the truth; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I entrust my case to you and to God to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.

I am not grieved, men of Athens, at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me, and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. I am much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it; for I did not expect so small a majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should have been acquitted. And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had

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"Ανυτος καὶ Δύκων, κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, καὶ

Φιλε χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβῶν τὸ πέμπτον

μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

26. Τιμᾶται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνήρ θανάτου. εἰεν-

ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὁ ἀνδρὲς

Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἄξιας; τί οὖν; τί

ἄξιός εἰμι παθείν ἢ ἀποτίςαι, ὃ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ

βίῳ οὐχ ἦσυχιαν ἦγον, ἀλλ’ ἀμελῆσας ὄντερ

ὁ πολλοὶ, χρηματισμὸν τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ

στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν

καὶ ξυνωμοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει

γυναικῶν, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν τῷ ὑπὲρ ἐπτει-

κέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὡστε εἰς ταῦτ ἰόντα σφίζεσθαι,

ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ἦν, οἱ ἐλθὼν μῆτε ὑμῖν μῆτε

ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὧδελος εἶναι, ἐπ’ ὅτι τὸ

ἰδία ἐκαστὸν ἴδιον εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐερ-

γεσίαν, ως ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ἤλθο, ἐπιχειρῶν

ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μῆτε τῶν

ἔαυτον μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἔαυτον ἐπιμε-

λῆθείη, ὡς ὁ βέλτιστος καὶ φρονίμωτατος

ἐσοῦτο, μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς

πόλεως, τῶν τῆς ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν ἔαυτον

τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν

tou λόγον ὅν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὁ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναίοι,

ei dei ge kata tην άξιαν tην ἀληθείαν τιμᾶσθαι

καὶ ταῦτα ge aγαθὸn toioúton, ὃ tι an prêto

emoi. tì ouv prêpei anhri pênhti euergeth,

demênvo anegov scholêm epî tηn ýmeterà parake-

leûseis; ouk éstô o tì múllon, ò anhres Athênaioi,

prêpei ou tôs, ouc των toioûton anhra en proutaneiô

suteîsathai, polû ge múllon ò ei tîs ýmôw îpîphù
THE APOLOGY

not come forward to accuse me, he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a fifth part of the votes.

And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for—money-making and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and plots and parties that come up in the state—and thinking that I was really too honourable to engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection in goodness and wisdom rather than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then, does such a man as I deserve? Some good thing, men of Athens, if I must propose something truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting for me. Now what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the Prytaneum. That is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the
PLATO

ξυνωρίδει ἢ ξεύγει κενδικηθεὶς Ὀλυμπίασιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἕγω δὲ εἶναι.

Ε καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἕγω δὲ δέομαι. εἰ οὖν δὲι με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι,

37 τοῦτον τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείᾳ σιτῆσεως.

27. Ἰσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταῦτα λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὦσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἰκτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολῆσεως, ἀπαυθαδικόμενος: τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιότου, ἀλλὰ τοιώνυμε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἕγω ἐκών εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθων ὡς ἡγόμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὦσπερ καὶ ἀλλος

Β ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μῖαν ἁμέραν μόνον κρίνων, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπεισδήτη ἢν ὅν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὅλῳ μεγάλας διαβολας ἀπολύσεως. πέπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδενα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀξίος εἰμὶ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τιμῆσεσθαι τοιότου των ἐμαυτῷ. τί δεῖσας; ἢ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο, οὐ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται, ὃ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτε ἐν ἀγαθον οὔτε ἐν κακον ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τοῦτο δὴ ἔλωμαι ὅν οὐδ' ὑμῖν κακῶν ὑπων, τοῦ τιμῆσάμενος; ποτέρον δεσμοῦ;

C καὶ τί με δεῖ ξῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἂρχῇ; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι, ἐως ἀν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ τοιτοῦ μοί ἔστων, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔληγον οὐ γὰρ ἐστι μοι χρήματα, ὅποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγής τιμῆσάμενος; ἦσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τοῦτον τιμῆσατε. πολλὴ μέντ' ἂν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως

1 Schanz brackets elai, following Hermann.
THE APOLOGY

Olympic games with a pair of horses or a four-in-hand. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you happy in reality; and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I must propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, I propose maintenance in the Prytaneum.

Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring, I am speaking in a spirit of bravado; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have, that capital cases should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would be convinced; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am convinced that I never wronged any one, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should I? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil? What penalty shall I propose? Imprisonment? And why should I live in prison a slave to those who may be in authority? Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? But that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be
PLATO

ἀλόγιστός εἰμι, ὡστε μη δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ἄντες πολῖται μου ὠν όιοί τε
D ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκείων τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὡστε ξητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλλαγῆαι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἁρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥαδίως;
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ Ἀθηναίοι. καλὸς οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰη ἐξελθὸντε τηλικάδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἀλλην ἐξ ἀλλης πόλεως ἁμειβομένης καὶ ἐξελαυνομένου ἱην. εὖ γαρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ὅτι οὖν ἄλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὁσπερ ἐνθάδε·
καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὐτοὶ ἑμὲ αὐτοὶ ἐξελώσι, πεῖθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ
Ε μη ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ ὀἰκεῖοι δι' αὐτῶν τούτως.

28. 'Ισως οὖν ἂν τις εἶποι συγῶν δὲ καὶ ἥσυχιαν ἄγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἶδ' τ' ἐσει ἡμῖν ἐξελοθῶν ἵην; τούτι δ' ἔστε πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαί τινας ὑμῶν. εάν τε γαρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ
θεῷ ἀπειθείν τοῦτ' ἐστίν καὶ διὰ τούτο ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρωνευμένης·
38 εάν τ' αὐ λέγω, ὦτι καὶ τυγχάναε μέγιστον ἄγαθον ἄνθρωπῳ τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὅ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος
βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἄνθρωπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως,
ὡς ἐγώ ϕημι, ὃ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ βάδιον,
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμα οὐκ εἰδίσμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἄξιον κακοῦ
οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γαρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην
B ἀν χρημάτων δοσα ἐμελλον ἑκτίσειν οὐδὲν γαρ

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possessed by a great love of life if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, could not endure my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to drive me out, and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out for their sakes.

Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without talking?" Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting and will not believe me; and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, you will believe me still less. This is as I say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, as large as I could pay; for that would have done me no harm.
PLATO

δὴ ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον δὴν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτον βούλεσθέ μοι τιμήσαι. Ἰσώς δὲ δὴν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ύμῖν μνᾶν ἄργυρόν τος τοσοῦτον οὖν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ οδε, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κριτῶν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύσοι με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐγγυάσθαι τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσοῦτον, ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ ύμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἄργυρίου οὗτοι ἄξιόχρεοι.

29. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἔνεκα χρόνου, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δύναμα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφὸν φήσουσί γὰρ δὴ με σοφὸν εἰναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμι, οἱ βουλομένοι ύμῖν ονειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν περιμενεῖν τὸ ὅλον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου δὴ ύμῖν τούτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἥλικίαν, ὅτι πόρρω ἢ ἡ ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντας ύμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τους αὐτούς τοῦτους. Ἰσώς μὲ οἴσοθε, ὡς ἄνδρες, ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οὐς δὲν ύμᾶς ἐπείσα, εἰ φίλην δεῖν ἄπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὅστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δει. ἀλλ' ἀπορία μὲν ἐαλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ θέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ύμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἢδιστα ήν ἄκοινει, θηρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὄδυρομένου· καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλά καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ἄλλο φημι· οἶα δὴ καὶ εἰδισθε ύμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἐμῖν. ἀλλ' οὔτε τότε φήθην δεῖν ἐνεκα τοῦ
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But as it is—I have no money, unless you are willing to impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. So I propose that penalty; but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus, and Aristobulus tell me to propose a fine of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these men, who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.

It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man; for, you know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord; for you see how old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, but to those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think, gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. And yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting and doing and saying many things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me—such things as you are accustomed to hear from others. But I did not think at the time
39 ἐμὲ οὖτ' ἄλλου οὐδένα δεῖ τούτο μηχανάσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δὴλον γίγνεται, ὥστε τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἂν τίς ἐκφύγωι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ' ἰκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις, ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐὰν τίς τολμᾶ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἄλλα μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἢ χαλεπὸν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἄλλα πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν θάττου γὰρ θανάτον θεῖ.

Β καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἀτε βραδύς ἄν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἐάλων, οἳ δ' ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἀτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὅζεις ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττουν, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι υφ' ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὄφλων, οὕτω δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὀφληκτός μοχθηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας. καὶ ἐγώγε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένῳ καὶ οὕτω. ταῦτα μὲν ποι ἵσως οὕτως καὶ ἐδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἴμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

C 30. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶν υμῖν χρησιμοδήσαι, ὡς καταψηφισάμενοι μοῦ καὶ γὰρ εἴμι ὅτι ἐνταῦθα, ἐν δὲ μάλιστα ἀνθρωποί χρησιμοδούσών, ὅταν μέλλοσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. ἰημαρὰ γάρ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἦξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἔμοι θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπώτεραν νη Δία ἢ οἷαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργασθε οἴμονοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ υμῶν πολὺ ἐναντίον
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that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor in war ought I or any other man to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death if one is willing to do and say anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness, for that runs faster than death. And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower runner, and my accusers, who are clever and quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I think they are well.

And now I wish to prophesy to you, O ye who have condemned me; for I am now at the time when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, ye men who have slain me, that punishment will come upon you straightway after my death, far more grievous in sooth than the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say that you will find
PLATO

ἀποβηθῆσται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημὶ. πλεῖοις ἔσονται ὑμᾶς

D οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς οὖν ἐγὼ κατείχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἔσχάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσοι νεώτεροὶ εἰσίν, καὶ ύμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οίκεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχῆσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζήτε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ’ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ βάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ’ ἐαυτὸν παρασκευάξειν ὅπως ἔσται ὃς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφι-

E σαμένους μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

31. Τοίς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἢδέως ἄν διαλε- χθείν ύπέρ τοῦ γεγονότος τούτου πράγματος, ἐν οἷς ἄρχοντες ἀσχολιάν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔτω ἐρχομαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἄλλην, ἐως ἐξεστίν. ύμῖν γὰρ ὃς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνὶ μοι ἐμπεθήκος τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταῖ—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἄν καλοίν—θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν. η γὰρ εἰσθανά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἡμὲν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἄει ἤμ καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιομένη, εἰ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ ἐμπεθήκη μοι, ἀπερ ὀρὰτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταύτι ἄ γε δὴ οἰσθεὶν ἀν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ

B οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἐσθεν οἴκοθεν ἦμαντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημείον, οὔτε ἦνικα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυδοὶ

1 Schanz follows Schleiermacher in bracketeting ἡ τοῦ δαι-

μονίου.

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the result far different. Those who will force you to give an account will be more numerous than heretofore; men whom I restrained, though you knew it not; and they will be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you think that by putting men to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you because you do not act as you should, you are mistaken. That mode of escape is neither possible at all nor honourable, but the easiest and most honourable escape is not by suppressing others, but by making yourselves as good as possible. So with this prophecy to you who condemned me I take my leave.

But with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to converse about this which has happened, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Wait with me so long, my friends; for nothing prevents our chatting with each other while there is time. I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened to me. For, judges—and in calling you judges I give you your right name—a wonderful thing has happened to me. For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not; but now this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon me; but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech,

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ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὕτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχού δὴ μὲ ἐπέσχε χε λέγοντα μεταξὺ νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν οὐτ' ἐν ἕργῳ οὐκ οὕτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἤναντίωται μοι. τί οὖν αἰτίων εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὡμὴν ἑρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ἐμμεθηκος τούτο ἄγαθόν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς ἡμεῖς ὁρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν,

C ὃςοι οἴομεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐκ ἤναντιώθη ἂν μοι τὸ εἰσθός σημείον, εἰ μὴ τι ἐμελλὼν ἐγὼ ἄγαθόν πράξειν.

32. Ἕνωσόμεθα δὲ καὶ τῇ, ὡς πολλῇ ἐπίς ἐστιν ἄγαθόν αὐτῷ εἶναι· δυνών γὰρ θάτερον ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ ὁ λόγος ὡς ἐμὲ ἄνθρωποι μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἰσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τοὺς τεθνέωτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολὴ τις τυγχάνει οὕς καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ¹ εὐθεῖα εἰς ἀλλὰν τόπον, καὶ εἰτε μηδεμία αἰσθησίς

D ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον ὡς καθαύνον μηδὲν ὁνάρ μηδὲν ὁρᾶ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἰῃ ὁ θάνατος. ἕγω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἱ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ἦ ὡς κατεδαρθεν, ὅστε μηδὲν ὁνάρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν, πόσας ἀμείνων καὶ ἡμιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς ἐβεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν

E βασιλέα ἐναρίθμητος ἃν εὐρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν

¹ Schanz, following C and Hirschig, brackets τοῦ τόπου τοῦ.
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when I was going to say anything; and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us who think death is an evil must be mistaken. A convincing proof of this has been given me; for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with something good.

Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing. For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if any one were to pick out that night in which he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say, after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that night,—I believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature of death, I
τοιούτου ο θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἐγγέχει λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδέν πλείων ο πάς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δ’ αὐτὸν ἀποδημήσαι ἐστιν ο θάνατός ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὅσα ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσιν ἀπαντεῖ τοις ἀληθείς ἐπειδής, τὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἰς τὸ νῦν ὃς ὁ ἄλλος ἐκαστάς; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδον, ἀπαλλαγεῖς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οὔτε γάρ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ραδάμανθιsus καὶ Ἀιακὸς καὶ Τριπτὸλεμὸς καὶ ἄλλοι ὤροι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημισθείση αὐτὸς ὁ Ὅρφευς ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσάιοι καὶ Ἅσιόδορος καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπὶ πόσον ἂν τοῖς δέξατ’ ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις θέλω τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτ’ ἐστιν ἀληθῆ ἐπεὶ ἐμοῦ ἡ καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἰ ἂν ἡ διατριβή αὐτόθι, ὅπως ἐπιτύχωμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Ἀιαντὶ τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τίς ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τεθνήκεν, ἀντι- παραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἑκείνων, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἄνθης εἴη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἔξετάζοντα καὶ ἔρευνοντα ὀσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστι καὶ τίς οὐεῖ μέν, ἐστιν δ’ οὐ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ’ ἂν τοὺς, δ’ ὁ ἄλλοις δικασταὶ, δέξατο ἔξετάζαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἄγαγόντα τὴν πολλὴν στρατιῶν Ἡ Ἄδυσσεα ἡ Σίσυφον, ἡ ἄλλος μυρίως ἂν τις εἰποῦ καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; οἴς ἐκεῖ διαλε- γοῦσαι καὶ ἄνυείναι καὶ ἔξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰη εὐδαίμονις. πάντως οὐ δήποτε τούτου γε ἔνεκα οἱ ἐκεί ἀποκτείνουσιν τά τε γάρ ἄλλα
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count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. But on the other hand, if death is, as it were, a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be, judges? For if a man when he reaches the other world, after leaving behind these who claim to be judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would the change of habitation be undesirable? Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die many times over, if these things are true; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment, and compared my experience with theirs. I think that would not be unpleasant. And the greatest pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not. What price would any of you pay, judges, to examine him who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or countless others, both men and women, whom I might mention? To converse and associate with them and examine them would be immeasurable happiness. At any rate, the folk there do not kill people for it; since, if what we are told is true,
33. Αλλά καὶ ὑμᾶς χρῆ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικασταὶ, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθεῖς, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ξύντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα. οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἔστι τούτο, ὅτι ἢδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλ-λάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγνω γε τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνω χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζουτό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἶο-μενοὶ βλάπτειν τούτῳ αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνθε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι τοὺς νικῶς μου, ἔπειδαν ἤβησσον, τιμωρήσασθε, ὃ ἄνδρες, ταύτα ταύτα λυποῦντες, ἀπέρ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἔλυπνοι, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρησκόω ν ἢ ἄλλου τοῦ πρῶτου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἁρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μὴ δεν ὄντες, ὑνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς, ἀστερεῖ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὑμᾶι, καὶ οὔταν τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ ἐὰν ταύτα ποιήτε, δίκαια 42 πεπονθώσ ἐγὼ ἐσομαι υφ' ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ νικῶς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἢδη ὡρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοί μὲν ἀπο-θανομένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένῳ ὑπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλην ἡ τῷ θεῷ.
THE APOLOGY

they are immortal for all future time, besides being happier in other respects than men are here.

But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him. So, too, this which has come to me has not come by chance, but I see plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the sign never interfered with me, and I am not at all angry with those who condemned me or with my accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, but because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of them: when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you; if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you do this, both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.

But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to the better lot, is known to none but God.
CRITO
INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO

This dialogue is a conversation between Socrates and his lifelong friend Crito, which takes place in the prison where Socrates is confined after his trial to await the day of his execution. Crito was a man of wealth and position, devotedly attached to Socrates, and greatly interested in philosophical speculation. Diogenes Laertius (II. 121) gives a list of seventeen dialogues on philosophical subjects attributed to him, but Plato represents him throughout as a man of kindly disposition and practical common sense, quite lacking in originality and with no gift for philosophical investigation.

There can be little doubt that Crito tried more than once to induce Socrates to escape from prison, but this dialogue can hardly be considered a mere report of a conversation which actually took place; it is planned and carried out with the exquisite skill peculiar to Plato, and must be recognised as his work. It is difficult, often impossible, to distinguish between the doctrines and beliefs of the real Socrates and those which are put into his mouth by Plato; but in view of the fact that Socrates did not escape from prison, his conduct must have been determined by some consideration of right. We may therefore believe that the doctrine that injustice is always
wrong and that we must not requite injustice with injustice is really Socratic, and that the exalted patriotism and sublime serenity of mind portrayed by Plato in this dialogue were really exhibited in the last days, as in the previous life, of the master whom he delighted to honour.

For editions of the Crito, see the Introduction to the Apology.
KRITON

Η ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΕΟΤ, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΖΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ

Α 1. ΖΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί τηνικάδε ἄφησαι, ὦ Κρίτων; ἢ ὅ u πρὶ ἔτι ἔστιν;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΖΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 'Ορθρός βαθύς.
ΖΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θαυμάζω, ὅπως ἦθελησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ευνήθης ἢ δή μοῖ ἔστω, ὦ Σώκρατες, διὸ τὸ πολλάκις δύρο φοιτάν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργέτηται ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ.
ΖΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αρτι δὲ ἢ κείσῃ πάλαι;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. 'Επιεικῶς πάλαι.

Β ΖΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἶτα πῶς οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπήγγειρά με, ἀλλὰ συγῆ παρακάθησαι;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ’ ἄν αὐτὸς ἥθελον ἐν τοσαύτη τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος, ὡς ἥδεως καθεύδεις· καὶ ἐπὶ τηδὲς σὲ οὐκ ἤγειρον, ἢν ὡς ἡδίστα διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμόνισα 150.
CRITO

[OR ON DUTY; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS
Socrates, Crito

Socrates. Why have you come at this time, Crito? Or isn't it still early?

Crito. Yes, very early.

Socrates. About what time?

Crito. Just before dawn.

Socrates. I am surprised that the watchman of the prison was willing to let you in.

Crito. He is used to me by this time, Socrates, because I come here so often, and besides I have done something for him.

Socrates. Have you just come, or some time ago?

Crito. Some little time ago.

Socrates. Then why did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting by me in silence?

Crito. No, no, by Zeus, Socrates, I only wish I myself were not so sleepless and sorrowful. But I have been wondering at you for some time, seeing how sweetly you sleep; and I purposely refrained from waking you, that you might pass the time as pleasantly as possible. I have often thought through-

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τοῦ τρόπου, πολλ' δὲ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ νυνὶ παρεστώς ἔμφορα, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶς φέρεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Κρίτων, πλημμελεῖς C εἴῃ ἀγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα, εἶ δὲ ἡδὴ τελευτάν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι εἰν τοιαύταις ἔμφοραις ἀλάσκονται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύει τὴ ἡλικία τὸ μῆ σοῦ ἁγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐστι ταῦτα. ἄλλα τί δὴ οὕτω προὶ ἀφίξαι;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀγγελίαν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φέρουν χαλεπὴν, οὐ σοὶ, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείους πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἣν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατ' ἂν ἐνέγκαιμι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται

D ἐκ Δῆλου, οὐ δεὶ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὕτω δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἢξειν τῆμερον ἢξ ἄπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντέσ τινες ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ καταλιπόντες ἐκεῖ αὐτό. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἄγγελων1 ὧτι ἢξει τῆμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὲ εἰς ἀὔριον ἑσται, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

2. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ', ὁ Κρίτων, τύχη ἀγαθῆ. εἰ ταύτη τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτη ἑστώ. οὐ μέντοι 44 οἴμαι ἢξειν αὐτὸ τῆμερον.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Πόθεν τούτῳ τεκμαλρει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἔρω. τῇ γὰρ ποι ὑστεραία δεῖ με ἀποδυνάσκειν ἡ ἢ ἂν ἐλθῃ τὸ πλοῖον.

1 Schanz brackets ἀγγέλων.
CRITO

out your life hitherto that you were of a happy disposition, and I think so more than ever in this present misfortune, since you bear it so easily and calmly.

Socrates. Well, Crito, it would be absurd if at my age I were disturbed because I must die now.

Crito. Other men as old, Socrates, become involved in similar misfortunes, but their age does not in the least prevent them from being disturbed by their fate.

Socrates. That is true. But why have you come so early?

Crito. To bring news, Socrates, sad news, though apparently not sad to you, but sad and grievous to me and all your friends, and to few of them, I think, so grievous as to me.

Socrates. What is this news? Has the ship come from Delos, at the arrival of which I am to die?

Crito. It has not exactly come, but I think it will come to-day from the reports of some men who have come from Sunium and left it there. Now it is clear from what they say that it will come to-day, and so to-morrow, Socrates, your life must end.

Socrates. Well, Crito, good luck be with us! If this is the will of the gods, so be it. However, I do not think it will come to-day.

Crito. What is your reason for not thinking so?

Socrates. I will tell you. I must die on the day after the ship comes in, must I not?
KRITON. Φασί γέ τοι δή οί τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἴμαι αὐτὸ ᾧζειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τινος ἑνυπνίου, ὃ ἐώρακα ὤλγον πρότερον ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς καὶ κινδυνεύεις ἐν καίρῳ τινι οὐκ ἐγείραμεν με.

KRITON. Ην δὲ δὴ τί τοῦ ἑνυπνίου;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔδοκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλῆ καὶ εὐειδής, λευκὰ ἱμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι β με καὶ εἰπεῖν ὁ Σώκρατες,

ἡματὶ κὲν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἱκεῖο.

KRITON. Ἀποτοῦν τὸ ἑνυπνίου, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐναργεῖς μὲν οὖν, ὡς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Κρίτων.

3. KRITON. Δίαν γε, ὡς ξοικεῖν. ἀλλ’, ὃ δαιμόνιον Σώκρατες, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἔμοι πιθοῦ 1 καὶ σῶθην: ὡς ἐμοί, ἅν σὺ ἀποθάνῃς, οὐ μία ἐνικοφορά ἑστίν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἑστερῆθαι τοιοῦτον ἑπιτηδείου, οἶνον ἐγὼ οὐδένα μὴ ποτὲ ἐυρήσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοὶ δόξω, οί ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ C-μὴ σαφῶς ἱσασίν, ὡς οἶδος τ’ ὡς σὲ σφόζειν, εἰ ἤθελον ἀναλίσκειν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καὶ τοῖς ἀν αἰσχίνων εἰὴ ταύτης δόξα ἡ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονοις ποιεῖται ἡ φίλον; οὐ γὰρ πεῖ-

σονται οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡθέλησας ἀπιέναι ἐνθένδε ἡμῶν προθυμομένων.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τί ἢμῖν, ὃ μακάριε Κρίτων,

οὔτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιεικέστατοι, ὃν μᾶλλον ἄξιον φροντίζειν, ἡγήσονται αὐτὰ οὔτω πεπράχθαι, ὥσπερ ἀν πραξῆ.

D KRITON. Ἀλλ’ ὀρᾷ δή, ὅτι ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες,

1 πιθοῦ Schanz, following Burges, πελθον BCDE.
CRITO

CRITO. So those say who have charge of these matters.

SOCRATES. Well, I think it will not come in to-day, but to-morrow. And my reason for this is a dream which I had a little while ago in the course of this night. And perhaps you let me sleep just at the right time.

CRITO. What was the dream?

SOCRATES. I dreamed that a beautiful, fair woman, clothed in white raiment, came to me and called me and said, "Socrates, on the third day thou wouldst come to fertile Phthia." ¹

CRITO. A strange dream, Socrates.

SOCRATES. No, a clear one, at any rate, I think, Crito.

CRITO. Too clear, apparently. But, my dear Socrates, even now listen to me and save yourself. Since, if you die, it will be no mere single misfortune to me, but I shall lose a friend such as I can never find again, and besides, many persons who do not know you and me well will think I could have saved you if I had been willing to spend money, but that I would not take the trouble. And yet what reputation could be more disgraceful than that of considering one's money of more importance than one's friends? For most people will not believe that we were eager to help you to go away from here, but you refused.

SOCRATES. But, my dear Crito, why do we care so much for what most people think? For the most reasonable men, whose opinion is more worth considering, will think that things were done as they really will be done.

CRITO. But you see it is necessary, Socrates, to

¹ Homer, Iliad ix, 363
καὶ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλεως. αὐτὰ δὲ δῆλα
tὰ παρόντα νυνί, ὅτι οἷοὶ τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ
tὰ σμικρότατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ
μέγιστα σχεδὸν, ἐὰν τις ἐν αὐτοῖς διαβεβελη-
mένοις ἦ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ γὰρ ὠφελοῦ, ὁ Κρίτων, οἷοὶ τ' εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργάζεσθαι, ἢν
οἷοὶ τ' ἥσαν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθά, καὶ καλῶς
ἀν εἴχεν νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οἷοὶ τε οὔτε γὰρ φρό-
νυμον οὔτε ἀφρον δυνατοὶ ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι δὲ
τούτο ὅ τι ἀν τύχωσι.

Ε 4. ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετω· τάδε
dὲ, ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπέ μοι. ἀρά γε μὴ ἐμοῦ προ-
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mηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, μή, ἐὰν σὺ
ἐνθένδε ἐξέλθῃς, οἱ συκοφάνται ἥμων πράγματα
παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθένδε ἐκκλέψασιν, καὶ ἀναγκα-
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CRITO

care for the opinion of the public, for this very trouble we are in now shows that the public is able to accomplish not by any means the least, but almost the greatest of evils, if one has a bad reputation with it.

SOCRATES. I only wish, Crito, the people could accomplish the greatest evils, that they might be able to accomplish also the greatest good things. Then all would be well. But now they can do neither of the two; for they are not able to make a man wise or foolish, but they do whatever occurs to them.

CRITO. That may well be. But, Socrates, tell me this: you are not considering me and your other friends, are you, fearing that, if you escape, the informers will make trouble for us by saying that we stole you away, and we shall be forced to lose either all our property or a good deal of money, or be punished in some other way besides? For if you are afraid of anything of that kind, let it go; since it is right for us to run this risk, and even greater risk than this, if necessary, provided we save you. Now please do as I ask.

SOCRATES. I am considering this, Crito, and many other things.

CRITO. Well, do not fear this! for it is not even a large sum of money which we should pay to some men who are willing to save you and get you away from here. Besides, don't you see how cheap these informers are, and that not much money would be needed to silence them? And you have my money at your command, which is enough, I fancy; and moreover, if because you care for me you think you
δεῶν ἀναλίσκειν τάμα, ξένοι εἴναθα ἐστομοὶ ἀναλίσκειν. εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκόμηκεν ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀργύρων ἰκανόν. Σιμμίας ο ὸηθαῖος ἐστομος δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάνυ. ὡστε ὅπερ λέγω, μήτε ταῦτα φοβούμενοι ἀποκάμης σαυτὸν σῶσαί, μήτε ὃ ἔλεγες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δυσχερές σοι γενέσθω, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἔχοις ἔξελθον ὃ τι χρῆ σαυτῷ πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅτι τὸν ἀφίκη ἀγαπήσουσί σε. ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θετταλίαν ἴέναι, εἰσὶν ἐμοὶ ἐκεῖ ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ ποιήσουται καὶ ἀσφάλειαν σοι παρέξουται, ὡστε σε μηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ Θετταλίαν.

5. Ἡτὶ δὲ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐδὲ δικαίων μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι, ἐξον σωθῆναι καὶ τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἄν καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσασιν τε καὶ ἐσπευσάν σε διαφθείραι βουλόμενοι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τοὺς υἱὲς τοὺς σαυτὸν ἐμοιγε δοκεῖς προδιδόναι, οὕς σοι ἐξον καὶ ἐκθρέψαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσαι. όμισεις καταλυτῶ, καὶ τὸ σὸν μέρος, ὅ τι ἄν τύχωσιν, τοῦτο πράξονσι. τεῦξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, τοιοῦτων οἷόπερ εἰωθεν γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς. ἢ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας ἢ ξυνδιαταλαμωρεῖν καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· σον δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ βαθυμότατα αἰρεῖσθαι. χρὴ δέ, ἀπερ ἄν ἀνήρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔλοιπο, ταῦτα αἰρεῖσθαι, φάσκοντα γε δὴ ἄρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι οὕς ἐγὼγε καὶ ἀπερ σοῦ καὶ ἤπερ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδεῖων αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δέχῃ ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀναιρεία τινὶ τῇ

1 After ξένοι the MSS. read οὕς, which Schanz brackets.
CRITO

ought not to spend my money, there are foreigners here willing to spend theirs; and one of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought for this especial purpose sufficient funds; and Cebes also and very many others are ready. So, as I say, do not give up saving yourself through fear of this. And do not be troubled by what you said in the court, that if you went away you would not know what to do with yourself. For in many other places, wherever you go, they will welcome you; and if you wish to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will make much of you and will protect you, so that no one in Thessaly shall annoy you.

And besides, Socrates, it seems to me the thing you are undertaking to do is not even right—betraying yourself when you might save yourself. And you are eager to bring upon yourself just what your enemies would wish and just what those were eager for who wished to destroy you. And moreover, I think you are abandoning your children, too, for when you might bring them up and educate them, you are going to desert them and go away, and, so far as you are concerned, their fortunes in life will be whatever they happen to meet with, and they will probably meet with such treatment as generally comes to orphans in their destitution. No. Either one ought not to beget children, or one ought to stay by them and bring them up and educate them. But you seem to me to be choosing the laziest way; and you ought to choose as a good and brave man would choose, you who have been saying all your life that you cared for virtue. So I am ashamed both for you and for us, your friends, and I am afraid people will think that this whole affair of yours has
ὁμετέρα πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ ἐἰσοδὸς τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἐξὸν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγών τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγένετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τούτι, ὡσπερ κατάγελως τῆς πράξεως, κακία τινὶ καὶ ἀνανδρία τῇ ἰμετέρᾳ διαπεφευγέναι ἦμας δοκεῖν, οὕτως τῇ ἐσωσάμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σαυτὸν, οἷον τε ὅν καὶ δυνάτων, εἰ τι καὶ μικρὸν ἠμῶν ὁφέλεις ἦν. ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔρα μὴ ἀμα τῷ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρᾷ ἡ σοὶ τε καὶ ἡμῖν. ἀλλὰ βουλεύουν, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἐτί ὁρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύεσθαι. μία δὲ βουλή τῆς γὰρ ἐπιούσῃς νυκτὸς πάντα ταῦτα δεὶ πεπράχθαι. εἰ δὲ τι περιμενοῦμεν, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκέτι οἶον τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ Σώκρατες, πείθου μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἀλλὸς πολεῖ. 6. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ φίλε Κράτων, ἡ προθυμία σου πολλοῦ ἄξια, εἰ μετά τινος ὁρθότητος εἶν. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅσω μειζόν, τοσοῦτο χαλεπώτερα. σκοπεῖσθαι οὐν χρή ἦμας, εἰτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἴτε μὴ ὡς ἔγω οὗ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, δέ ἂν ὁμοίους ἤτελιτστος φαίνηται. τοὺς δὲ λόγους, οὓς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβαλεῖν, ἐπειδῆ μοι ἢδε ἡ τύχῃ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὁμοίου φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὺς αὑτοὺς πρεσβεῖον καὶ τιμῶν οὕσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὡν(ἐὰν μὴ) βελτία(ἐχωμεν λέγειν) ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι οὐ μὴ σοι ἐγγυγορᾶσσω, οὗτο ἄν πλείον τῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὡσπερ παῖδας ἥμας μορμολύττηται, δεσμοὺς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιτέμπουσα καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πώς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκοποιμέθα 160
been conducted with a sort of cowardice on our part—both the fact that the case came before the court, when it might have been avoided, and the way in which the trial itself was carried on, and finally they will think, as the crowning absurdity of the whole affair, that this opportunity has escaped us through some base cowardice on our part, since we did not save you, and you did not save yourself, though it was quite possible if we had been of any use whatever. Take care, Socrates, that these things be not disgraceful, as well as evil, both to you and to us. Just consider, or rather it is time not to consider any longer, but to have finished considering. And there is just one possible plan; for all this must be done in the coming night. And if we delay it can no longer be done. But I beg you, Socrates, do as I say and don’t refuse.

Socrates. My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth a great deal, if it should prove to be rightly directed; but otherwise, the greater it is, the more hard to bear. So we must examine the question whether we ought to do this or not; for I am not only now but always a man who follows nothing but the reasoning which on consideration seems to me best. And I cannot, now that this has happened to us, discard the arguments I used to advance, but they seem to me much the same as ever, and I revere and honour the same ones as before. And unless we can bring forward better ones in our present situation, be assured that I shall not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude frighten us with even more terrors than at present, as children are frightened with goblins, threatening us with imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of property. Now
αὐτὰ; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβοιμεν, δὖν σὺ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο ἐκάστοτε ἢ οὐ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δεῖ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὐ. ἢ πρὶν μὲν ἐμὲ δεῖν ἀποδυνάμειν καλῶς ἐλέγετο, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἄλλως ἐνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἢν δὲ παϊδιὰ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπιθυμῶ δ' ἔγγον ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς Κρίτων, κοινῇ μετὰ σοῦ, εἰ τί μοι ἀλλοιότερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔχω, ἢ ὅ αὐτός, καὶ ἐάσομεν καὶ ἐμφανέν ἡ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πῶς, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὅπε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων τι λέγειν, ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν, ἃς οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἔδοξάζουσιν, δέοι ταῖς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ταῖς δὲ μή. τοῦτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὡς Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεια.

47 ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποδυνάμειν αὖριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούνοι ἡ παροῦσα ξυμφορά: σκόπει δὴ οὐχ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρὴ τὰς δοξας τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν, τὰς δ' οὐ; οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν, τῶν δ' οὐ; τί φῆς; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

κρίτων. Καλῶς.

ἐπικρατεῖς. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ ποιηρᾶς μή;

κρίτων. Ναὶ.

ἐπικρατεῖς. Χρησταί δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, ποιηραι δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

κρίτων. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

7. ἐπικρατεῖς. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα

Β ἐλέγετο; γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων

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CRITO

how could we examine the matter most reasonably? By taking up first what you say about opinions and asking whether we were right when we always used to say that we ought to pay attention to some opinions and not to others? Or were we right before I was condemned to death, whereas it has now been made clear that we were talking merely for the sake of argument and it was really mere play and nonsense? And I wish to investigate, Crito, in common with you, and see whether our former argument seems different to me under our present conditions, or the same, and whether we shall give it up or be guided by it. But it used to be said, I think, by those who thought they were speaking sensibly, just as I was saying now, that of the opinions held by men some ought to be highly esteemed and others not. In God's name, Crito, do you not think this is correct? For you, humanly speaking, are not involved in the necessity of dying to-morrow, and therefore present conditions would not lead your judgment astray. Now say, do you not think we were correct in saying that we ought not to esteem all the opinions of men, but some and not others, and not those of all men, but only of some? What do you think? Is not this true?

Crito. It is.

Socrates. Then we ought to esteem the good opinions and not the bad ones?

Crito. Yes.

Socrates. And the good ones are those of the wise and the bad ones those of the foolish?

Crito. Of course.

Socrates. Come then, what used we to say about this? If a man is an athlete and makes that his
πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ὡς ἴδε, καὶ τυνχαία ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτριβής ὄν; 
κριτών. Ἅν ὡς μόνον.

σοκράτης. Οὐκοῦν φοβεῖσθαι χρῆ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν.
κριτών. Δὴλα δή.

σοκράτης. Ταύτη ἀρα αὐτῷ πρακτέοι καὶ γνωμαστέοι καὶ ἐδεστέοι γε καὶ ποτέοι, ὡς ἴδε, ἐνὶ δοκῇ τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαινοτὶ, μᾶλλον ἡ ἡ ἕμμασθα τοῖς ἄλλοις.
κριτών. Ἑστι ταύτα.

C σοκράτης. Εἰεν. ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτιμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαινοτῶν, ἀρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται;
κριτών. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

σοκράτης. Τί δ’ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο; καὶ ποί τείνει, καὶ εἰς τὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀπειθοῦντος;
κριτών. Δήλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο γὰρ διολλάμεωι.

σοκράτης. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα, ὁ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἣν μὴ πάντα διώκωμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ σοφών καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ ὧν οὐ γὰρ ἡ βουλή ἤμιν ἐστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτὴν ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἑνὸς, εἰ τίς ἐστιν ἐπαίνῳ, δυν δεὶ καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμπαίνῃς τοὺς ἄλλους; ὃς εἰ μὴ ἀκολουθήσομεν, διαφθεροῦμεν ἑκεῖνο καὶ

1 Schanz, following Burges, brackets καὶ τοὺς ἑπαίνους.
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business, does he pay attention to every man’s praise and blame and opinion or to those of one man only who is a physician or a trainer?

CRITO. To those of one man only.

SOCRATES. Then he ought to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one man and not of the multitude.

CRITO. Obviously.

SOCRATES. And he must act and exercise and eat and drink as the one man who is his director and who knows the business thinks best rather than as all the others think.

CRITO. That is true.

SOCRATES. Well then; if he disobeys the one man and disregards his opinion and his praise, but regards the words of the many who have no special knowledge, will he not come to harm?

CRITO. Of course he will.

SOCRATES. And what is this harm? In what direction and upon what part of the one who disobeys does it act?

CRITO. Evidently upon his body; for that is what it ruins.

SOCRATES. Right. Then in other matters, not to enumerate them all, in questions of right and wrong and disgraceful and noble and good and bad, which we are now considering, ought we to follow and fear the opinion of the many or that of the one, if there is anyone who knows about them, whom we ought to revere and fear more than all the others? And if we do not follow him, we shall injure and cripple that which we used to say is benefited by
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λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δικαίῳ βέλτιον ἐγύνευτο, τῷ δὲ ἀδικῷ ἀπώλευτο. ἦ οὐδέν ἐστὶ τούτῳ;

κρίτων. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὁ Σώκρατες.

8. σοκράτης. Φέρε δή, εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τού ὑγιείων μὲν βέλτιον γιγνόμενον, ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσώδους δὲ διαφθειρόμενον διολέσωμεν πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαιτοῦντων δόξῃ, ἀρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ δὲ ποι ὁ παῦσα: ἤ οὐχί;

κρίτων. Ναὶ.

σοκράτης. Ἀρ' οὖν βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ διεφθαρμένου σώματος;

κρίτων. Οὐδαμῶς.

σοκράτης. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου ἂρ' ἡμῖν βιωτὸν διεφθαρμένου, ὥς τὸ ἀδικοῦ μὲν λοβάται, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὄνλησιν; ἡ φαυλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἰναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο, δὲ τὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων,

48 περὶ δ' ἢ τε ἄδικα καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν;

κρίτων. Οὐδαμῶς.

σοκράτης. Ἀλλὰ τιμωτέρον;

κρίτων. Πολὺ γε.

σοκράτης. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὁ βέλτιστε, πάνω ἡμῖν ὦτω φροντιστέον, τί ἔρονθιν οἱ πολλοὶ ήμᾶς, ἄλλ' ὅ τι ὁ ἐπαίτων περὶ τῶν δικαιών καὶ ἀδίκων, ὃ εἰς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀληθεία. ὡστε πρῶτον μὲν ταύτην οὐκ ορθῶς εἰσηγεῖ, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ήμᾶς φροντίζειν. περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.

Β ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, φαίη γ' ἀν τις, οἷοὶ τέ εἰσιν ήμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτείνουναι.

κρίτων. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα: φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὁ σώκρατες.

1 φαίη γὰρ ἂν bracketed by Schanz.
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the right and is ruined by the wrong. Or is there nothing in this?

CRITO. I think it is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES. Well then, if through yielding to the opinion of the ignorant we ruin that which is benefited by health and injured by disease, is life worth living for us when that is ruined? And that is the body, is it not?

CRITO. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then is life worth living when the body is worthless and ruined?

CRITO. Certainly not.

SOCRATES. But is it worth living when that is ruined which is injured by the wrong and improved by the right? Or do we think that part of us, whatever it is, which is concerned with right and wrong, is less important than the body?

CRITO. By no means.

SOCRATES. But more important?

CRITO. Much more.

SOCRATES. Then, most excellent friend, we must not consider at all what the many will say of us, but what he who knows about right and wrong, the one man, and truth herself will say. And so you introduced the discussion wrongly in the first place, when you began by saying we ought to consider the opinion of the multitude about the right and the noble and the good and their opposites. But it might, of course, be said that the multitude can put us to death.

CRITO. That is clear, too. It would be said, Socrates.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἂλλ', ὃ θαυμάσιε, οὕτος τε ὁ λόγος ὅν διειληλύθαμεν, ἐμοί γὰρ δοκεῖ ἡτὶ ὁμοίος εἶναι καὶ πρότερον καὶ τόνδε αὐτό σκότει, εἰ ἔτει μένει ἡμῖν ἡ ὦ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

ΚΡΙΤΟΝ. Ἀλλὰ μένει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὁτι ταυτόν ἐστιν, μένει ἡ ὦ μένει;

ΚΡΙΤΟΝ. Μένει.

9. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔκοιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τότῳ σκέπτεον, πρότερον δικαίον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε εἰπράσθαι ἐξεῖναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἦ ὦ δικαίον καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται δικαίον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἔωμεν. ἅς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τας ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ παίδων τροφῆς, μή ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὁ Κρίτων, σκέμματα ἢ τῶν ῥαδίων ἀποκτινωντῶν καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἀν, εἰ οἷοι τ' ἦσαν, οὐδεὶ ξύν νῦ, τοῦτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῖν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτως αἱρεῖ, μὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκεπτέον ἢ ὡς ὀπερ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, πρότερον δικαία πράξεων καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτων τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε ἐξάξουσι καὶ χάριτας, καὶ αὐτὸι ἑξάγουντες τι καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἢ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀδικήσομεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες καὶν φαίνωμεθα ἀδικα αὐτὰ ἔργαζόμενοι, μή οὐ δὲν ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὐτ' εἰ ἀποθησκεῖν δεὶ παραμένοντας καὶ Ἰσνυλαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε άλλο ὁτιοῦν πᾶσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

1 Schanz gives Ἀληθῆ λέγεις to Crito.
2 The usual reading, ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ δμοῖο εἶναι τῇ καὶ πρότερον was corrected by Schanz, who follows a quotation of the passage by Priscian.

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SOCRATES. That is true. But, my friend, the argument we have just finished seems to me still much the same as before; and now see whether we still hold to this, or not, that it is not living, but living well which we ought to consider most important.

CRITO. We do hold to it.

SOCRATES. And that living well and living rightly are the same thing, do we hold to that, or not?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then, we agree that the question is whether it is right for me to try to escape from here without the permission of the Athenians, or not right. And if it appears to be right, let us try it, and if not, let us give it up. But the considerations you suggest, about spending money, and reputation, and bringing up my children, these are really, Crito, the reflections of those who lightly put men to death, and would bring them to life again, if they could, without any sense, I mean the multitude. But we, since our argument so constrains us, must consider only the question we just broached, whether we shall be doing right in giving money and thanks to these men who will help me to escape, and in escaping or aiding the escape ourselves, or shall in truth be doing wrong, if we do all these things. And if it appears that it is wrong for us to do them, it may be that we ought not to consider either whether we must die if we stay here and keep quiet or whether we must endure anything else whatsoever, but only the question of doing wrong.

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KRITON. Καλῶς μέν μοι δοκεῖσ λέγειν, ὡς Σωκρατεσ. ὅρα δὲ, τί δρῶμεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὡς ἀγαθέ, κοινῇ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ ἔσομαι: εἰ δὲ μὴ, παῦσαι ἢ ἂν, δὲ μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς χρῆ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπείναι; ὡς ἐγὼ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταύτα πράττειν, ἄλλα μὴ ἀκόντος. ὅρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τῆς ἀρχῆς, εάν σοι ἰκανῶς λέγηται, καὶ πειρώ ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτόμενον, ἢ ἂν μάλιστα οὖ.

KRITON. 'Ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι.

10. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδεὶς τρόπῳ φαμέν ἐκόντας ἄδικητέον εἰναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἄδικητέον τρόπῳ, τινὶ δὲ οὖ; ή οὐδαμῶς τὸ γε ἄδικεῖν οὔτε ἄγαθον οὔτε καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὁμολογηθῆ; 1. ή πᾶσαι ἡμῖν ἐκεῖναι αἱ πρόσθεν ὁμολογοῦσα ἐν ταῖσ ταῖσ ὀλύας ἡμέραις ἐκκεχυμέναι εἰσίν, καὶ πάλαι, ἢ Κρίτων, ἀρα ἐπικοίδε 2 ἄνδρες πρὸς ἀλλήλους σπουδὴ διαλεγόμενοι ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες; ή παντὸς μᾶλλον οὔτως ἔχει, ὡσπερ τότε ἐλέγετο ἡμῖν, εἰτε φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰτε μή, καὶ εἰτε δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐτι τώυδε χαλεπώτερα πάσχειν εἰτε καὶ πρότερα, ὡμώς τὸ γε ἄδικεῖν τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ τυγχάνει ὁ παντὶ τρόπῳ; φαμέν ἢ οὖ

KRTON. Φαμέν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀρα δεὶ ἄδικεῖν.

1 The words ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγετο, "as has just been said, too," follow in the MSS. but are omitted by Schanz and others.

2 τηλικοίδε γέροντες MSS.

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CRITO. I think what you say is right, Socrates; but think what we should do.

SOCRATES. Let us, my good friend, investigate in common, and if you can contradict anything I say, do so, and I will yield to your arguments; but if you cannot, my dear friend, stop at once saying the same thing to me over and over, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians; for I am anxious to act in this matter with your approval, and not contrary to your wishes. Now see if the beginning of the investigation satisfies you, and try to reply to my questions to the best of your belief.

CRITO. I will try.

SOCRATES. Ought we in no way to do wrong intentionally, or should we do wrong in some ways but not in others? Or, as we often agreed in former times, is it never right or honourable to do wrong? Or have all those former conclusions of ours been overturned in these few days, and have we old men, seriously conversing with each other, failed all along to see that we were no better than children? Or is not what we used to say most certainly true, whether the world agree or not? And whether we must endure still more grievous sufferings than these, or lighter ones, is not wrongdoing inevitably an evil and a disgrace to the wrongdoer? Do we believe this or not?

CRITO. We do.

SOCRATES. Then we ought not to do wrong at all.
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ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ού δήτα.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδή γε οὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἄδικεῖν.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐ δεῖ δή ποῦ, ὡς Σώκρατες.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν, δίκαιου ἢ οὐ δίκαιου;
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ γάρ που κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἄν οτιοῦν πάσχῃ

D ύπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ ὡς, ὡς Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν, ὥσποσ μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ὁμολογής. οἶδα γάρ, ὅτι ὁλίγοις τοῖς ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει. οἶς οὐν οὔτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τούτους οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. σκόπει δὴ οὗν καὶ σὺ εὐ μᾶλα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλεύομενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὅρθως ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμυνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς· ἢ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ

Ε κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ καὶ πάλαι οὔτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ, σοι δὲ εἰ πὴ ἀλλη δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδαςκε. εἰ δ' ἐμμένεις τοῖς πρόσθε, τὸ μετὰ τούτῳ ἀκονε.
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CRITO. Why, no.
SOCRATES. And we ought not even to requite wrong with wrong, as the world thinks, since we must not do wrong at all.
CRITO. Apparently not.
SOCRATES. Well, Crito, ought one to do evil or not?
CRITO. Certainly not, Socrates.
SOCRATES. Well, then, is it right to requite evil with evil, as the world says it is, or not right?
CRITO. Not right, certainly.
SOCRATES. For doing evil to people is the same thing as wronging them.
CRITO. That is true.
SOCRATES. Then we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us. And be careful, Crito, that you do not, in agreeing to this, agree to something you do not believe; for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this. Now those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another. Do you therefore consider very carefully whether you agree and share in this opinion, and let us take as the starting point of our discussion the assumption that it is never right to do wrong or to requite wrong with wrong, or when we suffer evil to defend ourselves by doing evil in return. Or do you disagree and refuse your assent to this starting point? For I have long held this belief and I hold it yet, but if you have reached any other conclusion, speak and explain it to me. If you still hold to our former opinion, hear the next point.
KRITON. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι ἀλλὰ λέγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δέγω δὴ αὐτὸ μετὰ τούτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ: πότερον ἃ ἂν τις ὀμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ ὄντα ποιητέου ἡ ἐξαπατητέον;

KRITON. Ποιητέον.

11. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἄθρει. ἀπίστευτε 50 ἐνθένδε ἡμεῖς μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦμεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐ δήκιστα δεῖ, ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμένομεν οἷς ὀμολογήσαμεν δικαίους οὕσιν ἢ οὐ;

KRITON. Οὖν ἔχω, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς ἐρωτᾷς· οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ᾽ ὅσει σκόπει. εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε εἰτέ ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἰθ᾽ ὀπωσ δεῖ ὁνομάσαι τούτο, ἐλθόντες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἐρωτῶ: εἰπέ μοι, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τί ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἄλλο τι τῇ τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, ὁ ἐπιχειρεῖς, διανοεῖ τοὺς

Β τε νόμους ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἐξυμπασάν τὴν πόλιν τὸ σὸν μέρος; ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶνον τε ἐτί ἐκεῖνη τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ἡ αἰ γενόμεναι δίκαιοι μηδὲν ἵσχυον, ἄλλα ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροι τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὁ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τις ἔχοι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ρήτωρ, εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὅ τὰς δῖκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτευε κυρίας εἶναι. ἡ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς,

C δὴ ἦδεικε γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην ἕκρινεν; ταῦτα ἡ τι ἐροῦμεν;

KRITON. Ταῦτα νὴ Δία, ὁ Σῶκρατες.

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CRITO. I do hold to it and I agree with you; so go on.

SOCRATES. Now the next thing I say, or rather ask, is this: "ought a man to do what he has agreed to do, provided it is right, or may he violate his agreements?"

CRITO. He ought to do it.

SOCRATES. Then consider whether, if we go away from here without the consent of the state, we are doing harm to the very ones to whom we least ought to do harm, or not, and whether we are abiding by what we agreed was right, or not.

CRITO. I cannot answer your question, Socrates, for I do not understand.

SOCRATES. Consider it in this way. If, as I was on the point of running away (or whatever it should be called), the laws and the commonwealth should come to me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what have you in mind to do? Are you not intending by this thing you are trying to do, to destroy us, the laws, and the entire state, so far as in you lies? Or do you think that state can exist and not be overturned, in which the decisions reached by the courts have no force but are made invalid and annulled by private persons?" What shall we say, Crito, in reply to this question and others of the same kind? For one might say many things, especially if one were an orator, about the destruction of that law which provides that the decisions reached by the courts shall be valid. Or shall we say to them, "The state wronged me and did not judge the case rightly"? Shall we say that, or what?

CRITO. That is what we shall say, by Zeus, Socrates.
12. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί σοι, ἄν εἰπωσιν οἱ νόμοι· ὁ Σώκρατες, ἢ καὶ ταύτα ὁμολογητὸ ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἢ ἐμμενεῖν ταῖς δίκαιαις αἰς ἂν ἢ πόλις δικάζῃ; εἰ ὁν κατὰς ἐνναμάξοιμεν λεγόντων, ἵσως ἂν εἰποιεὶν ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μηθ' ἐνναμάζει τὰ λεγόμενα, ἄλλ' ἀποκρίνου, ἔπειδὴ καὶ εἰώθασι χρήσθαι τῷ ἔρωταν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε

Greek text follows...
CRITO

Socrates. What then if the laws should say, "Socrates, is this the agreement you made with us, or did you agree to abide by the verdicts pronounced by the state?" Now if I were surprised by what they said, perhaps they would continue, "Don't be surprised at what we say, Socrates, but answer, since you are in the habit of employing the method of question and answer. Come, what fault do you find with us and the state, that you are trying to destroy us? In the first place, did we not bring you forth? Is it not through us that your father married your mother and begat you? Now tell us, have you any fault to find with those of us who are the laws of marriage?"

"I find no fault," I should say. "Or with those that have to do with the nurture of the child after he is born and with his education which you, like others, received? Did those of us who are assigned to these matters not give good directions when we told your father to educate you in music and gymnastics?" "You did," I should say. "Well then, when you were born and nurtured and educated, could you say to begin with that you were not our offspring and our slave; you yourself and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you think right as between you and us rests on a basis of equality, so that whatever we undertake to do to you it is right for you to retaliate? There was no such equality of right between you and your father or your master, if you had one, so that whatever treatment you received you might return it, answering them if you were reviled, or striking back if you were struck, and the like; and do you think that it will be proper for
PLATO

έσται 1 σοι, ὡστε, εάν σε ἑπιχειρώμεν ἡμεῖς ἀπολλύναι δίκαιον ἥγούμενοι εἶναι, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν πατρίδα, καθ’ ὅσον δύνασαι, ἑπιχειρήσεις ἀνταπολλύναι, καὶ φήσεις ταῦτα ποιῶν δίκαια πράττειν, ὁ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἑπιμελόμενος; ἡ οὖτως εἰ σοφὸς, ὡστε λέγηθεν σε, ὅτι μητρὸς τε καὶ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων προγόνων ἀπάντων τιμωτέρον ἔστιν ἡ πατρίς καὶ σεμιότερον καὶ ἄγιωτέρον καὶ ἐν μείζον μοίρᾳ καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι, καὶ σέβεσθαι δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπείκειν καὶ θωπεύειν πατρίδα χαλεπαίνουσαν ἡ πατέρα, καὶ ἡ πείθειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἢ ἄν κελεύῃ, καὶ πάσχειν, εάν τι προστάτη παθεῖν, ἰσχύσας ἄγοντα, εάν τε τύππεσθαι εάν τε δεῖσθαι, εάν τε εἰς πόλεμον ἄγη τρωθησόμενον ἢ ἀποθανούμενον, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικετέον οὐδὲ ἀναχωρητέον οὐδὲ λειπότεον τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ πανταχοῦ ποιητεύον ἢ ἄν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθειν αὐτήν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δὲ οὐχ ὅσον οὔτε μητέρα οὔτε πατέρα, πολὺ δὲ τούτων ἦτο ἦττον τὴν πατρίδα; τὶ φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ο Κρίτων; ἀληθὴ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἑμοῦγε δοκεῖ.

13. ἘΝΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν, ὁ Σῶκρατες, φαίειν ἄν ἦσως οἱ νόμοι, εἰ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια ἡμᾶς ἑπιχειρεῖς δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἑπιχειρεῖς. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σε γεννήσαντες, ἐκθρε-ψαντες, παιδεύσαντες, μεταδόντες ἀπάντων ὃν

1 So Schanz, έστειν BCE.
CRITO

you to act so toward your country and the laws, so that if we undertake to destroy you, thinking it is right, you will undertake in return to destroy us laws and your country, so far as you are able, and will say that in doing this you are doing right, you who really care for virtue? Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?" What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not?

CRITO. I think they do.

SOCRATES. "Observe then, Socrates," perhaps the laws would say, "that if what we say is true, what you are now undertaking to do to us is not right. For we brought you into the world, nurtured you, and gave a share of all the good things we could to
D οίοι τ' ἤμεν καλῶν σοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν πολίταις, ὃμως προαγορεύομεν τῷ ἐξουσίαν πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλομένῳ, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθῇ καὶ ἵδη τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει πράγματα καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς νόμους, ὃ ἀν μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς, ἐξεῖναι λαβόντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπιέναι ὅποι ἂν βούληται. καὶ οὔδεὶς ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐμποδόν ἐστιν οὐδ' ἀπαγορεύει, εάν τε τις βούληται ὑμῶν εἰς ἀποκλίαν ἴναι, εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἡ πόλις, εάν τε μετομείω άλλοσε ποι ἔλθων, ἴναι ἐκείσε ὅποι ἂν βούληται, ἐχοῦτα τὰ αὐτοῦ.

Ε ὁς δ' ἂν ὑμῶν παραμείνῃ, ὅρων ὑν τρόπων ἡμεῖς τάς τε δίκας δικάζομεν καὶ τάλλα τὴν πόλιν διοικούμεν, ἢ ὡς φαμὲν τούτου ωμολογηκέναι ἐργῷ ἡμῖν ἂν ἡμεῖς κελεύωμεν ποιήσειν τάντα, καὶ τὸν μὴ πειθὸμεν τριχῆ φαμὲν ἀδικείν, ὅτι τε γεννηταῖσιν ὡς ἡμῖν οὐ πείθεται, καὶ ὅτι τροφεύσι, καὶ ὅτι ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται οὐτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτείνων ἡμῶν καὶ οὐκ ἄγριώς ἐπιταττόμενον ποιεῖν ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφείσων δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ πείθειν ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

14. Ταύταις δὴ φαμὲν καὶ σὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνεξέσθαι, εἴπερ ποιήσεις ἂ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὐχ ἦκιστα Ἀθηναίων σὲ, ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἔγω εἰπομί διὰ τί δή; ἵσως ἂν μου δικαίως καθάπποντο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίοις ἔγω αὐτοῖς ωμολογηκώς τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ωμολογίαν. φαίνει γὰρ ἂν 

Β ὅτι ὁ Σώκρατες, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμήρια

1 Sehanz omits ἂ and brackets Σώκρατες.
CRITO

you and all the citizens. Yet we proclaim, by having offered the opportunity to any of the Athenians who wishes to avail himself of it, that anyone who is not pleased with us when he has become a man and has seen the administration of the city and us, the laws, may take his goods and go away wherever he likes. And none of us stands in the way or forbids any of you to take his goods and go away wherever he pleases, if we and the state do not please him, whether it be to an Athenian colony or to a foreign country where he will live as an alien. But we say that whoever of you stays here, seeing how we administer justice and how we govern the state in other respects, has thereby entered into an agreement with us to do what we command; and we say that he who does not obey does threefold wrong, because he disobeys us who are his parents, because he disobeys us who nurtured him, and because after agreeing to obey us he neither obeys us nor convinces us that we are wrong, though we give him the opportunity and do not roughly order him to do what we command, but when we allow him a choice of two things, either to convince us of error or to do our bidding, he does neither of these things.”

...“We say that you, Socrates, will be exposed to these reproaches, if you do what you have in mind, and you not least of the Athenians but more than most others.” If then I should say, “How so?” perhaps they might retort with justice that I had made this agreement with them more emphatically than most other Athenians. For they would say, “Socrates, we have strong evidence that we and the city pleased you; for you would never have stayed in
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ἐστιν, ὅτι σοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἁρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὔ γάρ ἂν ποτὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως εὖ αὐτῇ ἔπεδημες, εἰ μὴ σοι δια-

φερόντως ἁρέσκεσθαι, καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πὼποτ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες 1 οὔτε ἄλλοσσε οὐδαμῶς, εἰ μὴ ποι οὐ στρατευσόμενοι, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδημίαν ἐποιήσω πὼποτε, ἀσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι, οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὔτε ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβαν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ ἡμεῖς σοι ἰκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὔτω σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ, καὶ ὁμολόγεις καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσεσθαι, τὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποιήσων, ὡς ἀρεσκοῦσης σοι τῆς πόλεως· ἔτι τούτων ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δίκῃ ἔξεσθαι σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβούλουν, καὶ ὅπερ τῶν ἀκούσης τῆς πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκούσης ποιῆσαι τὸ δὲ τὸτε μὲν ἑκαλλω-

πίζου ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῷν, εἰ δέοι τεθνάναι σε, ἀλλὰ ἤροῦ, ὡς ἐφήσαθα, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον ὅν δὲ οὐτ᾽ ἐκεῖνους τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐντρέπει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείραι.

pras̄teis te a̅sp̄er a̅n d̄oûλosfa̅nîs̄t̄os̄ prâ̅xei̅n, ἀπὸδιδράσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τᾶς ξυνῆκας τε 

καὶ τᾶς ὁμολογίας, καθ᾽ ἃς ἡμῖν ξυνέθου πολι-

τεύσθαι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, εἰ ἄληθῆ λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε 

ὡμολογήκειν πολιτεύσθαι καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἔργον, ἀλλ’ οὐ λόγω, ἢ οὐκ ἄληθή. τί φῶμεν πρὸς 

taūta, ὁ K𝑟itων; ἄλλο τι ὁ ὁμολογῶμεν; 

kritis̄n. Ἄναγκη, ὁ Σῶκραται.

1 The words ἄταξ εἰς ἰσθμόν, "except once to the Isthmus," after έξῆλθες are omitted by Schanz and others as an early interpolation.

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it more than all other Athenians if you had not been better pleased with it than they; you never went out from the city to a festival, or anywhere else, except on military service, and you never made any other journey, as other people do, and you had no wish to know any other city or other laws, but you were contented with us and our city. So strongly did you prefer us and agree to live in accordance with us; and besides, you begat children in the city, showing that it pleased you. And moreover even at your trial you might have offered exile as your penalty, if you wished, and might have done with the state's consent what you are now undertaking to do without it. But you then put on airs and said you were not disturbed if you must die, and you preferred, as you said, death to exile. And now you are not ashamed to think of those words and you do not respect us, the laws, since you are trying to bring us to naught; and you are doing what the meanest slave would do, since you are trying to run away contrary to the compacts and agreements you made with us that you would live in accordance with us. First then, answer this question, whether we speak the truth or not when we say that you agreed, not in word, but by your acts, to live in accordance with us.” What shall we say to this, Crito? Must we not agree that it is true?

CRITO. We must, Socrates.
PLATO

αθῆς. Ἀλλὰ τι οὖν, ἂν φαῖεν, ἥξινθήκας ὃς ἦμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὀμολογίας παραβαίνεις, ἦπο ἀνάγκης ὀμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατήθεις ἐκεῖνον δέλγῳ χρόνῳ ἀναγκασθεὶς βουλεύσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπείνας, εἰ μὴ ἣρεσκομεν ἥμεις μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντο σοι αἱ ὀμολογίαι εἶναι· σὺ δὲ οὗτε Λακεδαίμονα προηγοῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ὡς ἦκάστοτε φής εὐνομεῖσθαι, οὔτε ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν τῶν

53 Ἐλληνίδων πόλεων οὔτε τῶν βαρβαρικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ὡς οἱ χωλοὶ τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι· οὐτω σοί διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἥρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἥμεις οἱ νόμοι δήλον ὅτι· τίνι γὰρ ἄν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἄνευ νόμων; 1 νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμενεῖς τοῖς ὀμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἦμῖν γε πείθη, ὡς Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγέλαστος γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξελθὼν.

15. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβᾶς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνων τι τούτων τι ἄγαθον ἔργασε σαντοῦ ἴ

Β τοὺς ἐπιτηθείους τοὺς σαντοῦ, ὃτι μὲν γὰρ κινδυνεύσουσι γάρ σοι οἱ ἐπιτήθειοι καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγεις καὶ στερηθήσατ τῆς πόλεως ὑ τῆν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχεδὸν τι δήλον αὐτῶς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατα των πόλεων ἐλθῆς, ἢ Θῆβαζε ἢ Μέγαράδε—ἐνυνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεραι—πολέμος ἥξεις, ὡς Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὡσοιπέρ κῆδονται τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεως, ὑποβλέψονται σε διαφθορέα ἠγούμενοι τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν, ὡστε

1 Schanz omits δὴ... νόμων, “evidently; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws?”

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SOCRATES. "Are you then," they would say, "not breaking your compacts and agreements with us, though you were not led into them by compulsion or fraud, and were not forced to make up your mind in a short time, but had seventy years, in which you could have gone away, if we did not please you and if you thought the agreements were unfair? But you preferred neither Lacedaemon nor Crete, which you are always saying are well governed, nor any other of the Greek states, or of the foreign ones, but you went away from this city less than the lame and the blind and the other cripples. So much more than the other Athenians were you satisfied with the city and evidently therefore with us, its laws; for who would be pleased with a city apart from its laws? And now will you not abide by your agreement? You will if you take our advice, Socrates; and you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

"For consider. By transgressing in this way and committing these errors, what good will you do to yourself or any of your friends? For it is pretty clear that your friends also will be exposed to the risk of banishment and the loss of their homes in the city or of their property. And you yourself, if you go to Thebes or Megara—for both are well governed—will go as an enemy, Socrates, to their government, and all who care for their own cities will look askance at you, and will consider you a destroyer of the laws, and you will confirm the
δοκεῖν ὀρθῶς τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὅστις γὰρ
νόμων διαφθορεῖς ἔστιν, σφόδρα που δόξειεν
ἀν νέων γε καὶ ἀνοῆτων ἀνθρώπων διαφθορεῖς
εἰναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τάς τε εὐνομομένας
πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἄνδρων τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους; καὶ
tούτο ποιοῦντι ἄτα ἂξιόν σοι ξῆν ἔσται; ἦ
πλησιάσεις τούτοις καὶ ἀναγχυντήσεις διαλεγό-
μενος—τίνας λόγους, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἢ οὖσπερ
ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου
ἀξίου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰ νόμμα καὶ οἱ
νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἷοι ἄσχημον ἄν φανεῖσθαι τὸ
tοῦ Σώκρατος πράγμα; οἶεσθαι γε χρῆ. ἀλλ' ἐκ
μὲν τούτων τῶν τόπων ἀπαρείς, ξῆεις δὲ
eis Θετταλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ξένους τοὺς Κρίτωνος;
ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἄταξία καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ
ἰσως ἄν ἤδεις σου ἀκούσεις, ὡς γελοῖς ἐκ τοῦ
dειμωτηρίου ὑπεδίδρασκες σκευὴν τε τινὰ περι-
θέμενος, ἦ διφθεραν λαβὼν ἢ ἄλλα οἷα δὴ
eἰόθασιν ἐνοκενάζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκουντες, καὶ
tὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας· ὅτι δὲ γέρων
ἀνὴρ σμικρῶς χρόνον τῷ βίῳ λοιποῦ οὐτὸς, ὡς
τὸ εἰκός, ἑτόλμησας οὖτως ἁίσχρως ἐπιθυμεῖν
ξῆν, νόμους τους μεγάλους παραβᾶς, οὐδεὶς δὲ
ἔρει; ἱσως, ἄν μὴ τινα λυπῆς· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει,
ὁ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχό-
μενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύοντι
τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐωχούμενος ἐν Θετταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ
ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεδημηκὼς εἰς Θετταλίαν; λόγοι
δὲ ἐκεῖνοι οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἀλλης
ἀρετῆς ποῦ ἡμῖν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παῖδων

1 Schanz omits δουλεύον, “being a slave.”
2 Schanz omits ἐν Θετταλίᾳ.
CRITO

judges in their opinion, so that they will think their verdict was just. For he who is destroyer of the laws might certainly be regarded as a destroyer of young and thoughtless men. Will you then avoid the well-governed cities and the most civilised men? And if you do this will your life be worth living? Or will you go to them and have the face to carry on—what kind of conversation, Socrates? The same kind you carried on here, saying that virtue and justice and lawful things and the laws are the most precious things to men? And do you not think that the conduct of Socrates would seem most disgraceful? You cannot help thinking so. Or you will keep away from these places and go to Crito's friends in Thessaly; for there great disorder and lawlessness prevail, and perhaps they would be amused to hear of the ludicrous way in which you ran away from prison by putting on a disguise, a peasant's leathern cloak or some of the other things in which runaways dress themselves up, and changing your appearance. But will no one say that you, an old man, who had probably but a short time yet to live, clung to life with such shameless greed that you transgressed the highest laws? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anyone; but if you do, Socrates, you will have to listen to many things that would be a disgrace to you. So you will live as an inferior and a slave to everyone. And what will you do except feast in Thessaly, as if you had gone to Thessaly to attend a banquet? What will become of our conversations about justice and virtue? But

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ἐνεκα βούλει ξῆν, ἵνα αὐτοὺς ἐκθρέψης καὶ παιδεύσῃς; τί δὲ; εἰς Θετταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγὼν θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ξένους ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ξώντος βέλτιον θρέψουνται καὶ παιδεύσουνται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοὺς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτηδείου οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσουνται τοῖς αὐτῶν. πότερον ἐὰν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς, ἐπιμελήσουνται, ἐὰν δὲ εἰς Ἁιδοὺ ἀποδημήσῃς, οὐκ ἐπιμελήσουνται; εἴπερ γέ τι ὁφελος αὐτῶν ἔστω τῶν σοὶ φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἴεσθαι γε χρή.

16. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, πειθόμενος ἦμιν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσῃ μήτε παίδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ξῆν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ἵνα εἰς Ἁιδοὺ ἐλθὼν ἔχῃς πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοῖς ἐκεῖ ἄρχοντες οὐτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοὶ φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντι ἁμεινών εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ὅσιότερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν σοῦ οὔδει, οὔτε ἑκείσε ἀφικομένῳ ἁμεινών ἔσται. ἄλλα νῦν μὲν ήδικημένος ἀπει, ἐὰν ἄπις, οὐχ ύφ' ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἄλλα υπὸ ἀνθρώπων· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξέλθῃς οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀνταδικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουρήσας, τὰς σαυτοὺς ὁμολογιάς τε καὶ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβὰς καὶ κακὰ ἐργασάμενος τούτους οὐς ἡκιστα ἐδει, σαυτὸν τε καὶ φίλους καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἠμεῖς τε σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ξώντι, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἄδελφοι οἱ ἐν Ἁιδοὺ νόμοι οὐκ εὐμενῶς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπολέσαι

1 Schanz omits ἐπιμελήσουνται here and also the punctuation after αὐτῶν, making one long interrogative sentence.
probably you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them? How so? Will you take them to Thessaly to be brought up and educated, making exiles of them, that you may give them that blessing also? Or perhaps you will not do that, but if they are brought up here while you are living, will they be better brought up if you are not with them than if you were dead? Oh yes! your friends will care for them. Will they care for them if you go away to Thessaly and not if you go away to the dwellings of the dead? If those who say they are your friends are of any use, we must believe they will care for them in both cases alike.

"Ah, Socrates, be guided by us who tended your infancy. Care neither for your children nor for life nor for anything else more than for the right, that when you come to the home of the dead, you may have all these things to say in your own defence. For clearly if you do this thing it will not be better for you here, or more just or holier, no, nor for any of your friends, and neither will it be better when you reach that other abode. Now, however, you will go away wronged, if you do go away, not by us, the laws, but by men; but if you escape after so disgracefully requiting wrong with wrong and evil with evil, breaking your compacts and agreements with us, and injuring those whom you least ought to injure—yourself, your friends, your country and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and there our brothers, the laws in Hades' realm, will not receive you graciously; for they will know that you tried, so far as in you lay,
PLATO

τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἄλλα μῇ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν
D ἄ λέ γει μᾶλλον ἢ ἡμεῖς.

17. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταῖρε Κρίτων, ἐν ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπέρ οἱ κορυφαντιῶντες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦσιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ἤχῳ τούτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μῇ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἄλλα ἴσθι, ὥσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἔρεις· ὃμως μέντοι εἰ τῷ οἷεὶ πλέον ποιήσειν, λέγει.

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ. Ἄλλ᾽, ὁ Σώκρατες, σὺν ἔχω λέγειν.

Ε ἘΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐα τοῖνυν, ὁ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττομεν ταῦτῃ, ἐπειδὴ ταύτῃ ὁ θεὸς ύφηγεῖται.

1 Schanz follows Cobet and Naber in omitting Κρίτων.
CRITO

to destroy us. Do not let Crito persuade you to do what he says, but take our advice."

Be well assured, my dear friend, Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the frenzied dervishes of Cybele seem to hear the flutes, and this sound of these words re-echoes within me and prevents my hearing any other words. And be assured that, so far as I now believe, if you argue against these words you will speak in vain. Nevertheless, if you think you can accomplish anything, speak.

CRITO. No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

SOCRATES. Then, Crito, let it be, and let us act in this way, since it is in this way that God leads us.
PHAEDO
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

The *Phaedo*, like the *Crito*, has for its scene the prison of Socrates, though the dialogue is here supposed to be reported by one who was present, not actually carried on in the presence of the reader. The immediate purpose of the dialogue seems to be to show that the philosopher will be glad to die; and this purpose is never lost sight of, for it appears toward the end, as at the beginning. In order, however, to prove that willingness to die is rational, it is necessary to prove that the soul will continue to exist after the death of the body, and thus the original statement that the philosopher will be glad to die leads to the proof of a far more important truth. The commonly accepted statement that the real subject of the *Phaedo* is the immortality of the soul has certainly some justification. In order, however, to prove that the soul is immortal the theory is advanced that generation proceeds from opposite to opposite by alternation, that life proceeds from death as death from life, and that therefore the soul must exist after death as before birth. Again, all sensible objects are referable to certain types, of which they are likenesses. These types must be known to us before we can refer objects to them, and we have not seen or learned the types in this life; we must therefore have seen them before this life began; our knowledge is thus seen to be reminiscence of knowledge
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

gained before our birth. All this proves, however, only that the soul existed for a probably very long time before our birth and continues to exist for a probably very long time after our death, but not that it is immortal and indestructible. This objection leads to the discussion of causation and to the conclusion that “the ideas are the sole causes of all things and the sole objects of knowledge.” The idea inherent in soul is life, and since ideas are so connected with particulars that no particular can admit an idea directly contrary to its own inherent idea, the soul cannot admit death. The proof of the immortality of the soul has been reached by proving the everlasting truth of the ideas. This last is the most important part of the Phaedo, so far as the development of Plato’s system of philosophy is concerned, though it is introduced as a means for proving the immortality of the soul, just as the immortality of the soul is proved in order to show that the true philosopher will not fear, but welcome, death.¹

This dialogue, then, establishes the doctrine of the real existence of ideas as the sole objects of knowledge and also shows how that doctrine is necessary to human happiness, because it serves to prove that the soul is immortal. The ordinary human being is little interested in metaphysical speculation, but greatly interested in his own future; he will therefore pay attention to metaphysical theory if it is so presented as to seem to affect his happiness. The Phaedo, by applying the doctrine of ideas to prove

¹ This brief discussion of the contents and purpose of the Phaedo is for the most part derived from the introduction to R. D. Archer-Hind’s excellent edition, to which the reader is referred for a more complete exposition.
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

the immortality of the soul, tends to popularise the doctrine of ideas, and this may have been the ultimate purpose of Plato in writing the dialogue; but that he was also fully in earnest in his belief in the immortality of the soul, and that the proof of immortality was an important part of his purpose in writing the dialogue, cannot be doubted.

In composition the Phaedo is elaborate without being complicated. The dramatic setting serves here, as in the Crito, as an appropriate introduction to a discourse on immortality and offers an opportunity to portray the gentle, genial nature, the kindly humour, and the calm, untroubled courage of Socrates; it also marks the divisions between the various parts of the discussion, and offers relief to the mind of the reader who is wearied by close application to serious argument. Those who take part in the conversation are admirably characterised; this is especially true of the two Thebans, Simmias and Cebes, who play the most important parts after Socrates himself. Both are eager searchers after truth, and both are evidently highly regarded by Socrates—were, in other words, at least respected by Plato; but Simmias appears as a man of somewhat vague notions, inclined to mysticism, and somewhat lacking in keenness, while Cebes is clear-sighted, sharp, and keen, tenacious of his opinion, but quick to see when an opinion is no longer tenable. These distinguishing traits are drawn with few lines, but the few are masterly. The beautiful imaginative description of the life of souls in the other world is not merely a picturesque addition to the variety of the composition; it teaches us how Plato believed that right and wrong actions were rewarded or

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punished. Quite different imagery is employed for the same end in the *Phaedrus*, but in both dialogues the justice of the treatment accorded the souls is made clear, and in both the importance of conduct in this life is emphasised, though this emphasis is stronger in the *Phaedo*, as is natural in view of the dramatic setting.

The number of persons mentioned in the *Phaedo* is considerable.

Echecrates of Phlius was one of the last of the Pythagoreans; we know of no particular reason why he is introduced into this dialogue, unless it be that, as a Pythagorean, he might naturally be in sympathy with the doctrine of ideas. Of his personal relations to Socrates nothing is known. Phaedo, of Elis, was taken prisoner in 401 B.C. and brought to Athens, where he was, according to Aulus Gellius (ii., 18), ransomed by Cebes. After the death of Socrates he returned to Elis and founded the Elean school of philosophy, which was afterwards moved to Eretria by Menedemus and known as the Eretrian school. Phaedo wrote several dialogues, but virtually nothing is known of his doctrines. He seems to have been highly esteemed by Socrates and his followers. Apollodorus of Phalerum is of no philosophical importance. He is mentioned several times by Plato and Xenophon as an ardent admirer and constant companion of Socrates, and a man of impulsive, unrestrained disposition. Simmias and Cebes were both Thebans, warm personal friends, and equally devoted to Socrates; both offered money to secure the release of Socrates from prison (*Crito*, 45 B). The composition preserved under the name of *Pinax* or *Tablet* of Cebes is certainly spurious. *Crito* appears
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDO

here, as in the dialogue that bears his name, as the old and tried friend of Socrates. The others who are mentioned as companions of Socrates in his last hours are Critobulus, the son of Crito; Hermogenes, probably the son of Hipponicus and then identical with a speaker in the Cratylus; Epigenes, son of Antiphon; Aeschines, a well-known follower of Socrates, author of several dialogues; Antisthenes, founder of the Cynic school; Ctesippus, a youth mentioned also in the Euthydemus and the Lysis; Menexenus, son of Demophon and an admirer of Ctesippus; his name is given to one of Plato's dialogues; Phaedonides, a Theban; Euclides of Megara, founder of the Megarian school; and Terpsion, also a Megarian. Evenus, mentioned in 60 d, was a Parian sophist and poet.

The most important separate editions of the Phaedo are those of Geddes, W. Wagner, Wohlrab, Schanz, Hirschig, Burnet, and Archer-Hind. The introduction and commentary in the last-named edition are of special importance.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ
Η ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ, ΗΘΙΚΟΣ

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΔΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΑΠΟΛΛΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΕΒΗΣ,
ΣΙΜΜΙΑΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ, Ο ΤΩΝ ΕΝΔΕΚΑ ΤΗΠΡΕΤΗΣ

St. I
p. 57

Α 1. ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Φαῖδων, παρεγένοι
Σωκράτει ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ἢ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἄλλοι του ἡκουσάς;
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Αὐτὸς, ὁ Ἐξέκρατης.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τι οὖν δὴ ἐστὶν ἀττα εἶπεν ὁ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἐτελεύτα; ἡδὲς γὰρ ἀν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὐτε τῶν πολιτῶν
Φλισάνων οὐδεὶς πάντω τι ἐπιχωρίαζε τὰ νῦν
Ἄθηνας, οὐτε τις εἴδος ἀφίκται χρόνου συχνοῦ
Β ἐκείθεν, ὅστις ἄν ἡμῖν σαφῆς τι ἀγγείλαι οἶδος τ’ ἢν περὶ τοῦτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιῶν ἀποθάνοι. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράξειν.

58 ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἁρὰ ἐπίθεσθε ὑν τρόπου ἐγενετο;

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ναὶ, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγείλε τις,
καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανόν. τι οὖν ἦν
τούτο, ὁ Φαῖδων;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐξέκρατης, συνέβη·
ἐτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραιά τῆς δίκης ἐπιμένα

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PHAEDO

[or ON THE SOUL; ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS

ECHECRATES, PHAEDO, APOLLODORUS, SOCRATES, CEDES,
SIMMIA S, CRITO, the Servant of the Eleven.

ECHECRATES. Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day when he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?

PHAEDO. I was there myself, Echecrates.

ECHECRATES. Then what did he say before his death? and how did he die? I should like to hear, for nowadays none of the Phliasians go to Athens at all, and no stranger has come from there for a long time, who could tell us anything definite about this matter, except that he drank poison and died, so we could learn no further details.

PHAEDO. Did you not even hear about the trial and how it was conducted?

ECHECRATES. Yes, some one told us about that, and we wondered that although it took place a long time ago, he was put to death much later. Now why was that, Phaedo?

PHAEDO. It was a matter of chance, Echecrates. It happened that the stern of the ship which the
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ἐστεμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὡς Δῆλον Ἀθηναίοι πέμπτουσιν.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτο δὲ δὴ τί ἐστιν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Τοῦτ' ἐστι τὸ πλοίον, ὡς φασιν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν ὧν Ἡθεσεύς ποτε εἰς Κρήτην τούς διὸς ἐπτὰ ἐκείνους ὥχετο ἀγών καὶ ἐσωσέ τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπόλλωνι εὔξαντο, ὡς λέγεται, τότε, εἰ σωθεὶν, ἐκάστου ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξειν εἰς Δῆλον· ἢν δὴ ἄει καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ ἦς ἐκείνου κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπτουσιν. ἔπειδὰν οὖν ἄρξωνται τῆς θεωρίας, νόμος ἐστὶν αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεῦει τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτινωνύμαι, πρὶν δὲν εἰς Δῆλον τέ ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοίον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο· τοῦτο δὲ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἱκύρηται, ὅταν τύχωσιν ἀνέμοι C ἀπολαμβάνετε αὐτοὺς. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας, ἔπειδαν οἱ ἤερεύς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος στέψη τὴν πρύμναν τοῦ πλοίου· τοῦτο δὲ ἐτυχεῖν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραιᾷ τῆς δίκης γεγονός· διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνος ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ θανάτου.

2. ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὁ Φαίδων; τί ἢν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραχθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτη- δείων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὐκ εἶναι οἱ ἄρχοντες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἔρχομαι ἐπελεύσατα φίλοι;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τίνες καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

ΕΞΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προθυμήθητι ὡς σαφέστατα ἦμιν ἀπαγγείλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὖσα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι.
PHAEDO

Athenians send to Delos was crowned on the day before the trial.

ECHECRATES. What ship is this?

PHAEDO. This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with the fourteen youths and maidens, and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. And from that time even to the present day they send it annually in honour of the god. Now it is their law that after the mission begins the city must be pure and no one may be publicly executed until the ship has gone to Delos and back; and sometimes, when contrary winds detain it, this takes a long time. The beginning of the mission is when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship; and this took place, as I say, on the day before the trial. For that reason Socrates passed a long time in prison between his trial and his death.

ECHECRATES. What took place at his death, Phaedo? What was said and done? And which of his friends were with him? Or did the authorities forbid them to be present, so that he died without his friends?

PHAEDO. Not at all. Some were there, in fact, a good many.

ECHECRATES. Be so good as to tell us as exactly as you can about all these things, if you are not too busy.

PHAEDO. I am not busy and I will try to tell
Ὑμῖν διηγήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμνημένον Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἄει πάντων ἔδιστον.

Ἐξεκράτης. Ἀλλὰ μή, ὦ Φαίδων, καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσμένους γε τοιούτους ἔτερους ἔχεις· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὡς ἂν δύνῃ ἀκριβέστατα διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

Ε Ἐκτίπο. Καὶ μήν ἐγώ γε θαυμάσσα τὸ παραγενόμενον. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς θανάτῳ παρόντα με ἀνήρ ἐφαινετο, ὦ Ἐκεκράτης, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἄδεως καὶ γενναίως ἔτελεύτα, ὡστε μνί ἔκεινον παρίστασθαι μηδ’ εἰς Ἀἰδοὺ ἴόντα ἄνευ θείας μοίρας ἴσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσθαι ἀφικό-μενον εὗ πράξεων, εἰπὲρ τῖς πόρποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὔδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεινον εἰσῆγε, ὡς εἰςος ἀν δόξειν εἶναι παρόντι πενθεῖ οὔτε αὐ ήδονή ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων, ὡσπερ εἰώθειμεν· καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τοιούτοι τίνες ἦσαν· ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπόν τι μοι πάθος παρῆν καὶ τις ἀῤῥήθη κρᾶσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης, ἐνθυμουμένως ὅτι αὐτίκα ἔκεινος ἑμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχέδουν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες, ἐίς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλώδωρος· οἴσθα γὰρ ποὺ τῶν ἄνδρα καὶ τῶν τρόπον αὐτοῦ.

Ἐξεκράτης. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἐκτίπο. Ἐκείνος τε τοίνυν παντάπασιν οὕτως εἴχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώγε ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Ἐξεκράτης. Ἐτυχον δὲ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

Φαίδων. Οὕτως τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλώδωρος τῶν
PHAEDO

you. It is always my greatest pleasure to be reminded of Socrates whether by speaking of him myself or by listening to someone else.

ECHOCRATES. Well, Phaedo, you will have hearers who feel as you do; so try to tell us everything as accurately as you can.

PHAEDO. For my part, I had strange emotions when I was there. For I was not filled with pity as I might naturally be when present at the death of a friend; since he seemed to me to be happy, both in his bearing and his words, he was meeting death so fearlessly and nobly. And so I thought that even in going to the abode of the dead he was not going without the protection of the gods, and that when he arrived there it would be well with him, if it ever was well with anyone. And for this reason I was not at all filled with pity, as might seem natural when I was present at a scene of mourning; nor on the other hand did I feel pleasure because we were occupied with philosophy, as was our custom—and our talk was of philosophy;—but a very strange feeling came over me, an unaccustomed mixture of pleasure and of pain together, when I thought that Socrates was presently to die. And all of us who were there were in much the same condition, sometimes laughing and sometimes weeping; especially one of us, Apollodorus; you know him and his character.

ECHOCRATES. To be sure I do.

PHAEDO. He was quite unrestrained, and I was much agitated myself, as were the others.

ECHOCRATES. Who were these, Phaedo?

PHAEDO. Of native Athenians there was this

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επιχωρίων παρήν καὶ ὁ Κρῖτοβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἑπιγένης καὶ Ἀισχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης. ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτῆσιππος ὁ Παιανεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ, οἶμαι, ἦσθενε.

EXEKRAHTHE. Ξένοι δὲ τινὲς παρῆσαν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ναὶ, Συμμίας τέ γε ὁ Ῥηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνιδης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

EXEKRAHTHE. Τι δὲ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλέομβροτος τNDARΕΓΕΝΟΝΤΟ;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Οὐ δὴτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

EXEKRAHTHE. Ἄλλος δὲ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Σχεδὸν τι οἴμαι τούτοις παραγενέθαι.

EXEKRAHTHE. Τι ὅν πὴ; τὶνες, φής, ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;

3. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ἑγὼ σοι ἐκ ἄρχῆς πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσασθαι. ὧδ' γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὰς πρὸςθεν ἡμέρας εἰσώθειμεν φοιτῶν καὶ ἑνώ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τῶν Σωκράτη, συνλεγόμενοι ἐσθεν εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ἐν δὲ καὶ η ἤγερεν εἰσετοπλησίου γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε, ἐς αὐνοίχθει τὸ δεσμωτηρίου, διατριβοῦτες μετ' ἄλληλων ἀνέφημο γὰρ οὐ πρότειν ἄνοιχθεί, εἰσῆμεν τοῖς Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύμεν τοῖς ἄντο. καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε πρωίαίτερον συνελέγημεν. τῇ γὰρ προτεραὶ.

1 Schanz, after Cobet, inserts οὐ after Κλέομβροτος.
2 After προτεραία the MSS. read ἡμέρα, which Hermann, followed by Schanz and others, brackets.

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PHAEDO

Apollodorus, and Critobulus and his father, and Hermogenes and Epiganes and Aeschines and Antisthenes; and Ctesippus the Paeanian was there too, and Menexenus and some other Athenians. But Plato, I think, was ill.

ECHOCRATES. Were any foreigners there?

PHAEDO. Yes, Simmias of Thebes and Cebes and Phaedonides, and from Megara Euclides and Terpsion.

ECHOCRATES. What? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?

PHAEDO. No. They were said to be in Aegina.

ECHOCRATES. Was anyone else there?

PHAEDO. I think these were about all.

ECHOCRATES. Well then, what was the conversation?

PHAEDO. I will try to tell you everything from the beginning. On the previous days I and the others had always been in the habit of visiting Socrates. We used to meet at daybreak in the court where the trial took place, for it was near the prison; and every day we used to wait about, talking with each other, until the prison was opened, for it was not opened early; and when it was opened, we went in to Socrates and passed most of the day with him. On that day we came together earlier; for the day before, when we left the prison
Ε ἐπειδὴ ἔξηλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἑσπέρας, ἐπυθόμεθα ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δήλου ἀφυγμένον εἰη. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν ἀλλήλοις ἦκεια ός προϊάτετα εἰς τὸ εἰωθός. καὶ ἦκομεν καὶ ἦμιν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὡσπερ εἰώθει ὑπακούειν, εἴπεν περιμένειν καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι, ἔσω ἀν αὐτὸς κελεύσῃ. Δύουσι γάρ, ἐφι, οἱ ἐνδεκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσιν ὅπως ἄν τῇ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτήσῃ. οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἡμᾶς εἰσίναι. εἰσελθόντες οὖν κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἄρτι λελυμένον, τῇ δὲ Ἐαυθίππην—γυγυόπλευς γάρ—ἐχούσαν τε τὸ παιδίων αὐτοῦ καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὡς οὖν εἴδεν ἡμᾶς ἡ Ἐαυθίππη, ἀνευφημήσε σκι σκι καὶ τοιαύτ' ἄττα εἴπεν, οἶα δὴ εἰώθασιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὦτι Ἡ Ἐσκρατεῖς, ὅστατον δὴ σε προσεροῦσι νῦν οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ υἱ τούτοις. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς τὸν Κρίτωνα. ὁ Κρίτων, ἔφη, ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν οἰκαδε. καὶ ἐκείνην μὲν ἀπήγγον τινες τὸν τοῦ Κρίτωνος βοώσαν 
Β τε καὶ κοππομένην ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἀνακαθιζομένος εἰς τὴν κλίνην ὑπέκαμψε τέ το σκέλος καὶ ἐξέτρυψε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἀμα. ὡσ ἀτοποῦ, ἔφη, ὁ ἀνδρες, ἐοικε τι εἰναι τούτο, ὁ καλούσαν οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἄδυς ὡς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἰναι, τὸ λυπηρόν, τῷ ἄμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἐθέλειν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐάν δὲ τὶς διώκῃ τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνῃ, σχεδὸν τι ἀναγκαζέσθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ὡσπερ ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς συνημένοι δῦ ὄντε. καὶ 
C μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Ἀισώπος, μῦθον ἂν συνθείναι, ως ὁ θεὸς βουλόμενος αὐτὰ, 208
in the evening we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. So we agreed to come to the usual place as early in the morning as possible. And we came, and the jailer who usually answered the door came out and told us to wait and not go in until he told us. "For," he said, "the eleven are releasing Socrates from his fetters and giving directions how he is to die to-day." So after a little delay he came and told us to go in. We went in then and found Socrates just released from his fetters and Xanthippe—you know her—with his little son in her arms, sitting beside him. Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say: "Oh Socrates, this is the last time now that your friends will speak to you or you to them." And Socrates glanced at Crito and said, "Crito, let somebody take her home." And some of Crito's people took her away wailing and beating her breast. But Socrates sat up on his couch and bent his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and while he was rubbing it, he said, "What a strange thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure! How wonderfully it is related to that which seems to be its opposite, pain, in that they will not both come to a man at the same time, and yet if he pursues the one and captures it, he is generally obliged to take the other also, as if the two were joined together in one head. And I think," he said, "if Aesop had thought of them, he would have made a fable telling how they were at war and god wished to reconcile them, and when
Ἀκολουθεῖ οὖν ἐκάποια, ἐπείδὴ οὐκ ἦδυνατο, συνήψειεν εἰς ταῦτον τούτος τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἦν τὸ ἑτερον παραγένηται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὡστερον καὶ τὸ ἑτερον. Ὡστερ οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔσωκεν, ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἦν ἐν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγείων, ἤκειν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἦδυ.

4. Ὅ οἶνον Κέβης ὑπολαβῶν. Ἡ τῶν Δία, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὐ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γὰρ τῶν τοὺς ποιημάτων ὅπερ ποιήκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τού Αἰσχόπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινές με ἦδη ἥρωτο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Εὐνύμος πρόφην, ὃ τι ποτὲ διανοηθεῖται, ἐπειδὴ δεύρω ἡλθες, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποιήσας. Εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τοῦ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Εὐνύμο ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅταν με αὖθις ἥρωτα, εὐ οἴδα γὰρ, ὃτι ἐρήσεται, εἰπὲ, τὶ χρὴ λέγειν. Ἑγεθε τόινυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὃ Κέβης, τάληθη, ὃτι οὖν ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος οὐδὲ τοῦς ποιήμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνοι εἰναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα. Ἡδεῖν γὰρ ὃς οὐ ράδιον εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐνυπνίων τινών ἀποπειράμενοι τί λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενοι, εἰ πολλάκις ταῦτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἢν γὰρ δὴ ἀτὰ τοιάδε πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνυπνίον ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοτ' ἐν ἄλλῃ ὑπεὶς φαινόμενον, τα αὐτα δὲ λέγων, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, μουσικὴν ποιεὶ καὶ ἠργάζον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τούτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτό μοι παρακελεύεσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὡστερ οὐ τοῖς θέουσι διακελεύμονοι, καὶ ἐμοὶ οὖτο τὸ ἐνυπνίον, ὅπερ ἔπραττον, τούτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὃς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕσης μεγάλης.
he could not do that, he fastened their heads together, and for that reason, when one of them comes to anyone, the other follows after. Just so it seems that in my case, after pain was in my leg on account of the fetter, pleasure appears to have come following after."

Here Cebes interrupted and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I am glad you reminded me. Several others have asked about the poems you have composed, the metrical versions of Aesop's fables and the hymn to Apollo, and Evenus asked me the day before yesterday why you who never wrote any poetry before, composed these verses after you came to prison. Now, if you care that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again—and I know he will ask me—tell me what to say."

"Then tell him, Cebes," said he, "the truth, that I composed these verses not because I wished to rival him or his poems, for I knew that would not be easy, but because I wished to test the meaning of certain dreams, and to make sure that I was neglecting no duty in case their repeated commands meant that I must cultivate the Muses in this way. They were something like this. The same dream came to me often in my past life, sometimes in one form and sometimes in another, but always saying the same thing: 'Socrates,' it said, 'make music and work at it.' And I formerly thought it was urging and encouraging me to do what I was doing already and that just as people encourage runners by cheering, so the dream was encouraging me to do what I was doing, that is, to make music, because philosophy was the
μουσικής, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος· νῦν δ' ἐπεειδῆ ἢ τε δίκη ἐγένετο καὶ ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτή
dιεκάλυε με ἀποθυγήσκειν, ἐδοξὲ χρῆναι, εἰ ἀρα
pολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην
tὴν δημώδῃ μουσικῆς ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθήσαι αὐτῷ,
ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν. ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπίεναι

Β πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πειθό-
μενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν
θεὸν ἐποίησα, οὐ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα θυσία· μετὰ δὲ
tὸν θεὸν, ἐνυόσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι, εἴπτερ
μέλλου ποιητὴς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους, ἀλλ' οὐ
λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταῦτα
dὴ οὐδ' προχείρους εἶχον καὶ ἡπιστάμενην μύθους
tοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτους ἐποίησα, οἷς πρῶτοι
ἐνετυχοῦν.

5. Ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Εὐήνω φράζε, καὶ

ἐρρώσῳ καὶ, ἄν σωφρονῆ, ἐμὲ διώκειν ὡς
tάχιστα. ἀπειμὶ δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον κελεύονθι
gὰρ Ἀθηναίοι. καὶ ὁ Σιμμάς. Οἶον παρακε-

λευεῖ, ἔφη, τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, Εὐήνως; πολλὰ
gὰρ ἡ ἐντετύχηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ· σχεδοῦν οὖν, ἐξ
δὲν ἐγὼ ἦσθημαι, οὖθ᾽ ὡσπεσίστιν σοι ἐκὼν
εἶναι πείσεται. Τί δαί; ἡ δ' ὃς, οὐ φιλόσοφος

Εὐήνως; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμάς. Ἐθε-

λῆσει τοίνυν καὶ Εὐήνως καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀξίως
τούτου τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἵσως
βιάζεται αὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ φασὶ θεμέλιον εἶναι.

καὶ ἀμα λέγων ταῦτα καθηκε τὰ σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν
gῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὖτος ἦδη τὰ λοιπὰ διελ-

γετο. ἦρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης. Πῶς τοῦτο

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greatest kind of music and I was working at that. But now, after the trial and while the festival of the god delayed my execution, I thought, in case the repeated dream really meant to tell me to make this which is ordinarily called music, I ought to do so and not to disobey. For I thought it was safer not to go hence before making sure that I had done what I ought, by obeying the dream and composing verses. So first I composed a hymn to the god whose festival it was; and after the god, considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, must compose myths and not speeches, since I was not a maker of myths, I took the myths of Aesop, which I had at hand and knew, and turned into verse the first I came upon. So tell Evenus that, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to come after me as quickly as he can. I, it seems, am going to-day; for that is the order of the Athenians."

And Simmias said, "What a message that is, Socrates, for Evenus! I have met him often, and from what I have seen of him, I should say that he will not take your advice in the least if he can help it."

"Why so?" said he. "Is not Evenus a philosopher?"

"I think so," said Simmias.

"Then Evenus will take my advice, and so will every man who has any worthy interest in philosophy. Perhaps, however, he will not take his own life, for they say that is not permitted." And as he spoke he put his feet down on the ground and remained sitting in this way through the rest of the conversation.

Then Cebes asked him: "What do you mean by
Λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἕαυτὸν βιάζονται, ἐθέλειν δὲ ἂν τῷ ἀποθνῄσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἔπεσθαι; Τί δέ, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἂν ἔεκατε σὺ τε καὶ Σιμιᾶς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων Φιλολάφῳ συγγεγονότες; Οὔδεν γε σαφές, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ εἴξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω. ὦ μὲν οὖν τυχχάνῳ ἄκηκος, φθόνος οὐδεὶς λέγειν. καὶ γὰρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει ἔμελλοντα ἐκείσε ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἔκει.¹ ποίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν οἰόμεθα εἶναι: τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιῶι ἀλλο ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἦλιου δυσμῶν χρόνων; 6. Κατὰ τί δὴ οὖν ποτε οὐ φασι θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἐαυτὸν ἀποκτιννύναι, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἤδη γὰρ ἔγορε, διπερ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἢρου, καὶ Φιλολάφου ἡκουσα, διπερ ἤμιν διηγᾶτο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, ὡς οὖ δέοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν: σαφῆς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδενός πῶςτε οὐδέν ἀκήκοα. Ἀλλὰ προθμεῖσθαι χρή, ἔφη τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἄκουσας. ἰσως μέντοι θαυμαστόν σοι φανεῖται, εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπλοῦν ἐστιν καὶ οὐδέποτε τυχχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, διπερ καὶ τάλλα,² ἐστιν οτε καὶ οἷς βέλτιον τεθνάναι ἢ ζην ἡ οἷς δὲ βέλτιον τεθνάναι, θαυμαστόν ἰσως σοι φαίνεται, εἰ τοῦτος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ οἷον αὐτούς ἐαυτοὺς εὐ ποιεῖν, ἄλλα ἄλλων δεὶ περιμένειν εὐεργέτην. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἢρέμα ἐπυγελάσας: Ἰττω Ζεὺς, ἔφη τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπὼν. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δοξείειν, ἔφη ο

¹ Schanz brackets τῆς ἔκει.
² Schanz, following Forster, puts a period after τάλλα and inserts ἄλλα.

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this, Socrates, that it is not permitted to take one's life, but that the philosopher would desire to follow after the dying?"

"How is this, Cebes? Have you and Simmias, who are pupils of Philolaus, not heard about such things?"

"Nothing definite, Socrates."

"I myself speak of them only from hearsay; but I have no objection to telling what I have heard. And indeed it is perhaps especially fitting, as I am going to the other world, to tell stories about the life there and consider what we think about it; for what else could one do in the time between now and sunset?"

"Why in the world do they say that it is not permitted to kill oneself, Socrates? I heard Philolaus, when he was living in our city, say the same thing you just said, and I have heard it from others, too, that one must not do this; but I never heard anyone say anything definite about it."

"You must have courage," said he, "and perhaps you might hear something. But perhaps it will seem strange to you that this alone of all laws is without exception, and it never happens to mankind, as in other matters, that only at some times and for some persons it is better to die than to live; and it will perhaps seem strange to you that these human beings for whom it is better to die cannot without impiety do good to themselves, but must wait for some other benefactor."

And Cebes, smiling gently, said, "Gawd knows it doos," speaking in his own dialect.

"It would seem unreasonable, if put in this way,"
Β Σωκράτης, οὔτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον οὗ μέντοι ἀλλ' ἴσως γ' ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀπορρήτους λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινὶ φρουρᾷ ἔσμεν οἱ ἁνθρώποι καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἕαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος διδεῖν οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τόδε γε μοι δοκεῖ, ο Ἐμούγη, εὐ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἁνθρώπους ἐν τοῖς κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἡ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως; Ἑμούγη,

C φησιν ὁ Ἐμθης. Οὔκοιν, ἡ δ' ὡς, καὶ σὺ ἀν τῶν σαυτοῦ κτημάτων εἰ τι αὐτὸ ἐαυτὸ ἀποκτινύοι, μὴ σημήναντος σου δι' ἑκατέρα οὕτωσι τεθύναι, χαλεπάνως ἄν οὐτὸ, καὶ εἰ τινὰ ἑχος τιμωρίαν, τιμωροῖο ἄν; Πάνω γ', ἐφη. Ἰσως τόλυν ταύτη οὐκ ἄλογον, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτινύναι δεῖν, πρὶν ἀν ἀνάγκην τινὰ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ, ὁσπερ καὶ τὴν νῦν ἡμῶν παροῦσαν.

7. Ἀλλ' εἰκός, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτο γε φαίνεται. ὁ μέντοι νῦν δὴ ἔλεγεν, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσοφοὺς ράδιος ἀν ἐθέλειν ἀποθύσκειν, ἔοικεν

D τοῦτο, ὁ Σώκρατης, ἀτόπῳ, εἰπή δ' νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελουμένον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτείν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπίστωτα, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν ὀπέρ ἁριστοὶ εἶσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστᾶται, θεοὶ, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον, οὐ γὰρ ποι αὐτὸς γε αὐτοῦ οἴεται ἁμείνον ἐπιμέλησεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἀλλ' ἀνόητος μὲν ἁνθρώπος τάχι ἀν οὐθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ 216
said Socrates, "but perhaps there is some reason in it. Now the doctrine that is taught in secret about this matter, that we men are in a kind of prison and must not set ourselves free or run away, seems to me to be weighty and not easy to understand. But this at least, Cebes, I do believe is sound, that the gods are our guardians and that we men are one of the chattels of the gods. Do you not believe this?"

"Yes," said Cebes, "I do."

"Well then," said he, "if one of your chattels should kill itself when you had not indicated that you wished it to die, would you be angry with it and punish it if you could?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Then perhaps from this point of view it is not unreasonable to say that a man must not kill himself until god sends some necessity upon him, such as has now come upon me."

"That," said Cebes, "seems sensible. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers ought to be ready and willing to die, that seems strange if we were right just now in saying that god is our guardian and we are his possessions. For it is not reasonable that the wisest men should not be troubled when they leave that service in which the gods, who are the best overseers in the world, are watching over them. A wise man certainly does not think that when he is free he can take better care of himself than they do. A foolish man might perhaps think so, that he ought to run away from his master, and he would not consider that he must not run
Ε δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπὸ γε τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ φεύγειν, ἀλλ’ ὃ τι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἄλογόστως ἂν φεύγοι, ὃ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπὶθυμοῦ τοῦ ἂν οἱ εἰναὶ παρὰ τῷ αὐτοῦ βελτίων. καὶ τοιούτως, ὃ Σώκρατες, τουναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ δ’ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθυσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δ’ ἀφρόνας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἠσθῆναι τε μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς· Ἀεὶ τοι, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγοις τινὰς ἀνερεύνα, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πεῖθεσθαι, ὃ τι ἂν τις εἴπη. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας· Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥαδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπτων καὶ ἀρχοντας ἁγαθοὺς, ὡς ἂν ἀντὸς ὡμολογεῖς, θεοὺς. Ἁκούσας, ἐφη, λέγετε. οἴμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν, ὅτι χρὴ με πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὡσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη οἱ Σιμμίας.

8. Φέρε δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὃς, πειραθὼ πιθανῶτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ὑμῶν ἡταίρων πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἀλλοὺς σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἁγαθοὺς, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ’ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἡδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἄγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ νῦν δὲ εὐ ἴστε, ὅτι παρ’ ἄνδρας τε ἐπιλίξω ἀφίξεσθαι

1 Schanz brackets feuktev... despotov.
away from a good master, but ought to stay with him as long as possible; and so he might thoughtlessly run away; but a man of sense would wish to be always with one who is better than himself. And yet, Socrates, if we look at it in this way, the contrary of what we just said seems natural; for the wise ought to be troubled at dying and the foolish to rejoice."

When Socrates heard this I thought he was pleased by Cebes' earnestness, and glancing at us, he said, "Cebes is always on the track of arguments and will not be easily convinced by whatever anyone says."

And Simmias said, "Well, Socrates, this time I think myself that Cebes is right. For why should really wise men run away from masters who are better than they and lightly separate themselves from them? And it strikes me that Cebes is aiming his argument at you, because you are so ready to leave us and the gods, who are, as you yourself agree, good rulers."

"You have a right to say that," he replied; "for I think you mean that I must defend myself against this accusation, as if we were in a law court."

"Precisely," said Simmias.

"Well, then," said he, "I will try to make a more convincing defence than I did before the judges. For if I did not believe," said he, "that I was going to other wise and good gods, and, moreover, to men who have died, better men than those here, I should be wrong in not grieving at death. But as it is, you may rest assured that I expect to go to good men, though I should not care to assert this positively; but I would
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἀγαθούς καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἄν πάνυ δισχυρισάμην ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἦξειν, εὐ ἑστε ὅτι, εἰπέρ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων, δισχυρισάμην ἄν καὶ τοῦτο. ᾠστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶν, ἀλλ’ εὐελπίς εἴμι εἰναὶ τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι, καὶ ἀσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἀμείνου τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡ τοῖς κακοῖς. Τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ἀπίεναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης; κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀμα σοι ἀπολογία ἐστίν, εάν ἀπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσεις. Ἁλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα, τι ἔστιν ὁ βούλευσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν. Τί, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον, ὅτι χρῆ σοι φράξειν ὡς ελάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένος, δεὶν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιούτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ.

Εἰ δὲ μή, ένιοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις καὶ τρῖς πίνειν τοὺς τοιούτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Ἔσε, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἐαυτοῦ2 παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δις δώσων, ἢν δὲ δέη, καὶ τρῖς. Ἁλλὰ σχεδοῦν μὲν τι ἡδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων: ἀλλὰ μοι πάλαι3 πράγματα παρέχει. Ἔσε αὐτῶν, ἔφη. ἀλλ’ ἤμων δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἡδη τῶν λόγων ἀποδοῦναι, ὡς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ἄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βλον θαρρεῖν

1 Schanz brackets ἦξειν, following Hirschig.
2 Schanz brackets τὸ ἐαυτοῦ.
3 Schanz brackets πάλαι.
assert as positively as anything about such matters that I am going to gods who are good masters. And therefore, so far as that is concerned, I not only do not grieve, but I have great hopes that there is something in store for the dead, and, as has been said of old, something better for the good than for the wicked.”

“Well,” said Simmias, “do you intend to go away, Socrates, and keep your opinion to yourself, or would you let us share it? It seems to me that this is a good which belongs in common to us also, and at the same time, if you convince us by what you say, that will serve as your defence.”

“I will try,” he replied. “But first let us ask Crito there what he wants. He has apparently been trying to say something for a long time.”

“Only, Socrates,” said Crito, “that the man who is to administer the poison to you has been telling me for some time to warn you to talk as little as possible. He says people get warm when they talk and heat has a bad effect on the action of the poison; so sometimes he has to make those who talk too much drink twice or even three times.”

And Socrates said: “Never mind him. Just let him do his part and prepare to give it twice or even, if necessary, three times.”

“I was pretty sure that was what you would say,” said Crito, “but he has been bothering me for a long time.”

“Never mind him,” said Socrates. “I wish now to explain to you, my judges, the reason why I think a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is
64 μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπίς εἶναι ἐκεῖ 
μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθά, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ 
pῶς ἂν οὐν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχωι, ὁ Σιμμία 
tε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

9. Κινδυνεύονσι γὰρ ὁσοὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς 
ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, 
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτὸι ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνη-
σκείν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἄληθὲς, 
ἀτοπον δὴπον ἂν εἳ προδυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ 
τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ 
ἀγανακτεῖν, δὶ πάλαι προεθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετή-
δευν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας. Νὴ τὸν Δία,

Β ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γε μὲ νῦν γελα-
σεῖοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἴμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ 
tοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν 
eῦ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας καὶ 
ξυμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους 
καὶ πάνυ, ὅτι τῷ ὀντὶ οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι 
καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν, ὅτι ἄξιοι εἰσὶν τοῦτο 
pάσχειν. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γὰρ λέγοιοι, ὁ Σιμμία, 
πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν 
γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἤ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἤ ἄξιοι εἰσὶ 
θανάτου καὶ οἴον θανάτου οἱ ὃς ἀληθῶς φιλό-
σοφοι. εἰπώμεν γὰρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, 
χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις ἤγονεμέθα τι τὸν 
θάνατον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ 
Σιμμίας. Ἀρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡ τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς 
ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγῆν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο 
tο τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέν 
αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ 
tῆν ψυχῆν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγέισαν
naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he will attain the greatest blessings in that other land. So I will try to tell you, Simmias, and Cebees, how this would be.

"Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came for which they had all along been eagerly practising."

And Simmias laughed and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, I don't feel much like laughing just now, but you made me laugh. For I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it."

"And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. Let us then," said he, "speak with one another, paying no further attention to them. Do we think there is such a thing as death?"

"Certainly," replied Simmias.

"We believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists
PLATO

αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἀρα μὴ ἀλλο τι ἢ¹ θάνατος ἢ τούτο; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτο, ἔφη. Σκέψαι δὴ, ὃ ἀγαθὲ, ἐὰν ἀρα καὶ σοι ξυνδοκῇ ἀπέρ ἐμοὶ. ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἰσεθαί περὶ ὁν σκοποῦμεν. φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἥδους καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσθε, οἶνον σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν; ᾿Ηκιστα, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμῆας. Τὰ δὲ; τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Τὶ δὲ; τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἥγεισθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἶνον ἰματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμῶν ἐ δοκεῖ σοι ᾿Η ᾿Ατιμάζειν, καθ' ὁσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; ᾿Ατιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὃ γε ὁς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. Οὐκοῦν ὁλῶς δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ὡ τοῦ τοιοῦτον πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; ῾Εμοιγε. Ὁρο ὅσον πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δὴλος ἔστων ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὃ τι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; Φαίνεται. Καὶ δοκεῖ γε δήπου, ὃ ᾿ Σιμμῆα, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὃ μηδὲν ἢδυ τῶν τοιοῦτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν, οὕκ ἄξιον εἶναι ξῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἥδουν ἀι διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσιν. Πάνυ μὲν οὐν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

¹ Schanz brackets ᾿.
alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?"
"No, it is this," said he.
"Now, my friend, see if you agree with me; for, if you do, I think we shall get more light on our subject. Do you think a philosopher would be likely to care much about the so-called pleasures, such as eating and drinking?"
"By no means, Socrates," said Simmias.
"How about the pleasures of love?"
"Certainly not."
"Well, do you think such a man would think much of the other cares of the body—I mean such as the possession of fine clothes and shoes and the other personal adornments? Do you think he would care about them or despise them, except so far as it is necessary to have them?"
"I think the true philosopher would despise them," he replied.
"Altogether, then, you think that such a man would not devote himself to the body, but would, so far as he was able, turn away from the body and concern himself with the soul?"
"Yes."
"To begin with, then, it is clear that in such matters the philosopher, more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body?"
"It is."
"Now certainly most people think that a man who takes no pleasure and has no part in such things doesn't deserve to live, and that one who cares nothing for the pleasures of the body is about as good as dead."
"That is very true."
PLATO

10. Τί δέ δή περὶ αὐτήν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὖ, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνῶν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; Β οὖν τὸ τοιώνδε λέγω· αὖ γὰρ ἐξεῖ ἀλήθειαν τῶν ὑψις τε καὶ ἀκοῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἥ τά γε τοιαύτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἢμιν ἂεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, διτι οὖν ἀκούομεν ἀκριβείς οὐδὲν οὐτε ὀρώμεις; καίτοι εἰ αὐτὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μή ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολὴ αὐτοῖς ἀλλαὶ πάσαι γάρ ποι τοῦτων φαινότεραι εἰσιν· ἢ σοι οὖ δοκοῦσιν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πότε οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; ὃταν μὲν γάρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρημένη τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. Κ Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι, εἴπερ ποι λαλοθεῖ, κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων; Ναι. Λογίζεται δέ γέ ποι τότε καλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τοὺς μηδὲν παραλυπῆ, μήτε ἀκοῆ μήτε ὑψις μήτε ἄλγησθω μηδὲ τις ἔδονή, ἀλλ' ὅ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεται ἔσωστα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μή κοινωνούσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπτομένη ὀρέγνηται τοῦ ὄντος. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Οὕκ οὖν καὶ ἐνταῦθα Λ ὃ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μᾶλλον ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτή καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; Φαίνεται. Τί δέ δῆ τα τοιάδε, ὁ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἰναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὔδέν; Φαμὲν μέντοι νῦν Δία. Καὶ
"Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see anything accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to these. Do you not think so?"

"Certainly I do," he replied.

"Then," said he, "when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it."

"True."

"In thought, then, if at all, something of the realities becomes clear to it?"

"Yes."

"But it thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality."

"That is true."

"In this matter also, then, the soul of the philosopher greatly despises the body and avoids it and strives to be alone by itself?"

"Evidently."

"Now how about such things as this, Simmias? Do we think there is such a thing as absolute justice, or not?"

"We certainly think there is."
PLATO

καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἄναθόν; Πῶς δ' οὖ; Ἡδὴ
οὖν πώποτε τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς
eῖδες; Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὃς. Ἀλλ' ἄλλη τυι
αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἑφήσω αὐτῶν;
λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους περὶ, ὑγιείας,
ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς
Ε ὀύσιας, δ' τυγχάνει ἔκαστον ὦν; ἀρα διὰ τοῦ
σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ
ὡς ἔχει; δ' ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα
παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἔκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ
οὐ σκοπεῖ, οὔτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἰοί τοῦ γυνῶν ἔκαστον;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐκείνος ἂν
tούτο ποιήσει καθαρώτατα, ὡστις ὅτι μάλιστα
αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἦν ἐφ' ἔκαστον, μήτε τὴν ὄψιν
παραπληθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην
ἀισθήσεων ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ,
ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ
χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖς ἔκαστον
ἐπιχειροὶ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεῖς ὅτι
μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὅτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος
eἰπεῖν ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταραττοῦντος
καὶ οὐκ ἔντος τῆς ψυχῆς κτησασθαι ἀλήθειάν
tε καὶ φρόνησιν, ὅταν κοινωὴ, ἃρ' οὐχ οὔτὸς
ἔστιν, ὃ Σιμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος, ὃ τευξόμενος
tοῦ ὄντος; Ἀπερφυῶς, ἐφ' ὁ Σιμίας, ὃς ἀληθῆ
λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

Β 11. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων
παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως
φιλοσόφοις, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα
ἀττα λέγειν, ὅτι κινδυνεύει τοι ὁσπερ ἀτραπός
tις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς, ὅτι, ἔως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν
μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει, καὶ συμπεφυμένη
"And absolute beauty and goodness."
"Of course."
"Well, did you ever see anything of that kind with your eyes?"
"Certainly not," said he.
"Or did you ever reach them with any of the bodily senses? I am speaking of all such things, as size, health, strength, and in short the essence or underlying quality of everything. Is their true nature contemplated by means of the body? Is it not rather the case that he who prepares himself most carefully to understand the true essence of each thing that he examines would come nearest to the knowledge of it?"
"Certainly."
"Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?"
"That is true as true can be, Socrates," said Simmias.
"Then," said he, "all this must cause good lovers of wisdom to think and say one to the other something like this: 'There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή μετὰ τοιοῦτον κακού, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησόμεθα ἰκανός οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τούτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφὴν· ἔτι δὲ ἀν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἔρατων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλαρίας ἐμπίπτησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἄληθῶς τῷ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἠμῶν ἐγγύνεται οὐδὲποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πόλεμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἀλλο παρέχει ἡ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἰ τοῦτον ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦτον θεραπείαν· καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ' ἔσχατον πάντων, ὅτι, ἐὰν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τράπωμεθα ὑπὸ τὸ σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ξητήσεωι αὐ τοιοῦτον παραπίπτουν θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καθαρὰν τάλησθες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπ' ημῶν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μελλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, ἀπαλλακτέουν αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὴ τῇ

ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς οἶκεν, ἡμῶν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν τε καὶ φαμέν ἑρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ξῶσιν δὲ οὐ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἶον τε μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶιναι, δυοὶ θάτερον, ἡ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτῆσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἡ τελευτήσασιν· τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἢ

167 ψυχή ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ' οὖ.
soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of sustenance; and moreover, if diseases come upon it they hinder our pursuit of the truth. And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its service. And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth, and in fact we perceive that, if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone. And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead we are likely to possess the wisdom which we desire and claim to be enamoured of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two thing must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall,
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καὶ ἐν ὧν ἱὼμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγχυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὁ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὁ τι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀνατιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἄν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς: καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαρὸ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές.

B τούτῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἵσως τὸ ἀληθές. μὴ καθαρῶ γάρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμέτων ἢ τοιαύτα οἴμαι, ὁ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πρὸς ἄλλην. λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖι σοι οὕτως; Πάντοσ' γε μᾶλλον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

12. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθή, ὁ ἐταῖρος, πολλῇ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οὗ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἰκανῶς, εἰπέρ ποιον ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τούτῳ οὐ ἐνεκα ή πολλή πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὡστε ἡ γε ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀναγήσθης ἐλπίδος γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ, δὴ ἤγειταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὀσπέρ κεκαθαρμένην. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Κάθαρος δὲ εἶναι ἀρᾳ οὐ τούτῳ ξυμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι εν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὁ τι μάλιστα ἀπ' τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν καὶ ἔθισα αὐτὴν καθ' αυτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαι τε καὶ ἄθροισθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ εν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ εν τῷ ἐπείτα μόνην καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυμένην

D τετερ' ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος; Πάνω μὲν
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I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is absolutely necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free. And in this way, freeing ourselves from the foolishness of the body and being pure, we shall, I think, be with the pure and shall know of ourselves all that is pure,—and that is, perhaps, the truth. For it cannot be that the impure attain the pure.' Such words as these, I think, Simmias, all who are rightly lovers of knowledge must say to each other and such must be their thoughts. Do you not agree?"

"Most assuredly, Socrates."

"Then," said Socrates, "if this is true, my friend, I have great hopes that when I reach the place to which I am going, I shall there, if anywhere, attain fully to that which has been my chief object in my past life, so that the journey which is now imposed upon me is begun with good hope; and the like hope exists for every man who thinks that his mind has been purified and made ready."

"Certainly," said Simmias.

"And does not the purification consist in this which has been mentioned long ago in our discourse, in separating, so far as possible, the soul from the body and teaching the soul the habit of collecting and bringing itself together from all parts of the body, and living, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, freed from the body as from fetters?"

"Certainly," said he.
oùν, ἔφη. Οὐκοὺν τούτο γε θάνατος ὁνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σῶματος; Παντάπασι γε, ἦ δ’ ὦσ. Λόγων δὲ γε αὐτῆς, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται αἱ ἐκ μᾶλλον καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σῶματος, ἦ σοῦ; Φαίνεται. Οὐκοὖν, ὃπερ ἔν ἄρχῃ ἔλεγον, γέλοιον ἂν εἰ ἄνδρα παρασκευάζονθ’ ἐαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὃ τι ἐγγυτάτω ὑπάτα τοῦ τεθνάναι οὗτος ζην, κἀπείθ’ ἡκουτος αὐτῷ τούτων ἀγανακτεῖν.1 οὐ γέλοιον; Πῶς δ’ σοῦ; Τῷ ὁντὶ ἀρά, ἔφη, οἱ Σωμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθυμήσκειν μετελώσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἡκιστα αὐτοῖς ἀνθρώπων φοβερῶν. ἐκ τῶν δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σῶματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τοῦτον δὲ γνωμομένου εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγανακτοῦν, οὐ πολλὴ ἄν ἀλογία εἰη, εἰ μὴ ἁσμενοι ἔκεισε ίοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοι ἐπὶς ἐστίν οὐ δϊα βίου ἄρων τυχεῖν ἄρων δὲ φρονῆσεως· ὃ τε διεβέβλητο, τοῦτον ἀπῆλλαχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς; ἡ ἀνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ υἱῶν ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκούτες ἡθέλησαν εἰς “Αἰδοῦ ἔλθειν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἁγιομένου τῆς ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὄψεσθαι τε ἐκεί ὃν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσεσθαι φρονῆσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἔρων, καὶ λαβὼν σφόδρα τῇ αὐτῆς ταύτης ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἀλλοθεί εντεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἂξιος λόγου ἡ ἐν “Αἰδοῦ, ἀγανακτῆσει τε ἀποθυμήσκων καὶ οὐκ ἁσμενὸς εἰςαν αὐτός; ὀισσαὶ

1 After ἀγανακτεῖν BT read οὐ γέλοιον; Schanz brackets these words. Burnet reads γέλοιον, giving it to Simmias,

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"Well, then, this is what we call death, is it not, a release and separation from the body?"
"Exactly so," said he.
"But, as we hold, the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body—is their study, is it not?"

"Obviously."

"Then, as I said in the beginning, it would be absurd if a man who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could, should then be disturbed when death came to him. Would it not be absurd?"

"Of course."

"In fact, then, Simmias," said he, "the true philosophers practise dying, and death is less terrible to them than to any other men. Consider it in this way. They are in every way hostile to the body and they desire to have the soul apart by itself alone. Would it not be very foolish if they should be frightened and troubled when this very thing happens, and if they should not be glad to go to the place where there is hope of attaining what they longed for all through life—and they longed for wisdom—and of escaping from the companionship of that which they hated? When human loves or wives or sons have died, many men have willingly gone to the other world led by the hope of seeing there those whom they longed for, and of being with them; and shall he who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world grieve when he dies and not be glad to go there? We cannot
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γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὤντι γε ᾗ, ὃ ἔταιρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐντεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἄλλη ἢ ἐκεῖ. ἐι δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἄν ἀλογία εἶη, ἐι φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Πολλή μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἢ δ’ ὃς.

13. Οὐκοῦν ἰκανόν σοι τεκμήριον, ἔφη, τούτῳ ἀνδρός ὅν ἂν ἴδης ἀγανακτοῦντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρ’ ἢν φιλόσοφος, ἀλλὰ τις φιλοσώματος; ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ ποῦ οὕτως τυγχάνει ὃν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτοι τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἢ ἁμφότερα. Πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔχει οὕτως, ὡς λέγεις. Ἀρ’ σὺν, ἔφη, δ’ Σιμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὄνομα-ξομένη ἀνδρεία τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένους μάλιστα προσήκει; Πάντως δὴπου, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄνομάζουσι σωφρο-σύνη, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοήσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὀλυγώρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμῖως, ἀρ’ οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ σώματος ὀλυγωροῦσιν τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Εἰ γὰρ ἔθελεις, ἢ δ’ ὃς, ἐνυόησαι τὴν γε τῶν ἄλλων ἀνδρείας τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἶναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δὴ, ὃ Σώκρατες; Οἴσθα, ἢ δ’ ὃς, ὅτι τοῦ θάνατον ἠγούνται πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ’, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν φόβοι μειξόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρείοι τοῦ θάνατον, ὅταν ὑπομένωσιν; Ἐστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδεναὶ ἀρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρείοι εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ
think that, my friend, if he is really a philosopher; for he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world. And if this is so, would it not be very foolish for such a man to fear death?"

"Very foolish, certainly," said he.

"Then is it not," said Socrates, "a sufficient indication, when you see a man troubled because he is going to die, that he was not a lover of wisdom but a lover of the body? And this same man is also a lover of money and of honour, one or both."

"Certainly," said he, "it is as you say."

"Then, Simmias," he continued, "is not that which is called courage especially characteristic of philosophers?"

"By all means," said he.

"And self-restraint—that which is commonly called self-restraint, which consists in not being excited by the passions and in being superior to them and acting in a seemingly way—is not that characteristic of those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy?"

"Necessarily," said he.

"For," said Socrates, "if you care to consider the courage and the self-restraint of other men, you will see that they are absurd."

"How so, Socrates?"

"You know, do you not, that all other men count death among the great evils?"

"They certainly do.

"And do not brave men face death—when they do face it—through fear of greater evils?"

"That is true."

"Then all except philosophers are brave through
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φιλόσοφοι. καίτοι ἀλογόν γε δέει τινα καὶ δειλία
Ε ἀνδρείον εἶναι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι
αὐτῶν; οὐ ταύτων τοῦτο πεπόνθασιν ἁκολασίᾳ
τοιί σώφρονες εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἄδυνατον
εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὤμως αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τούτῳ ὤμοιον
τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτην τὴν εὐήθη σωφροσύνην.
φοβοῦμενοι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ
ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκεῖνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ'
ἄλλων κρατούμενοι. καίτοι καλοῦσι γε ἁκολασίαν
τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀρχεσθαι. ἀλλ' ὤμως συμβαίνει
αὐτοῖς κρατουμένους ϊπ' ἡδονῶν κρατεῖν ἄλλων
ἡδονῶν. τοῦτο δ' ὤμοιον ἔστων ὦν ὡν δὴ ἐλέγετο,
τῷ πρόποι τινὰ δι' ἁκολασίαν αὐτοὺς σεσω-
φονίσθαι. Ἠσικε γὰρ. Ὡ μακάριε Σιμμία,
μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὐτῇ ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγή,
ἡδονᾶς πρὸς ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ
φόβου πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, καὶ μείζω
πρὸς ἐλάττω, ὧσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο
μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὐ δεῖ ἄπαντα

Β ταύτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρονήσις, καὶ τούτου
μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτων ἄνωθεν ὑπὲρ τοῦτο
πεπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σω-
φροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξυλικῆ θησιν ἁληθῆς
ἀρετῆ μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγγομένων καὶ
ἀποσυνισμένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων. χωρίζομεν δὲ
φρονήσεως καὶ ἄλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἄλληλων μὴ
σκιαγραφία τις ἢ τοιαύτη ἁρετή καὶ τῷ ὄντι
ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἁληθῆς
ἐχει, τὸ δ' ἁληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις

1 Schanz brackets ἄλλων.
fear. And yet it is absurd to be brave through fear and cowardice."

"Very true."

"And how about those of seemly conduct? Is their case not the same? They are self-restrained because of a kind of self-indulgence. We say, to be sure, that this is impossible, nevertheless their foolish self-restraint amounts to little more than this; for they fear that they may be deprived of certain pleasures which they desire, and so they refrain from some because they are under the sway of others. And yet being ruled by pleasures is called self-indulgence. Nevertheless they conquer pleasures because they are conquered by other pleasures. Now this is about what I said just now, that they are self-restrained by a kind of self-indulgence."

"So it seems."

"My dear Simmias, I suspect that this is not the right way to purchase virtue, by exchanging pleasures for pleasures, and pains for pains, and fear for fear, and greater for less, as if they were coins, but the only right coinage, for which all those things must be exchanged and by means of and with which all these things are to be bought and sold, is in fact wisdom; and courage and self-restraint and justice and, in short, true virtue exist only with wisdom, whether pleasures and fears and other things of that sort are added or taken away. And virtue which consists in the exchange of such things for each other without wisdom, is but a painted imitation of virtue and is really slavish and has nothing healthy or true in it; but truth is in
C τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ
dikaiosúνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ
katharomós τις ἤ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς
teleτὰς ἡμῖν οὖτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαίλουν
eīnai, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι δὲ ἂν
ἀμύντος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς "Αἰδου ἄφικηται, ἐν
βορβόρῳ κεῖσται, ὡς δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ
tetelēsemménoν οὔκ ἔκεισθαι ἄφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν ὀικήσεις.
eἰσὶν γὰρ ὅτι, ὡς φανερὰ, οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς,
ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοὶ, βάκχοι δὲ τε παῦροι.

D οὖτοι δ' εἰσίν κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ
οἱ πειθεσοφηκότες ὅρθως. ὡν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ
γε τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ
παντὶ τρόπῳ προφυσικῇ γενέσθαι εἰ δ' ὅρθως
προφυσικῇ καὶ τῇ ἁμάντῳ, ἐκεῖσθαι ἐλθόντες τὸ
σαφῆς εἰς ὁμοθετία, ἀν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὅλιγον ὑπέρθου,
ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὐν ἐγώ, ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμέα
τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι, ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε
ἀπολεῖπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς

Ε φέρω οὖν ἄγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος κακεὶ οὐδὲν ἥττουν
ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἄγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ
ἐταῖροις:1 εἰ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανότερος εἴμι ἐν τῇ
ἀπολογίᾳ ἡ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ ἄν
ἐχοι.

14. Εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταύτα ὑπο-
λαβὼν ὁ Κέβης ἐφη. Ὅ Σωκράτες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
70 ἐμοῦντε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ
ἐπειδὰν ἄπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδὰμοι ἐτί γ',

1 After ἐταῖροις, the MSS. read τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν
παρέχει, "but the many do not believe this." Ast, followed
by Schanz and Burnet, omits.
fact a purification from all these things, and self-restraint and justice and courage and wisdom itself are a kind of purification. And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not un-enlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes un-initiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. For as they say in the mysteries, 'the thyrsus-bearers are many, but the mystics few'; and these mystics are, I believe, those who have been true philosophers. And I in my life have, so far as I could, left nothing undone, and have striven in every way to make myself one of them. But whether I have striven aright and have met with success, I believe I shall know clearly, when I have arrived there, very soon, if it is God's will. This then, Simmias and Cebes, is the defence I offer to show that it is reasonable for me not to be grieved or troubled at leaving you and the rulers I have here, because I believe that there, no less than here, I shall find good rulers and friends. If now I am more successful in convincing you by my defence than I was in convincing my Athenian judges, it is well.'

When Socrates had finished, Cebes answered and said: "Socrates, I agree to the other things you say, but in regard to the soul men are very prone to disbelief. They fear that when the soul leaves the body it no longer exists anywhere, and that on the
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αλλ' ἐκείνη τῇ ἥμερᾳ διαφθείρηται τε καὶ ἀπολυται, ἢ ἂν ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀποθενθήκη ἐνθεύς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνονσα ὡσπερ πνεῦμα ἡ κατανός διασκεδασθείσα οἴχθαι διαπτομένη καὶ οὐδέν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ. ἔτει, εἴπερ εἰπ' οὖν αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν συνεθχροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὁνὶ σὺ νῦν δὴ διήλθες, πολλὴ ἂν ἐπὶς εἰς καὶ καλῇ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἔστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ δὴ ἵσως οὐκ ὅλογης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τινα δύναμιν ἐχει καὶ φρόνησιν. 'Αληθῆ, ἐφι, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κέβης. ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογόμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἐχεῖν εἴτε μὴ; Ἑγώγει σὺν, ἐφί ο Κέβης, ἢδεις ἂν ἀκούσαμεν ἣνταν δόξαν ἐχεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν. Οὔκουν γ' ἂν οἴμαι, ἢ ὅ ος ο Σωκράτης, εἴπεις τινα νῦν ἅ 

1 Ακούσαντα, οὖν ἐκ κομφοδιοποιοῦ εἰς, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὖν περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι.

15. Σκεψῷμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇ δὲ πη, εἰτ' ἄρα ἐν Ἀιδὸν εἰδὼς αὐτὴν τελευτασάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸς λόγος, οὐ μεμνημέθα, ὡς εἰς ἐνθεύς ἀφικομέναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθεωτῶν καὶ εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἐχεῖ, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ἔχωντας, ἀλλὰ τί ἢ 

D εἴεν ἃν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσω ἐγίγνοντο μὴ οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἴκανὸν τεκμηρίου τοῦ ταύτ' εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο, ὅτι 

1 Schanz and Burnet bracket οἴχθαι . . . ἦ.
day when the man dies it is destroyed and perishes, and when it leaves the body and departs from it, straightway it flies away and is no longer anywhere, scattering like a breath or smoke. If it exists anywhere by itself as a unit, freed from these evils which you have enumerated just now, there would be good reason for the blessed hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But perhaps no little argument and proof is required to show that when a man is dead the soul still exists and has any power and intelligence."

"What you say, Cebes, is true," said Socrates. "Now what shall we do? Do you wish to keep on conversing about this to see whether it is probable or not?"

"I do," said Cebes. "I should like to hear what you think about it."

"Well," said Socrates, "I do not believe anyone who heard us now, even if he were a comic poet, would say that I am chattering and talking about things which do not concern me. So if you like, let us examine the matter to the end.

"Let us consider it by asking whether the souls of men who have died are in the nether world or not. There is an ancient tradition, which we remember, that they go there from here and come back here again and are born from the dead. Now if this is true, if the living are born again from the dead, our souls would exist there, would they not? For they could not be born again if they did not exist, and this would be a sufficient proof that they exist, if it should really be made evident that the
ούδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεότων: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τούτο, ἄλλον ἂν του δέοι λόγου. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ο Ἀκέβης. Μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ' ὅσι, σκόπει μόνον τούτο, εἰ βούλει ῥαβον μαθεῖν, ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ ξύλων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ ξυλλήβδην διαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν, περὶ πάντων εἰδομένω, ἢρ οὔτωσι γίγνεται Πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει δὴ τοιοῦτον τί, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον ποὺ καὶ δίκαιον ἄδικον, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἀμα ἀναγκαίον, ὅσοις ἔστι τὶ ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῶ ἐναντίον. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζον τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη ποὺ εἵ ἐλάττων ὅντος πρῶτον ἐπείτη μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; Ναι. Οὐκοῦν κἂν ἐλάττων γίγνηται, ἐκ 71 μεῖζονος ὅντος πρῶτον ὑστερον ἐλαττων γενήσεται; Ἕστων οὕτω, ἐφη. Καὶ μὴν εἴ ἵσχυρον τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάττων; Πάνω γε. Τί δὲ; ἂν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὖκ εἵ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, εἵ ἄδικωτέρον; Πῶς γὰρ οὗτος ἔφη, ἔχομεν τούτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται, εἵ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα; Πάνου γε. Τί δ' αὕ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιοῦτο ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον 244
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living are born only from the dead. But if this is not so, then some other argument would be needed."

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"Now," said he, "if you wish to find this out easily, do not consider the question with regard to men only, but with regard to all animals and plants, and, in short, to all things which may be said to have birth. Let us see with regard to all these, whether it is true that they are all born or generated only from their opposites, in case they have opposites, as for instance, the noble is the opposite of the disgraceful, the just of the unjust, and there are countless other similar pairs. Let us consider the question whether it is inevitable that everything which has an opposite be generated from its opposite and from it only. For instance, when anything becomes greater it must inevitably have been smaller and then have become greater."

"Yes."

"And if it becomes smaller, it must have been greater and then have become smaller?"

"That is true," said he.

"And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the slower from the quicker?"

"Certainly."

"And the worse from the better and the more just from the more unjust?"

"Of course."

"Then," said he, "we have this fact sufficiently established, that all things are generated in this way, opposites from opposites?"

"Certainly."

"Now then, is there between all these pairs of
μεταξὺ ἄμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν

Β ὅντων δύο γενέσεις, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἕτερου ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρον, ἀπὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἕτερον πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρον·

καὶ φύσεις, καὶ καλούμεν οὖτω τὸ μὲν

αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; Ναί, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ γνῶσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὖτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ

χρώμεθα τοῖς ὁνόμαις ἐνακοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὖτος ἔχειν ἀναγκαίον, γίνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε εἰναι ἐξ ἑκατέρου·

εἰς ἀλληλα; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἢ δὲ οὐς.

C 16. Τί οὖν; ἔφη. τῷ ξήν ἐστὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ὃσπερ τῷ ἐγρηγοροῖν τὸ καθεύδειν; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί; Τὸ τεθυναίναι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἐξ

ἀλλήλων τε γίνεται ταῦτα, εἰπὲν ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς μεταξὺ δύο

δυοῖν ὅντων; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν ἑτέραν συζύγων ὃν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, Ἕρω, ὁ Ἑωράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις·

σὺ δὲ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν,

τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγοροῖν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ

ἐγρηγοροῖν γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγοροῖν τὸ

D καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν κατα-

dαρθάνειν εἰναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἰκάνως σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Δέγε δὴ μοι καὶ

1 Schanz brackets ἐξ ἑκατέρου.
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opposites what may be called two kinds of generation, from one to the other and back again from the other to the first? Between a larger thing and a smaller thing there is increment and diminution and we call one increasing and the other decreasing, do we not?"

"Yes," said he.

"And similarly analysing and combining, and cooling and heating, and all opposites in the same way. Even if we do not in every case have the words to express it, yet in fact is it not always inevitable that there is a process of generation from each to the other?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "is there anything that is the opposite of living, as being awake is the opposite of sleeping?"

"Certainly," said Cebes.

"What?"

"Being dead," said he.

"Then these two are generated from each other, and as they are two, so the processes between them are two; is it not so?"

"Of course."

"Now," said Socrates, "I will tell about one of the two pairs of which I just spoke to you and its intermediate processes; and do you tell me about the other. I say one term is sleeping and the other is being awake, and being awake is generated from sleeping, and sleeping from being awake, and the processes of generation are, in the latter case, falling asleep, and in the former, waking up. Do you agree, or not?"

"Certainly."
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σύ, ἐφη, οὐτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φής τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; Ὑγωγη. Γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἄλληλων; Ναὶ. Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τὶ τὸ γεγομένου; Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἐφη. Τί δὲ, ἢ δὲ ὡς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος; Ἀναγκαῖον, ἐφη, ὀμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. Ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂρα, ὁ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντα τε καὶ οἱ Ξόντες γίγνονται; Φαινεται, ἐφη. Εἰς ἄρα, ἐφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἀιδοῦ. Ἐοικεν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν γενεσέων τῶν περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ’ ἔτερα σαφῆς οὐσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου, ἢ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὡς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτη χωλή ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν; Πάντως που, ἐφη. Τίνα ταύτην; Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὡς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ 72 ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; Πάνω γε. Ὁμολογεῖται ἂρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτη τοὺς 248
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"Now do you," said he, "tell me in this way about life and death. Do you not say that living is the opposite of being dead?"
"I do."
"And that they are generated one from the other?"
"Yes."
"Now what is it which is generated from the living?"
"The dead," said he.
"And what," said Socrates, "from the dead?"
"I can say only one thing—the living;"
"From the dead, then, Cebes, the living, both things and persons, are generated?"
"Evidently," said he.
"Then," said Socrates, "our souls exist in the other world."
"So it seems."
"And of the two processes of generation between these two, the one is plain to be seen; for surely dying is plain to be seen, is it not?"
"Certainly," said he.
"Well then," said Socrates, "what shall we do next? Shall we deny the opposite process, and shall nature be one-sided in this instance? Or must we grant that there is some process of generation the opposite of dying?"
"Certainly we must," said he.
"What is this process?"
"Coming to life again."
"Then," said Socrates, "if there be such a thing as coming to life again, this would be the process of generation from the dead to the living?"
"Certainly."
"So by this method also we reach the conclusion
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ξώντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἦττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν ξώντων· τούτου δὲ οὗτος ἰκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

17. Ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἄδικως ὁμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἑτέρα τοῖς ἑτέροις γεγόνει μεν ὡσπερει κύκλῳ περινόντα, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθείᾳ τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνου εἰς τὸ καταντικρύ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτέρον μηδὲ καμπήν ποιοῦτο, οἶος ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἄν σχοῖν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἄν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γυγνόμενα; Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ᾽ οἶον εἰ τὸ καταδραθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γυγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος,

ὅσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ᾽ ἀν λήρων τὸν Ἐνδυμώνα ἀποδείξειν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἀν φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ταύτων ἐκεῖνο πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνωτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνωτο δὲ μη, ταχὺ ἀν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἰη, ὀμοί πάντα χρήματα. ὡσάυτως δε, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, εἰ ἀποδηνήσκοι μὲν πάντα, ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δέ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχῆματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιωσκοίτο, ἄρ᾽ ού τολλη ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα

tεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ εκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θυήσκοι, τίς

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that the living are generated from the dead, just as much as the dead from the living; and since this is the case, it seems to me to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead exist somewhere, whence they come back to life.

"I think, Socrates, that results necessarily from our previous admissions."

"Now here is another method, Cebes, to prove, as it seems to me, that we were right in making those admissions. For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all."

"What do you mean?" said he.

"It is not at all hard," said Socrates, "to understand what I mean. For example, if the process of falling asleep existed, but not the opposite process of waking from sleep, in the end, you know, that would make the sleeping Endymion mere nonsense; he would be nowhere, for everything else would be in the same state as he, sound asleep. Or if all things were mixed together and never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras, 'all things are chaos,' would soon come true. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things that have life should die, and, when they had died, the dead should remain in that condition, is it not inevitable that at last all things would be dead and nothing alive? For if the living were generated from any other things than from the dead, and the living were to die, is
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μηχανή μή ού πάντα καταναλωθήναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖσ παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Ἐστιν γὰρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὐτώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῷ οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀναβιῶσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεωτῶν τούτων ζώντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς ἐίναι.”

18. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνόν γε τῶν λόγων ὁ Σώκρατες, εἴ ἀληθῆς ἔστιν, δυν σὺ εἰσώθας θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμυνσις τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμυνησκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἴ μὴ ἢν ποὺ ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων εἴδη γενέσθαι ὡστε καὶ ταύτη ἀδύνατον ἡ ψυχὴ τι ἐσοκεῖν εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ, ὁ Κέβης, ἐφη ὁ Σιμώνιας ὑπολαβὼν, ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπομνησίων με' οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι μέσων. Εὐν μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, καλῶς, ότι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἀνθρώποι, εάν τις καλὸς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτὸι λέγουσιν πάντα ἢ ἐχεῖ· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστῆμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὄρθος λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οὗτον τοῦτο ποιήσαι. ἔπειτα έάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα Β ἅγη ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἐχεῖ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ

1 After εἶναι the MSS. read καὶ ταῖς μὲν γε ἀγαθάς ἔμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακάς κάκιον, “and that the good fare better and the bad worse.” Bracketed by Stallbaum, followed by Schanz, Burnet, and others.

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there any escape from the final result that all things would be swallowed up in death?"

"I see none, Socrates," said Cebees. "What you say seems to be perfectly true."

"I think, Cebees," said he, "it is absolutely so, and we are not deluded in making these admissions, but the return to life is an actual fact, and it is a fact that the living are generated from the dead and that the souls of the dead exist."

"And besides," Cebees rejoined, "if it is true, Socrates, as you are fond of saying, that our learning is nothing else than recollection, then this would be an additional argument that we must necessarily have learned in some previous time what we now remember. But this is impossible if our soul did not exist somewhere before being born in this human form; and so by this argument also it appears that the soul is immortal."

"But, Cebees," said Simmias, "what were the proofs of this? Remind me; for I do not recollect very well just now."

"Briefly," said Cebees, "a very good proof is this: When people are questioned, if you put the questions well, they answer correctly of themselves about everything; and yet if they had not within them some knowledge and right reason, they could not do this. And that this is so is shown most clearly if you take them to mathematical diagrams or anything of that sort."

"And if you are not convinced in that way,
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taút̂η ge, ἔφη, πείθει, ὁ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι, ἀν τῇδε πῇ σοι σκοπούμενος συνδόξης. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ δή, πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἐστίν; Ἀπιστῶ μὲν σοι ἔγωγε, ἥ δ᾽ ὁ Σιμμίας, οὐ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι μαθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἔξων Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἢδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι: οὔδεν μὲντ' ἄν ἢττον ἀκούσμι νῦν, πῇ σῷ ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν. Τῇδ᾽ ἔγωγε, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθῆσεται, δεῖν αὐτῶν τοῦτο πρῶτον ποτὲ ἐπιστασθαι. Πάνω γ', ἔφη. Ἀρ' οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγγέληται τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμμησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τινα τρόπον τόνδε: εάν τίς τι ἢ ἢ ἢ ἢ καθώς ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσεων λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἄλλα καὶ ἐπεροῦν ἐννοήσῃ, οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλ' ἄλλη, ἃρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἔλαβεν; Πῶς λέγεις; Ὅλον τὰ τοιάδε: ἄλλη πόν ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ὅυκοῦν οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ ἔρασται, ὅταν ἦσσον λύραν ἢ ἔματιον ἢ ἄλλο τι οἶς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἰσθε χρήσθαι, πάσχοις τοῦτον ἐγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἴδος τοῦ παιδός, οὐ ἢ τῇ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμμησις; ὅσπερ καὶ Σιμμίαος τὴν ἢ ἢ πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη, καὶ ἄλλα πόν μυρία τοιαύτῃ ἀν εἰη. Μυρία μέντοι νῇ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ᾽ ὃς, τὸ τοιούτου ἀνάμμησις τίς ἐστί; μάλιστα

1 After τι BCD read πρῶτον, which Schanz brackets. T reads τι ἐτερον τι, Burnet τι ἐτερον.
Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you don't agree when you look at it in this way. You are incredulous, are you not, how that which is called learning can be recollection?

"I am not incredulous," said Simmias, "but I want just what we are talking about, recollection. And from what Cebes undertook to say I already begin to recollect and be convinced; nevertheless, I should like to hear what you were going to say."

"It was this," said he. "We agree, I suppose, that if anyone is to remember anything, he must know it at some previous time?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Then do we agree to this also, that when knowledge comes in such a way, it is recollection? What I mean is this: If a man, when he has heard or seen or in any other way perceived a thing, knows not only that thing, but also has a perception of some other thing, the knowledge of which is not the same, but different, are we not right in saying that he recollects the thing of which he has the perception?"

"What do you mean?"

"Let me give an example. Knowledge of a man is different from knowledge of a lyre."

"Of course."

"Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples."

"To be sure you could," said Simmias.

"Now," said he, "is that sort of thing a kind of
PLATO

μέντοι, ὅταν τις τούτο πάθη περὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἄ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἢδη ἐπελέληστο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; ἢ δ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἔστιν ἵππου γεγραμμένον ἰδοντα καὶ λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδοντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδοντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ

74 Σιμμίαν ἀναμνησθῆναι; Ἐστι μέντοι, ἔφη.

19. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταύτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ’ ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; Συμβαίνει. Ἀλλ’ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμμηνήσκηται τίς τι, ἢ τινα ἀναγκαίον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τούτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκεῖνόν οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Σκόπει δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὅσ’, εἰ ταύτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν ποῦ τι εἶναι ἵσον, οὐ ξύλων λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθων λίθῳ οὐδ’ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταύτα πάντα ἔτερον τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἵσον φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;

Β Φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δι’, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε. Ἡ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ δ’ ἔστιν; Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ’ ὅσ. Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τινα ἢ τινα τὸν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδοντες ἵσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο
PHAEDO

recollected? Especially when it takes place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and inattention?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Well, then," said Socrates, "can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?"

"Surely."

"And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?"

"Yes," said he.

"All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?"

"Yes."

"And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?"

"Inevitably," he replied.

"Now see," said he, "if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?"

"We shall say that there is," said Simmias, "most decidedly."

"And do we know what it is?"

"Certainly," said he.

"Whence did we derive the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we were just speaking of? Did we not, by seeing equal pieces of wood
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ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἔτερον δὲ τούτων; ἢ ὦχ ἔτερον σοι
φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῆς. ἀρ' οὐ λίθοι μὲν
ἰσοὶ καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτα ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἵσα
φαίνεται, τῷ δ' οὐ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ;
αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα ἑστιν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἢ

Κ

ἰσότης ἀνισότης; Οὐδεπώπτοτε γε, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Οὐ ταῦταν ἄρα ἑστίν, ἢ δ' ὦς, ταὐτά τε τὰ ἱσα
καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ ἱσων. Οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὁ
Σώκρατες. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ', ἐφη, τῶν
ἰσων, ἔτερων ὄντων ἐκεῖνων τού ἱσων, ὅμως αὐτοῦ
τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννεοήκας τε καὶ εἰληφας; Ἀλη-
θέστατα, ἐφη, λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίοι ὄντος
toútois ἢ ἀνομοίοι; Πάνω γε. Διαφέρει δὲ γε,
ἡ δ' ὦς, οὐδέν' ἐως ἄν ἄλλο ἱδών ἄπο ταὐτῆς τῆς

D

ὀψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσης, εἰτε ὁμοίοι εἰτε ἀνόμοιοι,
ἀναγκαίοι, ἐφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. Πάνω
μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ; ἢ δ' ὦς: ἡ πάσχομεν τι τοιοῦ-
tον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οĩς νῦν ἢ
ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἵσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται ἦμῖν οὖτως ἵσα
εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ δ' ἑστιν ἵσον, ἢ ἐνδεί τι ἐκεῖνο
τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἵσον, ἢ οὐδέν; Καὶ
πολύ γε, ἐφη, ἐνδεί. Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν
tis τι ἱδῶν ἐννοήςη, ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τούτο, δ

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or stones or other things, derive from them a knowledge of abstract equality, which is another thing? Or do you not think it is another thing? Look at the matter in this way. Do not equal stones and pieces of wood, though they remain the same, sometimes appear to us equal in one respect and unequal in another?"

"Certainly."

"Well, then, did absolute equals ever appear to you unequal or equality inequality?"

"No, Socrates, never."

"Then," said he, "those equals are not the same as equality in the abstract."

"Not at all, I should say, Socrates."

"But from those equals," said he, "which are not the same as abstract equality, you have nevertheless conceived and acquired knowledge of it?"

"Very true," he replied.

"And it is either like them or unlike them?"

"Certainly."

"It makes no difference," said he. "Whenever the sight of one thing brings you a perception of another, whether they be like or unlike, that must necessarily be recollection."

"Surely."

"Now then," said he, "do the equal pieces of wood and the equal things of which we were speaking just now affect us in this way: Do they seem to us to be equal as abstract equality is equal, or do they somehow fall short of being like abstract equality?"

"They fall very far short of it," said he.

"Do we agree, then, that when anyone on seeing a thing thinks, 'This thing that I see aims at being
νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, εἶναι οἶον ἄλλο τι τῶν οὐντων, ἐνδεῖ
δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἶον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’
ἐστὶν φαιλότερον, ἀναγκαῖον ποὺ τὸν τοῦτο
ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο φησιν αὐτὸ
προσεικέναι μὲν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν; Ἀν-
άγκη. Τὶ οὖν; τοιοῦτον πεπόθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς,
ἡ οὐ, περί τε τὰ ἱσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον; Παντά-
πασὶ γε. Ἀναγκαῖον ἁρὰ ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ
75 ἱσον πρὸ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ χρόνου, ὡτε τὸ πρώτον
ιδόντες τὰ ἱσα ἐννοήσαμεν, ὡτι ὀρέγεται μὲν
πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἶον τὸ ἱσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐν-
δεεστέρως. Ἐστι ταῦτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε
ὁμολογοῦμεν, μη ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννοηκέναι μηδὲ
dυνατόν εἶναι ἐννοήσαι, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκ του ἰδείν ἢ
ἀφασθαι ἢ ἐκ τινος ἁλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταυτών
δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. Ταυτῶν γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ
Σώκρατες, πρὸς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος.
Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεὶ ἐννοῆσαι,
ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέ-
γεται τοῦ δ ἐστίν ἵσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεεστερά
ἐστιν; ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; Οὐτως. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα
ἀρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὅρᾶν καὶ ἄκουειν καὶ τάλλα
αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει ποὺ εἰθηφότας ἐπιστήμην
αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἱσον ὃ τι ἐστὶν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν
αἰσθήσεων ἱσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὡτι προθυμεῖται
μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ’ εἶναι οἶον ἐκεῖνο, ἐστὶν δὲ αὐτοῦ
φαιλότερα.1 Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὃ
Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὖθυς ἐωρῶμεν τε

1 Schanz brackets δὴ προθυμεῖται . . . φαιλότερα.
like some other thing that exists, but falls short and is unable to be like that thing, but is inferior to it,' he who thinks thus must of necessity have previous knowledge of the thing which he says the other resembles but falls short of?"

"We must."

"Well then, is this just what happened to us with regard to the equal things and equality in the abstract?"

"It certainly is."

"Then we must have had knowledge of equality before the time when we first saw equal things and thought, 'All these things are aiming to be like equality but fall short.'"

"That is true."

"And we agree, also, that we have not gained knowledge of it, and that it is impossible to gain this knowledge, except by sight or touch or some other of the senses? I consider that all the senses are alike."

"Yes, Socrates, they are all alike, for the purposes of our argument."

"Then it is through the senses that we must learn that all sensible objects strive after absolute equality and fall short of it. Is that our view?"

"Yes."

"Then before we began to see or hear or use the other senses we must somewhere have gained a knowledge of abstract or absolute equality, if we were to compare with it the equals which we perceive by the senses, and see that all such things yearn to be like abstract equality but fall short of it."

"That follows necessarily from what we have said before, Socrates."
καὶ ἥκοιμος καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἶχομεν;

C Πάνω γε. Ὁθεὶ δὲ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν
tοῦ ἱσον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι; Ναι. Πρὶν
gενέσθαι άρα, ός έοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἥμιν αὐτὴν
eἰληφέναι. Ἄοικεν.

20. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ
gενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἔγενόμεθα, ἥπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν
gενέσθαι καὶ εὑθὺς γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἱσον καὶ
tὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἄλλα καὶ ξύμπαντα τὰ
tοιαῦτα; οὔ γάρ περὶ τοῦ ἱσον νῦν ὁ λόγος ἥμιν
μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ αὐτοῦ
tοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὅσιου, καὶ, ὅπερ λέγω,

D περὶ ἀπαντῶν οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τὸ ὃ ἔστι,
καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἑρωτήσεσιν ἑρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς
ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον
ἡμῖν τούτων πάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ
gενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. Ἡστι ταῦτα. Καὶ εἰ
μὲν γε λαβόντες ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἑπιλελήσμεθα,
eἰδότας ἂεὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ βίου εἰδέναι· τὸ
γάρ εἰδέναι τοῦτο ἔστιν, λαβόντα τοὺς ἐπιστήμην
ἐχειν καὶ μὴ ἀποκλεικέναι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λήθην
λέγομεν, ὃ Σιμμία, ἐπιστήμης ἀποβολήν; Πάν-

Ε τοὺς δὴπου, ἕφη, ὃ Σώκρατες. Εἴ δὲ γε, οἶμαι,
λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γεγονόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν,
ὑστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεις χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ
ἐκείναις ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας, ἂς ποτὲ

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"And we saw and heard and had the other senses as soon as we were born?"
"Certainly."
"But, we say, we must have acquired a knowledge of equality before we had these senses?"
"Yes."
"Then it appears that we must have acquired it before we were born."
"It does."
"Now if we had acquired that knowledge before we were born, and were born with it, we knew before we were born and at the moment of birth not only the equal and the greater and the less, but all such abstractions? For our present argument is no more concerned with the equal than with absolute beauty and the absolute good and the just and the holy, and, in short, with all those things which we stamp with the seal of 'absolute' in our dialectic process of questions and answers; so that we must necessarily have acquired knowledge of all these before our birth."
"That is true."
"And if, after acquiring it we have not, in each case, forgotten it, we must always be born knowing these things, and must know them throughout our life; for to know is to have acquired knowledge and to have retained it without losing it, and the loss of knowledge is just what we mean when we speak of forgetting, is it not, Simmias?"
"Certainly, Socrates," said he.
"But, I suppose, if we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth, but afterwards by the use of our senses regained the knowledge which we had previously possessed, would not the process
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καὶ πρὶν ἐξιχμεν, ἃρ' οὖχ δ' καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἄν εἶη; τοῦτο δέ πον ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαι λέγοντες ὅρθως ἄν λέγοιμεν; Πάνω γε. Δυνατὸν γὰρ ὅ τοῦτὸ 76 γε ἐφάνη, αἴσθομενόν τι ἣ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἔτερον τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐμνήσαι, ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ὃ τοῦτο ἐπιλησίαξεν ἀνόμοιον ὅμως ὅστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν τὰ ἔτερα, ἥτοι ἐπιστάμενοι γε αὐτὰ γεγονεμένας καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὑστερον, οὔς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὔδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ ἀναμμυνήσκονται οὕτω, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμμησις ἄν εἶη. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὁ Σώκρατες.

21. Πότερον οὖν αἴρει, ὁ Σιμμία, ἐπισταμέ- Β νυς ἢμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμμυνήσκεσθαι ύστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἣμεν; Οὐκ ἔχω, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθαι. Τί δὲ τόδε; ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ· ἀνήρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὃν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἀν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὐ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ἡ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; Βουλοῦμην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὕριον τὴν καὶ δια οὐκέτι ἢ ἀνθρώπων υῦδε ἄξιως οἶδος τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. Οὐκ ἀρὰ δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι γε, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτὰ; Οὐδαμῶς.
which we call learning really be recovering knowledge which is our own? And should we be right in calling this recollection?"

"Assuredly."

"For we found that it is possible, on perceiving a thing by the sight or the hearing or any other sense, to call to mind from that perception another thing which had been forgotten, which was associated with the thing perceived, whether like it or unlike it; so that, as I said, one of two things is true, either we are all born knowing these things and know them all our lives, or afterwards, those who are said to learn merely remember, and learning would then be recollection."

"That is certainly true, Socrates."

"Which then do you choose, Simmias? Were we born with the knowledge, or do we recollect afterwards things of which we had acquired knowledge before our birth?"

"I cannot choose at this moment, Socrates."

"How about this question? You can choose and you have some opinion about it: When a man knows, can he give an account of what he knows or not?"

"Certainly he can, Socrates."

"And do you think that everybody can give an account of the matters about which we have just been talking?"

"I wish they might," said Simmias; "but on the contrary I fear that to-morrow, at this time, there will be no longer any man living who is able to do so properly."

"Then, Simmias, you do not think all men know these things?"

"By no means."
'Αναμμυνήσκονται ἀρα ἃ ποτε ἐμαθοῦν; 'Ανάγκη.
Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄφ’ οὐ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγόναμεν. 
Οὐ δὴ τα. Πρότερον ἄρα. Ναι. 'ὴσαν ἄρα, ὡς Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι 
ἐν ἀνθρώπων εἰδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν 
eἰχον. Εἰ μὴ ἄρα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὡς 
Σώκρατες, ταῦτα τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὕτως γὰρ 
Δ λείπεται ἐτὶ ὁ χρόνος. Ἐιπεν, ὡς ἐταύρε. ἀπόλλυμεν 
de αὐτᾶς ἐν ποίῳ ἀλλῳ χρόνῳ; οὐ γὰρ 
δὴ ἔχοντες γε αὐτᾶς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὁμολογή-
σαμεν; ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν, ἐν φίπτερ καὶ 
λαμβάνομεν; ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; 
Οὐδαμῶς, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτῶν 
oύδεν εἰπόνων.

22. Ἄρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὡς Σιμμία; 
eἰ μὲν ἔστιν ὃ θρυλοῦμεν ἂεί, καλὸν τε καὶ 
ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ 
ταῦτα τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέ-

Ε ῥομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὕσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἑκείνη ἀπεικάζομεν, 
ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὡσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως 
καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχήν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι 
ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰς ἃν ὁ λόγος 
οὕτως εἰρημένος εἰς; ἄρ’ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐστὶ 
ἀνάγκη ταύτα τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς 
πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ
PHAEDO

"Then they recollect the things they once learned?"

"Necessarily."

"When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Surely not after we were born as human beings."

"Certainly not."

"Then previously."

"Yes."

"Then, Simmias, the souls existed previously, before they were in human form, apart from bodies, and they had intelligence."

"Unless, Socrates, we acquire these ideas at the moment of birth; for that time still remains."

"Very well, my friend. But at what other time do we lose them? For we are surely not born with them, as we just now agreed. Do we lose them at the moment when we receive them, or have you some other time to suggest?"

"None whatever, Socrates. I did not notice that I was talking nonsense."

"Then, Simmias," said he, "is this the state of the case? If, as we are always saying, the beautiful exists, and the good, and every essence of that kind, and if we refer all our sensations to these, which we find existed previously and are now ours, and compare our sensations with these, is it not a necessary inference that just as these abstractions exist, so our souls existed before we were born; and if these abstractions do not exist, our argument is of no force? Is this the case, and is it equally certain that provided these things exist our souls also existed before we were born, and that if these do not exist, neither did our souls?"
τάδε; Ἡπερφυῖς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμᾶς, δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὄμοιως εἶναι τὴν 77 τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἵνα σὺ λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε οὐδὲν οὔτω μοι ἐναργεῖς διὸ ὃς τούτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτ’ εἶναι ὡς οἶδον τε μάλιστα, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τάλλα πάντα δ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες· καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἰκανὸς ἀποδείκται. Τί δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἐφ’ ὁ Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν. Ἰκανὸς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμᾶς, ὡς ἔγωγε οἶμαι· καίτοι καρτερώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἐστιν πρὸς τὸ ἀπιστεῖν τοὺς λόγους· ἀλλ’ οἶμαι οὐκ ἐνδέως τούτο τετείθαι αὐτὸν, ὅτι πρὶν

B γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ.

23. Εἰ μέντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἔτι ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποδείκται, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐνέστηκεν, δ νῦν δὴ Κέβης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθησκοῦντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διασκεδαζόμεθα ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ αὐτή τοῦ εἶναι τούτο τέλος ἦ. τί γὰρ κωλύει γίγνεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν καὶ ξυνίστασθαι ἀλλοθὲν ποθὲν καὶ εἰναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπειον σῶμα ἀφικεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀφίκηται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτου, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτᾶν καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;

C Εὖ λέγεις, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμᾶ, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ ὡσπερ ἡμῶν ἀποδείχθαι οὐ δεῖ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή· δεῖ δὲ προσαποδείξεις ὅτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὐδὲν ἦττον ἔσται ἢ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἢ ἀποδεῖξις έχειν. Ἀποδείκται μὲν, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμᾶ τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, 268
"Socrates, it seems to me that there is absolutely the same certainty, and our argument comes to the excellent conclusion that our soul existed before we were born, and that the essence of which you speak likewise exists. For there is nothing so clear to me as this, that all such things, the beautiful, the good, and all the others of which you were speaking just now, have a most real existence. And I think the proof is sufficient."

"But how about Cebes?" said Socrates. "For Cebes must be convinced, too."

"He is fully convinced, I think," said Simmias; "and yet he is the most obstinately incredulous of mortals. Still, I believe he is quite convinced of this, that our soul existed before we were born. However, that it will still exist after we die does not seem even to me to have been proved, Socrates, but the common fear, which Cebes mentioned just now, that when a man dies the soul is dispersed and this is the end of his existence, still remains. For assuming that the soul comes into being and is brought together from some source or other and exists before it enters into a human body, what prevents it, after it has entered into and left that body, from coming to an end and being destroyed itself?"

"You are right, Simmias," said Cebes. "It seems to me that we have proved only half of what is required, namely, that our soul existed before our birth. But we must also show that it exists after we are dead as well as before our birth, if the proof is to be perfect."

"It has been shown, Simmias and Cebes, already," said Socrates, "if you will combine this conclusion
καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθεῖναι τούτον τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταύταν καὶ ὅν πρὸ τοῦτον ὁμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γύγνεσθαι πάν τὸ ξών ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ιούσῃ τε καὶ γιγαντέμενη μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γύγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδῆ γε δεὶ αὐθίς αὐτήν γύγνεσθαι; ἀποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγετε καὶ νῦν.

24. Ὁμος δὲ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τε καὶ Σιμμίας ἴδεως ἂν καὶ τούτων διαπραγματεύσασθαί τοῖς λόγοις ἐτί μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδεῖναι τοῖς παιδῶν, μή ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἀνέμος αὐτῆς ἐκβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος διαφυσᾶ καὶ διασκεδάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μὴ ἐν νηνεμίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθησάσω. καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσασθα. Ὁς δεδιότων, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, πειρῶ ἀναπέθειν μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἐν τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παιδί, ὡστὶς τὰ τουαῦτα φοβεῖται τούτων οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδεῖναι τὸν θάνατον ὡστε τὰ μορφολύκεια. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδειν αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας, ἐως ἐν ἐκπατήτη.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἐπωδόν ληψόμεθα, ἐπειδή σὺ, ἐφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις; Πολλὴ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐν ἡ ἐνεισὶν ποῦ ἀγαθοὶ ἀνδρεῖς, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οὐς πάντας χρή διερευνάσθαι ξητοῦντας τοιούτων ἐπωδόν, μήτε χρημάτων φεδομένους μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι ἁν ἀναγκαίοτερον ἀναλύσοιτε χρήματα. ξητεῖν δὲ χρή καὶ αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἵσως 270
with the one we reached before, that every living being is born from the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and, when it comes into life and is born, cannot be born from anything else than death and a state of death, must it not also exist after dying, since it must be born again? So the proof you call for has already been given. However, I think you and Simmias would like to carry on this discussion still further. You have the childish fear that when the soul goes out from the body the wind will really blow it away and scatter it, especially if a man happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather."

And Cebes laughed and said, "Assume that we have that fear, Socrates, and try to convince us; or rather, do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child within us, who has such fears. Let us try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin."

"Ah," said Socrates, "you must sing charms to him every day until you charm away his fear."

"Where then, Socrates," said he, "shall we find a good singer of such charms, since you are leaving us?"

"Hellas, Cebes," he replied, "is a large country, in which there are many good men, and there are many foreign peoples also. You ought to search through all of them in quest of such a charmer, sparing neither money nor toil, for there is no greater need for which you could spend your money. And you must seek among yourselves, too, for
PLATO

γὰρ ἂν οὔδὲ ῥάδιως εὑροίτε μᾶλλον ὑμῶν δύνα-
μένους τούτο ποιεῖν. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν δή, ἐφη,
ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης. οὔθεν δὲ ἀπελέπομεν, ἐπανέλ-
θωμεν, εἰ σοι ἡδομένῳ-ἐστίν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδο-
μένῳ γε' πῶς γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Καλῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.

25. Οὐκοίν τοιόνδε τι, ἢ δ᾽ ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης,
δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐρέσθαι ἑαυτούς, τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ ἄρα
προσήκει τούτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν, τὸ διασκεδάν-
νυσθαι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποίου τινὸς δεδίεναι μὴ
πάθη αὐτὸ, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινὶ οὐ καὶ μετὰ τούτο
αὐ ἐπισκέψασθαι, πότερον ἡ ψυχὴ ἔστιν, καὶ ἐκ
τοῦτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδίεναι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας
ψυχῆς; Ἄληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις. Ἀρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν
C συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει
τούτο πάσχειν, διαρεθῆναι ταυτή ἢπερ συνε-
τέθη; εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει ὅν ἀξίωθεν, τοῦτῳ μόνῳ
προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταύτα, εἰπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ;
Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη, οὔτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐκοίν
ἀπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὀσαύτως ἔχει, ταυτα
μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀξίωθεν, ἀ δὲ ἄλλοτ'
ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταυτα, ταυτα δὲ
einai ta súntheta; Ἐμούγε δοκεῖ οὔτως. Ἰωμεν
D δὴ, ἐφη, ἐπὶ ταυτα ἐφ' ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν
λόγῳ. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἡς λόγον δίδομεν τὸ εἴναι
καὶ ἑρωτώντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι, πότερον ὅσαύ-
tως ἀεὶ ἔχει κατὰ ταυτα ἡ ἄλλοι άλλως; αὐτὸ
tὸ ἔσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστίν,
τὸ δὲ, μὴ ποτὲ μεταβολῆν καὶ ἡμινοῦν ἐνδεχεται;
ἡ ἂεὶ αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐστί, μονοειδὲς ὅν αὐτὸ
perhaps you would hardly find others better able
to do this than you."

"That," said Cebs, "shall be done. But let us
return to the point where we left off, if you are
willing."

"Oh, I am willing, of course."

"Good," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "must we not ask
ourselves some such question as this? What kind of
thing naturally suffers dispersion, and for what kind
of thing might we naturally fear it, and again
what kind of thing is not liable to it? And after
this must we not inquire to which class the soul
belongs and base our hopes or fears for our souls upon
the answers to these questions?"

"You are quite right," he replied.

"Now is not that which is compounded and com-
posite naturally liable to be decomposed, in the same
way in which it was compounded? And if anything is
uncompounded is not that, if anything, naturally
unlikely to be decomposed?"

"I think," said Cebs, "that is true."

"Then it is most probable that things which are
always the same and unchanging are the uncom-
pounded things and the things that are changing and
never the same are the composite things?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Let us then," said he, "turn to what we were
discussing before. Is the absolute essence, which we
in our dialectic process of question and answer call
ture being, always the same or is it liable to change?
Absolute equality, absolute beauty, any absolute
existence, true being—do they ever admit of any
change whatsoever? Or does each absolute essence,
καθ' αυτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται; Ἡσαύτως, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὁ Σώκρατες. Τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπων ή ἐπτῶν ή ἰματίων ή ἄλλων ὀντινωνοῦν τοιούτων, ή ἴσων ή καλῶν ή πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὄμωνύμων; ἀρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ πάν τοῦν- αντίον ἐκείνως οὕτε αὑτὰ αὐτοῖς οὕτε ἀλλήλως οὐδέποτε, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταύτα; Οὔτως, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης· οὐδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει.

79 Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄσφαλοι κἂν ἴδοις κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσιν αἴσθοιο, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντων οὐκ ἔστων ὅτω ποτ' ἂν ἄλλω ἐπιλάβοι τῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ λογισμῷ, ἄλλῃ ἔστιν ἀειδῇ τὰ τοιαύτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατὰ; Πάνταπασιν, ἔφη, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

26. Ὁδὲν οὐν βούλειν, ἔφη, δύο εἶδη τῶν ὑντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδὲς; Ὁδὲν, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀειδὲς ἅει κατὰ ταύτα ἔχων, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα; Καὶ τούτο, ἔφη, ὁδὲν.

Β Φέρε δή, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἀλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. Ποτέρω οἷν ὁμοίοτερον τῷ εἰδεῖ φαίμεν ἄν εἶναι καὶ ἐνυγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; Παντὶ, ἔφη, τούτῳ γε δήλον, ὦτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀειδὲς; Οὐχ ὑπ' ἄνθρωπων γε, ὁ Σώκρατες,
since it is uniform and exists by itself, remain the same and never in any way admit of any change?"

"It must," said Ceber, "necessarily remain the same, Socrates."

"But how about the many things, for example, men, or horses, or cloaks, or any other such things, which bear the same names as the absolute essences and are called beautiful or equal or the like? Are they always the same? Or are they, in direct opposition to the essences, constantly changing in themselves, unlike each other, and, so to speak, never the same?"

"The latter," said Ceber; "they are never the same."

"And you can see these and touch them and perceive them by the other senses, whereas the things which are always the same can be grasped only by the reason, and are invisible and not to be seen?"

"Certainly," said he, "that is true."

"Now," said he, "shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?"

"Let us assume them," said Ceber.

"And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?"

"Let us assume that also," said he.

"Well then," said Socrates, "are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?"

"Yes," he replied.

"Now to which class should we say the body is more similar and more closely akin?"

"To the visible," said he; "that is clear to everyone."

"And the soul? Is it visible or invisible?"

"Invisible, to man, at least, Socrates."
έφη. Ἡ λέγουσιν γε τὰ ὀρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει λέγομεν· ἡ ἄλλη τινὶ οἶει· ἦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Τί οὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὅρατον ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; Οὐχ ὥρατον. 'Αειδῆς ἂρα; Ναὶ. ὁμοίωτον ἂρα ψυχή σώματος ἦστιν τῷ ἀειδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὑρατῷ. Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σώκρατες.

27. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε πάλαι λέγομεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν τῷ σώματι προσχρηται εἰς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἡ διὰ τοῦ ὀράμα καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ δὲ ἄλλης τινὸς αἰσθήσεως· τοῦτο γάρ ἦστιν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεων σκοπεῖν τι· τότε μὲν ἐλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴ πλανάται καὶ ταράττεται καὶ ἕλεγχον ὁσπερ μεθύουσα, ἀτε τοιούτων ἑφαπτομένης. Πάνω γε. "Ὅταν δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἐκεῖσε οὖχεται εἴς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπὸ καὶ ἀδάνατον καὶ ὁσιάτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενής οὔσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ' ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅταντερ αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἔξή αὐτῆς, καὶ πέπαυται τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὁσιάτως ἔχει, ἀτε τοιούτων ἑφαπτομένης καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; Παντότες, ἐφη, καλῶς καὶ ἄλθη λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ποτέρον οὖν αὐτοὶ δοκεῖ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐμπροσθέν καὶ ἐκ 276
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"But we call things visible and invisible with reference to human vision, do we not?"
"Yes, we do."
"Then what do we say about the soul? Can it be seen or not?"
"It cannot be seen."
"Then it is invisible?"
"Yes."
"Then the soul is more like the invisible than the body is, and the body more like the visible."
"Necessarily, Socrates."
"Now we have also been saying for a long time, have we not, that, when the soul makes use of the body for any inquiry, either through seeing or hearing or any of the other senses—for inquiry through the body means inquiry through the senses,—then it is dragged by the body to things which never remain the same, and it wanders about and is confused and dizzy like a drunken man because it lays hold upon such things?"
"Certainly."
"But when the soul inquires alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so?"
"Socrates," said he, "what you say is perfectly right and true."
"And now again, in view of what we said before and of what has just been said, to which
Ε τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ψυχὴ ὁμοίτερον εἶναι καὶ ἔννογενέστερον; Πάς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὡς, συν-χωρήσαι, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐκ ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ ὁμοίωντερόν ἔστιν ψυχὴ τῷ ἀεὶ ὀσάυτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή. Τί δὲ τὸ σῶμα; Τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

28. Ὄρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε, ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὃς τῇ ψυχῆ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάται, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὐτὸ πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιοῦν τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θυτῷ; ὡς ὁ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ μὲν θείῳν ὅπων ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἤγεμονινειν πεφυκέναι, τῷ δὲ θητῷν ἀρχεσθαι καὶ καὶ δουλεύειν; Ἐμοῦγε. Ποτέρῳ οὖν ἡ ψυχή ἐοικεν; Δήλα δὴ, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχή τῷ θείῳ, τῷ δὲ σῶμα τῷ θυτῷ. Σκόπτει δὴ, ἕφη, ὡς Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν ἔννοβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὀσάυτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι εὐαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυ-χήν, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θυτῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνυότῳ καὶ ἀδιαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι εὐαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ εἶναι σῶμα. ἔχομεν τι παρὰ ταύτα ἀλλο λέγειν, ὡς φίλε Κέβης, ἡ οὐχ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει; Οὐκ ἔχομεν.

29. Τί οὖν; τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἀρ' οὐχὶ σῶματος μὲν ταχὺ διαλύεσθαι προσήκει, ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτὸ παράπαν ἀδιαλύτῳ εἶναι ἡ ἐγγύς τι τού-
class do you think the soul has greater likeness and kinship?"

"I think, Socrates," said he, "that anyone, even the dullest, would agree, after this argument that the soul is infinitely more like that which is always the same than that which is not."

"And the body?"

"Is more like the other."

"Consider, then, the matter in another way. When the soul and the body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you not think that the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?"

"Yes, I think so."

"Which, then, does the soul resemble?"

"Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal."

"Then see, Ceaces, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say anything, my dear Ceaces, to show that this is not so?"

"No, we cannot."

"Well then, since this is the case, is it not natural for the body to meet with speedy dissolution and for the soul, on the contrary, to be entirely indissoluble, or nearly so?"
C του; Πώς γὰρ οὗ; Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν ἀποθάνη ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ μὲν ὅρατον αὐτοῦ, τὸ σώμα, καὶ ἐν ὅρατῳ κεῖμεν, ὃ δὲ νεκρὸν καλοῦμεν, ὃς προσήκει διαλύσθαι καὶ διαπίπτειν, οὐκ εὔθυς τούτων οὐδὲν πέπονθεν, ἀλλὰ ἐπιεικῶς συχνῶν ἐπιμένει χρόνων, εἰ δὲν τοις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σώμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὠρᾳ, καὶ πάντως μᾶλα. συμπεσον γὰρ τὸ σώμα καὶ ταριχευθέντες, ὅσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ταριχευθέντες, ὅλογαν ὅλον μένει αἰμήκανον ὅσον χρόνον.1 ἔνια δὲ μέρη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἂν σαπῆ, ὡστά τε καὶ νεύρα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὅμως ὡς ἔποσ εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατα ἐστὶν ἡ οὖ; Ναί. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ ἀειδής, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχόμενον γενναίον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀειδής, εἰς Ἄιδον ὡς ἀληθῶς, παρὰ τὸν ἁγαθὸν καὶ φρονιμον θεόν, οὐ, ἂν θεός ἑκλή, αὐτίκα καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἱτέον, αὕτη δὲ δὴ ἠμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκὼν ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὔθυς διαπεφύσηται καὶ ἀπόλολεν, ὡς φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀνθρώποι; Ε πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὃ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμμία, ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον φῶς ἔχει· εἰ δὲν καθαρᾳ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος ἔννομον κοιμώμεθα, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲν κοιμώμουσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκοῦσα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθροιοσμένη 2 αὕτη εἰς ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλὰ μελετῶσα ἀλλ᾽ τοῦτο—τοῦτο δὲ οὕνεν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἡ ὥρθος φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι τεβνάναι μελετῶσα.3 ἡ οὖ τούτῳ ἀν εἴη

1 Schanz brackets συμπεσον . . . χρόνον.
3 The MSS. read μελετῶσα μᾶθεις. Schanz brackets μᾶθεις.
"Of course."

"Observe," he went on, "that when a man dies, the visible part of him, the body, which lies in the visible world and which we call the corpse, which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition, does not undergo these processes at once, but remains for a considerable time, and even for a very long time, if death takes place when the body is in good condition, and at a favourable time of the year. For when the body is shrunk and embalmed, as is done in Egypt, it remains almost entire for an incalculable time. And even if the body decay, some parts of it, such as the bones and sinews and all that, are, so to speak, indestructible. Is not that true?"

"Yes."

"But the soul, the invisible, which departs into another place which is, like itself, noble and pure and invisible, to the realm of the god of the other world in truth, to the good and wise god, whither, if God will, my soul is soon to go,—is this soul, which has such qualities and such a nature, straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say? Far from it, dear Cebes and Simmias, but the truth is much rather this:—if it departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone, since this has always been its constant study—but this means nothing else than that it pursued philosophy rightly and really practised being in a state of death: or is not this the practice of death?"
μελέτη θανάτου; Παντάπασι γε. Ούκοιν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὤμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀείδες ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεόν τε καὶ ἄθανατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ ἀφικομένῃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι, πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωποείων ἀπηλλαγμένη, ὧσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμυημένων, ὑστερθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διάγοισα; οὕτω φῶμεν, ὁ Κέβης, ἡ ἄλλως;

30. Οὕτω νη Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 'Εαν δὲ γε, Β οἷμαι, μεμασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττησαι, ἄτε τῷ σώματι ἂν ἐξούσια καὶ τούτῳ θεραπεύοντα καὶ ἔρωσα καὶ γεγονητευμένη ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὅστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἅλλ' ἢ τὸ σωματοειδὲς, οὐ τις ἂν ἄφαιτο καὶ ἰδοί καὶ πίσι καὶ φύγοι καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοσισκοτῶν καὶ ἀείδες, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφία αἱρετῶν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει

Σ ψυχῆς αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεθαι; Οὐδ' ὀπωστιούν, ἔφη. 'Αλλὰ καὶ διειλημμένη γε, οἷμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰ̄ ἐξουσίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε χύμφυτον; Πάνω γε. Ἐμβριθές δὲ γε, ὁ φίλε, τοῦτο οἰσθαί χρῆ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεώδες καὶ ὅρατον· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχῇ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐκεῖται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὅρατον τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς τε καὶ ᾿Αἰδοῦ, οὕσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ δὴ καὶ ὡφθη ἄττα
"By all means."

"Then if it is in such a condition, it goes away into that which is like itself, into the invisible, divine, immortal, and wise, and when it arrives there it is happy, freed from error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills, and as the initiated say, lives in truth through all after time with the gods. Is this our belief, Cebes, or not?"

"Assuredly," said Cebes.

"But, I think, if when it departs from the body it is defiled and impure, because it was always with the body and cared for it and loved it and was fascinated by it and its desires and pleasures, so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal, which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible to philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will depart pure and uncontaminated?"

"By no means," said he.

"But it will be interpenetrated, I suppose, with the corporeal which intercourse and communion with the body have made a part of its nature because the body has been its constant companion and the object of its care?"

"Certainly."

"And, my friend, we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this and is dragged back into the visible world, through fear of the invisible and of the other world, and so, as they say, it flits about the monuments and the tombs, where shadowy shapes of souls have been
ψυχών σκιοειδή φαντάσματα, οία παρέχονται αἱ τοιαύται ψυχαὶ εἰδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὅρωνται. Εἰκὸς γε, ὁ Σώκρατες. Εἰκὸς μὲντοι, ὁ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἁγαθῶν ταύτας εὑνεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνος τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὐσῆς· καὶ μέχρι γε τοῦτον πλανῶνται, ἐως ἃν τῇ τοῦ ξυνεπακολούθουντος τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς ἐπιθυμία ἐνδεδωσιν εἰς σῶμα.

Ε 31. 'Ενδοῦνται δὲ, ὦσπερ εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαύτα ἡθη ὅποι νₒτὶ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκύια τῦχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

Τὰ ποιὰ δὴ ταύτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὑβρεῖς καὶ φιλοσοφίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διενδεικμένους, εἰς τὰ τῶν ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύονται. ἢ οὐκ οἰεῖ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις. Τοὺς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἄρπαγας προτετιμήκοτας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱερόν γένη; ἢ ποι ἂν ἀλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι; Ἄμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα. Ὁύκοιν, ἢ δὲ ὡς, δὴλα δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἢ ἄν ἐκαστὰ ἑοί, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοίωτητας τῆς μελέτης; Δήλου δὴ, ἔφη πῶς δὲ οὖ; Ὁύκοιν εὐδαιμονεστατοί, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς βέλτιστον τόπον ἦντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν

Β καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετησευκότες, ἢν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονότας ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ
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seen, figures of those souls which were not set free
in purity but retain something of the visible; and
this is why they are seen.”

“That is likely, Socrates.”

“It is likely, Cebes. And it is likely that those
are not the souls of the good, but those of the base,
which are compelled to flit about such places as a
punishment for their former evil mode of life. And
they flit about until through the desire of the cor-
poreal which clings to them they are again im-
prisoned in a body. And they are likely to be
imprisoned in natures which correspond to the
practices of their former life.”

“What natures do you mean, Socrates?”

“I mean, for example, that those who have
indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness,
and have taken no pains to avoid them, are likely
to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of
that sort. Do you not think so?”

“Certainly that is very likely.”

“And those who have chosen injustice and
tyranny and robbery pass into the bodies of wolves
and hawks and kites. Where else can we imagine
that they go?”

“Beyond a doubt,” said Cebes, “they pass into
such creatures.”

“Then,” said he, “it is clear where all the others
go, each in accordance with its own habits?”

“Yes,” said Cebes, “of course.”

“Then,” said he, “the happiest of those, and
those who go to the best place, are those who have
practised, by nature and habit, without philosophy
or reason, the social and civil virtues which are
called moderation and justice?”

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νοῦ; Πῇ δὴ οὖτοι εὐδαιμονεστατοί; "Οτι τούτοις εἰκός ἐστιν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεισθαι πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἡ ποι μελιτῶν ἡ σφηκῶν ἡ μυρμήκων, ἥ καὶ εἰς ταύτων γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, καὶ γίγνεσθαι εξ αὐτῶν ἀνδράς μετρίους· Εἰκός.

32. Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς καθαρῷ ἀπίστην, οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ φιλομαθεί. ἀλλὰ τούτον ἐνεκα, ὦ ἐταύρα Σιμώνε τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόσαι αὐταῖς ἑαυτούς, οὐ τὶ οἰκοφορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβοῦμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι. οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμῶν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδοτές, ὥσπερ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι. ἐπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι, ἕφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Κέβης. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὄς. Τοιγάρτοι τούτοις μὲν ἀπασιν, ὡς Κέβης, ἑκεῖνοι, οἰς τι μέλει τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ μὴ σῶματι λατρεύοντες ἕξοσι, χαίρειν εἰπόντες οὐ κατὰ ταύτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσιν ὅπῃ ἔρχονται, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἑκείνῃ λύσει τε καὶ καθαρῳ ταύτῃ τρέπονται ἑκείνη ἑπόμενοι, ἢ ἑκείνη ύφηγείται.

33. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Ἐγώ ἔρω, ἑφη. γιγνώσκοντι γάρ, ἢ δ' ὄς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι παραλαβοῦσα αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχῆν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀτεχνῶς

1 λατρεύοντες is an emendation proposed by Schanz for πλάττοντες of the MSS.

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"How are these happiest?"

"Don't you see? Is it not likely that they pass again into some such social and gentle species as that of bees or of wasps or ants, or into the human race again, and that worthy men spring from them?"

"Yes."

"And no one who has not been a philosopher and who is not wholly pure when he departs, is allowed to enter into the communion of the gods, but only the lover of knowledge. It is for this reason, dear Simmias and Cebe, that those who truly love wisdom refrain from all bodily desires and resist them firmly and do not give themselves up to them, not because they fear poverty or loss of property, as most men, in their love of money, do; nor is it because they fear the dishonour or disgrace of wickedness, like the lovers of honour and power, that they refrain from them."

"No, that would not be seemly for them, Socrates," said Cebe.

"Most assuredly not," said he. "And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads."

"How do they do this, Socrates?"

"I will tell you," he replied. "The lovers of knowledge," said he, "perceive that when philo-
Ε διαδεδεμένην ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκολλημένην, ἀναγκαζομένην δὲ ὅσπερ διὰ εἰργμοῦ διὰ τούτου σκοπείσθαι τὰ ὅντα ἄλλα μὴ αὐτὴν δι’ αὕτης, καὶ ἐν πάσῃ ἀμαθίᾳ κυλινδουμένην, καὶ τοῦ εἰργμοῦ τῆς δεινότητας καταδύοσα ὅτι δι’ ἐπιθυμίας ἐστὶν, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος

83 ἔγινεν εἰς τοὺς δεδέσθαι,—ὅπερ ὅνων λέγω, γεγυνόσκοιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι οὗτο παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἔχουσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἥρεμα παραμυθεῖται καὶ λύειν ἐπίχειρεῖ, εὐδεικνυμένη ὅτι ἀπάτης μὲν μεστή ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων σκέψεις, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὠτών καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν αἰσθήσεων, πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ἔγινεν ἐπιθυμεῖσαι καὶ ἀθροίζεσθαι παρακελευσμένη, πιστεύειν δὲ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἄλλῳ.

Β ἡ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν, ὃ τι ἄν νοσής αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τῶν ὄντων ὃ τι δ’ ἂν δι’ ἄλλων σκοπῆ περὶ ἄλλοις ὅν ἄλλο, μηδὲν ἥγεσθαι ἄλλης· εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν τοιούτοιν αἰσθητῶν τε καὶ ὀρατῶν, δὲ αὐτὴν ὀρᾶ νοητὸν τε καὶ ἀείδες. ταύτῃ ὑπὸ τὴν λύσει ὅπως ὅσιον ὄντως ὑποκύπτει ὅτι ἦν ἐναντιοῦσα· τοῦ ὦς ἀλληθῶς φιλοσόφου ψυχῆν ὑπὸς ἀπέχεται τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ λυπῶν καὶ φόβων, καθ’ ὅσον δύναται, λογιζομένη ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν τις σφόδρα ἡσθηθῇ ἡ φοβηθῇ ἡ λυπηθῇ ἡ ἐπιθυμηθῇ, οὐδέν τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἔπαθεν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὅν ἂν τις οἰσθείη, οἷον ἡ νοσήσας ἡ τι ἀναλώσας

C διὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἄλλῳ δ’ πάντων μέγιστον τε κακὸν καὶ ἔσχατον ἐστὶ, τούτο πάσχει καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτῷ. Τί τούτο, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἐφή ὁ

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sophy first takes possession of their soul it is entirely fastened and welded to the body and is compelled to regard realities through the body as through prison bars, not with its own unhindered vision, and is wallowing in utter ignorance. And philosophy sees that the most dreadful thing about the imprisonment is the fact that it is caused by the lusts of the flesh, so that the prisoner is the chief assistant in his own imprisonment. The lovers of knowledge, then, I say, perceive that philosophy, taking possession of the soul when it is in this state, encourages it gently and tries to set it free, pointing out that the eyes and the ears and the other senses are full of deceit, and urging it to withdraw from these, except in so far as their use is unavoidable, and exhorting it to collect and concentrate itself within itself, and to trust nothing except itself and its own abstract thought of abstract existence; and to believe that there is no truth in that which it sees by other means and which varies with the various objects in which it appears, since everything of that kind is visible and apprehended by the senses, whereas the soul itself sees that which is invisible and apprehended by the mind. Now the soul of the true philosopher believes that it must not resist this deliverance, and therefore it stands aloof from pleasures and lusts and griefs and fears, so far as it can, considering that when anyone has violent pleasures or fears or lusts he suffers from them not merely what one might think—for example, illness or loss of money spent for his lusts—but he suffers the greatest and most extreme evil and does not take it into account.”

“What is this evil, Socrates?” said Cebeus.
Κέβθης. Ὡτι ψυχή παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἄμα τε ἢσθήναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἠγείρθαι, περὶ δὲ ἄν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατον τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· ταῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ὀρατά· ἢ οὖ;  

D Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδεῖται ψυχή ύπὸ σώματος; Πῶς δή; Ὁτι ἐκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὁσπερ ἡλιον ἐχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπερνοῦ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀλήθῃ εἶναι ἀπερ ἄν καὶ τὸ σῶμα φη. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὀμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται οἵματος ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄμοτροφος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οία μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄλοκο καθαρῷς ἀφικέσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἄει τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἔξεναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἀλλο σῶμα καὶ  

Ε ὁσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀμοιραῖο εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ἁληθεύεται, ἕφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβθης, ὁ Σώκρατες.

34. Τοὺτων τοῖνυν ἐνεκα, ὁ Κέβθης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι εἰσι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὡς μᾶ 84 πολλοὶ ἐνεκα· ἢ σὺ οἶει; Οὐ δῆτα ἐγὼγε. Οὐ γὰρ, ἀλλ' οὕτω λογίσατ' ἀν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλο-σόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἄν οἰηθεὶ τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρήναι ἐαυτὴν λύειν, λυνόσης δὲ ἐκείης αὐτὴν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκα- 

tadeiv καὶ ἀνήμυτον ἔρχον πρᾶττειν Πηνελόπης 290
"The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?"

"Certainly."

"And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?"

"How so?"

"Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute."

"What you say, Socrates, is very true," said Cebees.

"This, Cebees, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; not the world's reason. Or do you disagree?"

"Certainly not."

"No, for the soul of the philosopher would not reason as others do, and would not think it right that philosophy should set it free, and that then when set free it should give itself again into bondage to pleasure and pain and engage in futile toil, like Penelope unweaving the web she wove. No, his
PLATO

τινὰ ἐναντίως ἵστον μεταχειριζομένην, ἀλλὰ
gαλήνην τοῦτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἐπομένῃ τῷ
λόγῳ μοῦ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὕσα, τὸ ἄλλης καὶ τὸ
θείον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καί ὑπ’ ἐκείνου
tρεφομένη, ξῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν, ἔως ἂν ξῆ, καὶ
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ἔμνησις καὶ εἰς τὸ
tοιούτων ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
cακῶν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινῶν
μὴ φοβηθῇ, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ
dιασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ
tῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσιθείσα καὶ διαπτομένη σικῆται
καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ἦ.

35. Σιμή οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ

C Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τε πρὸς
tῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἢν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν
ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἦμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ
Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλων διελεγέσθησιν καὶ
ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτῷ ἤρετο. Τί; ἔφη, ὅμως τὰ
λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεώς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς
γὰρ δὴ ἐτί ἐξεῖ ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβᾶς, εἰ γε δὴ
tis αὐτά μέλλει ἰκανῶς διεξεῖναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν τι
アルバム σκοπεῖσθων, οὐδὲν λέγων, εἰ δὲ τι περὶ
tοιοῦτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκυνήσητε καὶ αὐτὸι

D εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἰ πῇ ὅμως φαίνεται βέλτιον
ἀν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὐ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἰ
ti μᾶλλον oἶχεσθε μετ’ ἐμοῦ εὑροπῆσειν. καὶ ὁ
Σιμμίας ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν, ὁ Σωκράτης, τάληθι σοι
ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἔτε-
ρον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν

1 After φοβηθῇ the MSS. read ταῦτα ὅ ἐπιτηδεύσασα. As
bracketed this and is followed by Schanz and Burnet.
soul believes that it must gain peace from these emotions, must follow reason and abide always in it, beholding that which is true and divine and not a matter of opinion, and making that its only food; and in this way it believes it must live, while life endures, and then at death pass on to that which is akin to itself and of like nature, and be free from human ills. A soul which has been nurtured in this way, Simmias and Cebes, is not likely to fear that it will be torn asunder at its departure from the body and will vanish into nothingness, blown apart by the winds, and be no longer anywhere."

When Socrates had said this there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself was apparently absorbed in what had been said, as were also most of us. But Simmias and Cebes conversed a little with each other; and Socrates saw them and said: "Do you think there is any incompleteness in what has been said? There are still many subjects for doubt and many points open to attack, if anyone cares to discuss the matter thoroughly. If you are considering anything else, I have nothing to say; but if you are in any difficulty about these matters, do not hesitate to speak and discuss them yourselves, if you think anything better could be said on the subject, and to take me along with you in the discussion, if you think you can get on better in my company."

And Simmias said: "Socrates, I will tell you the truth. For some time each of us has been in doubt and has been egging the other on and urging him to ask a question, because we wish to hear your answer,
μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὅκενεῦ δὲ ὅχλον παρέχειν, μὴ σοι ἀγδές ἢ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν· καὶ δὲ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησίν, Βαβαί,

Ε ὁ Σιμμία· ἢ ποὺ χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαμι, ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν ἠγούμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὦτε γε μηδ’ ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε, μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ· καὶ, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαιλότερος ὑμῖν εἰναι τὴν μαντικὴν, οἵ ἐπειδὰν αἰσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ἄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ μάλιστα ἄδουσι, γεγονότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεόν ἀπιέναι, οὐπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. οἱ δ’ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τὸ αὐτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καὶ φασίν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξάδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὅρνευν ἄδει, ὅταν πεινῇ ὡς ὑπολογίζω τοιαύτην καὶ ὑπ’ ἰσνήθηται, οὐδὲ αὐτῇ ἢ τε ἄγδαι καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ἐποψά, ἢ δὴ φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ἄδειν· ἀλλ’ οὔτε ταῦτα μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ’ ἄτε οἴμαι τοῦ Ἀπολλωνίου δύνατε μαντικοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τά ἐν Ἀδών ἀγαθά ἄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐμπρόσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἠγούμαι ὁμόδουλος γε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ιερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χείρον’ ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὔτε δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλ’ τούτοις γε ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὃ τι ἀν βούλησθε, ἔως ἃν Ἀθηναίων ἐώςιν ἄνδρες

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but hesitate to trouble you, for fear that it may be disagreeable to you in your present misfortune."

And when he heard this, he laughed gently and said: "Ah, Simmias! I should have hard work to persuade other people that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, when I cannot even make you believe it, but you are afraid I am more churlish now than I used to be. And you seem to think I am inferior in prophetic power to the swans who sing at other times also, but when they feel that they are to die, sing most and best in their joy that they are to go to the god whose servants they are. But men, because of their own fear of death, misrepresent the swans and say that they sing for sorrow, in mourning for their own death. They do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or has any other trouble; no, not even the nightingale or the swallow or the hoopoe which are said to sing in lamentation. I do not believe they sing for grief, nor do the swans; but since they are Apollo's birds, I believe they have prophetic vision, and because they have foreknowledge of the blessings in the other world they sing and rejoice on that day more than ever before. And I think that I am myself a fellow-servant of the swans, and am consecrated to the same God and have received from our master a gift of prophecy no whit inferior to theirs, and that I go out from life with as little sorrow as they. So far as this is concerned, then, speak and ask whatever questions you please, so long as the eleven of the Athenians permit."
PLATO

ένδεκα. Kalòs, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας: καὶ

C ἔγωγε σοι ἔρω ὁ ἄπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ἢ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρήμενα. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὁ Ἐφίδια καὶ οἱ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἵσως ὠσπερ καὶ σοι τὸ μὲν σαφῆς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεσθον τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαιρείται γενέσθαι, πρὶν ἀν πανταχὺ σκοπῶν ἄπειτη τις, πάντα μαθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός. Ἔδειν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἐν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξει ἀνθρωπών Λάμπηνα καὶ δυσεξελγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὁχούμενον ὠσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδὸς κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεύσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὁχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε ὅπῃ ἐπαισκυνθήσομαι ἐρείσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ, οὔτε ἐμαυτὸν αἰτίασομαι ἐν ύστερῳ χρόνῳ, ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἴπον ᾿ἔμοι δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῷ τὰ εἰρήμενα, οὐ πάντα φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

D 36. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. Ἰσως γὰρ, ἐφη, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται ἀλλὰ λέγε, ὅτι δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς. Ταῦτα ἔμουγε, ὦ δ’ ὦσ, ὦ ἀρµονίας καὶ τῷ τῆς καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτῶν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὥς ἢ μὲν ἁρµονία ἀρµατῶν τι καὶ ἀσώµατον καὶ πάγκαλον τι καὶ τῷ καὶ ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρµοσµένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ λύρα

1 Schanz brackets ἦσ... ἐνδεκα.
PHAEDO

"Good," said Simmias. "I will tell you my difficulty, and then Cebes in turn will say why he does not agree to all you have said. I think, Socrates, as perhaps you do yourself, that it is either impossible or very difficult to acquire clear knowledge about these matters in this life. And yet he is a weakling who does not test in every way what is said about them and persevere until he is worn out by studying them on every side. For he must do one of two things; either he must learn or discover the truth about these matters, or if that is impossible, he must take whatever human doctrine is best and hardest to disprove and, embarking upon it as upon a raft, sail upon it through life in the midst of dangers, unless he can sail upon some stronger vessel, some divine revelation, and make his voyage more safely and securely. And so now I am not ashamed to ask questions, since you encourage me to do so, and I shall not have to blame myself hereafter for not saying now what I think. For, Socrates, when I examine what has been said, either alone or with Cebes, it does not seem quite satisfactory."

And Socrates replied: "Perhaps, my friend, you are right. But tell me in what respect it is not satisfactory."

"In this," said he, "that one might use the same argument about harmony and a lyre with its strings. One might say that the harmony is invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful and divine in the well attuned lyre, but the lyre itself and its strings are bodies,
καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ ξύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἔστὶ καὶ τοῦ θυητοῦ ξυγγενῆ. ἔπειδαν οὖν ἢ κατάξη τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμη 1 καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἰ τις δισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σῦ, ὡς ἄναγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἄρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι· συδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἄν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγιῶν τῶν χορδῶν 2 καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θυητοειδεῖς οὕσας, τὴν δὲ ἄρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυή τε καὶ ξυγγενὴ, προτέραν τοῦ θυητοῦ ἀπολομένην ἄλλα φαίη ἄναγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἄρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι, πρὶν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν,—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὡς Σώκρατες, οἴμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸν σε τούτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιούτον τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἠμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἕρου καὶ ἕρου καὶ τοιούτων των·

κράσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἠμῶν, ἔπειδαν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὕσα ἄρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἠμῶν ἀμέτρως ἡ ἐπιταθή ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἄναγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καὶ περ οὕσαν θειοτάτην, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ἀλλαί ἄρμονίαι αἱ τʼ ἐν τοῖς φθόνοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολὺν

1 Schanz brackets diatēmē.
2 Schanz brackets dieōrōγιῶν tōn χορδῶν,

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and corporeal and composite and earthy and akin to that which is mortal. Now if someone shatters the lyre or cuts and breaks the strings, what if he should maintain by the same argument you employed, that the harmony could not have perished and must still exist? For there would be no possibility that the lyre and its strings, which are of mortal nature, still exist after the strings are broken, and the harmony, which is related and akin to the divine and the immortal, perish before that which is mortal. He would say that the harmony must still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot away before anything could happen to it. And I fancy, Socrates, that it must have occurred to your own mind that we believe the soul to be something after this fashion; that our body is strung and held together by heat, cold, moisture, dryness, and the like, and the soul is a mixture and a harmony of these same elements, when they are well and properly mixed. Now if the soul is a harmony, it is clear that when the body is too much relaxed or is too tightly strung by diseases or other ills, the soul must of necessity perish, no matter how divine it is, like other harmonies in sounds and in all the works of artists, and the remains of each body will endure a
PLATO

D χρόνον παραμένειν, ἔως ἃν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατα-
σαπῇ. ὃρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσο-
μεν, ἐάν τις ἀξίοι κράσιν οὐσαν τὴν ψυχήν τῶν
ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλομένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην
ἀπόλλυσθαι.

37. Διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦσπερ τὰ
πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφή,
λέγει ὁ Σιμμάς. εἴ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος
ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως
εἰοικεν ἀποτελέσθαι τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι

Ε χρήναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἤτι πρὸτερον Κέβητος
ἀκούσαι, τί αὐτῇ ἄγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνον
ἐγγενομένου βουλευσόμεθα, τί ἐροῦμεν, ἐπειτα δὲ
ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς, εάν τι δοκῶσι
προσάειν, ἐάν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἢ ἂν ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ
λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἢ δ' ὁς, ὁ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἢν
τὸ σὲ αὐθράττον. Δέγω δή, ἢ δ' ὁς ὁ Κέβης.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἤτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι,
καὶ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ταύτων

87 ἐγκλημα ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ
πρὶν εἰς τὸν ἐλθεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατιθήματι μὴ
οὐχὶ πάνω χαριέντως, καὶ, εἰ μή ἔπαρχής ἐστιν
ἑπείν, πάνω ἰκανός ἀποδείχθαι· ως δὲ καὶ
ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἐτί ποὺ ἔσται, οὐ μοι δοκεὶ
τῇ. ως μὲν οὐκ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονίω-
τερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῷ τῇ Σιμμίῳ
ἀντιλήψει· δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνω πολύ
διαφέρειν. τί οὖν, ἄν φαίη ὁ λόγος, ἐτί ἀπιστεῖς,
ἐπειδή ὅρας ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε

Β ἀσθενέστερον ἢτί δ' ὁν; τὸ δὲ πολυχρονίωτερον οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἤτι σφέξεσθαι ἐν τούτῳ
τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δ' ὁτὸ τόδε ἐπίσκεψαι, εἰ τι

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long time until they are burnt or decayed. Now what shall we say to this argument, if anyone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the elements of the body, is the first to perish in what is called death?"

Then Socrates, looking keenly at us, as he often used to do, smiled and said: "Simmias raises a fair objection. Now if any of you is readier than I, why does he not reply to him? For he seems to score a good point. However, I think before replying to him we ought to hear what fault our friend Cebes finds with our argument, that we may take time to consider what to say, and then when we have heard them, we can either agree with them, if they seem to strike the proper note, or, if they do not, we can proceed to argue in defence of our reasoning. Come, Cebes," said he, "tell us what it was that troubled you."

"Well, I will tell you," said Cebes. "The argument seems to me to be just where it was, and to be still open to the objection I made before. For I do not deny that it has been very cleverly, and, if I may say so, conclusively shown that the soul existed before it entered into this bodily form, but it does not seem to me proved that it will still exist when we are dead. I do not agree with Simmias' objection, that the soul is not stronger and more lasting than the body, for I think it is far superior in all such respects. 'Why then,' the argument might say, 'do you still disbelieve, when you see that after a man dies the weaker part still exists? Do you not think the stronger part must necessarily be preserved during the same length of time?'

Now see if my
λέγω· εἰκόνος γὰρ τινος, ὡς ἔοικεν, κἂγὼ ὥσπερ Σιμμίας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἂν τις περὶ ἀνθρώπου υφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντος λέγοι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἀλλ' ἔστι ποι ἑώς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοιτο θοιμάτων ὁ ἡμπείριος αὐτὸς υφηγάμενος, ὅτι ἔστι σῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἰ τις ἀπιστοὶ αὐτῷ, ἀνερώτησεν πότερον πολυχρονιώτερον ἔστι τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἰματίῳ ἐν χρεία τε ὅντος καὶ φορομένου, ἀποκριμαμένου δὲ τινος ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οἷοτο ἀποδεδείξατο ὅτι παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνθρώπος σῶς ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ γε ὀλυγχρονιώτερον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. τὸ δ' οἴμαι, οὗ Σιμμία, οὐχ οὗτος ἔχει σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ δ' ἡ λέγω. πάς γὰρ ἄν ὑπολαβῶι ὅτι εὐθές λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ υφάντης οὕτος πολλὰ κατατρίψας τοιαύτα ἰμάτια καὶ υφηγάμενος ἐκείνων μὲν ύστερος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν οὕτως, τοῦ δὲ τελευταίου οἴμαι πρότερος, καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τοῦτον ἐνεκα ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἰματίῳ φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ οἴμαι εἰκόνα δέξαμεν καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι ἄν μοι φαίνοιτο λέγειν, ώς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρονιών ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλυγχρονιώτερον ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίη εκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σῶματα κατατρίβειν, ἀλλοις τε καὶ εἰ πολλὰ ἦτε βιώσατε εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἢστι ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἄλλῳ η' ψυχὴ ἄει τὸ κατατριβόμενον ἀνυφάινοι,
reply to this has any sense. I think I may, like Simmias, best express myself in a figure. It seems to me that it is much as if one should say about an old weaver who had died, that the man had not perished but was safe and sound somewhere, and should offer as a proof of this the fact that the cloak which the man had woven and used to wear was still whole and had not perished. Then if anyone did not believe him, he would ask which lasts longer, a man or a cloak that is in use and wear, and when the answer was given that a man lasts much longer, he would think it had been proved beyond a doubt that the man was safe, because that which was less lasting had not perished.

"But I do not think he is right, Simmias, and I ask you especially to notice what I say. Anyone can understand that a man who says this is talking nonsense. For the weaver in question wove and wore out many such cloaks and lasted longer than they, though they were many, but perished, I suppose, before the last one. Yet a man is not feeble or weaker than a cloak on that account at all. And I think the same figure would apply to the soul and the body and it would be quite appropriate to say in like manner about them, that the soul lasts a long time, but the body lasts a shorter time and is weaker. And one might go on to say that each soul wears out many bodies, especially if the man lives many years. For if the body is constantly changing and being destroyed while the man still lives, and the soul is always weaving anew that which wears out, then
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άναγκαίον μέντ’ ἂν εἰ, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὑφασμα τυχείν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τούτου μόνου προτέραν ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ’ ἦδη τὴν φύσιν τῆς ἀσθενείας ἐπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχὺ σαπεῖν διοίκουτο. ὡστε τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὕτω ἄξιον πιστεύσαντα θερρεῖν, ὡς, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν, ἔτι πού ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἄ συ λέγεις συγχωρήσειν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τᾶς ψυχᾶς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἐστεθήσει καὶ πολλάκις γενέσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὐθις· οὔτω γὰρ αὐτῷ φύσει ἵσχυρον εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γιγαντεύουσαν ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν· δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροί, μὴ ὅποιον αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσι καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἐν τινὶ τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι.

B τούτου δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος, ἡ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει οἴλεθρον, μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτρῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡμῶν· εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδενὶ προσήκει τὸν θάνατον προσέρχεται μὴ ὅποι ἀνοητὸς θαρρεῖν, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἔχει ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀδάνατον τε καὶ ἀνύλεθρον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἂεὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀποθανείσθαι δεδεῖναν ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς, μὴ ἐν τῇ γῆν τοῦ σώματος διαξεύτηκεν παντάπασιν ἀποληθαί.

38. Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰπόντων αὐτῶν ἄγδος διετέθημεν, ὡς ὅστε τῶν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἄλληλους, διτ ύπο τοῦ ἐμπρόσθεν λόγου σφόδρα πεπεισμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκουν ἀναταράξαι καὶ
when the soul perishes it must necessarily have on its last garment, and this only will survive it, and when the soul has perished, then the body will at once show its natural weakness and will quickly disappear in decay. And so we are not yet justified in feeling sure, on the strength of this argument, that our souls will still exist somewhere after we are dead. For if one were to grant even more to a man who uses your argument, Socrates, and allow not only that our souls existed before we were born, but also that there is nothing to prevent some of them from continuing to exist and from being born and dying again many times after we are dead, because the soul is naturally so strong that it can endure repeated births,—even allowing this, one might not grant that it does not suffer by its many births and does not finally perish altogether in one of its deaths. But he might say that no one knows beforehand the particular death and the particular dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul, for none of us can perceive that. Now if this is the case, anyone who feels confident about death has a foolish confidence, unless he can show that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. Otherwise a man who is about to die must always fear that his soul will perish utterly in the impending dissolution of the body.”

Now all of us, as we remarked to one another afterwards, were very uncomfortable when we heard what they said; for we had been thoroughly convinced by the previous argument, and now they seemed to be throwing us again into confusion and
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eis ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑστερον μέλλοντα ῥηθήσεσθαι, μὴ οὔτενος ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταί ἤ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἀπίστα ἢ.

ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥ Φαίδων, συγγραμμὴν γε ἔχω ὑμῖν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτόν με νῦν ἀκούσαντά σου τοιοῦτον τί λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν 

ὁ ἐπέρχεται τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύομεν λόγοι; ὡς γὰρ σφōδρα πιθανὸς ὡν, δυν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγου, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν. θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μου ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ 

νῦν καὶ ἀεί, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τινα ἡμῶν εἰναι τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ὀσπερ ὑπεμνησένθη ὡς ζῆθες ὦτι καὶ 

αὐτῷ μοι ταῦτα προδέδοκτο. καὶ πάνυ δέομαι 

πάλιν ὀσπερ ἔξ ἀρχής ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου, ὡς με 

πείσει ως τοῦ ἀποθανόντος οὐ συνάπτονόσκε 

ἡ ψυχή. λέγε οὖν πρὸς Διός, πή ὁ Σωκράτης 

Ε μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κακείνου, ὀσπερ 

ὑμᾶς φής, ἐνδηλὸς τι ἐγένετο ἀχθομένος ἢ οὐ, 

ἀλλὰ πρῶς ἐβοήθει τῷ λόγῳ; καὶ ἰκανῶς 

ἐβοήθησεν ἡ ἐνδεῶς; πάντα ἡμῖν δίελθε ως δύνα 

σαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Καὶ μή, ὥ Ἐχέκρατες, πολλάκις 

ς θαυμάσας Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μάλλον ἡγάσθη 

ἡ τότε παραγενόμενος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ὅ τι 

λέγοι εκείνοι, ἵσως οὐδὲν ἀτοπον ἀλλὰ ἐγώ 

μάλλον ἐθαυμάζας αὐτὸν πρῶτον μὲν τούτο, ὡς 

ἡδέως καὶ εὐμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεκροσκω 

τὸν λόγον ἀπεδέξατο, ἐπείτα ἡμῶν ὡς ὦξεως 

ἡσθετο ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων, ἐπείτα ὡς 

ἐν ἡμᾶς ἰάσατο καὶ ὀσπερ πεφευγότας καὶ
distrust, not only in respect to the past discussion but also with regard to any future one. They made us fear that our judgment was worthless or that no certainty could be attained in these matters.

**ECHOCRATES.** By the gods, Phaedo, I sympathise with you; for I myself after listening to you am inclined to ask myself: “What argument shall we believe henceforth? For the argument of Socrates was perfectly convincing, and now it has fallen into discredit.” For the doctrine that the soul is a kind of harmony has always had (and has now) a wonderful hold upon me, and your mention of it reminded me that I had myself believed in it before. Now I must begin over again and find another argument to convince me that when a man dies his soul does not perish with him. So, for heaven’s sake, tell how Socrates continued the discourse, and whether he also, as you say the rest of you did, showed any uneasiness, or calmly defended his argument. And did he defend it successfully? Tell us everything as accurately as you can.

**PHAEDEO.** Echocrates, I have often wondered at Socrates, but never did I admire him more than then. That he had an answer ready was perhaps to be expected; but what astonished me more about him was, first, the pleasant, gentle, and respectful manner in which he listened to the young men’s criticisms, secondly, his quick sense of the effect their words had upon us, and lastly, the skill with which he cured us and, as it were, recalled us from our flight and
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ήπιππόμενος ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προύτρηψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

ἐξεκράτησε. Πῶς δὴ;

Φαίδων. Ἐγὼ ἔρω. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξιᾷ αὐτοῦ

Β καθῆμενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνυν ἐπὶ χαμαιξῆλου τυών, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πολὺ υψηλοτέρου ἢ ἔγω. καταψήφιας

οὐν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ συμπίεσας τὰς ἑπὶ τῷ

αὐχένι τρίχας—εἴωθει γὰρ, ὅποτε τύχοι, παΐζειν

μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Αὐριον δὴ, ἐφη, ἦσως, ὡ

Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς κόμας ἀποκερεῖ. Ἐσμέν, ἂν

δ' ἔγω, ὡ Σώκρατες. Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείθη.

'Αλλὰ τί; ἂν δ' ἔγω. Τήμερον, ἐφη, κάγω τὰς

ἐμᾶς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, εάντερ γε ἢμῖν ὁ λόγος

teleutῆσαι καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι.

C καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν, εἰ σὺ εἶτι καὶ με διαφεύγων ὁ λόγος,

ἐνροκου ἄν ποιησαίμην ὡστερ Ἀργείοι, μὴ πρὸ-

τερον κομήσεων, πρὶν ἄν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος

tὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. 'Αλλ', ἂν δ'

ἔγω, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷος τε

eίναι. 'Αλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἐφη, τὸν Ἰὸλων παρα-

κάλει, ἔως ἐτι φῶς ἐστιν. Παρακαλῶ τοῖνυν,

ἐφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰὸλως. Οὔδὲν

dιοίσει, ἐφη.

39. 'Αλλὰ πρῶτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ

πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποιοῦν; ἂν δ' ἔγω. Μὴ γενώ-

μεθα, ἂν δ' ὡς, μισόλογοι, ὡστερ οἱ μισάνθρω-

ποι γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν, ἐφη, ὡ τί ἄν τις

μείζων τοῦτον κακόν πάθοι ἤ λόγους μισήσας.

γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ

μισανθρωπία. ὡ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδυόται

ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεύσαι ἀνευ τέχνης, καὶ

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defeat and made us face about and follow him and join in his examination of the argument.

ECHOCRATES. How did he do it?

PHAEDO. I will tell you. I was sitting at his right hand on a low stool beside his couch, and his seat was a good deal higher than mine. He stroked my head and gathered the hair on the back of my neck into his hand—he had a habit of playing with my hair on occasion—and said, “To-morrow, perhaps, Phaedo, you will cut off this beautiful hair.”

“I suppose so, Socrates,” said I.

“Not if you take my advice.”

“What shall I do then?” I asked.

“You will cut it off to-day, and I will cut mine, if our argument dies and we cannot bring it to life again. If I were you and the argument escaped me, I would take an oath, like the Argives, not to let my hair grow until I had renewed the fight and won a victory over the argument of Simmias and Cebes.”

“But,” I replied, “they say that even Heracles is not a match for two.”

“Well,” said he, “call me to help you, as your Iolaus, while there is still light.”

“I call you to help, then,” said I, “not as Heracles calling Iolaus, but as Iolaus calling Heracles.”

“That is all one,” said he. “But first let us guard against a danger.”

“Of what sort?” I asked.

“The danger of becoming misologists or haters of argument,” said he, “as people become misanthropists or haters of man; for no worse evil can happen to a man than to hate argument. Misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without
- ἤγισασθαι παντάπασι τε ἀληθή εἶναι καὶ ὑγιὴ
καὶ πιστών τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἔπειτα ὀλύγον ὑστερον
εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρὸν τε καὶ ἀπιστὸν καὶ αὕθις
ἔτερον, καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ
ὑπὸ τοῦτοι μάλιστα οὕς ἂν ἤγισαστοι οἰκειοτά-
Ε τοὺς τε καὶ ἔταιροτάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ
προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἤγειται οὐδενὸς
οὐδὲν ὑγίεσ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἦ οὐκ ἤσθησαι σὺ
τοῦτο γεγονόμενον; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Οὔκοιν,
ἡ δ’ ὡς, αἰσχρῶν,1 καὶ δήλων ὅτι ἀνεῖν τέχνης
tῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρήσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖ
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; εἰ γάρ ποὺ μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο,
슨περ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἤγισαστο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς
καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὀλύγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς
δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφήν ἐγώ.
"Ὡςπερ, ἦ δ’ ὡς, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ
μεγάλων οἴει τι σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα
μέγαν ἢ σφόδρα σμικρῶν ἐξευρεῖν ἀνθρώπον ἢ κύνα
ἡ ἅλλο ὃτιον; ἢ αὖ ταχὺν ἢ βραδὺν ἢ αἰσχρὸν
ἡ καλῶν ἢ λευκῶν ἢ μέλανα; ἦ οὐκ ἤσθησαι
ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τῶν
ἐσχάτων σπάνια καὶ ὀλύγα, τὰ δὲ μεταχεὶν ἄφθονα
καὶ πολλά; Πάνυ γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Οὔκοιν οἴει,
Β ἐφη, εἰ πονηρίας ἄγων προτεθείη, πάνυ ἂν ὀλύ-
γους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτους φανήμει; Εἰκὸς
γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ. Εἰκὸς γάρ, ἐφη. ἄλλα ταύτη

1 Schanz brackets αἰσχρῶν.

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sufficient knowledge. You think the man is perfectly true and sound and trustworthy, and afterwards you find him base and false. Then you have the same experience with another person. By the time this has happened to a man a good many times, especially if it happens among those whom he might regard as his nearest and dearest friends, he ends by being in continual quarrels and by hating everybody and thinking there is nothing sound in anyone at all. Have you not noticed this?"

"Certainly," said I.

"Well," he went on, "is it not disgraceful, and is it not plain that such a man undertakes to consort with men when he has no knowledge of human nature? For if he had knowledge when he dealt with them, he would think that the good and the bad are both very few and those between the two are very many, for that is the case."

"What do you mean?"

"I mean just what I might say about the large and small. Do you think there is anything more unusual than to find a very large or a very small man, or dog, or other creature, or again, one that is very quick or slow, very ugly or beautiful, very black or white? Have you not noticed that the extremes in all these instances are rare and few, and the examples between the extremes are very many?"

"To be sure," said I.

"And don't you think," said he, "that if there were to be a competition in rascality, those who excelled would be very few in that also?"

"Very likely," I replied.

"Yes, very likely," he said. "But it is not in that
μὲν οὖν ὁμοιοὶ οἱ λόγοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν δὴ προάγοντος ἐγὼ ἐφεσπόμην, ἀλλὰ ἐκείνη, ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τινὶ ἀληθεὶς εἶναι ἄνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, καὶ πειτᾶ ὁ λόγον ὑστερον αὐτῷ δόξῃ ψευδῆς εἶναι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁν, ἐνίοτε δ᾿ οὐκ ὁν, καὶ αὐθεὶς ἑτερος καὶ ἑτερος· καὶ μᾶλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντι-
C λογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οίσθ᾿ ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφῶτατοι γεγονόναι τε καὶ κατανενοικήναι μόνοι ὅτι οὐτε τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγείας οὔδε βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἀτεχνῶς ὄσπερ ἐν Εὐρίπῳ ἀνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν οὐδενὶ μένει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφην ἐγὼ, ἀληθῆ λέγειν. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Φαίδων, ἐφη, οἰκτρῶν ἄν εἴη τὸ πάθος, εἴ ὄντως δὴ τινὸς ἄληθοὺς καὶ βεβαιόν λόγον καὶ δυνατον κατανοῆσαι, ἐπείτα D διὰ τὸ παραγγέλσαι τοιοῦτοι σοὶ λόγοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθείαν εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ μή, μή ἔαυτόν τις αἵτιο ὅτι τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἁσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους αὖ ἔαυτον τὴν αἰτίαν ἀπώσαιτο καὶ ἢδὴ τὸν λοιπὸν βλευν μιᾶν τε καὶ λοιδορῶν διατελοὶ, τῶν δὲ ὄντων τῆς ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείη. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἢν δ᾿ ἐγώ, οἰκτρῶν δήτα.

40. Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖνυν, ἐφη, τούτῳ εὐλαβη- E θῶμεν καὶ μὴ παρίσχομεν εἰς τὴν ψυχήν, ὡς τῶν λόγων κινδυνεύειν οὐδὲν ψυχεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὕτως ψυχῶς ἔχομεν, ἀλλὰ ἀνδριστέων καὶ προθυμητέων ψυχῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις καὶ τοῦ ἐπειτα βλευν παντὸς 312
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respect that arguments are like men; I was merely following your lead in discussing that. The similarity lies in this: when a man without proper knowledge concerning arguments has confidence in the truth of an argument and afterwards thinks that it is false, whether it really is so or not, and this happens again and again; then you know, those men especially who have spent their time in disputation come to believe that they are the wisest of men and that they alone have discovered that there is nothing sound or sure in anything, whether argument or anything else, but all things go up and down, like the tide in the Euripus, and nothing is stable for any length of time."

"Certainly," I said, "that is very true."

"Then, Phaedo," he said, "if there is any system of argument which is true and sure and can be learned, it would be a sad thing if a man, because he has met with some of those arguments which seem to be sometimes true and sometimes false, should then not blame himself or his own lack of skill, but should end, in his vexation, by throwing the blame gladly upon the arguments and should hate and revile them all the rest of his life, and be deprived of the truth and knowledge of reality."

"Yes, by Zeus," I said, "it would be sad."

"First, then," said he, "let us be on our guard against this, and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there is no soundness in arguments at all. Let us far rather assume that we ourselves are not yet in sound condition and that we must strive manfully and eagerly to become so, you and the others
91 ἐνεκα, ἔμοι δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα τοῦ θανάτου· ὃς κινδυνεύω ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦτον οὔ περὶ τοῦ πάνω ἀπαί- δευτοι πιθονεῖκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ὅτι μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὅν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἕὶ οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ τὸ ταύτα δοξεί τοῖς παροῦσιν, τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνον διοίσειν· οὔ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παρόουσιν ἂν ἔγω λέγω δοξεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι προθυμοθήσομαι, ἐὰν μὴ εἴη πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἐμοὶ ὃ τι μᾶλλον δοξεί τούτων ἐχεῖν. λογίζομαι γὰρ, ὃ φίλε ἐταύρε· θέασαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς· εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὅντα ἄ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ’ ὅγια τοῦτον ἔν τοῦ ἁρώνου αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἢ τοῦτος παροῦσιν ἀληθῆ ἔσομαι ὅμορμον. ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια μοι αὕτη οὐ ξυνδιατελεῖ, καθὼς γὰρ ἂν ἑκατεροῦς ἢ κατεροῦς ἀπολεῖ- ται. παρεσκευασμένος δὴ, ἡφι, ὁ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οὕτωσι ἐρχομαι ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ὑμεῖς μέντοι, ἓν ἔμοι πείθησθε, σμικρὸν φροντίζασθε Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας πολὺ μᾶλλον, εὰν μὲν τι ὑμῖν δοκῶ ἀληθὲς λέγειν, συνομολογήσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτίθετε, ὅπως μὴ ἔγω ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἄμα ἐμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἔξα- πατήσας ὅσπερ μέλιτα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταληπτῶν οἰχύσομαι.

41. Ἀλλ＇ ἵτεον, ἡφι. πρῶτον μὲ ὑπομνή- σατε ἢ ἐλέγετε, ἐὰν μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένοι. Σιμμίας μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ἔγωμαι, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται, μὴ ἴ ὑπαχ οὕμως καὶ θείοτερον καὶ
for the sake of all your future life, and I because of my impending death; for I fear that I am not just now in a philosophical frame of mind as regards this particular question, but am contentious, like quite uncultured persons. For when they argue about anything, they do not care what the truth is in the matters they are discussing, but are eager only to make their own views seem true to their hearers. And I fancy I differ from them just now only to this extent: I shall not be eager to make what I say seem true to my hearers, except as a secondary matter, but shall be very eager to make myself believe it. For see, my friend, how selfish my attitude is. If what I say is true, I am the gainer by believing it; and if there be nothing for me after death, at any rate I shall not be burdensome to my friends by my lamentations in these last moments. And this ignorance of mine will not last, for that would be an evil, but will soon end. So," he said, "Simmias and Cebes, I approach the argument with my mind thus prepared. But you, if you do as I ask, will give little thought to Socrates and much more to the truth; and if you think what I say is true, agree to it, and if not, oppose me with every argument you can muster, that I may not in my eagerness deceive myself and you alike and go away, like a bee, leaving my sting sticking in you.

"But we must get to work," he said. "First refresh my memory, if I seem to have forgotten anything. Simmias, I think, has doubts and fears that the soul, though more divine and excellent than the
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D κάλλιον ὅν τοῦ σῶματος προαπολλυόμαι ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει οὕσα. Κήβης δέ μοι ἔδοξε τούτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχώρειν, πολυχρονώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχὴν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τόδε ἄδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σῶματα καὶ πολλάκις κατατρίψασα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλιποῦσα νῦν αὐτὴ ἀπολλυόμαι, καὶ ὃ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὀλέθρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμα γε ἀεὶ ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἀρα ἀλλ' ἢ ταῦτ' ἐστίν, ὃ Σιμ-μία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἃ δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι;

Ε συνωμολογείτην δὴ ταῦτ’ εἶναι ἄμφω. Πότερον οὖν, ἐφή, πάντας τοὺς ἐμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε, ἢ τοὺς μὲν, τοὺς δ’ οὖ; Τοὺς μὲν, ἐφάτην, τοὺς δ’ οὖ. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὃς, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε, ἐν ὃ ἐφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου οὗτος ἐχοντος ἀναγκαῖος ἔχειν ἄλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σῷματι ἐνδεθῆναι; Ἕγω μὲν, ἐφή ο Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμένω ὡς οὐδεὶ λόγῳ. Καὶ μὴν, ἐφή ο Σιμμίας, καὶ αὐτὸς οὔτως ἔχω, καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μοι περὶ γε τούτου ἄλλα ποτὲ δόξειεν. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης: Ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη σοι, ἐφή, ὃ ἔξεν Θηβαῖε, ἄλλα δοξάσαι, εάνπερ μείνῃ ἢ ἔχεις τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι σύνθετον πρᾶγμα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐντεταμέων συγκεί-σθαι. οὐ γάρ ποι ἂν ἀποδέξεις γε σαυτοῦ λέγοντος, ὃς πρότερον ἂν ἄρμονία συγκείμενη, πρὶν ἐκεῖνα εἶναι, εξ ὃν ἔδει αὐτὴν συντεθῆναι. ἢ ἂν ἂν ἀποδέξεις; Ὁδαμώς, ἐφη, ὃ Σωκράτες. Αἰσθάνει οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὃς, ὅτι ταῦτα σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν, ὅταν
body, may perish first, being of the nature of a
harmony. And, Cebes, I believe, granted that the
soul is more lasting than the body, but said that no
one could know that the soul, after wearing out
many bodies, did not at last perish itself upon leaving
the body; and that this was death—the destruction
of the soul, since the body is continually being
destroyed. Are those the points, Simmias and Cebes,
which we must consider?"

They both agreed that these were the points.

"Now," said he, "do you reject all of our previous
arguments, or only some of them?"

"Only some of them," they replied.

"What do you think," he asked, "about the
argument in which we said that learning is recollec-
tion and that, since this is so, our soul must necessarily
have been somewhere before it was imprisoned in
the body?"

"I," said Cebes, "was wonderfully convinced by
it at the time and I still believe it more firmly than
any other argument."

"And I too," said Simmias, "feel just as he does,
and I should be much surprised if I should ever think
differently on this point."

And Socrates said: "You must, my Theban friend,
think differently, if you persist in your opinion that
a harmony is a compound and that the soul is a
harmony made up of the elements that are strung
like harpstrings in the body. For surely you will
not accept your own statement that a composite
harmony existed before those things from which it
had to be composed, will you?"

"Certainly not, Socrates."

"Then do you see," said he, "that this is just
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φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπου εἰδός γε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκεκιμένην ἐκ τῶν οὐδέπω δυντῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρμονία γε σοι τοιοῦτον ἔστιν ὁ ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ οἱ

C φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι ὄντες γίγνονται, τελευταίοι δὲ πάντων ξυνίσταται ἡ ἄρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὐτός οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκεῖνῳ πῶς ἤνασται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμάς. Καὶ μὴν, ἢ δὲ ὦ, πρέπει γε εὑπέρ τοι ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ξυνίφδῳ εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἄρμονίας. Πρέπει γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμάς. Οὔτος τοίνυν, ἔφη, σοι οὐ ξυνίφδος· ἀλλὰ ὥρα, πότερον αἱρεῖ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμιμησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν; Πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἔφη, ἐκεῖνον, ὃ Σώκρατες. διὸ μὲν γὰρ μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως μετὰ εἰκότος τινὸς

D καὶ εὐπρεπείας, οὐθὲν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις· ἐγώ δὲ τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιομένοις λόγους ἐξουσίας υἱοῦν ἀλλαζόν, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φυλάττηται, εὑρετήσεις οὐ εξεπάτησιν, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρία καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασίν. ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγος δὲ ὑποθέσεως ἄξιας ἀποδείξεις εἰρηται. ἔρρηθ' γὰρ που οὔτως ἢμων εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὅσπερ αὐτὴ ἔστιν ἡ ούσια ἐχούσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ δ

Ε ἔστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἔμαυτον πείθω, ἦκαν ὦ, τε καὶ ὑπὸς ἀποδείχεσθαι. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἐοίκε, διὰ ταύτα μήτε ἔμαυτον μήτε ἄλλου ἀποδείχεσθαι λέγοντος, ὡς ψυχή ἔστιν ἄρμονια.

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what you say when you assert that the soul exists before it enters into the form and body of a man, and that it is composed of things that do not yet exist? For harmony is not what your comparison assumes it to be. The lyre and the strings and the sounds come into being in a tuneless condition, and the harmony is the last of all to be composed and the first to perish. So how can you bring this theory into harmony with the other?"

"I cannot at all," said Simmias.

"And yet," said Socrates, "there ought to be harmony between it and the theory about harmony above all others."

"Yes, there ought," said Simmias.

"Well," said he, "there is no harmony between the two theories. Now which do you prefer, that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony?"

"The former, decidedly, Socrates," he replied. "For this other came to me without demonstration; it merely seemed probable and attractive, which is the reason why many men hold it. I am conscious that those arguments which base their demonstrations on mere probability are deceptive, and if we are not on our guard against them they deceive us greatly, in geometry and in all other things. But the theory of recollection and knowledge has been established by a sound course of argument. For we agreed that our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists. Now I am persuaded that I have accepted this essence on sufficient and right grounds. I cannot therefore accept from myself or anyone else the statement that the soul is a harmony."
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42. Τί δέ, ἢ δ' ὡς, ὦ Σιμμία, τήδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἀρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ συνθέσει προσήκειν ἄλλως 93 πως ἔχειν ἢ ὡς ἄν ἐκεῖνα ἔχη, ἔξ ὡς ἄν συν-κέηται; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖν τι, ὡς ἐγὺμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχειν ἄλλο παρ’ ἄν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνέφη. Οὐκ ἀρα ἡγεῖσθαι γε προσήκειν ἀρμονίαν τούτων, ἐξ ὡς ἄν συντεθῇ, ἄλλ' ἐπέσθαι. Συνεδόκει. Πολλοῦ ἀρα δεῖ ἐναντία γε ἀρμονία κινηθῆναι ἢ φθέγξασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἐναντιωθῆναι τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν. Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἡφη. Τί δέ; οὔχ οὖτος ἀρμονία πέφυκεν εἶναι ἐκάστη ἀρμονία, ὡς ἄν ἄρμοσθῇ; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἡφη. Οὐχί, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἄν μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρμοσθῇ καὶ ἔπὶ πλέον, εἰπέρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἄν ἀρμονία εἶναί καὶ πλεῖον, εἰ δ' ἥττον τε καὶ ἔπ' ἐλαττον, ἥττον τε καὶ ἐλάττων; Πάνω γε. Ἡ οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο περὶ ψυχῆς, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐπ' ἐλαττον καὶ ἥττον αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ψυχῆν; Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιον, ἡφη. Φέρε δή, ἡφη, πρὸς Διός· λέγεται ψυχῆ ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄρετην καὶ εἶναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δε' ἀνθίαν τε καὶ μοχ- 

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"Here is another way of looking at it, Simmias," said he. "Do you think a harmony or any other composite thing can be in any other state than that in which the elements are of which it is composed?"
"Certainly not"
"And it can neither do nor suffer anything other than they do or suffer?"
He agreed.
"Then a harmony cannot be expected to lead the elements of which it is composed, but to follow them."
He assented.
"A harmony, then, is quite unable to move or make a sound or do anything else that is opposed to its component parts."
"Quite unable," said he.
"Well then, is not every harmony by nature a harmony according as it is harmonised?"
"I do not understand," said Simmias.
"Would it not," said Socrates, "be more completely a harmony and a greater harmony if it were harmonised more fully and to a greater extent, assuming that to be possible, and less completely a harmony and a lesser harmony if less completely harmonised and to a less extent?"
"Certainly."
"Is this true of the soul? Is one soul even in the slightest degree more completely and to a greater extent a soul than another, or less completely and to a less extent?"
"Not in the least," said he.
"Well now," said he, "one soul is said to possess sense and virtue and to be good, and another to
θηρίαν καὶ εἶναι κακῆ; καὶ ταῦτα ἀληθῶς λέγεται; Ἀληθῶς μέντοι. Τῶν ὁνὶν θεμένων ψυχῆν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει ταῦτα δύνα
eῖν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν; πότερον ἁρμονίαν αὐ
tια ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν; καὶ τὴν μὲν ἡμόσθηα, τὴν ἀγαθήν, καὶ ἕχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἁρμονίᾳ οὕση ἄλλην ἁρμονίαν,
tὴν δὲ ἀναρμοστον αὐτὴν τε εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἕχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλῃ; Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ', ἐφή ὁ Σιμμίας, εἰπείν δὲ ἔγωγ' ὅτι τοιαύτ' ἄττ' ἀν λέγοι ὁ ἐκείνο ύποθέμενος. Ἀλλὰ προσωμολόγῃται, ἐφή,
μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἦττον ἐτέραν ἑτέρας ψυ-
χῆν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τούτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ὅμολογημα,
μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ' ἔπι πλέον μηδ' ἦττον μηδ'
ἐπ' ἐλαττον ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἁρμονίαν εἶναι. ἢ
gάρ; Πάνω γε. Τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ
hotmail.com ἁρμονίαν οὕσαν μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον
ἡμόσθαι· ἔστιν οὕτως; Ἐστιν. Ἡ δὲ μὴ
mᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἡμοσθεὶς· ἔστιν δ' τι πλέον
ἡ ἐλαττον ἁρμονίας μετέχει, ἢ τὸ ἰσον; Τὸ ἰσον.
Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ἐπειδῆ ὃϋδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον

Ε ἀλλή ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο ψυχῆ· ἔστιν, οὐδὲ δὴ
μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον ἡμοσθαι; Οὐτω. Τοῦτο
dὲ γε πεπουθεῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ
ἀρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν; Οὐ γὰρ οὐν. Τοῦτο δ' αὐ
pεπουθεῖα ἄρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς
μετέχοι ἑτέρα ἑτέρας, εἰπερ ἢ μὲν κακία ἀνα-
ρμοστία, ἢ δὲ ἁρετή ἁρμονία εἰς; Οὐδέν πλέον.
Μᾶλλον δὲ γε ποιν, ὁ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν

94 λόγον κακίας οὐδεμία ψυχὴ μεθέξει, εἰπερ ἀρ-
possess folly and wickedness and to be bad; and is this true?” “Yes, it is true.”

“Now what will those who assume that the soul is a harmony say that these things—the virtue and the wickedness—in the soul are? Will they say that this is another kind of harmony and a discord, and that the soul, which is itself a harmony, has within it another harmony and that the other soul is discordant and has no other harmony within it?”

“I cannot tell,” replied Simmias, “but evidently those who make that assumption would say something of that sort.”

“But we agreed,” said Socrates, “that one soul is no more or less a soul than another; and that is equivalent to an agreement that one is no more and to no greater extent, and no less and to no less extent, a harmony than another, is it not?” “Certainly.”

“And that which is no more or less a harmony, is no more or less harmonised. Is that so?” “Yes.”

“But has that which is no more and no less harmonised any greater or any less amount of harmony, or an equal amount?” “An equal amount.”

“Then a soul, since it is neither more nor less a soul than another, is neither more nor less harmonised.”

“That is so.”

“And therefore can have no greater amount of discord or of harmony?” “No.”

“And therefore again one soul can have no greater amount of wickedness or virtue than another, if wickedness is discord and virtue harmony?” “It cannot.”

“Or rather, to speak exactly, Simmias, no soul will have any wickedness at all, if the soul is a harmony;
μονία ἐστὶν. ἄρμονία γὰρ δὴπον παντελῶς αὐτὸ τούτο οὖσα ἄρμονία ἀναρμοστίας οὐποτ' ἀν μετάσχοι. Οὐ μὲντοι. Οὔδε γε δὴπον ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακίας. Πῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων; Ἐκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ξύλων ὅμοιως ἀγαθαὶ ἐσονται, εἰπερ ὅμοιως πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τούτο, ψυχαὶ, εἰναι. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἡφη, ὥ Σῶκρατες. B Ἡ καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἢ δ' ὡς, οὖτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἄν ταιτα ὁ λόγος, εἰ ὁρθῇ ἢ ὑπόθεσις ἦν, τὸ ψυχὴν ἄρμονίαν εἰναι; Οὔδ' ὀπωστιοῦν, ἡφη.

43. Τι δὲ; ἢ δ' ὡς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἐσθ' ὡ τι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον; Οὐκ ἔγωγε. Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν' τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἡ καὶ ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε, οἶον θ' καύματος ἐνοῦτος καὶ δόξους ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἔλκειν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνούσης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἐσθείων, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία που ὅρῳμεν ἐναντιομένην τὴν ψυχὴν C τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. ἡ οὖ; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὡμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μήποτ' ἀν αὐτῆς, ἄρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναύτης ἄδειων οἰς ἐπιτείωντο καὶ χαλῳτο καὶ πάλλει τοῖς ἀλλο ὅτιοι πάθος πάσχοι ἐκεῖνα ἐξ ὧν τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαι ἐκεῖνος καὶ οὕποτ' ἐστιν.  

<sup>1</sup> Schanz brackets συγχωροῦσαν.

<sup>2</sup> Schanz omits ἡ καὶ.

<sup>3</sup> οἶον Stobaeus. ὡς CDE, bracketed by Schanz.
for if a harmony is entirely harmony, it could have no part in discord."

"Certainly not."

"Then the soul, being entirely soul, could have no part in wickedness."

"How could it, if what we have said is right?"

"According to this argument, then, if all souls are by nature equally souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good."

"So it seems, Socrates," said he.

"And," said Socrates, "do you think that this is true and that our reasoning would have come to this end, if the theory that the soul is a harmony were correct?"

"Not in the least," he replied.

"Well," said Socrates, "of all the parts that make up a man, do you think any is ruler except the soul, especially if it be a wise one?"

"No, I do not."

"Does it yield to the feelings of the body or oppose them? I mean, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul oppose it and draw it away from drinking, and from eating when it is hungry, and do we not see the soul opposing the body in countless other ways?"

"Certainly."

"Did we not agree in our previous discussion that it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them?"
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δὲν ἤγεμονεύειν; Ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἐφ' ὅπως γὰρ οὖ; Τί οὖν; νῦν οὖν πᾶν τοῦντίον ἦμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζόμενη, ἤγεμονεύονσά τε ἐκείνων πάντων ἤξ' ὅν φησὶ τις αὐτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιοῦν.

Στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἦν παπᾶ μύθῳ τέτλαθι δὴ, κραδίη καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλησ.

Ε' ἀρ' οὔει αὐτῶν τάυτα ποιήσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὖς καὶ οἷς ἀγεσθαί ὕπο τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθῶν, ἄλλ' οὐ' χ' οἷς ἀγειν τε τάυτα καὶ δεσπόξειν, καὶ οὖς οὕςοις αὐτῆς πολὺ θειοτέρον τινὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἀρμονίαιν; Ὀῆ Δία, ὃ Σῶκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὔκ ἀρα, ὃ ἀριστε, ἢμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχὴν ἀρμονίαν τινὰ φαίνει εἶναι. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν, ὡς 95 ἔσικεν, 'Ομήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ ὀμολογούμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἢμῖν αὐτοῖς. Ἐχειν οὕτως ἔφη.

44. Ἐλευ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἢμῖν τῆς Θηβαϊκῆς ἠλεά πως, ὡς ἔσικε, μετρίως γέγονεν: τί δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἐφ' ὃς

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"Yes," he replied, "we did, of course."

"Well then, do we not now find that the soul acts in exactly the opposite way, leading those elements of which it is said to consist and opposing them in almost everything through all our life, and tyrannising over them in every way, sometimes inflicting harsh and painful punishments (those of gymnastics and medicine), and sometimes milder ones, sometimes threatening and sometimes admonishing, in short, speaking to the desires and passions and fears as if it were distinct from them and they from it, as Homer has shown in the *Odyssey*\(^1\) when he says of Odysseus:

> He smote his breast, and thus he chid his heart:
> 'Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this'?

Do you suppose that, when he wrote those words, he thought of the soul as a harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body, and not rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony?"

"By Zeus, Socrates, the latter, I think."

"Then, my good friend, it will never do for us to say that the soul is a harmony; for we should, it seems, agree neither with Homer, the divine poet, nor with ourselves."

"That is true," said he.

"Very well," said Socrates, "Harmonia, the Theban goddess, has, it seems, been moderately

\(^1\) *Odyssey* xx, 17, 18. Bryant's translation.
Κέβης, πώς ἱλασόμεθα καὶ τίνι λόγῳ; Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἐφ’ ὦ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσειν τούτων γοῦν τὸν λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἄρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι εἴπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Σιμμίου γὰρ λέγοντος ὦ τι ἡπόρει, πάνυ ἑθαυμαζόν, εἰ τι ἔξει τις χρῆσασθαι

Β τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ. πάνυ μὲν σὺν μοι ἀτόπως ἐδοξεῖν εἰθῖς τὴν πρώτην ἐφόδου οὐ δέξασθαι τοῦ σου λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσασι καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι. Ὅ γαθε, ἐφ’ ὦ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγει, μὴ τίς ἡμῶν βασικανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἐξεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικὸς ἐγγὺς ἴντες πειρώμεθα, εἰ ἁρὰ τι λέγεισ. ἔστι δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον ὧν ξητεῖς· ἁξίοις ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον

C τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὕσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἄνηρ μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι, θαρρῶν τε καὶ ἡγούμενος ἀποθανόν ἔκει εὗ πράξειν διαφερόντως ἢ εἰ ἐν ἀλλῷ βίῳ βίους ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητον τε καὶ ἡλίθιον θάρρος θαρρῆσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν, ὅτι ἵσχυρὸν τῷ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοειδῆς καὶ ἦν ἐτί πρότερον, πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὔδὲν κωλύειν φης πάντα ταῦτα μηνύειν ἀθανασίαν μὲν μή, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρόνιον τῇ ἐστὶν ψυχῇ καὶ ἦν που πρότερον ἀμήχανον ὡςον χρόνον καὶ ἤδει τε καὶ ἔπραττεν πολλὰ ἄττα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔδέν τι μᾶλλον

D ἢν ἀθάνατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἐλθεῖν ἀρχῇ ἢν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὡσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρομένη τῇ δὴ τούτῳ τὸν βίον ξώῃ καὶ τελευτῶσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ

1 Schanz, following Hermann, brackets ἔσθαι.
gracious to us; but how, Cebes, and by what argument can we find grace in the sight of Cadmus?"

"I think," said Cebes, "you will find a way. At any rate, you conducted this argument against harmony wonderfully and better than I expected. For when Simmias was telling of his difficulty, I wondered if anyone could make head against his argument; so it seemed to me very remarkable that it could not withstand the first attack of your argument. Now I should not be surprised if the argument of Cadmus met with the same fate.

"My friend," said Socrates, "do not be boastful, lest some evil eye put to rout the argument that is to come. That, however, is in the hands of God. Let us, in Homeric fashion, 'charge the foe' and test the worth of what you say. Now the sum total of what you seek is this: You demand a proof that our soul is indestructible and immortal, if the philosopher, who is confident in the face of death and who thinks that after death he will fare better in the other world than if he had lived his life differently, is not to find his confidence senseless and foolish. And although we show that the soul is strong and godlike and existed before we men were born as men, all this, you say, may bear witness not to immortality, but only to the fact that the soul lasts a long while, and existed somewhere an immeasurably long time before our birth, and knew and did various things; yet it was none the more immortal for all that, but its very entrance into the human body was the beginning of its dissolution, a disease, as it were; and it lives in toil through this life and finally
ἀπολλύωντο. διαφέρειν ἃ δὲ ἡ φῆς οὐδὲν, εἰτε ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεται εἰτε πολλάκις, πρός γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν φοβεῖσθαι. προσήκειν γὰρ φοβεῖ
σθαι, εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἶη, τὸ μὴ εἰδότε μηδὲ ἔχοντε
λόγον διδόναι, ὡς ἀθάνατον ἐστι. τοιαύτ' ἄττα
Ε ἐστίν, οἷμαι, ὦ Κέβης, ὦ λέγεις· καὶ ἔξεπτην ἥ
πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς,
εἰ τέ τι βούλει, προσθῆς ἡ ἀφέλης. καὶ ὁ Κέβης· Ἄλλῳ
οὐδὲν ἔγωγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἔφη, οὔτε ἀφελεῖν οὔτε προσθείναι δέομαι· ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα, ὥσ
λέγω.

45. ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συχνὸν χρόνον ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκεφάμενος, Οὐ φαύλου
πράγμα, ἐφη, ὦ Κέβης, ζητεῖς· ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ
περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγ
96 ματεύσασθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοι δίειμι περὶ αὐτῶν,
ἐὰν βούλῃ, τά γε ἐμὰ πάθη· ἐπείτα ἂν τί σοι
χρήσιμον φαίνηται ὁ ἐν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ
περὶ ὧν λέγεις χρήσει. Ἄλλα μὴν, ἐφη ὦ
Κέβης, βούλομαι γε. Ἀκούσε τοίνυν ὡς ἔροιν
τος. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἐφη, ὦ Κέβης, νέος ὁ ἁθυμα-
στῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἂν ἢ
καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. ὑπερήφανος γὰρ
μοι ἐθύμει εἰναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκαστοῦ,
διὰ τί γίγνεται ἐκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί

Β ἐστι· καὶ πολλάκις ἐμαυτὸν ἃνω κἀτῳ μετέβαλ
λον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τά τοιάδε, ἃρ ἐπειδῶν τὸ
θερμόν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν τὸν Σχάνζ δείκνυσι τινὰ λάβῃ, ὥς

1 Schanz reads διαφέρει.
2 Schanz reads προσήκει.
3 τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν Eb Stobaeus. τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυ
χρὸν BD, Schanz brackets ψυχρὸν.
perishes in what we call death. Now it makes no difference, you say, whether a soul enters into a body once or many times, so far as the fear each of us feels is concerned; for anyone, unless he is a fool, must fear, if he does not know and cannot prove that the soul is immortal. That, Cebes, is, I think, about what you mean. And I restate it purposely that nothing may escape us and that you may, if you wish, add or take away anything."

And Cebes said, "I do not at present wish to take anything away or to add anything. You have expressed my meaning."

Socrates paused for some time and was absorbed in thought. Then he said: "It is no small thing that you seek; for the cause of generation and decay must be completely investigated. Now I will tell you my own experience in the matter, if you wish; then if anything I say seems to you to be of any use, you can employ it for the solution of your difficulty."

"Certainly," said Cebes, "I wish to hear your experiences."

"Listen then, and I will tell you. When I was young, Cebes, I was tremendously eager for the kind of wisdom which they call investigation of nature. I thought it was a glorious thing to know the causes of everything, why each thing comes into being and why it perishes and why it exists; and I was always unsettling myself with such questions as these: Do heat and cold, by a sort of fermentation, bring about the organisation of animals, as some people say? Is
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τινες ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζώα συντρέφεται· καὶ πότερον τὸ αἷμα ἐστὶν ὁ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὁ ἄρρητος ἢ τὸ πῦρ, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν, ὡς ἐγκέφαλος ἐστιν ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούειν καὶ ὅραν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γύνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λαβούσης τὸ ἱρεμεῖν κατὰ ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην· καὶ αὐτὸ τούτων

C

τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν οὐρανόν καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἐδοξά πρὸς ταῦτα τὴν σκέψιν ἀφική εἶναι, ὡς οὐδὲν χρήμα. τεκμηρίον δὲ σοὶ ἐρῶ ἰκανόν· ἐγώ γὰρ ἂν καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπεισάμην, ὡς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐδόκουν, τὸτε ὑπὸ ταῦτα τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐνυφλώθην, ὡστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ ἃ πρὸ τοῦ φύμην εἴδεναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τούτῳ γὰρ φύμην πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δήλου εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ

D

πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτῶν ταῖς μὲν σαρξίς σάρκης προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστεόις ὀστά, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεία ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὄλγον δυνκὸν ὅταν ὑστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν· οὕτως τὸτε φύμη· οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίως; Ἐμοιγε, ἐφη ο Κέβης. Σκέψασι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. φύμην γὰρ ἰκανόνς μοι δοκεῖν, ὡστε τις φαίνοιτο ἄνθρω- πος παραστὰς μέγας σμικρῷ μείζον εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ

E

κεφαλῆς, καὶ ὑποτος ὑποτού· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδοκεί τῶν ὁκτῶ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσθεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίππχυ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμῖσει αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν. Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἐφη ο Κέβης, τί σοι

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it the blood, or air, or fire by which we think? Or is it none of these, and does the brain furnish the sensations of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion arise from these, and does knowledge come from memory and opinion in a state of rest? And again I tried to find out how these things perish, and I investigated the phenomena of heaven and earth until finally I made up my mind that I was by nature totally unsuited for this kind of investigation. And I will give you a sufficient proof of this. I was so completely blinded by these studies that I lost the knowledge that I, and others also, thought I had before; I forgot what I had formerly believed I knew about many things and even about the cause of man's growth. For I had thought previously that it was plain to everyone that man grows through eating and drinking; for when, from the food he eats, flesh is added to his flesh and bones to his bones, and in the same way the appropriate thing is added to each of his other parts, then the small bulk becomes greater and the small man large. That is what I used to think. Doesn't that seem to you reasonable?"

"Yes," said Cebes.

"Now listen to this, too. I thought I was sure enough, when I saw a tall man standing by a short one, that he was, say, taller by a head than the other, and that one horse was larger by a head than another horse; and, to mention still clearer things than those, I thought ten were more than eight because two had been added to the eight, and I thought a two-cubit rule was longer than a one-cubit rule because it exceeded it by half its length."

"And now," said Cebes, "what do you think about them?"
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dokei perì autōn; Pórrw pòu, ἐφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ ὁἰς ἐκεῖνοι περὶ τούτων τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὃς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς, ἐπειδὰν εἰ τις προσβῆ ἐν, ἢ τὸ ἐν ὃ προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστέθεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ ὃ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἔτέρῳ τῷ ἔτερῳ δύο ἐγένετο ταυμάζω γάρ, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἦσθην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπιλησίας ἀλλήλων, αὕτη ἀρα αἰτία αὐτῶν ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἥ ἔννοιας τοῦ πλησίου ἀλλήλων τεθήναι. οὐδὲ γε ὡς, εάν τις ἐν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἐτί πεθεσθαι ὃς αὕτη ἀφ' αὐτία γέγονεν, ἥ σχῆσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι: ἐναντία γάρ γίγνεται γὰρ τὸτε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι τὸτε μὲν γάρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίου ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἐτέρου ἔτέρῳ, νῦν δὲ ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτέρου ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδὲ γε, δι' ὅ τι εὗ γίγνεται ὅς ἐπισταμαί ἐτί πεθήκες ἐμαυτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐν λόγῳ δι' ὅ τι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ ἔστι, κατὰ τούτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ἄλλα των ἄλλων τρόπον αὐτός εἰκῇ φύρω, τούτων δὲ οὖδαι ἰημέρα ἐποίεισαι.

46. Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἐφη, Ἀναξαγόρου ἄναγγελον, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμὸν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίων, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἰδὴν τε καὶ ἐδοξέ μοι τρόπου τινὰ εὗ ἐξειν τὸ τῶν νοῶν εἶναι πάντων αἰτίων, καὶ ἤγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' ὂντως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν1 καὶ ἐκα-

1 Schanz brackets κοσμεῖν.
"By Zeus," said he, "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of any of these things, I who do not even dare to say, when one is added to one, whether the one to which the addition was made has become two, or the one which was added, or the one which was added and the one to which it was added became two by the addition of each to the other. I think it is wonderful that when each of them was separate from the other, each was one and they were not then two, and when they were brought near each other this juxtaposition was the cause of their becoming two. And I cannot yet believe that if one is divided, the division causes it to become two; for this is the opposite of the cause which produced two in the former case; for then two arose because one was brought near and added to another one, and now because one is removed and separated from another. And I no longer believe that I know by this method even how one is generated or, in a word, how anything is generated or is destroyed or exists, and I no longer admit this method, but have another confused way of my own.

"Then one day I heard a man reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, that it is the mind that arranges and causes all things. I was pleased with this theory of cause, and it seemed to me to be somehow right that the mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought, 'If this is so, the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes
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στον τιθέναι ταύτη ὃπῃ ἄν βελτιστα ἔχῃ εἰ ὦν τις βούλοντο τὴν αἰτίαν εὔρειν περὶ ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τούτῳ δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὔρειν, ὅπῃ βελτιστὸν αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁμοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ

D λόγου τοῦτον οὖν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βελτιστὸν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χείρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενον ἀσμενὸς εὑρήκεναι ὃμιθν διδάσκαλος τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ, τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν, πότερον ἢ γῆ πλατεία ἐστὶν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ

E φράσειν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἁμεῖνον καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἁμεῖνὸν ἢ τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἁμεῖνον ἢν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀπο- 98 φαίνοιτο, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἴδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἦλιον οὗτω παρεσκευάσμην, ὡςαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πη ποτε ταύτ’ ἁμεῖνον ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτῶν ὃμιθν, φάσκοντα γε ὑπὸ νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμήσθαι, ἀλλ’ τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βελτιστὸν αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἔστιν ὀσπερ ἔχει.

B ἐκάστῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ

1 αὐτοὶ ἐκέλνου BCDE. Schanz brackets αὐτού. Wohlrab omits ἐκέλνου and reads αὐτοῦ. Burnet brackets ἐκέλνου.

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each thing as it is best for it to be. So if anyone wishes to find the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of a particular thing, he must find out what sort of existence, or passive state of any kind, or activity is best for it. And therefore in respect to that particular thing, and other things too, a man need examine nothing but what is best and most excellent; for then he will necessarily know also what is inferior, since the science of both is the same.' As I considered these things I was delighted to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the cause of things quite to my mind, and I thought he would tell me whether the earth is flat or round, and when he had told me that, would go on to explain the cause and the necessity of it, and would tell me the nature of the best and why it is best for the earth to be as it is; and if he said the earth was in the centre, he would proceed to show that it is best for it to be in the centre; and I had made up my mind that if he made those things clear to me, I would no longer yearn for any other kind of cause. And I had determined that I would find out in the same way about the sun and the moon and the other stars, their relative speed, their revolutions, and their other changes, and why the active or passive condition of each of them is for the best. For I never imagined that, when he said they were ordered by intelligence, he would introduce any other cause for these things than that it is best for them to be as they are. So I thought when he assigned the cause
κοινὴ πάσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βελτιστὸν φύμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πάσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθὸν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῆς λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἰος τῇ ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἢν ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βελτιστὸν καὶ τὸ χείρον.

47. Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς Ἕλπιδος, ὃ ἑταῖρε, φύχομην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ προϊόν καὶ ἁναγιγνώσκουν ὅρως ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ
twας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον εἰς τὸ διακοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα, ἀέρας δὲ καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὑδάτα αἰτιώμενον καὶ ἄλλα πολλά καὶ ἄτοπα. καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν ὁμοιότατον πεπονθέναι ὅστερ ἄν εἰ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὁσ πράττει νῦν πράττει, κἀπειτα ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστων ὅν πράττω, λέγω ορθῶν μὲν ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάθημαι, ὅτι σύγκειται μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὡστέων καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὡστὰ ἐστὶν στερεὰ καὶ διαφυγας ἔχει χωρίς ἀπ' ἄλληλου, τὰ δὲ νεύρα
do ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι, περιμπέχοντα τὰ ὡστὰ μετὰ τῶν σαρκῶν καὶ δέρματος ὁ συνέχει αὐτά· αἰσθουμένους οὐν τῶν ὡστέων ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἐνυμπολαίς χαλώντα καὶ συντείνοντα τὰ νεύρα καμπτεῖσθαι που ποιεῖ οἶον τ' εἶναι ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταῦτης τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεῖς ἐνθάδε κάθημαι· καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ὑμῖν ἑτέραις τοιαύταις αἰτίας λέγοι, φονᾶς τε καὶ ἀέρας καὶ ἁκοάς καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τοιαύτα αἰτιώμενος.

E ἀμελήσας τὰς ὡς ἀληθῶς αἰτίας λέγειν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίοις ἔδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἐμοῦ καταψηφίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον

1 Schanz brackets καὶ.
of each thing and of all things in common he would go on and explain what is best for each and what is good for all in common. I prized my hopes very highly, and I seized the books very eagerly and read them as fast as I could, that I might know as fast as I could about the best and the worst.

"My glorious hope, my friend, was quickly snatched away from me. As I went on with my reading I saw that the man made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes for the ordering of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other absurdities. And it seemed to me it was very much as if one should say that Socrates does with intelligence whatever he does, and then, in trying to give the causes of the particular thing I do, should say first that I am now sitting here because my body is composed of bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed and, with the flesh and the skin which contains them all, are laid about the bones; and so, as the bones are hung loose in their ligaments, the sinews, by relaxing and contracting, make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent. Or as if in the same way he should give voice and air and hearing and countless other things of the sort as causes for our talking with each other, and should fail to mention the real causes, which are, that the Athenians decided that it was best to condemn me, and therefore I have decided
αὐ δέδοκται ἐνθάδε καθήσθαι, καὶ δικαιώτερον
παραμένοντα ὑπέχειν τὴν δίκην ἢν ἂν κελεύσωσιν.
ἐπεὶ ἥ τὸν κύνα, ὡς ἐγάμμαι, πάλας ἂν ταῦτα τὰ
νεῦρα τε καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἣ περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτοῦς
ην, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ
dικαιώτερον ωῇ καὶ κάλλιον εἰναι πρὸ τοῦ
φεύγειν τε καὶ ἀποδιδάσκειν ὑπέχειν τῇ πόλει
dίκην ἡμῖν· ἀν τάττῃ. ἀλλ᾽ αἰτιά μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα
καλεῖν λίαν ἀτοποῦν· εἰ δὲ τὶς λέγοι ὡτὶ ἄνευ τοῦ
tὰ τοιαύτα ἔχειν καὶ ὀστὰ καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα
ἐχω, οὐκ ἂν ὦλον τῇ ὑπὸ ποιεῖν τὸ δόξαντά μοι,
ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγω· ὡς μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἅ ποιῶ
καὶ ταῦτα γῆ πράττω, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου
αἱρέσει, πολλῆ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία ἤν εἰ ὑπὸ
λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἶνον τ᾽ εἶναι ὡτὶ
ἀλλὸ μὲν τὶ ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῇ ὄντι, ἀλλο δὲ
ἐκεῖνο ἄνευ οὐ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἂν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον· ὃ
dὴ μοι φαίνονται ψυλαφῶντες οἱ πολλοὶ ὅσπερ
ἐν σκότει, ἀλλοτρίῳ ὑπόματι προσχρόμενοι, ὡς
αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τὸς
dίνῃ περίτεθες τῇ γῆ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑφρανοῦ μένειν δὴ
pοιεῖ τὴν γῆν, ὃ δὲ ὅσπερ καρδόπω πλατείᾳ
βάθρων τῶν ἀέρα ὑπερεῖδε. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅς οἶνον τὲ
βελτίστα αὐτὰ τεθήναι δύναμιν οὕτω νῦν κείσθαι,
tαύτην οὕτω ξητοῦσιν οὕτα τινὰ οἴονται δαιμονίαν
ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, ἄλλα ἡγοῦνται τούτου Ἀτλαντα ἂν
ποτὲ ἱσχυρότερον καὶ ἄθανατότερον καὶ μάλλον
ἀπαίτα συνέχοντα ἔξερειν, καὶ ὡς ἄληθῶς τὸ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον ξυνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν
οἴονται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας, ὅτι
ποτὲ ἔχει, μαθητής ὅτου ὤν ἡδιστὶ· ἂν γενοίμην
ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἐστερήθην καὶ οὕτα αὐτὸς εὑρεῖν
that it was best for me to sit here and that it is right for me to stay and undergo whatever penalty they order. For, by Dog, I fancy these bones and sinews of mine would have been in Megara or Boeotia long ago, carried thither by an opinion of what was best, if I did not think it was better and nobler to endure any penalty the city may inflict rather than to escape and run away. But it is most absurd to call things of that sort causes. If anyone were to say that I could not have done what I thought proper if I had not bones and sinews and other things that I have, he would be right. But to say that those things are the cause of my doing what I do, and that I act with intelligence but not from the choice of what is best, would be an extremely careless way of talking. Whoever talks in that way is unable to make a distinction and to see that in reality a cause is one thing, and the thing without which the cause could never be a cause is quite another thing. And so it seems to me that most people, when they give the name of cause to the latter, are groping in the dark, as it were, and are giving it a name that does not belong to it. And so one man makes the earth stay below the heavens by putting a vortex about it, and another regards the earth as a flat trough supported on a foundation of air; but they do not look for the power which causes things to be now placed as it is best for them to be placed, nor do they think it has any divine force, but they think they can find a new Atlas more powerful and more immortal and more all-embracing than this, and in truth they give no thought to the good, which must embrace and hold together all things. Now I would gladly be the pupil of anyone who would teach me the nature of such a cause; but since that
οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου μαθεῖν οἷός τε ἐγενόμην, τὸν ∆' δεύτερον πλούν ἔτι τὴν τῆς αἰτίας ἕτησιν ἢ πεπραγμάτευμα, βούλει σοι, ἐφι, ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσωμαι, ὁ Κέβης; ὁπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἐφι, ὡς βούλομαι.

48. Ἐδοξε τοίνυν μοι, ἢ δ' ὦς, μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ ὄντα σκοπῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθήναι, μὴ πάθομι ὅπερ οἱ τὸν Ἡλιον ἐκλείποντα θεωροῦντες καὶ σκοποῦμενοι. διαφθείρονται γὰρ τὸν ἐνοίκο ταὸ ὄμματα, ἔαν μὴ ἐν ἔδατι ἡ τοὐν

Ε' τοιοῦτῳ σκοποῦντα τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτον τι καὶ ἐγὼ διενοθήκην, καὶ ἔδεισα, μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεῖν βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπετεθαίρων αὐτῶν. Ἐδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἵσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάζω τρόπον τίνα οὐκ ἔοικεν. οὔ γὰρ πάνω συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοποῦμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις. ἄλλον οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὄρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὅν ἄν κρίνω ἐρρωμενεστάτον εἶναι, δὲ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ως ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων, δ' ἂν μὴ, ός οὖν ἀληθῆ. βούλομαι δὲ σοι σαφέστερον εἰπεῖν ἃ λέγω. οἴμαι γὰρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἐφι ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

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Β' 49. Ἀλλ', ἢ δ' ὦς, φῦντε λέγω, οὐδὲν καὶνόν, ἄλλο ἄπερ ἀεὶ καὶ ἄλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὔδεν πέπαυμαι λέγων. ἐρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ
was denied me and I was not able to discover it myself or to learn of it from anyone else, do you wish me, Cebes," said he, "to give you an account of the way in which I have conducted my second voyage in quest of the cause?"

"I wish it with all my heart," he replied.

"After this, then," said he, "since I had given up investigating realities, I decided that I must be careful not to suffer the misfortune which happens to people who look at the sun and watch it during an eclipse. For some of them ruin their eyes unless they look at its image in water or something of the sort. I thought of that danger, and I was afraid my soul would be blinded if I looked at things with my eyes and tried to grasp them with any of my senses. So I thought I must have recourse to conceptions and examine in them the truth of realities. Now perhaps my metaphor is not quite accurate; for I do not grant in the last that he who studies realities by means of conceptions is looking at them in images any more than he who studies them in the facts of daily life. However, that is the way I began. I assume in each case some principle which I consider strongest, and whatever seems to me to agree with this, whether relating to cause or to anything else, I regard as true, and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue. But I want to tell you more clearly what I mean; for I think you do not understand now."

"Not very well, certainly," said Cebes.

"Well," said Socrates, "this is what I mean. It is nothing new, but the same thing I have always been saying, both in our previous conversation and elsewhere. I am going to try to explain to you the nature of that cause which I have been studying,
ΠΛΑΤΟ

πεπραγμάτευμαι, καὶ εἰμὶ πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἀρχομαι ἀπ᾽ ἐκεῖνων, ὑποθέ-
μενος εἰναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ ἄγαθον
καὶ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα πάντα· ἄ εἰ μοι δίδως τε
καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἰναι ταῦτα, ἐλπίζω σοι ἐκ τού-
tων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν, ὡς

C ἄθανατον ἡ ψυχή. Ἄλλα μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης,
ὡς διδόντος σοι όυκ ἂν φθάνοις περαῖνον.
Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκεῖνοις, εάν σοι
ξυνδοκῇ ὡσπερ ἐμοί. φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἰ τί
ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ
dι᾽ ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἰναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκεῖνο
τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ
τοιμάδε αἰτία συγχωρεῖς; Συγχωρῶ," ἔφη.
Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦ δ’ ὤς, ἐτὶ μανθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς
ἀλλὰς αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γνωρίσκειν· ἄλλ’
ἐαν τίς μοι λέγῃ, δι’ ὅ τι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὅτιον, ἦ

D χρῶμα εὐανθῆς ἔχον ἡ σχῆμα ἡ ἄλλο ὅτιον τῶν
tοιοῦτων, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα χαίρειν εὖ, ταράττομαι
γάρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι, τούτῳ δὲ ἀπλῶς καὶ
ἀτέχνως καὶ ἵσας εὐήθως ἔχω παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, ὅτι
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν ἡ ἡ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ
καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσίᾳ εἴτε κοινωνίᾳ ὅτῃ δὴ καὶ
ὅτως προσγενομένη οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ τούτῳ δισχυρί-
ξομαι, ἄλλ’ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γύγνεται
calá. τούτῳ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι
καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀτοκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτῳ

E ἐχόμενος ἠγούμαι οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ πεσεῖν, ἄλλ’
ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὅτιον ἄλλῳ ἀπο-
κρίνασθαι, ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ· ἢ οὐ
καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ; Δοκεῖ. Καὶ μεγέθει ἃρα τὰ
and I will revert to those familiar subjects of ours as my point of departure and assume that there are such things as absolute beauty and good and greatness and the like. If you grant this and agree that these exist, I believe I shall explain cause to you and shall prove that the soul is immortal."

"You may assume," said Cebes, "that I grant it, and go on."

"Then," said he, "see if you agree with me in the next step. I think that if anything is beautiful it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty; and this applies to everything. Do you assent to this view of cause?"

"I do," said he.

"Now I do not yet, understand," he went on, "nor can I perceive those other ingenious causes. If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely colour, or its shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else makes it beautiful but the presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty. For I think this is the safest answer I can give to myself or to others, and if I cleave fast to this, I think I shall never be overthrown, and I believe it is safe for me or anyone else to give this answer, that beautiful things are beautiful through beauty. Do you agree?"

"I do."

"And great things are great and greater things
PLATO

μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεῖξι μεῖξι, καὶ σμικρότητι τὰ ἐλάττω ἐλάττω; Ναὶ. Ὅτι ὅσι ἀφ’ ἀν ἀποδέχοις, εἴ τις τινα φαίη ἔτερον ἕτερον τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖξι εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροις ἂν, ὅτι σὺ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μεῖξι πᾶν ἔτερον ἕτερον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μεῖξι ἐστίν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τούτο μεῖξι, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττὸν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐλαττὸν ἢ σμικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τούτο ἐλαττὸν, διὰ τὴν σμικρότητα, φοβούμενος οἶμαι, μὴ τῖς σοι ἐναντίον λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μεῖξινα τινα φής εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττῳ, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μεῖξι μεῖξι εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἐλαττόν, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ σμικρᾷ

Β σοῦς τὸν μεῖξι μεῖξι εἶναι, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ σμικρῷ τῳ μέγαν τινὰ εἶναι. Ἦ οὐκ ἂν φοβοῖο ταῦτα; Καὶ ὁ Κέβθης γελάζας. Ἐγώγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυνῶν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτῃ τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλει, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος; καὶ τὸ δίππυχ τοῦ πηχυαίου ἡμίσει μεῖξι εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ μεγέθει; ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ ποὺ φόβος. Πάνω γ’, ἔφη. Τὶ δὲ; ἐν ἔνοις προστεθέντοι τῇ πρόσθεσιν αἰτίᾳ εἶναι τοῦ δύο

C γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχῖσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοφῖς ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πῶς ἔκαστον γνωμόμενον ἢ μετασχῆν τῇς ἱδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν

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greater by greatness, and smaller things smaller by smallness?"

"Yes."

"And you would not accept the statement, if you were told that one man was greater or smaller than another by a head, but you would insist that you say only that every greater thing is greater than another by nothing else than greatness, and that it is greater by reason of greatness, and that which is smaller is smaller by nothing else than smallness and is smaller by reason of smallness. For you would, I think, be afraid of meeting with the retort, if you said that a man was greater or smaller than another by a head, first that the greater is greater and the smaller is smaller by the same thing, and secondly, that the greater man is greater by a head, which is small, and that it is a monstrous thing that one is great by something that is small. Would you not be afraid of this?"

And Cebes laughed and said, "Yes, I should."

"Then," he continued, "you would be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two and that this is the reason it is more. You would say it is more by number and by reason of number; and a two-cubit measure is greater than a one-cubit measure not by half but by magnitude, would you not? For you would have the same fear."

"Certainly," said he.

"Well, then, if one is added to one or if one is divided, you would avoid saying that the addition or the division is the cause of two? You would exclaim loudly that you know no other way by which anything can come into existence than by participating in the proper essence of each thing in which it
PLATO

tou'tōs ouk exheis allhn tinà aitíain tou dýo
gvenésthai all' h tòn tis duádos metáskevin, kai
dein tou'tou metaskeivn tâ mêllonta dýo esésthai,
kal monádos ó an melhē en esésthai, tás de skhíseis
tau'tas kal prosthéseis kal tás allas tás
toiaútais koupsiēias efh's an xairēin, parēis apok-
krínasathai tois seautou sofwtéropoi. su de dēdios

D an, to legómenein, tîn seautou skiai kai tîn
âpeirian, exh'menos ekéinon tòu ásphaloús tîs
uposthésews, ou'tòs apokrínai aîn; ei de tîs aînìs
tîs uposthésews éfouito, xairēin efh's an kai ouk
apokrínai, éws an tâ âp' ekéinhs òrmhênta
skhpiain, ei su alllhlois sumphnei h diafwnh:
êpeidh de ekéinhs aînìs deoi se didinai lógon,
ôsathîs an didhîs, allhnh an upôsthsein uposth-
menos, òtis tòn anowthen bêtisth fainîto, éws

E êpî ti ikanón elthoi, áma de ouk an fûroio òsper
oi antilologikoi peri te tîs arxhís dialegoméneos kal
tîn ex ekéinhs òrmhménav, èipter boulyio ti tîn
ôntwv eúreiv. ekéinous men gar ìsws ou'de elis peri
tou'tou lógon ou'de frountis' ikanoli gar up'do sofías
ómov pànta kuxwntes òmws dúnavasthai1 autòl

102 autòvs ìrèskhei. su d' èipter ei tîwv filosóphov, ou'mai an òs ìgôw léghw poiois. 'Alhêstata, 
exekrathe. N'h Diá, ò Faidhwn, eikotws ge' than-
masthos gar mou dovei òs ènarhôw tîf kal smikeròv
novn ìxounti èiptei òkéinov tau'ta.

Faidhwn. Pânu men ou'n, ò' Exekrathe, kal pâsi
tîwv parousin ìdou'v.

1 Schanz follows Hirschig in bracketing dúnavasthai.
participates, and therefore you accept no other cause of the existence of two than participation in duality, and things which are to be two must participate in duality, and whatever is to be one must participate in unity, and you would pay no attention to the divisions and additions and other such subtleties, leaving those for wiser men to explain. You would distrust your inexperience and would be afraid, as the saying goes, of your own shadow; so you would cling to that safe principle of ours and would reply as I have said. And if anyone attacked the principle, you would pay him no attention and you would not reply to him until you had examined the consequences to see whether they agreed with one another or not; and when you had to give an explanation of the principle, you would give it in the same way by assuming some other principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones, and so on until you reached one which was adequate. You would not mix things up, as disputants do, in talking about the beginning and its consequences, if you wished to discover any of the realities; for perhaps not one of them thinks or cares in the least about these things. They are so clever that they succeed in being well pleased with themselves even when they mix everything up; but if you are a philosopher, I think you will do as I have said."

"That is true," said Simmias and Cebes together.

Echecrates. By Zeus, Phaedo, they were right. It seems to me that he made those matters astonishingly clear, to anyone with even a little sense.

Phaedo. Certainly, Echecrates, and all who were there thought so, too.
PLATO

EXEKRATHE. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοὺς ἀπούσι, νῦν δὲ ἀκούονσιν. ἄλλα τίνα δὴ ἂν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

V 50. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐπεὶ αυτῷ ταῦτα συνεχωρήθη, καὶ ὁμολογεῖτο εἰναὶ τι

Β ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τὰλλα μεταλαμ-
βάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἔπωνυμίαν ἰσχεῖν, τὸ

δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡρώτα. Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ' ὦς, ταῦτα

οὗτος λέγεις, ἄρ' οὖν, ὅταν Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους

φῆς μείζω εἰναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἔλαττω, λέγεις τὸτ'

εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιμμίᾳ ἁμφότερα, καὶ μέγεθος καὶ

σμικρότητα; Ἐγώγε. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὦς, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ

τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπέρεχειν Σωκράτους

οὕς ὅς τοῖς ρήμασι λέγεται οὗτο καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς

ἐχειν. οὐ γὰρ πον πεφικέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπέρεχειν

C τούτῳ τῷ Σιμμίᾳ εἰναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει θ

tυγχάνει ἐχον οὔδ' αὐ Σωκράτους ὑπέρεχειν, ὅτι

Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι σμικρότητα

ἐχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖνον μέγεθος; Ἀληθῆ.

Οὔδε γε αὐ υπὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπέρεχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι

Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ

Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμία σμικρότητα; Ἐστι

ταῦτα. Οὖτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει

σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἰναι, ἐν μέσῳ ὅν ἀμφότερων,

D τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπέρεχειν τὴν σμικρότητα

ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος

παρέχων ὑπερέχον. καὶ ἀμα μειδίαςα. Ἐοικα,

ἐφη, καὶ ἥψηραφικῶς ἔρειν, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχει γἐ

που, ὡς λέγω. Συνέφη. Λέγω δὲ τούδ' ἐνεκα,
AND SO DO WE WHO WERE NOT THERE, AND ARE HEARING ABOUT IT NOW. BUT WHAT WAS SAID AFTER THAT?

PHAEOD. AS I REMEMBER IT, AFTER ALL THIS HAD BEEN ADMITTED, AND THEY HAD AGREED THAT EACH OF THE ABSTRACT QUALITIES EXISTS AND THAT OTHER THINGS WHICH PARTICIPATE IN THESE GET THEIR NAMES FROM THEM, THEN Socrates asked: "Now if you assent to this, do you not, when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, say that there is in Simmias greatness and smallness?"

"Yes."

"But," said Socrates, "you agree that the statement that Simmias is greater than Socrates is not true as stated in those words. For Simmias is not greater than Socrates by reason of being Simmias, but by reason of the greatness he happens to have; nor is he greater than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has smallness relatively to his greatness."

"True."

"And again, he is not smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias's smallness."

"That is true."

"Then Simmias is called small and great, when he is between the two, surpassing the smallness of the one by exceeding him in height, and granting to the other the greatness that exceeds his own smallness." And he laughed and said, "I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is very much as I say."

Simmias agreed.

"I am speaking so because I want you to agree
ΠΛΑΤΟ

βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ὁπερ ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ γὰρ
φαίνεται οὐ μονὸν αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτε
ἐθέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρόν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
tὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ
σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ἐθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυνών τὸ
ἐτερον, ἡ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχορεῖν, ὅταν αὐτῷ
Ε προσήθη τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἡ προσελθόντος
ἐκεῖνον ἀπολωλέναι: ὑπομείνας δὲ καὶ δεξάμενον
τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἐτερον ἡ ὁπερ Ἰν.
ὦσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάμενος καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρό-
τητα, καὶ ἔτι δὲν ὄσπερ εἰμί, οὕτως ὁ αὐτὸς
σμικρός εἰμι: ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα ὃν
σμικρὸν εἶναι: ὡς δὲ αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν
ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι,
οὐδὲ ἀλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὅπερ Ἰν
ἀμα τοῦναντίον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦτοι
ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.
Pαντάπασιν, ἐφε ο Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

51. Καὶ τις ἔπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὁς τεις
ὡ ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι. Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν
tοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπὸ
λεγομένου ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττους τὸ
μείζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἐλάττου,
καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὐτὴ εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις,
ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεὶ λέγεσθαι, ὅτι
tούτῳ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης
παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ ἀκούσας, Ἀνδρι-

Β κῶς, ἐφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς
τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε.
τότε μεν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος
tὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ, ὅτι αὐτὸ
τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο,
with me. I think it is evident not only that greatness itself will never be great and also small, but that the greatness in us will never admit the small or allow itself to be exceeded. One of two things must take place: either it flees or withdraws when its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it has already ceased to exist by the time smallness comes near it. But it will not receive and admit smallness, thereby becoming other than it was. So I have received and admitted smallness and am still the same small person I was; but the greatness in me, being great, has not suffered itself to become small. In the same way the smallness in us will never become or be great, nor will any other opposite which is still what it was, ever become or be also its own opposite. It either goes away or loses its existence in the change."

"That," said Cebes, "seems to me quite evident."

Then one of those present—I don't just remember who it was—said: "In Heaven's name, is not this present doctrine the exact opposite of what was admitted in our earlier discussion, that the greater is generated from the less and the less from the greater and that opposites are always generated from their opposites? But now it seems to me we are saying that this can never happen."

Socrates cocked his head on one side and listened. "You have spoken up like a man," he said, "but you do not observe the difference between the present doctrine and what we said before. We said before that in the case of concrete things opposites are generated from opposites; whereas now we say that the abstract concept of an opposite can never become
PLATO

οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει. τότε μὲν γάρ, ὁ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν, ὅν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα: αὐτὰ δ' ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ

C φαμεν ἐθελήσαι γένεσιν ἄλληλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἀμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν. Ἄρα μή πον, ὁ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σε τι τούτων ἑτάραξεν ὃν οδε εἶπεν; ὁ δ' Οὐκ1 αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης;2 οὕτως ἔχω καὶ τοιο ὀὕτο λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει. Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἀρα, ἵ δ' ὅς, ἀπλῶς τούτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἕαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐσεθαί. Παντάπαςιν, ἔφη.

52. Ἐτι δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε σκέφται, ἔφη, εἰ ἀρα συνωμολογήσεις. θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; Ἔγωγε. Ἅρ' ὅπερ χίωνα καὶ πῦρ;

D Μᾶ Δῖ', οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἄλλ' ἔτερον τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἑτέρον τι χίωνα τὸ ψυχρόν; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ τόδε γ', οἶμαι, δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χίωνα3 οὔσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἐσεθαί ὅπερ ἢν, χίωνα καὶ θερμόν,4 ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ ὑπεκχωρῆσειν αὐτῷ5 ἢ ἀπολείσθαι. Πάνω γε. Ἐν τῷ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξείναι ἢ ἀπολείσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ

1 δ' αὖ BT. δ' οὖκ αὖ, Hermann, Schanz.
2 Schanz brackets δ Κέβης.
3 Schanz inserts χίωνα before χίωνα.
4 Schanz brackets καὶ θερμόν.
5 αὐτῷ BCE; bracketed by Schanz. αὐτῷ c, Wohlrab, Burnet.

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its own opposite, either in us or in the world about us. Then we were talking about things which possess opposite qualities and are called after them, but now about those very opposites the immanence of which gives the things their names. We say that these latter can never be generated from each other."

At the same time he looked at Cebes and said: "And you—are you troubled by any of our friends' objections?"

"No," said Cebes, "not this time; though I confess that objections often do trouble me."

"Well, we are quite agreed," said Socrates, "upon this, that an opposite can never be its own opposite."

"Entirely agreed," said Cebes.

"Now," said he, "see if you agree with me in what follows: Is there something that you call heat and something you call cold?"

"Yes."

"Are they the same as snow and fire?"

"No, not at all."

"But heat is a different thing from fire and cold differs from snow?"

"Yes."

"Yet I fancy you believe that snow, if (to employ the form of phrase we used before) it admits heat, will no longer be what it was, namely snow, and also warm, but will either withdraw when heat approaches it or will cease to exist."

"Certainly."

"And similarly fire, when cold approaches it, will either withdraw or perish. It will never succeed in
PLATO

tolmήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι
ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν.ι

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Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. "Εστιν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἕνα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἴδος ἄξιονόθειν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος εἰς τὸν ἁεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, δ' ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἁεὶ ὄσταπερ ἦ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖσοδε ἵσως ἔσται σαφέστερον δ' λέγω. τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἁεὶ που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὄνοματος τυχάνειν, ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὖ; Πάνυ γε. Ἄρα μόνον τῶν ὑντων, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι, δ' ἔστι μὲν οὖν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν, ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὄνοματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἁεὶ διὰ τὸ οὐτω πεφυκέναι, ὡστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέπουθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά. σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἀρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς ὄνοματι ἁεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὅντος οὐχ οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἰμισος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας, ὡστε οὐκ ὁν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἁεὶ ἐκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός· καὶ αὐ ὅτα δύο καὶ τὰ τέταρτα καὶ ἄπας ὁ ἐτερος αὐ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὅν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὅμως ἐκαστος αὐτῶν ἁρτιός ἐστιν ἁεὶ· συγχωρεῖς ἢ οὖ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη. "Ο τοίνυν, ἔφη, βούλομαι δη- λώσαι, ἀθρεί. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλληλα οὐ δεχόμενα, ἄλλα καὶ ὅσα οὐκ ὄντι ἄλληλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἁεὶ τάναντια, οὐδέ ταύτα ἑοίκε δεχομένους ἐκείνην τὴν

1 Schanz brackets καὶ ψυχρόν.
admitting cold and being still fire, as it was before, and also cold."

"That is true," said he.

"The fact is," said he, "in some such cases, that not only the abstract idea itself has a right to the same name through all time, but also something else, which is not the idea, but which always, whenever it exists, has the form of the idea. But perhaps I can make my meaning clearer by some examples. In numbers, the odd must always have the name of odd, must it not?"

"Certainly."

"But is this the only thing so called (for this is what I mean to ask), or is there something else, which is not identical with the odd but nevertheless has a right to the name of odd in addition to its own name, because it is of such a nature that it is never separated from the odd? I mean, for instance, the number three, and there are many other examples. Take the case of three; do you not think it may always be called by its own name and also be called odd, which is not the same as three? Yet the number three and the number five and half of numbers in general are so constituted, that each of them is odd though not identified with the idea of odd. And in the same way two and four and all the other series of numbers are even, each of them, though not identical with evenness. Do you agree, or not?"

"Of course," he replied.

"Now see what I want to make plain. This is my point, that not only abstract opposites exclude each other, but all things which, although not opposites one to another, always contain opposites;
PLATO

ιδέαν ἢ δι ἀν αὐτοῖς οὐσὶν ἐναντία ἢ, ἀλλ' C ἐπιούσης αὐτῆς ὣτιοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχω-
ροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι
πρῶτον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτιον πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπο-
μείναι ἐτι τρία ὄντα ἁρτία γενέσθαι; Πάνν μὲν
οὖν, ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης. Οὐδὲ μήν, ἢ δ' οὐς, ἐναντίον
γέ ἐστι δυσ τριάδι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Οὐκ ἢρ
μόνον τὰ εἰδη τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἔπιοντα
ἀλληλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ
ὑπομένει ἔπιοντα. 'Αληθεστατα, ἐφή, λέγεις.

53. Βούλει οὖν, ἢ δ' οὐς, ἢδιν οὐδὲ τ' ὁμεν,
ὑμισώμεθα ὅποια ταύτα ἐστιν; Πάνν γε.

D 'Αρ' οὖν, ἐφή, ὁ Κέβης, τάδε εἰη ἂν, ἢ ὁ τι ἀν
κατάσχεγ, μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῖ ιδέαν
αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ τινος; 1 Πὼς
λέγεις; 'Ωσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἰσθα γὰρ δή-
που, ὅτι ἢ ἄν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ιδέα κατάσχεγ, ἀνάγκη
αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τριῶν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ περιττοῖς.
Πάνν γε. 'Επὶ τὸ τοιούτον δῆ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναν-
τία ἱδέα ἐκεῖνῃ τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τούτῳ ἀπεργά-
ζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἐλθοι. Οὐ γὰρ. Ἐφράζετο

1 αὐτῷ ἄει τινος BCDE. Stallbaum, followed by Schanz,
brackets αὐτῷ.

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these also, we find, exclude the idea which is opposed to the idea contained in them, and when it approaches they either perish or withdraw. We must certainly agree that the number three will endure destruction or anything else rather than submit to becoming even, while still remaining three, must we not?"

"Certainly," said Cebees.

"But the number two is not the opposite of the number three."

"No."

"Then not only opposite ideas refuse to admit each other when they come near, but certain other things refuse to admit the approach of opposites."

"Very true," he said.

"Shall we then," said Socrates, "determine if we can, what these are?"

"Certainly."

"Then, Cebees, will they be those which always compel anything of which they take possession not only to take their form but also that of some opposite?"

"What do you mean?"

"Such things as we were speaking of just now. You know of course that those things in which the number three is an essential element must be not only three but also odd."

"Certainly."

"Now such a thing can never admit the idea which is the opposite of the concept which produces this result."

"No, it cannot."
PLATO

δέ γε ἡ περιττή; Ναί. Ἐναντία δὲ ταύτη ἡ Ἐ τοῦ ἄρτιον; Ναί. Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἀρὰ ἡ τοῦ ἄρτιον ἵδεα οὐδεποτε ἥξει. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἀμοιρά δὴ τοῦ ἄρτιον τὰ τρία. Ἀμοιρά. Ἀνάρτιος ἀρὰ ἡ τριάς. Ναί. Ὁ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὑπά τοι δῶμος οὐ δέχεται αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, οἶον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἄρτῳ ὀυκ οὐσα ἐναντία οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἄλλ' ὁρὰ δὴ, εἰ οὕτως ὀρίζει, μη μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ δὲ ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκεῖνῳ, ἐφ' ὃ τι ἄν αὐτὸ ἦ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδεποτε δέχασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμνήσκον· οὐ γὰρ χείρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἄρτιον οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον τούτῳ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ οὐκ ἐναντίον, ὁμώς δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ Β οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμόλιον οὐδὲ τὰλα τὰ τοιαύτα, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὐ καὶ

1 Schanz, following Bekker, brackets τὸ ἐναντίον.
2 After τοιαύτα the MSS. read τὸ ἡμόσων, "half," which Schanz brackets.

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"But the result was produced by the concept of the odd?"
"Yes."
"And the opposite of this is the idea of the even?"
"Yes."
"Then the idea of the even will never be admitted by the number three."
"No."
"Then three has no part in the even."
"No, it has none."
"Then the number three is uneven."
"Yes."
"Now I propose to determine what things, without being the opposites of something, nevertheless refuse to admit it, as the number three, though it is not the opposite of the idea of even, nevertheless refuses to admit it, but always brings forward its opposite against it, and as the number two brings forward the opposite of the odd and fire that of cold, and so forth, for there are plenty of examples. Now see if you accept this statement: not only will opposites not admit their opposites, but nothing which brings an opposite to that which it approaches will ever admit in itself the oppositeness of that which is brought. Now let me refresh your memory; for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the idea of the even, nor will ten, the double of five, admit the idea of the odd. Now ten is not itself an opposite, and yet it will not admit the idea of the odd; and so one-and-a-half and other mixed fractions and one-third and other simple frac-
πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπει τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. Πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἐφη, καὶ ἔσομαι.

54. Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἐφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι ὁ ἄν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἔμε. λέγω δὲ παρ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὅρων ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροι με, φῶ καὶ τί ἐγγένηται, θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν

C ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἔρω ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι φῶ δὲν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψότεραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὃ δὲν πῦρ οὐδὲ ἄν ἔρη, φῶ δὲν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται, νοσήσῃ, οὐκ ἔρω δὲν ὃ δὲν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὃ ὁ πυρετός, οὐδὲ φῶ δὲν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται, περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἔρω φῶ δὲν περιττότης, ἀλλ' φῶ δὲν μονάς, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ ἦδη ἰκανῶς οἶσθ' ὅ τι βούλομαι. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἰκανῶς, ἐφη. Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἢ δ' ὃς, φῶ δὲν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; Ὑμὶ ἄν ψυχή, ἐφη. Οὐκ- D οὖν ἄει τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἡ δ' ὃς. Ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ὅτι ἄν αὐτή κατάσχῃ, ἄει ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; Ἡκει μέντοι, ἐφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῆ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; Ἑστίν, ἐφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ ὁ τὸ ἐναντίον φῶ αὐτή ἐπιφέρει ἄει οὐ μὴ ποτὲ

1 After τί the MSS. read ἐν τῷ σώματι, “in the body,” which Schanz brackets.
tions reject the idea of the whole. Do you go with me and agree to this?"

"Yes, I agree entirely," he said, "and am with you."

"Then," said Socrates, "please begin again at the beginning. And do not answer my questions in their own words, but do as I do. I give an answer beyond that safe answer which I spoke of at first, now that I see another safe reply deduced from what has just been said. If you ask me what causes anything in which it is to be hot, I will not give you that safe but stupid answer and say that it is heat, but I can now give a more refined answer, that it is fire; and if you ask, what causes the body in which it is to be ill, I shall not say illness, but fever; and if you ask what causes a number in which it is to be odd, I shall not say oddness, but the number one, and so forth. Do you understand sufficiently what I mean?"

"Quite sufficiently," he replied.

"Now answer," said he. "What causes the body in which it is to be alive?"

"The soul," he replied.

"Is this always the case?"

"Yes," said he, "of course."

"Then if the soul takes possession of anything it always brings life to it?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Is there anything that is the opposite of life?"

"Yes," said he.

"What?"

"Death."

"Now the soul, as we have agreed before, will
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dέχηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὁμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

55. Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἱδέαν τί νῦν δὴ ὄνομάζομεν; Ἄναρτιον, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ δ ἂν μονσικὸν Ἐ μὴ δέχηται; Ἀμουσοῦν, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἅδικον. Εἰπὲ δ' ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἄθανατον, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται βάνατον; Οὐ. Ἄθανατον ἄρα ἡ ψυχή. Ἄθανατον. Εἰπὲ, ἔφη, τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι φῶς ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα γε ἰκανῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες. Τί οὖν, ἢ δ' ὃς, ὁ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἢν ἀνωλέθρφ εἶναι, ἄλλο 106 τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀθέρμον ἀναγκαῖον ἢν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμοῦ ἐπαγάγοι, ὑπεξῆξε ἢ ἡ χιόν οὐσα σῶς καὶ ἀτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὔδ' αὐ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ὀσαύτως, οἶμαι, κἂν εἰ τὸ ἄφυ- κτον ἀνώλεθρον ἢν, ὀπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἔπησε, οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπεσβένυσε σῶς ἀπωλεύσατο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὼν φύετο. Ἄναγκη, ἔφη.

Β Οὐκοῦν καὶ θὰ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ ἄθανάτου 364.
never admit the opposite of that which it brings with it.”

"Decidedly not," said Cebe.s.

"Then what do we now call that which does not admit the idea of the even?"

"Uneven," said he.

"And those which do not admit justice and music?"

"Unjust," he replied, "and unmusical."

"Well then what do we call that which does not admit death?"

"Deathless or immortal," he said.

"And the soul does not admit death?"

"No."

"Then the soul is immortal."

"Yes."

"Very well," said he. "Shall we say then that this is proved?"

"Yes, and very satisfactorily, Socrates."

"Well then, Cebe.s," said he, "if the odd were necessarily imperishable, would not the number three be imperishable?"

"Of course."

"And if that which is without heat were imperishable, would not snow go away whole and unmelted whenever heat was brought in conflict with snow? For it could not have been destroyed, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat."

"That is very true," he replied.

"In the same way, I think, if that which is without cold were imperishable, whenever anything cold approached fire, it would never perish or be quenched, but would go away unharmed."

"Necessarily," he said.

"And must not the same be said of that which is
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εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῆ, ὅταν θάνατος ἔπ αὐτὴν ἦ, ἀπόλλυσθαι. θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέχεται οὐδ᾿ ἐσται τεθνηκυία, ὡσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἐσται, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γαὶ τὸ περιττὸν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρὸν, οὐδὲ γε ἢ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμότης. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει, φαίνῃ ἂν τις, ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττὸν μὴ γύρυσθαι ἐπιώντος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὡσπερ ὁμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἂντ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρτιον γεγονέναι; τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρον ἐστιν· ἔτει εἰ τούτῳ ὁμολόγητο ἢμῖν, ῥαδίως δὲν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἄρτιον τὸ περιττὸν καὶ τὰ τρία οἰχεται ἀπιώντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα. ἢ οὖ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἄθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἰναι, ψυχῆ δὲν εἰς πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δεοι λόγου. Ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἐφη, τοῦτον γε ἔνεκα· σχολή γὰρ ἂν τί ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο, εἰ γε τὸ ἀθάνατον ἁδίων ἄν φθορὰν δέχεται.

56. Ὅ δε γε θεὸς, οἶμαι, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τῷ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδος καὶ εἰ τί ἄλλο ἀθάνατον ἐστίν, παρὰ πάντων ἄν ὀμολογηθεὶς μηδὲποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι. Παρὰ πάντων μὲντοι νὴ Δῆ, ἐφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἐτὶ μᾶλλον, ὡς ἑγὼμαι, παρὰ θεῶν. Ὅποτε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατο

καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἐστὶν, ἄλλο τι ψυχῆ ἃ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἰ; 366
immortal? If the immortal is also imperishable, it is impossible for the soul to perish when death comes against it. For, as our argument has shown, it will not admit death and will not be dead, just as the number three, we said, will not be even, and the odd will not be even, and as fire, and the heat in the fire, will not be cold. But, one might say, why is it not possible that the odd does not become even when the even comes against it (we agreed to that), but perishes, and the even takes its place? Now we cannot silence him who raises this question by saying that it does not perish, for the odd is not imperishable. If that were conceded to us, we could easily silence him by saying that when the even approaches, the odd and the number three go away; and we could make the corresponding reply about five and heat and the rest, could we not?"

"Certainly."

"And so, too, in the case of the immortal; if it is conceded that the immortal is imperishable, the soul would be imperishable as well as immortal, but if not, further argument is needed."

"But," he said, "it is not needed, so far as that is concerned; for surely nothing would escape destruction, if the immortal, which is everlasting, is perishable."

"All, I think," said Socrates, "would agree that God and the principle of life, and anything else that is immortal, can never perish."

"All men would, certainly," said he, "and still more, I fancy, the Gods."

"Since, then, the immortal is also indestructible, would not the soul, if it is immortal, be also imperishable?"
Πολλὴ ἀναγκὴ. ἩΕπιόντος ἀρὰ θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τὸ μὲν θυτιτὸν, ὡς έοικεν, αὐτοῦ ἀποθυήσκει, τὸ δ’ ἀθάνατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἶχεται ἁπίον, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ. Φαίνεται. Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἐφι, ὁ Κέβης, ψυχὴ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὅτι ἐσονται ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν "Αιδοῦ. Ὁὐκον ἔγωγε, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐφι, ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδὲ π Validates "Απιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ’ εἰ δὴ τι Συμμίας ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασυγχῆσαι ὅσι νῦκ οἶδα εἰς ὄντινα τις ἄλλον καιρὸν ἀναβάλλοιτο ἢ τὸν νῦν παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων βουλόμενος ἢ τι εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι. Ἄλλα μὴν, ἢ δ' ἔδε ο Συμμίας, οὐδ’ αὐτὸς ἔχω ὅτι ἀπιστῶ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ δὲν οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπιστικοὶ ἐτὶ ἔχειν παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων. Οὐ μόνον γ’, ἐφι, ὁ Συμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἄλλα1 καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ύμιν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἔπισκεπτέασα σαφεῖστερον καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὰς ἱκανῶς διέλητε, ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, ἀκολουθήστε τῷ λόγῳ καθ’ ὅσι δύνατον μᾶλιστ’ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσας καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ σαφῆς γένηται, οὐδὲν ζητήστε περαιτέρω. Ἄληθη, ἐφι, λέγεις.

57. Ἄλλα τόδε γ’, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνδρείς, δίκαιον ἀνανηθῆναι ὅτι, εἰπέρ ὃ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, ἐπίμελης δὴ δεῖται ὡς ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνου, ἐν φ’ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἄλλ’ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καλ

1 After ἄλλα the MSS. read ταῦτα τε εὖ λέγεις; bracketed by Ast, Schanz, and others.
"Necessarily."

"Then when death comes to a man, his mortal part, it seems, dies, but the immortal part goes away unharmed and undestroyed, withdrawing from death."

"So it seems."

"Then, Cebes," said he, "it is perfectly certain that the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will exist somewhere in another world."

"I," said Cebes, "have nothing more to say against that, and I cannot doubt your conclusions. But if Simmias, or anyone else, has anything to say, he would do well to speak, for I do not know to what other time than the present he could defer speaking, if he wishes to say or hear anything about those matters."

"But," said Simmias, "I don't see how I can doubt, either, as to the result of the discussion; but the subject is so great, and I have such a poor opinion of human weakness, that I cannot help having some doubt in my own mind about what has been said."

"Not only that, Simmias," said Socrates, "but our first assumptions ought to be more carefully examined, even though they seem to you to be certain. And if you analyse them completely, you will, I think, follow and agree with the argument, so far as it is possible for man to do so. And if this is made clear, you will seek no farther."

"That is true," he said.

"But my friends," he said, "we ought to bear in mind, that, if the soul is immortal, we must care for it, not only in respect to this time, which we call life,
οι κύκλους ἦν δὴ καὶ δόξειν ἄν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἰ τὸς αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἔρμαιον ἄν ἢ τῶς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος αὐτὴ ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς. νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὔσα, οὐδεμία ἄν εἰη αὐτῇ

D ἅλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστη τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς ᾿Αἰδοῦς ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παideias τε καὶ τροφῆς, ἣ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὁφελεῖ η βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται δὲ οὗτός, ὡς ἄρα τελευτήσαντα ἔκαστον ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμον, ὁσπερ ξῶντα εἰλήξει, οὕτως ἀγείν ἐπι-χειρεῖ εἰς δὴ τινά τόπον, οὐ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασαμένους εἰς ᾿Αἰδοῦς πορεύεσθαι

E μετὰ ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου φί δὴ προστέτακται τοὺς ἐνθένθε ἐκείσε πορεύσαι· τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ ἄν δεῖ τυχεῖν καὶ μείναντας ἐν χρή χρόνον ἄλλοις δεύρο πάλιν ἡγεμόν τοῖς τολλαῖς χρόνον καὶ μακραῖς περιοδοῖς. ἔστι δὲ ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὐχ ὡς ὁ ᾿Αἰσχύλου Τῆλεφος λέγει· ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἱμὸν φησιν εἰς ᾿Αἰδούν φέρειν, ἢ δ’ οὔτε ἀπλῇ οὔτε μία φάνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢν ἡγεμόνων ἔδει· οὐ γὰρ πού τις ἐν διαμάρτων οὐδαμόσει μᾶς ὁδοῦ οὕσης. νῦν δὲ ἔσχεσις τε καὶ περιόδους τολλαὶς ἐχειν· ἀπὸ τῶν ὁσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρό-μενος λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχῇ ἐπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἄγνοι τὰ παρόντα. ἡ δ’ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ὕ τὸ ἐμπροσθὲν εἴπον, περὶ ἐκείνο τοῦν χρόνον

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but in respect to all time, and if we neglect it, the
danger now appears to be terrible. For if death
were an escape from everything, it would be a boon
to the wicked, for when they die they would be
freed from the body and from their wickedness to-
gether with their souls. But now, since the soul is
seen to be immortal, it cannot escape from evil or be
saved in any other way than by becoming as good
and wise as possible. For the soul takes with it to
the other world nothing but its education and nurture,
and these are said to benefit or injure the departed
greatly from the very beginning of his journey
thither. And so it is said that after death, the tute-
lary genius of each person, to whom he had been
 allotted in life, leads him to a place where the dead
are gathered together; then they are judged and
depart to the other world with the guide whose task
it is to conduct thither those who come from this
world; and when they have there received their due
and remained through the time appointed, another
guide brings them back after many long periods of
time. And the journey is not as Telephus says in
the play of Aeschylus; for he says a simple path
leads to the lower world, but I think the path is
neither simple nor single, for if it were, there would
be no need of guides, since no one could miss the way
to any place if there were only one road. But
really there seem to be many forks of the road and
many windings; this I infer from the rites and
ceremonies practised here on earth. Now the orderly
and wise soul follows its guide and understands its
circumstances; but the soul that is desirous of the
body, as I said before, flits about it, and in the
visible world for a long time, and after much resist-
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Β ἐπτομεμένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βία καὶ μόνης υπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οίχεται ἀγομένη. ἀφικομένη δὲ ὃθιπτερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τὴν πεποιηκυίαν τοιοῦτον, ἢ φόνων ἅδικων ἡμέρην ἢ ἄλλ’ ἀττα τοιαύτα εἰργασμένην, ἢ τούτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἑργα τυγχάνει ὑπάρχει, ταύτην μὲν ἀπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὔτε ἐνυήμπορος οὔτε ἠγεμόνε

C ἐθέλει γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴ δὲ πλανᾶται ἐν πᾶσῃ ἕχομενῃ ἀπορίᾳ, ἐως ἄν ὅτι τινος χρόνοι γένωνται, ὥσ ἐξελθόντων ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτήν πρέπουσαν οἰκησίαν ἢ δ’ καθαρῶς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξελθοῦσα, καὶ ἐνυήμπορως καὶ ἠγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ὀκησεν τὸν αὐτήν ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκοντα. εἰσίν δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαυμάστολ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτὴ οὔτε οἷα οὔτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσβολῶν λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τίνος πέπεισμαι.

D 58. Καὶ ο Σιμμίας. Πῶς ταῦτα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὡς Σόκρατες; περὶ γὰρ τοῦ γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἁκήκσα, οὐ μὲντοι ταῦτα δ’ σε πείθει ἡδέως οὐν δὴ ἀκούσαιμι. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὡς Σιμμία, οὐχὶ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἢ γ’ ἐστίν ὡς μέντοι ἁληθῆ, χαλεπώτερόν μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἵσως οὐδ’ ἀν οἷος τε εἶναι, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός, ὡς Σιμμία, τῷ μῆκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ. τὴν μέντοι ἱδέαν

Ε τῆς γῆς, οἷαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδέν με κωλύει λέγειν. Ἀλλ’, ἔφη ο Σιμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρκει. Πέπεισμαι τούτων, 372
ance and many sufferings is led away with violence and with difficulty by its appointed genius. And when it arrives at the place where the other souls are, the soul which is impure and has done wrong, by committing wicked murders or other deeds akin to those and the works of kindred souls, is avoided and shunned by all, and no one is willing to be its companion or its guide, but it wanders about alone in utter bewilderment, during certain fixed times, after which it is carried by necessity to its fitting habitation. But the soul that has passed through life in purity and righteousness, finds gods for companions and guides, and goes to dwell in its proper dwelling. Now there are many wonderful regions of the earth, and the earth itself is neither in size nor in other respects such as it is supposed to be by those who habitually discourse about it, as I believe on someone's authority."

And Simmias said, "What do you mean, Socrates? I have heard a good deal about the earth myself, but not what you believe; so I should like to hear it."

"Well Simmias, I do not think I need the art of Glaucus to tell what it is. But to prove that it is true would, I think, be too hard for the art of Glaucus, and perhaps I should not be able to do it; besides, even if I had the skill, I think my life, Simmias, will end before the discussion could be finished. However, there is nothing to prevent my telling what I believe the form of the earth to be, and the regions in it."

"Well," said Simmias, "that will be enough."

"I am convinced, then, said he, that in the first
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η δ' ὃς, ἐγώ, ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν ἐν μέσῳ τῷ οὐρανῷ περιφερής οὐσα, μηδὲν αὐτὴ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μὴ πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηδεμίας τοιαύτης, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἵσχειν τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ πάντη καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἰσορροπίαν ἰσορροποῦν γὰρ πράγμα ὁμοιόν τινὸς ἐν μέσῳ τεθέν ὦν ἔξει μᾶλλον οὐδ' ἦττον οὐδαμόσε κλιθήμαι, ὁμοῖως δ' ἔχον ἀκλίνες μενεί. πρῶτον μέν, ἡ δ' ὃς, τούτο πέπεισμαι. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε, ἐφ' ὁ Σιμμίας. Ἐτι τοίνυν, ἐφῃ, πάμμεγα τι εἶναι αὐτό, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν τοὺς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων

B στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σγικρῷ τοις μορίω, ὁσπερ περὶ τέλμα μυρμηκας ἡ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκούντας, καὶ ἄλλους ἀλλοθε πολλοὺς ἐν πολλοῖς τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῆ περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοίλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, εἰς δ' εὐνερρηκέναι τὸ τα ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὁμίχλην καὶ τὸν ἀέρα: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γῆν καθαρὰν ἐν καθαρῷ κεῖσθαι τῷ οὐρανῷ, ἐν όπερ ἔστι τὰ ἄστρα, ὅν δὴ αἰθέρα

C οὐνομάζειν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσθότων λέγειν· οὐ δὴ ὑποστάθημα ταύτα εἶναι, καὶ εὐρείων ἀεὶ εἰς τὰ κοίλα τῆς γῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκούντας ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις αὐτῆς λειτθεῖναι, καὶ οἰςθαί ἄνω ἔπι τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖν, ὁσπερ ἄν εἰ τις ἐν μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οὐκιότω τε ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης οἰκεῖν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὤδας ὅρον τὸν ἡλιον καὶ τὰ ἀλλὰ ἄστρα τὴν θαλάτταν ἱγοῖτο οὐρανὸν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ βραδυτήτα τε καὶ

D ἀσθένειαν μηδεπώποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς θαλάττης ἀφιγιγένος μηδὲ ἑωρακός εἴη, ἐκδοός καὶ ἀνακύψας

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place, if the earth is round and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither the air nor any other similar force to keep it from falling, but its own equipoise and the homogeneous nature of the heavens on all sides suffice to hold it in place; for a body which is in equipoise and is placed in the centre of something which is homogeneous cannot change its inclination in any direction, but will remain always in the same position. This, then, is the first thing of which I am convinced."

"And rightly," said Simmias.

"Secondly," said he, "I believe that the earth is very large and that we who dwell between the pillars of Hercules and the river Phasis live in a small part of it about the sea, like ants or frogs about a pond, and that many other people live in many other such regions. For I believe there are in all directions on the earth many hollows of very various forms and sizes, into which the water and mist and air have run together; but the earth itself is pure and is situated in the pure heaven in which the stars are, the heaven which those who discourse about such matters call the ether; the water, mist and air are the sediment of this and flow together into the hollows of the earth. Now we do not perceive that we live in the hollows, but think we live on the upper surface of the earth, just as if someone who lives in the depth of the ocean should think he lived on the surface of the sea, and, seeing the sun and the stars through the water, should think the sea was the sky, and should, by reason of sluggishness or feebleness, never have reached the surface of the sea, and should never have seen, by rising and lifting his head out of the
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ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὅσφιν καθαρότερος καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσι, μηδὲ ἄλλου ἀκηκούς εἰς τοῦ ἑωρακότος. ταύτων δὴ τούτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεποιθέναι οἰκούντας γὰρ ἐν τινι κοίλῳ τῆς γῆς οὐκ ἦσαν οὐκ ἅπανοι εὐτῆς οἰκεῖν, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα οὐρανοῦ καλεῖν, ὡς διὰ τούτου οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦντα· τὸ δὲ εἶναι

Ε ταύτων, ὑπ’ ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυτῆτος οὐχ οἶονς τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν ἐπ’ ἐσχατον τὸν ἀέρα· ἐπεί, εἰ τις αὐτοῦ ἐπ’ ἀκρᾳ ἔλθοι ἡ πτηνὸς γενόμενος ἀνάπτυχος, κατιδεῖν ἂν ἀνακύψαντα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης ἰχθύες ἀνακύπτοντες ὀρῶσι τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὔτως ἂν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἤκακη εἰς ἁνέχεσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνώναι ἂν, ὅτι ἐκεῖνος ἐστὶν ὁ ἀληθῶς οὐρανὸς καὶ τὸ ἀληθῶς φῶς καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ.

110 ἦδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ ἀπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεθαρμένα ἐστὶν καὶ καταβεβρωμένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλμης, καὶ οὔτε φύεται οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐστιν, σήραγγες δὲ καὶ ἄμμος καὶ πηλὸς ἀμήχανος καὶ βορβοροῖς εἰσιν, ὅπου ἂν καὶ ἡ γῆ ἢ, καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρ’ ἰμῖν κάλλη κρίνεσθαι οὐδ’ ὀπωστεῖν ἄξια· ἐκείνα δὲ αὐτὸν παρ’ ἰμῖν πολὺ ἂν ἐτὶ πλέον φανεῖ διαιφέρειν. εἰ γὰρ δεῖ καὶ μῦθον λέγειν, ἄξιον ἀκούσαι, ὁ Συμμά, οἱ τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Συμμά, ὁ Ὁκρατεῖς, ημεῖς οἱ τούτου τοῦ μῦθου ἢδεως ἂν ἀκούσαιμεν.

59. Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἐφη, ὁ ἔταξε, πρῶτον

1 Schanz, following Rückert, brackets εἰναι ταὐτῶν.
sea into our upper world, and should never have heard from anyone who had seen, how much purer and fairer it is than the world he lived in. Now I believe this is just the case with us; for we dwell in a hollow of the earth and think we dwell on its upper surface; and the air we call the heaven, and think that is the heaven in which the stars move. But the fact is the same, that by reason of feebleness and sluggishness, we are unable to attain to the upper surface of the air; for if anyone should come to the top of the air or should get wings and fly up, he could lift his head above it and see, as fishes lift their heads out of the water and see the things in our world, so he would see things in that upper world; and, if his nature were strong enough to bear the sight, he would recognise that that is the real heaven and the real light and the real earth. For this earth of ours, and the stones and the whole region where we live, are injured and corroded, as in the sea things are injured by the brine, and nothing of any account grows in the sea, and there is, one might say, nothing perfect there, but caverns and sand and endless mud and mire, where there is earth also, and there is nothing at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things of our world. But the things in that world above would be seen to be even more superior to those in this world of ours. If I may tell a story, Simmias, about the things on the earth that is below the heaven, and what they are like, it is well worth hearing."

"By all means, Socrates," said Simmias; "we should be glad to hear this story."

"Well then, my friend," said he, "to begin with,
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μὲν εἰναι τοιαύτη ἡ γῆ αὐτή ἰδεῖν, εἰ τις ἀνωθέν θείο, ὁσπερ αἱ δωδεκάκιντοι σφαίραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλήμμενη, διν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὁσπερ δείγματα, οἵς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχράονται: ἐκεῖ δὲ πάσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ τούτων τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργὴ εἶναι καὶ θαμμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γένους ἡ χιόνος λευκότερον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλῶν χρωμάτων συγκειμένην ὡςαύτως, καὶ ἐτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἡ ὁσα ἤμεῖς ἐωφάκαμεν, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοίλα αὐτής ὑδατὸς τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεα οὖντα, χρώματος τι εἰδὸς παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀλλῶν χρωμάτων ποικίλια, ὅστε ἕν τι αὑτῆς εἰδὸς συνεχεῖς ποικίλου φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτη ὅση τοιαύτη ἀνὰ λόγων τὰ φυσικὰ φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἀιθή καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς· καὶ αὐ τὰ ὅρη ὡςαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὴν τὴ λειτουργία καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω· διὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ ἰάσπιδις καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἐτὶ τοιοῦτον καλλίω· τὸ δ' αἰτίον τούτου εἶναι, ότι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδησεμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι ὁσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ άλμης 1 ὑπὸ τῶν δεύτερο ἐνεργημώντων, καὶ οἱ λίθοι καὶ γῆ καὶ τοὺς ἀλλοίς ξένους τε καὶ φυτοὺς ἀνακαθιστούς τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὕτην κεκοσμήσθαι τούτων τε ἀπασὶ καὶ ἐτὶ χρυσῷ καὶ

1 Schanz brackets ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ άλμης.
the earth when seen from above is said to look like those balls that are covered with twelve pieces of leather; it is divided into patches of various colours, of which the colours which we see here may be regarded as samples, such as painters use. But there the whole earth is of such colours, and they are much brighter and purer than ours; for one part is purple of wonderful beauty, and one is golden, and one is white, whiter than chalk or snow, and the earth is made up of the other colours likewise, and they are more in number and more beautiful than those which we see here. For those very hollows of the earth which are full of water and air, present an appearance of colour as they glisten amid the variety of the other colours, so that the whole produces one continuous effect of variety. And in this fair earth the things that grow, the trees, and flowers and fruits, are correspondingly beautiful; and so too the mountains and the stones are smoother, and more transparent and more lovely in colour than ours. In fact, our highly prized stones, sards and jaspers, and emeralds, and other gems, are fragments of those there, but there everything is like these or still more beautiful. And the reason of this is that there the stones are pure, and not corroded or defiled, as ours are, with filth and brine by the vapours and liquids which flow together here and which cause ugliness and disease in earth and stones and animals and plants. And the earth there is adorned with all these jewels and also with gold and silver and every-
111 ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῷ τοιώντοις. ἐκφανὴς γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὅντα πολλὰ πληθεὶς καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλαχῶ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἱδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων θεστῶν. ξύλο δὲ ἐπὶ αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἴκοντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἄερα, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ εν νῆσοις ἄσ περιρρέω τὸν ἄερα πρὸς τὴν ἥπειρον οὐσάς· καὶ ἔνι λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττα ἐστιν

Β πρὸς τὴν ἡμέτεραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἄερα, δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ ἄηρ, ἐκεῖνος τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ἀράς αὐτῆς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκείνους ἄνθιστοις εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ἥν πολὺ πλεῖον τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὤψει καὶ ἀκοή καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιώντοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει, ἦπερ ἄηρ τὸ ὕδατος ἀφεστήκειν καὶ αἰθήρ ἁέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἀληθεία τε καὶ ἱέρα αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι οἰκητὰς θεοῦς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίγνεσθαι

C αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἦλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἀστρα ὀρᾶσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμονίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

60. Καὶ όλην μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν αὐτῷ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γῆν· τόπους δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ ἐγκοίλα αὐτῆς κύκλῳ περὶ οἰλή πολλοῖς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀναπέπταμένους μᾶλλον ἦ ἐν ὧ δ’ ἡμεῖς οἴκομεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυτέρους ὄντας τὸ αὐτῶν χάσμα ἔλαττον ἔχειν τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν τόπου,

D ἔστι δ’ οὖς καὶ βραχυτέρους τὸ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους· τούτως δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ 380
thing of the sort. For there they are in plain sight, abundant and large and in many places, so that the earth is a sight to make those blessed who look upon it. And there are many animals upon it, and men also, some dwelling inland, others on the coasts of the air, as we dwell about the sea, and others on islands, which the air flows around, near the mainland; and in short, what water and the sea are in our lives, air is in theirs, and what the air is to us, ether is to them. And the seasons are so tempered that people there have no diseases and live much longer than we, and in sight and hearing and wisdom and all such things are as much superior to us as air is purer than water or the ether than air. And they have sacred groves and temples of the gods, in which the gods really dwell, and they have intercourse with the gods by speech and prophecies and visions, and they see the sun and moon and stars as they really are, and in all other ways their blessedness is in accord with this.

"Such then is the nature of the earth as a whole, and of the things around it. But round about the whole earth, in the hollows of it, are many regions, some deeper and wider than that in which we live, some deeper but with a narrower opening than ours, and some also less in depth and wider. Now all these
γῆν εἰς ἀλλήλους συντετρήσθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ εὐρύτερα, καὶ διεξόδους ἔχειν, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ύδαρ ῥεῖν ἢ ἀλλήλους ὥσπερ ἐις κρατῆρας, καὶ ἀενάων ποταμῶν ἀμήχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ύδάτων καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πύρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς, πολλοὺς δὲ ύγροῦ πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρου

Ε καὶ βορβορωδεστέρου, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ρύκακος πηλοῦ δέοντες ποταμοῖ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ῥύαξ· ἂν δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους πληροῦσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστους τὐχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιπρο φυγομένη. ταύτα δὲ πάντα κινεῖν ἀνω καὶ κάτω ὥσπερ αἰώραν τινα ἐνοῦσαι ἑν τῇ γῇ· ἔστι δὲ ἄρα αὐτῇ ἢ αἰώρα διὰ φύσιν. τοιάνδε τινά. ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἀλλαγες τοῦ μεγιστον τυγχάνειν

ὄν καὶ διαμπερὲς τετρήμενον δι’ ἄλης τῆς γῆς, τοῦτο ὃπερ Ὀμηρος εἶπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

τῆλε μάλ’, ἥχι βάθιστὸν ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστὶ βέρεθρον

ὅ καὶ ἀλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρταρον κεκλήκασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέουσι τε πάντες οἱ ποταμοί καὶ ἐκ τοῦτο πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν γίγνονται δὲ ἐκαστοι τοιοῦτοι, δι’ οὔτος ἂν καὶ τῆς γῆς ρέωσιν. ἢ δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐνεῦθεν καὶ εἰσεβεῖν

Β πάντα τὰ ἰεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ύγρὸν τοῦτο. αἰώρεται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἀνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄηρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ περὶ αὐτὸ ταύτου ποιεῖ. Ἐννέπται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα τῆς γῆς ὀρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ
are connected with one another by many subterranean channels, some larger and some smaller, which are bored in all of them, and there are passages through which much water flows from one to another as into mixing bowls; and there are everlasting rivers of huge size under the earth, flowing with hot and cold water; and there is much fire, and great rivers of fire, and many streams of mud, some thinner and some thicker, like the rivers of mud that flow before the lava in Sicily, and the lava itself. These fill the various regions as they happen to flow to one or another at any time. Now a kind of oscillation within the earth moves all these up and down. And the nature of the oscillation is as follows: One of the chasms of the earth is greater than the rest, and is bored right through the whole earth; this is the one which Homer means when he says:

Far off, the lowest abyss beneath the earth;¹

and which elsewhere he and many other poets have called Tartarus. For all the rivers flow together into this chasm and flow out of it again, and they have each the nature of the earth through which they flow. And the reason why all the streams flow in and out here is that this liquid matter has no bottom or foundation. So it oscillates and waves up and down, and the air and wind about it do the same; for they follow the liquid both when it moves toward the other side of the earth and when it moves toward this side, and

¹ Homer, *Iliad* 8, 14, Lord Derby's translation.
Επὶ τάδε, καὶ ὡσπερ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων ἂει ἐκπνεῖ
tε καὶ ἀναπνεῖ ῥέον τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ
ξυναιρεόμευον τῷ ὑγρῷ τὸ πνεῦμα δεινοῦς τινάς
ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμπελάνους παρέχεται καὶ εἰσιν καὶ

C έξιον. ὅταν τε οὖν ὑποχωρήσῃ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸν
τόπον τὸν δὴ κάτω καλούμενον, τοῖς κατ' ἐκεῖνα
ρεῦματα διὰ τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροὶ αὐτὰ
ὡσπερ οἱ ἐπαντλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὐτ' ἐκεῖθεν μὲν
ἀπολίπῃ, δεύο ὁ ὅρμησι, τα ἐνθάδε πληροὶ
αὐθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ρεῖ διὰ τῶν ὄχετῶν καὶ
diὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἠκαστα ἀφικνοῦ-
μενα, εἰς οὓς ἐκάστους ὄδοις ὁποιεῖται, θαλάττας τε
καὶ λίμνας καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ κρῆνας ποιεῖ
ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν

D μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ πλείους, τὰ
dὲ ἐλάττους καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν
Τάρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω ἢ
ἐπηνυλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὄλιγον· πάντα δὲ υποκάτω
εἰσρεῖ τῆς ἐκροῆς. καὶ ἕνα μὲν καταντικρῷ ἢ
ἐξέπεσεν εἰσρεῖ, ἕνα δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἐστι
dὲ ἀ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἢ ἀπαξ ἢ
καὶ πλεονάκις περιελειχθεῖτα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὡσπερ
οἱ ὄφεις, εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν κάτω καθέντα πάλιν

Ε ἐμβάλλει. δυνατὸν δὲ ἐστίν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ
μέσου καθίεναι, πέρα δ' οὖν ἀναντεῖ γὰρ ἀμφοτέ-
ροις τοῖς ῥεῦματι τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

61. Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα
καὶ παντοδαπὰ ῥεῦματα ἔστι· τυγχάνει δ' ἢρᾳ
ἄντα εὖ τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ', ἀττα ῥεῦματα,
ὅν τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέουν κύκλῳ ὁ
καλούμενος 'Οκεανός ἔστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικρ
καὶ ἐναντίως ῥέων 'Αχέρων, ὅς δὲ ἐρήμων τε

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just as the breath of those who breathe blows in and out, so the wind there oscillates with the liquid and causes terrible and irresistible blasts as it rushes in and out. And when the water retires to the region which we call the lower, it flows into the rivers there and fills them up, as if it were pumped into them; and when it leaves that region and comes back to this side, it fills the rivers here; and when the streams are filled they flow through the passages and through the earth and come to the various places to which their different paths lead, where they make seas and marshes, and rivers and springs. Thence they go down again under the earth, some passing around many great regions and others around fewer and smaller places, and flow again into Tartarus, some much below the point where they were sucked out, and some only a little; but all flow in below their exit. Some flow in on the side from which they flowed out, others on the opposite side; and some pass completely around in a circle, coiling about the earth once or several times, like serpents, then descend to the lowest possible depth and fall again into the chasm. Now it is possible to go down from each side to the centre, but not beyond, for there the slope rises upward in front of the streams from either side of the earth.

"Now these streams are many and great and of all sorts, but among the many are four streams, the greatest and outermost of which is that called Oceanus, which flows round in a circle, and opposite this, flowing in the opposite direction, is Acheron, which flows through

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τόπων ρεῖ ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ υπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχεροσνίαδα, οἰ αἱ τῶν τετελευτηκότων ψυχαὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μείναισαν, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκπέμπουνται εἰς τὰς τῶν ζωῆς γενέσεις. τρῖτος δὲ ποταμὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσον ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τὸ πένθος μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καὶ ἡμέρᾳ, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρήμων θαλάττης, ξέουσαν υδάτος καὶ πηλοῦ.

B ἐντεῦθεν δὲ χωρεῖ κύκλῳ θολερῶς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελλιτόμενος δὲ ἀλλοσέ τε ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ' ἐσχατα τῆς Ἀχεροσνίαδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμιγνημενὸς τῷ ὑδάτι περιελλιχθεὶς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου οὕτως δὲ ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπονομάζουσιν Πυρίφλεγέθοντα, οὗ καὶ οἱ ρύακες ἀποστάσματα ἀναφυσώσωσιν ὅτι ἃν τύχωσι τῆς γῆς. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτό κατανικρύ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπίπτει εἰς τὸ πέπλων πρῶτον ᾗν δεινὸν τε καὶ ἀγριον, ὡς λέγεται, χρώμα δὲ ἔχοντα ὅλου ὅλυν ὁ κυνός, ὄν δὴ ἐπονομάζουσι Στύγιον, καὶ τὴν λίμνην, ἢν ποιεῖ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγια. οὓς δὲ ἐμπεσόν ἐν τῇ καὶ δεινὸς δυναμεις καθὼς ἐν καὶ τῷ ὑδάτι, δῶς κατὰ τῆς γῆς, περιελλιτόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρίφλεγέθοντα καὶ ἀπαντᾷ ἐν τῇ Ἀχεροσνίαδι λίμνῃ ἐξ ἐναντίας καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο ὑδρο ὑπενὶ μίγνυται, ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως κύκλῳ περιελθὼν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τῶν Τάρταρος ἐναντίος τῷ Πυρίφλεγέθοντι ὁμομα νῷ ὁ τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.

C

D 62. Τοῦτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφί-

1 Schanz brackets τρῶτον.
various desert places and, passing under the earth, comes to the Acherusian lake. To this lake the souls of most of the dead go and, after remaining there the appointed time, which is for some longer and for others shorter, are sent back to be born again into living beings. The third river flows out between these two, and near the place whence it issues it falls into a vast region burning with a great fire and makes a lake larger than our Mediterranean sea, boiling with water and mud. Thence it flows in a circle, turbid and muddy, and comes in its winding course, among other places, to the edge of the Acherusian lake, but does not mingle with its water. Then, after winding about many times underground, it flows into Tartarus at a lower level. This is the river which is called Pyrphlegethon, and the streams of lava which spout up at various places on earth are offshoots from it. Opposite this the fourth river issues, it is said, first into a wild and awful place, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli. This is called the Stygian river, and the lake which it forms by flowing in is the Styx. And when the river has flowed in here and has received fearful powers into its waters, it passes under the earth and, circling round in the direction opposed to that of Pyrphlegethon, it meets it coming from the other way in the Acherusian lake. And the water of this river also mingles with no other water, but this also passes round in a circle and falls into Tartarus opposite Pyrphlegethon. And the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

"Such is the nature of these things. Now when
κωνται οί τετελευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ
dαίμων ἐκαστον κομίζει, πρῶτον μὲν διεδικάσαντο
οί τε καλῶς καὶ ὀσίως βιώσαντες καὶ οἱ μή. καὶ
οἱ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες
ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες ἢ ἄδικοι ὁχή-
ματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν
λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεί οἰκοῦσι τε καὶ καθαίρομενοι τῶν τε
ἀδικημάτων διδόντες δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι

Ε ἡδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν τιμᾶς φέρονται κατὰ
tὴν ἄξιαν ἐκαστος. οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως
ἐχεῖν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἡ ἱερο-
συλίας πολλᾶς καὶ μεγάλας ἡ φόνος ἁδίκους καὶ
παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένου, ἡ ἄλλα ὅσα
τοιαύτα τυχχάνει ὅπτα, τούτοις δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα
μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαί-
νουσιν. οἱ δ' ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν, μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν
ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς πατέρα ἡ
μητέρα ὑπ' ὀργῆς βλαίον τι πράξαντες, καὶ μετα-

μέλον αὐτοῖς τὸν ἄλλον βλὼν βιῶσιν, ἡ ἄνδροφόνοι
tοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, τούτους δὲ
ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσοῦσας
dὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει
tὸ κύμα, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδροφόνους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν,
tοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν
Πυριφλεγόντα· ἐπειδὰν δὲ φερόμενοι γένωνται
cατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν Ἀχεροσιάδα, ἐνταῦθα
βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐς ἀπέκτειναν,
oi δὲ οὐδὲ βρισάν, καλέσαντες δ' ἰκετεύονται καὶ

Β δέονται ἐάσαι σφᾶς ἐκβηναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ
dέξασθαι, καὶ ἐὰν μὲν πείσωσιν, ἐκβαίνουσι τε
καὶ λήγουσι τῶν κακῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, φέρονται αὕτις
eis τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς ποτα-
the dead have come to the place where each is led by his genius, first they are judged and sentenced, as they have lived well and piously, or not. And those who are found to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the Acheron and, embarking upon vessels provided for them, arrive in them at the lake; there they dwell and are purified, and if they have done any wrong they are absolved by paying the penalty for their wrong doings, and for their good deeds they receive rewards, each according to his merits. But those who appear to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their wrong-doings, because they have committed many great deeds of sacrilege, or wicked and abominable murders, or any other such crimes, are cast by their fitting destiny into Tartarus, whence they never emerge. Those, however, who are curable, but are found to have committed great sins—who have, for example, in a moment of passion done some act of violence against father or mother and have lived in repentance the rest of their lives, or who have slain some other person under similar conditions—these must needs be thrown into Tartarus, and when they have been there a year the wave casts them out, the homicides by way of Cocytus, those who have outraged their parents by way of Pyriphlegethon. And when they have been brought by the current to the Acherusian lake, they shout and cry out, calling to those whom they have slain or outraged, begging and beseeching them to be gracious and to let them come out into the lake; and if they prevail they come out and cease from their ills, but if not, they are borne away again to Tartarus and thence back into the rivers, and this goes on
μοῦς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχοντες οὐ πρότερον παύονται, πρὶν ἂν πείσωσιν οὓς ἡδίκησαι. αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοὺς ἐτάχθη. οί δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφέρόντως πρὸς τὸ οὐσίως βιώσαν, οὐτοὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τῶν μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευ-θερούμενοι τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὡσπερ δεσμω-τηρῶν, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἰκήσιν ἀφικνού-μενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζομενοι. τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἰκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἀνευ τοιοῦτων ἓλθοι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἤτο τούτων καλλίους ἀφικνοῦται, ἄσ οὔτε ράδιον δηλώσατο οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἵκανος ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἐνεκα χρῆ ᾧν διελ-, λύθαμεν, ὁ Σιμμία, πάν τοι ἔστη, ὡστε ἡ στῆ-, καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν. καλῶν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐπίς μεγάλη.

63. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτα διακριθεῖσαν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ· δι' ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτ' ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἠμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἔπειτε πρὸς ἀνάματον ἠ γὰρ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὕτα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἀξίων κινδυνεῖσαι οἰομένων οὕτως ἔχειν· καλῶς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος· καὶ χρῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὡσπερ ἐπάδειν ἐαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἐγώ χρῆς καὶ πάλαι μηκῶν τῶν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἐνεκα θαρρεῖν χρῆ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῆς ἄνδρα, δοσίς ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἡδονὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἰσαε χαίρειν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὑπάτας, καὶ πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργά-ζομαι, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μαυθάνειν ἐστούδασε τέ καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχήν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνῃ τε καὶ δικαίοσύνῃ καὶ

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until they prevail upon those whom they have wronged; for this is the penalty imposed upon them by the judges. But those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. And of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes which it is not easy to describe, nor have we now time enough.

"But, Simmias, because of all these things which we have recounted we ought to do our best to acquire virtue and wisdom in life. For the prize is fair and the hope great.

"Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while; and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms, which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long. This then is why a man should be of good cheer about his soul, who in his life has rejected the pleasures and ornaments of the body, thinking they are alien to him and more likely to do him harm than good, and has sought eagerly for those of learning, and after adorning his soul with no alien ornaments, but with its own proper adornment of self-restraint and justice and
115 ἀνδρεία καὶ ἔλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω περι-
μένει τὴν εἰς Ἀιδοὺ πορείαν, ὡς πορευσόμενος
ὅταν ἵ εἰμαρμένη καλῆ. ύμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ
Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰσαύθησι ἐν
τινὶ χρόνῳ ἐκαστοί πορεύσεσθε· ἐμὲ δὲ νῦν ἢδη
καλεῖ, φαίη ἂν ἀνήρ τραγικός, ἡ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ
σχεδόν τί μοι ὡρὰ τραπέσθαι πρὸς τὸ λουτρὸν·
δοκεῖ γὰρ ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι λουσάμενον πιεῖν τὸ
φάρμακον καὶ μὴ πράγματα ταῦς γυναιξὶ παρέχειν
νεκρὸν λούειν.

64. Τάντα δὴ εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων· Εἰεν,
Β ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἡ ἐμοὶ ἐπι-
στέλλεις ἢ περὶ τῶν παίδων ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ,
ὁ τι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἴμεῖς ἐν χάριτι μάλιστα
ποιοῦμεν; Ἀπερ ἰεί λέγω, ἐφη, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν
κανονερόν· ὅτι ύμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελοῦμεν ὑμεῖς
καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς καὶ ύμῶν αὑτοῖς ἐν χάριτι
ποιήσετε ἀντὶ ἂν ποιήτη, καν μὴ νῦν ὀμολογήσετε·
ἐὰν δὲ ύμῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ἁμελήτε μὴ τὴν χεῖρα
ὦστερ κατ' ἰχνῆ κατὰ τὰ νῦν τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ
ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἥν, οὐδὲ εἶδω πολλὰ
C ὀμολογήσετε ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν
πλέον ποιήσετε. Τάντα μὲν τοίνυν προθυ-
μηθησόμεθα, ἐφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν· ὀπταμοῦμεν δὲ
σε τίνα τρόπον; Ὅπως ἂν, ἐφη, βούλησθε,
ἐὰντερ γε λάβητε μὲ καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς.
γελάσας δὲ ἀμα ἡσυχῇ καὶ πρὸς ἥμας ἀποβλέψας
εἰσπεῖν. Οὐ πεῖθω, δὲ ἀνδρεῖς, Κρίτωνα, ὡς ἐγὼ
εἴμι οὕτος Σωκράτης, ὁ νῦν διαλεγόμενος καὶ
διατάττων ἐκαστὸν τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἴεται μὲ
ἐκεῖνον εἶναι, ὅπως ὀψεῖται ὃλίγον ὑστερον νεκρὸν,
D καὶ ἔρωτᾶ δὴ, πῶς με θάπτῃ. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλαι
courage and freedom and truth, awaits his departure to the other world, ready to go when fate calls him. You, Simmias and Cebes and the rest," he said, "will go hereafter, each in his own time; but I am now already, as a tragedian would say, called by fate, and it is about time for me to go to the bath; for I think it is better to bathe before drinking the poison, that the women may not have the trouble of bathing the corpse."

When he had finished speaking, Crito said: "Well, Socrates, do you wish to leave any directions with us about your children or anything else—anything we can do to serve you?"

"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new. If you take care of yourselves you will serve me and mine and yourselves, whatever you do, even if you make no promises now; but if you neglect yourselves and are not willing to live following step by step, as it were, in the path marked out by our present and past discussions, you will accomplish nothing, no matter how much or how eagerly you promise at present."

"We will certainly try hard to do as you say," he replied. "But how shall we bury you?"

"However you please," he replied, "if you can catch me and I do not get away from you." And he laughed gently, and looking towards us, said: "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that the Socrates who is now conversing and arranging the details of his argument is really I; he thinks I am the one whom he will presently see as a corpse, and he asks how to bury me. And though I have been saying at
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πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς, ἐπειδὴν πὶώ τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὕμιν παραμενῶ, ἀλλὰ οἰχήσομαι ἀπίων εἰς μακάρων δὴ τίνας εὐδαιμονίας, ταῦτά μοι ὁδὸ υἱόθεν ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθούμενος ἃμα μὲν ὑμᾶς, ἃμα δ' ἐμαυτόν. ἐγγυήσασθε σὺν με πρὸς Κρίτωνα, ἡφή, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγγύην ἢ ἢν οὕτως πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἴσχνατο. οὕτως μὲν γὰρ ἢ μὴν παραμενεῖν υμεῖς δὲ ἢ μὴν μὴν παραμενεῖν ἐγγυήσασθε, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνω, ἀλλὰ Εἰ σιχῆσθαι ἀπίόντα, ἵνα Κρίτων ὤν φέρῃ, καὶ μὴ ὅρων μοι τὸ σῶμα ἢ καιόμενον ἢ κατορυττόμενον ἀγανακτὴ ὑπὸ ἐμοῦ ὡς δεινὰ πάσχοντος, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ, ὡς ἡ προτίθεται Σωκράτη ἢ ἐκφέρει ἢ κατορύπτει. εῦ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἢ δ' ὃς, ἢ ἀριστεῖ Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τούτῳ πλημμελεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακῶν τι ἐμποτεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν τε χρὴ καὶ φανεῖ τούμον σῶμα θάπτειν, καὶ θάπτειν οὕτως ὅτες ἄν σοι φίλον ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἐγὼ νόμιμον εἶναι.

65. Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἀνίστατο εἰς οἰκήμα τι ὡς λουσόμενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἰπετο αὐτῷ, ἡμᾶς δ' ἐκέλευσε περιμένειν. περιμένομεν οὖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αυτοῦ διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκοποῦντες, τοτε δ' αὐ περὶ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς διεξόντες, ὅση ἡμῖν γεγονόντα εἰς αὐτή νομιμόνες ὅστε πατρὸς στερηθέντες διάμεσα ὥρφον τὸν ἐπείτα βίον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐλούν—

Β παῖς καὶ ἣνέχθη παρ' αὐτόν τὰ παιδία—δύο γὰρ αὐτῷ νείς σμικροὶ ἤσαν, εἰς δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ

1 Schanz, following Madvig, brackets μοι.
great length that after I drink the poison I shall no longer be with you, but shall go away to the joys of the blessed you know of, he seems to think that was idle talk uttered to encourage you and myself. So," he said, "give security for me to Crito, the opposite of that which he gave the judges at my trial; for he gave security that I would remain, but you must give security that I shall not remain when I die, but shall go away, so that Crito may bear it more easily, and may not be troubled when he sees my body being burnt or buried, or think I am undergoing terrible treatment, and may not say at the funeral that he is laying out Socrates, or following him to the grave, or burying him. For, dear Crito, you may be sure that such wrong words are not only undesirable in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. No, you must be of good courage, and say that you bury my body,—and bury it as you think best and as seems to you most fitting."

When he had said this, he got up and went into another room to bathe; Crito followed him, but he told us to wait. So we waited, talking over with each other and discussing the discourse we had heard, and then speaking of the great misfortune that had befallen us, for we felt that he was like a father to us and that when bereft of him we should pass the rest of our lives as orphans. And when he had bathed and his children had been brought to him—for he had two little sons and one big one—and
οίκείαι γυναίκες ἀφίκοντο, ἐκείναις ἐναντίονι1 τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεγθείς τε καὶ ἐπιστείλας ἅττα ἐβούλετο, τὰς μὲν γυναίκας καὶ τὰ παιδία ἀπείνα ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ’ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἡ ἡ δὴ ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτρεψεν ἐνδοῦν. ἐλθὼν δ’ ἐκαθέζετο λευκομένος, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ μετὰ ταύτα διελέ�θη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν Ĉ ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στᾶς παρ’ αὐτῶν ὈΣωκρατεσ, ἐφη, οὐ καταγρώσωμαι σοῦ ὀπερ ἄλλων καταγιγνώσκω, ὅτι μοι χαλεπαίνουσι καὶ καταρώνται, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλῶ πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχόντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλως ἐγώ παρ’ τῶν χρόνων γενναιότατον καὶ πραότατον καὶ ἀριστον ἄνδρα ὁντα τῶν πώτοτε δεύρω ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὗ ὀίδεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔμοι χαλεπαίνεις, γεγρωσκείς γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἄλλα ἐκεῖνος. νῦν, οἰσθάν γὰρ ὁ ἡλίον ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς ῥάστα D φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία. καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μεταστρέφομεν ἀυτής. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψας πρὸς αὐτῶν. Καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἠμεῖς ταύτα ποιήσομεν. καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ὀς ἀστείος, ἐφη, ὁ ἀνθρωπός καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τῶν χρόνων προσήκει καὶ διελέγετο ἐνίοτε καὶ ἦν ἄνδρων λύστος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναιῶς με ἀποδακρύσει. ἄλλα ἄγε δὴ, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθόμεθα ἀυτῶ τε ἐνεγκάτο τοῖσ το φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται ἐδὲ μὴ, τριψάτε ὁ ἀνθρωπός καὶ ὁ Κρίτων. E ἈΛΛ ὁ οἶμαι, ἐφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐτὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖσ ὀρεστίν καὶ οὓποι δεδοκέναι. 1 ἐναπτον ἐκεῖναι, Ebd. ἐναπτομ ἐκεῖναι, ὁ ἐκεῖναι ἐναπτον.
the women of the family had come, he talked with them in Crito's presence and gave them such directions as he wished; then he told the women to go away, and he came to us. And it was now nearly sunset; for he had spent a long time within. And he came and sat down fresh from the bath. After that not much was said, and the servant of the eleven came and stood beside him and said: "Socrates, I shall not find fault with you, as I do with others, for being angry and cursing me, when at the behest of the authorities, I tell them to drink the poison. No, I have found you in all this time in every way the noblest and gentlest and best man who has ever come here, and now I know your anger is directed against others, not against me, for you know who are to blame. Now, for you know the message I came to bring you, farewell and try to bear what you must as easily as you can." And he burst into tears and turned and went away. And Socrates looked up at him and said: "Fare you well, too; I will do as you say." And then he said to us: "How charming the man is! Ever since I have been here he has been coming to see me and talking with me from time to time, and has been the best of men, and now how nobly he weeps for me! But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let someone bring the poison, if it is ready; and if not, let the man prepare it." And Crito said: "But I think, Socrates, the sun is still upon the mountains and has not yet set; and
καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἄλλους πάνυ ὅψε πίνοντας, ἐπειδὰν παραγγελθῇ αὐτοῖς, δευτησαντάς τε καὶ πιόντας ἐν μάλα, καὶ ἔγγενομένους ἡ ἐνίους ὅν ἀν τύχωσιν ἐπιθυμούντες. ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ἐπείγου ἔτι γὰρ ἐγχωρεῖ. καὶ ὁ Ἐοκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἐφή, ὥς Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐσ σὺ λέγεις, οἴονται γὰρ κερδαίνειν ταῦτα ποιήσαντες, καὶ ἔγωγε ταῦτα εἰκότως 1 οὐ ποιῆσων. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἴμαι κερδαίνειν ὄλγον ύστερον πιὼν ἀλλο γε ἡ γελωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, γηληχυμενος τοῦ ἔξω καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδὲν ἐτὶ ἐνόντος. ἀλλ' ἵθι, ἐφη, πιθοῦ καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

66. Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκούσας ἔνευσε τῷ παιδὶ πλησίον ἑστῶτι. καὶ ὁ παῖς ἔξελθων καὶ συχνῶν χρόνον διατρίψας ἤκεν ἄγων τόν μέλλοντα διδοῖναι τῷ φάρμακον, ἐν κύλικι φέροντα τετριμμένον ἴδων δὲ ὁ Ἐοκράτης τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Εἰεν, ἐφη, ὥς βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τοῦτων ἐπιστήμων, τῷ χρῆ ποιεῖν; Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἐφη, ἡ πιόντα περιέναι, ἔως ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσι γένηται, ἐπείτα κατακεῖσθαι καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ ποιῆσει. καὶ ἄμα ὥρεξε τὴν κύλικα τῷ Ἐοκράτῃ καὶ δὴ λαβὼν καὶ μάλα ἔλεως, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, οὐδὲν τρέσας οὐδὲ διαφθείρας οὔτε τοῦ χρωμάτος οὔτε τοῦ προσώπου, ἄλλ' ὡσπερ εἰώθει ταυρηδόν ὑποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Τί λέγεις, ἐφη, περὶ τούδε τοῦ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποπείσαι τινι; ἐξεστὶν ἢ οὐ; Τοσοῦτον, ἐφη, ὁ Ἐοκράτες, τρίβομεν, ὡς οἱ οἴμεθα μέτρων εἶναι πιεῖν. Μανθάνω, ἢ

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1 Schanz brackets eikótws, following Hirschig.
PHAEDO

I know that others have taken the poison very late, after the order has come to them, and in the meantime have eaten and drunk and some of them enjoyed the society of those whom they loved. Do not hurry; for there is still time."

And Socrates said: "Crito, those whom you mention are right in doing as they do, for they think they gain by it; and I shall be right in not doing as they do; for I think I should gain nothing by taking the poison a little later. I should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life and spared it, when there is no more profit in it. Come," he said, "do as I ask and do not refuse."

Thereupon Crito nodded to the boy who was standing near. The boy went out and stayed a long time, then came back with the man who was to administer the poison, which he brought with him in a cup ready for use. And when Socrates saw him, he said: "Well, my good man, you know about these things; what must I do?" "Nothing," he replied, "except drink the poison and walk about till your legs feel heavy; then lie down, and the poison will take effect of itself."

At the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. He took it, and very gently, Echecrates, without trembling or changing colour or expression, but looking up at the man with wide open eyes, as was his custom, said: "What do you say about pouring a libation to some deity from this cup? May I, or not?" "Socrates," said he, "we prepare only as much as we think is enough." "I understand," said Socrates; "but I may and must pray to the gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I
PLATO

εὐτυχῆ γενέσθαι· ἂ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ εὐχομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταῦτη. καὶ ἀμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισηχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπειν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἴοι τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὡς δὲ εἰδομεν πίνοντα τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὕκετι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῖ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὸ ἐξώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὅστε ἐγκαλυφάμενος ἀπέκλαιον ἐμαυτοῦ οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνον γε, ἀλλὰ

D τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἴον ἀνδρὸς ἑταῖρον ἔστερεμένος εἰην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶος τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἔξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχήσαμεν κλαίων καὶ ἅγιακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντων οὐ κατέκλασα τῶν παρόντων πλῆν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐκείνος δέ, Οἶα, ἐφή, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἠκιστα
tούτων ἐνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ
tοιαύτα πλημμελοῦεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν

Ε ἐυφημία χρῆ τελευτῶν. ἀλλ' ἠσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε. καὶ ἤμεις ἀκούσαντες ἠσχύνθη
μέν τε καὶ ἐπέσκυψαν τοῦ δακρύων. ὁ δὲ περιελ
thῶν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἐφή τα σκέλη, κατε
kλίθη ὑπτίος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκείλεψεν ὁ ἀνθρωπος· καὶ ἀμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ ὅτος ὁ δοὺς τὸ

1 Schanz brackets κλαίων καί.
2 Schanz follows Upton and others in bracketing ὅτος...
PHAEDO

offer this prayer, and may it be granted.” With these words he raised the cup to his lips and very cheerfully and quietly drained it. Up to that time most of us had been able to restrain our tears fairly well, but when we watched him drinking and saw that he had drunk the poison, we could do so no longer, but in spite of myself my tears rolled down in floods, so that I wrapped my face in my cloak and wept for myself; for it was not for him that I wept, but for my own misfortune in being deprived of such a friend. Crito had got up and gone away even before I did, because he could not restrain his tears. But Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time before, then wailed aloud in his grief and made us all break down, except Socrates himself. But he said, “What conduct is this, you strange men! I sent the women away chiefly for this very reason, that they might not behave in this absurd way; for I have heard that it is best to die in silence. Keep quiet and be brave.” Then we were ashamed and controlled our tears. He walked about and, when he said his legs were heavy, lay down on his back, for such was the advice of the attendant. The man who had administered the poison laid his hands on him and after a while examined his hands and legs, then pinched his foot hard and asked if he felt it. He said “No”; then after that, his thighs; and passing upwards in
ἐπεδείκνυτο, ὅτι ψύχοιτο τε καὶ πηγνύτο. καὶ ἄνθις ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὰν πρὸς τὴν καρδία γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται. ἦδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος, ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ, εἶπεν, ὅ δὴ τελευταίου ἐφθέγξατο. Ὡ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὁφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀποδότε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὅρα, εἰ τι ἄλλο λέγεις. ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὁλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτὸν, καὶ ὅ τὰ ὁμματα ἐστησεν· ἴδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

67. Ἡδὲ ἡ τελευτή, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐπαίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἥμεις φαίμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ἄν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτον καὶ δικαιοτάτον.

1 αὖθις, Forster. αὖθις, BCDE. αὖ, Schanz.
2 Schanz brackets ἄλλως.
PHAEDO

this way he showed us that he was growing cold and rigid. And again he touched him and said that when it reached his heart, he would be gone. The chill had now reached the region about the groin, and uncovering his face, which had been covered, he said—and these were his last words—"Crito, we owe a cock to Aesculapius. Pay it and do not neglect it."

"That," said Crito, "shall be done; but see if you have anything else to say." To this question he made no reply, but after a little while he moved; the attendant uncovered him; his eyes were fixed. And Crito when he saw it, closed his mouth and eyes.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, who was, as we may say, of all those of his time whom we have known, the best and wisest and most righteous man.
PHAEDRUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

The Phaedrus is pre-eminent among the dialogues of Plato for the variety of its contents and style, the richness of its imaginative description, and the sportive humour of its conversation. The chief theme of the dialogue is rhetoric, the art of speaking, a subject which formed an important part of the oral and written instruction of the sophists. Plato, and herein he agrees with the sophists, assumes that the result aimed at by rhetoric is persuasiveness, ability to lead the minds of the hearers to a particular belief or action. For the attainment of this result, the sophists claimed that knowledge of the truth concerning the subject under discussion is not essential; all that is necessary is ability to make one’s conclusions seem probable. Plato shows that only the man who knows the truth can know what will seem probable; and he must also know the minds or souls to be persuaded. This he cannot do without a knowledge of the nature of the soul. Now knowledge of the truth concerning the various subjects of discourse and knowledge of all the different classes of human souls must be supplemented by knowledge of the different kinds of argument and of the various niceties of speech taught by the sophists. Only he who has acquired all this knowledge is a perfect orator, so far as perfection is attainable by man; but the acquisition
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

of this knowledge is a great task, which no one would undertake merely for the purpose of persuading his fellows; a higher purpose, the perfection of his soul and the desire to serve the gods, must animate the spirit of the student of the real art of rhetoric.

But if rhetoric is the chief theme of the dialogue, it is not by any means the only theme. The rationalistic (Euhemeristic) explanation of myths is briefly discussed and rejected, the higher and lower forms of love are analysed, the nature of the soul is described in the beautiful figure of the charioteer and his two horses, and here, as in the Phaedo, the doctrine of ideas and its derivative, the doctrine of reminiscence, are intimately connected with the description of the life of the soul. Yet, formally, at any rate, the other subjects of the dialogue are subordinate to the discussion of rhetoric. The processes of collection and division, by which a number of particulars may be brought together under one head and a general concept may be divided, are clearly stated. The latter is of such importance in the dialectic method, which for Plato was the only correct method of reasoning, that we may well believe the discussion of rhetoric to have been undertaken in part for the purpose of giving a concise and clear statement of this principle.

In this dialogue, as in the Phaedo, we find the soul justly rewarded or punished for conduct in this life; but the soul is here described as made up of a charioteer and two horses, whereas in the Phaedo it is one and indivisible; but the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is confessedly and obviously figurative, and the simple, uniform nature of the soul
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

is arrived at in the Phaedo by serious argument. It is therefore evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single being. The two horses, then, represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body; the good horse typifies the influence of the emotions, the bad horse that of the appetites, and the charioteer is reason. It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion in any attempt to determine Plato's conception of the soul. Since the Phaedo and the Phaedrus were probably written about the same time, no real disagreement between them is to be assumed.

The first of the three discourses on love is ascribed to the famous orator, Lysias, son of Cephalus, and the question has been much discussed whether it is really a work of Lysias which Plato has inserted here. All the extant speeches of Lysias were composed to be spoken in court or at least on public occasions. We have no specimen of a discourse written by him purely as an example of his skill or for the delectation of his audience, nor do we know that he ever wrote such discourses. The discourse on love is certainly in the style of Lysias, that is to say, it approaches the style of his extant speeches as nearly as a discourse on such a subject can be expected to approach the style of a speech intended for delivery in a court of law; but Plato was a consummate literary artist, and there is surely every reason to believe that he could imitate the style of Lysias if he chose. Similarity to the style of Lysias is therefore no sufficient reason for the belief that
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de discourse is not Plato's composition, especially as the introduction of a genuine discourse by Lysias would impair the unity, and, to a certain extent, the dignity of the dialogue.

Toward the end of the Phaedrus, Plato inserts a remarkable discussion of the relative value of the spoken and the written word. It is somewhat startling to find so voluminous a writer maintaining that the written word is only a plaything, or, at best, a reminder; yet this must, apparently, be accepted as his deliberate judgment. In the Academy he laid great stress upon oral instruction, and this passage seems to indicate that he considered that instruction more important than his writings. It is interesting to find this judgment of the written word in a dialogue in which the playful element is so strong.

Of Phaedrus, the only interlocutor and the sole audience of Socrates in this dialogue, little or nothing is known except what we learn from Plato. He was the son of Pythocles, of the Attic deme of Myrrhinus. He appears in several dialogues of Plato as a follower of Socrates, but no writings of his are extant, if any ever existed. Diogenes Laertius (iii., 29, 31), speaks of him as Plato's favourite. Some of the persons mentioned in the dialogue are so well known that no further account of them is necessary. Such are the great orator Lysias, the sophist and rhetorician Gorgias of Leontini, the philosopher Zeno of Elea (who masquerades under the name of Palamedes, 261 ν), the distinguished sophist Protagoras of Abdera, Hippocrates, the "father of medicine," and the rhetorician, orator, and sage Isocrates. Acumenus and his son, Eryximachus, were Athenian physicians,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHAEDRUS

Herodicus was a physician of Megara, Morychus was an Athenian of some means, whose house had apparently been bought by Epicrates, who is described by a scholiast as an orator and demagogue. The other persons mentioned, Tisias of Sicily, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Theodorus of Byzantium, Evenus of Paros, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, Polus of Agrigentum, and his teacher, Licymnius, were all sophists and rhetoricians, whose inventiveness in the matter of rhetorical nomenclature is ridiculed.

Separate editions of the Phaedrus are few. The only one which appears to demand special mention is that of W. H. Thompson (1868).
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΚΑΛΟΥ- ΗΘΙΚΟΥ]

TA TOY ΔΙΑΔΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠA
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ

Σ. Π. p. 227

1. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ω φίλε Φαίδρε, ποί δή καὶ πόθεν; ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παρὰ Λυσίον, ὥς Σώκρατες, τοῦ Κεφάλον πορεύομαι δὲ πρὸς περίπατον ἐξω τείχους. συχνὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖ διέτριψα χρόνον καθή- μενος ἐξ ἕωθινον ὁδὸν δὲ σφαῖρα ἐταίρω πειθόμενος Ἀκούμενος κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιοῦμαι τοὺς περιπάτους. φησί γὰρ ἀκοπωτέρους εἶναι B τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοισι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γάρ, ὥς ἐταίρη, λέγει. ἀτὰρ Λυσίας ἂν, ὡς έοικέν, ἐν ἄστει.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί, παρ’ Ἐπικράτει, ἐν τῇ ἡ τῇ πλησίον τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου οἰκίᾳ τῇ Μορυχίᾳ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν δή ἢν ἡ διατριβή; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῶν λόγων ὑμᾶς Λυσίας εἰστία;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πεῦσε, εἰ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δὲ; οὐκ ἄν οἴει με κατὰ Πίν-
PHAEDRUS
[or ON THE BEAUTIFUL, ETHICAL]

CHARACTERS
Socrates, Phaedrus

Socrates. Dear Phaedrus, whither away, and where do you come from?

Phaedrus. From Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus; and I am going for a walk outside the wall. For I spent a long time there with Lysias, sitting since early morning; and on the advice of your friend and mine, Acumenus, I am taking my walk on the roads; for he says they are less fatiguing than the streets.

Socrates. He is right, my friend. Then Lysias, it seems, was in the city?

Phaedrus. Yes, at Epicrates' house, the one that belonged to Morychus, near the Olympieum.

Socrates. What was your conversation? But it is obvious that Lysias entertained you with his speeches.

Phaedrus. You shall hear, if you have leisure to walk along and listen.

Socrates. What? Don't you believe that I
δαρον καὶ ἀσχολιάς ὑπέρτερον πράγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ σὴν τε καὶ Λυσίαν διατριβῆν ἀκούσαι;

C ἈΙΔΡΟΣ. Πρόαγε δὴ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγοις ἂν.

ἈΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατε, προσήκουσά γέ σοι ἡ ἀκοὴ. ὁ γὰρ τοι λόγος ἦν, περὶ δὲν διετρίβομεν, οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὄντων πρῶτων ἐρωτικῶς. γέγραφε γὰρ δὴ ὁ Λυσίας πειρόμενον τινα τῶν καλῶν, οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἔραστον δὲ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ κεκόμησενταί· λέγει γὰρ ὡς χαριστέον μὴ ἐρώτημα μᾶλλον ἡ ἑρώτημα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡ γενναῖος, εἰθέ γράψειν ὡς χρὴ πέντε πᾶλλον ἡ πλουσίως, καὶ προσβυτέρῳ ἡ νεωτέρῳ, καὶ ὡς ἄλλα ἐμοὶ τε πρόσεστι καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἤμοιν ἡ γὰρ ἀν ἀστεῖοι καὶ δημοφιλεῖς εἶναι οἱ λόγοι. ἔγωγ᾽ οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκούσαι, ὡστε ἐὰν βαδίζων ποιή τὸν περίπατον Μέγαράδε, καὶ κατὰ Ἡρόδικον προσβὰς τῷ τείχει πάλιν ἀπίης, οὐ μὴ σου ἀπολειψθῶ.

ἈΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ βέλτιστε Σώκρατε; 228 οἰεὶ με, ὦ Λυσίας ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ σχολὴν συνέθηκε, δεινότατος ὡς τῶν τῶν γράφειν, ταῦτα ἰδιώτην ὤντα ἀπομνημονεύσεις ἄξιος ἐκείνου;

1 Pindar Isthm. i. 1. Μᾶτερ ἐμά, τὸ τεῦν, χρύσαστι Θήβα, πράγμα καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον θόσοιμαι. "My mother, Thebes, the golden shield, I will consider thy interest greater even than business."

2 Herodicus, Sch. : ἰατρὸς ἦν καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἐξ ὑπὸ τείχους ἐποιεῖτο, ἀρχόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν διαστήματος οὐ μακροῦ ἄλλα συμμέτρου, ἄξιος τοῦ τείχους, καὶ ἀναστρέφων. "He was a physician and exercised outside the wall, beginning at some distance, not great but moderate, going as far as the wall and turning back."
consider hearing your conversation with Lysias "a greater thing even than business," as Pindar says? 1

PHAEDRUS. Lead on, then.

SOCRATES. Speak.

PHAEDRUS. Indeed, Socrates, you are just the man to hear it. For the discourse about which we conversed, was in a way, a love-speech. For Lysias has represented one of the beauties being tempted, but not by a lover; this is just the clever thing about it; for he says that favours should be granted rather to the one who is not in love than to the lover.

SOCRATES. O noble Lysias! I wish he would write that they should be granted to the poor rather than to the rich, to the old rather than to the young, and so of all the other qualities that I and most of us have; for truly his discourse would be witty and of general utility. I am so determined to hear you, that I will not leave you, even if you extend your walk to Megara, and, as Herodicus says, go to the wall and back again. 2

PHAEDRUS. What are you saying, my dear Socrates? Do you suppose that I, who am a mere ordinary man, can tell from memory, in a way that is worthy of Lysias, what he, the cleverest writer of our day, composed at his leisure and took a long time for?

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πολλοῦ γε δέω καὶ τοι ἐβουλόμην γ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ μοι πολὺ χρυσίον γενέσθαι.

2. σφικταὶς. Ὡ Φαίδρε, εἰ ἐγὼ Φαίδρον ἀγνοῶ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέξασμαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲτέρα ἐστὶ τούτων εὖ οἶδα ὅτι Δυσίον λόγον ἀκούων ἐκεῖνος οὐ μόνον ἀπαξ ἄκουσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἐπαναλαμβάνων ἐκέλευν οἱ λέγειν· ὁ δὲ B ἐπείθετο προθύμως. τῷ δὲ οὖδὲ ταῦτα ἦν ικανὰ, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν παραλαβὼν τὸ βιβλίον ἄ μάλιστα ἐπεθύμει ἐπεσκόπει, καὶ τούτῳ δρῶν, ἐξ ἔωθινοῖς καθῆμενος, ἀπειπών εἰς περίποτον ἤει, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ς τὸν κύνα, ἐξεπιστάμενος τὸν λόγον, εἰ μὴ πάνω τις θ' ἢ μακρός. ἐπορεύετο δ' ἐκτὸς τείχους, ἵνα μελετῇ. ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ νωσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν, ἰδὼν μὲν ήσθη, ὅτι ἔξοι τὸν C συγκορυβαντῶντα, καὶ προαγεὶν ἐκέλευε· δεομένου δὲ λέγειν τοῦ τῶν λόγων ἔραστον, ἐθρύπτετο ὡς δὴ οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶν λέγειν· τελευτῶν δὲ ἐμελλέ, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις ἐκὼν ἀκούοι, βία ἐρείν. σὺ οὖν, ὁ Φαίδρε, αὐτοῦ δεήθητι, ὅπερ τάχα πάντως ποιήσει, νῦν ἢδη ποιεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐμοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺ κράτιστον ἐστὶν οὕτως ὅπως δύναμαι λέγειν. ὡς μοι δοκεῖς σὺ οὖν μας με ἀφήσειν, πρὶν ἄν εἰπὼ ἀμῶς γέ πως.

ΣΦΙΚΤΑΙΣ. Πάνω γάρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

3. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτωςι τοίνυν ποιήσω. τῷ οὖν γάρ, ὁ Σφικταῖς, παντὸς μᾶλλον τά γε ῥήματα οὐκ ἐξέμαθον· τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν σχέδον ἀπάντων, οἷς ἔφη διαφέρειν τα τοῦ ἑρώτητος ἢ τα τοῦ μή, ἐν κεφαλαῖοι ἐφεξῆς δείμη, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου.

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1 tis B.T: ti Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

Far from it; and yet I would rather have that ability than a good sum of money.

SOCRATES. O Phaedrus! If I don't know Phaedrus, I have forgotten myself. But since neither of these things is true, I know very well that when listening to Lysias he did not hear once only, but often urged him to repeat; and he gladly obeyed. Yet even that was not enough for Phaedrus, but at last he borrowed the book and read what he especially wished, and doing this, sitting from early morning, when he grew tired, went for a walk, with the speech, as I believe, by the Dog, learned by heart, unless it was very long. And he was going outside the wall to practise it. And meeting the man who is sick with the love of discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his revel, and told him to lead on. But when the lover of discourse asked him to speak, he feigned coyness, as if he did not yearn to speak; at last, however, even if no one would listen willingly, he was bound to speak whether or no. So, Phaedrus, ask him to do now what he will presently do anyway.

PHAEDRUS. Truly it is best for me to speak as I may; since it is clear that you will not let me go until I speak somehow or other.

SOCRATES. You have a very correct idea about me.

PHAEDRUS. Then this is what I will do. Really, Socrates, I have not at all learned the words by heart; but I will repeat the general sense of the whole, the points in which he said the lover was superior to the non-lover, giving them in summary, one after the other, beginning with the first.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δείξας γε πρῶτον, ὃς φιλότης, τί ἄρα ἐν τῷ ἀριστερῶν ἔχεις ὑπὸ τῷ ἰματίῳ. τοπτάκω γάρ σε ἔχειν τὸν λόγον αὐτόν. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἔστιν, Ε ὁ ὠτωσὶ διανοοῦ περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγὼ σε πάνι μὲν φιλῶ, παράντος δὲ Δυσίων ἔμαυτόν σοι ἐμε- λετάν παρέχειν οὐ πάνι δέδοκται. ἀλλ’ ἵθι, δείκνυε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παῦε. ἐκκέκρουκάς με ἐλπίδος, ὃς Σώκρατες, ἦν εἶχον ἐν σοι ὡς ἐγγυμνασόμενος. ἀλλὰ ποῦ ὑδὴ βουλεῖ καθιζόμενοι ἀναγνώρει;

229 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῦρ ἐκτρατόμονα κατὰ τὸν Ἰλισ- σοῦν ἰσομεν, εἰτά ὅπου ἄν δόξῃ ἐν ἰσοχια καθιζη- σόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰς καιρῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνυπόδητος ὥν ἔτυχον. σὺ μὲν γὰρ ὑδὴ ἀει. ῥάζτον οἷν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸ υδάτιον βρέχουσι τοὺς πόδας ἵναι, καὶ οὐκ ἅγιοις, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ τήνδε τὴν ὦραν τοῦ ἐτούς τε καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρόσαγε δὴ, καὶ σκόπει ᾧμα ὅπου καθιζησόμεθα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὀρᾶς ὅπων ἐκείνην τὴν ἐγκηλοτάτην πλάτανον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί μήν;

B ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἔκαι σκιά τ’ ἐστί καὶ πνεῦμα μέ- τριον, καὶ πόα καθίζεσθαι ἢ ἄν βουλώμεθα κατα- κλιθήμαι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Προάγοις ἄν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰπὲ μοι, ὃς Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἐνθένδε μέντοι ποθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰλισσοῦ λέγεται ὁ Βορέας τὴν Ὀρείθυνιαν ἀρτάσαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγεται γάρ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀρ’ οὖν ἐνθένδε; χαρίεντα γοῦν καὶ 418
PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Yes, my dear, when you have first shown me what you have in your left hand, under your cloak. For I suspect you have the actual discourse. And if that is the case, believe this of me, that I am very fond of you, but when Lysias is here I have not the slightest intention of lending you my ears to practise on. Come now, show it.

PHAEDRUS. Stop. You have robbed me of the hope I had of practising on you. But where shall we sit and read?

SOCRATES. Let us turn aside here and go along the Ilissus; then we can sit down quietly wherever we please.

PHAEDRUS. I am fortunate, it seems, in being bare-foot; you are so always. It is easiest then for us to go along the brook with our feet in the water, and it is not unpleasant, especially at this time of the year and the day.

SOCRATES. Lead on then, and look out for a good place where we may sit.

PHAEDRUS. Do you see that very tall plane tree?

SOCRATES. What of it?

PHAEDRUS. There is shade there and a moderate breeze and grass to sit on, or, if we like, to lie down on.

SOCRATES. Lead the way.

PHAEDRUS. Tell me, Socrates, is it not from some place along here by the Ilissus that Boreas is said to have carried off Oreithyia?

SOCRATES. Yes, that is the story.

PHAEDRUS. Well, is it from here? The streamlet

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καθαρὰ καὶ διαφανῆ τὰ ὑδάτια φαίνεται, καὶ ἐπιτήδεια κόραις παίζειν παρ’ αὐτά.

C ἙΠΙΡΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖθεν ὅσον δῦ ἡ τρία στάδια, ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς Ἀγρας διαβαίνομεν· καὶ ποῦ τίς ἐστι βωμὸς αὐτόθι Βορέου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πάνυ νενόηκα· ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ πρὸς Δίος, ὁ Σῶκρατες· σὺ τούτο τὸ μυθολόγημα πεῖθει ἀληθῶς εἶναι.

4. ἙΠΙΡΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀπιστοῦχ, ὡσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ, οὐκ ἂν ἀτοπος εἶχην εἶτα σοφιζόμενος φαίνην ἂν αὐτὴν πνεῦμα Βορέου κατὰ τῶν πλησίων πετρών σὺν Φαρμακείᾳ παίζουσαν ώσιν, καὶ

D οὕτω δὴ τελευτήσασαν λεχθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Βορέου ἀναρπαστῶν γεγονέναι. ἐγὼ δὲ, ὁ Φαίδρε, ἄλλως μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα χαρέντα ἡγοῦμαι, λίαν δὲ δεινοῦ καὶ ἐπιτόνου καὶ οὗ πάνυ εὐτυχοὶ ἀνδρός, κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδενὶ, ὅτι δ’ αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη μετὰ τούτῳ τὸ τῶν Ἰπποκενταύρων εἰδὸς ἑπανορθοῦσθαι, καὶ ἀὐθίς τὸ τῆς Χιμαίρας, καὶ ἐπιρρεῖ δὲ ὅχλος τοιούτων Γοργόνων καὶ Πηγάσων καὶ ἄλλων

Ε ἀμηχάνων πλήθη τε καὶ ἀτοπία τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων αἷς εἰ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἐκαστον, ἀτε ἀγροίκῳ τις σοφία χρώμενος, πολλῆς αὐτῷ σχολῆς δεχέσθη. ἐμοὶ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὰ ὀνδαμῶς ἔστι σχολὴ τὸ δὲ αἰτίων, ὁ φίλε, τούτου τόδε· οὐ δύναμαι πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνώναι ἐμαυτῶν· γελοῖον δὴ μοι φαίνεται,
PHAEDRUS

looks very pretty and pure and clear and fit for girls to play by.

SOCRATES. No, the place is about two or three furlongs farther down, where you cross over to the precinct of Agra; and there is an altar of Boreas somewhere thereabouts.

PHAEDRUS. I have never noticed it. But, for Heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me; do you believe this tale is true?

SOCRATES. If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I should not be extraordinary; then I might give a rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north wind, pushed her off the neighbouring rocks as she was dying with Pharmacea, and that when she had died in this manner she was said to have been carried off by Boreas. But I, Phaedrus, think such explanations are very pretty in general, but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious and not altogether enviable man, for no other reason than because after this he must explain the forms of the Centaurs, and then that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him a whole crowd of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegas and multitudes of strange, inconceivable, portentous natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with a rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with probability, he will need a great deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet

1 The MSS. insert here ἡ ἐκ Ἀρείου πάγου. λέγεται γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος, ὡς ἔκειθεν ἄλλος ὀφθεὶν ἤπατος, “or from the Areopagus, for this story is also told, that she was carried off from there and not from here.” Schanz follows Bost and many editors in rejecting this as a gloss.
τούτῳ ἐτὶ ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. οὐκεν
oriously ἔσασα ταῦτα, πειθόμενος δὲ τῷ νομίζο-
μένῳ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἢ νυνὶ ἔλεγον, σκοπῶ ὑ
ταῦτα ἄλλα ἑραυτῶν, εἰτε τι θηρίον τυγχάνω
Τυφώνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμ-
μένον, εἰτε ἡμέρωτερον τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῷον,
θείας τινὸς καί ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.
ἀτάρ, ὥ ἐταιρε, μεταξύ τῶν λόγων, ἃρ' οὐ τὸδε ἦν
τὸ δένδρον, ἐφ' ὅπερ ἦγες ἡμᾶς;

Β

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτῳ μὲν οὖν αὐτῷ.

5. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ τὴν Ἡραν, καλὴ γε ἡ κατα-
γωγή. ἢ τε γὰρ πλάτανος αὐτὴ μάλ' ἁμφιλαφής
tε καὶ ψυχῆ, τοῦ τε ἄγου τὸ ύψος καὶ τὸ
σύσκιον πάγκαλον, καὶ ὡς ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθῆς,
ὅς ἂν εὐωδέστατον παρέχω τὸν τόπον. ἢ τε ἀν
πηγή χαριστάτη ὑπὸ τῆς πλατάνου ἤρει μάλα
ψυχροῦ ὑδατος, ὥστε γε τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρισθαι.
Νυμφῶν τὲ τινῶν καὶ Ἀχελώον ἱερῶν ἀπὸ τῶν
κορῶν τε καὶ ἀγαλμάτων ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ δ' ἂν
βουλεῖ, τὸ ἐὕπνου τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ
σφόδρα ἤδυ· θερινῶν τε καὶ λιγυρῶν ὑπηχεί τῷ
tῶν τεττύγων χορῷ. πάντων δὲ κομψότατον τῷ
τῆς πόας, ὅτι ἐν ἥρεμα προσάντει ἰκανὴ πέφυκε
κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν. ὥστε
ἀριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὃ φίλε Φαῖδρε.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σὺ δὲ γε, ὁ θαυμάσιε, ἀτοπώτατός τις
φαίνει. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ, ὁ λέγεις, ξεναγομένῳ τίνι
καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἐοικας· οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεος
οὐτ' εἰς τὴν ὑπερορίαν ἀποδημεῖς, οὕτ' ἔξω τείχους
εμοιγε δοκεῖς τὸ παράπαν ἐξενάι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὁ ἀρίστε. φιλο-
μαθῆς γὰρ εἶμι· τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα
know that, to investigate irrelevant things. And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the customary belief about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature. But, my friend, while we were talking, is not this the tree to which you were leading us?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, this is it.

SOCRATES. By Hera, it is a charming resting place. For this plane tree is very spreading and lofty, and the tall and shady willow is very beautiful, and it is in full bloom, so as to make the place most fragrant; then, too, the spring is very pretty as it flows under the plane tree, and its water is very cool, to judge by my foot. And it seems to be a sacred place of some nymphs and of Acheleous, judging by the figurines and statues. Then again, if you please, how lovely and perfectly charming the breeziness of the place is! and it resounds with the shrill summer music of the chorus of cicadas. But the most delightful thing of all is the grass, as it grows on the gentle slope, thick enough to be just right when you lay your head on it. So you have guided the stranger most excellently, dear Phaedrus.

PHAEDRUS. You are an amazing and most remarkable person. For you really do seem exactly like a stranger who is being guided about, and not like a native. You don't go away from the city out over the border, and it seems to me you don't go outside the walls at all.

SOCRATES. Forgive me, my dear friend. You see, I am fond of learning. Now the country places and
οὐδέν μ’ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀστεί ἀνθρωποί. σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τὴς ἔξοδον τὸ φάρμακον εὑρηκέναι. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ πειράματα θρέμματα θαλλόν ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσεύμοντες ἀγούσιν, σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὐτὼ προτείνων ἐν βι-
Ε βλίσθως τὴν τε Ἀττικῆν φαίνει περιάζειν ἀπασαν καὶ ὅποι οὐ ἄλλος σοὶ βούλη. νῦν οὖν ἐν τῷ παρ-
οντι δεύρ’ ἀφικόμενοι ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακεῖ-
σεθαι, σὺ δὲ ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οἰεὶ ῥάστα ἀνα-
γνώσεθαι, τοῦθ’ ἐλόμενος ἀναγίγνωσκε.

ΦΙΛΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἄκουε δή:
. 6. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι,
καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων

ακήκοας; ἄξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τούτο ἀτυχήσαι ὅν
δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔρασθης ἃν σου τυχχᾶνω. ὅς
ékεινοι μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὅν ἀν εὐ ποιήσωσιν,
ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται· τούς δὲ οὐκ
ἐστὶ χρόνος, ἐν ό μεταγνώναι προσήκει. οὐ γὰρ
ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ἄλλ’ ἐκόντες, ὅς ἂν ἀριστα περὶ τῶν
οἰκεῖων βουλευσάμηντο, πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν τὴν
αὐτῶν εὐ ποιοῦσιν. ἢτὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν ἔρωτες σκο-
ποῦσιν ἀ τε κακῶς διέθεντο τῶν αὐτῶν διὰ τὸν
ἐρωτα καὶ ἃ πεποιήκασιν εὐ, καὶ ἃν ἐξοῦν πόνον

Β προστιθέντες ἣγούνται πάλαι τὴν ἄξιαν ὑποδεδω-
κέναι χάριν τοῖς ἐρωμένοις· τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρώσιν
οὗτε τὴν τῶν οἰκείων ἀμέλειαν διὰ τούτου ἔστι
προφασίζεσθαι, οὐτε τοὺς παρελπηθότας πόνους
ὑπολογίζεσθαι, οὐτε τὰς πρὸς τοὺς προσήκοντας
dιαφοράς αὐτίασασθαι· ὅτε περιηρημένων τοιοῦ-
tῶν κακῶν οὐδέν ψιλολείπεται ἄλλ’ ἢ ποιεῖν

προθύμος, ὁ τι ἂν αὐτοῖς οἰκνται πράξαντες

C χαριεῖσθαι. ἢτὶ δὲ εἰ διὰ τούτο ἄξιον τοὺς
the trees won't teach me anything, and the people in the city do. But you seem to have found the charm to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by holding before me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you please. So now that I have come here, I intend to lie down, and do you choose the position in which you think you can read most easily, and read.

PHAEDRUS. Hear then.

You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases; but there is no time when non-lovers naturally repent. For they do kindnesses to the best of their ability, not under compulsion, but of their free will, according to their view of their own best interest. And besides, lovers consider the injury they have done to their own concerns on account of their love, and the benefits they have conferred, and they add the trouble they have had, and so they think they have long ago made sufficient return to the beloved; but non-lovers cannot aver neglect of their own affairs because of their condition, nor can they take account of the pains they have been at in the past, nor lay any blame for quarrels with their relatives; and so, since all these evils are removed, there is nothing left for them but to do eagerly what they think will please the beloved. And besides, if lovers ought to be highly esteemed
PLATO

ἐρωτας περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, ὅτι τοὐτος μάλιστα φασὶ φιλεῖν ὅν ἂν ἐρωτεῖν καὶ ἔτοιμοι εἰσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ὑπὸ ἄλλους ἀπεκθανόμενου τοὺς ἐρωμένους χαρίζεσθαι, ῥάδιον γραναι, εἰ ἀλήθη λέγουσιν, ὅτι ὅσοι ἂν ὑστερον ἐρασθῶσιν, ἐκεῖνος αὐτῶν περὶ πλείονος ποιῆσονται, καὶ δὴλον ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐκεῖνος δοκῇ, καὶ τούτους κακῶς ποιῆσονται. καὶ τοὶ πῶς εἰκὸς ἐστὶ τοιούτων πράγμα προέσθαι τοιαύτην ἐξοντι συμφοράν, ἵνα υοδ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσειν οὐδεὶς ἐμπειροῖς ὅν ἀποτρέπειν; καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦσιν νοσεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι ὅτι κακῶς φρονοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύνασθαι αὐτῶν κρατεῖν ὡστε πῶς ἂν εὐ φρονήσαντες ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχειν ἣγῆσαιτο περὶ ὅν οὕτω διακείμενοι βεβούλευνται; καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἐρωτῶν τὸν βέλτιστον αἵρεοι, ἐξ ὀλίγων ἂν σοι ἡ ἐκλεξίς εὑρ' ἐφ' ὅ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν σαυτῷ ἐπετηθειότατον, ἐκ πολλῶν.

Ε ὡστε πολὺ πλείον ἐπίσει ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ὅντα τυχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς σῆς φιλίας.

7. Εἰ τοῖς τῶν νόμων τὸν καθεστηκότα δέδοικας, μη πυθομένων τῶν ἁνθρώπων οὐ εἰδος σοι 232 γένηται, εἰκὸς ἐστὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐρωτάς, οὕτως ἂν ὁμομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζηλοῦσθαι ὕστερ αὐτοὺς υφ' αὐτῶν, ἐπαρθῆναι τῷ ἔχειν καὶ φιλοτιμομένους ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρὸς ἀπαντας, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπόνθηται· τοὺς δὲ μη ἐρωτας, κρείττους αὐτῶν οὕτας, τὸ βέλτιστον ἀντὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς παρὰ τῶν ἁνθρώπων αἱρεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐρωτας πολλοὺς ἀνάγκη πυθέσονται

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because they say they have the greatest love for the objects of their passion, since both by word and deed they are ready to make themselves hated by others to please the beloved, it is easy to see that, if what they say is true, whenever they fall in love afterwards, they will care for the new love more than for the old and will certainly injure the old love, if that pleases the new. And how can one reasonably entrust matters of such importance to one who is afflicted with a disease such that no one of any experience would even try to cure it? For they themselves confess that they are insane, rather than in their right mind, and that they know they are foolish, but cannot control themselves; and so, how could they, when they have come to their senses, think those acts were good which they determined upon when in such a condition? And if you were to choose the best from among your lovers, your choice would be limited to a few; whereas it would be made from a great number, if you chose the most congenial from non-lovers, so that you would have a better chance, in choosing among many, of finding the one most worthy of your affection.

Now if you are afraid of public opinion, and fear that if people find out your love affair you will be disgraced, consider that lovers, believing that others would be as envious of them as they are of others, are likely to be excited by possession and in their pride to show everybody that they have not toiled in vain; but the non-lovers, since they have control of their feelings, are likely to choose what is really best, rather than to court the opinion of mankind. Moreover, many are sure to notice and see the lovers going about with their beloved ones and making
καὶ ἰδεῖν, ἀκολουθοῦντας τοῖς ἔρωμένοις καὶ ἔργον
Β τοῦτο ποιουμένους, ὡστε ὅταν ὄφθωσι διαλεγόμενοι
ἀλλήλοις, τότε αὐτοὺς οἱ οἴονται ἢ γεγενημένης ἢ
μελλοῦσης ἐσεσθαι τῆς ἐπιθυμίας συνεῖναι· τοὺς
dὲ μὴ ἔρωτας οὐδ’ αἰτιάσθαι διὰ τὴν συνουσίαν
ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἔστιν ἢ διὰ
φιλίαν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἢ δὲ ἄλλην τινα ἡδονήν.
καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ σοι δέος παρέστηκεν ἡγουμένως
χαλέπων εἶναι φιλίαν συµµένειν, καὶ ἄλλῳ µὲν
τρόπῳ διαφορᾶς γενοµένης κοινὴν ἄν ἀµφοτέρους
καταστήναι τὴν συµµοράν, προεµένου δὲ σου ἃ
C περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖ µεγάλην δὴ ἃς πλάβην ἀν
γενέσθαι, εἰκὸτος δὴ τοὺς ἔρωτας µᾶλλον ἄν
φοβοῦν πολλά γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐστὶ τὰ λυποῦντα, καὶ
πάντ’ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῶν βλάβη νοµίζουσι γίγνεσθαι.
διότερ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους τῶν ἔρωμένων
συνουσίας ἀποτρέπουσιν, φοβοῦμενοι τοὺς µὲν
οὐσίαν κεκτηµένους, µὴ χρήµασιν αὐτοὺς ὑπερ-
βάλωνται, τοὺς δὲ πεπαιδευµένους, µὴ συνεῖς
κρείττους γένονται τῶν δ’ ἄλλο τι κεκτηµένων
D ἀγάθον τὴν δύναµιν ἐκάστου φυλάττονται. πεί-
σατε µὲν οὖν ἀπέχθεσθαι σε τούτοις εἰς ἔρηµιαν
φίλων καθιστάσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὸ σεαυτῷ σκοπῶν
ἀµειων ἐκείνων φρονήσει, ἦξεις αὐτοῖς εἰς διαφοράν
ὁσοὶ δὲ µὴ ἔρωται ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἄρετήν
ἐπραξαν ὅν ἐδέωντο, οὐκ ἂν τοῖς συνούσι φθονοῖεν,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς µὴ ἐθέλοντας μισοῖεν, ἡγούµενοι σ’ ὑπ’
ἐκείνων µὲν ὑπερράσθαι, ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων δὲ

1 ἄν inserted by Hirschig and Schanz.
2 δὴ here and after εἰκὸτος is inserted by Schanz for ἄν of BT.
that their chief business, and so, when they are seen talking with each other, people think they are met in connexion with some love-matter either past or future; but no one ever thinks of finding fault with non-lovers because they meet, since everyone knows that one must converse with somebody, either because of friendship or because it is pleasant for some other reason. And then, too, if you are frightened by the thought that it is hard for friendship to last, and that under other circumstances any quarrel would be an equal misfortune to both, but that when you have surrendered what you prize most highly you would be the chief sufferer, it would be reasonable for you to be more afraid of the lovers; for they are pained by many things and they think everything that happens is done for the sake of hurting them. Therefore they prevent their loves from associating with other men, for they fear the wealthy, lest their money give them an advantage, and the educated, lest they prove superior in intellect; and they are on their guard against the influence of everyone who possesses any other good thing. If now they persuade you to incur the dislike of all these, they involve you in a dearth of friends, and if you consider your own interest and are more sensible than they, you will have to quarrel with them. But those who are not in love, but who have gained the satisfaction of their desires because of their merit, would not be jealous of those who associated with you, but would hate those who did not wish to do so, thinking that you are slighted by these last and benefited by the former, so that there is much more
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Ε ὁφελεῖσθαι, ὡστε πολὺ πλεῖσιν ἐλπίς φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος ἡ ἔχθραν γενήσεσθαι.

8. Καὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν μὲν ἔρωτιν τοὺς πολλοὶ πρῶτον τοῦ σώματος ἐπεθύμησαν ἡ τοῦ τρόπου ἐγνωσαν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων ἐμπειροῖ ἐγένοντο, ὡστε ἄδηλον εἰ ἕτι βουλήσονται φίλοι εἶναι,

233 ἐπειδὰν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν, οἱ καὶ πρῶτον ἄλληλοις φίλοι ὄντες ταῦτα ἐπηράξαν, οὐκ ἂν ὃν ἂν εὐ πάθωσι ταῦτα εἰκὸς ἐλάττω τῆν φιλίαν αὐτοῖς ποιήσαι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μνημεία καταλειφθῆναι τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. καὶ μὲν δὲ βελτίωνι σοι προσήκει γενέσθαι ἐμοὶ πειθομένῳ ἡ ἔραστῃ. ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστὸν τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ τά πραττόμενα ἐπαινοῦσι, τὰ μὲν δεδίότες μὴ

Β ἀπέχθωνται, τὰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ χεῖρον διὰ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας γιγανόσκοντες, τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ ἔρως ἐπιδεικνύεται δυστυχοῦντας μὲν, ἀ μὴ λύπην τοὺς ἄλλους παρέχει, ἀναφερομένης εὐτυχοῦντας δὲ καὶ τὰ μὴ ἡδονὴς ἄξια παρ’ ἱκείνων ἐπαίνου ἀναγκάζει τυχάνειν ὡστε πολὺ μᾶλλον ἑλεέιν τοὺς ἐρωμένους ἡ ἁγιοῦν αὐτοῖς προσήκει. ἐὰν δ’ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ὡς τὴν παρούσαν ἡδονήν θεραπεύων συνέσομαι σοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν

C μέλλουσαν ὁφελίαιν ἔσεσθαι, οὐχ ὡς ἐρωτὸς ἡπτώμενος, ἀλλ’ ἐμαυτοῦ κρατῶν, οὐδὲ διὰ σμικρὰ ἱσχυρὰν ἔχθραν ἀναγρόφεος, ἀλλὰ διὰ μεγάλα βραδέως ὀλίγην ὀργὴν ποιοῦμενος, τῶν μὲν ἀκουσάν συγγράμμα ἐξων, τὰ δὲ ἐκουσία πειρόμενος ἀποτρέπειν ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι φιλίας πολὺν χρόνον ἐσομένης τεκμήρια. εἰ δ’ ἄρα σοι τούτῳ παρέστηκεν, ὡς οὐχ ἐν τῇ ἱσχυρὰν φιλίαν γενέσθαι, 430.
likelihood that they will gain friendship than enmity from their love-affair with you.

And then, too, many lovers are moved by physical passion before they know the character or have become acquainted with the connexions of the beloved, so that it is uncertain whether they will wish to be your friends after their passion has ceased. But in the case of those who are not in love, who were your friends before entering into the closer relation, the favours received are not likely to make the friendship less, but will remain as pledges of future joys. And then, too, it will be better for your character to yield to me than to a lover. For lovers praise your words and acts beyond due measure, partly through fear of incurring your displeasure, and partly because their own judgment is obscured by their passion. For such are the exhibitions of the power of Love: he makes the unsuccessful lovers think that things are grievous which cause no pain to others, and he compels the successful to praise what ought not to give pleasure; therefore those whom they love are more to be pitied than envied. But if you yield to me, I shall consort with you, not with a view to present pleasure only, but to future advantage also, not being overcome by passion but in full control of myself, and not taking up violent enmity because of small matters, but slowly gathering little anger when the transgressions are great, forgiving involuntary wrongs and trying to prevent intentional ones; for these are the proofs of a friendship that will endure for a long time. But if you have a notion that friendship cannot be firm
PLATO

D ἐὰν μὴ τις ἔρων τυγχάνῃ, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρή, ὅτι οὔτ' ἂν τοὺς νεῖσις περὶ πολλοῦ ἐπουόμεθα οὔτ'
ἀν τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τὰς μητέρας, οὔτ' ἂν πιστοὺς
φίλους ἐκεκτήμεθα, οὔκ οὐκ ἔξ ἐπιθυμίας τοιαύτης
γεγόνασιν ἀλλ' ἔξ ἐτέρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

Ε ἐτι δὲ εἰ χρή τοῖς δεομένοις μάλιστα
χαρίζεσθαι, προσήκει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ τοὺς
βελτίστους ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτους εὐ ποιεῖν
μεγίστων γὰρ ἀπαλλαγέντες κακῶν πλείστην
χάριν αὐτοῖς ἐισοῦνται. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἐν ταῖς

ιδίαις διαπάναις οὐ τοὺς φίλους ἄξιον παρακαλεῖν,
ἀλλὰ τοὺς προσαίτουντας καὶ τοὺς δεομένους
πλησιόνης· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ καὶ ἀγαπήσουσιν καὶ
ἀκολουθήσουσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας ἤζοιν καὶ
μάλιστα ἥσθησονται καὶ οὐκ ἔλαχιστην χάριν
ἐισοῦνται καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς εὐξοῦνται. ἀλλὰ
ἰσος προσήκει οὐ τοῖς σφόδρα δεομένοις χαρίζεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ τοῖς μάλιστα ἀποδοῦναι χάριν
dυναμένοις· οὐδὲ τοῖς προσαίτουι μόνον, ἀλλὰ
toῖς τοῦ πράγματος ἄξιοις· οὐδὲ ὅσοι τῆς σῆς

234 ὀρασὶ ἀπολαῦσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες πρεσβυτέροις
γενομένῳ τῶν σφετέρων ἀγαθῶν μεταδόσουσιν·
οὐδὲ οἱ διαπραξάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φιλο-
tιμήσονται, ἀλλ' οἱ τινες αἰσχυνόμενοι πρὸς
ἀπαντᾶς σιωπήσουσι· οὐδὲ τοῖς θλίγμον χρόνον
στοινάξουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἠμοίῳς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ
βίου φίλου ἐσομένοις· οὐδὲ οἱ τινες πανόμενοι
τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐχθραὶ πρόφασιν ζητήσουσιν, ἀλλ']

Β οἱ παυσαμένοις τῆς ὁρασὶ τότε τὴν αὐτῶν ἄρετην
ἐπιδείξονται. σὺ όν τῶν τε εἰρημένων μέμνησο,
καὶ ἐκεῖνο ἐνθυμοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔρων τας οἱ φίλοι
νοθετοῦσιν ὡς ὅντος κακοῦ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος,
unless one is in love, you should bear in mind that in that case we should not have great affection for sons or for fathers and mothers, nor should we possess faithful friends who have been gained not through passion but through associations of a different kind.

Besides, if you ought to grant favours to those who ask for them most eagerly, you ought in other matters also to confer benefits, not on the best, but on the most needy; for they will be most grateful, since they are relieved of the greatest ills. And then, too, at private entertainments you ought not to invite your friends, but beggars and those who need a meal; for they will love you and attend you and come to your doors and be most pleased and grateful, and will call down many blessings upon your head. Perhaps, however, you ought not to grant favours to those who beg for them, but to those who are most able to repay you; and not to those who ask merely, but to the most deserving; and not to those who will enjoy your youthful beauty, but to those who will share their good things with you when you are older; and not to those who, when they have succeeded, will boast to others of their success, but to those who will modestly keep it a secret from all; and not to those who will be enamoured for a little while, but to those who will be your friends for life; and not to those who will seek a pretext for a quarrel when their passion has died out, but to those who will show their own merit when your youth is passed. Do you, then, remember what I have said, and bear this also in mind, that lovers are admonished by their friends, who think
PLATO

tois de mē erōsin oudeis pōpote τῶν οἰκείων ἐμέμψατο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο κακῶς βουλευομένους περὶ ἑαυτῶν.

Ίσως μὲν οὖν ἄν ἔρωι με, εἰ ἀπασίν σοι παραμῶν
tois mē erōsi xarizēthai. ἔγω de oûmē oude an
tovn erōneta pros apanta se kelleiwn tous erōntas

tautēn ἐχειν την διάνοιαν. ουτε γαρ τῷ λόγῳ

λαμβάνωντι χάριτος ἵσης άξιον, ουτε σοι βουλο-

μένω τοὺς ἅλλους δικάνων ὁμοίως δυνατόν. δεῖ
dē βλάβην μὲν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν, ὡφέλιαν δε

ἀμφοῖν γίγνεσθαι. ἐγὼ·μὲν οὖν ἰκανά μοι νομίζω
tā eirhēma. eī de tī 2 σū podeis, ἡγούμενος

paraleleīfthai, érōta.

10. Tī soi faivnetai, ο Σώκρατες, ο λόγος; οὐχ

ὑπερφυῶς τά τε ἀλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρήσθαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δαιμονίως μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὧστε

μὲ ἐκπλαγῆναι. καὶ τοῦτο ἔγω ἔπαθον διὰ σὲ, ὦ

Φαιδρε, πρὸς σὲ ἀποβλέπων, ὦτι ἐμοὶ ἑδόκεις

ganvsthai upō toû lógon metaxu anagignóskōn.

ἡγούμενος γαρ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἔμε ἐπαίειν περὶ τῶν

toiou̱tων soi eiptōmyn, καὶ ἐπόμενος συνεβάκχευσα

metā soû tês theias kefalēs.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰεν· οὔτω δὴ dōkeî 3 paizēn;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκῶ γαρ soi paizēn kai ouχi

eśpoudakēnai;

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλα ὡς

ἀληθῶς εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου, οὐεὶ ἄν τινα ἐχειν
eipteîn ἅλλον tōn 'Ellēnōn étera toûtōn meîzω

kal pleiō peri toû autou prāgamatos;

1 λόγῳ B. Omitted by Schanz.
2 de tī BT. δ' esti tī Schanz, following Heindorf.
3 dē dōkeî T. dē B. deî, Schanz.

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PHAEDRUS

their way of life is bad, but no relative ever blamed a non-lover for bad management of his own interests on account of that condition.

Perhaps you may ask me if I advise you to grant favours to all non-lovers. But I think the lover would not urge you to be so disposed toward all lovers either; for the favour, if scattered broadcast, is not so highly prized by the rational recipient, nor can you, if you wish, keep your relations with one hidden from the rest. But from love no harm ought to come, but benefit to both parties. Now I think I have said enough. But if you feel any lack, or think anything has been omitted, ask questions.

What do you think of the discourse, Socrates? Is it not wonderful, especially in diction?

SOCRATES. More than that, it is miraculous, my friend; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your train and joined you in the divine frenzy.

PHAEDRUS. Indeed! So you see fit to make fun of it?

SOCRATES. Do I seem to you to be joking and not to be in earnest?

PHAEDRUS. Do not jest, Socrates, but, in the name of Zeus, the god of friendship, tell me truly, do you think any other of the Greeks could speak better or more copiously than this on the same subject?
Τί δέ; καὶ ταύτη δεῖ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ τὸν λόγον ἐπαινεθῆναι, ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνη μόνον, ὅτι σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα, καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐκαστὰ τῶν ὁνομάτων ἀποτελοῦμεν; εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, συγχωρητέον χάριν σὴν, ἐπεὶ ἐμὲ γε ἐλαθεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμῆς οὐδενίας. τὸ γὰρ ῥητορικὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον τὸν νοῦν προσέχον, τούτῳ δὲ οὐδὲ αὐτὸν φῶς Λυσίαν οὐσθαί ἵκανον εἶναι. καὶ οὖν μοι ἔδοξεν, ὁ Φαίδρε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις, δίς καὶ τρῖς τὰ αὐτὰ εἰρηκέναι, ὡς οὗ πάνω εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ ἵσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιοῦτον· καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύσθαι ἐπιδεικνύομενος, ὡς οἷος τε ὑπ' αὐτὰ ετέρως τε καὶ ετέρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἀριστα.

Φαίδρος. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτῳ καὶ μάλιστα ὁ λόγος ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ ἐνότων ἄξιως ῥηθήναι εἰν τῷ πράγματι οὐδὲν παραλέλοιπεν, ὡστε παρὰ τὰ ἐκεῖνα εἰρημένα μηδὲν ἂν ποτε δύνασθαι εἰπεῖν ἀλλα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια.

Σώκρατες. Τοῦτο ἐγώ σοι οὐκέτι οἷος τε ἐσομαι πιθέσθαι. παλαιοὶ γὰρ καὶ σοφοὶ ἀνδρὲς τε καὶ γυναῖκες περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρηκότες καὶ γεγραφότες ἐξελέγξουσι με, εάν σοι χαριζόμενοι συγχωρώ.

Φαίδρος. Τίνες οὖτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἄκηκοας;

11. Σώκρατες. Νῦν μὲν οὖτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν δήλου δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἄκηκοα, ἢ ποῦ Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν. πόθεν δὴ τεκμαίρομενον λέγω; πληρές πως, ὅ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στήθος ἔχων αἰσθά-

ἄξιως BT. ἄξιων Madvig, followed by Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. What? Are you and I to praise the discourse because the author has said what he ought, and not merely because all the expressions are clear and well rounded and finely turned? For if that is expected, I must grant it for your sake, since, because of my stupidity, I did not notice it. I was attending only to the rhetorical manner, and I thought even Lysias himself would not think that satisfactory. It seemed to me, Phaedrus, unless you disagree, that he said the same thing two or three times, as if he did not find it easy to say many things about one subject, or perhaps he did not care about such a detail; and he appeared to me in youthful fashion to be exhibiting his ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently.

PHAEDRUS. Nonsense, Socrates! Why that is the especial merit of the discourse. He has omitted none of the points that belong to the subject, so that nobody could ever speak about it more exhaustively or worthily than he has done.

SOCRATES. There I must cease to agree with you; for the wise men and women of old, who have spoken and written about these matters, will rise up to confute me, if, to please you, I assent.

PHAEDRUS. Who are they? and where have you heard anything better than this?

SOCRATES. I cannot say, just at this moment; but I certainly must have heard something, either from the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps from some prose writers. What ground have I for saying so? Why, my dear friend, I feel that my own
νομαί παρά ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἄτερα μὴ χείρῳ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν εἴναι ἡκαστοί, εν οἶδα, συνειδῶς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν. λείστεαι δὴ, οἴμαι, ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρώσθαι μὲ δίκην ἤγγειον. ὑπὸ δὲ νοσθείας αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπιλέξησαι, ὅπως τε καὶ ὁν τινων ἡκούσα.

Φαίδρος. Ἀλλ᾽, ὦ γενναιότατε, κάλλιστα εἰρήνης. σὺ γὰρ ἔμοι ὃν τινων μὲν καὶ ὅπως ἡκουσας, μηδ᾽ ἂν κελεύω εἴπης, τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἡ λέγεις ποίησον τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μη ἐλάττων ἔτερα ὑπόσχεσθε εἰπεῖν, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος. καὶ σοι ἐγώ, ὦς περὶ οἱ ἐννέα ἀρχοντες, ὑπαχνοῦμαι χρυσῆν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθῆ-σειν, οὐ μόνον ἐμαυτοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ σήν.

Σωκράτης. Φίλτατος εἰ καὶ ὅς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς, ὦ Φαίδρε, εἰ με οἷει λέγειν ὡς Δυσί亚ς τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκε, καὶ οἷόν τε δὴ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἄλλα εἰπεῖν τοῦτο δὲ οἴμαι οὐδ᾽ ἂν τῶν φανλότατον παθεῖν συγγραφέα. αὐτίκα περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος, τίνα οἷει λέγοντα ὡς χρῆ μὴ ἔρωτε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρωτεί χαρίζεσθαι, παρένεα τοῦ μὲν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐγκωμίασεν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ ἀφρον ψέγειν, ἀναγκαία γοῦν ὅμως, εἰτ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἄττα ἔξειν λέγειν; ἀλλ᾽, οἴμαι, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ἐκτέα καὶ συγγνωστέα λέγοντε. καὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὔρεσιν ἄλλα τὴν διάθεσιν ἑπανετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων τε καὶ χαλεπῶν εὔρειν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὔρεσιν.

12. Φαίδρος. Συγγχωρῶ δ ἡ λέγεις· μετρίως γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ποιήσω οὖν καὶ ἔγω οὕτω

1 ὑποσχέσθε BT, ἐπιχελεῖ Schanz. The reading in the text was first suggested by Wex.
bosom is full, and that I could make another speech, different from this, and quite as good. Now I am conscious of my own ignorance, and I know very well that I have never invented these things myself, so the only alternative is that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher, from the well springs of another; but, again because of my stupidity, I have forgotten how and from whom I heard it.

PHAEDRUS. Most noble Socrates, that is splendid! Don't tell, even if I beg you, how or from whom you heard it; only do as you say; promise to make another speech better than that in the book and no shorter and quite different. Then I promise, like the nine archons, to set up at Delphi a statue as large as life, not only of myself, but of you also.

SOCRATES. You are a darling and truly golden, Phaedrus, if you think I mean that Lysias has failed in every respect and that I can compose a discourse containing nothing that he has said. That, I fancy, could not happen even to the worst writer. For example, to take the subject of his speech, who do you suppose, in arguing that the non-lover ought to be more favoured than the lover, could omit praise of the non-lover's calm sense and blame of the lover's unreason, which are inevitable arguments, and then say something else instead? No, such arguments, I think, must be allowed and excused; and in these the arrangement, not the invention, is to be praised; but in the case of arguments which are not inevitable and are hard to discover, the invention deserves praise as well as the arrangement.

PHAEDRUS. I concede your point, for I think what you say is reasonable. So I will make this concession:
ΠΛΑΤΟ

β το μὲν τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ μὴ ἔρωτος μᾶλλον νοσεῖν δῶσω σοι ὑποτίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἔτερα πλείω καὶ πλείονος ἄξια εἰπὼν τῶν Δυσίου, παρὰ τὸ Κυψελεῖδῶν ἀνάθημα σφυρήλατος ἐν Ὄλυμπιά στάθητι.  

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐσπυόδακας, ὃς Φαΐδρε, οτι σου τῶν παιδικῶν ἐπελαβόμην ἔρεσικλῆν σε, καὶ οἶει δὴ με ὃς ἀληθῶς ἐπιχειρήσειν εἰπεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνην σοφίαν ἔτερον τι ποικιλῶτερον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τούτου, ὃ φίλε, εἰς τὰς ὑμῶν λαβὰς ἐλήλυθας. ῥητέον μὲν γὰρ σοι παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτως ὅτι ὁ ὑος τε εἴ, ὅποι μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμαδῶν φορτικόν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζόμεθα ποιεῖν ἀνταποδιδόντες ἀλλήλοις, εὐλαβήθητι  

καὶ μὴ βουλόμεν μὲ ἀναγκάσαι λέγειν ἐκείνῳ τὸ εἰ ἐγώ, ὃ Σώκρατες, Σωκράτην ἀγνοοῦ, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέλησμαι, καὶ ὅτι ἐπεθύμει μὲν λέγειν, ἐθρύπτετο δέ· ἀλλὰ διανοήσαι ὅτι ἐνετείθην οὐκ ἀπιμεν, πρὶν ἀν σὺ εἶπης ὃ ἐφασθα ἐν τῷ στήθει ἔχειν. ἐσμὲν δὲ ἔρημος ἐν ἔρημι, ἰσχυρότερος δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος, ἐκ δ' ἀπάντων τούτων ἔννεος ὃ σοι λέγω, καὶ μηδαμός πρὸς βίας βουληθής μᾶλλον ἡ ἔκως λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ', ὃ μακάριε Φαΐδρε, γελοῖος ἔσομαι παρ' ἀγαθον ποιητὴν ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδίαξων περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οἶσθ' ὃς ἔχει; παῦσαι πρὸς με καλλοπιζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω δ' εἴπων ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μηδαμῶς τοίνυν εἴπης.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὴ λέγω· ὃ δὲ μοι

1 στάθητι BT, ἔσταθι Schanz following Cobet.  
2 Schanz, following Cobet, omits εὐλαβήθητι.
PHAEDRUS

I will allow you to begin with the premise that the lover is more distraught than the non-lover; and if you speak on the remaining points more copiously and better than Lysias, without saying the same things, your statue of beaten metal shall stand at Olympia beside the offering of the Cypselids.

SOCRATES. Have you taken my jest in earnest, Phaedrus, because, to tease you, I laid hands on your beloved, and do you really suppose I am going to try to surpass the rhetoric of Lysias and make a speech more ingenious than his?

PHAEDRUS. Now, my friend, you have given me a fair hold; for you certainly must speak as best you can, lest we be compelled to resort to the comic "you’re another"; be careful and do not force me to say "O Socrates, if I don’t know Socrates, I have forgotten myself," and "he yearned to speak, but feigned coyness." Just make up your mind that we are not going away from here until you speak out what you said you had in your breast. We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger and younger than you; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and speak voluntarily, rather than under compulsion.

SOCRATES. But, my dear Phaedrus, I shall make myself ridiculous if I, a mere amateur, try without preparation to speak on the same subject in competition with a master of his art.

PHAEDRUS. Now listen to me. Stop trying to fool me; for I can say something which will force you to speak.

SOCRATES. Then pray don’t say it.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, but I will. And my saying shall
Λόγος ὁρκος ἔσται· ὁμονωμα γάρ σοι—τίνα μέντοι,
Ε τίνα θεών; ἢ βούλει τὴν πλάτανον ταυτηνί; ἢ
μὴν, εάν μοι μὴ εἶπης τὸν λόγον ἐναντίον αὐτῆς
tαύτης, μηδέποτε σοι ἐτερον λόγον μηδένα μηδενὸς
ἐπιδείξειν μη δ' ἐξαγγελεῖν.

13. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βαβαι, ὦ μαρε, ὡς εὑ ἀνεύρεσ
τὴν ἀνάγκην ἀνδρὶ φιλολογῷ ποιεῖν ὦ ἄν κελεύῃς.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δήτα ἔχων στρέφεις;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι, ἐπειδὴ σὺ γε ταῦτα
ὁμόμοιας. πῶς γὰρ ἄν οἶός τ' εἴην τοιαύτης
θοινὴς ἀπέχεσθαι;

237 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε δή.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἰσθ' οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦ πέρι;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Εγκαλυφάμενος ἔρω, ὦ τι τάχι-
στα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον, καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σε
ὑπ' αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὡς βούλει
ποίει.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἁγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἰτε δ' φίδης
εἴδος λύγειαι, εἰτε διὰ γένους μουσικῶν τὸ Δινών
ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε
tοῦ μύθου, ὃν μὲ ἀναγκάζει ο βέλτιστος οὐτοσί
Β λέγειν, ὦ τι έταιρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν
tούτω σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξῃ.

'Ην οὗτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα
καλός· τοῦτῳ δὲ ἦσαν έρασται πάνω πολλοὶ. εἰς
dὲ τις αὐτῶν αἰμύλος ἦ, δὲ οὕτως ἦττον ἔρων
ἐπιπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὃς οὐκ ἐρφή· καὶ ποτε αὐτῶν

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be an oath. I swear to you by—by what god? By this plane tree? I take my solemn oath that unless you produce the discourse in the very presence of this plane tree, I will never read you another or tell you of another.

Socrates. Oh! Oh! You wretch! How well you found out how to make a lover of discourse do your will!

Phaedrus. Then why do you try to get out of it?

Socrates. I won't any more, since you have taken this oath; for how could I give up such pleasures?

Phaedrus. Speak then.

Socrates. Do you know what I'm going to do?

Phaedrus. About what?

Socrates. I'm going to keep my head wrapped up while I talk, that I may get through my discourse as quickly as possible and that I may not look at you and become embarrassed.

Phaedrus. Only speak, and in other matters suit yourself.

Socrates. Come then, O tuneful Muses, whether ye receive this name from the quality of your song or from the musical race of the Ligyans, grant me your aid in the tale this most excellent man compels me to relate, that his friend whom he has hitherto considered wise, may seem to him wiser still.

Now there was once upon a time a boy, or rather a stripling, of great beauty: and he had many lovers. And among these was one of peculiar craftiness, who was as much in love with the boy as anyone, but had made him believe that he was not in love; and once in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that favours ought to be granted rather
αἰτῶν ἔπειθε τούτ᾽ αὐτὸ, ὡς μὴ ἔρωτι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρωτός δέοι χαρέσσθαι, ἐλεγέν τε ὅδε.

14. Περὶ παντός, δ᾽ παί, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλημασι καλῶς θουλεύσασθαι εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἢ ἢ θεοῦ ἢ παντὸς ἀμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη. τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέγηθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἱσασί την οὐσίαν ἐκάστου. ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκός ἀποδιδόσαι οὐτε γὰρ ἔστι πάντως οὐτε ἀλλήλοις ὀμολογοῦσιν. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάσχωμεν ὃ ἄλλους ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος προκείται, ἔρωτι ἦ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἵτεον, περὶ ἔρωτος, οἷον τ᾽ ἔστι καὶ ἢν ἔχει δύναμιν.

D ὀμολογία θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τούτῳ ἀποπλήσωμεν καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιόμεθα, εἴτε ὁφελόν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχειν. δὴ λέγει οὖν ὅτι ἐπιθυμία τις ἡ ἔρως, ἀπαντήσας δὴ λέγει δὲ αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ ἔρωτες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἵσμεν. τὸ δὲ τὸν ἐρωτήτα τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν; δεῖ δὴ νοήσαι, ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ δυὸ τινὲς ἔστοι ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἅγιοντε, οἷον ἐπομέθα ἢ ἄν ἄγιον, ἡ μὲν ἐξήφυτος οὐσία ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιμένη τοῦ ἄριστον. τούτῳ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὀμονοεῖτον, ἐστὶ δὲ ἐτεραμιλλητον καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἔτερα, ἀλλοτέ δὲ ἡ ἔτερα κρατεῖ, δόξες μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὑνομα. ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἐλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονῶς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὑβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. ὑβρις δὲ δὴ πολυβοῦμον πολυμελεῖς γὰρ καὶ πολυειδές. καὶ τοῦτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρητῆς ἢ ἄν τύχῃ γενομένη, τὴν αὐτής ἐπωνυμίαν ὑνομαζόμενον τῶν ἔχοντα παρέχεται.
to the non-lover than to the lover; and his words were as follows:

There is only one way, dear boy, for those to begin who are to take counsel wisely about anything. One must know what the counsel is about, or it is sure to be utterly futile, but most people are ignorant of the fact that they do not know the nature of things. So, supposing that they do know it, they come to no agreement in the beginning of their enquiry, and as they go on they reach the natural result,—they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Now you and I must not fall into the error which we condemn in others, but, since we are to discuss the question, whether the lover or the non-lover is to be preferred let us first agree on a definition of love, its nature and its power, and then, keeping this definition in view and making constant reference to it, let us enquire whether love brings advantage or harm. Now everyone sees that love is a desire; and we know too that non-lovers also desire the beautiful. How then are we to distinguish the lover from the non-lover? We must observe that in each one of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow whithersoever they lead; one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which strives for the best. These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife; and sometimes one, and sometimes the other has the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess. Now excess has many names, for it has many members and many forms; and whichever of these forms is most marked
PLATO

οὔτε τι νὰ καλὴν οὔτε ἐπαξίαν κεκτῆσθαι.\(^1\) περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἀρίστου B καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τῶν ἔχοντα ταῦτὸν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται. περὶ δ' αὐτοῦ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τῶν κεκτημένων ταύτη ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὐ τεύξεται προσρήματος καὶ τἀλλα ἤ ἡ τὰ τούτων ἄδελφα καὶ ἄδελφων ἐπιθυμιῶν ὄνομα τῆς αἰεὶ δυναστευοῦσης ἢ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον. ἢς δ' ένεκα πάντα τὸ πρόσθεν εὑρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἡδή φανερὸν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθὲν πάν πως σαφέστερον; ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ C ὀρθὸν ὀρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἰδιοῦν ἀχθεία κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὐτὴν ἐαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἔρωμένως ῥωσθείσα νικήσασα ἄγωγη, ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ρώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη.

15. Ἡταύ, οὖν Φαίδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὡσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, θείον πάθος πεποιθέναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ὁ Σωκράτης, παρά τὸ εἰώθος εὐροία τῆς σε εἰλήφειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Συγῆ τοῖνυν μου ἄκουε· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ D θείος ἐοικεν ὁ τότος εἶναι· ὡστε ἐὰν ἀφα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊὼντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαναμάσης· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθεγγομαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Αληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος· ἄλλα τὰ λοιπὰ ἄκουε· ἴσως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράπωτο τὸ ἐπίον.

\(^1\) Schanz reads ἐκτήσθαι here and the corresponding forms elsewhere.
gives its own name, neither beautiful nor honourable, to him who possesses it. For example, if the desire for food prevails over the higher reason and the other desires, it is called gluttony, and he who possesses it will be called by the corresponding name of glutton, and again, if the desire for drink becomes the tyrant and leads him who possesses it toward drink, we know what he is called; and it is quite clear what fitting names of the same sort will be given when any desire akin to these acquires the rule. The reason for what I have said hitherto is pretty clear by this time, but everything is plainer when spoken than when unspoken; so I say that the desire which overcomes the rational opinion that strives toward the right, and which is led away toward the enjoyment of beauty and again is strongly forced by the desires that are kindred to itself toward personal beauty, when it gains the victory, takes its name from that very force, and is called love.¹

Well, my dear Phaedrus, does it seem to you, as it does to me, that I am inspired?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly, Socrates, you have an unusual fluency.

SOCRATES. Then listen to me in silence; for truly the place seems filled with a divine presence; so do not be surprised if I often seem to be in a frenzy as my discourse progresses, for I am already almost uttering dithyrambs.

PHAEDRUS. That is very true.

SOCRATES. You are responsible for that; but hear what follows; for perhaps the attack may be averted.

¹ This somewhat fanciful statement is based on a supposed etymological connexion between ἐρως and ῥώμη, ἐρρωμένως, ῥωσθείσα.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

taîta μὲν ὁν θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἴτεον.

Εἰκον, ὃ φέροστε· δὲ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὅν περὶ οὐ βουλευτέου, εἰρηταὶ τε καὶ ὁρισται, βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν, τίς ὦφελία ἢ βλάβη ἀπὸ τε ἑρώτητο καὶ μὴ τῷ χαριζομένῳ εἰς εἰκότος συμβήσεται.

Τῷ δὲ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντι τε ἡδονὴ ἀνάγκη που τὸν ἔρωμεν ὡς ἡδιστον ἐαυτῷ παρασκευάζειν νοσοῦντι δὲ πάν ἢδυ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνον, κρείττον δὲ καὶ ἵσον έχθρόν. οὔτε δὴ κρείττο ταῖς ἱσούμενον ἐκὼν ἐραστής παιδικὰ ἀνέξεται, ἣττῳ δὲ καὶ ὑποδεέστερον αἰεὶ ἀπεργάζεται· ἤττῳ δὲ ἀμαθὴς σοφοῦ, δειλὸς ἀνδρείου, ἀδύνατος εἰπεῖν ῥητορικοῦ, βραδὺς ἀγχίνου. τοσούτων κακῶν καὶ ἔτι πλείονών κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένῳ ἀνάγκη γυγυμένων τε καὶ φύσει ἐνότων, τῶν μὲν ἡδεσθαί, τὰ δὲ παρασκευάζειν, ἢ στερεσθαί τοῦ παραυτικὰ ἡδεσθ. Β φθονερὸν δὴ ἀνάγκη εἰναι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείρησαντα καὶ ὦφελίμων, ὅθεν ἄν μάλιστ᾽ ἄνηρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἰτιών εἰναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς οἴθεν ἄν φρονιμώτατος εἰη. τούτῳ δὲ η ἡθαίρεσις φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει ὁν, ἢς ἐραστὴν παιδικὰ ἀνάγκη πόρρωθεν εἰργειν, περίφοβον ὅντα τοῦ καταφρονηθήηαν· τὰ τὲ ἄλλα μηχανᾶσθαί, ὅπως ἄν ἡ πάντα ἁγνοῶν καὶ πάντα ἄποβλέπων εἰς τὸν ἑραστήν, ὁδος ὅν τῷ μὲν C ἡδίστος, ἐαυτῷ1 δὲ βλαβερότατος ἄν εἰη. τὰ μὲν

1 ἐαυτῷ T Stobaeus: τῷ ἐαυτῷ B Schanz.
PHAEDRUS

That, however, is in the hands of God; we must return to our boy.

Well then, my dearest, what the subject is, about which we are to take counsel, has been said and defined, and now let us continue, keeping our attention fixed upon that definition, and tell what advantage or harm will naturally come from the lover or the non-lover to him who grants them his favours.

He who is ruled by desire and is a slave to pleasure will inevitably desire to make his beloved as pleasing to himself as possible. Now to one who is of unsound mind everything is pleasant which does not oppose him, but everything that is better or equal is hateful. So the lover will not, if he can help it, endure a beloved who is better than himself or his equal, but always makes him weaker and inferior; but the ignorant is inferior to the wise, the coward to the brave, the poor speaker to the eloquent, the slow of wit to the clever. Such mental defects, and still greater than these, in the beloved will necessarily please the lover, if they are implanted by Nature, and if they are not, he must implant them or be deprived of his immediate enjoyment. And he is of necessity jealous and will do him great harm by keeping him from many advantageous associations, which would most tend to make a man of him, especially from that which would do most to make him wise. This is divine philosophy, and from it the lover will certainly keep his beloved away, through fear of being despised; and he will contrive to keep him ignorant of everything else and make him look to his lover for everything, so that he will be most agreeable to him and most harmful to himself. In respect to
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οὐν κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐπίτροπος τε καὶ κοινωνὸς οὐδαμὴ λυσιτελῆς ἀνὴρ ἔχων ἔρωτα.

16. Τὴν δὲ τοῦ σῶματος ἔξιν τε καὶ θεραπεῖαιν οὖν τε καὶ ὦς θεραπεύσει οὐ ἂν γένηται κύριος, ὅς ἦδυ πρὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡνάγκασται διώκειν, δεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἰδεῖν. ὀφθήσεται δὲ 1 μαλθάκων τινα καὶ οὐ στερεόν διώκων, οὐδὲ ἐν ἡλίῳ καθαρῶ τεθραμμένον ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ συμμυγεί σκίᾳ, πόνων μὲν ἀνδρείων καὶ ἱδρώτων ξηρῶν ἀπειρον, ἐμπειρον δὲ ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἀνάνδρου διαίτης, ἀλλοτρίως χρώμασι καὶ κόσμοις χίτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον, ὅσα τε ἄλλα τούτως ἔπεται πάντα ἐπιτυνθεύοντα, ἀ δῆλα καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον περαίτερο προβαίνειν, ἀλλ' ἐν κεφάλαιον ὀρισμένου ἐπ' ἀλλο ἴναι· τὸ γὰρ τοιούτον σῶμα ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ ἄλλαις χρείαις ὅσα μεγάλαι οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ ταρροῦσιν, οἱ δὲ φίλοι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ φοβοῦνται.

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ὃς δὴλον ἑαυτὸν, τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς ἢρτεόν, τίνα ἤμιν ὁφελέαν ἢ τίνα βλάβην περὶ τὴν κτήσιν ἢ τοῦ ἔρωτος ὀμιλία τε καὶ ἐπίτροπεία παρέξεται. σαφεῖς δὴ τούτο γε παντὶ μὲν, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ ἐραστῇ, ὅτι τῶν φιλτάτων τε καὶ εὐνουστάτων καὶ θειοτάτων κτημάτων ὀρφανῶν πρὸ παντὸς εὐξαίτ' ἀν εἶναι τὸν ἐρώμενον πατρὸς γὰρ καὶ μητρὸς καὶ ξυγγενῶν καὶ φίλων στέρε-240 σθαι ἂν αὐτὸν δέξαιτο, διακωλυτάς καὶ ἐπιτιμητὰς ἡγούμενος τῆς ἡδίστης πρὸς αὐτὸν ὀμιλίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡσίαν ὡς ἔχοντα χρυσοῦ ἢ τενος ἀλλής κτήσεως οὔτ' εὐάλωτον ὄμοιος οὔτε ἀλόντα εὐ-μεταχείριστον ἡγήσεται· ἐξ ὦν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἑραστὴν παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν μὲν ὡσίαν κεκτημένοις,

1 δὲ BT, δ' Schanz following Hirschig.

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the intellect, then, a man in love is by no means a profitable guardian or associate.

We must next consider how he who is forced to follow pleasure and not good will keep the body of him whose master he is, and what care he will give to it. He will plainly court a beloved who is effeminate, not virile, not brought up in the pure sunshine, but in mingled shade, unused to manly toils and the sweat of exertion, but accustomed to a delicate and unmanly mode of life, adorned with a bright complexion of artificial origin, since he has none by nature, and in general living a life such as all this indicates, which it is certainly not worth while to describe further. We can sum it all up briefly and pass on. A person with such a body, in war and in all important crises, gives courage to his enemies, and fills his friends, and even his lovers themselves, with fear.

This may be passed over as self-evident, but the next question, what advantage or harm the intercourse and guardianship of the lover will bring to his beloved in the matter of his property, must be discussed. Now it is clear to everyone, and especially to the lover, that he would desire above all things to have his beloved bereft of the dearest and kindest and holiest possessions; for he would wish him to be deprived of father, mother, relatives and friends, thinking that they would hinder and censure his most sweet intercourse with him. But he will also think that one who has property in money or other possessions will be less easy to catch and when caught will be less manageable; wherefore the lover must necessarily begrudge his beloved the possession of
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απολλυμένης δὲ χαίρειν. ἔτι τοῖνυν ἄγαμον, ἀπαίδα, ἄοικον ὦ τι πλείστον χρόνον παιδικα ἔραστής εὐξαίτ' ἄν γενέσθαι, τὸ αὐτοῦ γλυκὺ ὡς πλείστον χρόνον καρπούσθαι ἐπιθυμῶν.

17. Ἔστι μὲν δὴ καὶ ἄλλα κακά, ἄλλα τις δαίμων ἐμέξε τοῖς πλείστοις ἐν τῷ παραντική ἡδονήν, ὅλον κόλακι, δεινῷ θηρίῳ καὶ βλάβῃ μεγάλῃ, ὅμως ἐπέμειξεν ἡ φύσις ἡδονήν τίνα οὐκ ἄμουσον, καὶ τις ἐτάιραν ὡς βλαβερὸν ψέξειεν ἄν, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων προτέρημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηθεμάτων, οίς τὸ γε καθ' ἡμέραν ἡδι- στοις ποιεῖν ὑπάρχει: παιδικοῖς δὲ ἔραστής πρὸς τῷ βλαβερῷ καὶ εἰς τὸ συνημμερεῦσιν πάντων ἀγδεστάτον.

ἡλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος τέρπειν τὸν ἕλικα: ἡ γὰρ, εἴμαι, χρόνου ἴσοτης ἐπ’ ἴσας ἡδονὰς ἄγουσα δι’ ὅμοιοτητας φιλίαν παρέχεται ἀλλ’ ὅμως κόρου γε καὶ ἡ τούτων συνοψία ἔχει. καὶ μὴν τὸ γε ἀναγκαῖον αὐτ’ ἐκεῖ περὶ πάντων λέγεται· ὅ δὲ πρὸς τῇ ἀνομοιότητι μάλιστα ἔραστής πρὸς παιδικά ἔχει. νεωτέρος γὰρ πρεσβύτερος συνών οὐθ’ ἠμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἄκων

ἀπολείπεται, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ αἰστηρῶν ἐλαύνεται, δὴ ἐκέινοι μὲν ἡδονὰς αἰεὶ διδοῦσαν ἄγει ὅρωντι, ἀκούοντι, ἀποτομοῦντι, καὶ πᾶσαν ἀισθήσεων ἀισθαναμένῳ τοῦ ἑρωμένου, ὡστε μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἀραρτῶς αὐτόν ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ δὲ ὡς ἑρωμένῳ ποιοῦν παραμυθίου ἢ τίνας ἡδονὰς διδοὺς ποιήσει τὸν ἴσον χρόνον συνώντα μὴ οὐχὶ ἐπ’ ἐσχατον ἐλθεῖν ἀνδίας; ὁρῶντι μὲν ὡς πρεσβυτέραν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὅρᾳ, ἐπομενῶν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ταύτη, ἄ καὶ

λόγοι ἐστίν ἀκούοντι οὐκ ἐπιτετρέπετε, μὴ οί δὴ ἔργον ἀνάγκης αἰεὶ προσκειμένης μεταχειρίζεσθαι φυλα-
property and rejoice at its loss. Moreover the lover would wish his beloved to be as long as possible unmarried, childless, and homeless, since he wishes to enjoy as long as possible what is pleasant to himself.

Now there are also other evils, but God has mingled with most of them some temporary pleasure; so, for instance, a flatterer is a horrid creature and does great harm, yet Nature has combined with him a kind of pleasure that is not without charm, and one might find fault with a courtesan as an injurious thing, and there are many other such creatures and practices which are yet for the time being very pleasant; but a lover is not only harmful to his beloved but extremely disagreeable to live with as well. The old proverb says, "birds of a feather flock together"; that is, I suppose, equality of age leads them to similar pleasures and through similarity begets friendship; and yet even they grow tired of each other's society. Now compulsion of every kind is said to be oppressive to every one, and the lover not only is unlike his beloved, but he exercises the strongest compulsion. For he is old while his love is young, and he does not leave him day or night, if he can help it, but is driven by the sting of necessity, which urges him on, always giving him pleasure in seeing, hearing, touching, and by all his senses perceiving his beloved, so that he is glad to serve him constantly. But what consolation or what pleasure can he give the beloved? Must not this protracted intercourse bring him to the uttermost disgust, as he looks at the old, unlovely face, and other things to match, which it is not pleasant even to hear about, to say nothing of being constantly compelled to come into contact with them? And he
κάς τε δή καχυποτόπους φυλαττομένη διὰ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς, ἀκαίρους τε καὶ ἔπαινους καὶ ὑπερβάλλουτας ἀκούοντες, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς ψόγους νήφοντος μὲν οὐκ ἀνεκτούσι, εἰς δὲ μέθην ἱόντος πρὸς τῷ μὴ ἀνεκτῷ ἐπαισχεῖς ἡ παρρησίᾳ κατακορεῖ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένῃ χρωμένου.

18. Καὶ ἔρων μὲν βλαβερός τε καὶ ἀηδής, λήξας δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἀπιστός, εἰς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ὀρκῶν τε καὶ δεήσεων ύπισχυόμενος μόγις κατείχε τὴν ἐν τῷ τότε ἦρωτικὰν ἐπίστολον φέρειν δι’ ἐπιδίᾳ ἀγαθῶν. τότε δὴ δέον ἐκτίνειν, μεταβαλῶν ἄλλον ἀρχοντά ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ προστάτην, νοῦν καὶ σοφροσύνην ἀντ’ ἔρωτος καὶ μανίας, ἄλλος γεγονός λέληθεν τὰ παιδικά. καὶ ἀνεκ τῶν τῶν τότε, ὑπομονήσκων τὰ πραξάμενα καὶ λειτουργῶν, ὡς τῷ αὐτῷ διαλεγόμενον· ὁ δὲ ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης οὔτε εἰπεὶν τολμᾶ ὃτι ἄλλος γέγονεν, οὐθ’ ὅπως τὰ τῆς προτέρας ἀνοίητον ἀρχῆς ὀρκωμοσία τε καὶ υποσχέσεις ἐμπεδώσει ἔχει, νοῦν ἢ ἄσχημος καὶ σεσωφρονηκός, ἵνα μὴ πράττων ταύτα τῷ πρὸς τόν ὰμοίος τοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὃ αὐτὸς πάλιν γένηται. φυγάδει δὴ γίγνεται ἐκ τούτων, καὶ ἀπεστερηκώς ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ὁ πρὶν ἐραστής, ὀστράκων μεταπεσόντος, ἰσταί φυγῆς μεταβαλῶν· ὁ δὲ ἀναγκάζεται διώκειν ἀγανακτῶν καὶ ἐπιθεάξων, ἡγομένως τὸ ἀπαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥστε οὐκ ἀρα ἐδεί ποτὲ ἔρωτι καὶ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης ἀνοίητον χαρίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον

1 ἐπα σχεῖς Schanz following Heindorf, ἐπ’ αἰσχεῖ BT.
PHAEDRUS

is suspiciously guarded in all ways against everybody, and has to listen to untimely and exaggerated praises and to reproaches which are unendurable when the man is sober, and when he is in his cups and indulges in wearisome and unrestrained freedom of speech become not only unendurable but disgusting.

And while he is in love he is harmful and disagreeable, but when his love has ceased he is thereafter false to him whom he formerly hardly induced to endure his wearisome companionship through the hope of future benefits by making promises with many prayers and oaths. But now that the time of payment has come he has a new ruler and governor within him, sense and reason in place of love and madness, and has become a different person; but of this his beloved knows nothing. He asks of him a return for former favours, reminding him of past sayings and doings, as if he were speaking to the same man; but the lover is ashamed to say that he has changed, and yet he cannot keep the oaths and promises he made when he was ruled by his former folly, now that he has regained his reason and come to his senses, lest by doing what he formerly did he become again what he was. He runs away from these things, and the former lover is compelled to become a defaulter. The shell has fallen with the other side up; and he changes his part and runs away; and the other is forced to run after him in anger and with imprecations, he who did not know at the start that he ought never to have accepted a lover who was necessarily without reason, but rather a reason-

1 This refers to a game played with oyster shells, in which the players ran away or pursued as the shell fell with one or the other side uppermost.
μὴ ἔρωτι καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἰς ἐνδοῦναι αὐτοῦ ἀπίστῳ, δυσκόλω, φθονερῷ, ἀνθεί, βλαβερῷ, μὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν, ἢς οὔτε ἀνθρώποις οὔτε θεοῖς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμιῶτερον οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτε ποτὲ ἐσται. ταῦτα τε οὖν χρή, ὥπα, ξυννοεῖν, καὶ εἰδέναι τὴν ἐραστοῦ φιλίαν, ὅτι οὐ μετ' εὐνοίας γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ σιτίου τρόπον, χάριν πλησμονής.

D ὡς λύκοι ἄρν ἤγαπῶσ', ὦς παῖδα φιλοῦσιν ἐραστά.

19. Τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, ὥ Φαίδρε. οὐκέτ' ἂν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἢδη σοι τέλος ἐχέτω ὁ λόγος.

Φαίδρος. Καίτοι φίλης γε μεσοῦν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐρεῖν τὰ ἵσα περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἔρωτος, ὡς δεῖ ἐκεῖνος χαρίζεσθαι μᾶλλον, λέγων ἡ ἀνεχεῖ ἀγαθα· νῦν δὲ δή, ὥ Σώκρατις, τί ἀποταύει;

Ε σωκράτης. Οὐκ ἦσθων, ὥ μακάρι, ὅτι ἢδη ἐπη φθέγγομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι διαθράμβους, καὶ ταῦτα ψέγων; εὖν δ' ἐπαινεῖν τὸν ἄρξωμαι, τί με ὀιεί ποιήσειν; ἀρ' ὀίσθ' ὅτι ὑπὸ τῶν Νυμφῶν, αισ με πρὸς βαλας ἐκ προοίας, σαφῶς ἐνθουσιάςω; λέγω οὖν ἐν ὧν, ὅτι ὑπά τὸν ἄρξωμα τῆς ἐνθουσιασμός; καὶ τί δεῖ μακροῦ ἱεροῦ; περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοῦ ἰκανῶς εἰρηταί. καὶ οὕτω δη ὁ μύθος, ὃ τι πάσχειν 242 προσήκει αὐτῷ, τοῦτο πείσεται· κάγὼ τῶν ποταμῶν

1 δυσκόλω φθονερῷ omitted by Schanz, following Spengel,
2 λέγων ΒΤ, λέγοντ' Schanz,
able non-lover; for otherwise he would have to surrender himself to one who was faithless, irritable, jealous, and disagreeable, harmful to his property, harmful to his physical condition, and most harm-
ful by far to the cultivation of his soul, than which there neither is nor ever will be anything of higher
importance in truth either in heaven or on earth. These things, dear boy, you must bear in mind, and
you must know that the fondness of the lover is not a matter of goodwill, but of appetite which he wishes
to satisfy:

Just as the wolf loves the lamb, so the lover
adores his beloved.

There it is, Phaedrus! Do not listen to me any
longer; let my speech end here.

PHAEDRUS. But I thought you were in the middle
of it, and would say as much about the non-lover as
you have said about the lover, to set forth all his
good points and show that he ought to be favoured.
So now, Socrates, why do you stop?

SOCRATES. Did you not notice, my friend, that I
am already speaking in hexameters, not mere dithy-
rambics, even though I am finding fault with the
lover? But if I begin to praise the non-lover, what
kind of hymn do you suppose I shall raise? I shall
surely be possessed of the nymphs to whom you pur-
posely exposed me. So, in a word, I say that the
non-lover possesses all the advantages that are
opposed to the disadvantages we found in the lover.
Why make a long speech? I have said enough
about both of them. And so my tale shall fare as
τούτον διαβάς ἵππερχομαι, πρὶν ὑπὸ σοῦ τι μεῖξον ἀναγκασθῆναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μῆτος γε, ὦ Σώκρατε, πρὶν ἄν τὸ καῦμα παρέλθῃ ἡ οὖν ὁρᾶς ὡς σχεδόν ἦδη μεσημβρία ἵσταται; ἀλλὰ περιμείναντες, καὶ ἅμα περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων διαλεχθέντες, τάχα ἐπειδάν ἀποφυχῆ ἴμεν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Θείος γ' εἰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὦ Φαίδρε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς θαυμάσιος. οἶμαι γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σοῦ βίου γεγονότων μηδένα πλείους ἢ σὲ πεποιηκέναι γεγενήσθαι ἦτοι αὐτῶν λέγοντα ἢ ἀλλός ἐνὶ γε τῷ τρόπῳ προσαναγκάζοντα. Σιμμῖαν Θηβαῖον ἔξαιρῳ λόγον τῶν δὲ ἀλλών πάμπολυ κρατεῖς· καὶ νῦν αὐτὸς αὐτίος μοι γεγενήσθαι λόγῳ τινὶ ῥηθήναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἀγγέλλεις· ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

20. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ἡνίκ' ἐμελλον, ὦ ἵσσε, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον μοι γίνεσθαι ἐγένετο—ἀεὶ δὲ μὲ ἐπὶ σχεὶ, ὃ ἄν μέλλω πράττειν—καὶ τινα φωνῆν ἔδοξα αὐτόθεν ἀκοῦσαι, ἢ με οὖν ἐὰν ἀπίεναι πρὶν ἄν ἀφοσιώσομαι, ὅσ τε ἡμαρτηκότα εἰς τὸ θείον. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντης μὲν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἄλλ' ὅσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμαντῷ μόνον ἰκανός· σαφῶς οὖν ἦδη μανθᾶνο τὸ ἀμάρτημα. ὡς δὴ τού, ὦ ἐταίρε, μαντικὸν γε τι καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔθραξε μὲν τι καὶ πάλαι λέγοντα τόν λόγον, καὶ πῶς ἐδυσφούμην κατ'

1 After ἵσταται: BT have ἦδη (ὁ ἄρ t, Stobaeus) καλομένη σταθερά, “which is called noontide,” which Schanz brackets.
2 Schanz follows Heindorf in bracketing δει . . . πράττειν.
it may; I shall cross this stream and go away before you put some further compulsion upon me.

PHAEDRUS. Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is past. Don't you see that it is already almost noon? Let us stay and talk over what has been said, and then, when it is cooler, we will go away.

SOCRATES. Phaedrus, you are simply a superhuman wonder as regards discourses! I believe no one of all those who have been born in your lifetime has produced more discourses than you, either by speaking them yourself or compelling others to do so. I except Simmias the Theban; but you are far ahead of all the rest. And now I think you have become the cause of another, spoken by me.

PHAEDRUS. That is not exactly a declaration of war! But how is this, and what is the discourse?

SOCRATES. My good friend, when I was about to cross the stream, the spirit and the sign that usually comes to me came—it always holds me back from something I am about to do—and I thought I heard a voice from it which forbade my going away before clearing my conscience, as if I had committed some sin against deity. Now I am a seer, not a very good one, but, as the bad writers say, good enough for my own purposes; so now I understand my error. How prophetic the soul is, my friend! For all along, while I was speaking my discourse, something troubled
PLATO

Δ' Ἰβυκον, μή τι παρὰ θεοὶς ἀμβλακών τιμᾶν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀμελήσων νῦν δὲ ἱσθημαι τὸ ἀμάρτημα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δέγεις δὲ δή τι;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινόν, ὁ Φαίδρε, δεινόν λόγον αὐτός τε ἐκόμισας ἐμὲ τε ἱνάγκασας εἰπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δή;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εὐήθη καὶ ὑπὸ τι ἄσβηθ. οὐ τίς ἄν εἴη δεινότερος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδείς, εἰ γε σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἑρωτα οὐκ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ θεον τίνα ἤγει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δέγεται γε δή.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ τι ὑπὸ γε Δυσίου, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἐ σοῦ λόγου, δς διὰ τοῦ ἐμοῦ στόματος καταφαρ- μακενθέντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐλέχθη. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ὡσπερ οὖν ἔστι, θεῷς ἢ τι θείον ὁ Ἑρως, οὐδὲν ἂν κακῶν εἴη· τῶ δὲ λόγῳ τῷ νῦν δὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέτην ὡς τοιοῦτον ὑμτος. ταύτη τε οὗν ἡμαρτανέτην περὶ τὸν Ἑρωτα, ἔτι τε ἡ εὐήθεια αὐτοῖν πάνιν ἄστεια, τὸ μηδὲν ὑγίες λέγοντε μηδὲ ἀληθῆς 243 σεμνύνεσθαι ὡς τί ὄντε, εἰ ἀρα ἀνθρωπίσκους τινὰς ἐξαπατήσαντε εὐδοκιμήσετον ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὁ φίλε, καθήμασθαί ἀνάγκη ἐστι δὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσι περὶ μυθολογιῶν καθαρμὸς ἀρχαῖος, ὅ""""Ομηρος μὲν οὐκ ἠθετο, Στήσιχορος δὲ τῶν γὰρ ὁμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἐλένης κακηγοριῶν οὖκ ἠγνόησεν ὡσπερ "Ομηρος, ἀλλ' 460
me, and "I was distressed," as Ibycus says, "lest I be buying honour among men by sinning against the gods."¹ But now I have seen my error.

**PHAEDRUS.** What do you mean?

**SOCRATES.** Phaedrus, a dreadful speech it was, a dreadful speech, the one you brought with you, and the one you made me speak.

**PHAEDRUS.** How so?

**SOCRATES.** It was foolish, and somewhat impious. What could be more dreadful than that?

**PHAEDRUS.** Nothing, if you are right about it.

**SOCRATES.** Well, do you not believe that Love is the son of Aphrodite and is a god?

**PHAEDRUS.** So it is said.

**SOCRATES.** Yes, but not by Lysias, nor by your speech which was spoken by you through my mouth that you bewitched. If Love is, as indeed he is, a god or something divine, he can be nothing evil; but the two speeches just now said that he was evil. So then they sinned against Love; but their foolishness was really very funny besides, for while they were saying nothing sound or true, they put on airs as though they amounted to something, if they could cheat some mere manikins and gain honour among them. Now I, my friend, must purify myself; and for those who have sinned in matters of mythology there is an ancient purification, unknown to Homer, but known to Stesichorus. For when he was stricken with blindness for speaking ill of Helen, he was not, like Homer, ignorant of the reason, but

¹ Fragment 24, Bergk.
PLATO

ἀτε μουσικὸς ὃν ἔγνω τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐθὺς

οὐκ ἔστι ἐτύμος λόγος οὗτος,
οὐδ' ἔβασ ἐν μνυσίν εὐσέλμοις, οὐδ' ἴθεο

B
Περγαμα Τροίας·
καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην παλινφείαν
παραχρῆμα ἀνέβλεψεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σοφότερος
ἐκεῖνων γενήσομαι κατ' αὐτὸ γε τοῦτο πρῶν γάρ
τι παθεῖν διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ερωτος κακηγορίαν πειρά-
σομαι αὐτῷ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν παλινφείαν, γνωμὴ τῇ
κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ τότε ὑπ' αἰσχύνης
ἐγκεκαλυμμένος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τουτοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀττ'
ἀν ἐμοὶ εἶπες ἢδιο.

21. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ γάρ, ὦ γαθῆ Φαίδρε, ἐννοεῖς

C ὡς ἀναιδῶς εἰρησθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ, οὗτος τε καὶ ὁ ἐκ
τοῦ βιβλίου ῥηθεῖς. εἰ γάρ ἀκούων τις τῆς ἡμῶν
γεννάδας καὶ πρᾶος τὸ ἡθος, ἐτέρου δὲ
tοιούτου ἐρῶν ἤ καὶ πρότερον ποτε ἐρασθεῖς,
λεγόμενον ὡς διὰ σμικρὰ μεγάλας ἐχθρας οἱ
ἐρασταὶ ἀναιροῦνται καὶ ἠχοῦσι πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ
φθονερῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς, πῶς οὖν ἂν οἱ αὐτῶν
ήγεισθαι ὕκουεῖν ἐν ναύταις που τεθραμμένων καὶ
οὐδένα ἐλεύθερον ἔρωτα ἔωρακότων, πόλλοι δ' ἃν

D
deίν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν ἃ φέγγομεν τὸν Ἔρωτα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡσώς νη Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτον γε τοῖνυν ἔγγυει αἰσχυνῷ-

μενος, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἔρωτα δεδώς, ἐπιθυμῶ

ποτίμῳ λόγῳ οἴδαν ἁλμυρὰν ἀκούν ἀποκλύσασθαι:

συμβουλεύω δὲ καὶ Δυσία ὅ τι τάχιστα γράψαι,
PHAEDRUS

since he was educated, he knew it and straightway he writes the poem:

"That saying is not true; thou didst not go within the well-oared ships, nor didst thou come to the walls of Troy";¹

and when he had written all the poem, which is called the recantation, he saw again at once. Now I will be wiser than they in just this point: before suffering any punishment for speaking ill of Love, I will try to atone by my recantation, with my head bare this time, not, as before, covered through shame.

PHAEDRUS. This indeed, Socrates, is the most delightful thing you could say.

SOCRATES. Just consider, my good Phaedrus, how shameless the two speeches were, both this of mine and the one you read out of the book. For if any man of noble and gentle nature, one who was himself in love with another of the same sort, or who had ever been loved by such a one, had happened to hear us saying that lovers take up violent enmity because of small matters and are jealously disposed and harmful to the beloved, don’t you think he would imagine he was listening to people brought up among low sailors, who had never seen a generous love? Would he not refuse utterly to assent to our censure of Love?

PHAEDRUS. I declare, Socrates, perhaps he would.

SOCRATES. I therefore, because I am ashamed at the thought of this man and am afraid of Love himself, wish to wash out the brine from my ears with the water of a sweet discourse. And I advise Lysias

¹ Fragment 32, Bergk.
ός χρη ἑραστῇ μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ ἔρωτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων χαρίζεσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἱσθι ὅτι ἐξει τοῦθ' οὖτωςοῦ γὰρ εἰπόντος τὸν τὸν ἑραστοῦ ἔπαινον, πᾶσα
Ε ἀνάγκη Λυσίαν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀναγκασθήναι γράψαι
αὐτὶ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν πιστεύω, ἐωςπερ ἂν ἦς
ὅς ἐς εἶ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε τοῖνυν θαρρῶν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ποῦ δὴ μοι ὁ παῖς πρὸς ὑπὸ ἔλεγον;
ίνα καὶ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀνήκουσιν φθάσῃ
χαρίσαμένος τῷ μῇ ἔρωτι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔτος παρὰ σοι μᾶλα πλησίον ἂεὶ
πάρεστιν, ὅταν σὺ βούλῃ.

22. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὔτωσι τοῖνυν, ὦ παῖ καλέ,
244 ἐννόησον, ὡς ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαίδρου
τοῦ Πυθοκλέους, Μυρμονουσίου ἄνδρος· ἤν δὲ
μέλλω λέγειν, Στησιχόρου τοῦ Εὐφήμου, Ἰμεραίου.
λεκτέος δὲ ὦδε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ἐτυμὸς λόγος,
δς ἂν παρόντος ἑραστοῦ τῷ μῇ ἔρωτι μᾶλλον φὴ
δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, διότι δὴ ὁ μὲν μαίνεται, ὁ δὲ
σωφρονεῖ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἄτπλοῦν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν
ἐίναι, καλῶς δὲν ἔλεγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίγνεται διὰ μανίας, θέια μὲντοι
dόσει διδομένης. ἢ τε γὰρ δὴ ἐν Δελφοῖς προ-

Β φήτις α'] τ' ἐν Δωδώνῃ ἱέρειαι μανεῖσαι μὲν πολλὰ
δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὴν Ἐλλάδα
eιργάσαντο, σωφρονοῦσαι δὲ βραχέα ἡ οὐδέν· καὶ
eὰν δὴ λέγωμεν. Σίβυλλάν τε καὶ ἄλλους, ὅσοι
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PHAEDRUS

also to write as soon as he can, that other things being equal, the lover should be favoured rather than the non-lover.

PHAEDRUS. Be assured that he will do so: for when you have spoken the praise of the lover, Lysias must of course be compelled by me to write another discourse on the same subject.

SOCRATES. I believe you, so long as you are what you are.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then without fear.

SOCRATES. Where is the youth to whom I was speaking? He must hear this also, lest if he do not hear it, he accept a non-lover before we can stop him.

PHAEDRUS. Here he is, always close at hand whenever you want him.

SOCRATES. Understand then, fair youth, that the former discourse was by Phaedrus, the son of Pythocles (Eager for Fame) of Myrrhinus (Myrrhtown); but this which I shall speak is by Stesichorus, son of Euphemus (Man of pious Speech) of Himera (Town of Desire). And I must say that this saying is not true, which teaches that when a lover is at hand the non-lover should be more favoured, because the lover is insane, and the other sane. For if it were a simple fact that insanity is an evil, the saying would be true; but in reality the greatest of blessings come to us through madness, when it is sent as a gift of the gods. For the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when they have been mad have conferred many splendid benefits upon Greece both in private and in public affairs, but few or none when they have been in their right minds; and if we should speak of the Sibyl and all the others who by pro-
μαντικὴ χρώμενοι ἐνθέφι πολλὰ δὴ πολλοῖς προ-λέγοντες εἰς τὸ μέλλον ὀρθωσαν, μὴ κύνοιμεν ἂν δὴ λα παντὶ λέγοντες· τόδε μὴν ἁξιον ἐπιμαρτύ-ρασθαί, ὅτι καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ τὰ ὄνομα τιθέμενοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦντο οὔτε ὀνειδὸς μανίαν.

C οὐ γὰρ ἂν τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἢ τὸ μέλλον κρίνε-ται, αὐτὸ τούτο τοῦνομα ἐμπλέκοντες μανικῆν ἐκάλεσαν· ἀλλ’ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος, ὅταν θεία μοίρα γίγνεται, οὐτω νομάσαντες ἔθεντο, οἱ δὲ νῦν ἀπειροκάλως τὸ ταῦ ἐπεμβάλλοντες μαντικῆν ἐκάλεσαν. ἑπεὶ καὶ τὴν γε τῶν ἐμφρόνων ζήτησιν τοῦ μέλλοντος διὰ τε ὀρυθὼν ποιομένων ¹ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σημείων, ἀτ’ ἐκ διανοιας ποριζομένων ἀνθρω-πίνη οἴσει νοῦν τε καὶ ἱστορίαν, οἰονοιστικὴν ἐπωνύμασαν, ἢν νῦν οἰωνιστικὴν τῷ ὁ σεμνύνοντες οἱ νέοι καλούσιν· ὅσφι δὴ οὐν τελεώτερον καὶ ἐν-τιμότερον μαντικὴ οἰωνιστικῆς, τὸ τε ὅνομα τοῦ ὄνοματος ἐργον τ’ ἐργον, τόσφω κάλλιον μαρτυ-ροῦσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ μανίαν ἑκατοσύνης τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ τῆς παρ’ ἀνθρώπων γεννομένης. ἀλλὰ μὴν νόσων γε καὶ πόνων τῶν μεγίστων, δι’ δὴ παλαιῶν ἐκ μηνιμάτων ποθὲν ἐν τούτων γενὼν, η μανία

D ἔγγενομένη καὶ προφητεύσασα οἰς ἔδει ἀπαλλαγήν εὑρετο, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχάς τε καὶ λατρείας, δύναν δὴ καθαρμῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν τυχοῦσα ἐξάντη ἐποίησε τὸν ἑαυτῆς ἐχοῦτα πρὸς

¹ Schanz brackets ποιομένων.
phetic inspiration have foretold many things to many persons and thereby made them fortunate afterwards, anyone can see that we should speak a long time. And it is worth while to adduce also the fact that those men of old who invented names thought that madness was neither shameful nor disgraceful; otherwise they would not have connected the very word mania with the noblest of arts, that which foretells the future, by calling it the manic art. No, they gave this name thinking that mania, when it comes by gift of the gods, is a noble thing, but nowadays people call prophecy the manic art, tastelessly inserting a T in the word. So also, when they gave a name to the investigation of the future which rational persons conduct through observation of birds and by other signs, since they furnish mind (nous) and information (historia) to human thought (oiesis) from the intellect (dianoia) they called it the oiono-istic (oioistike) art, which modern folk now call oinistic, making it more high-sounding by introducing the long O. The ancients, then testify that in proportion as prophecy (mantike) is superior to augury, both in name and in fact, in the same proportion madness, which comes from god, is superior to sanity, which is of human origin. Moreover, when diseases and the greatest troubles have been visited upon certain families through some ancient guilt, madness has entered in and by oracular power has found a way of release for those in need, taking refuge in prayers and the service of the gods, and so, by purifications and sacred rites, he who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time, and for him who is rightly possessed of

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II 2
PLATO

τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, ἀλλιώτερος μανέντε τε καὶ κατασχομένῳ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν εὐρομένῃ. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ Μουσῶν κατοκωχῆ τε καὶ μανία, λαβοῦσα ἀπαλῆς καὶ ἄσατον ψυχῆς, ἐγείρουσα καὶ ἐκβακχεύουσα κατὰ τε ἀδός καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ποίησιν, μυρία τῶν παλαίων ἔργα κοσμοῦσα τοὺς ἐπιγνωμονέους παίδευεί: ὃς δὲ ἂν ἄνευ μανίας Μουσῶν ἐπὶ ποιητικὰς θύρας ἀφίκηται, πεισθεὶς ὥς ἂρα ἐκ τέχνης ἰκανὸς ποιητής ἐσόμενος, ἀτελής αὐτὸς τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν μανιομένων ἡ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος ἡφανίσθη.

23. Τοσαῦτα μέντοι καὶ ἔτι πλεῖω ἡχώ μανίας γνωμομήνης ἀπὸ θεῶν λέγειν καλὰ ἔργα· ὡστε τούτῳ γε αὐτὸ μὴ φοβόμεθα, μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θεοῦ λεγείναι δεδιδόμενος, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεκινημένου τὸν σώφρονα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον ἀλλὰ τόδε πρὸς ἐκεῖνον δεῖξας φερέωσθο τὰ νικητῆρια, ὡς οὐκ ἔτ’ ὡφελία ὁ ἔρως τῷ ἔρωτι καὶ τῷ ἔρωμένῳ ἐκ θεῶν ἐπιπήμπτει. ἡμῖν δὲ ἀποδείκτέον αὐτοῦ τουπαντίον, ὡς ἔτ’ εὐτυχία τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἡ τοιαύτη μανία δίδοται· ἢ ὅτ’ ἂν ἀπόδειξις ἐσται δεινοῖς μὲν ἀπίστοις, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστῆ. δεῖ οὖν πρῶτον ψυχῆς φύσεως πέρι θείας τε καὶ ἀνθρωποτύπης ἐδόντα πάθη τε καὶ ἔργα τάλαθές νοῆσαι· ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀποδείξεως ἦδε.

24. Ψυχή πᾶσα ἄθανατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀεικύνητον ἄθανατον· τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ’ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παύλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παύλαν ἤχαι ζωῆς· μόνον δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν. ἄτε οὖν ἀπολείπτου ἑαυτῷ, οὐ τοτέ λήγει κινούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσα κινεῖται τούτῳ πηγῇ καὶ ἀρχῇ κινήσεως. ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἐξ ἄρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πάν τὸ

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madness a release from present ills is found. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.

All these noble results of inspired madness I can mention, and many more. Therefore let us not be afraid on that point, and let no one disturb and frighten us by saying that the reasonable friend should be preferred to him who is in a frenzy. Let him show in addition that love is not sent from heaven for the advantage of lover and beloved alike, and we will grant him the prize of victory. We, on our part, must prove that such madness is given by the gods for our greatest happiness; and our proof will not be believed by the merely clever, but will be accepted by the truly wise. First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows:

Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal; but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the
γεγονόμενοι γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ’ ἔξ ἐνός: εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἁρχῆ ἁγνυντο,¹ οὐκ ἀν ἔξ ἁρχῆ ἁγνυντο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἁγένητον ἔστιν, καὶ ἀδιάφορον αὐτὸ ἁνάγκη εἶναι. ἁρχῆς γὰρ δὴ ἄπολομένης οὔτε αὐτὴ ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὔτε ἀλλο ἔξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται, ἐπερ ἔξ ἁρχῆς δεῖ τὰ πάντα γίγνεσθαι. οὔτω δ’ ἁινήσεως μὲν ἁρχῆ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δὲ οὔτ’ ἀπολλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, Ε ἡ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσούσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν θεον κινηθέντα γενήσεται. ἀδανάτου δὲ πεφασμένου τοῦ υφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κινομένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε καὶ λόγον τοῦτον αὐτὸν τις λέγων οὐκ ἁισχυνεῖται. πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα, ὁ μὲν ἔξωθεν τὸ κινεῖσθαι, ἁγνυχων, ὃ δὲ ἐνδοθεῖν αὐτῷ ἔχει αὐτοῦ, ἐμψυχων, ὡς ταῦτης οὐσίας φύσεως ψυχῆς. εἰ δ’ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὔτως ἐχον, μὴ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν ἢ ψυχήν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἁγένητον τε καὶ ἀδανατον ψυχήν ἀν εἰη.

25. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἁδανασίας αὐτῆς ἰκανῶς: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἱδέας αὐτῆς ὡδε λεκτέον. οἴον μὲν ἐστι, πάντη πάντως θείας εἶναι καὶ μακρὰς διηγήσεως, ὃ δὲ ἐοικεν, ἄνθρωπίνης τε καὶ ἅλατουνος ταύτης οἰν λέγωμεν. ἐοικετῶ δὴ ἔμφυτω δυνάμει ὑποπτέρου ζεύγους τε καὶ ἦνιχον. θεῶν μὲν οὖν ὑποτε τε καὶ ἦνιχοι πάντες αὐτοῖ τε ἁγάθοι καὶ ἐξ ἁγαθῶν, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων μέμκται καὶ πρῶτον

¹ Schanz adds τοῦτο before οὐκ.
beginning is ungenerated. For everything that is
generated must be generated from a beginning, but the
beginning is not generated from anything; for if the
beginning were generated from anything, it would
not be generated from a beginning. And since it is
ungenerated, it must be also indestructible; for if the
beginning were destroyed, it could never be generated
from anything nor anything else from it, since all
things must be generated from a beginning. Thus that
which moves itself must be the beginning of motion.
And this can be neither destroyed nor generated,
otherwise all the heavens and all generation must
fall in ruin and stop and never again have any source
of motion or origin. But since that which is moved
by itself has been seen to be immortal, one who says
that this self-motion is the essence and the very idea
of the soul, will not be disgraced. For every body
which derives motion from without is soulless, but
that which has its motion within itself has a soul,
since that is the nature of the soul; but if this is
true,—that that which moves itself is nothing else
than the soul,—then the soul would necessarily be
ungenerated and immortal.

Concerning the immortality of the soul this is
enough; but about its form we must speak in the
following manner. To tell what it really is would be
a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse,
but it is within human power to describe it briefly in
a figure; let us therefore speak in that way. We will
liken the soul to the composite nature of a pair of
winged horses and a charioteer. Now the horses and
charioteers of the gods are all good and of good
descent, but those of other races are mixed; and first
μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ ἀρχων ξυνωρίδος ἡμοχεῖ, εἰτα τῶν ἱππῶν ὁ μὲν αὐτῷ καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐκ τουούτων, ὁ δὲ ἔξ ἐναντίων τε καὶ ἐναντίος· χαλεπῇ δὴ καὶ δύσκολος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ περὶ ἡμᾶς ἡμιο-χήσις. πῇ δὴ οὖν θυτην καὶ ἀθάνατον ζῷον ἐκλήθη, πειρατέων εἶπειν. πᾶσα ἡ ψυχὴ παντὸς ἐπιμελεῖται τοῦ ἀγόνου, πάντα δὲ οὐρανὸν περι-πολεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις εἴδεσι γιγνομένη τελέα

C

μὲν οὖν οὕσα καὶ ἐπτερωμένη μετεφοροπορεῖ τε καὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον διωκεῖ· ὡς δὲ στερεοῦ τινὸς ἀντιλάβηται, οὐ κατοικισθεῖσα, σῶμα γηίνον λαβοῦσα, αὐτὸ αὐτὸ δοκοῦν κινεῖν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνης δύναμιν, ζῷον τὸ ἕμπαν ἐκλήθη, ψυχή καὶ σῶμα παγέν, θυτην τ' ἐσχέν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀθάνατον δὲ οὖδ' ἐξ ἐνὸς λογοῦ λελογισμένου, ἀλλ' πλάττομεν οὕτε ἰδόντες

D

οὕτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες θεόν, ἀθάνατον τι ζῷον, ἐχον μὲν ψυχὴν, ἐχον δὲ σῶμα, τὸν ἀεὶ δὲ χρόνον ταύτα ξυμπεφυκότα. ἀλλ' ταύτα μὲν δή, ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ ἑχετω τε καὶ λεγέσθω τὴν δ' αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποβολῆς, δι' ἥν ψυχῆς ἀπορρεῖ, λάβωμεν. ἔστι δὲ τις τοιάδε.

26. Πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθές ἄγειν ἀνω μετεωρίζουσα, ἢ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος οἰκεῖ· κεκοιμώνηκε δὲ τῇ μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ θείου. ¹ τὸ δὲ θείον καλὸν, σοφὸν, ἀγαθόν, καὶ πάν ὁ τι τοιούτων τούτως δὴ τρέ-φεται τε καὶ αὐξεῖται μάλιστα γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα, αἰσχρῷ δὲ καὶ κακῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ²

¹ The word ψυχή, given in the MSS. after θείου, is omitted by Plutarch and most modern editors, including Schanz.
² Schanz omits καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις.

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the charioteer of the human soul drives a pair, and secondly one of the horses is noble and of noble breed, but the other quite the opposite in breed and character. Therefore in our case the driving is necessarily difficult and troublesome. Now we must try to tell why a living being is called mortal or immortal. Soul, considered collectively, has the care of all that which is soulless, and it traverses the whole heaven, appearing sometimes in one form and sometimes in another; now when it is perfect and fully winged, it mounts upward and governs the whole world; but the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compounded of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal. It is not immortal by any reasonable supposition, but we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an immortal being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. Let that, however, and our words concerning it, be as is pleasing to God; we will now consider the reason why the soul loses its wings. It is something like this.

The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods. More than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine. But the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and all such qualities; by these then the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, but by the opposite qualities, such as vileness and
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φθίνει τε καὶ διόλλυται. ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεύς, ἔλαινον πτηνόν ἁρμα, πρώτος πορεύεται, διακοσμῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος·

247 τῷ δὲ ἑπταίι στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, κατὰ ἐνδεκα μέρη κεκοσμημένη· μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν θεῶν οἶκῳ μόνη· τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δόσι τῶν τῶν δώδεκα ἀριθμῷ τεταγμένοι θεοὶ ἄρχοντες ἦγοῦνται κατὰ τάξιν ἢν ἐκαστὸς ἐτάχθη. πολλαὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ μακάριαι θέαί τε καὶ διέξοδοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, ὡς θεῶν γένος εὐδαιμόνων ἕπιστρέφεται, πράττον ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἑπταίι δὲ ὁ ἀεὶ ἔθελον τε καὶ δυνάμενοι· φθόνοις γὰρ ἔξω θεῖον χοροῦ ἴσταται· ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρὸς δαίτα καὶ ἐπὶ θοίνην

Β ἵσταται, ἀκραῖ ὑπὸ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἂνίδα πορεύονται 2 πρὸς ἀναντες· ἢ δὴ τὰ μὲν θεῶν ὀχήματα ἱσορρόπως εὐθὺς ὠντα ῥαδίως πορεύεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα μόγις· βρίθει γὰρ ὁ τής κάκης ἱππος μετέχων, ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἐπί τῷ τε καὶ ἀράσις, ὃς μὴ καλῶς ἢ τεθραμμένος τῶν Ἰπποχῶν· ἐνθα δὴ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγῶν ἐσχάτος πυχῆ πρόκειται. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀθάνατοι καλοῦμεναι, ἦς καὶ ἂν πρὸς ἀκραφ γένωνται, ἔξω πορευθεῖσαι ἐστησαν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νότῳ, στάσας δὲ αὐτὰς περίαγει ἡ περιφορά, αἱ δὲ ὑπερῳδός τα ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ.

27. Τὸν δὲ ὑπουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὑμνησε πτω τῶν τῇ ποιητῆς οὔτε ποτὲ ὑμνησει κατ’ ἀξίαν, ἔχει δὲ ὁδε. τολμητέου γὰρ οὖν τὸ γε ἀληθῆς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα. ἡ γὰρ ἀχρόματος τε καὶ ἀσκημάτιστος

1 Schanz reads εὐδαιμόνων.
2 Schanz brackets πορεύονται.
3 ἢ δὴ Proclus, followed by Burnet. ἢ δὴ BT Schanz et al.

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evil, they are wasted away and destroyed. Now the great leader in heaven, Zeus, driving a winged chariot, goes first, arranging all things and caring for all things. He is followed by an army of gods and spirits, arrayed in eleven squadrons; Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods. Of the rest, those who are included among the twelve great gods and are accounted leaders, are assigned each to his place in the army. There are many blessed sights and many ways hither and thither within the heaven, along which the blessed gods go to and fro attending each to his own duties; and whoever wishes, and is able, follows, for jealousy is excluded from the celestial band. But when they go to a feast and a banquet, they proceed steeply upward to the top of the vault of heaven, where the chariots of the gods, whose well matched horses obey the rein, advance easily, but the others with difficulty; for the horse of evil nature weighs the chariot down, making it heavy and pulling toward the earth the charioteer whose horse is not well trained. There the utmost toil and struggle await the soul. For those that are called immortal, when they reach the top, pass outside and take their place on the outer surface of the heaven, and when they have taken their stand, the revolution carries them round and they behold the things outside of the heaven.

But the region above the heaven was never worthily sung by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be. It is, however, as I shall tell; for I must dare to speak the truth, especially as truth is my theme. For the colourless, formless, and intangible truly
καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα ψυχής\(^1\) κυβερνήτη
mόνος θεατὴ νῦ, περὶ ἂν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς
D ἐπιστήμης γένος τοῦτον ἔχει τὴν τόπον. ἂτ\(^2\) οὖν
θεοῦ διάνοια νῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀκριβάτφ τρεφο-
μένη καὶ ἀπάσης ψυχῆς, ὄση ἄν μέλη τὸ προσ-
ήκον δέξεσθαι,\(^3\) ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ἄγαπα
τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τὰληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ,
ἐὼς ἆν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορά εἰς ταῦτον περιενέγκη-
ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾶ μὲν αὐτήν δικαιοσύνην,
καθορὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορὰ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ
ἡ γένεσις προσετην, οὔτ' ἡ ἐστίν που ἔτέρα ἐν
E ἔτερῳ οὐσα ὃ ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντως καλοῦμεν, ἄλλα
τὴν ἐν τῷ ὃ ἔστιν ὃν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὔσαν· καὶ
τάλλα ὀσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ
ἐσπιαθείσα, δύσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ,
οίκαδε ἦλθεν, ἐλθοῦσα δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡμίχος πρὸς
τὴν φάτνη τοῦ ἵππους στήσας παρέβαλεν ἀμ-
βροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὴ νεκταρ ἐπότισεν.

28. Καὶ οὗτος μὲν θεῶν βίος· αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ψυ-

248 χαί, ἡ μὲν ἄριστα θεῷ ἐπομένη καὶ εἰκασμένη
ὑπερήφοιν εἰς τὸν ἐξω τόπον τὴν τοῦ ἡμίχου
κεφαλὴν, καὶ συμπεριπνέχθη τὴν περιφοράν, θορυ-
βομένη ὑπὸ τῶν ἵππων καὶ μόγις καθορῶσα τα
όντα· ἡ δὲ τοτὲ μὲν ἢρε, τοτὲ δ' ἐδυ, βιαζομένων
δὲ τῶν ἵππων τὰ μὲν εἰδεν, τὰ δ' οὐ· αἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλαι
γλειχόμεναι μὲν ἀπασα τοῦ ἄνω ἔτονται, ἀδυ-
νατοῦσαι δὲ ὑποβρύχια ἀκμαπεριφεροῦνται, πα-
B τούσα ἄλλιλας καὶ ἐπιβάλλουσαι, ἐτέρα πρὸ τῆς

1 ψυχή οὐσα B οὐσα ψυχῆς T. οὐσα Madvig, Schanz.
2 ἂτ' BT ἦ τ' Heindorf, Schanz.
3 καὶ ἀπάσης . . . δέξεσθαι bracketed by Schanz, following
Suckow.
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existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul. Now the divine intelligence, since it is nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it, rejoices in seeing reality for a space of time and by gazing upon truth is nourished and made happy until the revolution brings it again to the same place. In the revolution it beholds absolute justice, temperance, and knowledge, not such knowledge as has a beginning and varies as it is associated with one or another of the things we call realities, but that which abides in the real eternal absolute; and in the same way it beholds and feeds upon the other eternal verities, after which, passing down again within the heaven, it goes home, and there the charioteer puts up the horses at the manger and feeds them with ambrosia and then gives them nectar to drink.

Such is the life of the gods; but of the other souls, that which best follows after God and is most like him, raises the head of the charioteer up into the outer region and is carried round in the revolution, troubled by the horses and hardly beholding the realities; and another sometimes rises and sometimes sinks, and, because its horses are unruly, it sees some things and fails to see others. The other souls follow after, all yearning for the upper region but unable to reach it, and are carried round beneath, trampling upon and colliding with one another, each
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έτερας πειρωμένη γενέσθαι. θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἀμιλλα καὶ ἱδρός ἐσχατος γίγνεται, οὐ δὴ κακία ἡμῶν. πολλαὶ μὲν χωλεύουνται, πολλαὶ δὲ πολλὰ πτερὰ θραύςται: πᾶσαι δὲ πολλοὶ ἔχουσαι πόνον ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ἀντίος θέας ἀπέρχονται, καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῇ χρώνται. οὐ δὲ ένεχ' ἡ πολλῇ σπουδῇ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὐ̂' ἔστιν, ἡ τε δὴ προσήκονσα ψυχής τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεί λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὖσα, ἢ τε τοῦ τετεροὶ φύσις, ὃ ψυχὴ κοινὰς ἐστὶν τούτῳ τρέφων θεσμὸς τε Ἀδραστείας ἀδε, ἢτις ἄν ψυχὴ θεῶ ἕνωσανάδος γενομένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τε τῆς ἐτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα, καὶ ἄει τούτῳ δύνηται ποιεῖν, ἂς ἀβλαβὴ εἶναι. οὕτω δὲ ἄδυνατής αὐτῇ ἐνεπεσθαί μὴ ἕνα, καί τινι συντυχίᾳ χρησιμένη λήθης τε καὶ κακίας πληγοθείς ἐπερορρυθής τε καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν γην πέσθ' τοῦτο τὸ πάντων μη̂

D φυτεύεις εἰς μηδεμίαν θηρείουν φύσιν ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν πλεῖστα ἰδούσαν εἰς γονὴν ἀνδρὸς γεννησμένου φιλοσοφόου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τυνὸς καὶ ἔρωτικοῦ, τῇ δὲ δευτέραι καὶ βασιλέως ἐννόμον ἢ πολεμικοῦ καὶ ἄρχικοῦ, τρίτην εἰς πολιτικοῦ καὶ τινὸς οικονομικοῦ ἢ χρηματιστικοῦ, τετάρτην εἰς φιλοτύπου γυμναστικοῦ ἢ περὶ σώματος ἰασίν τινος ἐσωμένου, πέμπτην Ε μαντικὸν βίον ἢ τίνα τελεστικόν ἔξουσαν· ἐκτε νοητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησιν τὸς ἀλὸς ἀρμὸσε, ἐβδόμη δημιουργικὸς ἢ γεωργικὸς, ὁγδῷ σοφιστικὸς ἢ δημοτικὸς, ἐννάτῃ τυραννικὸς.

1 οὐ is omitted by Schanz, following Madvig.
striving to pass its neighbour. So there is the greatest confusion and sweat of rivalry, wherein many are lamed, and many wings are broken through the incompetence of the drivers; and after much toil they all go away without gaining a view of reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion. But the reason of the great eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, lies in the fact that the fitting pasturage for the best part of the soul is in the meadow there, and the wing on which the soul is raised up is nourished by this. And this is a law of Destiny, that the soul which follows after God and obtains a view of any of the truths is free from harm until the next period, and if it can always attain this, is always unharmed; but when, through inability to follow, it fails to see, and through some mischance is filled with forgetfulness and evil and grows heavy, and when it has grown heavy, loses its wings and falls to the earth, then it is the law that this soul shall never pass into any beast at its first birth, but the soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature, and the second soul into that of a lawful king or a warlike ruler, and the third into that of a politician or a man of business or a financier, the fourth into that of a hard-working gymnast or one who will be concerned with the cure of the body, and the fifth will lead the life of a prophet or someone who conducts mystic rites; to the sixth, a poet or some other imitative artist will be united, to the seventh, a craftsman or a husbandman, to the eighth, a sophist or a demagogue, to the ninth, a tyrant.
29. Ἡ δὲ τοῦτος ἅπασιν δὲ μὲν ἀν δικαίως διαγάγῃ, ἀμείνονος μοῖρας μεταλαμβάνει, δὲ δὲ ἀν ἀδίκως, χείρονος. εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ οἴκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκάστη σὺκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων· οὐ γὰρ πτερωταί πρὸ τοσοῦτον χρόνου, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἡ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας· αὕται δὲ τρίτη περιόδῳ τῇ χιλιετεί, ἐὰν ἐλωνται τρὶς ἐφεξῆς τὸν βίον τοῦτον, οὔτω πτερωθεῖσαι τρισχιλιστὸ ἐτεί ἀπέρχονται· αἱ δὲ άλλαι, ὅταν τὸν πρώτον βίον τελευτήσωσι, κρί- σεως ἐτυχον, κρίθεσαι δὲ αἰ μὲν εἰς τὰ υπὸ γῆς δικαιωτῆρα ἔθοσον δίκην ἐκτίνουσιν, αἱ δὲ εἰς

B τούρανον τινὰ τόπον ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης κοφισθεῖσαι διάγονους ἅξιοι οὐ ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει ἐβίωσαν βίοιν· τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀμφότεραι ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλῆρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίον αἱροῦνται δὲν ἄν ἐθέλη ἐκάστῃ ἐνθα καὶ εἰς θηρίον· βίον ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ἐκ θηρίου, ὅς ποτε ἀνθρωπος ἦν, πάλιν εἰς ἀνθρωπον. οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε μὴ ποτε ἰδοὺσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰς τόδε ἦξει τὸ σχῆμα. δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρωπον ξυμιέναι κατ᾿ 1 εἰδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν

C λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. 2 τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνά- μνησις ἑκένων, ἢ ποτ᾿ εἴδει ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμ- πορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ υπεριδοῦσα ἀ νῦν εἶναι φάμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄντως. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτερωταί ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ ἑκένως ἀεὶ ἐστὶν μνήμη κατὰ δύναμιν, πρὸς

1 Schanz inserts τὸ after κατ᾿.
2 Schanz, following Heindorf, reads ξυναιρούμενον.
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Now in all these states, whoever lives justly obtains a better lot, and whoever lives unjustly, a worse. For each soul returns to the place whence it came in ten thousand years; for it does not regain its wings before that time has elapsed, except the soul of him who has been a guileless philosopher or a philosophical lover; these, when for three successive periods of a thousand years they have chosen such a life, after the third period of a thousand years become winged in the three thousandth year and go their way; but the rest, when they have finished their first life, receive judgment, and after the judgment some go to the places of correction under the earth and pay their penalty, while the others, made light and raised up into a heavenly place by justice, live in a manner worthy of the life they led in human form. But in the thousandth year both come to draw lots and choose their second life, each choosing whatever it wishes. Then a human soul may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man. For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses; and this is a recollection of those things which our soul once beheld, when it journeyed with God and, lifting its vision above the things which we now say exist, rose up into real being. And therefore it is just that the mind of the philosopher only has wings, for he is always, so far as he is able, in communion through memory with those things
οίσπερ θεός ὃν θείος ἔστιν. τοῖς δὲ δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ υπομνήμασιν ὅρθως χρώμενος, τελέος ἀεὶ τελετάς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται.

D εξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γυγόμενος νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθε τοὺς πολλούς.

30. Ἐστιν δὴ οὖν δεύορ ὁ πᾶς ἦκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίας, ἢν ὅταν τὸ τῇδε τις ὅρων κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναμμυνομένους, πτερὼταὶ τε καὶ ἀναπτερούμενος προθυμούμενος ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δὲ, ὀρνιθὸς δίκην βλέπων ἀνώ, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀμελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μανικῶς

Ε διακείμενοι· ὡς ἄρα αὐτὴ πασῶν τῶν ἐνθουσιάσεων ἀρίστη τε καὶ ἐξ ἀρίστων τῷ τε ἔχοντι καὶ τῷ κοινωνοῦντι αὐτῆς γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ταύτης μετέχων τῆς μανίας ὁ ἔρως τῶν καλῶν ἔρασθης καλεῖται. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰρηται, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχή φύσει τεθέαται τὰ ὄντα, ἢ οὐκ ἂν

250 ἤλθεν εἰς τόδε τὸ ξύλον, ἀναμμυνόμενος δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖνα οὕτως ἀπάσῃ, οὕτε ὅσοι βραχέως εἶδον τότε τάκεῖ, οὕτε αὖ δεύορ πεσοῦσαι ἐνυστύχησαν, ὡστε ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμιλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδικον τραπόμεναι λήθην ὅν τότε εἶδον ἀερῶν ἔχειν. ὅλγαι δὴ λείπονται, αἰς τὸ τῆς μνήμης ἰκανῶς πάρεστιν. αὐται δὲ, ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμοίωμα ἰδωσιν, ἐκπλήττονται καὶ οὐκ ὅθ' αὐτῶν γίγνον-

1 Schanz omits τε καὶ.
the communion with which causes God to be divine. Now a man who employs such memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly perfect; but since he separates himself from human interests and turns his attention toward the divine, he is rebuked by the vulgar, who consider him mad and do not know that he is inspired.

All my discourse so far has been about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and neglects the things below. My discourse has shown that this is, of all inspirations, the best and of the highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it, and that he who loves the beautiful, partaking in this madness, is called a lover. For, as has been said, every soul of man has by the law of nature beheld the realities, otherwise it would not have entered into a human being, but it is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities, either for those which had but a brief view of them at that earlier time, or for those which, after falling to earth, were so unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some evil communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once saw. Few then are left which retain an adequate recollection of them; but these when they see here any likeness of the things of that other world, are stricken with amazement and can no longer control themselves; but they do not
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tai, ὃ ἦστι τὸ πάθος ἀγνοούσιν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἱκανῶς
diaisathánesthai. δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν καὶ σωφρο-
sύνης, καὶ ὁσα ἀλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς, οὐκ ἔνεστι
fégygos οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῆς ὁμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δὴ
ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτών καὶ ὅλγοι ἐπὶ τὰς
εἰκόνας ἱόντες θεώτοι τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος.
κάλλος δὲ τοῦ ἦν ἱδεῖν λαμπρόν, ὅτε σὺν εὐ-
δαίμονι χορῷ μακράν ὅψιν τε καὶ θέαν, ἐπόμενοι
μετὰ μὲν Δίως ἡμεῖς, ἀλλοι δὲ μετ’ ἀλλού θεῶν,
eἰδὸν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἦν θέμις

C

λέγειν μακαριωτάτην, ἥν ὠργιάζομεν ὀλόκληροι
μὲν αὐτοὶ ὄντες καὶ ἄπαθεῖς κακῶν, ὡσα ἡμᾶς ἐν
ὕστερον χρόνῳ ὑπέμενεν, ὀλόκληρα δὲ καὶ ἀπλὰ
καὶ ἄτρεμη καὶ εὐδαίμονα φάσματα μνοῦμενοι τε
καὶ ἐποπτεύοντες ἐν αὐγῇ καθαρᾷ, καθαροὶ ὄντες
καὶ ἀσήμαντοι τούτων, δὲ νῦν σῶμα περιφέροντες
ὀνομάζομεν, ἀστρέου τρόπον δεδεσμευμένοι.

31. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμη κεχαρίσθω, δι’ ἦν
πόθῳ τῶν τοτε νῦν μακρότερα εἵρηται· περὶ δὲ

D

κάλλους, ἄσπερ εἴπομεν, μετ’ ἐκείνων τε ἐλαμπεν
ὅν, δεύρο τ’ ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς
ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στύλβων
ἐναργέστατα. ὡς γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ
σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ἡ φύσεις τοῖς
ἀράται—δεινοὶ γὰρ ἄν παρεῖχεν έρωτας, εἰ τι
τοιοῦτον ἐαυτῆς ἑναργεῖς εἰδωλον παρείχετο εἰς
ὅψιν ἰόν—καὶ τάλλα ὁσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος
μόνον ταύτην ἐσχε μοιραν, ὡστ’ ἐκφανέστατον

E

eίναι καὶ ἑρασμωτάτον. ὁ μὲν οὖν μὴ νεοτελῆς ἦ

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understand their condition, because they do not clearly perceive. Now in the earthly copies of justice and temperance and the other ideas which are precious to souls there is no light, but only a few, approaching the images through the darkling organs of sense, behold in them the nature of that which they imitate, and these few do this with difficulty. But at that former time they saw beauty shining in brightness, when, with a blessed company—we following in the train of Zeus, and others in that of some other god—they saw the blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that which is rightly called the most blessed of mysteries, which we celebrated in a state of perfection, when we were without experience of the evils which awaited us in the time to come, being permitted as initiates to the sight of perfect and simple and calm and happy apparitions, which we saw in the pure light, being ourselves pure and not entombed in this which we carry about with us and call the body, in which we are imprisoned like an oyster in its shell.

So much, then, in honour of memory, on account of which I have now spoken at some length, through yearning for the joys of that other time. But beauty, as I said before, shone in brilliance among those visions; and since we came to earth we have found it shining most clearly through the clearest of our senses; for sight is the sharpest of the physical senses, though wisdom is not seen by it, for wisdom would arouse terrible love, if such a clear image of it were granted as would come through sight, and the same is true of the other lovely realities; but beauty alone has this privilege, and therefore it is most clearly seen and loveliest.
PLATO

διεφθαρμένος οὖν ὧξεως ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φέρεται πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος, θεώμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν τῆς ἐπωνυμίαν, ὥστε οὐ σέβεται προσορῶν, ἀλλ' ἦδονὴ παραδοὺς τετράποδος νόμον βαίνειν ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ παιδοστορεῖν, καὶ ὑβρεῖ προσομιλῶν οὐ δέδοικεν οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται παρὰ φύσιν ἦδονὴν διώκον· ὁ δὲ ἄρτιτελής, ὁ τῶν τότε πολυθεάμων, ὅταν θεοειδῆς πρόσωπον ἴδῃ κάλλος εὖ μεμιμημένον ἢ τίνα σώματος ἴδεαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἐφριξεν καὶ τὶ τῶν τότε ὑπῆλθεν αὐτὸν δειμάτων, εἶτα προσορῶν ὡς θεοῦ σέβεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ Ἰδείει τὴν τῆς σφόδρα μανίας δόξαν, θύσιν ἄν ὡς ἀγάλματι καὶ θεῷ τοῖς παιδικοῖς. ἴδοντα δ' αὐτὸν οἶον ἐκ τῆς φύσεως μεταβολή τε καὶ ἴδρως καὶ θερμότης ἄλθει B. λαμβάνει. δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροήν διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων ἑθερμανθῆ, ἥ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται,1 θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκῃ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμφυκότα εἰργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυήσισι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ὡδησὲ τε καὶ ὀρμησε φύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ῥίξης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πάν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδως· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτὴ. 32. Ζεὶ σὺν ἐν τοῦτῳ ὅλῃ καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ C ὁπερ τὸ τῶν ὁδουτοφυοῦντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται, ὅταν ἄρτι φύσιν, κυνής τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὐλὰ, ταυτὸν δὴ πέποιθεν ἢ τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχῆς ζεὶ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά. ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς

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1 Schanz brackets ή ... ἄρδεται.
PHAEDRUS

Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, does not quickly rise from this world to that other world and to absolute beauty when he sees its namesake here, and so he does not revere it when he looks upon it, but gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to lust and begetting; he makes licence his companion and is not afraid or ashamed to pursue pleasure in violation of nature. But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a god-like face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a god. And as he looks upon him, a reaction from his shuddering comes over him, with sweat and unwonted heat; for as the effluence of beauty enters him through the eyes, he is warmed; the effluence moistens the germ of the feathers, and as he grows warm, the parts from which the feathers grow, which were before hard and choked, and prevented the feathers from sprouting, become soft, and as the nourishment streams upon him, the quills of the feathers swell and begin to grow from the roots over all the form of the soul; for it was once all feathered.

Now in this process the whole soul throbs and palpitates, and as in those who are cutting teeth there is an irritation and discomfort in the gums, when the teeth begin to grow, just so the soul suffers when the growth of the feathers begins; it is feverish and is uncomfortable and itches when they begin to grow. Then when it gazes upon the beauty of the boy and
κάλλος εκείθεν μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ βέοντ’, ἀ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἵμερος καλεῖται, δεχομένην άρδηται τε καὶ θερμαίνηται, λωφῆ τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν· ὅταν δὲ χωρὶς γένηται καὶ αὐχμήση, τὰ τῶν διεξόδων στόματα, ἢ τὸ πτερόν ὀρμᾶ, συναναινώμενα μύσατα ἀποκλῆσε τὴν βλάστησιν τοῦ πτεροῦ, ἢ δ’ ἐντὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἵμερου ἀποκεκλημένη, πηδῶσα οἶνον τὰ σφύξοντα, τῇ διεξόδῳ ἐγχρεῖ ἐκάστη τῇ καθ’ αὐτῆν, ὡστε πᾶσα κεντουμένη κύκλῳ ἢ ψυχὴ οἰστρᾶ καὶ ὀδυνᾶται: μνήμην δ’ αὖ ἔχουσα τοῦ καλοῦ γέγηθεν. ἐκ δ’ ἀμφοτέρων μεμιγμένων ἐδημονεῖ τε τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀποροῦσα λυτᾶ, καὶ ἐμμανῆς οὐσα οὔτε νυκτὸς δύναται καθεύδειν οὔτε μεθ’ ἑμέραν οὐ ἂν ἢ μένειν, θεὶ δὲ ποθοῦσα, ὅπου ἂν οἴηται ὅψεσθαι τὸν ἔχουσα τὸ κάλλος· ἴδοὺσα δέ καὶ ἐποχετευσεμένη ἵμερον ἐλυσε μὲν τὰ τότε συμπεφραγμένα, ἀναπνοὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα κέντρων τε καὶ ὠδίνων ἔληξεν, ἤδουν δ’ 252 αὖ ταῦτην γλυκυτάτην ἐν τῷ παρόντι καρποῦται. οὖν ἂν ἔκουσα εἶναι νῦν ἀπολείπεται, οὐδέ τινα τοῦ καλοῦ περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται, ἀλλὰ μητέρων τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν καὶ ἐταῖρων πάντων λέληθαι, καὶ οὐσίας δ’ ἀμέλειαν ἀπολλυμένης παρ’ οὐδὲν τίθεται, νομίμων δὲ καὶ εὐσχημόνων, οἷς πρὸ τοῦ ἐκαλλωπίζετο, πάντων καταφρονήσασα δουλεύων ἐτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἐ’ τις ἐγχυτάτω τοῦ πόθου· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχουντα ἰατρόν ήὕρηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόλων.

1 After δεχομένη the best MSS. read τὸν ἵμερον. Schanz follows Stallbaum in omitting it.
PHAEDRUS

receives the particles which flow thence to it (for which reason they are called yearning), it is moistened and warmed, ceases from its pain and is filled with joy; but when it is alone and grows dry, the mouths of the passages in which the feathers begin to grow become dry and close up, shutting in the sprouting feathers, and the sprouts within, shut in with the yearning, throb like pulsing arteries, and each sprout pricks the passage in which it is, so that the whole soul, stung in every part, rages with pain; and then again, remembering the beautiful one, it rejoices. So, because of these two mingled sensations, it is greatly troubled by its strange condition; it is perplexed and maddened, and in its madness it cannot sleep at night or stay in any one place by day, but it is filled with longing and hastens wherever it hopes to see the beautiful one. And when it sees him and is bathed with the waters of yearning, the passages that were sealed are opened, the soul has respite from the stings and is eased of its pain, and this pleasure which it enjoys is the sweetest of pleasures at the time. Therefore the soul will not, if it can help it, be left alone by the beautiful one, but esteems him above all others, forgets for him mother and brothers and all friends, neglects property and cares not for its loss, and despising all the customs and proprieties in which it formerly took pride, it is ready to be a slave and to sleep wherever it is allowed, as near as possible to the beloved; for it not only reveres him who possesses beauty, but finds in him the only healer of its greatest woes. Now this

1 The play on the words μέρη and ῥυήρος cannot be rendered accurately in English. Jowett approaches a rendering by the use of the words motion and emotion, but emotion is too weak a word for ῥυήρος.
τούτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὦ παῖ καλέ, πρὸς ὃν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος, ἄνθρωποι μὲν Ἕρωτα ὄνομάζουσιν, θεὸς δὲ ὁ καλοῦσιν ἀκούσας εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάσει. λέγουσι δὲ, οἶμαι, τινὲς Ὁμηριδῶν ἐκ τῶν ἀποθέτων ἐπὶ δύο ἔπη εἰς τὸν Ἕρωτα, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τὸ ἐτερον ὑβριστικὸν πάνυ καὶ οὐ σφόδρα τι ἐμμετρον ὑμνοῦσι δὲ ὁρὐ.

C
tὸν δ᾽ ἦτοι θνητοὶ μὲν Ἕρωτα καλοῦσι ποτηνόν, ἀθάνατοι δὲ Πτέρωτα, διὰ πτεροφύτορ ἀνάγκην.

tούτοις δὴ ἔξεστι μὲν πείθεσθαι, ἔξεστιν δὲ μὴ ὁμώς δὲ ἢ γε αἰτία καὶ τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐρώτων τούτο ἐκεῖνο τυγχάνει ὧν.

33. Τῶν μὲν οὖν Διὸς ὁπαδῶν ὁ λῃσθεὶς ἐμβρέθεστερον δύναται φέρειν τὸ τοῦ πτερωνύμου ἁχθὸς. ὁποὶ δὲ Ἀρεώς τε θεραπευταλ καὶ μετ' ἐκείνου περιεπόλουν, ὅταν ὑπ᾽ Ἕρωτος ἀλώσιν καὶ τι οἰηθῶσιν ἀδικείσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐρωμένου, φοινικὸ καὶ ἐτοιμοὶ καθιερεύειν αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὰ παιδικά.

D
cαλ καὶ οὕτω καθ᾽ ἐκαστόν θεόν, οὐ ἐκαστος ἢν χορευτής, ἐκείνον τιμῶν τε καὶ μιμούμενος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ζη, ἐως ἂν ἢ ἀδιάφθορος, καὶ τὴν τῇ στρώ-
tην γένεσιν βιοτεῦ, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ πρὸς τε 
τούς ἐρωμένους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὀμίλει τε καὶ 
προσφέρεται. τὸν τε οὖν Ἕρωτα τῶν καλῶν πρὸς 
τρόπων ἐκλέγεται ἐκαστός, καὶ ὡς θεὸν αὐτὸν 
ἐκεῖνον ὑμα ἐαυτῷ οἶον ἄγαλμα τεκταίνεται τε 
καὶ κατακοσμεῖ, ὡς τιμήσων τε καὶ ὀργίασων. οἱ 
μὲν δὴ οὖν Διὸς διὸν τιμα εἶναι ξητοῦσι τὴν 
ψυχήν τῶν ὑφί αὐτῶν ἐρωμένου σκοποῦσιν οὖν, 
εἰ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ἡγεμονικὸς τὴν φύσιν, καὶ 
ὁταν αὐτῶν εὐρόντες ἔρασθώσι, πᾶν πουοῦσιν ὅπως

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PHAEDRUS

condition, fair boy, about which I am speaking, is called Love by men, but when you hear what the gods call it, perhaps because of your youth you will laugh. But some of the Homeridae, I believe, repeat two verses on Love from the spurious poems of Homer, one of which is very outrageous and not perfectly metrical. They sing them as follows:

"Mortals call him winged Love, but the immortals call him The Winged One, because he must needs grow wings."

You may believe this, or not; but the condition of lovers and the cause of it are just as I have said.

Now he who is a follower of Zeus, when seized by Love can bear a heavier burden of the winged god; but those who are servants of Ares and followed in his train, when they have been seized by Love and think they have been wronged in any way by the beloved, become murderous and are ready to sacrifice themselves and the beloved. And so it is with the follower of each of the other gods; he lives, so far as he is able, honouring and imitating that god, so long as he is uncorrupted, and is living his first life on earth, and in that way he behaves and conducts himself toward his beloved and toward all others. Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honour and worship him. The followers of Zeus desire that the soul of him whom they love be like Zeus; so they seek for one of philosophical and lordly nature, and when they find him and love him, they do all they can to give him such a character.
τοιοῦτος ἔσται. ἐὰν οὖν μὴ πρότερον ἐμβεβέλωσι τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι, τότε ἐπιχειρήσαντες μανθάνουσί τε θευν ἃν τι δύνωνται καὶ αὐτοὶ μετέρχονται, ἰχνεύοντες δὲ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἡμαγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοὺ τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνθουσιώτες ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχείν καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν ἑρωμένον αἰτιώμενον ἐτει τε μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ἕκ Διὸς ἀρύτωσιν, ὡσπερ αἱ βάκχαι, ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἑρωμένου ψυχῆς ἐπαντλούντες ποιοῦσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ὁμοίοτατον τῷ σφετέρῳ θεῷ.

Β ὅσοι δ' αὖ μεθ' Ἡρας εἵποντο, βασιλικὸν ξητοῦσι, καὶ εὐρόντες περὶ τούτων πάντα δρώσιν τὰ αὐτά. οἱ δὲ Ἀπόλλωνός τε καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν θεῶν οὕτω κατὰ τὸν θεὸν ἱόντες ξητοῦσι τὸν σφετέρον παιδα πεφυκέναι, καὶ ὅταν κτῆσωνται, μμούμενοι αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδικὰ πείθουντες καὶ ῥυθμίζουντες εἰς τὸ ἔκεινον ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ ἰδέαν ἁγουσιν, ὡς ἕκαστῳ δύναμις, ὡς φθορὶ συὸς ἀνελευθέρωσιν δυσμενεία χρώμενοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁμοίοτητα

C αὐτοῖς τῷ θεῷ, δὲν ἰν τιμῶσι, πάσαν πάντως ὑ τι μάλιστα πειράμαντο ἄγειν οὕτω ποιοῦσι. προθυμία μὲν οὖν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἑρώτων καὶ τελετῆ, εἶν γε διαπράξονται ὁ προθυμοῦνται ἣ λέγω, οὕτω καλῆ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δ' ἔρωτα

1 Schanz, following Madvig, reads χαῦ.
PHAEDRUS

If they have not previously had experience, they learn then from all who can teach them anything; they seek after information themselves, and when they search eagerly within themselves to find the nature of their god, they are successful, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in God. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god. And those who followed after Hera seek a kingly nature, and when they have found such an one, they act in a corresponding manner toward him in all respects; and likewise the followers of Apollo, and of each of the gods, go out and seek for their beloved a youth whose nature accords with that of the god, and when they have gained his affection, by imitating the god themselves and by persuasion and education they lead the beloved to the conduct and nature of the god, so far as each of them can do so; they exhibit no jealousy or meanness toward the loved one, but endeavour by every means in their power to lead him to the likeness of the god whom they honour. Thus the desire of the true lovers, and the initiation into the mysteries of love, which they teach, if they accomplish what they desire in the way I describe, is beautiful and brings happiness from the inspired lover to the loved one, if he be captured; and the
μανέντος φίλου τῷ φιληθέντι γίγνεται, εάν αἱρεθῇ ἀλίσκεται δὲ δὴ ὁ αἱρεθεῖς τοῦ δρόμῳ.

34. Καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τούδε τοῦ μύθου τριχή διειλόμην ψυχήν ἐκάστην, ἵσπομόρφω μὲν δύο τινες εἰδή, ἦνιοχικὸν δὲ εἶδος τρίτον, καὶ νῦν ἐτί ἤμων ταῦτα μενετω. τῶν δὲ δὴ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν, φαμέν, ἀγαθός, ὁ δ' οὖ ἁρετή δὲ τίς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διεῖσανεν, νῦν δὲ λεκτέον. ὁ μὲν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ καλλίστῃ στάσει δὴ τὸ τε εἶδος ὅρθος καὶ διηρθώμενος, ὑπανήκη, ἑπίγρυπος, λευκός ἰδεῖν, μελανόμματος, τιμής ἐραστής μετὰ σωφροσύνης τε καὶ αἰδοῦς, καὶ ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἐταῖρος, ἄπληκτος, κελεύματι μόνον καὶ λόγῳ ἦνιοχεῖται.

ὁ δ' αὐθεντίος, πολύς, ἐκῆ δυσμπερημένου, κράτεραύχην, βραχυτράχηλος, σιμοστρόσωπος, μελάγχρως, γλαυκόμματος, ὑφαίμος, ὑβρεώς καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος, περὶ δ' ὅτα λάσιος, κωφός, μάστυγι μετὰ κέντρων μόνως ὑπείκων. ὅταν δ' οὖν ὁ ἦνιοχὸς ἰδίων τὸ ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα, πάσαν αἰσθήσεις διαθερμήνας τὴν ψυχὴν, γαργαλισμοῦ τε καὶ πόθου κέντρων ὑποπλησθῇ, ὁ μὲν εὐπειθής τῷ ἦνιοχῷ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀεί τε καὶ τότε αἰδοὶ βιαξόμενος, ἐαυτὸς κατέχει μὴ ἐπιτηδέαν τῷ ἐρωμένῳ. ὁ δὲ οὕτω κέντρων ἦνιοχικῶν οὕτως μάστυγος ἔτι ἑντρέπεται, σκιρτῶν δὲ βία φέρεται, καὶ πάντα πράγματα παρέχον τῷ σύζυγῳ τε καὶ ἦνιοχῳ ἀναγκάζει ἑναὶ τε πρὸς τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ μενειν ποιεῖσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος. τῷ δ' ἄρχας μὲν ἀντιτιθετον ἄγαμακτούντε, ὡς

B δεινὰ καὶ παράνομα ἄναγκαζομένω τελευτώντες δὲ, ὅταν μηδέν ἢ πέρας κακοῦ, πορεύεσθον

1 Schanz brackets ὁ αἱρεθεῖς, following Badham.
PHAEDRUS

fair one who is captured is caught in the following manner:

In the beginning of this tale I divided each soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this division. Now of the horses we say one is good and the other bad; but we did not define what the goodness of the one and the badness of the other was. That we must now do. The horse that stands at the right hand is upright and has clean limbs; he carries his neck high, has an aquiline nose, is white in colour, and has dark eyes; he is a friend of honour joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory; he needs no whip, but is guided only by the word of command and by reason. The other, however, is crooked, heavy, ill put together, his neck is short and thick, his nose flat, his colour dark, his eyes grey and bloodshot; he is the friend of insolence and pride, is shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs. Now when the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul is warmed by the sight, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse that is obedient to the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and to the charioteer, and forcing them to approach the beloved and propose the joys of love. And they at first pull back indignantly and will not be forced to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but finally, as the trouble has no
PLATO

ἀγομένω, εἶξαντε καὶ ὁμολογήσαντε ποιήσειν τὸ κελευόμενον. καὶ πρὸς αὐτῷ τ’ ἐγένοντο καὶ εἶδον τὴν ὅψιν τὴν τῶν παιδικῶν ἀστράπτουσαν.

35. Ἡδοντος δὲ τοῦ ἴνιόχου ἡ μνήμη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κάλλους φύσιν ἴνεχθη, καὶ πάλιν εἶδεν αὐτὴν μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἐν ἀγνῷ βάθρῳ βεβώσαν. ἰδοὺ τ᾽ ἐδεισέ τε καὶ σεφθείσα ἀνέπέσεν ὑπτία, καὶ ἀμα ἰγκάκασθη εἰς τούπισο ἐλκύσαι τὰς ἤνιας οὐτω σφόδρα, ὡστ᾽ ἐπὶ τὰ ἱσχία ἄμφω καθίσαι τῷ ἢππῳ, τῶν μὲν ἐκόντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτείνειν, τῶν δὲ ὑβριστὴν μᾶλʾ ἀκοντα. ἀπελθόντε δὲ ἀπωτέρω, ὁ μὲν ὑπ᾽ αἰσχύνης τε καὶ θάμβους ἱδρώτι πᾶσαν ἔβρεξε τὴν ψυχήν, ὁ δὲ λήξας τῆς ὀδύνης, ἢν ὑπὸ τοῦ χαλινοῦ τε ἔσχεν καὶ τοῦ πτώματος, μόνης ἕξανατευάσας ἐλοιδορέσειν ὀργῆς, πολλὰ κακίζων τὸν τῆς ἴνιοχον καὶ τὸν ὁμόξυγα ὡς δειλὰ τε καὶ ἀναδρία λυπόντε τὴν τάξιν καὶ ὁμολογίαν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἐθέλοντας προσείναι ἀναγκάζον μόνης συνεχώρησε δεομένων εἰσαῦθες ὑπερβαλέσθαι. ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ συντεθέντος χρόνου, ἀμνημονεῖν προσποιομένω ἀναμμηνήσκων, βιαζομενος, χρεμετίζων, ἔλκων ἦν αγκασεν αὔ προσελθεῖν τοῖς παιδικοῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἔγγυς ἦσαν, ἔγκυψας καὶ ἐκτείνας τὴν κέρκον, ἐνδακών τὸν χαλινόν, μετ᾽ ἀναιδείας ἐλκει· ὁ δ᾽ ἴνιοχος ἐτὶ μᾶλλον ταύτῳ πάθος παθῶν, ὡσπερ ἀπὸ ὑςπλήγης ἀναπεσῶν, ἐτὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ ὑβριστοῦ ἢππου ἐκ τῶν ὀδόντων βία ὀπίσω σπάσας τὸν χαλινόν, τὴν τε κακήγορον γλῶτταν καὶ τὰς γνάθους καθήμαξεν καὶ τὰ σκέλη τε καὶ τὰ ἱσχία πρὸς τὴν γῆν.
end, they go forward with him, yielding and agreeing to do his bidding. And they come to the beloved and behold his radiant face.

And as the charioteer looks upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing with modesty upon a pedestal of chastity, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring both horses upon their haunches, the one quite willing, since he does not oppose him, but the unruly beast very unwilling. And as they go away, one horse in his shame and wonder wets all the soul with sweat, but the other, as soon as he is recovered from the pain of the bit and the fall, before he has fairly taken breath, breaks forth into angry reproaches, bitterly reviling his mate and the charioteer for their cowardice and lack of manhood in deserting their post and breaking their agreement; and again, in spite of their unwillingness, he urges them forward and hardly yields to their prayer that he postpone the matter to another time. Then when the time comes which they have agreed upon, they pretend that they have forgotten it, but he reminds them; struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly. The effect upon the charioteer is the same as before, but more pronounced; he falls back like a racer from the starting-rope, pulls the bit backward even more violently than before from the teeth of the unruly horse, covers his scurrilous tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches
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255 36. "Ατε οὖν πᾶσαν θεραπείαν ὡς ἱσόθεος θεραπευόμενος οὐχ ὑπὸ σχηματιζομένου τοῦ ἑρώτου, ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς τοῦτο πεποιθότος, καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν φύσει φίλος τῷ θεραπεῦοντι, εἶναι ἄρα καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ἔμφοιτητῶν ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων διαβεβλημένος ἢ, λεγόντων ὡς αἰσχρῶν ἑρώτων πλησιάζειν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπωθῆ τὸν ἑρώτα: προίόντος δὲ ἢδη τοῦ χρόνου ἢ τε ἡλικία καὶ τὸ χρεών ἦγαγεν εἰς τὸ προσέσθαι αὐτὸν εἰς ὀμιλίαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποτὲ εἴμαρται κακῶν κακῷ φίλον οὐδ' ἄγαθον μή φίλον ἄγαθῷ εἶναι. προσεμένου δὲ καὶ λόγου καὶ ὀμιλίαν δεξαμένου, ἐγγύθεν ἡ εὐνοία γιγνομένη τοῦ ἑρώτου ἐκπλήττει τὸν ἑρώμενον διαισθανόμενον, ὅτι οὐδ' οἱ ξύμπαντες ἄλλοι φίλοι τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοῖραν φιλίας οὐδεμίαν παρέχονται πρὸς τὸν ἐνθεόν φίλον. ὅταν δὲ χρονίζῃ τοῦτο δρῶν καὶ πλησιάζῃ μετὰ τοῦ ἀπτεσθαί ἐν τε γυμνασίως καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ὀμιλίαις, τότε ἢδη ἡ τοῦ ῥεῦματος ἐκείνου πηγή, ὅπερ Ἰμερον Ζεὺς Γανυμήδους ἑρῴων ἰνόμασεν, πολλῆ φερομένη πρὸς τὸν ἐραστῆν, ἢ μὲν εἰς αὐτὸν ἔδω, ἢ δ' ἀπομεστουμένου ἐξω ἀπορρέει· καὶ οἴον πνεῦμα ἢ τις ἤχῳ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεών ἀλλομένη.
to the ground, causing him much pain. Now when the bad horse has gone through the same experience many times and has ceased from his unruliness, he is humbled and follows henceforth the wisdom of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one, he is overwhelmed with fear; and so from that time on the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe.

Now the beloved, since he receives all service from his lover, as if he were a god, and since the lover is not feigning, but is really in love, and since the beloved himself is by nature friendly to him who serves him, although he may at some earlier time have been prejudiced by his schoolfellows or others, who said that it was a disgrace to yield to a lover, and may for that reason have repulsed his lover, yet, as time goes on, his youth and destiny cause him to admit him to his society. For it is the law of fate that evil can never be a friend to evil and that good must always be friend to good. And when the lover is thus admitted, and the privilege of conversation and intimacy has been granted him, his good will, as it shows itself in close intimacy, astonishes the beloved, who discovers that the friendship of all his other friends and relatives is as nothing when compared with that of his inspired lover. And as this intimacy continues and the lover comes near and touches the beloved in the gymnasia and in their general intercourse, then the fountain of that stream which Zeus, when he was in love with Ganymede, called "desire" flows copiously upon the lover; and some of it flows into him, and some, when he is filled, overflows outside; and just as the wind or an echo rebounds from smooth, hard surfaces and
πάλιν ὧδεν ὡρμήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ἥεμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμομάτων ἵν, ἥ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἱεναί ἄφικόμενον, καὶ ἀναπτερώσαν τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερών, ἀρδεῖ τε καὶ ὤρμησε πτεροφεῦεν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου αὐτή ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν. ἔρα μὲν οὐ, ὅτου δέ, ἄπορεί· καὶ οὐδ' ὅ τι πέποθεν οἶδεν οὐδ' ἔχει φράσαςι, ἀλλ' οἶον ἀπ' ἄλλον ὄφθαλμος ἀπολε- λαυκώς πρόφασιν εἶπειν οὐκ ἔχει, ὡστερ δ' ἐν κατόπτρῳ ἐν τῷ ἑρώτητε ἐαυτὸν ὀρῶν λέληθεν. καὶ ὅταν μὲν ἔκεινος παρῇ, λήγει κατὰ ταύτα ἔκεινῳ τῆς ὀδύνης· ὅταν δὲ ἀπῇ, κατὰ ταύτα αὐ ποθεῖ καὶ ποθεῖται, εἴδωλον ἔρωτος ἀντέρωτα ἔχων· καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ ὀὔται οὐκ ἑρωτα ἀλλὰ φιλίαιν εἶναι. ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἔκεινῳ παραπλησίως μὲν, ἀσθενετέρως δὲ, ὀρᾶν, ἀππεσθαῖν, φιλεῖν, συγκατα- κείσθαι· καὶ δὴ, οἶον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τούτο κατ豳 ταυτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἔραστοι ὁ ἀκόλαστος ὅππος ἔχει ὅ τι λέγη πρὸς τὸν ἴμισοχον, καὶ ἄχιοι ἁντὶ πολλῶν πόνων σμικρὰ ἀπολαῦσαι· ὃ δὲ τῶν παιδικῶν ἔχει μὲν οὖδenance εἶπειν, σπαργῶν δὲ καὶ ἄπορὼν περιβάλλει τὸν ἐραστὴν καὶ φιλεῖ, ὡς σφόδροι εἰσοῦν ἀσπαζόμενος· ὅταν τε συγκατακέωνται, ὁλο ἐστὶ μὴ ἄπαρνη- θήναι τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος χαρίσασθαι τῷ ἑρώτητε, εἰ δεπετί τυχείν· ὃ δὲ ὁμοζυζε αὐ μετὰ τοῦ ἴμισοχον πρὸς ταύτα μετ' αἴδους καὶ λόγου ἄντιτείνει. 37. Ἐὰν μὲν δὴ οὖν εἰς τεταγμένην τε δίαιταν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν νυκήσῃ τὰ βελτίω τῆς διανοιάς ἀγαγόντα, μακάριον μὲν καὶ ὠμονοητικὸν τὸν ἐνθάδε βλον διάγγοσιν, ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτῶν καὶ κόσμοι ὑντες, δουλωσάμενοι μὲν ὁ κακίας ψυχῆς

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returns whence it came, so the stream of beauty passes back into the beautiful one through the eyes, the natural inlet to the soul, where it reanimates the passages of the feathers, waters them and makes the feathers begin to grow, filling the soul of the loved one with love. So he is in love, but he knows not with whom; he does not understand his own condition and cannot explain it; like one who has caught a disease of the eyes from another, he can give no reason for it; he sees himself in his lover as in a mirror, but is not conscious of the fact. And in the lover’s presence, like him he ceases from his pain, and in his absence, like him he is filled with yearning such as he inspires, and love’s image, requited love, dwells within him; but he calls it, and believes it to be, not love, but friendship. Like the lover, though less strongly, he desires to see his friend, to touch him, kiss him, and lie down by him; and naturally these things are soon brought about. Now as they lie together, the unruly horse of the lover has something to say to the charioteer, and demands a little enjoyment in return for his many troubles; and the unruly horse of the beloved says nothing, but teeming with passion and confused emotions he embraces and kisses his lover, caressing him as his best friend; and when they lie together, he would not refuse his lover any favour, if he asked it; but the other horse and the charioteer oppose all this with modesty and reason.

If now the better elements of the mind, which lead to a well ordered life and to philosophy, prevail, they live a life of happiness and harmony here on earth, self controlled and orderly, holding in subjection that which causes evil in the soul and giving
PLATO

ένεγίγνυτο, ἐλευθερώσαντες δὲ ὥ ἁρετή· τελευτήσαντες δὲ δὴ υπόπτεροι καὶ ἐλαφροὶ γεγονότες τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν ἐν νευκήκασιν, οὐ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν οὐτε σωφροσύνη ἀνθρωπίνη οὐτε θεία μανία δυνατὴ πορίσαι ἀνθρώπῳ. εὰν δὲ δὴ διαίτη φορτικωτέρα τε καὶ ἀφιλοσόφῳ, φιλοτίμῳ δὲ χρήσωνται, τάχ

C

ἀν ποὺ ἐν μέθαις ἡ τινὶ ἀλλή ἀμελεία τῷ ἀκολάστῳ αὐτῶν ὑποξυγίῳ λαβόντες τὰς ψυχὰς ἀφρούρους, ἕναναγαγόντες εἰς ταὐτῶν, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακριστήν αἴρεσιν εἰλέσθησθε τε καὶ διεπράξαντο· καὶ διαπράξαμεν τὸ λοιπὸν ἄδη χρῶνται μὲν αὐτῇ, σπανία δὲ, ἀτε οὐ πάση δεδομένα τῇ διανοίᾳ πράττοντες. φίλῳ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτῳ, ἢττον δὲ ἐκείνων, ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὲ

D

tοῦ ἔρωτος καὶ ἐξωγενομένω διάγονοι, πίστεις τὰς μεγίστας ἡγομένω ἁλλήλων δεδωκέναι τε καὶ διεκέχθαι, ὡς οὐ θεμιτῶν εἶναι λύσαντας εἰς ἐξήθραν ποτὲ ἐλθείν. ἐν δὲ τῇ τελευτῇ ἀπτεροὶ μὲν, ἀρμηκότες δὲ πτερούσθαι ἑκβαίνουσι τοῦ σώματος, ὡστε οὐ σεκρόν ἄθλον τῆς ἐρωτικῆς μανίας φέρονται· εἰς γὰρ σκότουν καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ γῆς πορείαν οὐ νόμοι ἑστίν ἐπὶ ἐλθεῖν τοῖς κατηγομένοις ἡκτῆς ἐπουρανίου πορείας, ἀλλὰ φανῶν βίον διάγοντας εὐδαιμονεῖν μετὰ ἁλλήλων πορευομένους, καὶ ὁμοπτέρους ἔρωτος χάριν, ὅταν γενναίοις, γενέσθαι.

E

38. Ταῦτα τοσαῦτα, ὡς παῖ, καὶ θεία οὕτω σοι δαφήσεις ἡ παρ' ἐραστὸν φίλαι· ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μη ἑρώτως οἰκεῖοτης, σωφροσύνη θυτηθίκεκραμενη, θυτηθὶ τε καὶ θειόδωλα οἰκονομοῦσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλήθους ἐπαινουμένην ὡς

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freedom to that which makes for virtue; and when this life is ended they are light and winged, for they have conquered in one of the three truly Olympic contests. Neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration can confer upon man any greater blessing than this. If however they live a life less noble and without philosophy, but yet ruled by the love of honour, probably, when they have been drinking, or in some other moment of carelessness, the two unruly horses, taking the souls off their guard, will bring them together and seize upon and accomplish that which is by the many accounted blissful; and when this has once been done, they continue the practice, but infrequently, since what they are doing is not approved by the whole mind. So these two pass through life as friends, though not such friends as the others, both at the time of their love and afterwards, believing that they have exchanged the most binding pledges of love, and that they can never break them and fall into enmity. And at last, when they depart from the body, they are not winged, to be sure, but their wings have begun to grow, so that the madness of love brings them no small reward; for it is the law that those who have once begun their upward progress shall never again pass into darkness and the journey under the earth, but shall live a happy life in the light as they journey together, and because of their love shall be alike in their plumage when they receive their wings.

These blessings, so great and so divine, the friendship of a lover will confer upon you, dear boy; but the affection of the non-lover, which is alloyed with mortal prudence and follows mortal and parsimonious rules of conduct, will beget in the beloved soul the
PLATO

ἀρετὴν τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, ἐννέα χιλιάδας

257 έτών περὶ γῆν κυλινδουμένην αὐτὴν καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς

ἀνουν παρέχει. αὐτή σοι, ὦ φίλε ᾿Ερως, εἰς

ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὁ τι καλλίστη καὶ ἀρίστη
dédotaī te kai ekstéstetai palinwòdia, tā te

άλλα kai tois ónómasin ἡναγκασμένη ποιη-
tikōs tisw diá Φαίδρου εἰρήσθαι. ἀλλά τῶν

protérov te synagwōmēn kai tōn de xáron ἕχων,
eumenvhs kai íleos tēn ērwtikhēn moι tēchyn, ἢν

ἐδωκας, μήτε ἀφέλη μήτε πηρώσης δί όργην,

δίου δ’ ἐτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν παρὰ τοῖς καλοῖς τίμην

B eínai. tō próssebèn δ’ eī tī lýgo soi ápnevēs

eiptomev Φαίδρος te kai ēgō, Δυσίαν tōn tōn

lōgon patēra aitwōmenos pāse tōn toioútwn

lōgon, etpī filōsophian dē, ὦσπερ ὁ ἄδελφὸς

autŏn Polēmarχos tētraptai, trēsou, ἵνα kai ὁ

érastysh oδε autŏn mēketē ἑπαμφοτερίζη kathάpter

nūn, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς πρὸς ᾿Ερωτα μετὰ filōsophwv

lōgon tōn bión poiētai.

39. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Συνεύχομαι σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες,

C eipter āmeinou tautē ἤμιν eínai, tauta γίγνεσθαι.

tōn lōgon dē sou pálai thauimāsas ἕχω, ὡσφ

kallīw tōn protérov ἀπειργάσω. ὅστε ὅκνον μή

moi ὁ Δυσίας tāpeinōs fainē, ēan ēra kai ἐχθλήση

prōs autŏn allōn antiparateinai. kai γάρ tis

autŏn, ὦ thauimāsie, ēnagχos tōn politιkōn toût

autŏn λοιδορῶν ὁνείδιζε, kai diā πάς tēs tēs loι-
dorίas ekalēi λογογράφων tāχ’ oūn ἄν ὕπο

filotimías ἐπίσχοι ἤμιν ἄν τοῦ γράφειν.

D ᾿ΕΠΙΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γελοιόν γ’, ὦ νεανία, τὸ δόγμα

lēgeis, kai tōv ētaiρou συχνὸν diamatάneis, eī

autŏn ouswos ἤγεϊ τινὰ φυοδεά. ἴσως δὲ kai

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narrowness which the common folk praise as virtue; it will cause the soul to be a wanderer upon the earth for nine thousand years and a fool below the earth at last. There, dear Love, thou hast my recantation, which I have offered and paid as beautifully and as well as I could, especially in the poetical expressions which I was forced to employ on account of Phaedrus. Pardon, I pray, my former words and accept these words with favour; be kind and gracious to me; do not in anger take from me the art of love which thou didst give me, and deprive me not of sight, but grant unto me to be even more than now esteemed by the beautiful. And if in our former discourse Phaedrus and I said anything harsh against thee, blame Lysias, the father of that discourse, make him to cease from such speeches, and turn him, as his brother Polemarchus is turned, toward philosophy, that his lover Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now, between two ways, but may direct his life with all singleness of purpose toward love and philosophical discourses.

PHAEDRUS. I join in your prayer, Socrates, and pray that this may come to pass, if this is best for us. But all along I have been wondering at your discourse, you made it so much more beautiful than the first; so that I am afraid Lysias will make a poor showing, if he consents to compete with it. Indeed, lately one of the politicians was abusing him for this very thing, and through all his abusive speech kept calling him a speech-writer; so perhaps out of pride he may refrain from writing.

SOCRATES. That is an absurd idea, young man, and you are greatly mistaken in your friend if you think he is so much afraid of noise. Perhaps, too, you think
τὸν λοιδοροῦμενον αὐτῷ οἱεί νομίζοντα λέγειν ἢ ἐλεγεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐφαίνετο γὰρ, ὁ Σώκρατες· καὶ σύνουσθα ποι καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοι τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβοῦμενοι τοὺ ἐπειτα χρόνου, µὴ σοφισταλ καλῶται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Γλυκὺς ἄγκων, ὁ Φαίδρε, λέληθέν 
Ε σε ὅ καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἄγκων λανθάνει σε, ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον φρονοῦντες τῶν πολιτικῶν μάλιστα ἔρωσι λογογραφίας τε καὶ καταλείψεως συγγράμματων, οἳ γε καὶ ἐπειδὰν τινα γράφοσι λόγου, οὕτως ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς ἐπαινέτας, ὥστε προσπαραγάφουσι πρῶτους, οἳ ἂν ἐκασταχοῦ ἐπαινῶσιν αὐτοὺς.

258 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς λέγεις τούτο; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μανθάνεις ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ἄνδρος πολιτικοῦ συγγράμματι πρῶτος ὁ ἐπαινέτης γέγραται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐδοξεῖν ποὺ φησι τῇ βουλῇ ἢ τῷ δήμῳ ἢ ἀμφότεροι, καὶ ὅτι εἰπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων μάλα σεμινὸς καὶ ἐγκωμιάζων ὁ συγγραφεὺς, ἐπεὶτα λέγει δὴ μετὰ τούτο, ἐπιδεικνυμένος τοὺς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πᾶν µακρὸν

1 After λέληθέν see the MSS. read ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ µακροῦ ἄγκων τοῦ κατὰ Νεῖλον ἔκλειθη. Schanz and Burnet bracket these words, following Heindorf.
2 Schanz, following Madvig, brackets ἀρχῇ. Burnet brackets συγγράμματι below.
3 Schanz, following Krische, inserts τὸ after δὴ.
the man who abused him believed what he was saying.

PHAEDRUS. He seemed to believe, Socrates; and you know yourself that the most influential and important men in our cities are ashamed to write speeches and leave writings behind them, through fear of being called sophists by posterity.

SOCRATES. You seem to be unacquainted with the "sweet elbow,"¹ Phaedrus, and besides the elbow, you seem not to know that the proudest of the statesmen are most fond of writing and of leaving writings behind them, since they care so much for praise that when they write a speech they add at the beginning the names of those who praise them in each instance.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean? I don't understand.

SOCRATES. You don't understand that the name of the approver is written first in the writings of statesmen.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. The writer says, "It was voted by the senate (or the people, or both), and so-and-so moved," mentioning his own name with great dignity and praise, then after that he goes on, displaying his own wisdom to his approvers, and sometimes making a very long document. Does it seem to you that a

¹ This is a proverbial expression, similar in meaning to our "sour grapes." The explanation given in the MSS., that the sweet elbow gets its name from the long bend, or elbow, in the Nile may be an addition by some commentator; at any rate, it hardly fits our passage.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Β ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα· ἢ σοι ἀλλο τι φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ λόγος συγγεγραμμένος;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅνοικον εὖν μὲν οὗτος ἐμένη, γεγονός ἀπερχεται ἐκ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ ποιητής· ἐὰν δὲ ἔξαλιφη καὶ ἀμοιρὸς γένηται λογογράφίας τε καὶ τοῦ ἄξιος εἶναι συγγράφειν, πενθεῖ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ ἑταῖροι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον γε ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ύπερφρονοῦντες τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ἀλλ’ ὡς τεθαυμακότες.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

C ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὶ δὲ; ὅταν ἰκανὸς γένηται ῥήτωρ ἢ βασιλεὺς ὡστε λαβὼν τὴν Δυκούργου ἢ Σολῶνος ἢ Δαρείου δύναμιν ἀδάνατος γενέσθαι λογογράφος ἐν πόλει, ἀρ’ οὖν ἰσόθεον ἡγεῖται αὐτὸς τε αὐτὸν ἢτι ξῶν, καὶ οἱ ἐπειτα γνυόμενοι ταύτα ταύτα περὶ αὐτοῦ νομίζοντι, θεώμενοι αὐτοῦ τὰ συγγράμματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἶκει τινὰ οὖν τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστὶς καὶ ὑπωστησοῦν δύσνους Λυσία, ὀνειδίζειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι συγγράφει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὔκοιν εἰκός γε ἐξ ὅν σὺ λέγεις· καὶ γὰρ ἀν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, ὡς ἑοικεν, ὀνειδίζοι.

D 40. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτὸ γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ’ ἐκείνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἢδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, ἀλλ’ αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον δῆ.
thing of that sort is anything else than a written speech?

PHAEDRUS. No, certainly not.

SOCRATES. Then if this speech is approved, the writer leaves the theatre in great delight; but if it is not recorded and he is not granted the privilege of speech-writing and is not considered worthy to be an author, he is grieved, and his friends with him.

PHAEDRUS. Decidedly.

SOCRATES. Evidently not because they despise the profession, but because they admire it.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Well then, when an orator or a king is able to rival the greatness of Lycurgus or Solon or Darius and attain immortality as a writer in the state, does he not while living think himself equal to the gods, and has not posterity the same opinion of him, when they see his writings?

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Do you think, then, that any of the statesmen, no matter how ill-disposed toward Lysias, reproaches him for being a writer?

PHAEDRUS. It is not likely, according to what you say; for he would be casting reproach upon that which he himself desires to be.

SOCRATES. Then that is clear to all, that writing speeches is not in itself a disgrace.

PHAEDRUS. How can it be?

SOCRATES. But the disgrace, I fancy, consists in speaking or writing not well, but disgracefully and badly.

PHAEDRUS. Evidently.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίς οὖν ο τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μη γράφειν; δεόμεθα τι, δὲ Φαίδρε, Λυσίαν τε περὶ τούτων ἐξετάσαι καὶ ἄλλουν, ὅστις πώποτε τι γέγραφεν ἢ γράψει, εἰτε πολιτικὸν σύγγραμμα εἰτε ἰδιωτικὸν, ἐν μέτρῳ ὡς ποιητής, ἢ ἀνευ μέτρου ὡς ἰδιώτης; 

ΕΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐρωτάσει δεόμεθα; τίνος μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα κἀν τις ὡς εἰπεῖν ἥψη, ἀλλ' ἦ τῶν τοιούτων ἠδονών ἔνεκα; οὐ γάρ ποιεῖν γε ὡς προλυπηθήναι δεῖ ἢ μηδὲ ἡσθηναι, ὅ ἐκ οἷόν πᾶσας αἰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἠδοναὶ ἐχοῦσιν διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σχολὴ μὲν δή, ὡς ἐοικε καὶ ἀμα μοι δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐν τῷ πυγεὶ ὕπερ κεφαλῆς ἦμων ὁι τέττιγες ἄδοντες καὶ ἀλλήλους διαλεγόμενους καθορᾶν. εἰ οὖν ἰδοιεν καὶ νῦ καθάπερ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν μεσημβρία μὴ διαλεγόμενους, ἀλλὰ νυστάζοντας καὶ κηλουμένους ὡφ' αὐτῶν δὲ ἄργιαν τῆς διανοίας, δικαιῶς ἀν καταγελάφεν, ἠγούμενοι ἀνδράποδα ἀττα σφίσιν ἐλθόντα εἰς τὸ καταγώγιον ὡστε προβάτια μεσημβρίαζοντα περὶ τὴν κρήνην εὑδεῖν· εάν δὲ ὅρῳ διαλεγόμενους καὶ παραπλέοντάς σφας ὡστε Σειρήνας ἀκηλή- 

ΒΤΟΥΣ, ὃ γέρας παρὰ τεθῶν ἐχοῦσιν ἀνθρώπος διδόναι, τάχ' ἀν δοῖεν ἀγασθέντες.

41. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐχοῦσι δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο; ἀνήκουσ γάρ, ὡς ἐοικε, τυγχάνον ὡν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμονου ἀνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκουσ εἶναι· λέγεται δ' ὡς ποτ' ἵσαν οὗτοι ἀνθρώποι τῶν πρὶν Μοῦσας γεγονέναι, γενομένοι δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανέρης ὑδῆς οὕτως ἀρα τινὲς τῶν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν υφ' 510
Socrates. What, then, is the method of writing well or badly? Do we want to question Lysias about this, and anyone else who ever has written or will write anything, whether a public or private document, in verse or in prose, be he poet or ordinary man?

Phaedrus. You ask if we want to question them? What else should one live for, so to speak, but for such pleasures? Certainly not for those which cannot be enjoyed without previous pain, which is the case with nearly all bodily pleasures and causes them to be justly called slavish.

Socrates. We have plenty of time, apparently; and besides, the locusts seem to be looking down upon us as they sing and talk with each other in the heat. Now if they should see us not conversing at mid-day, but, like most people, dozing, lulled to sleep by their song because of our mental indolence, they would quite justly laugh at us, thinking that some slaves had come to their resort and were slumbering about the fountain at noon like sheep. But if they see us conversing and sailing past them unmoved by the charm of their Siren voices, perhaps they will be pleased and give us the gift which the gods bestowed on them to give to men.

Phaedrus. What is this gift? I don't seem to have heard of it.

Socrates. It is quite improper for a lover of the Muses never to have heard of such things. The story goes that these locusts were once men, before the birth of the Muses, and when the Muses were born and song appeared, some of the men were so
C ήδονῆς, ὃστε ἄδοιντες ἦμέλησαν σίτων τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἐλαθον тελευτήσαντες αὐτοὺς' εἴς ὁν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ' ἐκείνῳ φύται, γέρας τούτο παρὰ Μοῦσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφῆς δεῖσθαι γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἁσίτων τε καὶ ἄποτον εὐθὺς ἢδειν, ἐὼς ἄν τελευτήσῃ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλθον παρὰ Μοῦσας ἀπαγγέλλειν, τὸς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμᾶ τῶν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετιμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιοῦσι προσ- φίλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοῖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἔρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὕτω, κατὰ τὸ εῖδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς: τῇ δὲ πρεσβυτάτη Καλλιόπη καὶ τῇ μετ' αὐτὴν Οὐρανία τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμῶντας τὴν ἑκείνων μουσικὴν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αἱ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μοῦσῶν περί τε οὐρανὸν καὶ λόγους οὐσαί θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἱάσι καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λεκτέον γάρ οὖν.

E 42. ἘΝΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅυκοίν, ὅπερ νῦν προθέμεθα σκέψασθαι, τὸν λόγον ὅπῃ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ, σκεπτέον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον.

ἘΝΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὑπάρχειν δεὶ τοῖς εὗ γε καὶ καλῶς ῥηθησομένοις τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διά- νοιαν εἰδοίλαν τ' ἁληθὲς ὄν ἄρ ἐρεῖν περὶ μέλλης;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐτωσι περὶ τοῦτον ἄκηκοα, δ' φίλε

260 Σώκρατες, οὐκ εἶναι ἀνάγκην τῷ μέλλοντι ῥήτορι ἔσεσθαι τὰ τὸ ὄντι δίκαια μανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόξαν' ἄν πλήθει, οὔπερ δικάσουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ ἢ καλά, ἀλλ' ὡσα δόξει· ἐκ γάρ

1 Schanz, following Badham, puts γενόμενον after εὐθὺς.
overcome with delight that they sang and sang, forgetting food and drink, until at last unconsciously they died. From them the locust tribe afterwards arose, and they have this gift from the Muses, that from the time of their birth they need no sustenance, but sing continually, without food or drink, until they die, when they go to the Muses and report who honours each of them on earth. They tell Terpsichore of those who have honoured her in dances, and make them dearer to her; they gain the favour of Erato for the poets of love, and that of the other Muses for their votaries, according to their various ways of honouring them; and to Calliope, the eldest of the Muses, and to Urania who is next to her, they make report of those who pass their lives in philosophy and who worship these Muses who are most concerned with heaven and with thought divine and human and whose music is the sweetest. So for many reasons we ought to talk and not sleep in the noontime.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, we ought to talk.

SOCRATES. We should, then, as we were proposing just now, discuss the theory of good (or bad) speaking and writing.

PHAEDRUS. Clearly.

SOCRATES. If a speech is to be good, must not the mind of the speaker know the truth about the matters of which he is to speak?

PHAEDRUS. On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so;
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tóutwv éinai tó peíthev, áll' ouk ék tís álē
theías.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Oútoi ápobáliptovn épous éinai deí, ó
Faídres, ó an étwosoi sofoí, álll' skopéin mh tì
légwsw1 kai dh kai tò vín léxhèn ouk áfetéon.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Orhoùs légeis.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οúde dh skopówmen aútò.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Póς;

B ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ei se peíthoimi égw polémous ámúnein
khtsámenov íptovn, ámfw dh íptovn ágnooímen,
tosónve méntoi tughánoum eídws peri sou, dh
Faídros íptovn hgeítai tò tòv òmèrown xówn
mégista écho wta—

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Geleíon γ' án, ó Sówkrateis, eîn.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Oúpw ge' áḷl' òte stpoudh se
peíthoimi, svnntideis lóghon épainon kata tòv ónou,
iptovn épnonomázwv kai légwv ós pàntos áxion tò
ðbrémma oìkoi te kektísthai kai épi strateías,
ápotolêmèn te xhrístìmon kai prosoenegkeìn ðuná-
tòv skeình kai álła pollà óphelímov.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Pagonelíovn γ' án ðèh eînì.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Ar' ouvn ou krèittovn geleíon ò dhemón
tev kai ékhròn éinai;2

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Fainetai.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Otan ouvn ó ð̣ð̣tòrikoù ágnovón ágapó
kai kakóv, labôv pòliw ð̣sáutwos ëkousan peíðη,
mh peri ónou skiaux3 ws íptovn tòv épainon pnoú-
ìmenos, álll' peri kakóv òs ágapó, dòxas dh

1 Schanz, following Schaefer, reads légwswi.
2 éinai ἡ φίλον BT. Schanz follows Bekker in omitting ἡ φίλον.
3 Schanz follows Spalding in omitting skiaux.

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for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.

SOCRATES. "The word," Phaedrus, which the wise speak must not be rejected,"¹ but we must see if they are right; so we must not pass by this which you just said.

PHAEDRUS. You are right.

SOCRATES. Let us then examine it in this way.

PHAEDRUS. How?

SOCRATES. If I should urge you to buy a horse and fight against the invaders, and neither of us knew what a horse was, but I merely knew this about you, that Phaedrus thinks a horse is the one of the tame animals which has the longest ears—

PHAEDRUS. It would be ridiculous, Socrates.

SOCRATES. No, not yet; but if I tried to persuade you in all seriousness, composing a speech in praise of the ass, which I called a horse, and saying that the beast was a most valuable possession at home and in war, that you could use him as a mount in battle, and that he was able to carry baggage and was useful for many other purposes—

PHAEDRUS. Then it would be supremely ridiculous.

SOCRATES. But is it not better to be ridiculous than to be clever and an enemy?

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Then when the orator who does not know what good and evil are undertakes to persuade a state which is equally ignorant, not by praising the "shadow of an ass" ² under the name of a horse, but by praising evil under the name of good, and having studied the opinions of the multitude persuades them

¹ Homer, Iliad ii. 361. ² A proverbial expression.
πλήθους μεμελετηκώς πείση· κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ’ ἀγαθῶν, ποιῶν τινα οὐει μετὰ ταύτα τὴν ρητορικὴν
καρπὸν ὒν πλεορε θερίζειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὖ πάνυ γε ἐπιεική.

43. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Ἀρ’ οὖν, ὡ γαθέ, ἀγροικότερον τοῦ δέοντος λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; ἡ δ’ ἵσωσ ἀν εἰποι· τί ποτ’, ὡ θαυμάσιοι, λητεῖτε; ἐγώ γὰρ οὐδέν ἀγνοοῦντα τάληθες ἀναγκάζω μανθάνειν λέγεων, ἄλλ’, εἶ τις ἐμὴ ἕμμβουλη,1 κτησάμενος ἐκεῖνο οὐτὸς ἐμὲ λαμβάνει·
tόδε δ’ οὖν μέγα λέγω, ὡς ἄνευ ἐμοῦ τῷ τα ὄντα εἰδότι οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἔσται πείθειν τέχνην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὖκοιν δίκαια ἔρει, λέγουσα ταύτα;

Ε ἘΝ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φημί, ἐὰν οἱ γε ἐπιστώτες αὐτῇ λόγοι μαρτυρῶσιν εἶναι τέχνην. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἀκούειν δοκῶ τινων προσιόντων καὶ διαμαρτυρομένων λόγων, ὅτι ψεύδεται καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἄλλ’ ἀτεχνὸς τριβῆ τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησιν ὁ Δάκων, ἐτυμὸς τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἠθεῖα οὐτ’ ἔστιν οὔτε μὴ ποτὲ ψτερον γένηται.2

261 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τούτων δεὶ τῶν λόγων, ὁ Σώκρατες ἄλλα δεύρο αὐτοὺς παράγων ἐξέταζε, τί καὶ πῶς λέγουσι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πάριτε δῆ, θρέμματα γενναία, καλλί-παιδα τε Φαίδρον πείθετε, ὡς ἐὰν μὴ ἱκανῶς φιλοσοφήσῃ, οὐδὲ ἱκανός ποτὲ λέγειν ἔσται περὶ οὖθεν. ἀποκρινέσθω δὴ ὁ Φαίδρος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. 'Ερωτάτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αρ’ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὄλον ἡ ρητορικὴ

1 εἶ τις ἐμὴ ἕμμβουλῃ χρῆται Schanz, following Stephanus. εἶ τι ἐμὴ ἕμμβουλῃ B. εἴ τις ἐμὴ ἕμμβουλῃ T.
2 Schanz brackets τοῦ . . . γένηται.

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to do evil instead of good, what harvest do you suppose his oratory will reap thereafter from the seed he has sown?

PHAEDRUS. No very good harvest.

Socrates. Well, do you think we have reproached the art of speaking too harshly? Perhaps she might say: "Why do you talk such nonsense, you strange men? I do not compel anyone to learn to speak without knowing the truth, but if my advice is of any value, he learns that first and then acquires me. So what I claim is this, that without my help the knowledge of the truth does not give the art of persuasion."

PHAEDRUS. And will she be right in saying this?

Socrates. Yes, if the arguments that are coming against her testify that she is an art. For I seem, as it were, to hear some arguments approaching and protesting that she is lying and is not an art, but a craft devoid of art. A real art of speaking, says the Laconian, which does not seize hold of truth, does not exist and never will.

PHAEDRUS. We have need of these arguments, Socrates. Bring them here and examine their words and their meaning.

Socrates. Come here, then, noble creatures, and persuade the fair young Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak properly about anything. And let Phaedrus answer.

PHAEDRUS. Ask your questions.

Socrates. Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an
PLATO

ἀν εἰὴ τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ μόνον ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δημόσιοι σύλλογοι,
Β ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις, ἡ αὐτὴ σμικρῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων πέρι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐντιμότερον τὸ γε ὅρθον περὶ
σπουδαία ἡ περὶ φαύλα γυγνόμενον; ἡ πῶς σὺ ταῦτ' ἀκήκοας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία οὐ παντάπασιν οὐτως, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν πως περὶ τὰς δίκας λέγεται τε καὶ
γράφεται τέχνη, λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ δηµη-

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' ἡ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὄδυσσέως
tέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ

C σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαµήδους
ἄνηκοος γέγονας;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ναὶ μᾶ Δία ἔγγυε τῶν Νέστορος,
eἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἡ
tυνα Θρασύμαχον τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὅδυσσέα.

44. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰσως. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτοις ἐσώμεν
σὺ δ' εἰπέ, ἐν δικαστηρίοις οἱ ἀντίδικοι τί δρῶσιν;

οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσιν μέντοι, ἢ τὶ φῆσομεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τοῦτ' αὐτό.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου τε καὶ ἄδικου;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνη τοῦτο δρῶν ποιήσει
D φανῆσαι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοτὲ μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν
dὲ βούληται, ἄδικον;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ ἐν δηµηγορίᾳ ἢ τῇ πόλει δοκεῖν
tὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθά, τοτε δ' αὖ τἀναντία;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν οὖν Ἐλεατικὸν Παλαµήδην

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art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well? And is it not the same when concerned with small things as with great, and, properly speaking, no more to be esteemed in important than in trifling matters? Is this what you have heard?

PHAEDRUS. No, by Zeus, not that exactly; but the art of speaking and writing is exercised chiefly in lawsuits, and that of speaking also in public assemblages; and I never heard of any further uses.

SOCRATES. Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes?

PHAEDRUS. Nor of Nestor's either, unless you are disguising Gorgias under the name of Nestor and Thrasy machus or Theodorus under that of Odysseus.

SOCRATES. Perhaps I am. However, never mind them; but tell me, what do the parties in a lawsuit do in court? Do they not contend in speech, or what shall we say they do?

PHAEDRUS. Exactly that.

SOCRATES. About the just and the unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Then he whose speaking is an art will make the same thing appear to the same persons at one time just and at another, if he wishes, unjust?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And in political speaking he will make the same things seem to the State at one time good and at another the opposite?

PHAEDRUS. Just so.

SOCRATES. Do we not know that the Eleatic
PLATO

λέγοντα οὐκ ἵσμεν τέχνη, ὡστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούοντι τὰ αὐτὰ ὁμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλά, μένοντά τε αὖ καὶ φερόμενα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὖν ἄρα μόνον περὶ δικαστήρια τέ
Ε ἐστιν ἡ ἀντιλογικὴ καὶ περὶ δημηγορίαν, ἀλλ’, ὅς ἔοικε, περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἰπερ ἐστιν, αὕτη ἄν εἴη, ἣ τις οἰός τ’ ἔσται πᾶν
παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν τῶν δυνατῶν καὶ οἷς δυνατῶν, καὶ
ἀλλῷ ὁμοιοῦντος καὶ ἀποκρυπτομένου εἰς φῶς
ἄγειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τῇδε δοκῶ ξητοῦσιν φανεῖσθαι. ἀπά-
τη πότερον ἐν πολὺ διαφέρουσι γίγνεται μᾶλλον
ἢ ὁλὸν;

262 ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐν τοῖς ὁλίγοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλά γε δὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν μετα-
βαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ
κατὰ μέγα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν μέλλοντα ἀπατήσειν
μὲν ἄλλον, αὐτὸν δὲ μὴ ἀπατήσεσθαι, τὴν
ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ἀκριβῶς
dιειδέναι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ οὖν οἰός τε ἔσται, ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοῶν
ἐκάστου, τὴν τοῦ ἀγνοουμένου ὁμοιότητα σμικρὰν
Β τε καὶ μεγάλην ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις διαγιγνώσκειν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕκοιν τοῖς παρὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζουσιν

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PHAEDRUS

Palamedes (Zeno) has such an art of speaking that the same things appear to his hearers to be alike and unlike, one and many, stationary and in motion?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Then the art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES. I think it will be plain if we examine the matter in this way. Is deception easier when there is much difference between things or when there is little?

PHAEDRUS. When there is little.

SOCRATES. And if you make a transition by small steps from anything to its opposite you will be more likely to escape detection than if you proceed by leaps and bounds.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then he who is to deceive another, and is not to be deceived himself, must know accurately the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, he must.

SOCRATES. Now will he be able, not knowing the truth about a given thing, to recognise in other things the great or small degree of likeness to that which he does not know?

PHAEDRUS. It is impossible.

SOCRATES. In the case, then, of those whose opinions are at variance with facts and who are
καὶ ἀπατωμένοις ἔδηλον ὡς τὸ πάθος τούτο δι᾿ ὁμοιότητων τινῶν εἰσερρή.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γίγνεται γοῦν οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἑστίν οὖν ὅπως τεχνικὸς ἐσται μεταβιβάζειν κατὰ σμικρὸν διὰ τῶν ὁμοιότητων ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστοτε ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἀπάγων, ἢ αὐτὸς τούτο διαφεύγειν, ὃ μὴ ἐγνωρικὸς ὃ ἐστὶν ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὄντων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ μὴ ποτε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δόγμαν ἄρα τέχνην, ὡς ἔταρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδός, δοξαὶ δὲ τεθηρευκός, γελοίαν τινά, ὡς έοικε, καὶ ἀτεχνὸν παρέξεται.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κινδυνεύει.

45. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Βούλει σοὶ ἐν τῷ Δυσίου λόγῳ, ὃν φέρεις, καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ ἡμεῖς εἶπομεν ἰδεῖν τὸν φαμέν ἀτεχνὸν τε καὶ ἐντεχνὸν εἶναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάντων γέ που μάλιστα, ὥς νῦν γε ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν, οὐκ ἔχουτε ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καὶ μὴν κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἐρήμησιν τὸν λόγῳ ἑχοῦτε τι παράδειγμα, ὡς ἄν ο εἰδός τὸ ἀλήθες προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. καὶ ἔγογγε, ὁ Φάιδρε, αἰτιῶμαι τοὺς ἐντοπίους θεούς. ἵσως δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν Μουσῶν προφήται οἱ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ὁδοὶ ἐπιπεπνευκότες ἃν ἡμῖν ἐλευ τοῦτο τὸ γέρας. οὐ γὰρ που ἔγογγε τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν μέτοχος.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐστο ὡς λέγεις. μόνον δήλωσον ὁ φης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἰθι δὴ μοι ἀνάγρωθι τὴν τοῦ Δυσίου λόγου ἀρχήν.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ-
PHAEDRUS

deceived, this error evidently slips in through some resemblances.

PHAEDRUS. It does happen in that way.

SOCRATES. Then he who does not understand the real nature of things will not possess the art of making his hearers pass from one thing to its opposite by leading them through the intervening resemblances, or of avoiding such deception himself?

PHAEDRUS. Never in the world.

SOCRATES. Then, my friend, he who knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems, attain an art of speech which is ridiculous, and not an art at all.

PHAEDRUS. Probably.

SOCRATES. Shall we look in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in what I said, for something which we think shows art and the lack of art?

PHAEDRUS. By all means, for now our talk is too abstract, since we lack sufficient examples.

SOCRATES. And by some special good fortune, as it seems, the two discourses contain an example of the way in which one who knows the truth may lead his hearers on with sportive words; and I, Phaedrus, think the divinities of the place are the cause thereof; and perhaps, too, the prophets of the Muses, who are singing above our heads, may have granted this boon to us by inspiration; at any rate, I possess no art of speaking.

PHAEDRUS. So be it; only make your meaning clear.

SOCRATES. Read me the beginning of Lysias' discourse.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and
στασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἦμιν τοῦτων γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιῶ δὲ μὴ διὰ τούτο ἀτυχήσαι ὃν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἑραστής ὃν σοῦ τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει—

263 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παῦσαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὗτος ἁμαρτάνει καὶ ἀτεχνὸν ποιεῖ, λεκτέον. ἢ γὰρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

46. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ παντὶ δῆλον τὸ γε τοιώδε, ὡς περὶ μὲν ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων ὁμονοητικῶς ἔχομεν, περὶ δὲ ἔνια στασιωτικῶς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δοκῶ μὲν ὃ λέγεις μανθάνειν, ἐτι δ' εἰπὲ σαφέστερον.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁταν τις ήνομα εἶπῃ σιδήρου ἡ ἀργύρου, ἄρ' οὖ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες διενοήθημεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' οὗτος δικαίον ἢ ἀγαθοῦ; οὐκ ἄλλος ἄλλη φέρεται, καὶ ἀμφισβητούμεν ἄλληλοις τε καὶ ἦμιν αὐτοῖς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

B ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἔν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς συμφωνοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὕ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὗτο.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ποτέρωθι οὖν εὐαπατητοτεροὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐν ποτέροις μεῖζον δύναται;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δῆλον ὅτι ἐν οἷς πλανώμεθα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τοὺς μέλλοντα τέχνης ῥητορικήν μετείην πρῶτον μὲν δει ταῦτα ὃδε διηρήσθαι, καὶ εἰληφέναι τινὰ χαρακτήρα ἐκατέρου τοῦ εἴδους, ἐν ὧ τε ἀνάγκη τὸ πλῆθος πλανᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν ὧ μὴ.

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καλὸν γοῦν ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰδος εἰῃ κατανενοηκὼς ὁ τοῦτο λαβὼν.

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you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your lover. For lovers repent of—

Socrates. Stop. Now we must tell what there is in this that is faulty and lacks art, must we not?

Phaedrus. Yes.

Socrates. It is clear to everyone that we are in accord about some matters of this kind and at variance about others, is it not?

Phaedrus. I think I understand your meaning, but express it still more clearly.

Socrates. When one says "iron" or "silver," we all understand the same thing, do we not?

Phaedrus. Surely.

Socrates. What if he says "justice" or "goodness"? Do we not part company, and disagree with each other and with ourselves?

Phaedrus. Certainly.

Socrates. Then in some things we agree and in others we do not.

Phaedrus. True.

Socrates. Then in which of the two are we more easy to deceive, and in which has rhetoric the greater power?

Phaedrus. Evidently in the class of doubtful things.

Socrates. Then he who is to develop an art of rhetoric must first make a methodical division and acquire a clear impression of each class, that in which people must be in doubt and that in which they are not.

Phaedrus. He who has acquired that would have conceived an excellent principle.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπειτά γε οἶμαι πρὸς ἑκάστη γη-
γόμενον μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀλλ' οξέως αὐσθάνεσθαι,
περὶ οὗ ἀν μέλλῃ ἔρειν, ποτέρου δὴ τυγχάνει τοῦ
γένους.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί οὖν; τὸν Ἐρωτά πότερον φῶμεν
εἶναι τῶν ἀμφίσβητησίμων ἢ τῶν μὴ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῶν ἀμφίσβητησίμων δὴ ποιον ἢ οἴει
ἂν σοι συγχωρῆσαι εἴπειν ἃ νῦν δὴ εἴπεσ περὶ
αὐτοῦ, ὡς βλάβη τε ἐστὶ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ καὶ ἐρῶντι,

καὶ αὐθίς ὡς μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τυγχάνει;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀριστὰ λέγεις. ἄλλ' εἴπε καὶ τόδε
—ἐγὼ γαρ τοι διὰ τὸ ἐνθουσιαστικὸν οὐ πάνω
μέμνημαι—εἰ ἀφισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενοι τοῦ
λόγου.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Νὴ Δία ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φεῦ, δοσὶ λέγεις τεχνικοτέρας Νύμ-
φας τὰς Ἀχελόον καὶ Πάνα τῶν Ἐρμοῦ Λυσίου
τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι. η σώδεν λέγω,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Λυσίας ἀρχόμενος τοῦ ἐρωτικοῦ
ήναγκασεν ἢμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν Ἐρωτα ἐν τῷ τῶν
Ε ὄντων, δ ἀυτὸς ἐβουλήθη, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ἦδη
συνταξάμενος πάντα τὸν ὑστερον λόγον διεπερ-
νατο; βούλει πάλιν ἀναγωγός τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀυτοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ· δ μέντοι ζητεῖς, οὐκ
ἐστ' αὐτόδι.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Λέγε, ἢν ἀκοῦσω αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖνον.

47. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων
ἐπιστασαι, καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν τοῖν
264 γενομένων, ἀκήκοας. ἀξιόω δὲ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο
ἀνυχθῆσαι δὲν δέομαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐραστής δὲν σοῦ
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PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. Then I think when he has to do with a particular case, he will not be ignorant, but will know clearly to which of the two classes the thing belongs about which he is to speak.

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Well then, to which does Love belong? To the doubtful things or the others?

PHAEDRUS. To the doubtful, surely; if he did not, do you think he would have let you say what you said just now about him, that he is an injury to the beloved and to the lover, and again that he is the greatest of blessings?

SOCRATES. Excellent. But tell me this—for I was in such an ecstasy that I have quite forgotten—whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, by Zeus, and wonderfully well.

SOCRATES. Oh, how much more versed the nymphs, daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are in the art of speech than Lysias, son of Cephalus! Or am I wrong, and did Lysias also, in the beginning of his discourse on Love, compel us to suppose Love to be some one thing which he chose to consider it, and did he then compose and finish his discourse with that in view? Shall we read the beginning of it again?

PHAEDRUS. If you like; but what you seek is not in it.

SOCRATES. Read, that I may hear Lysias himself.

PHAEDRUS. You know what my condition is, and you have heard how I think it is to our advantage to arrange these matters. And I claim that I ought not to be refused what I ask because I am not your
τυγχάνω. ὡς ἐκείνοις μὲν τότε μεταμέλει ὅν ἂν ἐν ποιήσωσίν, ἔπειδαν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας παύσωνται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ πολλοῦ δεῖν ἔοικε ποιεῖν ὅδε ὑε ὡς ξητοῦμεν, ὃς οὐδὲ ἀπ᾽ ἁρχῆς ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ υπτίας ἀνάπαυλι διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον, καλ ἀρχεῖαι ἀφ᾽ ὧν πεπαυμένος ἂν ἦδη ὁ ἐραστής λέγοι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. ὡς οὕδεν εἰπον, Φαίδρε, φίλη κεφαλή;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡ ἐστὶν γε τοῦ δή, ὡς Σώκρατες, τελευτή, περὶ οὗ τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὰ δὲ τὰλλα; οὐ χύδην δοκεῖ βεβλῆσθαι τὰ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ φαίνεται τὸ δεύτερον εἰρήμένον ἐκ τινος ἀνάγκης δεύτερον δεῦτερον δεῦτερον τεθήκατι, ἢ τι ἀλλο τῶν ῥηθέντων; ἢ μοί μὲν γὰρ ἔδοξεν, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότι, οὐκ ἀγεννῶς τὸ ἐπίθεν εἰρήσθαι τῷ γράφοντι; σὺ δ᾽ ἔχεις τινὰ ἀνάγκην λογογραφικῆν, ἢ ταύτα ἐκείνος οὕτως ἐφεξῆς παρ᾽ ἄλληλα ἔθηκεν;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Χρηστὸς εἰ, ὅτι μὲ ἡγεῖ ἰκανὸν εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνον οὕτως ἀκριβῶς διυδεῖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ τὸδε γε οἴμαι σε φάναι ἂν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὡσπερ ξύφον συνεστάναι σῶμα τι ἐχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτῶν, ὡστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἐχεῖν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ' ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὀλῷ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Σκέψαι τοῖνυν τὸν τοῦ ἑταίρου σου λόγον, εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἀλλως ἐχεῖ καὶ εὐρήσεις τὸν ἐπιγράμματος οὐδὲν διαφέροντα, δὴ Μῆδα τῷ Φρυγί φασί τινὲς ἐπιγραφάθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ποῖον τούτῳ, καὶ τὶ πεπονθός;
lover. For lovers repent of the kindnesses they have done when their passion ceases.

Socrates. He certainly does not at all seem to do what we demand, for he does not even begin at the beginning, but undertakes to swim on his back up the current of his discourse from its end, and begins with what the lover would say at the end to his beloved. Am I not right, Phaedrus my dear?

Phaedrus. Certainly that of which he speaks is an ending.

Socrates. And how about the rest? Don't you think the parts of the discourse are thrown out helter-skelter? Or does it seem to you that the second topic had to be put second for any cogent reason, or that any of the other things he says are so placed? It seemed to me, who am wholly ignorant, that the writer uttered boldly whatever occurred to him. Do you know any rhetorical reason why he arranged his topics in this order?

Phaedrus. You flatter me in thinking that I can discern his motives so accurately.

Socrates. But I do think you will agree to this, that every discourse must be organised, like a living being, with a body of its own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole.

Phaedrus. Certainly.

Socrates. See then whether this is the case with your friend's discourse, or not. You will find that it is very like the inscription that some say is inscribed on the tomb of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedrus. What sort of inscription is that, and what is the matter with it?
PLATO

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ οὔτε μὲν τούτῳ τόδε·
χαλκὴ παρθένος εἰμί, Μίδα δὲ ἐπὶ σήματι
κείμαι.
ὅφρ' ἄν ύδωρ τε νάγι καὶ δένδρα μακρὰ
tεθήλη, 
αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένουσα πολυκλαύτου ἐπὶ
τύμβου,
ἀγγελέω παρισοῦσι Μίδας ὅτι τῇδε τέθαται.

Ε ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἢ ὑστατόν τι
λέγεσθαι, ἐννοεῖς ποι, ὡς ἐγὼμαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σκώπτεις τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν, ὃ Σω-
κράτες.

48. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτου μὲν τοῖς, ἵνα μὴ σὺ
ἄχθη, ἔσωμεν καὶ τοις συμφα γε ἔχειν μοι δοκεῖ
παραδείγματα, πρὸς ἃ τις βλέπων οὖν ἐπιθύμει· 
ἀν,
μυμεῖσθαι αὐτῇ ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ πάντων τις εἰς ἅ 
τούς ἐτέρους λόγους ἰομεν. ἦν γὰρ τι ἐν αὐτοῖς, 
ως
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δοκῶ, προσήκον ἴδείν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ λόγων
σκοπεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὑπεντῶ ποι ἦσθαιν· ὁ μὲν γάρ,
ὡς τῷ ἔρωτι, ὁ δὲ ὡς τῷ μὴ δεῖ χαρίζομεθα, 
ἐλεγέτην.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μᾶλ’ ἀνδρικὸς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὡμην σε τάληθας ἐρέιν, ὃς μανι-
κῶς· ὁ μέντοι ἐξήτουν, ἐστιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο. μανίαν
γάρ τινα ἐφήσαμεν εἶναι τοῦ ἔρωτα, ἡ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Μανίας δὲ γε εἰδῆ δύο, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ
νοσημάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλ-
λαγῆς τῶν εἰωθῶν νομίμων γνωμομένην.
PHAEDRUS

SOCRATES. This is it:

A bronze maiden am I; and I am placed upon
the tomb of Midas.
So long as water runs and tall trees put forth
leaves,
Remaining in this very spot upon a much
lamented tomb,
I shall declare to passers by that Midas is
buried here;

and you perceive, I fancy, that it makes no difference
whether any line of it is put first or last.

PHAEDRUS. You are making fun of our discourse,
Socrates.

SOCRATES. Then, to spare your feelings, let us say
no more of this discourse—and yet I think there
were many things in it which would be useful
examples to consider, though not exactly to imitate—
and let us turn to the other discourses; for there
was in them, I think, something which those who
wish to investigate rhetoric might well examine.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. The two discourses were opposites; for
one maintained that the lover, and the other that the
non-lover, should be favoured.

PHAEDRUS. And they did it right manfully.

SOCRATES. I thought you were going to speak the
truth and say "madly"; however, that is just what
I had in mind. We said that love was a kind of
madness, did we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. And that there are two kinds of mad-
ness, one arising from human diseases, and the other
from a divine release from the customary habits.
PLATO

Β ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πάνω γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τής δὲ θελας τεττάρων θεών τηταρα μέρη διελόμενοι, μαντικήν μὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνους θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, Μουσῶν δ' αὐτοπηκτικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἐρωτος ἐρωτικήν μανίαν ἐφήσαμεν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ τὸ ἐρωτικὸν πάθος ἀπεικάζοντες, ἓσως μὲν ἀληθοὺς τινὸς ἐφαπτόμενοι, τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ ἀλλοσε παραφερόμενοι, κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπίθανον λόγον, μυθικόν τινα ἥμων προσεπαίσάμεν μετρίως τε καὶ εὐφήμως τὸν ἐμὸν τε καὶ σὸν δεσπότην Ἐρωτα, ὁ Φαίδρε, καλῶν παίδων ἔφορον.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἔμοιγε οὐκ ἀγηδῶς ἀκοῦσαι.

49. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τόδε τοῦν αὐτόθεν λάβωμεν, ὥς ἀπὸ τοῦ ψέγειν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαίνειν ἔσχεν ὁ λόγος μεταβήμαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν αὐτὸ λέγεις;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν φαίνεται τὰ μὲν ἰλλα τῷ ὅντι παιδιὰ πεπαισθαί τοῦτων δὲ τινῶν ἐκ τύχης ῥηθέντων δυοὶ εἰδόϊν, εἰ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν τέχνη λαβεῖν δύνατό τις, οὐκ ἄχαρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνων δη;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰς μιᾶν τε ἰδέαν συνορώντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσταρμένα, ἵν' ἔκαστον ὀριζόμενος δήλον ποιῆ, περὶ οὗ δὲν ἄει διδάσκειν ἐθέλη, ἀπερτὸ τὸ νυνῖδη περὶ Ἐρωτος δ' ἔστων ὀρισθέν, εἰτ' εὖ εἶτε κακῶς ἐλέχθη. τὸ γοῦν σαφὲς καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ ὀμολογοῦμενον διά ταύτ' ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὐ λόγος.

1 Schanz brackets τεττάρων θεών.

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PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And we made four divisions of the divine madness, ascribing them to four gods, saying that prophecy was inspired by Apollo, the mystic madness by Dionysus, the poetic by the Muses, and the madness of love, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros, we said was the best. We described the passion of love in some sort of figurative manner, expressing some truth, perhaps, and perhaps being led away in another direction, and after composing a somewhat plausible discourse, we chanted a sportive and mythic hymn in meet and pious strain to the honour of your lord and mine, Phaedrus, Love, the guardian of beautiful boys.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, and I found it very pleasant to hear.

SOCRATES. Here let us take up this point and see how the discourse succeeded in passing from blame to praise.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. It seems to me that the discourse was, as a whole, really sportive jest; but in these chance utterances were involved two principles, the essence of which it would be gratifying to learn, if art could teach it.

PHAEDRUS. What principles?

SOCRATES. That of perceiving and bringing together in one idea the scattered particulars, that one may make clear by definition the particular thing which he wishes to explain; just as now, in speaking of Love, we said what he is and defined it, whether well or ill. Certainly by this means the discourse acquired clearness and consistency.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ δ’ ἔτερον δὴ εἶδος τὶ λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;
Ε ὙΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ πάλιν κατ’ εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν, ΚΑΤ’ ἀρθρα, ἢ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπίχειρεῖν κατα- γνύαι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον ἀλλ’, ὦσπερ ἀρτι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τῇ κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαμβάνην, 266 ὦσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἐνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὀμόνυμα πέφυκε, σκαλα, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὔτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἰδός Ἰγνισμένω τῷ λόγῳ, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπ’ ἀριστερὰ τεμνό- μενος μέρος, πάλιν τούτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανήκειν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὄνομαζόμενον σκαλα τενα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησε μᾶλ’ ἐν δίκη, ὁ δ’ εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιὰ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγών ἡμᾶς, ὀμόνυμον μὲν Β ἑκεῖνῳ, θείοις δ’ αὐ τίν’ ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπήνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αὐτοῦ ἡμῖν ἁγαθῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
50. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τούτων δὴ ἔγνως αὐτὸς τε ἔραστής, ὁ Φαίδρε, τῶν διαρέσεων καὶ συνα- γωγῶν, ἵν’ οἴος τε ὁ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· εάν τε τιν’ ἄλλον ἴγνισωμα δυνατὸν εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθ’ ὀρᾶν, τούτον διόκω κατόπισθε μετ’ ἰχνιων ὡστε θεόι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ ὀρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς C οἶδεν, καλῶ δὲ οὕνεκε τοῦδε διαλεκτικοῦς. τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Δυσίον μαθόντας εἰπὲ τὶ χρή καλεῖν· ἢ τούτο ἑκεῖνο ἐστὶν ἡ λόγου τέχνη, ἢ Ἐρασύμαχος τε καὶ οὐ ἂλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. And what is the other principle, Socrates?

SOCRATES. That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver. As our two discourses just now assumed one common principle, unreason, and then, just as the body, which is one, is naturally divisible into two, right and left, with parts called by the same names, so our two discourses conceived of madness as naturally one principle within us, and one discourse, cutting off the left-hand part, continued to divide this until it found among its parts a sort of left-handed love, which it very justly reviled, but the other discourse, leading us to the right-hand part of madness, found a love having the same name as the first, but divine, which it held up to view and praised as the author of our greatest blessings.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and bringing together, as aids to speech and thought; and if I think any other man is able to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, him I follow after and "walk in his footsteps as if he were a god." And whether the name I give to those who can do this is right or wrong, God knows, but I have called them hitherto dialecticians. But tell me now what name to give to those who are taught by you and Lysias, or is this that art of speech by means of which Thrasymachus and the rest have

1 Homer, *Odyssey* v, 193, ἐν ἱερὰ ἀνείπω τις ἔλεγε (and he walked in the footsteps of the god).
μὲν αὐτὸι λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἀλλοις τε ποιοῦσιν, οἱ ἀν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεύσων ἐθέλωσιν;

φαίδρος. Βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἄνδρες, οὐ μὲν δῇ ἐπιστῆμονες γε ὃν ἔρωτας. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ μὲν τὸ εἴδος ὅρθως ἔμουγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικόν τὸ καλὸν τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἐθ’ ἡμᾶς.

ζωκράτης. Πῶς φῆς; καλὸν ποῦ τι ἄν εἰη, ὧ τούτων ἀπολειφθεὶν ὡμος τέχνη λαμβάνεται; πάντως δ’ οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοί τε καὶ ἐμοί, λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥήτορικῆς.

φαίδρος. Καὶ μάλα που συχνά, ὦ Σώκρατες, τά γ’ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.

51. ζωκράτης. Καλῶς γε ὑπεμμησας. προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεὶ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ ταῦτα λέγεις—ἢ γὰρ; τὰ κομψά τῆς τέχνης;

Ε φαίδρος. Ναί.

ζωκράτης. Δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῷ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα καὶ πλῆτσις οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωςιν λέγειν τόν γε βελτιστόν λογοδαίδαλον Βυξάντιον ἄνδρα.

φαίδρος. Τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;

ζωκράτης. Τί μὴν; καὶ ἕλεγχον γε καὶ ἐπεξε-λεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ. τὸν δὲ καλλιστὸν Πάριον Ἐυήνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, δς ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος εὑρέ καὶ παρεπαίνους; οἱ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασίν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ.

Τισιαν δὲ Γοργίλαν τε ἐάσομεν εὑδεῖν, οἱ πρὸ τῶν 536
become able speakers themselves, and make others so, if they are willing to pay them royal tribute?

PHAEDRUS. They are royal men, but not trained in the matters about which you ask. I think you give this method the right name when you call it dialectic; but it seems to me that rhetoric still escapes us.

SOCRATES. What do you mean? Can there be anything of importance, which is not included in these processes and yet comes under the head of art? Certainly you and I must not neglect it, but must say what it is that remains of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. A great many things remain, Socrates, the things that are written in the books on rhetoric.

SOCRATES. Thank you for reminding me. You mean that there must be an introduction first, at the beginning of the discourse; these are the things you mean, are they not?—the niceties of the art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. And the narrative must come second with the testimony after it, and third the proofs, and fourth the probabilities; and confirmation and further confirmation are mentioned, I believe, by the man from Byzantium, that most excellent artist in words.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the worthy Theodorus?

SOCRATES. Of course. And he tells how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and in defence. Shall we not bring the illustrious Parian, Evenus, into our discussion, who invented covert allusion and indirect praises? And some say that he also wrote indirect censures, composing them in verse as an aid to memory; for he is a clever man. And shall we leave Gorgias and
PLATO

ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τὰ τε
αὐτὸ σμικρά μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαι-

Β νεσθαι ποιοῦν εἰς ῥόμην λόγου, καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖας
tά τ’ ἐναντία καὶ ὅς, συντομάμεν τε λόγων καὶ
ἀπειρὰ μῆκη περὶ πάντων ἁνήρου; ταῦτα δὲ
ἂκουστὶ ποτὲ μοι Πρόδικος ἐγέλασε, καὶ μόνος
αὐτὸς ἄφικενα εἰς τὸν Ὅλον τὸν Ηλειον ἕξον γενέσθαι.

Φαίδρος. Σοφότατο γε, ὁ Πρόδικε.

Σωκράτης. Ἐπιλαύν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν; οἷμαι γὰρ ἀν
σύμψηφον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἡλειον ἔξον γενέσθαι.

Φαίδρος. Τί δ’ οὐ;

Σωκράτης. Τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν ἃν
μουσεῖα λόγων, ὡς δ’ διπλασιολογιάς καὶ γνωμο-

λογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν, ὃνομάτω τε Δικαιολοβῶν
ἀ’ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς πολὺς εὐθύσας;

Φαίδρος. Πρωταγόρεια δὲ, ὁ Σωκράτες, οὐκ ἂν
μέντοι τοιαῦτ’ ἀττα;

Σωκράτης. Ὁρθοσπεια γέ τις, ὃ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα
πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ. τῶν γε μὴ οἰκτυργών ἐπὶ
γῆρας καὶ πενήνια ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι
τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σήνος,
ὁργίσαι τε αὐτὸ πολλοὺς ἡμα δεινὸς ἀνήρ γέγονεν,

καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπάλληλοι κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη
διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβόλας ὀδενή
κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοῦν πᾶς
ἐσκευριστήρας ἐναι, ὃ τινές μὲν ἐπάνοδον,
ἀλλοι δὲ ἅλλο τιθενται ὅνομα.

1 πῶς φράσωμεν B. πῶς φράσομεν T. πῶς οὐ φράσομεν
Schanz. 2 ὡς B. ὡς T. Schanz.
3 Schanz, following Ast, brackets ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο.
4 Schanz reads προσεποίησεν εὐθύσας (προσεποίησεν after
Cornerius).

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PHAEDRUS

Tisias undisturbed, who saw that probabilities are more to be esteemed than truths, who make small things seem great and great things small by the power of their words, and new things old and old things the reverse, and who invented conciseness of speech and measureless length on all subjects? And once when Prodicus heard these inventions, he laughed, and said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of reasonable length.

PHAEDRUS. O Prodicus! How clever!

SOCRATES. And shall we not mention Hippias, our friend from Elis? I think he would agree with him.

PHAEDRUS. Oh yes.

SOCRATES. And what shall we say of Polus and his shrines of learned speech, such as duplication and sententiousness and figurativeness, and what of the names with which Licymnius presented him to effect beautiful diction?

PHAEDRUS. Were there not some similar inventions of Protagoras, Socrates?

SOCRATES. Yes, my boy, correctness of diction, and many other fine things. For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chalcedonian hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever. But all seem to be in agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἔκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνήσαι ἐπὶ τελευτής τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταύτα λέγω, καὶ εἰ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπτεῖν λόγων τέχνης πέρι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐσώμεν δὴ τὰ γε σμικρά· ταύτα δὲ ὑπ’ αὐγάς μᾶλλον ἰδωμεν, τίνα καὶ πότ’ ἔχει τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα ἐρρωμένην, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν γε δὴ πλῆθος συνόδοις.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐχει γάρ· ἄλλ’, δ’ ἀληθεύει, ἰδὲ καὶ σὺ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται διεστηκὸς αὐτῶν τὸ ἥτριον ὁσπερ ἔμοι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Δείκνυε μόνον.

Β. 52. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰπὲ δὴ μοι· εἰ τις προσεδόθων τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου Ἔρυξιμάχῳ ἢ τῷ πατρὶ αὐτοῦ Ἄκουμενῷ εἴποι ὅτι Ἔγώ ἐπίσταμαι τοιαῦτ’ ἀττα

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί γε ἄλλο ἢ ἐρέσθαι, εἰ προσεπισταται καὶ οὐστινα δεὶ καὶ ὅποτε ἐκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὀπόσον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Εἰ οὖν εἴποι ὅτι σύνδαμοι· ἄλλ’ ἄξιῳ τὸν ταύτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ μαθόντα αὐτὸν οἶν τ’ εἶναι ποιεῖν ἀ ἐρωτᾶς;
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. You mean making a summary of the points of the speech at the end of it, so as to remind the hearers of what has been said?

SOCRATES. These are the things I mean, these and anything else you can mention concerned with the art of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. There are only little things, not worth mentioning.

SOCRATES. Never mind the little things; let us bring these other things more under the light and see what force of art they have and when.

PHAEDRUS. They have a very powerful force, at least in large assemblies.

SOCRATES. They have; but my friend, see if you agree with me in thinking that their warp has gaps in it.

PHAEDRUS. Go on and show them.

SOCRATES. Tell me; if anyone should go to your friend Eryximachus or to his father Acumenus and should say "I know how to apply various drugs to people, so as to make them warm or, if I wish, cold, and I can make them vomit, if I like, or can make their bowels move, and all that sort of thing; and because of this knowledge I claim that I am a physician and can make any other man a physician, to whom I impart the knowledge of these things"; what do you think they would say?

PHAEDRUS. They would ask him, of course, whether he knew also whom he ought to cause to do these things, and when, and how much.

SOCRATES. If then he should say: "No, not at all; but I think that he who has learned these things from me will be able to do by himself the things you ask about?"
PLATO

C ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἴποιεν ἂν, οἴμαι, ὅτι μαίνεται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐκ βιβλίων ποιήθηκε ἀκούσας ἢ περιτυχών φαρμακίων ἱατρὸς οἴεται γεγονόναι, οὔδέν ἐπάθω τῆς τέχνης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' εἰ Σοφοκλῆς αὐτὸ προσέλθει καὶ Εὐριπίδη τις λέγοι, ὡς ἐπίστηται περὶ σμικροῦ πράγματος ἰσός ἐσις παμμῆκες ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλου πάντων σμικράς, ὅταν τε βούληται οἶκτρας, καὶ τούναντίον αὐτὸ φοβερὰς καὶ ἀπειλητικὰς, ὥσα

D τ' ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ διδάσκων αὐτὰ τραγῳδίας ποίησιν οἴεται παραδίδοναι;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὕτω ἂν, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἴμαι, καταγελῶν, εἰ τις οἴεται τραγῳδίαν ἄλλο τε εἶναι ἢ τὴν τούτων σύστασιν πρέπουσαν, ἀλλῆλωις τε καὶ τῷ ὀλῷ συνιστάμενην.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἄγροικως γε, οἴμαι, λοιδορῆσαι, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ ἂν μουσικὸς ἐντυχῶν ἄνδρι οἰομένῳ ἀρμονικῷ εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τυχανέοι ἐπιστάμενος ὡς οἶον τε οξυτάτην καὶ βαρυτάτην

Ε χορῆθην ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἄγριῶς εἴποι ἂν ὁ μοιχηρέ, μελαγχολᾶς, ἀλλ' ἄτε μουσικὸς ἂν πραότερον ὅτι, ὁ ἄριστο, ἀνάγκη μὲν καὶ ταύτ' ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ἀρμονίκον ἐσεσθαι, οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἀρμονίας ἐπαίτειν τὸν τὴν σὴν ἔξιν ἔχοντα· τὰ γὰρ πρὸ ἀρμονίας ἀναγκαία μαθήματα ἐπίστασαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἀρμονικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὄρθοτατά γε.

269 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕκον καὶ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τὸν σφίσσιν ἐπιδεικνύειν τὰ πρὸ τραγῳδίας ἂν φαίη ἀλλ’ οὐ

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PHAEDRUS. They would say, I fancy, that the man was crazy and, because he had read something in a book or had stumbled upon some medicines, imagined that he was a physician when he really had no knowledge of the art.

SOCRATES. And what if someone should go to Sophocles or Euripides and should say that he knew how to make very long speeches about a small matter, and very short ones about a great affair, and pitiful utterances, if he wished, and again terrible and threatening ones, and all that sort of thing, and that he thought by imparting those things he could teach the art of writing tragedies?

PHAEDRUS. They also, I fancy, Socrates, would laugh at him, if he imagined that tragedy was anything else than the proper combination of these details in such a way that they harmonize with each other and with the whole composition.

SOCRATES. But they would not, I suppose, rebuke him harshly, but they would behave as a musician would, if he met a man who thought he understood harmony because he could strike the highest and lowest notes. He would not say roughly, "You wretch, you are mad," but being a musician, he would say in gentler tones, "My friend, he who is to be a harmonist must know these things you mention, but nothing prevents one who is at your stage of knowledge from being quite ignorant of harmony. You know the necessary preliminaries of harmony, but not harmony itself."

PHAEDRUS. Quite correct.

SOCRATES. So Sophocles would say that the man exhibited the preliminaries of tragedy, not tragedy
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tα τραγικά, καλ ο 'Ακουμενός τα προ ιατρικής ἀλλ' ου τα ιατρικά.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

53. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δέ; τὸν μελίγηρν Ἀδραστον οἴομεθα ἤ καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκούσειαν ὃν νῦν δὴ ἤμειν δύημεν τῶν παγκάλων τεχνημάτων, βραχυλογιῶν τε καὶ εἰκονολογίων καὶ ὤσα ἀλλὰ διελθόντες ὑπ’ αὖγας ἔφαμεν εἶναι σκεπτέα,

Β πότερον χαλεπῶς ἂν αὐτούς, ὡσπερ ἔγω τε καὶ σύ, ὑπ’ ἄγροκις ρήμα τι εἰπέειν ἀπαίδευτον εἰς τοὺς ταῦτα γεγραφότας τε καὶ διδάσκοντας ὡς ρητορικήν τέχνην, ἢ ἀτε ἡμῶν ὄντας σοφωτέρους καὶ νῦν ἔπιπλῆξαι εἰπόντας· ὃ Φαῖδρε τε καὶ Σώκρατες, οὐ χρὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἄλλα συγγιγνώσκειν, εἰ τινὲς μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι διαλέγεσθαι ἀδύνατοι ἐγένοντο ὄρισασθαι, τί ποτ’ ἐστιν ρητορική, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τοῦ πάθους τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαία μαθήματα ἔχοντες ρητορικήν

C φύθησαν ἴηρηκέναι, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ διδάσκοντες ἄλλους ἠγούνται σφίσιν τελέως ρητορικήν δεδιδάχθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐκαστα τούτων πιθανῶς λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ δλον συνίστασθαι, οὐδὲν ἔργον, αὐτοὺς δὲν παρ’ ἐαυτῶν τοὺς μαθητὰς σφῶν πορίζεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, οὐ Σώκρατες, κινδυνεύει τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι τὸ τῆς τέχνης, ἢν οὐτοί οἱ ἄνδρες ὡς ρητορικὴν διδάσκοντον τε καὶ γράφοντον· καὶ

D ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ εἰρηκέναι· ἀλλὰ δὴ τὴν τοῦ
itself, and Acumenus that he knew the preliminaries of medicine, not medicine itself.

PHAEDRUS. Exactly so.

SOCRATES. Well then, if the mellifluous Adrastus or Pericles heard of the excellent accomplishments which we just enumerated, brachylogies and figurative speech and all the other things we said we must bring to the light and examine, do we suppose they would, like you and me, be so illbred as to speak discourteously of those who have written and taught these things as the art of rhetoric? Would they not, since they are wiser than we, censure us also and say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, we ought not to be angry, but lenient, if certain persons who are ignorant of dialectics have been unable to define the nature of rhetoric and on this account have thought, when they possessed the knowledge that is a necessary preliminary to rhetoric, that they had discovered rhetoric, and believe that by teaching these preliminaries to others they have taught them rhetoric completely, and that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves in their writings or speeches."

PHAEDRUS. Well, Socrates, it does seem as if that which those men teach and write about as the art of rhetoric were such as you describe. I think you are

1 Tyrtaeus, ed. Bergk, first ed. frg. 9, 7, oü' ei Tantai'dew Pēlopos baieléteros eîn ylóssan 5' Ἄδρηστου μειλιχύγηρν ɛχο, "not even if he were more kingly than Pelops and had the mellifluous tongue of Adrastus." Perhaps the orator Antiphon is referred to under the name of Adrastus, cf. chapter xliii. above.

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N N
τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην πῶς καὶ πόθεν ἂν τις δύναιτο πορίσασθαι;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαιδρέ, ὡστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, ἵσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἓχειν ὥσπερ τάλλα. εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικὸ ἐίναι, ἐσεὶ ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος, προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην ὅτου δ’ ἂν ἐλλύτης τούτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελής ἐσεὶ. ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνην, οὐχ ἦ Δυσίας τε καὶ Ἐρασύ-μαχος πορεύεται, δοκεῖ μοι φαίνεσθαι ἥ μέθοδος.

Ε ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἀλλὰ πὴ δῆ; ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἀριστε, εἰκότως ὁ Περικλῆς πάντων τελεώτατος εἰς τὴν ῥητορικὴν γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τῇ δῇ; 54. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πᾶσαι ὦσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν, προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετερωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι τὸ γὰρ ψηλόνουν τούτω καὶ πάντῃ τελεσιουργὸν ἔσκευεν ἐντεύθεν ποθεν εἰσινεῖαι. ὁ καὶ Περικλῆς πρὸς τῷ εὐφυῆς εἶναι ἐκτῆσατο προσπεσῶν γὰρ, οἷμαι, τουτωῦ ὡς Ἄναξαγόρα, μετερωρολογίας ἐμπλησθεῖσα καὶ ἐπὶ φύσιν νοῦ τε καὶ ἀνοίας ἀφικόμενος, ὁν δὴ πέρι τὸν πολὺν λόγον ἐποιεῖτο Ἄναξαγόρας, ἐντευθεὶς εἰλικρυσεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην τὸ πρόσφορον αὐτῇ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέεις; 270

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὁ αὐτὸς που τρόπος τέχνης ἰατρικῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ ῥητορικῆς.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πῶς δῆ; ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐν ἀμφοτέραις δεῖ διελέσθαι φύσιν, σώματος μὲν ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ψυχῆς δὲ ἐν τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, εἰ
right. But how and from whom is the truly rhetorical and persuasive art to be acquired?

SOCRATES. Whether one can acquire it, so as to become a perfect orator, Phaedrus, is probably, and perhaps must be, dependent on conditions, like everything else. If you are naturally rhetorical, you will become a notable orator, when to your natural endowments you have added knowledge and practice; at whatever point you are deficient in these, you will be incomplete. But so far as the art is concerned, I do not think the quest of it lies along the path of Lysias and Thrasymachus.

PHAEDRUS. Where then?

SOCRATES. I suppose, my friend, Pericles is the most perfect orator in existence.

PHAEDRUS. Well?

SOCRATES. All great arts demand discussion and high speculation about nature; for this loftiness of mind and effectiveness in all directions seem somehow to come from such pursuits. This was in Pericles added to his great natural abilities; for it was, I think, his falling in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a man, that filled him with high thoughts and taught him the nature of mind and of lack of mind, subjects about which Anaxagoras used chiefly to discourse, and from these speculations he drew and applied to the art of speaking what is of use to it.

PHAEDRUS. What do you mean by that?

SOCRATES. The method of the art of healing is much the same as that of rhetoric.

PHAEDRUS. How so?

SOCRATES. In both cases you must analyse a nature, in one that of the body and in the other that of the
πάλαις μὴ τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τέχνῃ, τῷ μὲν φάρμακα καὶ τροφῆν προσφέρων υγείαν καὶ ρώμην ἐμποίησειν, τῇ δὲ λόγους τε καὶ ἐπιτη- 
δεύσεις νομίμους πειθῶ ἢν ἂν βούλῃ καὶ ἄρετήν 
παραδώσειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὦ Σῶκρατες, οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ψυχής οὖν φύσιν ἄξιως λόγον κατα- 
νοήσαι οὐεὶ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἁνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου 
φύσεως;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Εἰ μὲν Ἰπποκράτει τῷ τῶν Ἀσκλη- 
πιάδων δεῖ τι πιθέσθαι, οὐδὲ περὶ σώματος ἁνευ 
τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Καλῶς γὰρ, ὦ έταίρε, λέγει: χρὴ 
mέντοι πρὸς τῷ Ἰπποκράτει τὸν λόγον ἔξετάζοντα 
σκοπεῖν, εἰ συμφωνεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Φημί.

55. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ τοῖνυν περὶ φύσεως σκόπει τί 

D ποτε λέγει Ἰπποκράτης τε καὶ ὁ ἄληθης λόγος. 
ἀρ’ οὖχ ὥδε δεὶ διανοεῖται περὶ ὅτου προῖ φύσεως 
πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν ἡ πολυειδές ἐστιν, οὐ περὶ 
βουλήσεμεθα εἰναι αὐτοι τεχνικοὶ καὶ ἄλλον 
dυνατοὶ ποιι τε ἐπειτα δὲ, ἀν μὲν ἀπλοῦν ἦ, 
σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν 
eis τὸ δράν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ, ἐπὶ 
δὲ πλεῖω εἰδὴ ἔχη, ταῦτα ἀρμαθμαζόνων, ὡς ὃ 
ἐφ’ ἐνός, τοὐτ’ ἴδείν ἐφ’ ἐκόλου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν 
αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κινδυνεύει, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡ γοῦν ἁνευ τούτων μέθοδος ἐσικοῖ 

Ε ἄν ωσπερ τυφλοὶ πορεία: ἀλλ’ οὐ μὴν ἀπεικα- 
στέον τῶν γε τέχνη μετίοντα ὅτι οἱν τυφλῷ συδὲ 
κωφῷ, ἀλλὰ δῆλου ὡς, ἂν τῷ τῆς τέχνης λόγους

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soul, if you are to proceed in a scientific manner, not merely by practice and routine, to impart health and strength to the body by prescribing medicine and diet, or by proper discourses and training to give to the soul the desired belief and virtue.

PHAEDRUS. That, Socrates, is probably true.

SOCRATES. Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of the whole man?

PHAEDRUS. If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except in that way.

SOCRATES. He is right, my friend; however, we ought not to be content with the authority of Hippocrates, but to see also if our reason agrees with him on examination.

PHAEDRUS. I assent.

SOCRATES. Then see what Hippocrates and true reason say about nature. In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first, whether that in respect to which we wish to be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform, and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of each form, as we did in the case of the simple nature, what its action is and how it is acted upon and by what?

PHAEDRUS. Very likely, Socrates.

SOCRATES. At any rate, any other mode of procedure would be like the progress of a blind man. Yet surely he who pursues any study scientifically ought not to be comparable to a blind or a deaf man, but evidently the man whose rhetorical teaching


PLATO

διδυ, τὴν ὦσίαν δεῖξει ἀκριβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου, πρὸς ὃ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ἐσται δὲ που ψυχὴ τοῦτο.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕκον τῇ ἁμελῆ μεταταί πρὸς τοῦτο πᾶσα πειθῶ γὰρ ἐν τοῦτῳ ποιεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ.

Η γὰρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δήλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Ὑπερσύμμαχός οὐ καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ρητορικὴν διδυ, πρῶτον πάση ἀκριβεία γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἴδειν, πότερον ἐν καὶ όμοιον πέφυκεν ἡ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδέσ· τοῦτο γὰρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύει.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὅτι τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

Β ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα δείξει τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἐκαστὸν ἐκάστῳ καὶ διδάσκων, ὅσα οὖσα υφ' οίων λόγων δι' ἡν αἰτίαν εὖ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Κάλλιστα γοῦν ἀν, ὡς ἕοικ', ἔχοι οὕτως.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν, ὃ ρίλε, ἄλλως ἐνδεχομένου ἡ λεγόμενον τέχνη ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ

C γραφήσεται οὔτε τι ἄλλο οὔτε τοῦτο ἀλλ` οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ὃν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνης λόγων πανούργοι εἰσὶ καὶ ἀποκρύπτονται, εἰδότης ψυχῆς πέρι παγκάλως πρὶν ἀν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τούτου λέγωσί τε καὶ γράφωσι, μὴ πειθώμεθα αὐτοῖς τέχνη γράφειν.
PHAEDRUS

is a real art will explain accurately the nature of that
to which his words are to be addressed, and that is
the soul, is it not?

PHAEDRUS. Of course.

SOCRATES. Then this is the goal of all his effort;
he tries to produce conviction in the soul. Is not
that so?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. So it is clear that Thrasymachus, or
anyone else who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric,
will first describe the soul with perfect accuracy
and make us see whether it is one and all alike, or,
like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what
we call explaining its nature.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. And secondly he will say what its
action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is
acted upon and by what.

PHAEDRUS. To be sure.

SOCRATES. Thirdly, he will classify the speeches
and the souls and will adapt each to the other,
showing the causes of the effects produced and why
one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain
classes of speeches, and another is not.

PHAEDRUS. That would, I think, be excellent.

SOCRATES. By no other method of exposition or
speech will this, or anything else, ever be written or
spoken with real art. But those whom you have
heard, who write treatises on the art of speech
nowadays, are deceivers and conceal the nature of
the soul, though they know it very well. Until they
write and speak by this method we cannot believe
that they write by the rules of art.
PHIAROS. Τίνα τούτον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ ρῆματα εἰπεῖν οὐ εὐπτετές· ὡς δὲ δεῖ γράφειν, εἰ μὲλλει τεχνικὸν ἔχειν καθ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, λέγειν ἐθέλω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Λέγε δή.

56. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἐπειδὴ λόγον δύναμις τυγχάνει φυγαγωγία οὖσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ρητορικῶς ἔσσεθαί ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχή ὅσα εἰδη ἔχει ἔστιν οὐν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα· ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοίδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε γίγνονται· τούτων δὲ δὴ διηρημένων, λόγων αὐ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἰδή, τούόνδε έκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὐν τοιοίδε υπὸ τῶν τοιώνδε λόγων διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν εἰς τὰ τοιάδε εὔπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοίδε διὰ τάδε δυσπειθεῖς· δεὶ δὴ ταῦτα ἰκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεόμενον Ε αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὅντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὅξεως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν εἰναι πω πλέον αὐτῷ ὃν τότε ἦκουν λόγων ἔχων. ὅταν δὲ εἰπεῖν τε ἰκανῶς ἐχὴ, οἷος ὑφ' οἰων πείθεται, παραγγέλων τὸν δυνατὸς ἢ δι-272 αὐσθανόμενος ἐαυτῷ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι οὗτος ἔστιν καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, περὶ ᾧ τότε ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι, νῦν ἔργῳ παροῦσά οἱ, ἢ προσωπιτέον τοῦδε ὥδε τοὺς λόγους ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦδε πειθώ, ταῦτα δὴ ἢδη πάντα ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροὺς τοῦτο πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχέτεον, βραχυλογίας τε αὐ καὶ ἐλεεινολογίας καὶ δεινῶσεως ἐκάστων τε ὅσἀ ἀν 552
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. What is this method?

SOCRATES. It is not easy to tell the exact expressions to be used; but I will tell how one must write, if one is to do it, so far as possible, in a truly artistic way.

PHAEDRUS. Speak then.

SOCRATES. Since it is the function of speech to lead souls by persuasion, he who is to be a rhetorician must know the various forms of soul. Now they are so and so many and of such and such kinds, wherefore men also are of different kinds: these we must classify. Then there are also various classes of speeches, to one of which every speech belongs. So men of a certain sort are easily persuaded—by speeches of a certain sort for a certain reason to actions or beliefs of a certain sort, and men of another sort cannot be so persuaded. The student of rhetoric must, accordingly, acquire a proper knowledge of these classes and then be able to follow them accurately with his senses when he sees them in the practical affairs of life; otherwise he can never have any profit from the lectures he may have heard. But when he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech, and is able, if he comes upon such a man, to recognize him and to convince himself that this is the man and this now actually before him is the nature spoken of in a certain lecture, to which he must now make a practical application of a certain kind of speech in a certain way to persuade his hearer to a certain action or belief—when he has acquired all this, and has added thereto a knowledge of the times for speaking and for keeping silence, and has also distinguished the favourable occasions for brief speech or pitiful speech or intensity and all the classes

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πλάτων τῆν εὐκαίριαν τε καὶ ἀκαίριαν διαγρόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελέως ἐστὶν ἢ

τέχνη ἀπειργασμένη, πρότερον δ' οὖν ἀλλ' ὁ τι ἂν αὐτῶν τις ἐλλείψῃ λέγων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ γράφων, φη δὲ τέχνη λέγειν, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. τι δὴ οὖν; φήσει ἵσως ὁ συγγραφέως, ὁ Φαίδρε τε καὶ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ σοῦτως; ἢ ἄλλως πῶς ἀποδεκτέον λεγομένης λόγων τέχνης;

φαίδρος. Ἀδύνατον ποι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως· καίτοι οὐ σμικρόν γε φαύνεται ἐργον.

ζωκρατῆς. Ἁληθῆ λέγεις. τούτου τοι ἐνεκα

χρὴ πάντας τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταστρέφουτα ἐπισκοπεῖν, εἰ τις τῆ ράων καὶ βραχυτέρα φαίνεται ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὁδὸς, ἵνα μὴ μάτην πολλὴν ἢ καὶ τραχεῖαν, ἐξὸν ὀλγὴν τε καὶ λείαν. ἄλλ' εἰ τινὰ τῆ βοήθειαν ἔχεις ἐπάκεικος Δυσίων ἢ τινὸς ἄλλου, πειρῶ λέγειν ἀναμμυθησκόμενος.

φαίδρος. Ἐνεκα μὲν πείρας ἔχοιμ' ἄν, ἢ ἄλλ' οὕτω νῦν γ' οὕτως ἔχω.

ζωκρατῆς. Βούλει οὖν ἐγώ τιν' εἶπω λόγον, ὅπερ τῶν περὶ ταῦτά τινων ἄκηκοα;

φαίδρος. Τί μὴν;

ζωκρατῆς. Λέγεται γοῦν, ὁ Φαίδρε, δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἶπείν.

φαίδρος. Καὶ σὺ γε οὕτω ποίει.

57. ζωκρατῆς. Φασὶ τοῖνυν οὐδὲν οὕτω ταῦτα δεῖν σεμνύνειν οὐδ' ἀνάγειν ἄνω μακρὰν περιβαλλόμενος· παντάπασι γὰρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰπομεν τοῦτο τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄληθειας μετέχειν δεόι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων,

1 Schanz reads λέγουι' ἄν.
of speech which he has learned, then, and not
till then, will his art be fully and completely
finished; and if anyone who omits any of these
points in his speaking or writing claims to speak by
the rules of art, the one who disbelieves him is the
better man. "Now then," perhaps the writer of our
treatise will say, "Phaedrus and Socrates, do you
agree to all this? Or must the art of speech be
described in some other way?"

PHAEDRUS. No other way is possible, Socrates.
But it seems a great task to attain to it.

SOCRATES. Very true. Therefore you must examine
all that has been said from every point of view, to
see if no shorter and easier road to the art appears,
that one may not take a long and rough road, when
there is a short and smooth one. If you have heard
from Lysias or anyone else anything that can help
us, try to remember it and tell it.

PHAEDRUS. If it depended on trying, I might, but
just now I have nothing to say.

SOCRATES. Then shall I tell something that I have
heard some of those say who make these matters
their business?

PHAEDRUS. Pray do.

SOCRATES. Even the wolf, you know, Phaedrus,
has a right to an advocate, as they say.

PHAEDRUS. Do you be his advocate.

SOCRATES. Very well. They say that there is no
need of treating these matters with such gravity and
carrying them back so far to first principles with
many words; for, as we said in the beginning of this
discussion, he who is to be a competent rhetorician
need have nothing at all to do, they say, with truth
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ή καὶ ἄνθρωπων γε τοιοῦτων φύσει ὄντων ἡ τροφή, τὸν μέλλοντα ἰκανῶς ρητορικὸν ἐσεσθαι. τὸ παράπαν γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστήριοις τούτων ἁληθείας μέλειν οὖνει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πιθανοῦ· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι τὸ εἰκός, φ' δεὺν προσέχειν τὸν μέλλοντα τέχνη ἔρειν. οὖν ὁ γὰρ αὖτα τὰ πραγχέντα δεῖν λέγειν ἐνίοτε, ἐὰν μὴ εἰκότως ἡ πεπραγμένα, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰκότα, ἐν τε κατηγορία καὶ ἀπολογία καὶ πάντως λέγοντα τὸ δὴ εἰκός διωκτέον εἶναι, πολλὰ εἰσόντα χαίρειν τῷ ἁληθεί· τοῦτο γὰρ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ λόγου γιγνόμενον τὴν ἀπασαν τέχνην πορί-ζειν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Αὐτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, διελήλυθας ἄ λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους τεχνικοὶ προσποιούμενοι εἶναι. ἀνεμνήσθην γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βραχέως τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἐφηψάμεθα, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο πάμμεγα εἶναι τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸν γε Τισίαν αὐτὸν πεπάτηκας ἀκριβῶς· εἰπέτω τοῖς καὶ τὸ δὲ ἡμῖν ὁ Τισίας, μὴ τὶ ἄλλο λέγει τὸ εἰκός ἡ τὸ τῷ πλήθει δοκοῦν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὶ γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἐοίκε, σοφὸν εὑρόν ἀμα καὶ τεχνικὸν ἐγγραφεῖν, ὡς εὰν τὶς ἀσθενής καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἵσχυρόν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἰμάτιον ἢ τῷ ἄλλο ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἀγηταὶ, δεὶ δὴ τάληθες μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγ-κεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς μόνω ἦκτην, ἔκεινῳ δὲ καταχρήσασθαι τῷ πῶς δ' ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσοδε τοιφῆ ἐπεχείρησα; ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔρει δὲ
in considering things which are just or good, or men who are so, whether by nature or by education.  For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth about these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability, so that he who is to be an artist in speech must fix his attention upon probability.  For sometimes one must not even tell what was actually done, if it was not likely to be done, but what was probable, whether in accusation or defence; and in brief, a speaker must always aim at probability, paying no attention to truth; for this method, if pursued throughout the whole speech, provides us with the entire art.

PHAEDRUS.  You have stated just what those say who pretend to possess the art of speech, Socrates.  I remember that we touched upon this matter briefly before,¹ but the professional rhetoricians think it is of great importance.

SOCRATES.  Well, there is Tisias whom you have studied carefully; now let Tisias himself tell us if he does not say that probability is that which most people think.

PHAEDRUS.  That is just what he says.

SOCRATES.  Apparently after he had invented this clever scientific definition, he wrote that if a feeble and brave man assaulted a strong coward, robbed him of his cloak or something, and was brought to trial for it, neither party ought to speak the truth; the coward should say that he had not been assaulted by the brave man alone, whereas the other should prove that only they two were present and should use the well-known argument, “How could a little man like me assault such a man as he is?”  The coward will

¹ See 259 E.
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τὴν ἐαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ψεῦδεσθαι εἰπεχερών τάχ’ ἀν ἔλεγχον πὴ παραδοίη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. καὶ περὶ τάλλα δὴ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἀττα ἐστὶν τὰ τέχνη λεγόμενα. οὐ γὰρ, ὦ Φαῖδρε;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μή;·

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Φεύ, δεινῶς γ᾽ ἐοικεν ἀποκεκρυμμένην τέχνην ἀνευρεῖν ὁ Τισίας ἢ ἄλλος ὅστις δὴ ποτ᾽ ὃν τυγχάνει καὶ ὅποθεν χαίρει ὤνομαξόμενος.

Δ ἀτάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, τοῦτο ἡμεῖς πότερον λέγωμεν ἢ μή·—

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποῦν;

58. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. "Οτι, ὦ Τισία, πάλαι ἡμεῖς, πρὶν καὶ σὲ παρελθέντος τυγχάνομεν λέγοντες, ὡς ἀρα τούτο τὸ εἰκὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τυγχάνει ἐγγεννόμενον. τὰς δὲ ὁμοιότητας ἄρτι διήλθομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ οὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εἰδὼς κάλλιστα ἐπιστηται εὐρίσκειν. διότι ἐν μὲν ἄλλο τι περὶ τέχνης λόγον λέγεις, ἀκούοιμεν ἢν εἰ δὲ μή, οἷς νυνὶ διήλθομεν πεσόμεθα, ὡς ἐὰν μὴ τις τῶν τε ἀκοουσμένων τὰς φύσεις διαριθμήσῃ, καὶ κατ᾽ εἶδὸς τῆς διαμείσθαι τὰ ὅντα καὶ μᾶ ἢδέα δυνάτος ἢ καθ᾽ ἐν ἐκαστὸν περιλαμβάνειν, οὐ ποτ᾽ ἔσται τεχνικὸς λόγον περὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. ταύτα δὲ οὐ μὴ ποτὲ κτήσῃται ἀνευ πολλῆς πραγματείας. ἦν οὖν ἐνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, κεχαρισμένως δεὶ πράττειν τὸ πᾶν εἰς δύναμιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἄρα, ὦ Τισία, φασίν οἱ σοφῶτεροι ἡμῶν, ὁμοδούλοις δεὶ χαρίζομαι μελετᾶν τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα, ὥς τι μὴ πάρεργον, ἀλλὰ δεσπόταις ἀγαθοῖς τε καὶ εἴς ἀγαθῶν· ὥστε

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not acknowledge his cowardice, but will perhaps try to invent some other lie, and thus give his oppo-
ponent a chance to confute him. And in other cases there are other similar rules of art. Is that not so, Phaedrus?

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Oh, a wonderfully hidden art it seems to be which Tisias has brought to light, or some other, whoever he may be and whatever country he is proud to call his own! But, my friend, shall we say in reply to this, or shall we not—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. “Tisias, some time ago, before you came along, we were saying that this probability of yours was accepted by the people because of its likeness to truth; and we just stated that he who knows the truth is always best able to discover likenesses. And so, if you have anything else to say about the art of speech, we will listen to you; but if not, we will put our trust in what we said just now, that unless a man take account of the characters of his hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the art of speech. But this ability he will not gain without much diligent toil, which a wise man ought not to undergo for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but that he may be able to speak and to do everything, so far as possible, in a manner pleasing to the gods. For those who are wiser than we, Tisias, say that a man of sense should surely practise to please not his fellow slaves, except as a secondary consideration, but his good and noble masters. Therefore, if the path is long, be not astonished;
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εἰ μακρὰ ἡ περίοδος, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· μεγάλων γὰρ ἔνεκα περιτέου, οὐχ ὡς σὺ δοκεῖς. ἐσταὶ μὴν, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησίν, εὰν τις θέλῃ, καὶ ταύτα κάλλιστα ἐξ ἐκείνων γιγνόμενα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλως ἐμούγε δοκεὶ λέγεσθαι, ὁ Σώκρατες· εἰπερ οἶδα τὲ τὶς εἴη.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Αλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντί τοι τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν καὶ πάσχειν ὃ τι ἂν τῷ ξυμβῷ παθεῖν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ δ' εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφὴς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, τῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχω καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπὸν. ἡ γάρ;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ναί.

59. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οἰσθ' οὖν ὅπῃ μάλιστα θεῷ χαρεῖ λόγων πέρι πράττων ἡ λέγων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐδαμῶς· σὺ δὲ;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἀκοὴν γ' ἔχω λέγειν τῶν προτέρων, τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖς αὐτοὶ ἱσασιν. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ εὑροίμεν αὐτοί, ἀρά γ' ἂν ἔθ' ἡμῖν μέλοι τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίων δοξασμάτων;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Γελοῖον ἦρον· ἀλλ' ἂ φῆς ἄκηκοεναι, λέγε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πως αὐτοὶ περὶ Ναύκρατιν τῇς Αἰγόπτου γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ παλαιῶν τινὰ θεῶν, οὐ καὶ τὸ ὄρνεον τὸ ἱερόν, δὴ καλοῦσιν ἵβων αὐτῷ δὲ ὅνομα τὸ δαίμονε εἶναι Θεύθ. τούτων δ' ἡ πρώτων ἀριθμῶν τε καὶ λογισμῶν εὑρεῖν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ ἀστρονομίαν, ἐτὶ δ' πεπτείας τε 560
for it must be trodden for great ends, not for those you have in mind. Yet your ends also, as our argument says, will be best gained in this way, if one so desires.”

PHAEDRUS. I think what you have said is admirable, if one could only do it.

SOCRATES. But it is noble to strive after noble objects, no matter what happens to us.

PHAEDRUS. Certainly.

SOCRATES. We have, then, said enough about the art of speaking and that which is no art.

PHAEDRUS. Assuredly.

SOCRATES. But we have still to speak of propriety and impropriety in writing, how it should be done and how it is improper, have we not?

PHAEDRUS. Yes.

SOCRATES. Do you know how you can act or speak about rhetoric so as to please God best?

PHAEDRUS. Not at all; do you?

SOCRATES. I can tell something I have heard of the ancients; but whether it is true, they only know. But if we ourselves should find it out, should we care any longer for human opinions?

PHAEDRUS. A ridiculous question! But tell me what you say you have heard.

SOCRATES. I heard, then, that at Naucratis, in Egypt, was one of the ancient gods of that country, the one whose sacred bird is called the ibis, and the name of the god himself was Theuth. He it was who invented numbers and arithmetic and geometry and astronomy, also draughts and dice, and, most
καὶ κυβείας, καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα βασιλέως δ’ αὖ τότε ὄντος Αἴγυπτου ὅλης Θαμοῦ περὶ τὴν μεγάλην πόλιν τοῦ ἂνω τόπου, ἦν οἳ Ἑλληνες Αἴγυπτιας Ἐθῆς καλοῦσι, καὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἀμμώνα, παρὰ τούτον ἐλθὼν ὁ Θεῦθ τὰς τέχνας ἐπέδειξεν, καὶ ἐφὴ δεῖν διαδοθῆναι τοῖς ἄλλοις Αἴγυπτιοις. ὁ δὲ ἤρετο, ἦντινα ἐκάστη ἔχοι ὅφελιαν, διεξιόντος δὲ, ὁ τι καὶ πῶς ἢ μὴ καὶ πῶς δοκοὶ λέγειν, τὸ μὲν Ἔ ἐψηε, τὸ δ’ ἐπήνει. πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦν τῷ Θεῦθ λέγεται ἀποφήμασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἰη διελθεῖν ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, τούτῳ δὲ, ὃ βασιλεύ, τὸ μάθημα, ἐφὴ ὁ Θεῦθ, σοφωτέρους Αἴγυπτιους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει. μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ηὐρέθη. ὁ δ’ εἶπεν ὁ τεχνικότατος Θεῦθ, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι, τίν’ ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὅφελίας τοῖς μέλλουσι 275 χρήσθαι καὶ νῦν σὺ, πατὴρ ὅ τιν γραμμάτων, δι’ εὐνοιαν τούγαντιόν εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τούτῳ γὰρ τῶν μαθητῶν λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελητησία, ἀτε διὰ πίστιν γραφῆς ἐξωθεὶν ὑπ’ ἀλλοτρίων τῦπων, οὐκ ἔνδοθεν αὐτοῖς υφ’ αὐτῶν ἀναμμηνησκομένους. οὐκοιν μνήμης ἀλλ’ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον ἔδρας. σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν, οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις πολυνό κοι γὰρ σοι γενόμενοι ἃνευ διδαχῆς πολυνόμονονες Β ἐιναι δόξουσιν, ἀγνώμονες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες 562
important of all, letters. Now the king of all Egypt at that time was the god Thamus, who lived in the great city of the upper region, which the Greeks call the Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth to show his inventions, saying that they ought to be imparted to the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked what use there was in each, and as Theuth enumerated their uses, expressed praise or blame, according as he approved or disapproved. The story goes that Thamus said many things to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts, which it would take too long to repeat; but when they came to the letters, "This invention, O king," said Theuth, "will make the Egyptians wiser and will improve their memories; for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom that I have discovered." But Thamus replied, "Most ingenious Theuth, one man has the ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practise their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when they are for the most part ignorant
καὶ χαλέποι ξυνεῖναι, δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὡ Σώκρατες, ραδίως σὺ Ἀιγυπτίους καὶ ὀποδαποὺς ἄν ἔθελης λόγους ποιεῖς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅι δὲ γ’, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Δωδωναίου ἱερῷ δρυὸς λόγους ἐφήσαν μαντικοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι. τοῖς μὲν οὐν τότε, ἀτε οὐκ οὐσί σοφοῖς ἄστερ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι, ἀπέχρη δρυὸς καὶ πέτρας ἄκουέν ὑπ’ εὐθείας, εἰ μόνον ἄληθῆ λέγοιεν σοὶ δ’ ἵσως διαφέρει τίς ὁ λέγων καὶ ποδατὸς. οὐ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο μονὸν σκοπεῖς, εἰτὲ οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὠρθῶς ἐπέπληξας, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ γραμμάτων ἔχειν ἠπερ ὁ Θηβαῖος λέγει.

60. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἴόμενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸ παραδεχόμενος ὡς τι σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενον, πολλὴς ἂν εὐθείας γέμοι καὶ τῷ ὑπ’ ἐκ τῆς Ἀμμωνος μαντείαν ἄγγοι, πλέον τι οἴόμενος εἶναι λόγους γεγραμμένους τού τῶν εἰδότα ὑπομνήσαι περὶ ὅν ἂν ἢ τὰ γεγραμμένα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ὄρθωτα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δεινὸν γάρ ποι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τούτ’ ἔχει γραφῇ, καὶ ως ἄληθῶς οἴμοιν ζωγραφία.

καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκεῖνη ἐκεῖνα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζωτὰ, ἐὰν δ’ ἄνεργη τι, σεμνῶς πάντως συγγ. ταῦτον δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι δόξαις μὲν ἄν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἐρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σιμάιει μόνον ταῦτον ἀεί. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ ἀπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαίτουσι, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς παρ’ 564
and hard to get along with, since they are not wise, but only appear wise."

PHAEDRUS. Socrates, you easily make up stories of Egypt or any country you please.

SOCRATES. They used to say, my friend, that the words of the oak in the holy place of Zeus at Dodona were the first prophetic utterances. The people of that time, not being so wise as you young folks, were content in their simplicity to hear an oak or a rock, provided only it spoke the truth; but to you, perhaps, it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from, for you do not consider only whether his words are true or not.

PHAEDRUS. Your rebuke is just; and I think the Theban is right in what he says about letters.

SOCRATES. He who thinks, then, that he has left behind him any art in writing, and he who receives it in the belief that anything in writing will be clear and certain, would be an utterly simple person, and in truth ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon, if he thinks written words are of any use except to remind him who knows the matter about which they are written.

PHAEDRUS. Very true.

SOCRATES. Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who
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οῖς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγειν οἷς
dei ge kal µη' πληµµελούµενος de kal οὐκ ἐν δίκη
λοιδορθεῖς τοῦ πατρὸς αἰεi δεῖται βοηθοῦ· αὐτὸς
gar ouv' ἀµώνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατός αὐτῷ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ ταῦτα σοι ὀρθῶτα εἰρηται.

276 ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ' ἄλλον ὅρῳµεν λόγον τούτον
ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον, τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὃσφ
ἀµείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτον φύεται;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνα τούτον καὶ πῶς λέγεις γνωµό-
µενον;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. 'Οσ µετ' ἐπιστήµης γράφεται ἐν τῇ
tou µανθάνοντος ψυχή, δυνατός µὲν ἀµώναι ἑαυτῷ,
ἐπιστήµων ὃ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγάν πρὸς οἷς δεῖ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον λέγεις ξώντα
καὶ ἐµψυχον, οὐ ο ἐγερµαµένος εἰδωλον ἀν τι
λέγοντο δικαίως.

Β. 61. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Παντάπασι µὲν οὐν. τὸδε δὴ µοι
eipē. ο νοῦν ἔχων γεωργός, δὲν σπερµάτων κῆδοιτο
cal ἐγκαρπα βούλοιτο γενέσθαι, πότερα σπουδῆ
avn θέρους εἰς Ἀδώνιδος κήπους ἀρῶν χαιροῦ
θεωρῶν καλοῦς ἐν ἡµέραισιν ὀκτὼ γυνοµένους, ἢ
ταῦτα µὲν δὴ παιδίας τε καὶ ἑορτῆς χάρων δρόη ἀν,
ὅτε καὶ ποιοῖ· ἐφ' οἷς δὲ ἐστούδακε, τῇ γεωργικῇ
χρώµενος ἀν τέχνη, σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσήκουν,
ἀγαπῶν ἀν ἐν ὁµόφῳ µην ὃσα ἐσπειρεῖν τέλος
λαβόντα;

C. ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὕτω ποι, ὡς Σώκρατες, τὰ µὲν
σπουδῆ, τὰ δὲ ὃς ἐτέρως ἀν, ἥ λέγεις, ποιοῖ.

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have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself.

PHAEDRUS. You are quite right about that, too.

SOCRATES. Now tell me; is there not another kind of speech, or word, which shows itself to be the legitimate brother of this bastard one, both in the manner of its begetting and in its better and more powerful nature?

PHAEDRUS. What is this word and how is it begotten, as you say?

SOCRATES. The word which is written with intelligence in the mind of the learner, which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before whom to be silent.

PHAEDRUS. You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which the written word may justly be called the image.

SOCRATES. Exactly. Now tell me this. Would a sensible husbandman, who has seeds which he cares for and which he wishes to bear fruit, plant them with serious purpose in the heat of summer in some garden of Adonis, and delight in seeing them appear in beauty in eight days, or would he do that sort of thing, when he did it at all, only in play and for amusement? Would he not, when he was in earnest, follow the rules of husbandry, plant his seeds in fitting ground, and be pleased when those which he had sowed reached their perfection in the eighth month?

PHAEDRUS. Yes, Socrates, he would, as you say, act in that way when in earnest and in the other way only for amusement,
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἑπιστήμης ἔχοντα τοῦ γεωργοῦ φῶμεν ἤττον νοῦν ἔχειν εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ σπέρματα;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἡκιστά γε.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκ ἀρὰ σπουδὴ αὐτὰ ἐν ᾦδατι γράψει μέλαιν σπείρων διὰ καλάμου μετὰ λόγων ἀδυνάτων μὲν αὐτοῖς λόγῳ βοηθεῖν, ἀδυνάτων δὲ ἰκανῶς τάληθη διδάξαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐκοιν δὴ τὸ γ' εἰκός.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐ γάρ ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ἐν γράμμασι κήτους, ὡς ἐοικε, παιδιάς χάριν σπερεῖ τε καὶ γράψει, ὅταν γράφῃ, ἐαυτῷ τε ὑπομνήματα ὑποσαυριζόμενος, εἰς τὸ λῆθης γῆρας ἔδώ ἴκνηται, καὶ παντὶ τῷ ταύτῳ ἵχνος μετίοντι, ἡσθῆσεται τε αὐτοῦς θεώροι φυσιέους ἀπαλούσης ὅταν δὲ ἄλλοι παιδιάς ἄλλας χρώνται, συμποσίοις τε ἀρδοντες αὐτοὺς ἐτέρους τε ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, τὸ ἐκείνος, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀντὶ τούτων οἶς ΛΕΓΩ παῖζον διάξει.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδίαν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῦ ἐν λόγοις δυναμένου παίζειν, δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων δὲν λέγεις περί μυθολογοῦντα.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἑστί γάρ, ὡς φίλε Φαῖδρε, οὕτω πολὺ δ', οἴμαι, καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ μετ᾽ ἑπιστήμης λόγοις, οἱ ἑαυτοὶ τῷ τε 277 φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἰκανοὶ καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἑχοντες σπέρμα, ὅθεν ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις ἥθεσι 1 οἴς ΒΤ. ὁδ Schanz.

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SOCRATES. And shall we suppose that he who has knowledge of the just and the good and beautiful has less sense about his seeds than the husbandman? PHAEDRUS. By no means.

SOCRATES. Then he will not, when in earnest, write them in ink, sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves by argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.

PHAEDRUS. No, at least, probably not.

SOCRATES. No. The gardens of letters he will, it seems, plant for amusement, and will write, when he writes, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path, and he will be pleased when he sees them putting forth tender leaves. When others engage in other amusements, refreshing themselves with banquets and kindred entertainments, he will pass the time in such pleasures as I have suggested.

PHAEDRUS. A noble pastime, Socrates, and a contrast to those base pleasures, the pastime of the man who can find amusement in discourse, telling stories about justice, and the other subjects of which you speak.

SOCRATES. Yes, Phaedrus, so it is; but, in my opinion, serious discourse about them is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other minds other words capable
PLATO

φυόμενοι τούτ’ ἀεὶ ἀθάνατον παρέχειν ἰκανοῖ, καὶ τὸν ἐχοντα εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦντες εἰς ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ δυνατόν μάλιστα.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Πολὺ γὰρ τούτ’ ἔτι καλλιον λέγεις.

62. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νῦν δὴ ἐκεῖνα ἡδη, ὡς Φαῖδρε, δυνάμεθα κρίνειν, τούτων ὀμολογημένων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἡν δὴ πέρι βουληθέντες ἱδεῖν ὁ ἀφικόμεθα εἰς τὸδε, ὅπως τὸ Δυσίον τε ὅνειδος ἐξετάσαιμεν τῆς τῶν λόγων γραφῆς πέρι, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς λόγους οὐ τέχνη καὶ ἀνευ τέχνης γράφοιντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐντεχνον καὶ μὴ δοκεῖ μοι δεδηλώσθαι μετρίως.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἐδοξέ γε δὴ πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησον με πῶς.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Πρὶν ἂν τις τὸ τε ἀλήθες ἐκάστων εἰδὴ πέρι δὲν λέγει ἡ γράφει, κατ’ αὐτὸ τε πάν οἱ ἐνεγκαλεῖς βατόν γέννηται, ὁρισάμενον τε πάλιν κατ’ εἰδῆ μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν ἐπιστηθήτηε περὶ τε ψυχῆς φύσεως διδῶν κατὰ ταῦτα, τὸ προσομόττον ἐκάστη φύσει εἰδος ἀνευρίσκων, οὕτω τιθῇ καὶ διακοσμή τοῦ λόγου, ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῆς καὶ παναριμονίους διδοὺς λόγους, ἀπλοὺς δὲ ἀπλήθοι οὐ πρότερον δυνατῶν τέχνης ἔσεσθαι καθ’ ὅσον πέρικε μεταχειρισθήναι τὸ λόγων γένος, ὡς τι πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὕτε τι πρὸς τὸ πεῖσαι, ὡς ὁ ἐμπροσθεν πᾶς μεμήνυκεν ἡμῖν λόγος.

1 Schanz omits καὶ.

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of continuing the process for ever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest possible limit of human happiness.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, that is far nobler.

SOCRATES. And now, Phaedrus, since we have agreed about these matters, we can decide the others.

PHAEDRUS. What others?

SOCRATES. Those which brought us to this point through our desire to investigate them, for we wished to examine into the reproach against Lysias as a speech-writer, and also to discuss the speeches themselves and see which were the products of art and which were not. I think we have shown pretty clearly what is and what is not a work of art.

PHAEDRUS. Yes, I thought so, too; but please recall to my mind what was said.

SOCRATES. A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all this, he will not be able to speak by the method of art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, either for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion.

1 See 257 c.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε οὔτω πως ἐφάνη.

63. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τί δ᾿ αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὅτι γεγονόμενον ἐν δίκῃ λέγοιτ᾿ ἄν οὐνείδος ἢ μή, ἀρα οὐ δεδήλωκεν τὰ λεχθέντα ὄλγον ἐμπροστὸθεν —

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὰ ποία;

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅσ᾿ εἰτε Δυσίας ἢ τις ἄλλος πῶποτε ἐγραψέν ἢ γράφει ἢ ἔδαι ή δημοσία νόμους τιθείς, σύγγραμμα πολιτικοῦ γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τινὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνειαν, οὔτω μὲν οὐνείδος τῷ γράφοντι, εἰτε τὰς φήσιν εἰτε μή τὸ γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπαρ τε καὶ ὄναρ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων πέρι καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐκφεύ-

Ε γει τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ οὐκ ἔπονειδίστον εἶναι, οὔτε ἂν ὁ πἀς ὁχλὸς αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ὅ δ᾿ ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἐκάστου παιδιάν τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαίου εἶναι, καὶ οὔτεν πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ οὔτ᾿ ἀνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἁξίου σπουδῆς γραφῆναι, οὔτε λεχθῇ ως οἱ ῥαψοῦμενοι ἀνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέ-

278 χθησαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδότων ὄπομησι γεγονέναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκο-

μένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὅτι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν μόνοις τὸ τε ἐναργεῖ εἶναι καὶ τέλεον καὶ ἁξίου σπουδῆς. δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους

1 Schanz, following Schleiermacher, brackets νόμους τιθείς.
2 Schanz brackets οὔτε . . . ἐλέχθησαν.
PHAEDRUS

PHAEDRUS. Yes, certainly, that is just about our result.

SOCRATES. How about the question whether it is a fine or a disgraceful thing to be a speaker or writer and under what circumstances the profession might properly be called a disgrace or not? Was that made clear a little while ago when we said—

PHAEDRUS. What?

SOCRATES. That if Lysias or anyone else ever wrote or ever shall write, in private, or in public as lawgiver, a political document, and in writing it believes that it possesses great certainty and clearness, then it is a disgrace to the writer, whether anyone says so, or not. For whether one be awake or asleep, ignorance of right and wrong and good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even if the whole mob applaud it.

PHAEDRUS. That is true.

SOCRATES. But the man who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much that is playful, and that no written discourse, whether in metre or in prose, deserves to be treated very seriously (and this applies also to the recitations of the rhapsodes, delivered to sway people's minds, without opportunity for questioning and teaching), but that the best of them really serve only to remind us of what we know; and who thinks that only in words about justice and beauty and goodness spoken by teachers for the sake of instruction and really written in a soul is clearness and perfection and serious value, that such words should be considered
λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἶνον νείς γνησίους εἶναι, 
πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεὶς ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα
ἐἰ τινὲς τούτου ἔγγονότει τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἄμα ἐν
ἀλλαίσιν ἄλλων φυχαίσιν κατ’ ἄξιον ἐνέφυσαν·
tοὺς δὲ ἄλλους χαίρειν ἔως — οὗτος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
ἀνήρ κινδυνεύει, ὁ Φαίδρε, εἶναι οἶνον ἐγὼ τε καὶ
οὐ εὑξαίμηθ᾽ ἀν σὲ τε καὶ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ γε βούλομαι
τε καὶ ἀνακρομάι τὰ λέγεις.

64. ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ ἦν πεπαίσθω μετρίως
ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων· καὶ σὺ τε ἐλθὼν φράζε
Λυσία, ὅτι νῦ καταβάντες εἰς τὸ Νυμφῶν ναῦμά τε
καὶ μουσείων ἠκουσάμεν πάντων, οἵ ἐπέστειλλον
λέγειν Λυσία τε καὶ εἰ τὰς ἄλλας συντίθεσιν
λόγους, καὶ Ὀμήρῳ καὶ εἰ τὰς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς ποίησιν
ψίλην ἢ ἐν φοβῇ συντέθεικε, τρίτον δὲ Σόλωνι καὶ
ὅστις ἐν πολιτικοῖς λόγοις νόμους ὀνομάζων συγ-
γράμματα ἔγραφεν· εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τὸ ἀλήθες ἔχει
συνέθηκε ταῦτα, καὶ ἐκεῖνον βοηθεῖν εἰς ἔλεγχον
ἴων περὶ ὧν ἔγραψε, καὶ λέγων αὐτός δυνατός τὰ
γεγραμμένα φαύλα ἀποδείξει, οὐ τὸ τῶν ἐπωνυ-
μίαν ἔχοντα δεῖ λέγεσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὦ
ὅσ' ἐσπούδακεν ἐκεῖνων.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τίνας οὖν τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῆς νέμεις;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τὸ μὲν σοφὸν, ὁ Φαίδρε, καλεῖν
ἔμοινε μέγα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ θεῷ μόνῳ πρέπειν· τὸ
δὲ ἡ φιλόσοφον ἡ τοιοῦτον τι μᾶλλον τε ἄν αὐτῷ
ἀρμόττοι καὶ ἐμμελεστέρως ἔχοι.

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὸ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα τιμωτέρα
ὡν συνέθηκεν ἢ ἔγραψεν ἀνω κατῶ στρέφων ἐν

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the speaker's own legitimate offspring, first the word within himself, if it be found there, and secondly its descendants or brothers which may have sprung up in worthy manner in the souls of others, and who pays no attention to the other words,—that man, Phaedrus, is likely to be such as you and I might pray that we ourselves may become.

PHAEDRUS. By all means that is what I wish and pray for.

SOCRATES. We have amused ourselves with talk about words long enough. Go and tell Lysias that you and I came down to the fountain and sacred place of the nymphs, and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws:—If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them.

PHAEDRUS. What titles do you grant them then?

SOCRATES. I think, Phaedrus, that the epithet "wise" is too great and befits God alone; but the name "philosopher," that is, "lover of wisdom," or something of the sort would be more fitting and modest for such a man.

PHAEDRUS. And quite appropriate.

SOCRATES. On the other hand, he who has nothing more valuable than the things he has composed or
Ε χρόνοι, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν, ἐὰν δική που ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφου προσερείς;

ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν τῷ ἐταῖρῳ φράζε.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί δέ; σὺ πῶς ποιήσεις; οὒδε γὰρ οὒδὲ τὸν σὸν ἐταῖρον δεῖ παρελθεῖν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Τίνα τούτοιν;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ἰσοκράτη τὸν καλὸν· ὃ τι ἀπαγγελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες; τίνι αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Νέος ἐτεὶ, ὦ Φαίδρε, Ἰσοκράτης· ὃ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτὸν, λέγειν ἐθέλω.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τὸ ποίον δῆ; ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δοκεῖ μοι ἀμείλων ἢ κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Λυσίαν εἶναι λόγους τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἐτεὶ τῇ γεννυκωτέρῳ κεκρᾶσθαί· ὥστε οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστὸν προϊσόσης τῆς ἡλικίας εἰ περὶ αὐτοῖς τε τοὺς λόγους, οἷς νῦν ἔπιστευεῖν, πλέον ἢ παῖδων διενέγκι τῶν πῶς πετομεῖναν λόγων, ἐτεὶ τε εἰ αὐτῷ μὴ ἀποχρήσαι ταῦτα, ἐπὶ μείζω τὸς αὐτὸν ἃνοι ὁρμῇ θειοτέρᾳ· φῦσει γὰρ, ὦ φίλε, ἐνεστὶ τοῖς θείοις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ. ταῦτα δὴ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τῶν θεῶν ὡς ἐμοῖς παῖδικοῖς Ἰσοκράτει ἐξαγγέλλω, σὺ δὲ ἐκεῖνα ὡς σοῖς Λυσίᾳ.
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Ταῦτα ἐσταῖ· ἀλλὰ ἱσμεν, ἐπειδῇ καὶ τὸ πυνγος ἠπιώτερον γέγονεν.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Οὐκοῦν εὐξαμένω πρέπει τοῖς ἀνδρῶν περεύεσθαι;
ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ. Τί μήν;
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. ὁ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῇ δοῖτε, δοῖτε 1 μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τάνυθον· ἐξωθεῖν

1 Schanz reads δοῖτε.
written, turning his words up and down at his leisure, adding this phrase and taking that away, will you not properly address him as poet or writer of speeches or of laws?

**PHAEDRUS.** Certainly.

**SOCRATES.** Tell this then to your friend.

**PHAEDRUS.** But what will you do? For your friend ought not to be passed by.

**SOCRATES.** What friend?

**PHAEDRUS.** The fair Isocrates. What message will you give him? What shall we say that he is?

**SOCRATES.** Isocrates is young yet, Phaedrus; however, I am willing to say what I prophesy for him.

**PHAEDRUS.** What is it?

**SOCRATES.** I think he has a nature above the speeches of Lysias and possesses a nobler character; so that I should not be surprised if, as he grows older, he should so excel in his present studies that all who have ever treated of rhetoric shall seem less than children; and I suspect that these studies will not satisfy him, but a more divine impulse will lead him to greater things; for my friend, something of philosophy is inborn in his mind. This is the message that I carry from these deities to my favourite Isocrates, and do you carry the other to Lysias, your favourite.

**PHAEDRUS.** It shall be done; but now let us go, since the heat has grown gentler.

**SOCRATES.** Is it not well to pray to the deities here before we go?

**PHAEDRUS.** Of course.

**SOCRATES.** O beloved Pan and all ye other gods of this place, grant to me that I be made beautiful
PLATO

δὲ ὰσα ἱχω, τοῖς ἑντὸς εἶναι μοι φίλια. πλούσιοι

C δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσὸν πλῆθος εἰη

μοι ὰσον μῆτε φέρειν μῆτε ἄγειν δύναιτ' ἄλλος ἢ ῞

σώφρων. — Ἔτε' ἄλλου του ἰεόμεθα, ὡ Φαιδρε; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ μετρίως ἡνκται.

Φαιδρος. Καὶ ἐμοὶ ταῦτα συνεχοῦ· κοινὰ γὰρ

τὰ τῶν φίλων.

Σωκράτης. Ἱωμεν.
PHAEDRUS

in my soul within, and that all external possessions be in harmony with my inner man. May I consider the wise man rich; and may I have such wealth as only the self-restrained man can bear or endure.—Do we need anything more, Phaedrus? For me that prayer is enough.

PHAEDRUS. Let me also share in this prayer; for friends have all things in common.

SOCRATES. Let us go.
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